Bills Digest no. 174 2006–07
Corporations Legislation Amendment (Simpler Regulatory
System) Bill 2007
WARNING:
This Digest was prepared for debate. It reflects the legislation as
introduced and does not canvass subsequent amendments. This Digest
does not have any official legal status. Other sources should be
consulted to determine the subsequent official status of the
Bill.
CONTENTS
Passage history
Purpose
Background
Financial Services Regulation Background and
Main Provisions
Company reporting requirements Background and
Main Provisions
Auditor Independence Background and Main
Provisions
Corporate Governance - Background and Main
Provisions
Fundraising: Background and main
provisions
Takeovers Background and Main
Provisions
General Compliance - Background and Main
Provisions
Concluding comments
Endnotes
Contact officer & copyright details
Passage history
Corporations
Legislation Amendment (Simpler Regulatory System) Bill
2007
Corporations
(Fees) Amendment Bill 2007
Corporations
(Review Fees) Amendment Bill 2007
Date introduced:
24 May 2007
House: House of Representatives
Portfolio: Treasury
Commencement:
A range of commencement
dates.
The purpose of
this Bill is to make a series of amendments to the Corporations
Act 2001 that relate to financial services
regulation, company reporting obligations, auditor independence,
corporate governance, fundraising, takeovers and compliance.
As noted above, the Bill deals with a range of
amendments to the Corporations Act relating to financial services
regulation, company reporting obligations, auditor independence,
corporate governance, fundraising, takeovers and compliance. The
discussion in this Digest is divided into these seven specific
subject areas.
The changes proposed in the Bill draw on
recommendations made in a range of Government discussion papers
including:
- Corporate and Financial Services Regulation Review Consultation
Paper(1) (consultation paper)
- Corporate and Financial Services Regulation Review Proposals
Paper(2) (proposal paper)
- Australian Auditor Independence Requirements: A Comparative
Review(3)
- Rethinking Regulation, Report of the Taskforce on Reducing
Regulatory Burdens on Business(4)
The provisions in the Bill are to be
supplemented by regulations. At the time of writing this Digest,
the regulations had not been tabled in Parliament.
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In 2001, The Federal Parliament passed the
Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (FSRA) which put in
place a comprehensive regime to regulate the financial services
industry including insurance, superannuation, banking, and
financial markets. The regime contained a suite of measures
covering licensing, conduct, disclosure and educational
requirements for participants in the financial services industry.
FSRA was augmented by a large volume of regulations which were
designed to tailor elements of the regime to the needs of
particular industry participants.
Since its implementation, the FSRA and
associated regulations have been changed to refine the operation of
the legislative scheme. Without doubt this was in part due to the
fact that the FSRA put in place a uniform regulatory regime for the
entire financial services sector and has needed to be tailored to
meet the specific needs of particular parts of the sector.
The changes that are proposed in the Bill were
originally flagged in the Corporate and Financial Services
Regulation Review Consultation Paper and were the subject of
further public consultation in the Corporate and Financial
Services Regulation Review Proposals Paper. The amendments to
the financial services regime which have been picked up by the Bill
appear to be largely uncontroversial in nature.
The Bill puts in place legislative arrangements
so that the regulations can set monetary thresholds below which a
statement of advice (SOA) is not required for certain types of
financial product. In its place the providing entity will be
required to prepare a record of advice that will include the
information as set out in the regulations and must provide a copy
of this record of advice to the client (item
117).
The explanatory memorandum to the Bill suggests
that the monetary threshold will be $15,000.(5) The
regulations giving effect to this monetary limit have not, as yet,
been tabled in Parliament.
In its proposal paper, Treasury suggested that
this proposal was sound because:
There is evidence that the cost of producing an
SOA is not economic for an adviser where a client is seeking a
minor piece of advice and/or has a small amount of money to invest.
Many advisers are choosing not to provide personal advice to such
clients, with the result that in these circumstances often
small-scale consumers cannot access advice that may benefit
them.(6)
The proposal paper went on to state that:
It is anticipated that this would result in
increased access to, and affordability of, financial advisory
services for these consumers.(7)
A statement of advice must include key consumer
protection information that would be of interest to clients
receiving financial services advice such as the amount of
remuneration that the provider of the advice will receive and
information about any other potential conflicts of
interest.(8) In its submission to the proposal paper,
Choice criticised this proposal on the following grounds:
We are sympathetic to the fact that consumers with
smaller sums of money to invest tend not to get personal advice due
to the costs of the SOA. However, the proposal will mean that
consumers with less money to invest and presumably less capacity to
invest larger amounts will not be subject to any consumer
protection regime. A record of advice is not sufficient to provide
ASIC with the ability to examine the appropriateness of that
advice.
