2. Opportunities and challenges
   1. This chapter explores the opportunities and challenges facing Australian agriculture in Southeast Asia. It outlines findings of the Moore report, the Australian Government’s response to it, and provides an overview of agricultural trade with the region. Opportunities are examined at broad scale, by sector and in terms of two-way trade. Challenges include market access, non-tariff barriers, and increased competition from other exporting nations. The harmonisation of regulations and standards to develop and fulfil economic relationships is also discussed.

The Moore report

2.2Invested: Australia's Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040 (the Moore report) is a national strategy for promoting trade and investment between Australia and Southeast Asia. It describes Southeast Asia as a region of strong and continuing economic growth to which Australia is bound by reasons of proximity, security, and economic engagement. The strategy notes that Australia’s prosperity and security and that of its neighbours is intimately linked. Australia has much to offer the region through trade and investment, and is well placed to accelerate economic engagement with Southeast Asia. The strategy further observes that ‘boosting trade and investment will require a long-term effort from both business and government through to 2040 and beyond’.[1]

2.3The strategy makes a range of recommendations across four themes:

• Raising awareness;
• Removing blockages;
• Building capability; and
• Deepening investment.
  4. Agriculture and food is one of the key sectors within the trade and investment environment. The strategy states that:
• Australia is already a key partner in helping Southeast Asia meet its food security needs, and there is strong potential to develop this trade relationship further towards 2040.
• Technological advances will offer partnership opportunities, while collaborative investments can transform Australian raw commodities into higher-value exports for Southeast Asia.
• Boosting government resourcing to deliver new and improved market access opportunities for business will be key to expanding trade in the region.[2]
  5. The Moore report’s recommendations for the agriculture and food sector include:
• Pursuing a targeted, sustained and modern ‘whole-of-nation’ agricultural trade and investment advocacy effort to drive growth.
• Promoting Australia’s environmental, social and governance credentials along the agrifood supply chain.
• Advocating for the establishment of ongoing ministerial and senior officials–level engagement on agriculture through ASEAN mechanisms to provide additional forums to reduce barriers to trade.
• Deepening engagement with Cairns Group Farm Leaders in the region (Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines).
• Expanding resources for technical expertise and frameworks to support Australian export businesses to comply with new and existing import requirements (for example, environmental sustainability and halal) in Southeast Asian countries.
• Developing and deepening cooperation on sustainable agrifood systems through existing mechanisms and development programs.
• Expanding training programs to support regional farmers on world’s best agriculture practices (including water, soil, and broader environment and sustainability practices).
• Providing long-term support for Southeast Asian trading partners’ capacity to address biosecurity threats.
• Establishing an Australian Agriculture Partnership to bring together public and private sector expertise to support agricultural trade cooperation and development in Southeast Asia.[3]
  6. Other recommendations were identified as being relevant to two-way trade and investment in the agriculture sector, including, but not limited to:[4]
• Australia’s Trade 2040 Taskforce, in collaboration with Southeast Asian partners, to review the scope of existing Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) to determine priorities for agreement upgrade negotiations.[5]
• Expanding collaboration on trade rules and standards harmonisation with Southeast Asian partners.[6]
• Increasing whole-of-government trade and industry policy and commercial engagement capability in Australia’s Southeast Asia diplomatic missions and in Australia to assist Australian businesses to use FTAs and deliver market access.[7]
• Australian Government to strengthen efforts to support Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) to trade with Southeast Asia, including through greater emphasis on the region in the Export Market Development Grants program.[8]

Government response

2.7A Commonwealth Implementation Taskforce, led by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Treasury working with other government agencies, has been established to consider the findings of the Moore report. The implementation of the recommendations will be an iterative process.[9]

2.8Several initiatives to support Australia’s agricultural trade have been announced, including:

• The Australia–Southeast Asia Business Exchange (SEABX), which will support increased two-way trade between Australia and Southeast Asia through targeted business missions to Southeast Asia, after visit support for Australian companies, programs to raise Australian businesses’ awareness of opportunities in Southeast Asia, and marketing campaigns to promote Australian goods and services in the region. SEABX will also support business in agriculture and food, including as part of missions to the region and promotional support at key regional events.
• Ten senior Australian business leaders have been appointed as Business Champions to facilitate stronger business links between Australia and the ten countries covered in the Moore report. The Champions are linked to an individual country and will work to promote greater investment activity between Australia and their assigned country. Agriculture and food is a priority for a number of Champions, some of whom have direct experience in the sector.
• New Investment Deal Teams will work with Australian investors, and local project proponents in a range of sectors to identify and facilitate greater Australian investment in Southeast Asia. Deal Teams will be located in hubs in Singapore, Jakarta, and Ho Chi Minh City, with additional representatives spread across Southeast Asia.[10]
  9. Other initiatives related to the implementation of the Moore report recommendations include:
• A placements and internships pilot program for young professionals to help build enduring links between Australian and Southeast Asian businesses.
• New regional technology landing pads in Jakarta and Ho Chi Minh City to provide on-the-ground support for Australian businesses to boost technology services exports to Southeast Asian markets.
• An ASEAN–Australia Centre to strengthen business, education, cultural and community connections.
• Enhanced visa access for Southeast Asian travellers including five-year Business Visitor visas and access to ten-year Frequent Traveller visas.
• More Aus4ASEAN Scholarships and new Aus4ASEAN Fellowships to support leaders from Southeast Asia to come to Australia for study, professional exchanges, short-courses and study tours, commencing in 2025.
• Continuation of the successful Partnerships for Infrastructure program.[11]
  10. The Australian Government has announced funding of $505.9 million over five years from 2023–24 (and $118.3 million per year ongoing) to deepen Australia’s engagement with Southeast Asia. This includes measures to implement the next phase of the Government’s response to the Moore report:
• $229.6 million over four years from 2024–25 (and $50.2 million per year ongoing) to continue the Mekong–Australia Partnership, supporting development and resilience in the Mekong subregion.
• $152.8 million over four years from 2024–25 (and $42.8 million per year ongoing) to continue the Partnerships for Infrastructure program, providing advice and support to Southeast Asian governments on infrastructure development.
• $68.2 million over four years from 2024–25 (and $17.1 million per year ongoing) to continue the Marine Resources Initiative and enhance Southeast Asia maritime cooperation.
• $33.1 million over five years from 2023–24 (and $8.2 million per year ongoing) to establish an ASEAN–Australia Centre in Canberra, deepening engagement with Southeast Asia.
• $12.9 million over three years from 2024–25 to support new scholarships and fellowships under the existing Aus4ASEAN program.
• $4.8 million over four years from 2023–24 to establish two additional ‘Landing Pads’ in Jakarta and Ho Chi Minh City through the Austrade Landing Pads program to support Australian technology exports and startups to expand in the region.
• $1.1 million over two years from 2023–24 to improve visa access and provide long validity business and frequent traveller visas for ASEAN member countries and Timor-Leste.
  11. The Australian Government will also establish a $2 billion Southeast Asia Investment Financing Facility, administered by Export Finance Australia, on the National Interest Account to increase Australia’s trade and investment in Southeast Asia. Funding includes $3.3 million over five years from 2023–24 (and an additional $6.2 million from 2028–29 to 2033–34) to establish and manage the facility.
  12. It is expected that the costs of these initiatives will ‘be partially met from within the existing resources of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of Defence and the Department of Home Affairs’.[12]

