Myanmar update

30 June 2022

PDF version [355 KB]

Dr Angela Clare
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security

Executive summary

The Myanmar military’s February 2021 coup brought an end to the country’s transition to civilian rule, sparking widespread resistance and ushering in a new cycle of violence and instability.
Armed conflict continues to escalate, but there appears little prospect of victory on either side. The country is facing a humanitarian crisis – around half the population are now living in poverty and over a million are displaced.
The situation poses risks to security in the region, exacerbating refugee crises, border conflicts and health security risks, and increasing threats from human trafficking, drug manufacturing and trade, illegal mining and logging.
Western nations have imposed targeted sanctions on the junta, so far to little effect. ASEAN is leading the diplomatic response to the crisis but has been hampered by internal divisions and a military regime in Myanmar largely impervious to external pressure.
The previous Australian (Morrison) Government resisted calls to impose additional sanctions on members of the junta in response to the coup.
A Myanmar court ruled in June 2022 that the trial of Australian adviser Sean Turnell on charges of violating the official secrets law will proceed. The incoming Australian Government has rejected the ruling and called for his immediate release.
The UN and human rights groups are calling on the international community to urgently mobilise their resources to meet the humanitarian needs of the Myanmar people and support ASEAN peace efforts.

Contents

Executive summary
Introduction
The international response
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
United Nations
China and Russia
Where to now?
Conclusion

Introduction

Since its independence in 1948 Myanmar has endured decades of military rule, widespread poverty and civil war between ethnic minority groups. Its national elections in 2015 brought Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy party to government and raised hopes for ongoing democratic reform. But the February 2021 coup brought an end to the country’s transition to civilian rule, sparking mass protests and ushering in a new cycle of violence and political turmoil.[1]

Over a year later, Myanmar’s humanitarian, political and security crisis is seen as one of the worst in Southeast Asia’s recent history. The economy is ‘critically weak’, according to the World Bank, an estimated 30% smaller than it might have been in the absence of COVID-19 and the coup.[2] Widespread power outages and restrictions on financial transactions and communications disrupt daily life and civil disobedience undermines military control.[3] An estimated one million jobs have been lost and many more workers have reduced incomes, reversing the country’s impressive gains against poverty over recent decades.[4] Price hikes for basic commodities have increased vulnerability and food insecurity.[5] The UN estimates that almost half the population now live in poverty and 14.4 million are in need of urgent humanitarian assistance, while military-imposed restrictions have hampered the delivery of aid to conflict areas.[6]

Despite its size and advanced weaponry, the army has failed to gain control of many parts of the country.[7] The coup has halted decade-long peace processes between the Government and armed ethnic groups, leaving ‘a more complex and fast-changing conflict environment’, according to the International Crisis Group (ICG).[8] The army now faces opposition from an array of armed groups, including locally organised civilian militia and the opposition National Unity Government-affiliated People’s Defence Force, organised in response to the suppression of peaceful dissent.[9] The UN estimates that 700,000 people have been displaced since the coup, bringing the total of internally displaced persons in Myanmar to over one million as at May 2022.

Most analysts believe that the country is facing a period of protracted violence, with neither side likely to gain the upper hand and positions hardening. In March 2022 General Min Aung Hlaing vowed that the army would ‘annihilate’ groups opposed to military rule, declaring major resistance organisations as terrorist groups.[10]

UN Special Envoy for Myanmar, Noeleen Heyzer, has spoken of the ‘missing middle’ in this ‘zero-sum setting’, where there is little space to advocate for the de-escalation of violence or engage in talks.[11]

In April 2022 the army chief offered to meet the leaders of ethnic armed groups to negotiate an end to armed conflict across the country, but media reports suggest there was little immediate interest expressed by some of the largest groups.[12]

The military’s actions have drawn international condemnation, but the violence has surprised few. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, declared that the crisis:

… is built upon the impunity with which the military leadership perpetrated the shocking campaign of violence resulting in gross human rights violations against the Rohingya communities of Myanmar four years ago – and other ethnic minorities over many decades beforehand.[13]

In March 2022 the UN human rights office released its first comprehensive report on the coup, which documented widespread and systematic abuses committed by the military junta against civilian opponents that may amount to ‘crimes against humanity’. The report called for action ‘to stem the pace at which individuals are being targeted by the military authorities and stripped of their rights, their lives and their livelihoods’.[14] As at June 2022, the UN estimated that security forces have killed at least 1,900 people and arrested more than 13,500 since the coup, while in May, 701 people affiliated with the National League for Democracy were reported to remain in detention.[15]