It would appear that Choice made these comments
before the final draft of the legislation was developed. Under the
proposed regime as set out in the Bill, clients who do not receive
a statement of advice will still be required to receive a record of
advice. Part of the record of advice will contain key information
such as the amount of remuneration paid and other potential
conflicts of interest. (9)
Item 118 also adds an
additional circumstance to this list of situations set out in
section 946B where a statement of advice is not required; namely
where advice does not recommend the purchase or sale of products
and remuneration is not received by the provider of the advice
(proposed subsections 946B(7)-(9)).
The Bill makes amendments to the rules relating
to supervision of securities markets where entities have self
listed and competitors have also listed on the market. This
addresses possible conflict of issue problems that arise as a
result of the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) self listing and
being the primary market regulator of the exchange.
The issue of the effectiveness of market
supervisory arrangements for the ASX was explored by the Senate
Economics References Committee (SERC). In its February 2002 report
the SERC noted that:
3.57 While competing
with these other service providers, the ASX nonetheless has a
continuing responsibility to supervise its competitors, giving rise
to perceptions that conflicts of interest may arise
3.58 Computershare
Ltd s submission was one of the more prominent that raised the
issue of conflicts of interest arising from the ASX s moves into
new spheres of activity. However, a number of other submissions
also commented about the same matter. Boardroom Partners also
considered that the potential for conflict of interest was an
inevitable consequence of a demutualised ASX diversifying into new
commercial activities. They questioned whether the supervisor of
the listing rules could monitor its own activities.
3.59 Computershare
explained that it considered the ASX s power to set and apply
trading rules could give it the opportunity to use this power to
further its own interests at the expense of competitors, creating a
major and untenable conflict of interest. Computershare illustrated
its point in the following terms(10):
We are now in a situation where a publicly listed
company, the ASX, is able to make rules that may well supplement
the law but are potentially capable of being anti-competitive in
nature. By having the power to make and implement business rules
and prescribe technical processes, the ASX have the potential to
create actual commercial benefits for the ASX and rules that could
favour the technical platforms of their commercial adjacent
businesses, such as APRL which is the share registration service
Orient Capital and Bridge.[31]
The report went on to note
that:(11)
3.65 The ASX
defended itself vigorously against Computershare s assertions.
While acknowledging that diversification can create the potential
for conflicts of interest, the ASX reminded the Committee that it
is subject to legislative requirements (for example, s46 of the
Trade Practices Act) that prevent abuse of market power.
Further, it has introduced new measures (in particular ASXSR) to
address the issue.
3.66 The exchange
told the Committee that the concerns about conflicts of interest
were based on perceptions and fears, not reality:
Commentators who are critical of ASX tend to talk
in generalities about perceptions and fears tangible examples of
actual conflict having compromised ASX s supervisory effort are not
cited. That is because ASX s supervisory conduct is and continues
to be diligent, professional and even-handed.[35]
The Computershare submission does not present a
single example of misuse of ASX supervisory power in this area. Nor
could it. The Computershare submission, as conceded in evidence [at
page E59-60] is motivated by self-interest.[36]
The SERC report concluded
that:(12)
Against this background, the Committee has come to
the view that no major change to Australia s market supervision
framework should be contemplated at this point. While ASIC has
found, and the ASX has investigated, instances of market
misconduct, little evidence was presented that the supervisory
framework was inadequate in performing that task. Evidence
was presented of a potential for conflicts to occur which may
impinge on ASX s supervisory responsibilities, but there is also
clear evidence that the ASX and regulators are conscious of the
potential problems associated with the current model and are acting
to address them. However, should there be a significant material
change in ASX operations or should the ASX merge with another
exchange, or enter into an alliance which differs significantly
from the ASX-SGX [Singapore Stock Exchange] link, the Committee
should again review the market supervision framework
The Bill amends the Act to address potential
conflict of interest situations. The Bill addresses two aspects of
the conflict of interest situation namely, the ASX as a self listed
entity, and supervising companies that are direct competitors of
the ASX.
