Key points

• The Universities Accord (Australian Tertiary Education Commission) Bill 2025 (the Bill) provides for the establishment of the Australian Tertiary Education Commission (ATEC) to provide stewardship of the higher education system.
• The Bill enshrines a National Tertiary Education Objective (NTEO), to which ATEC must have regard in performing its functions.
• Establishing ATEC was a recommendation of the Australian Universities Accord, although not all components of the recommendations are included in the Bill.
• The Minister would appoint three commissioners, including a First Nations Commissioner. At least one must have experience with vocational education and training (VET). ATEC will be assisted by the Department of Education.
• As well as the NTEO, and specific criteria in the Bill, ATEC must have regard to the Minister’s short-term and long-term strategic priorities when performing functions or exercising powers.
• ATEC is to provide advice and recommendations on a number of prescribed areas and/or upon request by the Minister. It would also provide:
  • an annual report on the state of the tertiary education system
  • advice and recommendations on the Higher Education Standards Framework.
• ATEC would establish and monitor performance through mission based compacts with Table A and B providers, which will outline how the provider’s purpose, values and goals align with national, state and local priorities, planning and strategy.
• The Universities Accord (Australian Tertiary Education Commission) (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2025 (the C&T Bill) amends related legislation to implement the Bill, including transferring responsibilities for the Higher Education Standards Framework to ATEC, and enabling information sharing between the Department of Education and ATEC.
• The Coalition has questioned the need for an additional bureaucratic layer, but is yet to announce its position on the Bill.
• The Greens have not announced a position on the Bill; however, they appear to generally support the creation of a statutory ATEC.
• Sector stakeholders have generally been supportive of an ATEC, but have criticised elements of the Bill, such as ATEC’s limits on providing advice on its own initiative.
• The Bills have been referred to the Senate Education and Employment Legislation Committee, due to report on the 26 February 2026.

Introductory Info

Date of introduction: 26 November 2025
House introduced in: House of Representatives
Portfolio: Education
Commencement: Both Bills commence 28 days after Royal Assent.

Purpose of the Bill

The purpose of the Universities Accord (Australian Tertiary Education Commission) Bill 2025 (the Bill) is to establish the Australian Tertiary Education Commission (ATEC) to provide stewardship of the higher education system. The Bill sets out:

• ATEC’s structure of 3 commissioners, and relationship to relevant Ministers and the Department of Education
• ATEC’s objectives and functions, including entering into mission based compacts with Table A and B providers, preparing reports, and providing advice and recommendations if requested by the Minister.

The purpose of the Universities Accord (Australian Tertiary Education Commission) (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2025 (C&T Bill) is to support the implementation of the Bill through transitional arrangements and amendments to the:

• Higher Education Support Act 2003 (HESA)
• Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency Act 2011 (TEQSA Act).

Structure of the Bill

The Bill establishes a new Act with 6 Parts that cover the formation of ATEC, it’s structure, functions and objectives.

The C&T Bill comprises 2 Schedules. Schedule 1 covers amendments to HESA and the TEQSA Act. Schedule 2 covers application provisions and transitional rules.

Background

Past commissions

Australia established a Universities Commission in 1943, which was legislated as the Australian Universities Commission in 1959. In 1977, the Australian Universities Commission, the Commission on Advanced Education and the Commission on Technical and Further Education were amalgamated into the Tertiary Education Commission, which operated to 1988.

In 1988 the Minister for Employment, Education and Training (John Dawkins) introduced legislation to rationalise the advisory structures in his portfolio. The Employment, Education and Training Act 1988 abolished the existing advisory arrangements across the portfolio, including the commissions model, and replaced them with the National Board of Employment, Education and Training (NBEET), supported by advisory councils, including a Higher Education Council.

Further background on the previous commissions model is available in the Parliamentary Library’s 2003 publication, Higher Education Funding Policy.

Australian Universities Accord

The Australian Universities Accord was a 12-month review of the higher education sector. The Australian Universities Accord Interim Report (Interim Report) noted that the review was considering ‘the benefits of establishing a new national body, a Tertiary Education Commission’ (pp. 20–21). The Australian Universities Accord Final Report (Accord Report), released in February 2024, recommended the establishment of an ATEC (Recommendation 30).

