26
August 2021
PDF version [518KB]
Nicole
Brangwin (with assistance from Thea Gellerfy)
Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Security
Introduction
‘You
have the watches, we have the time’
This Taliban mantra has been widely quoted in media reports
and commentary over the last 20 years of war in Afghanistan.[1] It denotes the Taliban’s
strategy to wait for the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Afghanistan.
Now, as the United States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and allied
nations complete their military withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban has
advanced its strategy to full effect, occupying the Afghan capital Kabul on 16
August 2021.
This quick guide aims to provide a recent timeline showing
the impetus for, and trajectory of, the rapidly changing security situation in
Afghanistan, starting with the Trump administration’s agreement with the
Taliban.
US-Taliban agreement
The Agreement
for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the
Taliban and the United States of America (US-Taliban Agreement) was
made on 29 February 2020. The US-Taliban Agreement was the impetus for the withdrawal
of US and allied forces from Afghanistan. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (the
Afghan Government) did not participate in these talks.
The terms of the agreement were contingent on a number of
factors, including a reduction of violence by the Taliban, and an initial
drawdown of US and allied forces from Afghanistan within 135 days of the
agreement. This was to be followed by a complete withdrawal of US and allied
forces by May 2021.
The agreement also stipulated the commencement of
intra-Afghan peace negotiations leading to a ceasefire; prisoner releases
(Afghan Government to release 5,000 Taliban prisoners and the Taliban to
release 1,000 prisoners); and the US to commence diplomatic representations to
the UN Security Council to remove Taliban members from the sanctions list.
It was also agreed:
The United States and its allies
will refrain from the threat or the use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of Afghanistan or intervening in its
domestic affairs.[2]
On the same day the agreement was signed, US Defense
Secretary Mark Esper, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and President of
Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani held a press conference to address the next steps in
peace negotiations.[3]
Despite the exclusion of the Afghan Government from the US-Taliban talks and
subsequent agreement, President Ghani remained positive about upcoming
intra-Afghan peace talks.[4]
During the press conference the US affirmed its ‘right to self defense and the
right to protect our Afghan partners’ throughout the drawdown. Stoltenberg
reiterated that NATO’s mission in Afghanistan remained the same:
We are in Afghanistan because it is in our security interest
to provide -- to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for
international terrorists. That's the reason why we are committed and that's the
reason why any withdrawal -- any reduction of force levels will be
conditions-based.[emphasis added]
Esper also stated that US military operations against
terrorist groups such as Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) in
Afghanistan would continue.[5]
Al-Qaeda—the terrorist organisation responsible for the 11 September 2001
attacks in the US that were the original impetus for the war in Afghanistan—was
not mentioned.
Having secured US agreement to withdraw from Afghanistan,
the Taliban reportedly issued a religious decree in early March 2020 that
outlined its intent to establish an Islamic government in Afghanistan led by
the Taliban’s emir, Mullah
Haibatullah Akhundzada. The decree, or fatwa, declared the violence would
continue until the emir was ruler of Afghanistan.[6]
Intra-Afghan peace talks
It was not until 12 September 2020 that the first
intra-Afghan peace talks commenced in Doha, Qatar, between representatives from
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Taliban.[7] Initial progress was very slow
as both sides struggled to reach agreement on the agenda for peace talks.[8]
Some months later, after the Biden administration took
office in January 2021, President Biden reportedly became frustrated at the
lack of progress and urged US diplomats to help broker an intra-Afghan
agreement. In March 2021 Afghan news agency ToloNews published an
undated draft letter from US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Afghan
President Ghani that strongly encouraged an accelerated peace process towards a
negotiated settlement and ceasefire. The draft letter included proposals for
inclusion in an intra-Afghan peace agreement, such as developing:
a) The foundational principles that will guide
Afghanistan’s future constitutional and governing arrangements,
b) a roadmap to a new, inclusive government; and
c) the terms of a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire.