The Bill amends to Corporations Act so that it
will expressly provide that ASIC, rather than the market licensee,
must supervise the operation of the market when the market
licensee, a related body corporate of the market licensee or a
partnership where a partner is a related entity of the market
licensee, participates on the market. (item
101).
Currently a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
between the ASX and ASIC is in place which in effect gives ASIC
responsibility for regulating the ASX as a self listed entity. The
amendments contained in the Bill will supersede the aspects of this
MOU that deal with supervision of ASX as a self listed entity.
The Bill proposes that ASIC will have the
following powers in relation to this supervisory function:
- Admission of listed entity onto the market s official list
- Removal of the listed entity form the market s official
list
- Allowing, stopping and suspending trading on the market of the
listed entity s financial products
The Bill also provides that ASIC must perform a
supervisory function if an entity that is in direct competition
with the market licensee or a related body of the market licensee
participates on the market and requests ASIC operate as the
supervisor of the market in relation to that entities affairs
(item 106).
The Bill proposes to give ASIC the following
supervisory functions in relation to such participants:
- The admission of participants to the market
- The expulsion and suspension of participants from the
market
- The disciplining of the participant
- Compliance with the operating rules of the market or the
Corporations Act.
ASIC s powers do not extend to making the
operating rules. This power continues to be held by the ASX.
As a result of this change in powers, ASIC
will need to charge fees to pay for this particular role. The
Corporations (Fees) Amendment Bill 2007, facilitates the payment of
these fees.
The Bill makes the other following amendments
that relate to financial services reform:
- Alters the public forum exemption for financial services guides
to circumstances where general advice is being provided to a
section of the public (item 219).
- Makes the definition of wholesale client more flexible by
giving people the option to elect to be treated as sophisticated
clients, thereby reducing the regulatory burden on providers of
financial products or financial services (items
95-100).
- Changes the rules regarding joint and severable liability where
there has been a cross-endorsement of authorised representatives of
licensees (item 281)
- Relaxing the rules so that registered managed investment
schemes can invest in unregistered managed investment schemes
(item 66).
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The proposals relating to company reporting
were discussed in the Corporate and Financial Services
Regulation Review Consultation Paper and the Corporate and
Financial Services Regulation Review Proposals Paper.
Currently under the Corporations Act, all listed
companies must prepare a directors report which contains a
remuneration report .(13) The remuneration report must
contain the information mandated under section 300A of the
Corporations Act and the associated regulations. Entities that are
required by the Corporations Act to prepare financial reports must
prepare the reports in accordance with Accounting Standards. New
Accounting Standard AASB 124 deals with executive remuneration
disclosure. As a result of the requirements in this Accounting
Standard, financial reports must also disclose information relating
to executive remuneration. Therefore, listed entities must comply
with two sets of laws relating to disclosure of executive
remuneration. Currently there are inconsistencies and overlaps
between the disclosure requirements under the Corporations Act and
those mandated in the Accounting Standards. The Bill proposes to
amalgamate all of the requirements into the Corporations Act and
associated regulations and remove these overlaps and
inconsistencies.
The explanatory memorandum to the Bill explains
that the Bill will establish a disclosure framework that will allow
the accounting standards requirements for executive and director
remuneration to be incorporated into Corporations Act
(14) The explanatory memorandum goes on to state
that:(15)
The objective of the amendments is to consolidate
the remuneration disclosure requirements currently contained in the
accounting standards into the Corporations Act and Corporations
Regulations. Following on from the amendments to the Corporations
Act in this Bill, the remaining remuneration disclosure
requirements in the accounting standards will be incorporated into
the Corporations Regulations. This will simplify the requirements
as companies will no longer be required to refer to both the
accounting standards and the Corporations Act to determine their
remuneration disclosure requirements.
One of the key ways of achieving this
amalgamation will be to repeal the accounting standard that deals
with executive remuneration. The Bill also makes some amendments to
the Corporations Act to give effect to this policy change
(see items 24-37).
One of the important consequences of this change
in policy is that all information relating to executive
remuneration will be contained within the director s report. Since
the accounting standard that deals with executive remuneration will
be repealed, the financial statements will not need to include
information relating to executive remuneration.
To ensure that the remuneration report is
properly audited, the Bill, in item 36, states
that the auditor must report to members on whether the auditor is
of the opinion that the remuneration report complies with section
300A of the Corporations Act.