The repercussions of the crisis extend beyond Myanmar’s borders. The coup is perceived to have closed opportunities for the safe and sustainable repatriation of Rohingya refugees from neighbouring Bangladesh, while India has seen an estimated 22,000 refugees from Myanmar enter its troubled north-eastern region since February 2021.[16] The UN claims that Myanmar is witnessing ‘an unprecedented level of drug manufacturing and trade’, while the expansion of other illicit activities, including human trafficking, money laundering, and illegal mining and logging are destabilising already volatile border areas and bringing new health and security risks to the region.[17]

Myanmar occupies a geographically and politically strategic position in Southeast Asia and its stability is of international concern. A United States Institute of Peace report suggests that the country’s instability, dire poverty and lack of effective governance has left it highly vulnerable to ‘external and internal forces seeking to dominate its territory’, with the most immediate of these threats stemming from ‘China, Russia, and international criminal networks’.[18]

Human rights advocates have argued that the global community’s response to the coup has so far been ineffective, reflecting the ‘chronic weaknesses in an international, United Nations-based system’.[19] The advocacy group, Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, is calling for an end to the flow of weapons and cash to the junta, and that the international community hold the military to account for gross human rights violations through the criminal courts.[20] The UN has called for greater international efforts to ensure safe access for urgently needed humanitarian assistance and for donors to meet the significant humanitarian funding shortfall.[21] Aid and human rights groups are struggling to maintain global attention on Myanmar as new geostrategic crises emerge, however.[22]

The international response

The US, UK, EU and Canada have imposed targeted sanctions on members of the military with the aim of increasing economic and diplomatic pressure on the regime. Sanctions imposed by the US, Britain and Canada include freezing assets in foreign bank accounts and restricting access to visas, and have targeted the junta’s attorney-general, Supreme Court chief justice and other officials involved in the targeting and detention of political opponents. The sanctions also target military directorates responsible for procuring military hardware.[23] The EU has limited the Myanmar military’s access to foreign currency by including a key oil and gas enterprise in its latest round of sanctions.[24]

Few expect sanctions to influence the junta’s behaviour, given its demonstrated ‘willingness to endure prolonged and painful international isolation in defense of its perceived interests’.[25] But former Australian ambassador to Myanmar, Nicholas Coppel, argues that targeted sanctions can serve as ‘an expression of values and […] seek to articulate and establish norms for international behaviour’.[26]

The Morrison Government issued a number of statements condemning the coup, suspended its defence cooperation with Myanmar, and moved to downgrade its diplomatic representation in the country.[27] It resisted calls since the coup to add to its existing sanctions against Myanmar’s military, which include an arms embargo and targeted financial sanctions, and travel bans on members of the Myanmar military, but stated that it was continuing to keep its Myanmar sanctions regime ‘under close review’.[28]

The Morrison Government was widely accused of lending credibility to the junta after an April 2022 meeting between the outgoing Australian ambassador and army chief Min Aung Hlaing was reported in Myanmar media. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials noted that such engagement with the regime provides Australia with opportunities to call for the cessation of violence, the alleviation of the humanitarian situation and the release of Australian academic Sean Turnell.[29]

The Labor Opposition called on the Morrison Government to implement additional targeted sanctions against those responsible for the coup.[30] Australia could potentially introduce additional sanctions under Magnitsky-style legislation passed in December 2021, allowing the Government to extend sanctions on individuals, in particular those involved in egregious human rights abuses.[31]

In February 2022 Australia’s Future Fund announced it no longer held funds from a Chinese company linked to supplying weapons to the junta, but activists argue links with the junta remain.[32]

On 10 June a Myanmar court ruled that there was sufficient evidence against Sean Turnell – and several other defendents, including Aung San Suu Kyi – to proceed with their trial on charges of violating the official secrets law. The Australian Government rejected the ruling and called for his immediate release.[33]

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

As the premier Southeast Asian organisation, ASEAN is seen as the key forum to forge a regional solution to the crisis. Its Five-Point Consensus called for an end to violence, constructive dialogue between parties, the appointment of a special ASEAN envoy, provision of humanitarian assistance and a visit by the envoy to Myanmar.[34] In response to the junta’s refusal to allow the ASEAN special envoy to Myanmar access to Aung San Suu Kyi and other detained civilian leaders – a requirement under the Consensus – ASEAN took the significant step of blocking the junta from attending its October 2021 Leaders’ Summit.[35] But the lack of meaningful progress on its Five-Point plan has disappointed many and fuelled criticism of ASEAN’s weakness in the face of contemporary challenges.