The Accord Report argues that in the absence of such a commission, ‘tertiary education policy and implementation … has lacked deep thinking and clarity of direction’ (p. 226). Resulting fragmented policy and funding changes have had a range of consequences, including:

• ‘regulatory inconsistencies, insufficient data and metrics with which to monitor, evaluate and compare sector performance, and concerns about university governance and workforce arrangements, including high rates of casualisation’
• erosion of ‘the stability and sustainability of higher education providers, and their flexibility in adapting to changing needs.’ (p. 225)

Furthermore, ‘there has been a decline in the capability and capacity of the public institutions responsible for overseeing the system’ (p. 226). The Accord Report considers that the policy departments overseeing the sector ‘lack a long-term system focus and have instead prioritised responsiveness to ministerial and government priorities.’ (p. 226).

The Accord Report provides nine examples of resulting shortcomings, that include the following:

• the [Job -ready Graduates] reforms included policy changes that relied on student behavioural responses not supported by evidence to increase student enrolments in government-preferred fields of study

…

• the persistent under-representation of some student cohorts in higher education, meaning many Australians do not have the opportunity to participate in and benefit from post-school education
• ongoing challenges from the lack of alignment between the higher education and vocational education and training sectors, including barriers to reskilling and recognition of skills, have exacerbated skills shortages

…

• the current lack of clarity on pricing what government and students pay to reflect the true cost of delivery, both for the teaching of individual courses and for research activities, limits the targeting of funding arrangements to achieve intended policy outcomes (p. 227)

Recommendations

In his second reading speech Minister Clare stated that ‘[o]f all the recommendations in the Accord [the creation of ATEC] might be the most important. As someone told me the other day, the ATEC is the Accord.’

Recommendation 30 in the Accord Report covers the establishment of an Australian Tertiary Education Commission in 9 parts (a–i) and numerous subparts (pp. 244–245). Several other recommendations throughout the Accord Report are linked to the Commission’s activities.

The Accord Report also presents ‘the Commission’ in respect to its recommendation of ‘an overarching National Tertiary Education Objective’, to:

1. underpin a strong, equitable and resilient democracy

2. drive national economic and social development and environmental sustainability. (pp. 225, 233)

The Accord Report calls for the Commission to be established under legislation and to work with key institutions and meet the needs of its stakeholders’ by:

Some components recommended by the Accord Report are not addressed by the Bill. Several such components are discussed below, and in the Key issues and provisions section.

ARC and TEQSA incorporation

The Accord Report calls for the inclusion of the Australian Research Council (ARC) and Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA) under ATEC for ‘a comprehensive view of the whole tertiary education system’, with the head of these agencies to become commissioners (recommendation 30(e), p. 245). In May 2024, it was reported that Minister Clare had informed universities that TEQSA and the ARC would not be included in ATEC. The Bill makes no provisions for their inclusion under ATEC.

Commissioners and advisory bodies

The Bill does not provide for the Accord’s recommendation for several further commissioners: two deputy commissioners (the Bill provides for one ‘Commissioner’, clause 9), an Equity Commissioner and a Regional Education Commissioner (recommendation 30(g)). The Government has had a Regional Education Commissioner since 2021.

While the Bill provides for the establishment of a First Nations Advisory Committee (clause 25), it does not provide for the other advisory boards and councils in recommendation 30(h), including an ongoing Advisory Board. However, the Bill does provide for ATEC to establish further committees.

Pricing and funding authority

The Accord Report recommends that ATEC have ‘pricing authority’ and ‘funding allocation’ functions (recommendations 30(b)(iv) and 30(b)(v): ‘the Commission would need authority to make independent pricing decisions within a policy framework and funding envelope set by government’ (p. 238). This authority would also apply to research funding with the ARC proposed to be embedded in ATEC (p. 238, see also recommendation 28, p. 31).

The Bill addresses these areas only in terms of ATEC providing advice and recommendations on the costs of education provision (subparagraph 11 (d)(ii) and paragraph 41(1)(b)); see also later section on Job-ready Graduates).