Intra-Afghan negotiations were intermittent and continually stalled
on many issues, such as the Taliban’s refusal to agree to a ceasefire and the
Republic’s refusal to agree to the Taliban’s version of Sharia law.[9]
Despite the protracted efforts to negotiate a political
solution to the conflict in Afghanistan, recent remarks by the Pentagon Press
Secretary John Kirby suggested the Taliban’s ultimate agenda was to govern all
of Afghanistan through armed conflict rather than agree to a political
settlement:
It is clear from what they
[the Taliban] are doing that they have governance designs certainly of a
national scale. It is clear from what they are doing that they believe there is
a military solution to the end of this conflict.[10]
US and allied military withdrawal
United States
In November 2020 President Donald Trump ordered a drawdown
of US forces in Afghanistan.[11]
By January 2021 US forces had reduced to 2,500 personnel.[12]
On 13 April 2021 the Biden administration announced all
remaining US personnel would withdraw from Afghanistan before the 20th
anniversary of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.[13] The following day President
Biden made his official remarks about the ‘way forward in Afghanistan’.[14] On 8 July 2021
President Biden confirmed that the US military mission in Afghanistan would
conclude on 31 August 2021.[15]
By 20 July 2021 US Central Command reported that more than 95 per cent of
the withdrawal process was complete.[16]
On 13 July 2021 the US military formalised the change of
mission in Afghanistan by transferring command responsibility from General
Scott Miller—who commanded the NATO Resolute Support Mission (RSM) and US
Forces-Afghanistan in-country—to the Commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM),
General Frank McKenzie, headquartered in Florida. To continue ongoing support
for Afghanistan, McKenzie established a new organisation, US Forces-Afghanistan
Forward, which was to be based in Kabul and supported by CENTCOM’s forward
headquarters in Qatar.[17]
The focus of US Forces-Afghanistan Forward was to:
- protect America’s diplomatic presence in Afghanistan
- enable Kabul international airport to operate safely (the US was negotiating
with the Turkish Government on this matter)
-
continue providing ‘appropriate advice and assistance’ to the
ANDSF and
-
support US-led counterterrorism activities.[18]
NATO
On 14 April 2021 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan commenced a full
withdrawal towards a 1 May 2021 deadline.[19]
Around that time there were approximately 9,500 personnel from 36 contributing
countries assigned to NATO’s RSM; 2,500 of whom were US military personnel and
80 of whom were Australian military personnel.[20]
While the in-country military activities under the RSM
ceased, NATO had plans to continue the ‘train, advise and assist’ activities from
outside Afghanistan. At the time there were no specific details about where and
how these activities would be conducted but Jane’s reported on 30 July 2021
that Afghan Special Forces had been taken to Turkey as part of an ongoing
military training program.[21]
In addition, NATO had pledged to continue providing financial support to the
Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF), with NATO retaining a
diplomatic presence in Kabul via a Senior Civilian Representative Office.[22]
Australia
On 15 April 2021 the Australian Government announced the Australian
Defence Force (ADF) withdrawal from Afghanistan, stating:
While
our military contribution will reduce, we will continue to support the
stability and development of Afghanistan through our bilateral partnership, and
in concert with other nations. This includes our diplomatic presence,
development cooperation program, and continued people-to-people links,
including through our training and scholarship programs. Australia remains
committed to helping Afghanistan preserve the gains of the last 20 years,
particularly for women and girls.[23]
All ADF personnel had reportedly withdrawn from Afghanistan by
mid-June 2021.[24]
On 25 May 2021 the Australian Government announced its embassy
in Kabul would close on 28 May 2021. The Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Marise Payne, anticipated this would be an interim measure and said that Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) officials planned to regularly visit
Afghanistan from a post elsewhere in the region.[25] Australia was the first
coalition partner to withdraw all diplomatic representation from Afghanistan.[26]
The Government expected to re-establish a diplomatic
presence in Afghanistan. Prime Minister Scott Morrison stated on 21 July 2021:
… as soon as we’re able to
have Australians in Afghanistan in a diplomatic capacity to support our efforts
there, and when it’s safe to do so, it’s a matter I’ve discussed with other
leaders, particularly when I was at the G7, and I hope we’ll be able to do that
at an early opportunity. But, only if it’s safe.[27]
Appendix A contains a snapshot of Australia’s military
contribution to the war in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021.