Analysts argue that the Myanmar crisis poses an enormous challenge to the grouping, exposing rifts between member countries who hold divergent interests and views on the coup.[36] Indonesia leads the group of countries willing to speak out against the junta – including Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, albeit to varying degrees.[37] The Mekong countries of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam on the other hand ‘have little interest in pressuring Myanmar’s military for fear of harming their own economic interests and political ties with the generals’, analysts argue.[38] All ASEAN countries, however, have had to grapple with the need to take action in the face of the junta’s lack of cooperation with its Five-Point Consensus and ‘the need to maintain the organisation’s founding principle of non-interference’.[39]

Frustrated by ASEAN’s lack of progress, Malaysia has called for the grouping to engage directly with the opposition National Unity Government (NUG), while human rights groups have called for ASEAN countries to take bilateral action to bring an end to the humanitarian crisis, if consensus within the bloc cannot be achieved.[40]

The Thai Government’s response to the coup has been muted, despite being the ASEAN country most directly affected by instability along its border.[41] Its reluctance to condemn the coup has been linked to long-held and close ties between the Thai and Myanmar militaries as well as its recent political history: Prime Minister Prayuth seized power in his own coup in 2014.[42]

In contrast, former Thai foreign minister, Kasit Piromya, has argued that ‘ASEAN’s inaction has directly contributed to the region now hosting its own version of Syria’s protracted conflict’. If ASEAN wants to ‘meaningfully address crucial issues that threaten regional security, economic stability and diplomatic relations’, he argues, ‘it needs to reshape itself accordingly’:

ASEAN’s focus must now shift to doing whatever it takes to alleviate the suffering of Myanmar’s people, who have clearly chosen the future they want: without military involvement in politics. Now, the choice for the rest of the world is whether to support or abandon them.[43]

ASEAN appeared to acknowledge the gravity of the situation in its October 2021 Foreign Ministers statement, which noted that ‘the situation in Myanmar was having an impact on regional security as well as the unity, credibility and centrality of ASEAN as a rules-based organisation’.[44] If ASEAN places too much pressure on the junta, however, some have suggested that the Myanmar generals might be prepared to leave the grouping to preserve their independence – a move that would further distance the country from diplomatic influence, analysts point out.[45]

United Nations

Myanmar has presented profound challenges to UN agencies and member states over the last few decades, and the organisation has been widely criticised for its ineffective engagement in the country.[46] Although the General Assembly passed a (non-binding) resolution in June 2021 calling for an end to arms sales to the military – 119 countries voted in favour and one against – the Security Council has not gone any further than issuing statements of concern.[47] A Bangkok Post editorial accused the Security Council of ‘chronic paralysis’ over Myanmar and argued that the UN Secretary-General has been ‘unable or unwilling to make sure that the UN has a common approach’.[48]

Richard Horsey (ICG) agrees that international efforts to address the crisis have been ‘lacklustre at best’, but he points out that Security Council members are not as divided on Myanmar as they are on other issues:

China mostly shares Western concerns about the coup’s economic and security implications, which are a threat to its interests, but is much less inclined than other permanent Council members (except Russia) toward sanctions, public condemnation or framing the crisis in human rights terms. Beijing is also reluctant to see an issue in its neighbourhood internationalised, preferring to approach Naypyitaw bilaterally or through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). India, a non-permanent member, has also been increasingly resistant to Council scrutiny and action on this case. For their part, the Western permanent members – the U.S., UK and France – have chosen to keep any disagreement within limits, in order to avoid the toxic divisions that have emerged on issues such as Syria.[49]

While these differences hamper a stronger international stand against the regime, the ‘fragile modus vivendi’ that exists among Security Council members is ‘not completely without value’, Horsey argues. It has, for example, allowed the US and China to broker a deal that blocks the junta’s representation at the UN, leaving the existing ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun – who has publicly sided with the NUG – in Myanmar’s seat. This arrangement ‘is a major source of irritation for the regime and provides the NUG with its most important international platform’, Horsey contends.

