Senator David Pocock's additional comments
1.1The work this committee has done over both the previous and current parliamentary terms has been of enormous consequence to Australia's higher education sector. Prior to handing down its final report, the inquiry has already been a catalyst for change.
1.2We have seen the Albanese Government establish an Expert Council on University Governance, a change in leadership and a stop to further forced redundancies at the Australian National University (ANU).
1.3There have been other changes too, ranging from a walk back of job cuts at universities such as the University of Technology Sydney (UTS), to investigations being launched into senior leadership figures such as the Chancellor at Swinburne University.
1.4The spotlight of a Senate inquiry has allowed the sun to shine into some dark places. It has shown that Chancellors and Vice-Chancellors who do not do the right thing by their staff or students, or who otherwise jeopardise their institution's social licence, can and will be held accountable.
1.5I would like to thank the previous and current committee Chairs, Senator Tony Sheldon and Senator Marielle Smith, my colleagues on the committee, the secretariat and everyone who provided testimony, submissions and other evidence—in some cases at great personal cost—in support of this inquiry.
1.6I would also like to thank the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA) and its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Dr Mary Russell in particular for her consistently frank, fearless and forthcoming testimony before the committee, and for the diligence with which TEQSA carries out its duties as higher education regulator even under new and unprecedented circumstances. Such testimony and such an approach stands out and is to be commended.
1.7And I would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the University of Queensland's Emeritus Professor Graeme Turner, whose passing last month was a huge loss to Australia's higher education sector. Professor Turner's most recent publication Broken: Universities, Politics and the Public Good published in July this year clearly paints the picture this inquiry has seen first-hand of a higher education system in crisis. He charts the demise of what was once a publicly oriented system educating citizens and building knowledge—through decades of underfunding, market-driven policies and over-reliance on international student income—into a fractured, corporatised operation.
1.8My sincere hope is that the work of the committee, and all those who have contributed to it, can help chart a path back to rebuilding the kind of higher education system Australians need, want and deserve. We are incredibly fortunate in this country to have some of the best and brightest researchers, academics and higher educational professionals who dedicate their lives to furthering the public good. We need to get better at valuing their contributions and that of the institutions they call home.
1.9It will take courage and a government willing to spend not only political capital but invest actual capital to restore good governance of, and in, our higher education sector and enable it to achieve its full potential for current and future generations of staff and students.
1.10I wholeheartedly support the committee's view, as articulated in the committee's report that 'universities are indeed public institutions, established for the public good, and their governance arrangements should reflect that'.
1.11The interim Australian Tertiary Education Commission (ATEC) provided evidence to the committee during Senate Estimates that some preliminary work is being undertaken to better understand the true costs of teaching and learning. As the drivers behind one of Australia's biggest export industries worth some $50 billion annually, our academics shouldn't think they need to wear high viz to work to feel like they have a real job.
1.12We need to come up with a better formula for how we fund our public universities. We need to account for the increasing direct and indirect costs of research. We need to be clearer about the purpose of our universities for the public good and be willing to pay them to deliver that. This will allow universities to reduce their over-reliance on international students, to focus on student experience, to support more first-in-family students, to adapt their offerings to a changing world and ultimately, to recapture their social licence.
1.13While welcoming the evidence-based work on costs outlined above, I am alarmed that reform of the failed Job Ready Graduates (JRG) Scheme and a change to the timing of indexation on student debt have not progressed. These key recommendations of the Universities Accord are raised consistently by Vice‑Chancellors and first year humanities students alike.
1.14JRG has now been in operation longer under the Labor Government than it was under the Coalition Government. The one-off 20 percent reduction in existing student debt does nothing to address the structural problem or help arts and humanities students being saddled with $50 000 debts.
1.15At the same time, Australia's spend on research and development is at record lows. Jobs are being shed across the higher education sector, notwithstanding those the committee's work has helped to stop, and more broadly in what feels like a research sector under siege. More than 1000 jobs cut at the CSIRO, a cloud over the Australian Research Council, a failure to release additional Medical Research Future Fund (MRFF) funds to supplement National Health and Medical Research Council grants and lift grant award rates—these are just some of the signs of a system under extreme stress. I look forward to seeing what the Strategic Examination of Research and Development (SERD) review recommends and how the Albanese Government responds to this critical piece of work. Australia will not continue to be a clever country and successfully confront the challenges before us if we don’t turn this declining research and development investment trend around.
Recommendation 1
1.16The Australian Tertiary Education Commission (ATEC) should prioritise work to develop and consult on new models to sustainably fund Australia's universities to achieve their primary purpose in the public good. ATEC's work program must also tackle with urgency reforming the failed Job Ready Graduates Scheme and changing the timing of indexation of student debt.
Recommendation 2
1.17With due consideration of the final report of the Strategic Examination of Research and Development review, the Australian Government should commit to a pathway for increasing investment in research over the short, medium and longer term. This should also address the long-neglected issue of increasing PhD stipend base rates to support the next generation of researchers and academics our country will rely upon.
1.18I support the committee's recommendations but argue that the evidence tendered to the committee suggests some need to go further and I submit additional recommendations on top of those proposed.
1.19Regarding the committee's first recommendation, the evidence points to a need for this to be more explicit and stringent in addressing the composition and representative nature of university governing bodies.
1.20Similarly, the second recommendation needs to include stronger oversight and accountability mechanisms for university councils and more effective paths for recourse when governance goes awry.