Currently under the Corporations Act,
shareholders have the right to make a non-binding vote and ask
questions about the remuneration report. One of the consequences of
this consolidation of executive remuneration reporting will be
therefore that shareholders will have greater information and hence
increased scrutiny of the executive remuneration.
- Changes to the definition of small and large proprietary
company, by increasing the monetary thresholds (items
11-19).
- Minor changes to the administration of company details.
- Distribution of annual reports to be done electronically rather
than in hardcopy (items 38 40).
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Auditor
Independence Background and Main Provisions
The CLERP 9 reforms introduced a comprehensive
legislative regime to regulate the independence of company
auditors. Independence of company auditors came under scrutiny
globally following the collapse of companies such as Enron and at a
domestic level following the demise of HIH insurance. The CLERP 9
reforms drew on recommendations made in the Ramsay Report and the
HIH Royal Commission Report.
A key part of the required regulatory response
included a tightening of the auditor independence measures in the
Corporations Act. As a result, the CLERP 9 reforms introduced a
general requirement that auditors must not operate in a conflict of
interest situation. It also listed specific circumstances which
could be regarded as conflict of interest situations.
The explanatory memorandum to the CLERP 9
bills explained that:(16)
The sound operation of Australia s financial
market is dependent upon parties such as auditors providing
information or services to investors free from any bias, undue
influence or conflict of interest. Auditor independence is
concerned with the auditor s capacity, including the perception of
that capacity, to exercise objective and impartial judgement in
relation to the conduct of an audit.
Over recent years there have been a number of
corporate collapses which have called into question the degree of
independence of auditors. These cases have demonstrated that while
a company s actual financial position may have been poor, the
financial statements and audit report did not reflect the true
condition of the company. This has impaired the ability of
shareholders and the market more generally to adequately asses the
financial health of their investment. The proposals to promote
independence will improve the reliability of information provided
to the market.
Since the commencement of the CLERP 9 reforms,
it has been found that there have been small problems with the
operation of some of the provisions. ASIC has issued Class Orders
and regulations have been made to remove these problems. This Bill
looks to make amendments to the Act and hence will remove the need
for these Class Orders and regulations. These amendments are
contained in items 34, 35, 45, 46, 49, 56, 67, 63,
64.
The Bill also makes some policy changes to the
current auditor independence requirements although these changes
are not major in nature.
Currently the Corporations Act places a
prohibition on any more than one former partner of an audit firm or
director of an audit company being an officer of an audited body or
related entity.(17) There are no time restrictions on
this prohibition. This has the potential to create inflexible
working arrangements for former members and directors of audit
firms. The explanatory memorandum states that former partners of an
audit firm and former directors of an authorised audit firm who had
departed from the firm or audit company for five or more years
should be excluded from the restriction. (18) The Bill
in item 62, gives effect to this five year
restriction.
Section 324CI prevents a member of an audit
firm or audit company from becoming an officer of an entity for two
years if that entity was audited by the auditor s firm and the
auditor was a professional member of the team conducting the audit.
The explanatory memorandum to the Bill states that this requirement
applies regardless as to how far back the partner s participation
on the audit team took place .(19) This does seem to be
too restrictive and is inconsistent with overseas requirements. The
Bill amends the Act so that the two year time period will start
from the date that the auditors report was made in respect of the
latest audit that the partner/director participated (items
60 and 61).
The Bill also proposes to change the financial
relationship restrictions currently between and audit firm and the
audit client.
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The Bill proposes some straightforward changes
to some of the corporate governance arrangements in the
Corporations Act.
Where a public company or an entity that it
controls, gives a financial benefit to a related party , the
approval of the members of the company is required. Currently under
the Corporations Act, if this financial benefit in any given
financial year is less that $2,000 and it is given to a director,
or director s spouse or de facto spouse, member approval is not
required. The Bill proposes to remove the current $2,000 threshold
and set the monetary limit in regulations (item
190). The explanatory memorandum states that the initial
amount to be prescribed in regulations will be
$5,000.(20) Regulations giving effect to this proposal
have not, to date, been tabled in Parliament.
All companies must have a company name. A name
must not be used if it is identical or unacceptable under the
Corporations Regulations, unless Ministerial approval is given for
this. The Minister can delegate this approval function to the
officer of the Department. The Bill proposes to expand this
delegation function to include a member of ASIC or a staff member
of ASIC (item 188).