The Explanatory Memorandum (EM) flags that ‘future amendments to HESA and the ATEC’s enabling legislation will establish the ATEC’s role in the implementation of domestic managed growth and needs based funding for higher education providers.’ (p. 8) Future amendments to ATEC’s enabling legislation are also intended to support international student allocations (discussed below).

Reduce regulatory burden

The Accord Report states that its recommendation for an ATEC (among other recommendations) ‘is intended to be implemented in a way that reduces administrative burden on institutions whilst increasing tertiary education system intelligence, harnessing system capability and reinforcing institutional autonomy’ (p. 226). While several of ATEC’s functions are described as being aimed towards reducing regulatory burden, stakeholders such as Independent Higher Education Australia have expressed concern that ATEC itself will add to this burden.

Policy position of non-government parties/independents

The Coalition has not announced whether it will oppose or support the Bill. Shadow Minister for Education, Julian Leeser, has said there are ‘unresolved questions’ with the Bill, and questioned the need for the commission, which he referred to as ‘one more layer of bureaucracy’. These comments echo arguments that there was ‘no compelling case to proceed with the ATEC’ made by the Coalition in response to the Accord Report (see also recent discussion in Senate Estimates). At the 2025 election, the Parliamentary Budget Office costed ATEC as ‘not proceeding’ under the Coalition.

The Greens have not announced their position on the Bill. However, in additional comments to the Senate Education and Employment Legislation Committee report into Quality of governance at Australian higher education providers, they recommended that ‘the Australian Tertiary Education Commission's foundational legislation should clearly articulate the public mission and the educational, social, and civic functions of a public university sector’.

An area of likely debate is the continuation of the Job Ready Graduates package (discussed further below), which substantially increased student contributions in some disciplines. This issue has been a focus of the Greens’ and independent Senator David Pocock’s recent comments around ATEC.

Policy position of key interest groups

Reaction from sector bodies and commentators, including in submissions to the Senate Education and Employment Legislation Committee inquiry into the Bills (Senate Inquiry), have raised some consistent criticisms of the Bill, including arguments that there is:

• an insufficient number of Commissioners
• a lack of autonomy from the Department of Education, and for ATEC to pursue reporting, advice and recommendations on its own initiative
• ambiguity or overly broad remit for mission based compacts
• ambiguity over ATEC’s role in setting international student allocations, and funding allocations and contributions
• increased regulatory burden and duplication for providers (see also, for instance, the Regional Universities Network’s (RUN) response to the implementation consultation paper).

Several of these concerns are discussed further in the ‘Key issues and provisions section’ of the Digest.

Universities Australia (UA) argues that the proposed legislation will not ‘deliver a well-designed and independent system steward’ (submission 51, p. 2). UA recommends ATEC have more commissioners, greater autonomy to conduct research and deliver advice on its own initiative, greater control over its own staffing, and greater policy setting powers (including on costing and pricing) (p. 2). UA also recommends clarification around ATEC’s role ‘as a strategic steward, not a regulator’ (including minimising duplication with TEQSA), provision for strengthening First Nations leadership and contributions to ATEC’s work, strengthening provisions for research capability, and establishing an innovation fund through which ATEC could fund ‘independent, forward-looking research’ towards fulfilling its objectives (p. 3). The submission provides proposed amendments to meet UA’s recommendations.

The Independent Tertiary Education Council Australia (ITECA) cautiously supports an ATEC and elements of the Bill (submission 6), but has criticised it for prioritising the ‘structural primacy’ of public universities: ‘It is not credible for a Tertiary Education Commission to have a legislated remit that has direct oversight only on what is a small part – on any reliable metric – of the tertiary system.’ (submission 6, p. 5) It has called for the Bill to be withdrawn and reworked with wider consultation or alternatively amended to better represent the tertiary education system.

TAFE Directors Australia has expressed support for the establishment of ATEC and the introduction of the Bill.

Some additional discussion and analysis of submissions is available from the Future Campus website (see also a previous article, and analysis in relation to international education from the Koala International Education News).

Key issues and provisions

ATEC structure and selected functions

ATEC will consist of 3 commissioners: the Chief Commissioner, the First Nations Commissioner and the Commissioner (clause 9). They will be appointed by the Minister, hold office for no longer than 5 years at a time (though may be re-appointed), and must meet certain collective eligibility requirements, as well as individual eligibility requirements respective to the commissioner role, ranging from knowledge and experience to independence and credibility (clauses 56–59).