Agricultural trade with the region

2.13The growing importance of Southeast Asia to Australia, both strategically and economically, was emphasised by DFAT. Australia’s two-way trade with Southeast Asia is second only to trade with China. By 2040, Southeast Asia, taken as a whole, is expected to be the fourth largest economy in the world, while Australia needs to diversify its trade in the interests of long-term national resilience. According to DFAT, Southeast Asian countries are looking for trade, investment and development partnerships to ensure their continued growth. Australia has much to offer as a trusted and reliable economic partner. Given this, the region presents major economic opportunities for Australian business.[13] DFAT cautioned, however, that Australia’s trade and investment with the Southeast Asia has not kept pace with the region’s growth. DFAT noted that:

While Southeast Asia is one of the fastest-growing regions, and is set to drive global economic growth through to 2040, Southeast Asia’s share of Australia’s total trade over the last 20 years has remained constant at around 14 per cent. Similarly, Australia’s investment stocks in Southeast Asia represented only 2.7 per cent of Australia’s total investment overseas in 2023.[14]

2.14The National Farmers’ Federation (NFF) highlighted the growth in agricultural exports to Southeast Asia:

Over recent decades, the agriculture industry has greatly capitalised on the growing Southeast Asian market, both in terms of meeting overall demand and changing consumer preferences for sustainably grown products. Over the last 5 years, Australian agricultural exports to Southeast Asia have almost doubled, reaching $17.2 billion in 2023. Currently, around 23 per cent of all Australian agricultural exports are sent to the region. This also greatly contributes to a more food secure region, a point that policymakers must remain cognisant of.[15]

2.15The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) discussed Australia’s contribution to regional food security. It noted that ‘Australia has a reputation as a trusted and reliable supplier of a range of agriculture produce that continues to feed millions of people in the region, providing a pillar of regional security more broadly’.[16]

2.16DAFF observed that much of Australia’s trade with Southeast Asia is complementary, benefitting both. Australia is a ‘valued research partner and an important supplier of raw commodities that support food and fibre processing sectors’. Australian products play ‘a crucial role as inputs for Southeast Asia’s downstream industries, including processed timber, food processing, fibre manufacturing, beverage production, animal feed, and livestock sectors’.[17]

2.17Market access to Australia’s agricultural products in Southeast Asia is underpinned by seven bilateral or plurilateral free trade agreements. The four bilateral and three regional FTAs are:

• ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) – delivers extensive tariff reductions on 96 per cent of Australian exports.
• Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) – 89 per cent of Australian exports benefit from duty free access, rising to 94 per cent when fully implemented.
• Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) – eliminates more than 98 percent of tariffs in the free trade area.
• Singapore–Australia (SAFTA) – provides complete tariff elimination, and improved market access for Australian exporters in a range of sectors.
• Thailand–Australia (TAFTA) – eliminates the majority of Thai tariffs and quota barriers on goods imported from Australia over several phases.
• Malaysia–Australia (MAFTA) – guarantees 99 per cent of eligible Australian exports enter Malaysia tariff free including the vast majority of agricultural goods.
• Indonesia–Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IA-CEPA) – over 99 per cent of Australian goods exports by value to enter duty free or under significantly improved preferential arrangements.[18]
  18. The agreements have facilitated significant growth in agricultural exports to the region, with DFAT observing that:
• agricultural exports to Malaysia grew from $1 billion in 2012 (year before MAFTA), to $1.8 billion in 2023;
• agricultural exports to Indonesia grew from $2.3 billion in 2019 (year before IA-CEPA), to $5.1 billion in 2023; and
• agricultural exports to Thailand grew from $513 million in 2006 (three years after TAFTA), to $2.3 billion in 2023.[19]
  19. DFAT noted that these agreements ‘provide mechanisms for Australia and other parties to raise and address a variety of existing or emerging trade issues affecting agriculture’, including ‘committee structures on sanitary and phytosanitary measures and other non-tariff barriers’. These mechanisms are designed to ensure that exporters can continue to benefit from the FTAs.[20]
  20. This prospective growth is coming off a solid base of engagement in agricultural trade. DFAT noted:

Two-way agriculture trade with Southeast Asia (excluding Myanmar) was worth $23 billion in 2023, heavily weighted in Australia’s favour, with exports worth $17.7 billion and imports worth $5.4 billion. Australia’s agriculture exports to the region have more than doubled in value over the past five years, rising from $8.6 billion in 2019 to $17.7 billion in 2023). Australia’s largest agriculture export commodities in 2023 were wheat ($6.1 billion), cotton ($2.5 billion), beef ($1.3 billion) and sugars, molasses and honey ($1.0 billion). Australia’s largest agriculture export markets were Indonesia ($5.1 billion), Vietnam ($4.9 billion), Thailand ($2.3 billion), the Philippines ($2.1 billion) and Malaysia ($1.8 billion).[21]

2.21Tables 2.1–2.4 detail Australia’s agricultural trade with Southeast Asia, including main exports and imports, and main markets for exports and imports.

Source: DFAT, Submission 23, p. 3

Source: DFAT, Submission 23, p. 3

Source: DFAT, Submission 23, p. 4

Source: DFAT, Submission 23, p. 4

2.22Across the different sectors, Southeast Asia is a crucial destination for Australian grain exports.[22] The grain sector contributed $6.6 billion or 38 per cent of Australia’s agricultural exports (9 per cent of total Australian exports) to the Southeast Asian region. Since 2010–11, Australia has exported on average approximately 9.5 million metric tonnes of grain per annum to Southeast Asia. Wheat accounted for 90 per cent of exports, followed by barley (9 per cent).[23] Grain Trade Australia observed that there was a significant and growing demand for feed grain, with consumption growing by over 180 per cent since 2000–01.[24]

2.23Southeast Asia is already a significant market for Australian dairy products—as a whole it represents Australia's largest market for dairy.[25] In 2023, the total volume of trade to the region was 236,000 tonnes valued at $959 million, with substantial markets in Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. Australia exported 62,000 tonnes of dairy product worth almost $180 million to Singapore in 2022–23. Sixty-nine per cent of this was UHT milk. In 2022–23, Australian dairy exports to Indonesia were valued at almost $264 million, with skim milk powder making up 53 per of the trade by volume and 56 per cent by value. In 2022–23, Australia exported close to 40,000 tonnes of Australian dairy product, worth $167 million, to Malaysia. Australia’s top exports to this market included milk (35 per cent), condensed milk (28 per cent) and cheese (16 per cent).[26] Mr John Williams, President of the Australian Dairy Products Federation (ADPF), stated:

The Southeast Asian market continues to offer significant opportunities for growth potential. Importantly, for diversification opportunities, we manage global market risks, and that continues to provide avenues for value creation, making it a vital region for future investment.[27]

2.24The Red Meat Advisory Council (RMAC) observed that Australia exports substantial volumes of red meat and livestock into Southeast Asia, ‘and is well-placed to export more as demand rises’. It noted that in 2022, Southeast Asia was the destination for over 14 per cent of Australia’s red meat exports.[28]

2.25Between 2007 and 2023, the livestock export industry exported over thirteen million head of livestock into the region, with a total value of over $12 billion. Markets included Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam. In 2023, 84 per cent of livestock consignments went to Southeast Asia, mainly beef cattle from northern Australia:

• Indonesia is Australia’s largest market for live cattle, representing 65 per cent of total live exports to Southeast Asia.
• Malaysia is Australia’s third largest market for mutton.
• The Philippines is Australia’s fifth largest beef trimmings market.[29]
  26. Australia is also well positioned in the premium imported beef market—in 2021 Australian exports had an 83 per cent market share for Southeast Asian chilled beef.[30] RMAC noted that ‘Southeast Asia also provides a crucial market for secondary red meat products and byproducts that play a vital role in increasing carcase value and ultimately profitability for exporting red meat processors’—a market that did not readily exist elsewhere. This significantly increased the importance of these markets, ‘as a loss of these markets would result in a significant hit to overall carcass value for Australian processors’.[31]
  27. Approximately 85 per cent of Australia’s raw sugar production is exported, with 90 per cent of exports concentrated in three markets—Indonesia, South Korea and Japan. Within the Southeast Asian region there is a diverse mix of sugar surplus and deficit. For example:
• Indonesia is the world’s second largest sugar importer.
• In most years, Thailand is the world’s second largest exporter.
• Malaysia is a consistent importer—1.5 to 2 million tonnes each year.
• The Philippines and Vietnam are transitioning from production surpluses to deficits.[32]
  28. The region as a whole is transitioning from average net surplus in sugar production, to net deficit. This deficit is forecast to continue.[33]
  29. While highlighting potential competition from outside the region, CANEGROWERS observed that:

Australia is well located to supply the East and Southeast Asian sugar markets. A geographic freight advantage and the fact that these markets as a whole are and will remain large deficit markets, mean these markets are Australia’s highest returning raw sugar export destinations.[34]

2.30AUSVEG noted that Australia serves as a reliable supplier of a wide array of vegetables that fill crucial gaps in local production, ‘especially during periods of shortage due to seasonal variations or agricultural constraints in the region, thereby strengthening Southeast Asian food security’.[35] Thirty-eight per cent of Australia’s fresh vegetable exports go to Southeast Asian countries, with Singapore and Malaysia accounting for 27 per cent of trade. Carrots, potatoes, brassicas, onions, cucurbits, and leafy greens account for the majority of vegetable exports.[36]

2.31Singapore is the top export market, worth 17 per cent (AU$42,538,063 in 2023) of the export trade in fresh vegetables. Malaysia is worth ten per cent, Thailand six per cent, and the Philippines three per cent.[37] AUSVEG observed that:

The Southeast Asian region, characterized by its dynamic economies and rapidly expanding populations, faces significant challenges in ensuring food security and adequate nutrition. Australian vegetables, known for their quality and safety, play a crucial role in addressing these challenges, supporting health outcomes, and enhancing dietary diversity across Southeast Asia.[38]

Opportunities

2.32The Moore report highlighted a range of opportunities for Australia’s agriculture and food sector to 2040, including:

• Demographic change and market growth stimulating demand for premium agricultural products.
• Opportunities for two-way investment in agrifood supply chains to supply global food markets.
• Technological advancements which offer partnership opportunities to develop the region’s agriculture sector.
• An emerging opportunity to supply premium-quality Australian Indigenous agricultural products.[39]
  33. DAFF identified a range of factors that would contribute to rising demand for food and agricultural products in Southeast Asia in coming years, including population growth, demographic change, and rising incomes. It noted that in the next decade some ‘140 million new consumers are expected to emerge in the region, driving consumption to reach $4 trillion’.[40]
  34. Grains Australia observed that this rising population would be increasingly well educated with increased spending power. This demographic would ‘drive increased consumerism, due to the desire for greater access to goods, travel, and digital experiences’, with changing patterns of consumption increasingly focussed on health and nutrition. Grains Australia suggested that this would ‘create opportunities for Australia to proactively put forward our science-based research, farming practices and standards, integrated food technology, and benefits from utilising Australian agriculture produce’.[41]
  35. Given these changes, DAFF stated that food and beverage spending is projected to account for 30 per cent of consumption in the region, with figures potentially reaching as high as 40 per cent in countries like the Philippines and Vietnam. Rising incomes and urbanisation would shift food preferences towards more diverse diets, ‘with increased consumption of meat, seafood, eggs, dairy products, fruits, and vegetables’. DAFF noted that several countries in the region are ‘diversifying into downstream food manufacturing and value-adding sectors, including halal products, which will increase demand for high quality, safe and sustainably produced inputs’. For example, Australian barley exports to Southeast Asia, ‘used in food processing, beer production, and as specialty animal feed’, reached $662 million in 2023, an increase of $100 million in two years.[42]
  36. The growth of textiles and clothing industries has seen increased demand for fibre products, such as cotton. The value of Australian exports of cotton to Southeast Asia nearly doubled to $2.5 billion between 2021 and 2023, with Vietnam ‘accounting for 37 per cent of Australia’s total cotton exports in 2023’.[43]
  37. DAFF concluded that an increasingly wealthy and urbanised middle class in Southeast Asia is ‘consuming a wider variety of higher value agricultural products’—including meat, seafood, and horticultural produce. This increasing consumption is reflected in increased exports from Australia. DAFF cautioned, however, that Australia must recognise the challenge that meeting increased demand will present for our regional neighbours, ‘particularly to understand their domestic challenges which will drive their policy positions and approach to imports and exports’.[44] Similarly, RMAC observed that ‘the variance in market maturity and consumption habits requires a highly targeted approach to identify and develop opportunities’.[45]

Agricultural sectors

2.38In addition to broader opportunities, individual sectors highlighted specific opportunities available to them.

Dairy

2.39While the Australian dairy industry already has a strong presence in the region, it identified two specific opportunities from which it might benefit. The first is the commitment of incoming Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto to provide free lunches and milk to over 82 million students across Indonesia. The Australian Dairy Industry Council (ADIC) observed that ‘the school lunch and milk program presents an opportunity for the Australian dairy industry to support Indonesia in meeting its demand for milk’. The other opportunity is Thailand’s school milk program. ADIC noted that import tariffs and quotas for milk and cream, flavoured milk and skim milk powder would be removed by January 2025 under the TAFTA. This would ‘assist Australian exporters to be more price competitive, compared to some competitors including the US and Belgium’.[46]

Grains

2.40GrainGrowers highlighted a significant opportunity for Australian soft wheats as the market for baked goods increases, particularly in Indonesia.[47] It also pointed to the growth of barley exports, especially to Vietnam, for beer production and food processing, and the growing demand for feed grain for domestic meat production in Southeast Asian markets.[48] Graingrowers also observed the important role Australian wheat played in noodle manufacture—'offering a cost effective solution for individuals and families on limited budgets to access filling and nourishing hot meals’—and the use of Australian grain in Indonesia’s national flour fortification program.[49]

Sugar

2.41The sugar industry identified strong opportunities for growth in the Philippines and Vietnam, both net importers of sugar with rising domestic demand. CANEGROWERS observed that in both cases managing tariffs and quotas was vital to increasing Australia’s presence in the market. In the case of Vietnam, CANEGROWERS noted:

Currently, one of Vietnam’s major sugar refiners and raw sugar importers is working with Australia’s largest raw sugar exporter exploring the possibilities of securing improved terms of trade for Australian raw sugar entering Vietnam.[50]

Meat

2.42Australia’s meat industry already has a strong export presence in the region. The opportunity for continued growth was highlighted by the RMAC. It stated:

Protein consumption is generally defined by household income; as incomes increase, so too does consumption. As such, the rapid growth of emerging market economies presents an opportunity in and of itself, as the number of households making over US$35k/year in disposable income globally is forecast to grow from 350 million in 2022 to 470 million in 20272. This is especially true in Southeast Asia, a region that is rapidly growing and where Australia already enjoys strong trading relationships.[51]