China and Russia

China, Russia and Serbia are among the countries continuing to provide weapons to the junta, according to the UN.[50]

Russia is currently the junta’s strongest international supporter and its relations with Myanmar are described by one commentator as being at ‘an all-time high’.[51] Moscow has boosted military and economic cooperation since the coup and the junta has declared its support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (the NUG on the other hand has tweeted that it condemns Russia’s acts of war in Ukraine).[52]

As Myanmar’s largest trading partner and traditionally its closest ally, China’s relatively muted response to the coup appears to reflect its need to maintain relations with both the military and civil society in order to protect its interests in the country. Analysts believe China would likely have preferred Aung San Suu Kyi’s government to remain in power and is unhappy with the resulting political instability. It has, however, afforded de facto recognition to the junta and blocked a UN Security Council statement condemning the coup.[53]

China has invested heavily in infrastructure and energy projects in Myanmar as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, including oil and natural gas pipelines between the 2 countries and the development of a China-Myanmar Economic Corridor in Rakhine State to connect China’s landlocked Yunnan Province to the Indian Ocean.[54] The coup unleashed popular resentment towards Chinese businesses and the Chinese Government’s perceived support for the military, with protesters attacking a number of Chinese-run factories and investments.[55]

China must handle the situation ‘with extreme care’, according to analyst Xue Gong. Since the coup, it has made some effort to maintain relations with civil society, signing a UN statement condemning violence against peaceful protesters in March 2021 and making contact with opposition groups. But its investments could face pushback from Myanmar society if it continues to do business with the military government, Gong argues.[56]

Where to now?

Aung San Suu Kyi continues to enjoy popular support amongst the Buddhist majority, but her strategy of power-sharing and reconciliation with the military between 2015 and 2020 as a pathway to democracy ‘undeniably failed’.[57] Her political aim to end the cycle of confrontation and retaliation between armed ethnic groups and unite the country proved too ambitious, constitutional constraints prevented her from transforming the political system, and the military remained the country’s most politically influential institution.[58] Suu Kyi has also been criticised for overseeing ‘stark setbacks for civil and human rights’ in her time as de facto leader of the civilian government, while her defence at The Hague of the military’s 2017 atrocities against the Rohingya shocked and dismayed her international supporters.[59]

The NUG is showing signs that it has moved beyond Suu Kyi’s leadership. According to an ICG report, the shadow government has moved to build consensus among disparate opposition groups and create political and military alliances with ethnic armed groups in an attempt to forge a more united response to the crisis.[60] It has also released a new interim federal charter intended to replace the military’s 2008 constitution, ‘in an effort to convince ethnic armed groups that they have a historic opportunity to build the federal system they have long fought for’.[61] Importantly, the ICG argues:

… the coup has prompted a shift in how much of the Burman majority views ethnic armed groups and minorities’ demands for a fairer distribution of political power. Decades of propaganda had castigated minorities as the cause of Myanmar’s political problems, but Burmans angry at the regime now view ethnic grievances much more empathetically.[62]

Faced with ‘a mix of new and reinvigorated adversaries’, the junta has also sought to engage ethnic armed groups, but with a more limited goal: ‘it wants to keep them off the battlefield as much as possible and stop them from establishing formal alliances with the NUG’.[63] The regime has announced a 5-month unilateral ceasefire with ethnic armed groups, but ‘the junta has little to offer ethnic armed groups in terms of meaningful political reform’, according to the ICG.[64]

The NUG has also changed its position on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) hearings on genocide allegations against the junta, which resumed in February 2022. The NUG had previously refused to accept the ICJ’s authority to decide the issue, which deals with the military’s actions against Rohingya militants in 2017 that forced more than 700,000 Rohingya civilians to flee Myanmar for neighbouring Bangladesh.[65] The NUG also urged the court not to recognise the ruling military junta as Myanmar’s representative. In March 2022 the US declared Myanmar’s actions against the Rohingya Muslim population in 2016 and 2017 to be a ‘genocide’.[66]

In the Indo-Pacific, Helen Clark and Gareth Evans have argued that the Quad partnership – whose members include Australia, India, Japan and the US – needs to take stronger measures to help the Myanmar people, including stronger sanctions and supporting ‘strong enforcement action’ by the UN Security Council, if it is serious about being a positive force in the region.[67] The US is the only member of the Quad to have imposed new sanctions on the junta in response to the coup.