Recruitment for these positions has commenced. Higher education expert Andrew Norton has commented on what he sees as the difficulty of having sufficient breadth of experience across 3 commissioners. Several submissions to the Senate Inquiry also argue that the number of commissioners is insufficient (see for instance, UA (submission 51, pp. 5–6), the RUN (submission 35, p. [4]), the Australian Technology Network of Universities (ATN, submission 56, p 2), the International Education Association of Australia (submission 53, p. 3) and the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia (submission 33, p. 3)).

Part 5, Division 4 of the Bill sets out the terms and conditions of commissioner appointments, including that the Minister may determine other terms and conditions ‘in relation to matters not covered by this Act’ (clause 65). The Minister may terminate an appointment for reasons that include if ‘the Minister is satisfied that the performance of the ATEC Commissioner has been unsatisfactory for a significant period of time.’ (subclause 67(3)). No further guidance on this power is provided in the Bill or EM (p. 52).

The Bill enshrines the Accord Report’s recommendation for a National Tertiary Education Objective, to which the ATEC must have regard in performing functions and exercising powers:

(a)  promote a strong, equitable and resilient democracy; and

(b)  drive national, economic and social development and environmental sustainability (clause 13).

Several stakeholders called for this objective to be refined in their submissions to the Senate Inquiry (see, the Australasian Council of Deans of Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities (submission 19, p. 3) and the National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU) (submission 18, pp. [3]–[4])). The Bill lists 11 functions for ATEC (clause 11). Several are discussed below, and others in later sections.

Equity and First Nations

The Bill has areas of specific focus on increasing ‘equitable access to, and participation and success in, the higher education system,’ and improving the same benchmarks for Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders (clause 3) This focus is reiterated in the type of advice and recommendations that ATEC can give (paragraph 11(d)) and by the requirement for ATEC to have regard to the objective of improving outcomes for people facing systemic barriers to education, including Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders, in performing its functions or exercising its powers (clause 14).

The First Nations Commissioner must be an Aboriginal person or Torres Strait Islander and have significant understanding of issues affecting these groups (clause 57). Their functions include consulting with, promoting the interests and perspectives of, and providing advice on the participation and outcomes of Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders (clause 19).

UA has argued that the Bill does not provide sufficient decision making and resourcing for ‘First Nations leadership, research, policy capability and community engagement functions’ (submission 51, pp. 9–10).

International education

One of ATEC’s functions will be ‘to allocate a maximum number of international student commencements to [Education Services for Overseas Students] registered providers at the direction of the Minister’ (paragraph 11(h)). The EM states that ‘intended future amendments to the ATEC’s enabling legislation will also provide a framework for the ATEC’s role in allocating international student commencements to higher education providers, when directed by the Minister’ (p. 2).

Andrew Norton argues that paragraph 11(h) as it stands (without future amendments) constitutes a ‘capping power’. Norton states that given the intended future amendments to the legislation, ‘it is hard to see why section 11(h) needs to be in the ATEC bill.’ He calls for its removal.

ATEC autonomy and Ministerial powers

The Accord Report calls for ATEC to be:

… an independent statutory authority answering to the Education and Skills Ministers, to enable it to provide robust advice and support evidence-based decision making and planning. It needs to be agile and responsive to immediate issues, whilst remaining future-focused overall. (p. 234)

Discussion of ATEC has included questions and debate about its level of independence from both the government and higher education institutions. In a 2025 article, Tom Boland, former Chief Executive of Ireland’s equivalent to an ATEC, argues that such a body requires the autonomy to serve as a buffer between the Department and universities, appoint its own CEO and staff, and have the power to deliver research and advice as it deems appropriate and necessary.

The EM states that ‘Formal independence is a foundational element of the ATEC’s design.’ (p. 6) However, the Bill has raised concerns from stakeholders and experts about ATEC’s perceived lack of independence from the Minister and the Department of Education (the Department). Numerous stakeholders have submitted calls to give ATEC greater independence in providing research and advice, and separation from the Department (see UA (submission 51, pp. 5–7) the Group of Eight Universities (submission 27, p. 1), RUN (submission 35, p. [3]) and Australian Academy of Science (submission 39, pp. 1–2)).