1.21As TEQSA's CEO Dr Russell told the committee on 4 December:
We're actively contemplating the full range of possible outcomes. And I would have to say this is not something I think that has ever occurred for TEQSA before.[1]
1.22Most importantly, as Australia's national university, and the only one governed by Commonwealth legislation, the committee's report misses a unique opportunity to recommend reforms to the Australian National University Act 1991 (ANU Act) that could set the ANU up as the gold standard for university governance.
1.23ANU has been a distressing test case of the widespread governance issues that are plaguing Australian universities. But we have an opportunity to make the ANU an exemplar of what university governance can and should look like in this country. This will require continued leadership renewal, reform of the ANU Act, and for successive governments to get serious about how they fund our universities for the public good.
1.24Higher education reform is a complex problem, However, between the Universities Accord, the university governance inquiry and local expertise like the ANU Governance Project, we have been through the processes and amassed the experts with the solutions to solve this.
1.25Australian universities are operating within an accountability framework that is no longer fit for purpose. Since the 1980s, the sector has steadily imported the governance practices and managerialism of the for-profit private sector, often without sufficient regard for the fundamentally different public mission universities exist to serve. In the process, governing bodies and senior management have grown increasingly distant from the academic and student communities on whose behalf they exercise authority. Collegial governance has steadily fallen away as universities have expanded into vast institutions managing billions of dollars in public and private assets, and a model of top-down control—entrenched by the rise of managerialism and formalised through the governance protocols of 2004—has taken firm hold.[2] As one former Vice‑Chancellor told us, a '... root cause … is an uncritical assumption that a modified version of "corporate governance" is appropriate for a university'.[3]
1.26Universities are now governed by university councils composed of individuals of considerable professional standing.[4] Yet they too often lack the time, the sectoral understanding and the full information required to effectively discharge responsibilities on behalf of institutions that exist not for private gain, but for the public good.[5] These councils are functionally self-appointing, structurally insulated and, in practice, largely impermeable to meaningful internal challenge. As one academic serving on the UTS Council noted, 'when I communicated an invitation to some members to meet with professors in the faculties, one responded, "I don't think that would be appropriate"'.[6]
1.27The evidence before this committee demonstrates that councils fail to meet the basic accountability standards that would be uncontroversial in either a corporate boardroom or a democratic parliament. In corporations, shareholders can remove directors who fail to deliver. In democratic systems, citizens can remove governments that forfeit their confidence. In our universities, however, councils exercise vast power in a realm where no equivalent mechanism of internal consequence or accountability exists.[7] This is not a design flaw; it is a foundational defect in university governance arrangements, and one that strikes at the heart of the sector's legitimacy.
1.28This state of affairs persists in large part because the composition of university governing bodies is, in practice, shaped overwhelmingly by the office of the Chancellor. While the formal appointment processes are set out in each institution's establishing legislation, the effect in operation is a concentration of influence within a remarkably small circle. Councils do include elected representatives of staff, students, alumni and ex-officio executives, and that pluralism is important. Yet across Australian public universities, the clear majority of seats on council—some 68 per cent—are filled by appointed members, many drawn from corporate, financial or consultancy backgrounds.[8] These appointments are ostensibly guided by skills and diversity matrices. But the evidence before the committee makes clear that the Chancellor exercises a decisive influence at every critical juncture, chairing the nominations committee, shaping the pool of candidates, advising ministers on preferred appointments, and overseeing both the appointment and performance monitoring of the Vice-Chancellor.[9] Over time, and particularly in the case of long-serving Chancellors, this concentration of authority carries with it the power to refashion a governing body in the image of a single office-holder's preferences, networks and worldview. This system breeds insularity, invites the perception of jobs for mates, and steadily corrodes the conditions for genuine accountability.[10] For example, the Hon Wayne Martin AC KC was appointed to the ANU Council in 2025. The Hon Julie Bishop, who chairs the ANU Council Nomination Committee, told us in response to a question on notice that she 'has known the Hon Wayne Martin from the early 1990s, around the time he was appointed a Queen's Counsel'.[11]
1.29Just as the Briggs Review[12] laid bare a culture of patronage, favouritism and so-called 'jobs for mates' in public sector board appointments—where discretion too often displaced transparent rules and merit-based process—so too do we now see analogous failures reflected in the appointment processes of university governing bodies. This deficit of accountability leaves our universities poorly governed, lacking the accountability expected of public institutions and leading to sub-standard outcomes for students, the pursuit of knowledge by universities, and ultimately the public.
1.30When governance failures occur—whether financial mismanagement, deteriorating academic standards and student experience, systemic wage theft, or institutional crises—the people responsible for oversight remain entrenched, with no mechanism for stakeholders to demand change. Staff and students, who bear the consequences of poor governance, cannot remove council members who fail them. External appointees, who typically form council majorities, often lack deep stakes in academic outcomes and face minimal penalties for decisions that damage the university's core mission.[13]
1.31The external regulatory system compounds rather than corrects these accountability failures. As TEQSA informed this committee, it lacks direct enforcement powers and cannot pursue penalties without lengthy court involvement. Its focus on individual provider compliance rather than systemic risks means it struggles to address sector-wide problems like wage theft or cultural failures. Its multi-step, resource-intensive process delays enforcement and leaves the regulator unable to address urgent or emerging risks effectively.[14] The result is a system that serves neither the public interest, students or university staff.
