28 February 2024
PDF Version [783KB]
Dr Vu Lam
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security
Executive summary
- The 2024 ASEAN-Australia Special Summit marks 50 years of
partnership and underscores the evolving relationship between Australia and
ASEAN nations amidst a changing global landscape. This follows the 2018 Special
Summit and signals a deepening commitment to regional collaboration.
- Heightened tensions between the US and China, unresolved security
concerns (including those in the South China Sea and the ongoing crisis in
Myanmar), and emerging threats like climate change and cybersecurity may
heavily influence the summit’s discussions.
- ASEAN nations have navigated the US-China rivalry strategically,
aiming to maintain positive relationships with both major powers while also
diversifying partnerships. This dynamic creates both challenges and potential
opportunities for smaller regional players.
- ASEAN centrality remains a fundamental principle in ASEAN-Australia
relations, emphasising ASEAN’s central role in a
rules-based Indo-Pacific regional architecture, a stance consistently supported
by Australia.
- The 2024 summit will facilitate collaboration in several key
areas: strengthening defence and security partnerships; furthering economic
integration through regional agreements; exploring technology cooperation;
combating climate change with clean energy solutions; and promoting
cross-cultural exchange.
Introduction
The upcoming ASEAN-Australia Special Summit,
scheduled for 4–6 March 2024 in Melbourne, is set to mark a significant
milestone in ASEAN-Australia relations, celebrating 50 years since Australia
became ASEAN’s first Dialogue Partner and established official bilateral
relations. This event, the second of its kind hosted by Australia following the
first Special
Summit in 2018, reflects a deepening of ties and a commitment to jointly
addressing regional challenges and opportunities.
This Research Paper provides an
overview of the evolving context around ASEAN-Australia relations leading up to
the 2024 Special Summit, setting the stage for the summit’s agenda.
A brief history of bilateral relations
Founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has
expanded to include 10 member states, welcoming Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in
1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. ASEAN occupies a pivotal
position in Asian economic integration, demonstrating resilience through crises
such as the 1997 financial turmoil and the 2008 global recession. By 2022, it
had established itself as the world’s fifth-largest
economy. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), created in 1992, stands among
the world’s most extensive free trade areas, encompassing a population by 2023
that exceeds 679 million.
Australia’s official relations
with ASEAN started in 1974. Since then, bilateral relations have been
formalised through various mechanisms, including the signing of the Agreement
Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New
Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) in 2010, a Strategic Partnership in 2014,
and a Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership (CSP) in 2021. Australia has also been an active
participant in ASEAN-led platforms, being a founding member of the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) since its inception in 1994 and of the East
Asia Summit (EAS) established in 2005. Furthermore, Australia participates
in the ASEAN Defence
Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) to strengthen security and defence
cooperation. Most recently, Australia joined the ASEAN-Indo-Pacific
Forum (AIPF) launched in September 2023.
A more detailed history of
bilateral relations can be found in the 2018 Parliamentary Library research
paper, The
ASEAN-Australia Special Summit, Sydney, March 2018: issues and implications.
The 2018 ASEAN-Australia Special Summit
The 2018 ASEAN-Australia Special
Summit, held in Sydney on 17–18 March, commemorated the evolving strategic
partnership between Australia and ASEAN, culminating in the Sydney Declaration,
which set objectives for future cooperation. The summit was the first time
ASEAN leaders convened in Australia. Leading up to the Special Summit were a Business
Summit and a Counter-Terrorism Conference, reflecting the summit‘s central
themes of partnering for regional security and prosperity.
As per the Sydney
Declaration, ASEAN and Australian leaders agreed to further cooperation in
addressing transnational crime, terrorism, and maritime security
concerns, with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on
Counter-Terrorism to implement the 2016
ASEAN-Australia Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International
Terrorism. Both sides also committed to enhancing trade and investment
ties, with a focus on developing infrastructure, fostering
innovation, and promoting digital connectivity. Specifically, both sides
resolved to conclude the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a
free trade agreement involving the 10 ASEAN members, and China, Japan, South
Korea, Australia and New Zealand.
People-to-people links were also
featured, with both sides aiming to promote education, cultural
exchange, and youth engagement with a view to strengthening the
partnership and fostering long-term relationships.