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The Government is concerned that rights issues
have become a neglected avenue for a fundraising due to the current
requirement for them to be accompanied by a prospectus or Product
Disclosure Statement. The Government view is that this has led to
the use of alternate fundraising methods such as placements to
institutional shareholders, with the consequence that smaller
investors may be disadvantaged.(21)
Item 78 of Schedule 1 inserts
new section 708AA titled Rights issues that do not
need disclosure . The section relieves rights issuers from the
usual disclosure obligations under Part 6D.2, provided certain
conditions are met. ASIC is given power, effectively, to disallow
the disclosure relief if satisfied that the issuer has contravened
specified provisions of the Corporations Act in the previous 12
months.
Item 137 inserts new
section 1012DAA. This new section contains similar
provisions to new section 708AA, but operates in
respect of rights issues that relate to managed investment
schemes.
Subsection 709(4) currently allows an offeror
of securities to use an offer information statement rather than a
(more complex) prospectus, where the amount sought to be raised,
when added to amounts previously raised, is less than $5 million.
Item 84 of Schedule 1 removes $5
million from subsection 709(4) of the Corporations Act and
substitutes $10 million , thereby expanding the circumstances in
which the similar document may be used.
Item 9 of Schedule
1 inserts a new definition into section 9 of the
Corporations Act for the term eligible employee share scheme .
Item 86 adds to subsection 709(5), a proviso
excluding amounts raised under an eligible employee share scheme
from calculations in respect of amounts that trigger the
requirements relating to disclosure under section 709. Other
provisions relieve companies offering employee share schemes from
the prohibition on hawking and giving such companies limited
exemptions from licensing requirements. According to the
Explanatory Memorandum this includes:
...relief for the following activities: the
provision of general advice relating to the scheme; dealing in a
financial product where the purchase or disposal of the products
occurs through a licensed broker in or outside Australia; the
operation of a custodial or depository service in connection with
the scheme; and dealing in an interest in a contribution
plan.(22)
The advertising requirements for offers of
securities that require a prospectus are more onerous than those
for other financial products. The Government is of the view that
there is no justification for the differences.(23)
Items 210 and 212 amend parts of section 734 so as
to bring the requirements for advertising securities into line with
those for advertising of other financial products (Part 7.9 of the
Corporations Act).
Some amendments are made to ASIC s power to
prevent publication of advertisements in certain circumstances.
Item 213 amends subsection 739(1) to ensure that
ASIC s power extends to advertisements of the kind mentioned in
section 734 (for securities offers), where it considers such
advertisements to be defective .
Item 215 adds new
subsections 739 (6), (7) and (8), to
clarify the meaning of the term defective as it is used in the new
subsection 739(1), mentioned above. Such an advertisement will be
defective if it contains a misleading or deceptive statement, of if
there is an omission of something it is required to contain.
Stapled securities consist of two classes of
interest stapled together. In some instances offers for stapled
securities will require both a Product Disclosure Statement and a
prospectus. Stapled security issues might therefore prepare a
combined Product Disclosure Statement/prospectus. A difficulty that
has been identified with this is that, although Chapter 6D of the
Corporations Act allows for replacement prospectuses to be lodged,
there are no equivalent provisions relating to Product Disclosure
Statements. Amending errors in the latter can be cumbersome.
Items 94 and 146 introduce amendments addressed at
this situation. Item 146 inserts proposed
subdivision DA into Division 2 of Part 7.9, titled Replacement
Product Disclosure Statements , which provides a regime for the
lodgement of replacement disclosure documents relating to stapled
securities.
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The Bill proposes to remove the telephone
monitoring during takeover bids provisions in the Corporations Act
(item 68). This proposal is strongly endorsed by
many parties making submissions to the proposal paper.
The Bill also proposes to remove the 85% rule
relating to compulsory acquisitions of shares (item
69). Sections 665D and 665E of the Corporations Act place
an obligation on a person who holds 85% of the beneficial interest
of a class of securities, to notify the company that they hold 85%
of the securities and the company must in turn notify the remaining
security holders of this.