1.32Focusing exclusively on external accountability mechanisms—such as enhanced TEQSA reporting and regulatory oversight—without addressing broken internal accountability structures risks creating governance reforms that undermine university autonomy while failing to prevent future systemic failures. While the report's recommendations, such as improved consultation, staff representation, and complaints processes, are welcome, they lack institutionalisation and depend on voluntary cultural change within Australian universities.
1.33Effective accountability mechanisms must balance the competing demands of oversight and autonomy, rather than prioritising external compliance at the expense of institutional independence. In practice this means Australian universities need both effective governing bodies (existing councils) and accountability bodies. Such accountability bodies should be new internal institutions, where university stakeholders can revive internal university governance. External regulation can only act after failures occur rather than preventing them, potentially creating ongoing and increasing government involvement in university affairs that could jeopardize the autonomy of Australia's universities.
Recommendation 3
1.34Inquiries into university governance should be replicated in all other Australian states and territories to ensure that universities are meeting community expectations regarding governance practices.
Recommendation 4
1.35Further to the committee's first recommendation, state and territory governments, in reviewing the establishing acts of universities, should also amend those acts to ensure they meet, at a minimum, the recommendations of this inquiry and the Expert Panel on University Governance. University establishing acts ought to have explicit public good objectives, and should require that governing bodies have the appropriate structure and composition to meet such public good objectives.
1.36Australian universities' accountability systems must be refocused on three core tasks: ensuring the right people serve on governing bodies through changing composition and appointment processes, and better recall powers; rebuilding internal problem-solving and complaint-handling capacity so that staff and students have a genuine voice in decision-making; and lifting transparency standards so that governance no longer occurs behind closed doors but with integrity, in full public view.
1.37There are currently no clear or independent processes for managing complaints against Chancellors or other council members, nor for addressing the underperformance of council members, beyond referring the matter back to the council itself. In practice, councils are left to mark their own homework. Evidence given to this committee regarding the ANU demonstrates the weakness of this arrangement. The Department of Finance informed the committee that neither the Minister for Education nor the Minister for Finance has the authority to remove the ANU Chancellor, even in circumstances where the Chancellor is found to have egregiously breached their duties under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act).[15]
1.38Accountability through the higher education regulator, TEQSA, is likewise limited. While I commend the steps TEQSA has taken to address the unprecedented governance issues at the ANU, for example, I note that this is a time-consuming process. More than six months has elapsed since I wrote to the Education Minister outlining in detail a range of concerns which he then referred to TEQSA, and which it will take at least another three to four months to complete investigations and decision making about. For Dr Liz Allen, who first lodged a workplace grievance in February 2025, the process is even more drawn out, with many months yet to run on the inquiry eventually established internally by the ANU through a Special Governance Committee being led by Dr Vivienne Thom AM.[16] While criticisms have been levelled at this committee and our handling of the inquiry by the ANU Chancellor with respect to this specific case, they only serve to highlight the spectacular inadequacy of any remotely effective internal mechanism to respond to serious allegations against the most senior university leaders. The fact that the matter had to come before a Senate committee inquiry to prompt any kind of formal process to respond to the complaint underscores the extent of the internal failing.
1.39The Nixon Review highlighted this gap saying that the '... management of complaints about staff and students at ANU is fragmented which makes community safety initiatives difficult to assess from a whole-of-university perspective. Not all matters that should be handled as complaints are recognised as such or appropriately managed'.[17]
1.40Christine Nixon AO's work also highlighted another deeply problematic practice reflected in other testimony to the inquiry about the frequent and inappropriate use of non-disclosure or non-disparagement agreements:
During the course of this review, I requested information in relation to two academics that the University declined to provide because it had entered deeds prohibiting it from disclosing the information.
It has also been difficult for staff to obtain timely legal advice through the University Legal Office, which does not include specialist industrial relations expertise.[18]
1.41Where a university council or its members breach the Threshold Standards, TEQSA may initiate an investigation. In severe cases, the regulator may conclude that particular council members are not 'fit and proper' or impose registration conditions requiring their removal.[19] Either intervention would be unprecedented for an Australian university. Nevertheless, TEQSA has confirmed in evidence to the committee that it is currently considering both possibilities in relation to matters raised about the ANU, underscoring the gravity of the governance failures presented to this inquiry.[20]
1.42These structural gaps demonstrate the need for the formal introduction of recall provisions—clear, enforceable mechanisms for removing underperforming or unfit council members in cases of demonstrable failure, breach, or loss of confidence. Creating a new, independent body representing university stakeholders, empowered either to review council performance or to remove senior management in serious cases, would realign governance settings toward genuine accountability. Such a shift would strengthen institutional stewardship by ensuring that authority is matched with consequences for poor behaviour.
1.43In parallel, a committee of that independent appointments body could replace existing university nominations committees, which often operate through opaque and insular processes. A transparent, merit-based, publicly visible appointments system—supported by open advertising and rigorous assessment—should be mandated to eliminate patronage and favouritism and broaden the pool of high-quality candidates available for council roles. Collectively, these reforms would introduce disciplined governance standards, enhance public confidence, and embed accountability at the heart of university leadership.
Recommendation 5
1.44That independent bodies representing university stakeholders be created with powers to appoint new governing body members and, in cases of serious failure, breach, or loss of confidence, to terminate the appointment of existing members.
Recommendation 6
1.45Update university practices and procedures to prohibit or severely limit the circumstances in which non-disclosure or non-disparagement clauses or agreements can be used, and establish a mechanism to oversee and challenge any such use.