Taliban resurgence
The exact number of Taliban fighters in Afghanistan is
difficult to determine. Estimates range from 60,000 to 80,000 fighters.
Previous studies suggest the Taliban’s ‘total manpower exceeds 200,000
individuals, which includes around 60,000 core fighters, another 90,000 members
of local militias, and tens of thousands of facilitators and support elements’.[28]
With the US-Taliban Agreement in February 2020 ensuring a
withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan and the April 2021
announcement by US President Joe Biden confirming the full withdrawal of
international forces by September 2021, the Taliban advanced its strategy to
retake Afghanistan.[29]
The Afghanistan Analysts Network
(AAN) and ToloNews reported Taliban seizures of key border crossings
into Iran, Pakistan and Tajikistan.[30]
The Taliban took control of customs activities at the crossings and began
collecting millions in Afghanis a day, depriving the Afghan Government of
revenue.[31]
By 21 July 2021 US military officials believed ‘a Taliban
automatic military takeover’ was ‘not a forgone conclusion’, while also
acknowledging the ‘strategic momentum appears to be sort of with the Taliban’.[32]
By 15 August 2021 Taliban fighters had reached the gates of
the Afghan capital, Kabul, and met little to no resistance from the ANDSF as
they entered the city.[33]
The President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, fled the country (only to resurface
days later in the United Arab Emirates) while the Taliban continued talks in
Doha, Qatar on future government arrangements.[34]
What happened to the ANDSF?
As the Taliban made steady progress across the country, surrounding
provincial capitals and quickly seizing control, questions emerged about the lack
of resistance from the ANDSF.[35]
A number of theories have been put forward that suggest the ANDSF had poor
senior leadership, was rife with corruption and was heavily dependent on NATO
support, all of which led to the rapid disintegration of the ANDSF in the face
of the Taliban advance.[36]
Regional outposts were reportedly so poorly equipped, with limited weapons and
logistics support, lack of food supplies and problems with pay, it took little
encouragement from the Taliban to solicit the surrender of ANDSF members.[37]
In January 2021 the US Special Inspector-General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported that for many years the ANDSF
authorised strength was 352,000 personnel. However, this number was never
reached, so the authorised strength was reduced to 344,000.[38]
Broken down by sector this meant the Ministry of Defense (MOD)—army, air force,
special operations and civilian personnel—had an authorised strength of 208,000
and the Ministry of Interior (MOI)—policing, security and civilian staff—had
approval to fill around 136,000 positions.[39]
SIGAR noted:
Because MOD forces have been able to maintain an end strength
in the low- to mid-180,000 range, this keeps the MOD in the high 80% range of
its authorized strength, so they will not have to continue trying to recruit to
a much higher authorized strength as in the past.[40]
SIGAR questioned whether the ANDSF could be adequately
manned and sustained at these levels and was advised by the Combined Security
Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) that ‘both MOD and MOI forces are
staffed at sustainable levels given current attrition and recruitment trends’.[41]
Retention continued to plague the ANDSF:
… with one estimate suggesting that Afghan National Army
attrition stood at 2 percent per month, or roughly 24 percent per year in the
mid-to-late 2000s. By 2020, Afghan security forces were still replacing a
quarter of the force annually, which the U.S. military has come to view as
normal.