Minister’s power to advise priorities and give directions

The Bill allows the Minister to notify ATEC in writing of the Minister’s ‘short‑term and long‑term strategic priorities (if any) for the tertiary education system’ (clause 15). The Minister must seek and obtain agreement from the VET minister, and consult with the Science and/or Research ministers where relevant. ATEC must publish the Minister’s notification on its website and is required to take the Minister’s priorities into account when performing its functions or exercising its powers.

The Minister may, by legislative instrument, give written directions to an ATEC commissioner about how they ‘carry out any of the functions’ of their role or ATEC’s functions (clause 71). These directions are not subject to disallowance. This power is caveated by provisions that such directions cannot relate to:

 (a) the content of any advice that may be given by the ATEC Commissioner or the ATEC; or

 (b) any decision that may be made by the ATEC Commissioner or the ATEC; or

 (c) a higher education provider or a class or classes of higher education providers.

ATEC must prepare a ‘statement of strategic priorities’ (SSP), outlining its strategic priorities for the tertiary education system every 2 years (clause 43). It must consult with a range of Ministers, including at the state and territory level, and with stakeholder representatives, and invite submissions.

Similarly, ATEC must prepare a work plan setting out its ‘priorities and outcomes’ every 2 years. It requires the same ministerial consultations as the statement of strategic objectives (clause 45).

Neither the ATEC’s SSP or the workplan are legislative instruments (subclauses 43(8) and 45(6)).

Minister’s power to seek advice and recommendations

ATEC can provide advice and recommendations without request from the Minister in relation to specific regulatory legislation of its own initiative (paragraphs 11(e) and (f)). It can also ‘report and publish information in relation to the tertiary education system and higher education providers’, and ‘undertake or coordinate research and data analysis activities’ in relation to its functions (paragraphs 11(g) and (j)). However, the majority of ATEC’s advisory functions can only be performed at the request of the Minister.

Clause 41 lists areas in which ATEC must give advice and recommendations to the Minister, upon the Minister’s request. Requests can also be made by the VET Minister, or by respective state or territory Ministers through their Commonwealth counterparts, where relevant.

ATEC’s advice and recommendations can only be published with the agreement of the Minister (clause 69).

ATEC is also required to produce a ‘State of the Tertiary Education System’ report for every calendar year (clause 42) and publish it within 12 months of the end of that year. The Bill provides a list of options for what the report may include, such as emerging trends and issues, attainment and participation targets, service delivery for regional Australia, and outcomes for persons facing systemic barriers. The report must be provided to the Minister(s) 4 weeks ahead of publication on ATEC’s website, and the Minister must table a copy in parliament.

The Accord Report had recommended that ATEC also prepare a rolling triennial planning report, referred to as a ‘Future of the Sector’ report (p. 241 and recommendation 36(b), p. 254). There are no requirements that ATEC prepare such a report in the Bill.

Departmental role

ATEC will be housed in the Department of Education and assisted by its staff. Some criticism of the Bill has called into question the impact of these arrangements on ATEC’s independence (see also reporting on submissions to the Senate Inquiry, and submissions such as from UA (submission 51, pp. 5–6), the NTEU (submission 18, p. [2]) and RUN (submission 35, p. 3)).

ATEC Commissioners will be officials of the Department for the purposes of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 and therefore subject to the requirements under that Act (clause 10).

ATEC is to be assisted by APS employees of the Department, made available by the Secretary (clause 22). The Bill provides that these staff ‘are subject to the directions of the ATEC Commissioners’. The Secretary also controls arrangements for other Commonwealth employees, consultants or employees of State or Territory governments or government authorities to be available for ‘the performance of any of the ATEC’s functions’ (clauses 23 and 24).

Acting commissioner appointments and commissioner or Ministerial delegation arrangements may also involve SES employees of the Department (clauses 60 and clause 73).

ATEC’s authority

Mission based compacts

ATEC will assert direct influence over the higher education sector through mission based compacts.