The shifting global landscape
The global and regional stage has
shifted dramatically since the 2018 Special Summit. The simmering US-China
rivalry, including the ‘trade
war‘ starting in 2018, now dominates the Indo-Pacific. Economic tensions
escalated with the implementation of tariffs
and allegations of intellectual
property theft. Both countries have invested and competed heavily in semiconductor
technology. Geopolitical friction has intensified over competing claims in
the South China Sea (SCS) and US military support for Taiwan, while China’s
expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific has raised concerns. Cybersecurity
issues have added to the mix, and human rights concerns have emerged
regarding the Uyghur
population in Xinjiang and the
aftermath of the 2019–20 protests in Hong Kong.
The global security landscape
faces not only persistent traditional threats, but also a growing list of
emerging challenges with multifaceted implications. To name but a few, the
potential for conflict and
increased resource scarcity due to climate change is a significant and
pressing concern. Pandemics and potential bio-threats, as evidenced by the
COVID-19 pandemic, expose vulnerabilities in
global health systems. Disinformation
and the potential misuse of AI have prompted significant apprehension about
the erosion of trust and democratic processes, and incited heated debate about autonomous
weapons.
The socio-economic landscape has
shifted from steady growth to global
uncertainties. China’s 2023 economic growth rate was
reportedly the lowest in decades and global supply chains have faced a tangled
web of disruptions. Besides lingering effects from the pandemic, ongoing
challenges include trade tensions, labour shortages and climate events. Armed
conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and the broader Red Sea region have raised the
alarm about potential disruptions to sea traffic, supply chains, and the risk
of cascading humanitarian crises, including mass displacements and refugee
flows. All of this disrupts established trade routes, hinders resource access,
and brings uncertainty for businesses. Meanwhile, the digital
revolution is rapidly reshaping economies, requiring extensive investment
in infrastructure and skills development.
The evolving regional landscape
In recent years, Southeast Asia (SEA)
has been faced with several ongoing and emerging challenges.
The US-China rivalry has played
out across multiple spheres. In economics, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
has propelled China to become the region’s leading infrastructure development
partner, with reservations
from some countries, like Vietnam and the Philippines, which are seeking a
diversified pool of partners. The US has sought to provide alternatives, such
as the Mekong-US Partnership, and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Having been
in negotiation between the US and 13 other countries since 2022, IPEF has 4 pillars, including trade, supply
chains, clean energy and fair economy. The US and China have also intensified
the competition for technological
supremacy.
In terms of security, China has
asserted its territorial claims in the SCS through increased military
activities, prompting the US to respond with Freedom
of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) and strengthened partnerships with SEA
nations. The SCS disputes remain unresolved, with territorial claims and
militarisation leading to a sharp rise in maritime
incidents and stoking fears of a potential
flashpoint.
In light of new
tensions in the SCS, the Philippines seems to take a tougher
stance and shift away from China, especially with the US
publicly supporting this approach. But that does not automatically
translate into closer ties with the US, as shown by metrics like official
development assistance (ODA). Instead, other regional players like Japan and
multilateral lenders like the Asian Development Bank and World Bank have
become the Philippines’s biggest partners in areas such as infrastructure.
Across ASEAN, these regional players are gradually matching pace with China in
terms of ODA.
Apart from challenges, the
escalating US-China rivalry also presents regional countries with opportunities.
As both superpowers seek stronger economic ties within SEA, several ASEAN
members, such as Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia have reaped benefits
from the deeper integration into global supply
chains and attracted greater
foreign investment. Japan (as of 2023)
has become the third largest source of Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI), after the US and intra-ASEAN FDI.
Southeast
Asia’s strategic significance becomes elevated in the eyes of the US and China
as they seek to counterbalance each other’s regional influence. Both powers
have leveraged diplomatic channels, especially by pursuing CSPs with ASEAN and
regional countries. In recent years, China has signed CSPs with ASEAN (2021)
and Timor-Leste (2023). The US has done the same with ASEAN in 2022 and both
Vietnam and Indonesia in 2023. The competition may grant additional
bargaining power to ASEAN when securing beneficial trade agreements. The
potential for greater market access and an influx
of technology from both major powers could bolster regional economies.
The US-China rivalry presents SEA
countries with a delicate balancing act. ASEAN and its members have largely
employed hedging strategies, seeking to maintain
good relationships with both major powers while diversifying their
strategic partners. Yet, more subtly, some have shown differentiation in
navigating and potentially benefiting from this competition. Generally
speaking, the impact of the rivalry on countries varies based on factors such
as economic structure, trade relationships, geopolitical alignments,
technological dependencies, financial interconnections and policy responses.