As the violence in Afghanistan increased, the training time
schedule for ANDSF recruits decreased, which resulted in a ‘training
deficiency’ that ‘hamstrung the force as it tried to combat the insurgency’.[42]
Over the last 20 years of the war it is believed around 66,000 Afghan military
personnel were killed.[43]
According to the most recent US Department of Defense Lead Inspector-General
report to Congress on Operation Freedom’s Sentinel in Afghanistan (covering 1
April to 30 June 2021), the Afghan National Army (ANA) lacked the capacity to
mount an effective response to Taliban attacks:
The DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] stated that the ANA
likely lacks the capability to carry out its missions without coalition support
and remains heavily reliant on support from the ANA Special Operations Command
(ANASOC) and the Afghan Air Force (AAF). These special operations and aviation
units are the ANDSF’s primary offensive elements, and they continue to be
overextended and misused by ANA corps commanders, according to the DIA. Since
at least October 2017, the ANA has increased its reliance on ANASOC to assist
in conventional force functions, such as clearing and holding territory. The
DIA cited media reporting indicating that the ANA has been unable to respond
effectively to Taliban assaults in rural areas or large-scale assaults against
district centers, demonstrating that the ANA is unable to defend large portions
of the country independently without coalition support.[44]
The fledgling Afghan Air Force (AAF) was already stretched
thin and responsibility for aircraft maintenance had been transferred to the
AAF when contractors performing that work withdrew along with US forces. Due to
high operational tempo, AAF aircraft were not receiving the maintenance
required to keep the aircraft fully operational.[45]
In the days just prior to the Taliban’s advance on Kabul, a number of AAF
aircraft and ANDSF personnel reportedly flew from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan.[46]
The AAF possibly operated up to 284 aircraft (mainly helicopters), of which the
majority are reportedly still on the ground in Afghanistan.[47]
Afghan National Army Trust Fund
Since 2007 NATO administered the ANA Trust Fund to
financially support the:
… transportation and installation of donated equipment, to
purchase equipment and services for ANA engineering projects, and to support in
and out-of-country training. Over time, the scope of the ANA Trust Fund was
expanded to also support the sustainment of the Afghan National Army, to
support literacy and professional military education and capacity building
activities – including those to strengthen good governance within the Afghan
security structures - and to enhance women’s meaningful participation within
the relevant Afghan Ministries and security institutions.[48]
According to NATO data (see Table 1 below), as of February
2021 more than US$3.4 billion worth of contributions had been made to the ANA Trust
Fund. Australia was the second largest contributor with US$80 million per year
(around A$105 to A$107 million per year, depending on the exchange rate, from
the Department of Defence), totalling US$680 million.[49]
NATO very recently froze the ANA Trust Fund.[50]
Table 1: Afghan National Army Trust Fund contributions
Source: NATO, ‘Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund’, media backgrounder, 5 February 2021.
Ongoing terrorist threat
The US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has consistently
reported on the enduring ties between the Taliban and al-Qaeda, stating:
… al-Qaeda provided nominal military training and support to
the Taliban without directly claiming credit for attacks, and the Taliban continued
to provide safe haven for al-Qaeda fighters despite publicly denying the
terrorist group’s presence in Afghanistan.[51]
The DIA warned:
… the Taliban is “very likely” requesting that al-Qaeda
restrict its activities and downplaying the longstanding relationship between
the groups as a means of ensuring the complete withdrawal of U.S. and coalition
troops. U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Commander General Kenneth F. McKenzie,
Jr., said if “left unmolested [al-Qaeda] are certainly going to rebuild, re-strengthen
themselves, and we have no reason to doubt they…want to attack us in our
homeland.”[52]
Civilian casualties
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
has compiled regular reports on civilian casualties since 2009.[53]
Figure 1 below shows the number of civilian deaths and injuries by year (note
that the figures for 2021 represent only half the year). UNAMA reported that civilian
casualties increased significantly following the April 2021 announcement of the
withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan. UNAMA stated that the
number of civilian casualties between ‘May-June 2021 was the highest on record
for those two months since UNAMA began systematic documentation in 2009’.[54]
Figure 1: total civilian casualties in Afghanistan from 1 January 2009 to 30
June 2021
Source: UNAMA, ‘Afghanistan: protection of civilians in armed
conflict: mid-year report: 1 January to 31 June 2021’, report, 26 July 2021.