2.43A significant opportunity for the Australian meat industry is in the provision of halal products. RMAC observed that the ‘halal trade presents both opportunities and risks to Australia’s meat exports to the region’. It proposed that resources and activities ‘be designated to building Australia’s halal meat reputation and input into the development of halal standards or requirements’. RMAC highlighted the work of the Australian Government Approved Halal Program (AGAHP). This is ‘a tripartite system between the Australian Government (DAFF), approved Islamic Halal Certifying Bodies, and the industry which creates a point of difference and the highest level of halal assurance for Muslim consumers in export markets’.[52] DAFF also saw ‘substantial growth prospects for Australian exports in the halal sector including for raw and processed commodities’, stating that ‘Australia is well-positioned to meet the increasing demand for halal products in these regions’.[53]

Wine

2.44Australian Grape & Wine identified a number of emerging opportunities for innovations in wine which would support the growth prospects for Australian wine in Southeast Asian markets. Specific examples include:

• No Alcohol or ‘mid-strength’ wine – often perceived as a lighter or healthier alternative to full-strength alcoholic beverages and able to capitalise on health and wellbeing trends.
• Innovative or novel packaging – consumer research had identified a preference for smaller format packaging in Japan, ‘such as cans compared to 750 ml wine bottles’. Similar preferences could be realised in Southeast Asian markets.
• Sustainability – Australian Grape & Wine observe that the Australian industry has ‘invested significantly over the past 20 years in applying sustainability principles across the sector’. There is ‘a major opportunity to promote our sustainability credentials’ in emerging Southeast Asian wine markets.[54]

Organic agriculture

2.45Organic products are seen as a significant area for potential growth in trade with Southeast Asia. Australian Organic Limited (AOL) observed that the Australian organic industry could ‘offer an alternative for improving food security in Southeast Asia while offering premium products to markets like Vietnam, which have demonstrated willingness to pay premium prices’. It noted that organic products cater to the preferences of the growing middle class. This could ‘benefit Australian organic operators and contribute to the broader agricultural sector goal of becoming a $100 billion industry by 2030’.[55]

2.46AOL suggested that ‘as the middle class grows in Southeast Asia, organic products present an opportunity for broader trade and market access for a diverse range of Australian agricultural products’. It indicated that greater collaboration between ‘the government, relevant departments, and the organic industry’ is crucial to meeting the industry’s potential ‘and addressing the disparity where Australia contributes only about one per cent of the global industry’s value, despite possessing 60 per cent of the world’s organic farmland’.[56] AOL identified a number of barriers to market entry which are discussed below.

Two-way trade

2.47Two of Australia’s trading partners in the region, Thailand and Indonesia, highlighted the need to view expanded trade opportunities in both directions—noting that the benefits of engagement were not just about the opportunities created for Australian producers.

2.48Examining the impact of trade agreements and related mechanisms for bilateral cooperation, the Royal Thai Embassy emphasised that these mechanisms served as platforms ‘for both sides to discuss how to further increase two-way agricultural trade, including market access, and resolving challenges and barriers’. It pointed to bilateral discussions that had meant ‘cooked duck from Thailand gained access to the Australian market, while Australian avocados entered the Thai market’. The Thai Government sought to continue discussions with DAFF ‘on expanding the scope of cooked duck meat to include products containing bone, whole duck, offal, and fat’ through FTA mechanisms. Additional opportunities included:

• herbs and spices such as fresh ginger and turmeric, and plant-based products from Thailand, which are in high demand in the Australian market due to the growing health-conscious trend; and
• Australian seafood such as barramundi and mud crab which have great potential in the Thai market.[57]
  49. The Royal Thai Embassy observed that ‘fostering cooperation through trade facilitation will streamline the flow of agricultural and food products and reduce trade barriers’. It suggested encouraging the ‘regular exchange of knowledge and information to better understand rules and regulations regarding import requirements for agricultural products’.[58]
  50. Similarly, the Indonesian Ambassador, Dr Siswo Pramono, highlighted the opportunities for trade and economic cooperation between Australia and Indonesia. He noted Indonesia’s significant economic growth since 1998, going from a GDP purchasing power parity of US$900 billion to US$4 trillion in 2024. This was an opportunity for Australia.[59]
  51. Ambassador Pramono emphasised the importance of trading partners matching trade and development priorities within their relationships. A key priority for Indonesia is reducing the trade deficit with Australia, about US$6 billion, and achieving more balance in the two-way trade. He noted that there are a lot of matches between Indonesia’s priorities for trade and development and Australia’s priorities for trade with Southeast Asia.[60]
  52. Key priorities for the incoming Indonesian administration are the nutrition program and food security. This matches Australia’s priority for the export of agricultural produce and food. For example, Indonesia has the third-largest noodle industry in the world, which creates a strong demand for wheat. Indonesia imported $1.3 billion in wheat from Australia; but also required assistance in the management and storage of wheat, the transfer of knowledge and technology from Australia.[61]
  53. In addition, Indonesia imported between 400,000 and 500,000 live cattle from Australia for meat; a byproduct of this was leather. The opportunity was there for greater synergies in bilateral trade:

Live cattle are important for consumption in Indonesia but, out of the 500,000 cattle, we also have leather, and Indonesia has a growing leather industry. This is your leather, because we import it live from Australia. If there is more investment from Australia in our leather industry, including for shoes and so on, then we can send it back to Australia to make the balance much better—to reduce the deficit.[62]

2.54DAFF acknowledged the importance of two-way trade opportunities within the overall relationship with the Southeast Asian region. It observed that:

The requests for prompt technical assessments of imports from Southeast Asian governments are growing, and timely progression builds on our trade relationship. This is the idea that, for many of our markets, they want to trade with us and we want to trade with them, so we are working hand in hand to consider their imports. We're processing that technical assessment at the same time that they're processing our technical assessment.[63]

Challenges

Market access

2.55The success of the FTAs in promoting trade is attested by many stakeholders. The NFF highlighted the importance of the AANZFTA in providing ‘commercially meaningful market access across Southeast Asia for a range of agricultural goods’; and complementing gains achieved through bilateral FTAs in the region. Nonetheless, the NFF cautioned that while ‘existing FTAs provide excellent coverage of agricultural products, there remain some non-tariff barriers, nuisance tariffs and duties on agricultural goods that if addressed, could further benefit our agricultural exports to the region’. The NFF supported the regular review of these trade agreements ‘to improve existing arrangements where opportunities exist’, in particular ‘where direct competing countries may have negotiated FTAs more recently, with advantageous market access arrangements achieved’.[64]

2.56Other stakeholders agreed. AUSVEG observed that it is not an accident that Malaysia and Singapore are the two biggest markets in Southeast Asia for Australian vegetables, given that both are non-protocol markets and relatively open to Australian fresh produce.[65] The Consolidated Pastoral Company (CPC) noted that AANZFTA provided a ‘framework for Australia to grow dynamic partnerships across the region’, while cautioning the need for continuous engagement, stating that:

… the rate of economic and social change across Southeast Asia highlights the need for continuous dialogue and cooperation among the member states to ensure the FTA’s success and relevance in the evolving economic landscape.[66]

2.57Australian Grape & Wine observed that FTAs had worked well, meaning that ‘for the most part the largest barrier to entry which could be addressed are the costs associated with non-tariff measures’.[67] It suggested that ‘further reductions in tariffs, as well as non-tariff outcomes for wine’, should be sought as a priority in all future Southeast Asian FTA discussions.[68]