1.46This inquiry has heard from a wide array of peak bodies that claim to speak for the university sector, and many of them have appeared before the committee in this process. Yet it is also clear that the overwhelming weight of organised representation rests with senior management, chancellors and institutional leadership—through bodies such as Universities Australia, the University Chancellors Council and the Australian Higher Education Industrial Association—as well as with various councils of Deans. Those perspectives, while legitimate, are not always aligned with the experiences or interests of the staff and students who constitute the living heart of our universities. The National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU), of course, plays a vital role in representing the industrial and professional interests of its members. Yet it is a striking and consequential absence that academics themselves—as the custodians of teaching, research and scholarship—have no independent, non-union national voice through which to speak to the governance of the institutions they serve.
1.47And speak they most certainly did in this inquiry. From the hundreds of submissions received, a consistent thread emerges. Academics care deeply about the governance of their universities, and much of what they told us was not flattering. That should not be dismissed as discontent but as the accumulated frustration of those who have given their working lives to institutions whose public purpose is being steadily eroded.
1.48The evidence presented to the inquiry is entirely consistent with my own lived experience in what is, unequivocally, a university town, with five separate universities having campuses here. I have been stopped on the street by constituents wanting to talk about university governance more than any other issue since being elected to Parliament.
1.49Strengthening the voice of academics, students and the wider university community within institutional governance is not optional. It is essential. Those who create the knowledge of our universities and those who come to be educated within them hold the deepest and most enduring stake in institutional quality, and they possess forms of operational and institutional knowledge that too rarely reach the highest levels of decision making.
1.50This failure in the upward flow of critical information leads to poorly informed decisions. When policy and budgets are shaped by management without the informed input of the academic community, governing bodies are left unable to provide effective oversight.
1.51The evidence before the inquiry strongly indicates that university staff, students and the wider community require robust, formal mechanisms to scrutinise the decisions of senior executives and governing councils. Witnesses consistently argued that a pervasive lack of transparency and accountability has damaged institutional integrity and contributed to poor governance outcomes. University governance was repeatedly characterised as secretive and opaque, an information 'black hole'.[21] According to the Monash University Branch of the NTEU, requests for access to minutes are 'regularly refused and no effort is made to make these public documents available to staff, students or the community'.[22] The ANU Governance Project reported that 'Council and senior Executive processes were seen as secretive, with key deliberations closed and data withheld'.[23]
1.52During the course of the inquiry, my office was inundated with questions from university staff, students, parents of students and others seeking answers from university management. In the case of staff in particular, many expressed a fear of retribution should they raise concerns openly, while others reported that questions directed to management are frequently ignored. The proliferation of proton.me email addresses this inquiry has sparked speaks volumes. This evidence points to a systemic failure to provide safe, credible and effective avenues for scrutiny within universities. It shouldn't be the job of the Senate to be the intermediary between university management and their staff.
1.53The committee heard compelling and consistent evidence of a persistent information asymmetry between those who manage our universities and those who constitute their core academic life. Academics, professional staff and students hold deep operational and institutional knowledge, yet time and again that knowledge fails to reach the governing bodies charged with oversight. Staff and student representatives told this inquiry that their contributions were frequently marginalised in council deliberations, and in some cases that access to documents and core information was actively constrained, frustrating conscientious attempts at scrutiny.[24]
1.54The consequence of this disconnect is not abstract. It is decision making that is insufficiently informed by the lived realities of teaching, research and student life. Where governing bodies lack grounded experience of the institution's core functions, they are left poorly equipped to steward complex strategic choices. The risk that follows is clear and present: decisions that are poorly conceived, weakly tested, and ultimately misaligned with the public mission universities exist to serve.
1.55In response to these systemic weaknesses, the committee heard calls from a number of witnesses for a substantial strengthening of democratic representation within university governing councils. In particular, it was proposed that the Threshold Standards should prescribe a minimum number, or proportion, of elected staff and student members on Australian university councils, in order to anchor decision making more firmly in the lived reality of the institutions being governed.[25] Chancellors, by contrast, expressed concern that a majority of elected members would alter the character of governance and risk blurring the distinction between the role of academics as employees and their duties to the institution as a whole.[26]
1.56There is a legitimate debate to be had on this question. But the evidence before the committee makes one point unmistakably clear. A guaranteed minimum proportion of elected staff and student representatives would strengthen scrutiny and improve the flow of critical institutional knowledge, without transferring control of councils to narrower internal interests.
1.57Finally, the committee heard a major reform proposal aimed squarely at restoring scrutiny where it has been allowed to erode. Witnesses argued for the creation of a structured and protected avenue through which the university community could question, advise and scrutinise the governing body and senior executive on matters of performance, strategy and institutional direction. The case put to us was that this mechanism would strengthen internal accountability, help to rebuild trust that has been so visibly strained, and reduce the sector's increasing dependence on blunt external parliamentary or regulatory intervention as the primary means of correction. This proposal goes directly to the architecture of good governance, as I will return to later in these Additional Comments.
Recommendation 7
1.58The Threshold Standards should prescribe an explicit minimum proportion of elected staff and student members on Australian university councils of at least one-half.
1.59Transparency is desperately needed for these public bodies. Evidence to the inquiry shows a broad pattern of opaque governance across Australian universities. Key documents are routinely withheld, decision-making often occurs in camera, and there is no general obligation to publish council minutes. Staff, students, and unions describe a system that shields information from public view, creating a private company culture without corresponding shareholder accountability.