The Quad’s February 2022 joint foreign ministers statement on cooperation in the Indo-Pacific affirmed the group’s support for ASEAN centrality and called on the military regime ‘to urgently implement ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus’.[68]

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s first international engagement was a Quad meeting in Tokyo on 24 May.[69]

Conclusion

The situation in Myanmar continues to deteriorate, and the people of Myanmar will likely bear the brunt of escalating conflict and collapsing state institutions.

United States Institute of Peace analysis cautioned that the coup presents a serious threat to the world’s economy and stability and that states should not ‘outsource responsibility’ for addressing the crisis to ASEAN, which lacks ‘the tools and leverage to address problems of this magnitude’. Instead, the crisis must be ‘effectively addressed by the international community of democracies’, which should ‘mobiliz[e] their own robust responses to the crisis in support of ASEAN’s efforts’.[70]

Commentators suggest that after repeated criticisms by the new Labor Government, while in opposition, of the Morrison Government’s failure to impose additional sanctions on the junta, it will likely consider taking action in this regard.[71]

[1]. Lindsay Maizland, Myanmar’s Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, and Ethnic Conflict, Council on Foreign Relations, 31 January 2022.

[2]. The World Bank, ‘Economic Activity in Myanmar to Remain at Low Levels, with the Overall Outlook Bleak’, media release, 26 January 2022.

[3]. Laetitia Van Den Assum et al., ‘Asean still toothless a year after the coup’, Bangkok Post, 24 January 2022.

[4]. ‘The World Bank in Myanmar: overview’, The World Bank, updated April 2022.

[5]. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 18’, Reliefweb, 31 May 2022.

[6]. UN Department of Political and Peacekeeping Affairs (UN DPPA), ‘Remarks by Special Envoy Noeleen Heyzer at the informal meeting of the General Assembly on Myanmar’, Reliefweb, media release, 13 June 2022.

[7]. Special Advisory Council on Myanmar, ‘Cut the weapons’, website.

[8]. International Crisis Group (ICG), Myanmar’s Coup Shakes Up its Ethnic Conflicts, Report no. 319, 12 January 2022, p. 28.

[9]. ICG, Taking Aim at the Tatmadaw: The New Armed Resistance to Myanmar’s Coup, Crisis Group Briefing no. 168, p. 18.

[10]. Associated Press, ‘Myanmar Leader Vows to ‘Annihilate’ Opponents of Army Rule, More than a Year after Military Coup’, ABC News online, 28 March 2022.

[11]. UN DPPA, ‘Remarks by Special Envoy Noeleen Heyzer’.

[12]. Associated Press, ‘Myanmar’s Ruling Military Offers Minorities New Peace Talks,’ ABC News online, 23 April 2022.

[13]. UN News, ‘“Urgent, Renewed Effort” Needed to Restore Civilian Rule in Myanmar: Bachelet’, 28 January 2022.

[14]. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar Since 1 February 2021: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/49/72, 15 March 2022, 1.

[15]. UN News, ‘Myanmar: Cycle of “Human Rights Violations and Abuses” Continues, Warns Bachelet’, 14 June 2022; Eleven Media, ‘NLD Announces that 701 Party Members are Still Detained and 18 have Died’, The Nation-Thailand, 13 May 2022.

[16]. Md. Kamruzzaman, ‘Rohingya say Coup in Myanmar Obstacle to Repatriation’, Anadolu Agency (AA), 31 January 2022; Saket Ambarkhane and Sanjay V. Gathia, ‘Over a Year Later, Myanmar’s Military Coup Threatens India’s National Security’, United States Institute of Peace, 10 May 2022.

[17]. UN News, ‘“Window of Opportunity” for Unity Opens in Myanmar’, 31 January 2022.

[18]. Myanmar Study Group, Anatomy of the Military Coup and Recommendations for the US Response, final report, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, February 2022), 2.

[19]. Simon Tisdall, ‘Myanmar’s Top General Min Aung Hlaing is Strangling a Democracy. What Will the West do About it?’, The Guardian, 5 December 2021.

[20]. Special Advisory Council on Myanmar, ‘Cut the weapons’, ‘Cut the cash’ and ‘Cut the impunity’, website.

[21]. United Nations, Note to Correspondents, 3 May 2022; OCHA, Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 17, 19 April 2022.