2.58Nonetheless, market access remained an issue for many industries. AUSVEG noted that ‘navigating the complex and varied regulatory environment of Southeast Asian countries remains a challenge, including tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and fluctuating import regulations’.[69] ADIC observed that ‘while dairy trade to the region is mostly liberalised, there remain some nuisance tariffs’, including in the Philippines and Indonesia.[70] Meanwhile, according to CANEGROWERS, the sugar industry was being hamstrung in the Philippines and Vietnamese markets by quotas and preferential duties. With regard to Vietnam, CANEGROWERS stated:

Under current arrangements Australia has a tariff advantage over other major sugar exporters for in-quota raw sugar entering Vietnam. However, the lower duties paid by ASEAN members on white sugar continues to disadvantage Australian raw sugar entering Vietnam.[71]

Organic agriculture

2.59The organic agriculture sector faces a number of unique challenges in achieving market access. These include:

• Stringent and often market-specific entry requirements to export markets, combined with a lack of consistent Australian domestic standards, making market entry difficult and expensive.
• A lack of market specific information for organic producers through portals such as the Manual of Importing Country Requirements (MICOR).
• The absence of organic specific R&D levies which meant that there was no funding for organic-specific market access intelligence or activities.
• A lack of organic specific expertise amongst government agents in-market (e.g. Agriculture Counsellors/Austrade).
  60. To address the challenges faced by the organics sector, AOL recommends that the Australian Government:
• Improve the accessibility and detail of information provided on the MICOR and Austrade websites, with a specific focus on organic operators.
• Appoint a dedicated point of contact officer for Asian markets, with a background in the organic industry and a thorough understanding of the requirements for organic export.
• Allocate ongoing budgetary funding to improve resources available for the organic industry.
• Implement organic-specific grant programs tailored to support organic operators seeking entry into the Southeast Asian market.
• Conduct a review of the domestic regulatory framework to ensure its alignment with current international standards and potential rival jurisdictions. Additionally, establish mechanisms within the framework to define and regulate organic products within Australia’s domestic market, promoting clarity and consistency.[72]
  61. AOL further recommends consistent budget support for organic agriculture, including $2.5 million over four years.[73] It also emphasised the need to address domestic standards, stating that ‘as Southeast Asian countries progress with their organic industry regulations, maintaining a regulatory framework for organic conducive to continued trade and market access becomes imperative’. AOL noted that Australia’s current domestic framework for organic agriculture was ‘out of step with OECD standards’. Australia needs to implement ‘a system that includes a consistent definition of organic domestically’, to avoid potential market exclusion. AOL observed that ‘aligning with international standards by having a domestic regulatory framework will help secure ongoing trust in Australian organic products in this region’.[74]
  62. The Committee was advised that the opportunity is there to take the existing national export standard ‘and to regulate that to become our domestic standard as well’—there is ‘an existing framework that we could potentially adopt which is supported by industry as a way forward’.[75]

Non-tariff barriers

2.63Aside from tariffs there are other barriers to trade which can impact market access including non-tariff measures (NTMs), sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical barriers to trade (TBT) for agriculture products. DAFF observed that:

Once preferential tariff outcomes are established under FTAs, there is no guarantee Australian businesses can immediately export their produce to trading partners. Exporters may face technical market access restrictions and difficulty meeting trading partner regulations such as Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) as well as other Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs).[76]

2.64DAFF emphasised that despite significant tariff liberalisation across Southeast Asia, ‘there has been an increase in NTMs which have the potential to become trade-distorting non-tariff barriers (NTBs), increasing costs and reducing or preventing access to markets’.[77] It noted that in the period 2016–19, the total number of NTMs in ASEAN member states increased by approximately 15 per cent. This proliferation included ‘regulatory reforms aimed at enhancing food safety, consumer protection, domestic policies to support local industries’, and was related to ‘an increasingly connected global value chain’.[78]

2.65According to Grain Trade Australia (GTA), ‘these restrictive trade measures, including some NTMs and other policies can be detrimental to trade facilitation and can generate barriers that will increase the likelihood of food insecurity’. These measures, long used by governments as policy and trade regulatory tools, have the potential ‘to significantly increase the costs and risks of trade and impact on trade opportunities’.[79]

2.66A range of NTMs/NTBs were highlighted in evidence presented to the Committee. Grape & Wine Australia noted a number of NTMs faced by the wine industry in Southeast Asia, including:

• Health warnings – Thailand recently proposed Graphic Health Warnings including a number of impractical requirements around placement and cycling of label warning messages every 1000 containers. These measures alone, if implemented, would have substantially reduced the viability of the market.
• Nutrition and ingredient labelling – An area that alcohol (including wine) has typically been exempt from, but now appears to be creeping into regulatory considerations globally, is nutrition and ingredient labelling. A complex issue but one which will need significant effort to ensure harmonisation to reduce trade barriers. Malaysia has recently been considering ingredient labelling change that may apply to wine.
• Geographical Indications (GIs) used as trade advantage – A number of SEA countries undergoing free trade negotiations with the European Union are implementing, or have already implemented, GI provisions. For many, GIs are a foreign concept which doesn’t appear to impact the local market and therefore can be agreed to with minimal conflict friction in the local political context. They do, however, become a major trade barrier for other wine products. The grape variety, Prosecco, is an example of where a spurious GI claim has caused issues in Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam.
• Testing and certification – Overly onerous Certificate of Analysis and testing requirements are something that can be applied in SEA counties where there can be a lack of knowledge about the safety aspects of wine. This testing is costly for wine businesses and reduces the viability of markets as a whole.[80]
  67. Mr Lee McLean, CEO of Grape & Wine Australia, advised that labelling requirements are a significant cost to business:

There are always issues around the number of labels you need in a region. It doesn't sound like much perhaps, when you're not in the business, but when you are constantly changing every back label for every single market, for instance, that has a cost associated with it and has a level of administrative complexity and all the rest of it.[81]

2.68The dairy industry highlighted the issue of factory registration—Australian dairy processors waiting to get approval for their manufacturing facilities to be able to export to Indonesia. ADPF President, John Williams, explained:

We have about five factories at the moment that have been waiting for an excessive amount of time for registration. There's a myriad of reasons as to why that would happen, but I imagine that a lot of this will start to be fast-tracked from the Indonesian government’s side of things once the president comes in, because we have factories ready to meet the requirements that the incoming president has created, and yet they have this massive barrier, the fact that they're not registered to be able to export to that market.[82]

2.69Grain Trade Australia (GTA) noted that ‘due to political sensitivity in relation to the large number of small domestic corn producers’, most Southeast Asian countries tended towards ‘restrictions on imports of feed grains (including wheat, barley, corn and canola meal) to support domestic corn producers’. GTA cited the example of Thailand, stating:

…while Australian feed grains have a tariff advantage against international competitors under FTA arrangements, Thailand has at times implemented a regulation that requires a grain importer to purchase 2 tonnes of domestic corn production for every 1 tonne of imported feed grain. This inhibits economic feasibility and logistical efficiencies of both local and importing supply chains.[83]

2.70DAFF highlighted potential issues around halal certification, citing the recent implementation of the Halal Law in Indonesia mandating requirements for new certification for most exported goods and related services. DAFF observed that this legislation ‘broadens the scope of products necessitating halal certification, demanding Australian exporters comply to sustain or augment their presence in the Indonesian market’.[84] This was a concern for the dairy industry as well.[85]

2.71DAFF also cited the ‘classic’ example of maximum residue limits (MRLs) for pesticides:

Codex, the food safety standard setter, is setting MRLs for different products all around the world, and the ideal is that all countries use that international standard MRL, and that means, if you grow your product—your wheat—and you're meeting that international standard MRL, you could send your product anywhere. Unfortunately, of course, the reality is that many different countries have different MRLs. They're setting a higher or a lower pesticide setting.[86]