Mission based compacts already exist between the Commonwealth and Table A and Table B universities (all universities except Carnegie Mellon University):

Entering into a compact is one of the quality and accountability requirements which a higher education provider must meet under the Higher Education Support Act 2003 (HESA) as a condition of receiving a grant.

The purpose of the existing compacts is:

… to provide a strategic framework for the relationship between the Commonwealth and each higher education provider. It sets out how each provider’s mission aligns with the Commonwealth’s goals for higher education, innovation, teaching and learning, research and research training and equity.

The Accord Report considers the existing mission based compacts to ‘lack real clout and strategic impact, including enforcement or incentive mechanisms.’ (p. 236)

Having a mission based compact with ATEC will similarly be a requirement for Table A and B universities in order to receive a grant under Chapter 2 of HESA (clause 27). The purpose of these compacts is stated as:

to give the provider flexibility to pursue their goals and mission while also enabling the provider to:

(a) contribute to diversity within the higher education system; and

(b) contribute to higher education priorities including those set out in the statement of strategic priorities prepared under section 43; and

(c) meet the higher education needs of the provider’s students and community. (clause 28)

‘Flexibility’ appears to relate to the way in which each provider will have its own bespoke mission based compact, and the scope to operate independently within set objectives and requirements:

… while the form or structure of institutional compacts may be similar, the terms within each compact will be tailored to reflect the unique characteristics, priorities, and missions of individual institutions. This approach is designed to support diversity in delivery and purpose across the higher education system, enabling alignment with national, state, and local priorities, strategic planning, industry engagement, and innovations in learning and teaching. (EM, p. 28)

The reference in paragraph 28(c) to ‘meet the higher education needs of the provider’s students and community’ could be seen as offering further flexibility.

ATEC ‘must decide on the form and terms’ of the compacts, and in doing so it must ‘negotiate the form and terms of the compact with the provider’. ATEC must also ‘consider’ (clause 29):

• its statement of strategic priorities (under clause 43)
• the stated purpose of the compacts
• the goals, mission, strategic plan, geographic location and local community of the given provider
• the provider’s performance against any previous such compacts and
• ‘the effect (if any) the proposed terms may have on the academic freedom of the provider’.

The EM explains that intended future amendments to the legislation and HESA would also draw ‘load allocation’ into mission based compacts:

This structure will explicitly link institutional actions and commitments related to mission with student load allocation and distribution – recognising that these elements must be considered together to drive coherent system-wide outcomes. (p. 8)

The compacts should also include ‘measurable performance indicators’ and ‘methodologies to assess the provider’s performance’ (subclause 29(4)).

The compacts are in force for a period up to 4 years (clause 35).

Andrew Norton has expressed concern that these compacts ‘can include many prescriptive requirements and goals’ on Table B providers (primarily private institutions) that may be antithetical to their more independent status and the limited amount of Commonwealth funding they receive. Other stakeholders and experts have questioned the scope of the mission based compacts in terms of the ambiguity of the provisions in the Bill, and the potential for ATEC to wield significant power over providers (see submissions from Claire Field (submission 15, p. 3), Mark Warburton (submission 4, p. 3-4) and the University of New England (submission 10, p. 3)).

Suspension of mission based compacts

ATEC is to assess Table A and Table B providers’ outcomes against the terms of their mission based compacts at least once per calendar year (subclause 30(1)). These assessments may involve requesting information from the provider and must take into account ‘steps taken’ by the provider and matters beyond the provider’s control in meeting the terms of the compact (clause 30). ATEC can also conduct progress meetings with providers (clause 31).

Clause 33 sets out that ATEC may give notice to suspend a compact if the provider fails to comply with the compact’s terms, if the provider fails to provide information under subclause 30(2) or if ATEC considers the provider is not negotiating a subsequent compact in good faith. ATEC must give the provider 28 business days’ notice and must also take into account factors such as the provider’s response to the notice for suspension, previous engagement with ATEC and history of compliance (subclause 33(4)). ATEC must publish a list of providers with suspended compacts on its website. ATEC can remove a suspension if the reason for suspension is rectified (clause 34).

Consequences of suspension

If a mission based compact is suspended or one has not been entered into (including after a previous compact has expired), a default mission based compact is in force (clause 36). ATEC must decide on the form and terms of a default mission based compact, with options to continue applying the suspended or preceding compact (clause 36).