1.60Financial transparency is poor. Universities frequently avoid scrutiny of internal financial data. And financial data are reportedly poor. According to one accounting academic who serves on UTS Council, 'my university's cost accounting system is so structurally weak that its design wouldn't earn a pass for a second-year accounting student'.[27]
1.61Financial transparency concerns raised in the evidence centre on allegations that universities routinely misrepresent their financial position, obscure major categories of expenditure, and tightly control access to financial information. There is a concern that institutions craft a narrative by publishing an 'underlying operating deficit' that sharply diverges from the audited consolidated surplus. Universities do this, despite the fact that the underlying figure is not subject to audit, to present a financial narrative that suits management by selectively including or excluding items of revenue or expenditure. According to some staff, unions, and other stakeholders, a calculated presentation of financial fragility is used to rationalise job cuts, outsourcing, and large-scale organisational change. The practice of reporting unaudited underlying operating results has eroded public confidence in universities, contributing to widespread scepticism about the accuracy of financial data. The effect is a deepening mistrust in institutional leadership, as stakeholders increasingly view the published financial story not as an honest representation of university finances but as an instrument to secure managerial objectives.
Recommendation 8
1.62All universities should transition to adopt a single, transparent, standard method for calculating and publishing their 'underlying operating result', developed with the Australian Tertiary Education Commission and appropriate consultation, with the full methodology openly disclosed and reasons for inclusion or exclusion of revenues and expenditures individually and publicly reported. In addition to this standard measure, universities should also report common private-sector indicators such as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA). States and territories should align their reporting requirements with this standard method.
1.63Transparent disclosure of interests is central to maintaining the integrity, legitimacy, and public trust in university governance. When senior executives and council members exercise significant authority over budgets, strategy, appointments, and commercial partnerships, the public has a reasonable expectation that these decisions are made free from undisclosed personal or financial interests. Across many institutions, such disclosures are either incomplete, inconsistently maintained, and/or not publicly accessible. This lack of visibility creates fertile ground for real or perceived conflicts of interest—particularly when universities increasingly engage in commercial ventures, property development, industry partnerships, and consultancy arrangements that can overlap with the external roles or financial interests of decision-makers. Public, real-time disclosure is essential to maintaining integrity and trust, particularly as universities expand their commercial and partnership activities.
Recommendation 9
1.64Universities make disclosure-of-interests registers for senior executives and governing body members public and update them in real time.
1.65Concerns regarding procurement practices and the extensive use of external consultants were widely raised in submissions and hearings, with witnesses arguing that opaque, poorly documented, and occasionally self-serving contracting practices undermine financial accountability, institutional integrity, and the safeguards that prevent corruption in other parts of the public sector. Universities spend significant amounts of public and private funds on external expertise, yet disclosure is frequently inadequate. Each year, public universities collectively spent hundreds of millions of dollars on consultants and professional services, but this expenditure is often obscured within broad, uninformative categories in annual reports, making it difficult to identify which firms were engaged, on what terms, and whether conflicts of interest were appropriately managed. Staff and academic representatives also noted that consultant reports used to justify major restructures or strategic decisions are routinely withheld under claims of 'commercial-in-confidence', limiting scrutiny and falling short of the transparency standards expected across the broader public sector.
1.66Of particular concern is the pervasive influence of Nous Group and its UniForum benchmarking data. I was concerned to learn through the inquiry how many Australian universities Nous Group had contracted to in the past five years. Also of concern are potential conflicts of interest given contracts Nous Group has held with the Australian Public Service (APS). Nous Group has also been a destination of choice for multiple senior department officials over the years, often with no cooling off period or other safeguard in place. I return to this in more detail below.
1.67To respond to these systemic problems, stakeholders proposed stronger, enforceable procurement transparency requirements aligned with public-sector norms. First, many advocated adopting national itemised disclosure obligations modelled on the Victorian framework, requiring universities to publish clear, detailed information about all consultancy expenditure, including the purpose of each engagement and whether internal capability was considered. A similar model of disclosure operates for APS departments and agencies, known as the Murray motion. This level of disclosure would enable staff and public oversight, help guard against conflicts of interest, and reduce opportunities for corrupt or improper conduct. More generally, there is no reason that universities should not comply with public sector standards for full transparency over tendering processes, including independent probity sign-off for major contracts, and ensuring that procurement decisions are defensible and free from perceived or actual bias. Second, witnesses argued for greater 'insourcing' of expertise, noting that the over-reliance on consultants represents poor value for money and bypasses the substantial in-house capability available within universities.
Recommendation 10
1.68To strengthen financial accountability, prevent conflicts of interest, and align university governance with established public sector integrity standards, universities should be required to report all procurement contracts through their jurisdictions' reporting portal. For the Australian National University, this would mean registering their contracts with the Commonwealth's public sector reporting platform, AusTender.
1.69Making the proceedings of university governing bodies public would help restore legitimacy and accountability in their governance. These proposals aim to directly address the pervasive sense that university decision-making processes are currently shrouded in secrecy. The ANU Governance Project, an academic and student-led initiative, explicitly recommended that the ANU 'Council meetings should immediately be made fully accessible to the community', reflecting established practices at United States public universities.[28] The Australia Institute also recommended that university council meetings should be generally run in public by default, comparable to how parliament operates, specifically recommending that council meetings should be livestreamed, with provisions could be made for a specific 'in camera session' to address highly sensitive matters.[29] For this to work, there needs to be very clear guidelines about what material at council meetings there is a genuine public interest in remaining confidential, distinct from unjustified secrecy.