For instance, Cambodia and Laos have increasingly embraced the BRI, while
Vietnam has erred
on the cautious side. In the context of the US-China trade and
technological decoupling, smaller states like Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar may
face challenges due to the lack of resources, risking over-dependence
on foreign investment. Conversely, Vietnam’s strategic positioning has made
it one of the greatest beneficiaries of the trade war, elevating its rankings
in global supply chains, especially with production
and investment shifting from China to Southeast Asia. In 2023, besides the
CSP with the US, Vietnam also upgraded its relations with Japan to a CSP and agreed
to jointly build a ‘Vietnam-China
community with a shared future’. These
moves reflect Vietnam’s desire to foster cooperation with its key partners while
maintaining a non-aligned stance.
Besides the SCS disputes, the
Myanmar crisis since 2021 has underscored the varied responses within ASEAN. On
one side, there are nations within
the bloc advocating for a more robust stance against Myanmar‘s military
government, suggesting that firmer measures could encourage the junta to engage
in constructive dialogue and adhere to human rights norms. Conversely,
countries like Laos, which is chairing ASEAN in 2024, have accentuated the importance
of dialogue and engagement, proposing a ‘Myanmar-owned and led solution’ to
the crisis. Though some observers predict the
junta’s imminent collapse, the situation in Myanmar remains volatile and
fluid. The recent escalation of violence has displaced an
estimated 800,000 people since October 2023, pushing them towards refuge in
Thailand and India. The Five-Point Consensus (5PC), enacted by ASEAN in 2021 to
address the Myanmar crisis, has
seen little progress in ending violence or establishing dialogue.
Non-traditional
threats such as terrorism, piracy, and transnational crime continue to pose
challenges, demanding regional collaboration. The increasing sophistication of
cyberattacks threatens critical infrastructure and regional stability,
resulting in the formulation of various
collaborative frameworks.
In that context, the Quad (US,
India, Japan, Australia) and AUKUS (US, UK, Australia) security initiatives
raise complex considerations for ASEAN-Australia relations. On the positive
side, they align with ASEAN’s
vision for the Indo-Pacific – emphasising a peaceful, prosperous,
inclusive, and rules-based order – and potentially offer opportunities for
cooperation in areas like maritime security, counterterrorism and disaster
relief. However, concerns
exist within ASEAN about the impact of these initiatives, especially AUKUS,
on regional stability and inclusivity. Key anxieties include potential
undermining of ASEAN centrality, nuclear proliferation risks, and
heightened regional tensions.
Amidst this complexity, ASEAN
member states, especially under Indonesia’s chairmanship in 2023, have
committed to strengthening regional institutions and upholding ASEAN
centrality. This
concept, broadly speaking, depicts ASEAN as ‘the dominant regional platform
to overcome common challenges and engage with external powers’. ASEAN
centrality has been a core principle of bilateral relations, which was
confirmed at the previous
summit. In September 2023, the ASEAN-Indo-Pacific Forum (AIPF) was launched
in Jakarta, serving as a central
platform to implement the ASEAN Outlook for the Indo-Pacific, and aiming to
address global challenges and geopolitical rivalries. It focuses on 3 key
areas: green infrastructure and resilient supply chains; maritime security and
cooperation; and sustainable development and digital transformation. Also in
September 2023, ASEAN conducted the first-ever ASEAN-only
joint military exercise, codenamed ASEAN Solidarity Exercise 2023 (ASEX
2023).
Acknowledging the growing
importance of ASEAN to the regional architecture and Australia, the Australian
Government has always maintained its support for ASEAN centrality. Prime
Minister Anthony Albanese, speaking at the launch of the AIPF, emphasised:
The centrality of ASEAN is of
utmost importance for Australia, we share the same trust in this region. ASEAN
is Australia’s economic destiny. We are building upon a strong foundation, and
there is still untapped potential.
Critics often point to ASEAN’s lack
of strong institutional mechanisms and its members’ divergent interests and
priorities as fundamental challenges to collective decision-making and
regional policies. Yet, proponents of ASEAN centrality argue that the bloc is
effective as the
centre of the region’s diplomatic network, rather than as the driving
forces behind the region’s geopolitical or economic dynamics.
The progressive bilateral landscape
Looking back, many of the
objectives set out in the 2018 summit have been met. Australia and ASEAN
members have strengthened defence-security
collaboration, as seen in joint military exercises, information sharing and
capacity building and training.