2.72DAFF noted that it was working through the AANZFTA to simplify those pesticide limits, creating consistency in the region and making it simpler for exporters to meet importing market requirements.[87]

2.73Dealing with NTMs is a complex business. DFAT observed that all countries have non-tariff measures—measures in place to protect what are deemed to be legitimate policy objectives; it is ‘when they cross over into the illegitimate, or they kind of go too far, that they become barriers to trade’. However, ‘many countries don’t see these non-tariff barriers as barriers as such’.[88]

2.74DFAT stated that as a rule technical market access issues were not negotiated or addressed in free trade agreements.[89] Rather, the Australian Government adopted a multiagency approach, in conjunction with industry, to identify and address non-tariff barriers as they arise. Solutions might be found in a multilateral forum such as the World Trade Organisation; or through bilateral mechanisms—committees established under FTAs; or through Agriculture Counsellors or DFAT staff in Australian embassies overseas. DFAT observed that with regard to NTBs they are ‘always very interested to hear from business what kind of issues they're facing. We often don't know what the issues are until business does tell us.’[90]

2.75DAFF noted that it too played a crucial role ‘in navigating the complexities of NTMs’:

DAFF officials collaborate with industry bodies and exporters to gather insights into the practical implications of NTM’s and lead trade negotiations related to agriculture with governments to promote the reduction or removal of NTMs. By aligning standards and regulations, DAFF aims to minimise trade disruptions and reduce compliance costs for Australian exporters.[91]

Increased competition

2.76Increasing competition from global competitors is seen as a major challenge to Australia’s agricultural exports to Southeast Asia. AUSVEG noted that ‘other major exporting nations like the US and China offer stiff competition, especially on pricing and market access’.[92] DAFF observed that the proliferation of free trade agreements in Southeast Asia meant that Australian exporters encounter increased competition, noting that ‘these agreements create opportunities for other countries to strengthen their trade ties with Southeast Asian nations, leading to heightened competition for market access and share’. Southeast Asian nations are ‘seeking to insulate themselves against future supply shocks by expanding their sourcing options’; this market diversification means that ‘Australian exporters will continue to find themselves competing with a broader range of suppliers’.[93]

2.77DAFF noted that since 2000 ASEAN’s imports of agricultural products have increased but Australia’s proportion of this market has declined.[94] Australia’s competitive advantages relative to other agricultural exporting countries is declining, with gains through FTAs ‘being eroded as other countries negotiate their own agreements with Australia’s trading partners’.[95]

2.78On this point, ADPF President John Willams observed that the United Kingdom’s accession to the CPTPP has ‘diluted market access for existing members like Australia, as treaty-wide tariff rate quotas became available to UK suppliers, especially in Malaysia’. He stated that ‘government must ensure Australia's competitive position is enhanced in plurilateral FTAs’ such as the new accessions to the CPTPP.[96] In a similar vein, Grains Australia noted that ‘the multilateral system creates a need for both continued support and advocacy of that system, while simultaneously creating numerous additional bilateral and regional arrangements’.[97]

2.79Grains Australia also observed that while Australian wheat best matches the quality requirements for the staple food noodles, ‘there is increasing competition from low quality suppliers such as the Black Sea and South America’. It suggested that ‘Australia will only hold its advantage for the noodle sector if the quality, price, and service offerings remain compelling’.[98] Grains Australia argued that, in the face of increasing competition, ‘it is imperative that our Southeast Asian partners understand and trust Australia and therefore continue to source agriculture products from Australia, including grain’.[99]

Harmonisation

2.80An important part of the process of collaboration between trading partners is the harmonisation of regulations and standards. Recommendation 11 of the Moore report urged expanding ‘collaboration on trade rules and standards harmonisation with Southeast Asian partners’.[100] According to the CSIRO, the harmonisation of trade regulation—aligning national procedures with international conventions, standards, and practices—could ‘reduce trade barriers and enhance market access and growth through simplification and consistency’. It noted that in the area of biosecurity alone, there are considerable opportunities across ASEAN countries for harmonising how trade related risks are managed while not unnecessarily restricting trade.[101]

2.81RMAC highlighted the need for regulatory harmonisation across the region and avoiding European Union (EU) style prescriptive regulation. It observed that:

Many of our Southeast Asia trading partners are undergoing broad-ranging regulatory transformation and modernisation across a range of market access-related areas such as biosecurity, animal health, food safety, customs or other border-related regulatory processes.[102]

2.82This presents both challenges and opportunities—challenges in that this regulatory modernisation poses the risk of new trade barriers being created; and opportunities in that Australia could provide leadership in the regulatory space. RMAC stated:

In this environment, Australia’s world-leading biosecurity, food safety and other regulatory systems are often looked at by our Southeast Asian trading partners as a well-respected source for learning best regulatory practice, science-based measures and decision-making, and importantly provides an opportunity to align systems and approaches with those of Australia. This harmonisation to an ‘Australian’ regulatory approach has been demonstrated as a significant soft power approach to negating NTMs and creating trade opportunities, as has been seen in biosecurity cooperation with Singapore in particular.[103]

2.83RMAC noted that potential competition from other highly developed regulatory systems, such as the EU, is a potential threat, but that there is ‘a long-established desire for many of our Southeast Asian trading partners to cooperate with Australian in these regulatory areas, which creates a major opportunity for regulatory diplomacy, cooperation, and influence for Australia’s benefit’.[104]

2.84AUSVEG called for increased regulatory cooperation, including harmonising standards, ‘making it easier for Australian products to enter and compete in these markets’.[105] AUSVEG noted that harmonising SPS measures would increase the export potential of key markets such as Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines, but that ‘additional work needs to be done to facilitate greater trade opportunities and reduce non-technical barriers’.[106] Grape & Wine Australia supported greater regulatory cooperation and harmonisation of Southeast Asian wine standards with those of Australia.[107]

2.85Port of Melbourne noted that implementing the recommendations of the Moore report—especially those recommendations addressing the establishment of ongoing ministerial and senior officials-level engagement through ASEAN—'would significantly reduce barriers and costs associated with exporting by equipping businesses with the necessary knowledge and tools to effectively navigate diverse import regulation’. Port of Melbourne suggested that ‘enhanced engagement through ASEAN would also help harmonise these requirements, benefiting both ASEAN members and the Australian agricultural sector by simplifying trade processes’.[108]

2.86DAFF and CSIRO highlighted the challenges of harmonising regulations and standards across borders, sectors, systems and issues. The CSIRO’s Dr Rieks van Klinken told the Committee:

There are a lot of international standards that would be common across countries, but there can be a lot of individual standards that are developed not just for food safety but for sustainability purposes. Some of them are quite old, legacy standards, but they are still required to be met. Traditionally, the food safety people don't talk to the biosecurity people and don't talk to the sustainability people, so you end up with a range of more or less independent requirements. They also have their own audit requirements. That's where the complexity comes in.[109]

2.87Connecting all this together was seen as a priority by CSIRO.[110] According to Dr van Klinken, much of their work was about trying to take a higher level view, developing solutions and standards that could apply across different applications for a particular commodity—sustainability, biosecurity or food safety—and across sectors, thereby avoiding fragmentary solutions.[111] CSIRO had analysed the export of red meat to the United States using a methodology that ‘would also apply to Southeast Asia’.[112] The challenge was to have standards around food safety, sustainability, use of digital data for traceability and biosecurity recognised multilaterally.[113]