The main cause of civilian casualties throughout the last 20
years of war in Afghanistan was what UNAMA refers to as Anti-Government
Elements’ use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). In the first six months
of 2021, IEDs ‘caused 38 per cent of all civilian casualties’, which was ‘nearly
triple the number of civilian casualties from these devices compared with the
same period in 2020’. Ground engagements between the Taliban and ANDSF also
significantly increased during this period resulting in 33 per cent of civilian
casualties. Targeted killings by Anti-Government Elements were responsible for
14 per cent and airstrikes attributed to the AAF caused eight per cent of
civilian casualties, which more than doubled due to fewer airstrikes by
international forces.[55]
Appendix A
Australia’s contribution to the war
in Afghanistan
Australia’s military involvement in Afghanistan began with
the announcement by Prime Minister John Howard on 14 September 2001 that
Australia would invoke Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty in response to the terrorist attacks
against the US on 11 September 2001.[56]
Australia’s military involvement in Afghanistan ended on 15
April 2021 with the announcement by Prime Minister Scott Morrison that
Australian forces would withdraw.[57]
During the almost 20 years in between, the ADF lost 41
personnel and more than 260 personnel were wounded or injured as a result of
operations in Afghanistan.[58]
At its peak Australia’s military deployment comprised a
personnel strength of 1,550, and overall more than 39,000 ADF personnel
deployed to Afghanistan.[59]
Financial cost of Australia’s
military contribution
The ADF’s involvement in the Afghanistan war was conducted
under Operation
Slipper from November 2001 to December 2014 and Operation Highroad
from January 2015 until mid-2021, when the last ADF personnel withdrew.
Table 2 lists the actual costs (where available) and
authorised personnel strength for ADF operations in Afghanistan by financial
year. The cumulative cost of Operation Slipper was $7,312
million and the cumulative cost of Operation Highroad up to 2019–20 was $526.4
million (this figure excludes 2020–21 and 2021–22 budget estimates).[60] In addition, Defence received
supplementation totalling $540 million for Enhanced Force Protection measures
in Afghanistan from 2009–10 to 2013–14.[61]
The total cost of operations from November 2001 to mid-2020 equates to around $8,378.4
million.
Table 2: costs and personnel
strength of ADF operations in Afghanistan by financial year
|
Budget
(actual, $ million)
|
Personnel
(authorised strength)
|
| 2021–22 |
(estimate) 40.6 |
0 |
| 2020–21 |
(revised estimate) 85.3 |
80 |
| 2019–20 |
76.7 |
200 |
| 2018–19 |
86.7 |
300 |
| 2017–18 |
82.4 |
300 |
| 2016–17 |
223.0 |
270–300 |
| 2015–16 |
228.5 |
270 |
| 2014–15 |
293.0 |
400 |
| 2013–14 |
735.3 |
1,030 |
| 2012–13 |
1,006.5 |
1,550 |
| 2011–12 |
1,006.7 |
1,550 |
| 2010–11 |
1,088.9 |
1,550 |
| 2009–10 |
1,125.3 |
1,550 |
| 2008–09 |
701.9 |
1,200 |
| 2007–08 |
394.9 |
1,080 |
| 2006–07 |
223.3 |
840 |
| 2005–06 |
91.0 |
550 |
| 2004–05 |
- |
1 |
| 2003–04 |
- |
2 |
| 2002–03 |
176.0 |
2 |
| 2001–02 |
320.0 |
1,100 |
Sources: Defence
annual reports, various years; Defence
portfolio budget statements, various
years; and NATO in Afghanistan placemats, various years.
Note: 2003–04 and 2004–05 figures were combined with
Operation Catalyst (Iraq) and cannot be distinguished for those years. Figures
in this table reflect funding allocated against Operations Slipper and Highroad
and do not take into account peripheral but contributory expenditure (for
example, Operation
Manitou—Middle East Region Maritime—sustainment, personnel costs, training
costs).
Appendix B
Library publications on Afghanistan
[1].
S Jones, ‘Op-ed:
Take the war to Pakistan’, The New York Times, 3 December 2009; A
Saikal, ‘Will
the US withdrawal from Afghanistan put the Taliban in power?’, The
Strategist, blog, 13 August 2020.
[2].
Agreement
for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban
and the United States of America, 29 February 2020.
[3].
M Esper (US Secretary of Defense), J Stoltenberg (NATO Secretary General) and
A Ghani (President of Afghanistan), News
conference by Secretary Esper, Secretary Stoltenberg, and Afghanistan President
Ghani, transcript, 29 February 2020.