Economically, ASEAN-Australia
relations have been progressively robust and mutually beneficial. In 2022, the
total 2-way trade between Australia and ASEAN reached A$178 billion, exceeding
Australia’s trade with major partners like the US, Japan, and the EU. This
number represents an increase of nearly 47% compared
to 2018. Australia’s
FDI flow to ASEAN in 2022 accounted for A$106 billion. All of this
emphasises the economic vitality of the relationship and showcases the benefits
of AANZFTA.
The 2021 CSP brings into
focus new areas of collaboration in renewable
energy, climate change mitigation, and the circular
economy. Notably, the RCEP was finalised in 2020
and came into force in January 2022 for the 10 original parties, including
Australia, creating the largest trade bloc in the world, accounting for about
30% of the world’s population and 30% of global GDP.
As the 2024 Special Summit draws
closer, several notable political and security developments have impacted
ASEAN, which may influence the summit’s agenda. Notably, Indonesia is poised to
complete the first round of its general elections to select a new president
following President Widodo’s 10 years in office. As Indonesia occupies a
leading role within ASEAN and remains a key strategic partner for Australia,
the upcoming presidential election has the potential to affect bilateral
relations. However, experts generally anticipate continuity in Indonesia’s
foreign policy approach, suggesting limited
major changes.
The Myanmar crisis continues to
raise significant concerns, particularly regarding the continuous displacement
of people in the aftermath of the coup in 2021. While recent
developments have seen resistance groups showing unity and gaining ground,
a conclusive resolution remains elusive. Meanwhile, the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic assumes the Chairmanship of ASEAN in 2024, and will collaborate with
Indonesia and Malaysia through a troika mechanism to address the Myanmar issue,
amidst concerns
about Lao PDR’s lack of resources
and experience. The effectiveness of this troika approach remains to be
seen, as it is unclear
what support Indonesia, Malaysia and other ASEAN members can extend to Laos.
In January 2024, Laos appointed a Special Envoy to Myanmar in an effort to
persuade the junta to adhere to the 5PC. Some analysts have often questioned
ASEAN’s ability
to resolve the crisis, citing its intrinsic internal constraints and
divisions.
In 2022, Timor-Leste was accepted
as the 11th member of ASEAN, being granted an observer’s status, pending full
ratification, albeit without a clear timeframe. However, the nation’s
accession into the bloc appears to face obstacles due to its firm stance
against the Myanmar junta, potentially undermining the ASEAN principle of
consensus. The September 2023 CSP between Timor-Leste and China has raised
concerns about a potential security pact similar to the 2022 one between
China and Solomon Islands. Timor-Leste will attend the 2024 Special Summit
together with ASEAN member state leaders.
The 2024 Special Summit
Compared to the 2018 Summit, the
2024 Summit will encompass a broader and diverse range of activities. Accompanying the Special
Summit will be a CEO Business Forum, an SME Conference for small and medium
businesses, an Emerging Leaders Dialogue, a Climate and Clean Energy Forum, and
a Maritime Cooperation Conference, which means key focus areas
include business, emerging leaders, climate and clean energy, and maritime
cooperation. These are aligned with Australia’s
Southeast Asia economic strategy to 2040, emphasising the
need for Australia to raise awareness of SEA markets, remove blockages, build capacity and deepen investment in key
sectors, such as green energy transition, education and
skills, digital economy and healthcare.
Complex security issues like
heightened US-China tensions, cyber threats, and SCS disputes will necessitate
in-depth discussions on regional strategies. The impact of navigating
the SCS disputes and the
long-overdue ASEAN-China Code of Conduct on Australia’s national interest
has been a topic of debate over the years. Upcoming discussions in Melbourne
will most likely serve to reemphasise the importance of upholding ASEAN
centrality.
From Australia’s perspective,
collaboration with ASEAN is pivotal for fostering a stable and secure
Indo-Pacific region. This cooperation is crucial not only for Australia’s
national security, but also for its wider strategic interests. It is
anticipated that Australia will pursue stronger collaborative efforts with
ASEAN members to jointly tackle security concerns, encompassing maritime
security, counterterrorism, and cybersecurity. Specifically, there is an intent
to use the newly founded ASEAN-Indo-Pacific Forum (AIPF) as a conduit for
encouraging dialogue and action on these matters. Australia aims to contribute
to the development of regional security frameworks that adhere to the
principles of a rules-based international order. Furthermore, Australia’s
commitment to security cooperation extends to non-traditional security issues,
such as disaster response and climate change – areas where it can provide
considerable expertise and resources.
As an example, Australia has
collaborated with ASEAN member states through initiatives such as delivering Civil
Maritime Security Programs to enhance leadership and maritime enforcement
skills among officers from Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia,
and supporting coral reef conservation in the Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei
through the Coral Reef Monitoring and Protection Initiative.