2.88DAFF plays a leading role internationally in agriculture related measures, ‘in close consultation with other agencies, with DFAT and with our representative industry bodies’, in fora such as the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation, the G20, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and its standard-setting bodies. Other fora included the World Organisation for Animal Health, which sets the international animal standards; Codex, which sets the food safety standards for world trade; and the International Plant Protection Committee. Ms Jo Grainger, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Trade and International Division at DAFF, noted that ‘those standard-setting bodies are really important because, of course, they're setting the rules of racing for our trade.’[114]

2.89DAFF works with its Southeast Asian counterparts in these multilateral forums to highlight the importance of free, open, rules-based trade. It advocates for a flexible outcomes focused approach to sustainability.[115] Nonetheless, there are limits to the level of harmonisation and standardisation that could be achieved. Mr Tom Black, First Assistant Secretary, Exports and Veterinary Services at DAFF, explained:

There are certainly negotiations around the sorts of things you might see on the [sanitary/phytosanitary] certificate and the standardisation of terms as best you can on the certificate, but, in terms of having one certificate and one set of conditions that meets all markets, that's probably unlikely because each importing country has their own requirements according to their own pest and disease status. They might have different pests in a market, or not—and Australia, frankly, doesn't—so they'll require different things. There are some things we do have that others won't. So the theory is very sound, but the practical reality of everyone agreeing to one specific certificate and an agreed set of conditions from Australia, I think, would be exceedingly difficult to do.[116]

Traceability

2.90The traceability of agricultural products is seen as another opportunity to highlight the strengths of Australian agriculture.[117] DAFF observed that ‘the ability to trace food through the agri-food supply chain is an emerging requirement in Southeast Asia and around the world reflecting rising consumer awareness about food safety and the need to comply with international standards for trade’. It noted that ‘increasing investments are being made in traceability solutions with the global food traceability market expected to grow from US$20.04 billion in 2023 to US$45.29 billion by 2031’. DAFF concluded that this represented ‘a significant opportunity for Australia to collaborate and cooperate with partners and industry through the sharing of technical expertise and contribute to Australian Government key priorities in the region’.[118]

Committee comment

2.91The Moore report is both seminal and instructive. It highlights the importance of Australia’s relationship with Southeast Asia at an economic level, but also the need to look beyond trade to a broader and more closely integrated relationship. This is the case with agriculture as with other sectors of the economy.

2.92The Australian Government is already engaged in the process of implementing recommendations from the Moore report, including a number with direct relevance to Australian agriculture. It is the Committee’s hope and expectation that this process will continue and that in time the Moore report’s recommendations will be implemented in their entirety.

2.93The evidence presented to the Committee highlights the already extensive trade in food and agriculture between Australia and Southeast Asia. The region is second only to China as a destination for Australia’s agricultural exports and includes countries and commodities where Australia already has a mature and robust trading relationship. The anticipated growth in populations and incomes, and the likely shift in focus to premium foods that this will bring, presents significant opportunities for export growth in agricultural products to Southeast Asia. Australia is in a strong position to take advantage of this growth, with significant opportunities across almost all sectors. Related to this export growth is an expectation of increased two-way trade. Growth in two-way trade is a significant aspect of the broader relationship between Australia and the Southeast Asian region.

2.94There are a number of challenges to Australia’s economic engagement and the growth in agricultural trade. Despite the development of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements with the region, market access remains an issue. Non-tariff barriers are a significant and growing problem, requiring constant attention, and adequate resourcing by government (see Chapter 3). Australia’s ability to remain vigilant in identifying non-tariff barriers and persistent in addressing them will be vital to ensuring the continued growth in trade with the region. An important aspect of this will be addressing the changing trade environment as more countries seek to develop trade with the region. Every new agreement has the power to shift the balance of trade for or against Australia’s interests. Once again, vigilance and persistence are the keys to maintaining and promoting market access.

2.95A powerful tool in promoting Australia’s trade with the region is to pursue the harmonisation of regulations and standards. This must be a collaborative process, not a case of Australia imposing its standards on the region. It must also be an iterative process, identifying and resolving issues as they arise. Much of the architecture for addressing the harmonisation of regulations and standards exists in the processes provided within existing or prospective trade agreements. Once again, harmonisation is a matter of vigilance and persistence. Within this context, traceability of agricultural products is seen as another opportunity to highlight the strengths of Australian agriculture and a significant opportunity for Australia to collaborate with trading partners.

2.96A final word on the circumstances of organic agriculture. As with other industries within the agriculture sector, organic agriculture faces significant opportunities for export growth within Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, it also faces unique challenges which will not be readily overcome without government support. The organics industry has recommended a range of measures relating to improved accessibility and detail of information provided on the MICOR and Austrade websites, a dedicated point of contact officer for Asian markets, ongoing budgetary funding, organic-specific grant programs, and a review of the domestic regulatory framework. The Committee supports these proposals.

2.97The Committee recommends that the Australian Government continue to support the implementation of the Moore report recommendations.

2.98The Committee recommends that the Australian Government provide its agencies with the resources required to:

• Maintain Australia’s agricultural trade with Southeast Asia.
• Revise trade agreements as required.
• Address non-tariff barriers to trade.
• Harmonise regulations and standards to streamline trade, including supporting the traceability of Australian agricultural products.

2.99The Committee recommends that the Australian Government support the trade in organic agriculture in Southeast Asia by:

• Improving accessibility and detail of information provided on the MICOR and Austrade websites, with a specific focus on organic operators.
• Providing a dedicated point of contact officer for Asian markets, with a background in the organic industry and a thorough understanding of the requirements for organic export.
• Ongoing budgetary funding to improve resources available for the organic industry.
• Providing organic-specific grant programs tailored to support organic operators seeking entry into the Southeast Asian market.
• Reviewing the domestic regulatory framework to ensure its alignment with current international standards and potential rival jurisdictions, including mechanisms within the framework to define and regulate organic products within Australia’s domestic market.

Footnotes

[1]Commonwealth of Australia, Invested: Australia's Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040, September 2023, p. 1.

[2]Commonwealth of Australia, Invested: Australia's Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040, September 2023, p. 43.

[3]Commonwealth of Australia, Invested: Australia's Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040, September 2023, pp. 49–51.

[4]DFAT, Submission 23, p. 6.

[5]Commonwealth of Australia, Invested: Australia's Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040, September 2023, p. 31.

[6]Commonwealth of Australia, Invested: Australia's Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040, September 2023, p. 32.

[7]Commonwealth of Australia, Invested: Australia's Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040, September 2023, p. 37.

[8]Commonwealth of Australia, Invested: Australia's Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040, September 2023, p. 37.

[9]DFAT, Submission 23, pp. 6–7.

[10]DFAT, Submission 23, p. 6.

[11]DFAT, Submission 23, pp. 6–7.

[12]Budget 2024–25, Budget Paper No. 2, May 2024, pp. 106–7.

[13]DFAT, Submission 23, p. 2.

[14]DFAT, Submission 23, p. 2.

[15]NFF, Submission 14, p. 4.

[16]DAFF, Submission 20, p. 5.

[17]DAFF, Submission 20, pp. 6–7.

[18]DFAT, Submission 23, pp. 8–9.

[19]DFAT, Submission 23, p. 8.

[20]DFAT, Submission 23, p. 9.

[21]DFAT, Submission 23, p. 3.

[22]GrainGrowers, Submission 16, p. 2.

[23]Grain Trade Australia, Submission 5, pp. 2–3.

[24]Grain Trade Australia, Submission 5, p. 5.; see also Grains Australia, Submission 24, p. 7.