In relation to the current requirements in
section 665D and 665E, Ford s principles of corporations law
explains that:
...it is questionable whether they achieve any
useful purpose. ASIC has modified these requirements by class
order, to relieve the 85% holder of the obligation to give notice
if it has already given each member a compulsory acquisition or
but-out notice, and to modify the company s obligations
correspondingly.(24)
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The provisions dealing with return of
particulars was a proposal under CLERP 7. It, in conjunction with
the extract of particulars, was put into the Corporations Act in
place of the requirement for lodging an annual return. Background
to these amendments can be found in the Bills Digest dealing with
the Corporations Legislation Amendment Bill
2002.(25)
ASIC can issue a return of particulars to a
company or a responsible entity of a registered scheme where there
has been:
- non payment of the review fee, or
- ASIC suspects or believes the particulars recorded in relation
to a company or scheme in a register maintained by ASIC under
subsection 1274(1) are not correct, or
- no documents have been lodged with ASIC in relation to the
company or scheme for at least one year.
The Bill proposes to amend the Corporations Act
so that a return of particulars can only be issued where ASIC
suspects that the information on its subsection 1274(1) register is
not correct (item 208).
This is a back flip on the legislation that
was passed by parliament only three years ago. The proposal paper
argues that there is inconsistency between this legislative
provision and the policy intent behind the CLERP 7 reforms that
drove the inclusion of this legislative provision:
(26)
It is arguably inconsistent with the policy intent
of the CLERP 7 reforms that a ROP could be issued simply because a
company has not lodged documents for a year.
The proposals paper document does not however
explain what this inconsistency is. It does go on to state
that:
There are alternate mechanisms for actioning
non-payment of a review fee, such as the imposition of late fees
and deregistration of a company.(27)
There is no doubt that the return of
particulars can add an additional layer of paperwork for company
compliance. That being said, it is also arguable that the
additional return of particulars provisions give ASIC additional
enforcement powers where there has been non-compliance with the
requirements relating to an extract of particulars.
The Bill puts in place arrangements for the
electronic registration of company charges (items
191-196).
The Corporations (Review Fees) Amendment Bill
2007 puts in place arrangements that will give companies the option
of paying their review fees up front in one lump sum for up to ten
years.
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Concluding comments
This Bill makes changes to a number of
different areas of the Corporations Act 2001. Many of the
changes are small technical amendments. There are some significant
changes of note however including those relating to the supervision
of securities markets, changes to executive remuneration
arrangements and auditor independence. The Bill puts in place
regulation making powers in a number of places so that a number of
the changes will in fact be given effect to by regulations rather
than in the overarching legislation. Once these regulations have
been tabled in Parliament, it will be important to check them to
ensure that they do in fact give effect to the policy changes as
set out in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill.
- The Treasury,
Corporate and Financial Services Regulation Review Consultation
Paper, April 2006.
- The Treasury,
Corporate and Financial Services Regulation Review Proposal Paper,
November 2006.
- The Treasury,
Australian Auditor Independence Requirements: A Comparative Review,
November 2006.
- Rethinking
Regulation, Report of the Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory Burdens
on Business, April 2006.
- Explanatory
Memorandum Corporations Legislation Amendment (Simpler Regulatory
System) Bill 2007, p. 21.
- The Treasury,
Corporate and Financial Services Regulation Review Proposal Paper,
November 2006, p. 26.
- The Treasury,
Corporate and Financial Services Regulation Review Proposal Paper,
November 2006, p 27.
- Sub-sections
947(2)(d) and (e).
- Explanatory
Memorandum Corporations Legislation Amendment (Simpler Regulatory
System) Bill 2007, p. 28.
- Senate Economic
References Committee, February 2002, p. 25
- ibid, p. 26.
- ibid, p. xvi.
- Section 300A of the
Corporations Act.
- Explanatory
Memorandum, Corporations Legislation Amendment (Simpler Regulatory
System) Bill Explanatory Memorandum, op cit, p. 38.
- ibid, p. 41.
- Corporate Law
Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure)
Bill 2007, p.9.
- Section 324CK
Corporations Act.
- Corporations
Legislation Amendment (Simpler Regulatory System) Bill Explanatory
Memorandum, p. 65.
- ibid, p. 65.
- ibid, p. 65.
- ibid, par. 5.6.
- ibid, par.
5.27.
- ibid, par.
5.25.
- HAJ Ford RP Austin
and IM Ramsay, Fords Principles of Corporations Law, Loose leaf
service, Sydney, 2000, p 24184.
- Corporations
Legislation Amendment Bill 2002, Bills
Digest.
- The Treasury,
Corporate and Financial Services Regulation Review Proposal Paper,
November 2006, p.77.
- ibid
Susan Dudley
Law and Bills Digest Section
7 June 2007
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