[4].
Ibid.
[5].
Ibid.
[6].
B Roggio, ‘Taliban
religious decree calls for its emir to rule “Islamic government” in
Afghanistan’, FDD’s Long War Journal, 8 March 2020; Editorial,
‘Taliban
defends its chief as “legal” rule of Afghanistan’, Voice of America,
7 March 2020.
[7].
‘TOLOnews 6pm news 12
September 2020’, ToloNews, 12 September 2020.
[8].
S Amiry, ‘No significant
progress in Doha talks in past 9 days’, ToloNews, 21 January 2021.
[9].
Editorial, ‘High-stakes
talks between Afghan gov’t, Taliban as fighting rages’, Al Jazeera,
17 July 2021.
[10].
J Kirby, ‘Pentagon
Press Secretary John F. Kirby holds a press briefing’, US Department of
Defense, transcript, 12 July 2021.
[11].
C Miller (Acting US Defense Secretary), Acting
Secretary Miller announces troop levels in Afghanistan and Iraq,
transcript, 17 November 2020.
[12].
US Department of Defense, Statement
by Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller on force levels in Afghanistan,
media release, 15 January 2021.
[13].
White House, Background
press call by a Senior Administration Official on Afghanistan, press
briefing, 13 April 2021.
[14].
J Biden (President of the United States), Remarks
by President Biden on the way forward in Afghanistan, White House,
speech, 14 April 2021.
[15].
J Biden (President of the United States), Remarks
by President Biden on the drawdown of US forces in Afghanistan, White
House, speech, 8 July 2021.
[16].
US Central Command (US CENTCOM), ‘Update
on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan July 20, 2021’, US
CENTCOM website, 20 July 2021.
[17].
US CENTCOM, US
Forces-Afghanistan and Resolute Support transition of authority ceremony July,
12 2021, US CENTCOM, transcript, 13 July 2021.
[18].
Ibid.
[19].
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NATO allies decide
to start withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan, media release,
15 April 2021.
[20].
NATO, ‘Resolute
Support Mission (RSM): key facts and figures: troop contributing nations’,
February 2021.
[21].
G Dominguez, ‘NATO
starts training programme for Afghan special forces in Turkey, says report’,
Jane’s, 30 July 2021.
[22].
NATO, ‘NATO-Afghanistan
relations’, media backgrounder, June 2021.
[23].
S Morrison (Prime Minister), M Payne (Minister for Foreign Affairs) and P
Dutton (Minister for Defence), Australian
troops to drawdown in Afghanistan, media release, 15 April 2021.
[24].
P Dutton (Minister for Defence), Interview
with Laura Jayes, Sky News, transcript, 11 July 2021; A Greene, ‘Final
Australian troops leave Afghanistan as 20-year mission draws to a close’, ABC
News, 1 July 2021.
[25].
S Morrison (Prime Minister) and M Payne (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Statement
on the Australian Embassy in Afghanistan, media release, 25 May 2021.
[26].
Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Official
committee Hansard, 3 June 2021, p. 56.
[27].
S Morrison (Prime Minister), Press
conference: Canberra, ACT, transcript, 21 July 2021.
[28].
J Schroden, ‘Afghanistan’s
security forces versus the Taliban: a net assessment’, Combating Terrorism
Center at West Point, CTC Sentinel, 14(1), January 2021.
[29]. B Roggio, ‘Mapping
Taliban contested and controlled districts in Afghanistan’, FDD’s Long
War Journal.
[30].
K Clark, ‘Menace,
negotiation, attack: the Taleban take more district centres across Afghanistan’,
Afghanistan Analysts Network, 16 July 2021.
[31].
Editorial, ‘Customs revenue
declines amid increased Taliban attacks’, ToloNews, 7 July 2021; Z
Jahanmal, ‘Government stops
budget to development projects’, ToloNews,
13 July 2021.
[32].
US Department of Defense, Secretary
of Defense Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Milley press briefing,
transcript, 21 July 2021.
[33].
Editorial, ‘Taliban
says it will not enter Kabul by force’, ToloNews, 15 August 2021.