Recommendation 11
1.70Universities should adopt a clear transparency framework under which council meetings would be open to the public and livestreamed by default. Only a tightly limited in camera session would remain, reserved for matters where there is a demonstrable and compelling public interest in confidentiality. Council should publish reasons for the confidentiality of each in camera item. To support this, universities should establish clear and codified criteria that distinguish legitimate confidentiality from unnecessary secrecy, ensuring that staff, students, and the broader community can be confident that closed sessions are the exception rather than the norm.
Recommendation 12
1.71Specific timeframes for publishing council minutes should be established and rules adopted governing the appropriate labelling and sourcing of all reports and documentation presented to council. This will both improve transparency and also help guard against any unwitting reliance on data, analysis and documents provided by external consultants by council members in their decision making.
1.72The committee heard confronting evidence from staff who described, often at great personal cost, gruelling and distressing experiences of having serious complaints mishandled.[30] Many showed remarkable courage in coming forward despite fears of retaliation, reputational harm and career damage. Their evidence revealed complaint processes that are widely perceived as unsafe and ineffective, marked by weak accountability, inconsistent consequences for misconduct, cultures of fear and retaliation, and failures to address serious abuses of power. Routine use of non-disclosure and non-disparagement clauses are perceived to be used to silence complainants, suppress criticism and conceal wrongdoing. While the establishment of the National Student Ombudsman is a welcome and important step, no such institution exists for staff.
Recommendation 13
1.73The Higher Education Standards Framework (Threshold Standards) 2021 should be amended to require all Australian universities to maintain genuinely independent, safe and transparent complaints and misconduct‑handling systems, including for complaints made against senior leadership. In the case of the latter, such processes must be fit-for-purpose and not rest in the hands of more junior staff.
1.74The inquiry heard compelling evidence that management consultants now exert pervasive influence across the university sector, operating in effect as shadow decision-makers who advise both the Department of Education and universities while driving major restructuring programs. Firms such as Nous, Deloitte, and KPMG earn vast public contracts, with estimates as high as $734 million on consulting and professional advice in 2023 alone.[31] Their work spans restructuring portfolios, managing public communications during crises, redesigning academic services, streamlining operations and lifting research performance. In doing so, consultants routinely handle confidential information for multiple universities and the Department of Education.
1.75The inquiry also heard troubling evidence of a 'revolving door' between universities and major consulting firms, creating real and perceived conflicts of interest. The University of Wollongong case—where Professor John Dewar, a partner at KordaMentha, was appointed interim Vice-Chancellor shortly before the firm secured a major operational review contract—is particularly concerning. While the Chancellor denied any connection, documents later showed Professor Dewar remained engaged in business with KordaMentha during his tenure. Similar issues arose during the creation of Adelaide University, where Deloitte's Asia-Pacific CEO sat on the University of Adelaide Council before Deloitte was appointed as the merger's integration partner. More broadly, witnesses reported that consultants are frequently appointed to universities' governing bodies, embedding a culture that privileges restructuring over academic values.
1.76The inquiry also heard that heavy reliance on consultants undermines universities' own expertise. At ANU, for example, the new Vice-Chancellor sought advice in 2024 from an external consultancy on foundational questions about the university's future direction rather than drawing on internal academic capability. These consultancy reports, which shape strategic direction, are not subject to independent peer review and are treated as confidential trade secrets, despite universities existing to advance and transmit knowledge. And too often, they are of poor quality. As one council member informed the inquiry, 'upon seeing a set of slide decks and asking to see the report itself, I was informed that the slide decks were the report. This is the basis on which multimillion dollar decisions are being made'.[32]
1.77Finally, the use of opaque, commercially driven tools such as UniForum benchmarking was strongly criticised. These metrics are used to justify job cuts and structural change but measure service costs only through professional staff hours, ignoring administrative work shifted onto academics. This can create the appearance of efficiency while increasing workloads and damaging teaching and research. These risks are compounded by UniForum's ownership by Nous Group, which both sets the benchmark and sells the consultancy solutions to address it. This creates a situation where one part of the firm 'identifies' problems and another part can then swoop in to design the 'solution'.[33]
1.78We heard suggestions of other types of poorly managed conflicts of interest regarding consultancies.[34] The first relates to the risk of sharing confidential information by consultants between clients. For better or worse, universities see each other as competitors in some areas of work, meaning that their plans and aspirations are often commercial-in-confidence. This means that management consultants, whose work often involves helping university management shape their visions and the strategies and tactics for achieving them, are in a position to trade upon these secrets. In short, unscrupulous management consultants could sell the secrets of one university to another. There appears to be demand for that service from Vice Chancellors.[35]
1.79The second relates to the Department of Education. The committee heard that the Nous Group's work for the Department of Education during the development of the Universities Accord in 2023 raised concerns about a potential conflict of interest. The firm earns a large share of its income from universities at the same time as the role of external consultants ought to have been in the spotlight in the Accord process. This firm alone is currently conducting consulting work for 19 universities worth $5.9 million dollars.[36] The Department of Education engaged Nous to analyse submissions to the Accord consultation process. Its resulting 80-page report did not refer to external consultants at all, an omission that was widely described as extremely concerning given Nous's position in the sector. In response, representatives of the firm noted that staff who prepared the Department of Education's report were generally not working on university consulting at that moment, describing this as an imperfect defence but asserting that the conflicts had been managed as well as possible. Nous confirmed that it had undertaken $9.8 million worth of contracts for the Department in the period 2000–2025, and $23.1 million worth of contracts for state and territory education departments over the same period.[37]
Recommendation 14
1.80Universities should be required to publicly disclose all consultancy contracts, consistent with Recommendation 10, and to publish any consultant-produced advice in a timely manner, including the underlying data and methodologies, with only narrow and clearly defined exemptions.