It is only if no compact is in force that grants cannot be paid to a Table A or Table B provider (proposed section 19-110 of HESA, at item 1 of the C&T Bill). The Bill provides ATEC with the power to suspend, but not unilaterally terminate a mission based compact (clause 35). A mission based compact can only be terminated through agreement between ATEC and the provider, or if a provider terminates the compact or ceases to be either a Table A or Table B provider (paragraphs 35(b)–(d)). Note 2 to subclause 27(1) outlines that there may be other consequences to suspension of a mission based compact, including regulatory action from TEQSA in relation to a provider’s compliance with the Higher Education Standards Framework.

Job-Ready Graduates and funding for Commonwealth Supported Places

The Government’s reforms in response to the Accord have not yet addressed one of the sector’s leading preoccupations: the Job-ready Graduates (JRG) package. The Accord Report assesses JRG as follows:

Policy changes introduced as part of the JRG package in 2021, designed to influence student choice and usher students into areas of expected employment demand, have not worked. Rather, they have resulted in some students incurring disproportionately large HELP debts relative to future potential earnings, meaning that HELP debts are taking longer and longer to repay. (p. 153)

It concludes that JRG has undermined the purpose of the HELP system to enable wider access and system growth:

Various cost pressures on students as a result of higher fees are impeding student access to, and participation in, higher education – with a consequential effect on further system growth. (p. 152)

Research also suggests JRG has not changed student enrolment behaviour as intended, only influencing 1.5% of students to change degrees (extended report also available).

Recommendation 16a of the Accord Report calls for reducing the student contribution rates introduced through the JRG, and a move ‘toward a student contribution system based on projected potential lifetime earnings.’ (p. 166) In May 2025, the Government itself declared the JRG policy ‘didn’t work’, and stated that ATEC would ‘look at that Job-ready Graduates program and what change can happen’.

The Bill provides for no apparent immediate action to address student contribution costs. ATEC does have the specified function to prepare reports and provide advice and recommendations, if the Minister requests, on ‘the efficient cost of higher education across disciplines and student cohorts and in relation to the Commonwealth contribution amounts for places in funding clusters’ (subparagraph 11(d)(ii)). This function is reiterated with slightly different wording around the ‘the costs of teaching and learning in higher education and overall higher education funding amounts, including on a per student basis’ at paragraph 41(b).

Andrew Norton argues that the Bill suggests an approach whereby student contributions are a ‘residual item’ to Commonwealth contributions, with the former to be calculated against the latter. He also discusses how the wording of these subclauses may have relevance to the Government’s intended Managed Growth Funding System.

Higher Education Standards Framework (Threshold Standards)

Under the Bill, ATEC will provide advice and recommendations:

• to the Minister in relation to the Higher Education Standards Framework (the Framework) under the TEQSA Act
• to TEQSA in relation to the Higher Education Standards Framework under the TEQSA Act, on its own initiative or at TEQSA’s request (paragraphs 11(e) and (f)).

Through legislative instrument, the Minister can set the Higher Education Standards Framework, which includes the Threshold Standards and other quality-related standards. They are regulated by TEQSA.

Currently, under Part 9 of the TEQSA Act, the Higher Education Standards Panel (HESP) (currently 8 people) must develop the draft Framework for the Minister, and both must consult widely – for the Minister that includes with state and territory governments and TEQSA (see Andrew Norton’s blogpost for more overview). The Bill and C&T Bill will amend the TEQSA Act to repeal Part 9 and provide that the Minister will now make the Framework on the advice of the ATEC, instead of on the advice of the HESP (which will no longer exist).

Andrew Norton has noted that the eligibility requirements for ATEC Commissioners omit those applied to HESP members, such as ‘professional knowledge and demonstrated expertise, including in higher education and the development of quality standards’ (section 167, TEQSA Act). On the latter, the Bill does allow for ATEC to form committees, ‘with appropriate knowledge or experience relevant to the subject matter,’ to provide advice or recommendations (subclauses 25(2) and (4)). The EM explains that ATEC could form an advisory committee to assist with its functions relating to the Threshold Standards (p. 26).