[25]Mr John Williams, President, Australian Dairy Products Federation; and Deputy Chair, Australian Dairy Industry Council, Committee Hansard, 13 September 2024, p. 6.

[26]ADIC, Submission 4, pp. 4–5.

[27]Mr John Williams, President, Australian Dairy Products Federation; and Deputy Chair, Australian Dairy Industry Council, Committee Hansard, 13 September 2024, p. 6.

[28]RMAC, Submission 13, p. 4.

[29]RMAC, Submission 13, p. 4.

[30]RMAC, Submission 13, p. 4.

[31]RMAC, Submission 13, pp. 4–5.

[32]CANEGROWERS, Submission 8, p. 1.

[33]CANEGROWERS, Submission 8, p. 3.

[34]CANEGROWERS, Submission 8, p. 2.

[35]AUSVEG, Submission 15, p. 4

[36]AUSVEG, Submission 15, p. 5.

[37]AUSVEG, Submission 15, p. 5.

[38]AUSVEG, Submission 15, p. 4.

[39]DFAT, Submission 23, p. 5.

[40]DAFF, Submission 20, p. 22.

[41]Grains Australia, Submission 24, p. 7.

[42]DAFF, Submission 20, p. 22.

[43]DAFF, Submission 20, p. 22.

[44]DAFF, Submission 20, p. 22.

[45]RMAC, Submission 13, p. 8.

[46]ADIC, Submission 4, pp. 8–9.

[47]GrainGrowers, Submission 16, p. 2.

[48]GrainGrowers, Submission 16, p. 2.

[49]GrainGrowers, Submission 16, p. 5; see also Grains Australia, Submission 24, pp. 13–14.

[50]CANEGROWERS, Submission 8, pp. 2–3.

[51]RMAC, Submission 13, p. 8.

[52]RMAC, Submission 13, p. 9.

[53]DAFF, Submission 20, p. 24.

[54]Australian Grape & Wine, Submission 17, p. 9.

[55]Australian Organic Limited, Submission 2, p. 8.

[56]Australian Organic Limited, Submission 2, p. 4.

[57]Royal Thai Embassy, Submission 7, p. 3.

[58]Royal Thai Embassy, Submission 7, pp. 3–4.

[59]His Excellency Dr Siswo Pramono, Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia, Committee Hansard, 13 September 2024, p. 1.

[60]His Excellency Dr Siswo Pramono, Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia, Committee Hansard, 13 September 2024, p. 2.

[61]His Excellency Dr Siswo Pramono, Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia, Committee Hansard, 13 September 2024, p. 2.

[62]His Excellency Dr Siswo Pramono, Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia, Committee Hansard, 13 September 2024, pp. 2–3.

[63]Ms Jo Grainger, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Trade and International Division, DAFF, Committee Hansard, 12 September 2024, p. 2.

[64]NFF, Submission 14, p. 5.

[65]AUSVEG, Submission 15, p. 7.

[66]Consolidated Pastoral Company, Submission 21, p. 11.

[67]Australian Grape & Wine, Submission 17, p. 9.

[68]Australian Grape & Wine, Submission 17, p. 11.

[69]AUSVEG, Submission 15, p. 10.

[70]ADIC, Submission 4, p. 6.

[71]CANEGROWERS, Submission 8, p. 3.

[72]Australian Organic Limited, Submission 2, p. 3.

[73]Australian Organic Limited, Submission 2, p. 9.

[74]Australian Organic Limited, Submission 2, p. 7.

[75]Ms Jackie Brian, Chief Executive Officer, Australian Organic Limited, Committee Hansard, 11 October 2024, p. 5.

[76]DAFF, Submission 20.1, p. 1.

[77]DAFF, Submission 20, p. 3.

[78]DAFF, Submission 20, p. 7.

[79]Grain Trade Australia, Submission 5, p. 10.

[80]Australian Grape & Wine, Submission 17, p. 10.

[81]Mr Lee McLean, Chief Executive Officer, Australian Grape & Wine Inc., Committee Hansard, 13 September 2024, p. 14.

[82]Mr John Williams, President, Australian Dairy Products Federation; and Deputy Chair, Australian Dairy Industry Council, Committee Hansard, 13 September 2024, p. 8.

[83]Grain Trade Australia, Submission 5, p. 6.

[84]DAFF, Submission 20, p. 25.

[85]Mr Karl Ellis, Manager, Economic Sustainability and Competitiveness, Dairy Australia, Committee Hansard, 13 September 2024, p. 8.

[86]Ms Jo Grainger, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Trade and International Division, DAFF, Committee Hansard, 12 September 2024, p. 3.

[87]Ms Jo Grainger, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Trade and International Division, DAFF, Committee Hansard, 12 September 2024, p. 4.

[88]Mr Simon Clayton, Assistant Secretary, Agriculture and Non-Tariff Barriers Branch, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 22 August 2024, pp. 2–3.

[89]Mr Ian Mortimer, Director, Bilateral FTA Strategy and Implementation Section, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 22 August 2024, p. 8.

[90]Mr Simon Clayton, Assistant Secretary, Agriculture and Non-Tariff Barriers Branch, DFAT, Committee Hansard, 22 August 2024, p. 2.

[91]DAFF, Submission 20, p. 7.

[92]AUSVEG, Submission 15, p. 10.

[93]DAFF, Submission 20, p. 24.

[94]DAFF, Submission 20.1, p. 2.

[95]DAFF, Submission 20.1, p. 1.

[96]Mr John Williams, President, Australian Dairy Products Federation; and Deputy Chair, Australian Dairy Industry Council, Committee Hansard, 13 September 2024, p. 7.

[97]Grains Australia, Submission 24, p. 3.

[98]Grains Australia, Submission 24, p. 15.

[99]Grains Australia, Submission 24, p. 2.

[100]Commonwealth of Australia, Invested: Australia's Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040, September 2023, p. 32.

[101]CSIRO, Submission 3, pp. 6–7.

[102]RMAC, Submission 13, p. 10.

[103]RMAC, Submission 13, p. 10.

[104]RMAC, Submission 13, p. 10.

[105]AUSVEG, Submission 15, p. 12.

[106]AUSVEG, Submission 15, p. 7.

[107]Grape & Wine Australia, Submission 17, p. 10.

[108]Port of Melbourne, Submission 10, p. 8.

[109]Dr Rieks van Klinken, Senior Principal Research Scientist, Health and Biosecurity, CSIRO, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 4.

[110]Dr Lilly Lim-Camacho, Principal Research Scientist, Sustainability Assessment and Metrics, Agriculture and Food, CSIRO, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 5.

[111]Dr Rieks van Klinken, Senior Principal Research Scientist, Health and Biosecurity, CSIRO, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 4.

[112]Dr Rieks van Klinken, Senior Principal Research Scientist, Health and Biosecurity, CSIRO, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 4.

[113]Dr Rieks van Klinken, Senior Principal Research Scientist, Health and Biosecurity, CSIRO, Committee Hansard, 16 August 2024, p. 2.

[114]Ms Jo Grainger, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Trade and International Division, DAFF, Committee Hansard, 12 September 2024, p. 2.

[115]Ms Jo Grainger, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Trade and International Division, DAFF, Committee Hansard, 12 September 2024, p. 2.

[116]Mr Tom Black, First Assistant Secretary, Exports and Veterinary Services, DAFF, Committee Hansard, 12 September 2024, p. 3.

[117]DP World, Submission 12, p. 1.

[118]DAFF, Submission 20, p. 18.