Recommendation 15
1.81To prevent real or perceived conflicts of interest arising from the revolving door between universities and consulting firms, individuals should be prohibited from holding senior university roles and consultancy positions concurrently, and a mandatory cooling-off period should apply before a former executive or council member can be employed by a consultancy firm, and vice versa.
1.82The committee's interim report recommendation for greater external accountability to TEQSA is welcomed. However, the internal accountability recommendations rely mainly on voluntary action and cultural change within universities. Feedback I have received on the report suggests that without strong external enforcement mechanisms, or strong internal institutionalisation, internal governance reforms will have limited meaningful impact because they depend on universities choosing to fully implement them. This is a surface-level fix that does not shift internal incentives.
1.83This enforcement gap where the government creates a powerful regulator but leaves internal governance largely dependent on norms and cultural change, creates a potentially dangerous dynamic. While stronger external reporting may encourage some internal reforms, real progress depends on restoring a clear chain of accountability inside universities. Without institutionalised internal accountability mechanisms, university councils would remain self-perpetuating and resistant to scrutiny. Relying solely on external oversight to compensate for weak internal governance opens up the risk of ongoing and increasing government involvement in university affairs, potentially jeopardising the autonomy of Australia's universities while still failing to prevent governance failures before they occur.
1.84As a Senator for the ACT, I welcome the particular attention this inquiry has paid to the ANU. The ANU is unique in the tertiary education sector as a higher education institution established by an Act of Federal Parliament, in 1946. This unique status means the Commonwealth has legislative responsibility for the institution, placing the Federal Parliament in a unique oversight role over the university compared to other higher education providers established by acts of state and territory governments.
1.85The ANU is also the primary recipient of the National Institutes Grant, which provides long-term and stable funding to undertake research of national importance. As Australia's only national university, the ANU has a unique responsibility to serve the whole of Australian society. As witnesses from ANU noted, it is ideally placed to model what good university governance should look like in Australia.[38]
1.86I am persuaded that the ANU requires a dedicated, statutory accountability body to address long-standing failures in transparency, scrutiny and accountability in governance.[39] The inquiry revealed a persistent gap between the council and executive on the one hand, and staff, students and the wider university community on the other. This gap has enabled information asymmetries to flourish, fostered internal dissent and entrenched a perception that major decisions are insulated from meaningful scrutiny. In my view, these problems cannot be resolved through procedural reforms to governing bodies alone. What is required is a structural accountability institution, protected by enshrinement in the ANU Act, to give practical effect to the principles of voice, scrutiny and appointment and recall. It has been suggested that such a body could be called the 'ANU Senate' or 'ANU Forum'.[40]
1.87Such a body would not replace or compete with the university council as the governing authority. The council would remain the Accountable Authority and retain responsibility for the control and management of the university. Instead, the new body would operate as a permanent internal accountability mechanism with specific and limited functions and powers. It would provide a protected forum for staff and students to question the executive, require the production of information, convene regular public question-and-answer sessions, and report formally to council with a corresponding obligation on council to respond. It would possess appointment and, in extraordinary circumstances, recall powers in relation to the Chancellor and council members.
1.88The ANU Senate or Forum could also play a formal role in overseeing major institutional change programs, such as Renew ANU, which have repeatedly become flashpoints for crises across the sector. By sharing real decision-making authority over certain restructuring decisions with an accountability body of this kind, the quality, legitimacy and durability of change management would be strengthened, reducing the risk that internal change processes escalate into damaging public institutional crises.
1.89Staff and students should form the core of this body, reflecting their direct and ongoing stake in the university's mission, supported by representation of the wider public interest including representatives of this Parliament and First Nations stakeholders. It should operate with transparency as the default, meeting regularly in public, publishing recordings of debate and reporting annually on its work.
1.90This proposal represents a far more conservative and modest reform than granting staff and students a majority of seats on council. It preserves the existing governance model and the primacy of the council, while introducing a measured but meaningful layer of accountability alongside it.
1.91In my view, this is a pragmatic reform that would produce a structural shift in university governance, not radical but not merely cosmetic either. It would address the core accountability deficit facing the ANU by embedding accountability directly into the architecture of the university. This institutional architecture provides a credible internal alternative to the blunt instrument of external regulation, while accounting for and balancing stakeholder interests. Reform that creates concrete incentives for behavioural change within the university can begin to restore trust in an institution whose public mission depends fundamentally on openness, integrity and democratic legitimacy.
Recommendation 16
1.92That the Australian National University Act 1991 be amended to establish a statutory Australian National University Forum or Senate as a dedicated internal accountability body, with defined powers of providing advice, scrutiny, public questioning, information access, and appointment and recall in relation to the Chancellor and council members.
Recommendation 17
1.93That the Australian National University leadership methodically work through and provide a public response to each of the recommendations in the final report of the Australian National University Governance Project.
Senator David Pocock
Senator for the Australian Capital Territory
Footnotes
[1]Senate Education and Employment Legislation Committee, Supplementary Estimates 2025–26, Proof Committee Hansard, 4 December 2025, p. 91.