On ASEAN’s part, the member states are keen on preserving
their strategic autonomy while boosting their collective ability to manage
security challenges. They may appreciate Australia’s support in enhancing their
security capabilities, especially in the realms of maritime security and
counterterrorism. There is also an interest in further involving Australia in
conversations about cybersecurity and the safeguarding of the digital economy,
acknowledging the critical role of protecting this rapidly growing sector.
Through forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers’
Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), and AIPF, ASEAN strives to advance a vision of the
Indo-Pacific that is open, inclusive, and grounded in mutual respect and
international law. Engaging with Australia in these forums may be viewed as a
strategy to diversify external relations and promote shared interests and
values, ensuring that ASEAN’s perspectives and interests are integral to the
regional security architecture.
Economic adaptation will also be
key, focusing on navigating the global slowdown, harnessing digitalisation, and
exploring new areas like renewable energy and climate change. Besides RCEP and
IPEF, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
(CPTPP) is another trade agreement focusing on regional integration and
economic prosperity for the Indo-Pacific. The CPTPP currently comprises 11
countries, with China facing both
technical and political hurdles in its application for membership.
As an original party to all these
agreements alongside several ASEAN members, Australia is well-positioned to be
a key player in the region’s economic future and to leverage its economic
strengths. It should be noted, however, that while bilateral trade relations
have grown substantially, with ASEAN becoming Australia’s second-largest
trading partner in 2022, there is still significant potential for further
expansion and diversification.
Australia and ASEAN share the same
aspirations for sustainable development and economic growth. This shared vision
is reflected in initiatives focusing on renewable energy, digital
infrastructure, and education, aimed at fostering a region that is both
prosperous and sustainable. There is also a shared acknowledgement of the
importance of developing resilient supply chains and enhancing economic
integration to create a trade environment that is secure, efficient, and
capable of navigating global uncertainties.
Within this collaborative
framework, Australia is committed to broadening trade and investment with
ASEAN, recognising the bloc’s significant global influence and its role in the
evolution of global supply chains. Australia aspires to be a key partner in
sectors such as infrastructure and the digital economy, supporting ASEAN’s
progression towards a more technologically sophisticated and integrated
economy. Under the Aus4ASEAN
Futures Initiative, various projects are underway to support ASEAN
priorities. These include investments in Smart City projects, a study on the
ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement to accelerate digital integration,
and the development of the ASEAN
Plan of Action on Science, Technology, and Innovation. Additionally,
Australia may seek to deepen its involvement in the economic dynamics of the
region through strategic participation in economic integration, employing both
existing and potential free trade agreements to enhance economic ties (see
Figure 1 for a summary of Australia’s ASEAN programs).
Conversely, ASEAN members are
focused on diversifying their economic partnerships (especially considering the
growing economic focus on China), aiming to mitigate dependence on any single
external economy. This strategy aligns with their broader goal of economic
development and ascending global value chains, in which they seek Australia’s
support, particularly in digital transformation and sustainable development
practices. The rise
of economic nationalism and protectionism within the ASEAN region
underscores the challenging task of balancing domestic economic goals with the
wider demands of global economic integration, a balancing act that could
benefit from Australia’s
Just like the 2018 summit, the
2024 summit’s agenda reflects a forward-thinking approach by prioritising
engagement with emerging leaders. As of 2023, there are over 1 million Australians of Southeast
Asian descent, 800,000 Australians speaking an ASEAN language, and 100,000
ASEAN students in Australia. Investing in people-to-people connections through
cultural exchange programs and educational initiatives will strengthen regional
solidarity and understanding, building a community with a shared vision for the
future.
Australia’s
longstanding role as an education provider for SEA students has been a key
factor in strengthening people-to-people ties. To further enhance these
relationships, some analysts suggest moving beyond a market-driven
approach towards overseas students and further tapping into the
potential of the extensive alumni network. Such a shift in perspective may help
avoid some of the criticism Australia has previously attracted for prioritising
strategic alignment over cultivating genuine relationships with SEA nations.
Conclusion
In short, the 2024
ASEAN-Australia Special Summit will likely serve as a platform for dialogue and
exploration in a rapidly evolving global and regional context. It represents
not only a celebration of past achievements, but also a forward-looking commitment
to jointly address the evolving challenges and opportunities in the region.
Figure 1 A breakdown of
Australia’s ASEAN programs
Source:
Australian Mission to ASEAN
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