[34].
Editorial, ‘President
Ashraf Ghani leaves Afghanistan’, ToloNews, 15 August 2021;
Editorial, ‘Taliban
discussing future govt in Doha’, ToloNews, 16 August 2021; M Ansar,
‘Ghani, family “welcomed”
in UAE: statement’, ToloNews, 19 August 2021.
[35].
A Lieven, ‘Opinion:
why Afghan forces so quickly laid down their arms’, Politico, 16
August 2021; P Wintour, ‘A
tale of two armies: why Afghan forces proved no match for the Taliban’, The
Guardian, 16 August 2021; J Landay and I Ali, ‘Taliban
surge exposes failure of U.S. efforts to build Afghan army’, Reuters,
16 August 2021.
[36].
Wintour, ‘A tale of two armies’, op. cit.; A Basit, ‘Why
did the Afghan army disintegrate so quickly?’, Al Jazeera, 17 August
2021.
[37].
D Zucchino and N Rahim, ‘A
wave of Afghan surrenders to the Taliban picks up speed’, The New York
Times, 27 May 2021.
[38].
Special Inspector-General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), SIGAR
quarterly report to Congress, report, 30 January 2021, p. 60.
[39].
Ibid.
[40].
Ibid.
[41].
Ibid.
[42].
SIGAR, What
we need to learn: lessons from twenty years of Afghanistan reconstruction,
SIGAR August 2021, p. 67.
[43].
Ibid., p. VII.
[44].
US Department of Defense, Operation
Freedom’s Sentinel: Lead Inspector General report to the United States Congress,
Lead Inspector-General of OFS, 1 April 2021 to 30 June 2021, p. 22.
[45].
Ibid., pp. 23–24.
[46].
C Hoyle, ‘Concerns
grow over Afghan air force assets seized by Taliban’, Flight Global,
18 August 2021; Editorial, ‘Uzbekistan
says hundreds of Afghan soldiers flee over border with dozens of aircraft’,
Reuters, 17 August 2021; J Trevithick, ‘Dozens
Of U.S.-bought Afghan Air Force aircraft are now orphaned at an Uzbek airfield’,
The Drive, 17 August 2021.
[47].
Ibid.
[48].
NATO, ‘Afghan
National Army (ANA) Trust Fund’, media backgrounder, 5 February 2021.
[49].
Ibid.; Australian Government, Defence
annual report 2016–17, Department of Defence, November 2017, p. 138.
[50].
NATO, ‘NATO and
Afghanistan: financial sustainment of the Afghan National Defense and Security
Forces’, NATO website, updated 19 August 2021.
[51].
US Department of Defense, Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, op. cit., p. 18.
[52].
Ibid., p. 2.
[53].
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), ‘Reports on
the protection of civilians in armed conflict’, UNAMA website.
[54].
UNAMA, ‘Afghanistan:
protection of civilians in armed conflict: mid-year report: 1 January to 31
June 2021’, report, 26 July 2021, pp. 1–2.
[55].
Ibid., p. 3.
[56].
J Howard (Prime Minister), Application
of ANZUS Treaty to terrorist attacks on the United States, media
release, 14 September 2001.
[57].
S Morrison (Prime Minister), M Payne (Minister for Foreign Affairs) and P
Dutton (Minister for Defence), Australian troops to drawdown, op. cit.
[58].
Department of Defence (DoD), ‘Operation
Slipper: Afghanistan: Vale’, DoD website; K Andrews (Minister for Defence),
‘Ministerial
statements: Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Operations in the Middle East’,
House of Representatives, Hansard, 16 September 2015.
[59].
S Morrison (Prime Minister), M Payne (Minister for Foreign Affairs) and P
Dutton (Minister for Defence), Australian troops to drawdown, op. cit.
[60].
Australian Government, Defence
annual report 2016–17, Department of Defence, November 2017, p. 56; Australian
Government, Defence
annual report 2019–20, Department of Defence, November 2020, p. 72.
[61].
Australian Government, Defence
annual report 2013–14, Department of Defence, November 2014, p. 79.
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