[2]Emeritus Professor William Maley, Submission 5 (47th Parliament); Professor John Quiggin, Submission 11 (47th Parliament); Professor Serena Dipierro, Submission 76 (47th Parliament); University of Queensland NTEU Branch, Submission 102 (47th Parliament); Emeritus Professor Stephen Parker AO and Emeritus Professor Stephen Bottomley, Submission 43.
[3]Emeritus Professor Stephen Parker AO and Emeritus Professor Stephen Bottomley, Submission 43, p.3.
[4]University Chancellors Council, Submission 23 (47th Parliament); NTEU, Submission 15 (47thParliament).
[5]Dr Marija Taflaga et al., Submission 6 (48th Parliament); NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament).
[6]Dr Robert Czernkowski, Submission 5 (48th Parliament).
[7]The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament); Dr Marija Taflaga et al., Submission 6; Professors Parker and Bottomley, Submission 43.
[8]National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU), Submission 15 (47th Parliament).
[9]University Chancellors Council, Submission 23 (47th Parliament); Dr Marija Taflaga et al., Submission6.
[10]Dr Marija Taflaga et al., Submission 6.
[11]Education and Employment Committee, Question on Notice ASQ25-0070, Australian National University, Supplementary Budget Estimates 2025–26.
[12]Lynelle Briggs AO, No Favourites: Report of the Review into Public Sector Board Appointments Processes (August 2023).
[13]Professor Gavin Nicholson, Submission 21 (47th Parliament), Dr Marija Taflaga et al., Submission 6; Professors Parker and Bottomley, Submission 43.
[14]TEQSA, Submission 17 (47th Parliament).
[15]Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee, Supplementary Estimates 2025–26, Proof Committee Hansard, 2 December 2025, p. 80.
[16]Australian National University, Special Governance Committee (accessed 11 December 2025).
[17]Professor Christine Nixon, AO, APM, Report of a Review into matters of gender and culture in the ANU College of Health and Medicine and its constituent Schools, the John Curtin School of Medical Research, the School of Medicine and Psychology, and the National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health (27 May 2025), p. 37.
[18]Professor Christine Nixon, AO, APM, Report of a Review into matters of gender and culture in the ANU College of Health and Medicine and its constituent Schools, the John Curtin School of Medical Research, the School of Medicine and Psychology, and the National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health (27 May 2025), p. 37.
[19]Senate Education and Employment Legislation Committee, Estimates, Proof Committee Hansard, 4December 2025, Canberra, evidence of Mr Nicholas Riordan, General Counsel, Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency.
[20]Senate Education and Employment Legislation Committee, Estimates, Proof Committee Hansard, 4 December 2025, Canberra, evidence of Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency.
[21]Senate Education and Employment Legislation Committee, Quality of Governance at Australian Higher Education Providers, Proof Committee Hansard, 10 November 2025, Adelaide, evidence of MrRichard Denniss, Co-Chief Executive Officer, Australia Institute.
[22]NTEU Monash University Branch (NTEU Monash), Submission 117 (47th Parliament).
[23]Australian National University Governance Project Working Group, Submission 18.1.
[24]Senate Education and Employment Legislation Committee, Quality of Governance at Australian Higher Education Providers, Proof Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, Canberra, evidence of Mr William Burfoot, President, Australian National University Students Association.
[25]NTEU, Submission 15 (47th Parliament); The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament); Dr Terry Dwyer, Submission 2; Dr Robert Czernkowski, Submission 5; Australian National University Governance Project Working Group, Submission 18.1.
[26]For example, Senate Education and Employment Legislation Committee, Quality of Governance at Australian Higher Education Providers, Official Committee Hansard, 8 September 2025, Sydney, evidence of Professor Jennifer Westacott AC, Chancellor, Western Sydney University.
[27]Dr Robert Czernkowski, Submission 5. [p. 2].
[28]Australian National University Governance Project Working Group, Submission 18.1, p. 8.
[29]The Australia Institute, Submission 105 (47th Parliament).
[30]Senate Education and Employment Legislation Committee, Quality of Governance at Australian Higher Education Providers, Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, Canberra, evidence of Dr Liz Allen.
[31]NTEU, Submission 15, Attachment 1 (47th Parliament).
[32]Dr Robert Czernkowski, Submission 5.
[33]Tim McLellan, Submission 16.
[34]Tim McLellan, Submission 16.
[35]According to emails released through Freedom of Information requests, within days of commencing as Vice Chancellor at ANU, Professor Genevieve Bell sought to commission 'some competitive benchmarking and strategic research analysis of the Australian HE [higher education] sector generally and some key competitors specifically, Rick Morton, The consultancy driving ANU cuts, The Saturday Paper, 10 May 2025.
[36]Nous response to QoNs taken at the hearing on November 12.
[37]Nous response to QoNs taken at the hearing on November 12.
[38]Senate Education and Employment Legislation Committee, Quality of Governance at Australian Higher Education Providers, Committee Hansard, 12 August 2025, Canberra, evidence of Dr Jessie Moritz; Australian National University Governance Project Working Group, Submission 18.1.
[39]Dr Marija Taflaga et al., Submission 6.1.
[40]Australian National University Governance Project Working Group, Submission 18.1, pp. 95–96.
Senate
House of Representatives
Get informed
Bills
Committees
Get involved
Visit Parliament
Website features
Parliamentary Departments