[22]. Van Den Assum et al., ‘ASEAN Still Toothless’.

[23]. Simon Lewis, ‘U.S., Britain, Canada Issue New Myanmar Sanctions One Year after Coup’, Reuters, 1 February 2022.

[24]. Emma Connors, ‘EU Targets Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise’, Australian Financial Review, 4 February 2022.

[25]. Sebastian Strangio, ‘Myanmar Crisis Overshadows Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers’, The Diplomat, 18 February 2022.

[26]. Nicholas Coppel, ‘Australia’s Good Name Demands we Stand Firm on Myanmar’, The Australian, 18 May 2021.

[27]. Marise Payne (Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Statement on Myanmar Coup Anniversary’, media release, 1 February 2022 and ‘Statement on Myanmar’, media release, 8 March 2021; Stephen Dziedzic and Mazoe Ford, ‘Australia Not Appointing Ambassador to Myanmar Amid Moves to Downgrade Diplomatic Ties’, ABC News online, 17 May 2022.

[28]. Australian Government response to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Foreign Affairs and Aid Sub-committee report: Australia’s Response to the Coup in Myanmar, December 2021.

[29]. Dziedzic and Ford, ‘Australia Not Appointing Ambassador to Myanmar’.

[30]. Kristina Keneally (Acting Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Targeted Sanctions Overdue One Year on from Myanmar Coup’, media release, 1 February 2022.

[31]. Marise Payne (Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Strengthening Australia’s Sanctions Regime’, media release, 2 December 2021.

[32]. Emma Connors, ‘DFAT Acts on Myanmar Holdings in Future Fund’, Australian Financial Review, 17 February 2022.

[33]. Grant Peck, ‘Myanmar Trial of Australian to Go Ahead’, The Age, 11 June 2022; Penny Wong (Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Professor Sean Turnell Trial’, media release, 10 June 2022.

[34]. ASEAN, ‘Chairman’s Statement on the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting’, Jakarta, 24 April 2021.

[35]. ‘Myanmar Military Won’t Allow ASEAN Envoy to Meet Suu Kyi’, Reuters, 14 October 2021; Ben Bland, ‘ASEAN Muddles Through on Myanmar’, The Interpreter (blog), 22 October 2021.

[36]. Brian Harding and Jason Tower, ‘Myanmar Coup Weakens Southeast Asia Security and Cooperation’, United States Institute of Peace, 13 April 2021.

[37]. Gibran M. Drajat, ‘The Indonesia Factor in ASEAN’s Response to Myanmar’, East Asia Forum, 21 May 2021.

[38]. Priscilla A. Clapp and Jason Tower, ‘U.S.-ASEAN Summit: A Chance to Explore New Steps to Resolve Myanmar’s Conflict’, United States Institute of Peace, 12 May 2022.

[39]. Bland, ‘ASEAN Muddles Through on Myanmar’.

[40]. Center for Strategic & International Studies, ‘The Latest on Southeast Asia: May 12 2022’, blog, 12 May 2022; Amnesty International, ‘Myanmar: ASEAN Must Kickstart Stalled Approach to Human Rights Crisis at US Summit’, 12 May 2022.

[41]. Strangio, ‘Myanmar Crisis Overshadows Meeting’.

[42]. Kay Johnson and Panarat Thepgumpanat, ‘Analysis: Myanmar’s Neighbour Thailand Unlikely to Toughen Stance on Coup’, Reuters, 2 April 2022.

[43]. Kasit Piromya, ‘Myanmar Crisis: Is this the Beginning of the End of ASEAN?’ The Jakarta Post, 3 February 2022.

[44]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement of the Chair of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting’, Brunei Darussalam, 16 October 2021.

[45]. Andrew Selth, ‘If Pushed Far Enough, Would Myanmar Leave ASEAN?’, The Interpreter (blog), 20 October 2021.

[46]. Kelly Currie, ‘Beyond the Coup: Can the United Nations Escape its History in Myanmar?’, Just Security, 27 May 2021.

[47]. United Nations, ‘“The Situation in Myanmar”, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 18 June 2021’, 75th session.

[48]. Van Den Assum et al., ‘ASEAN Still Toothless’.

[49]. Richard Horsey, One Year On from the Myanmar Coup, International Crisis Group, 25 January 2022.

[50]. UN News, ‘Stop Weapons Supply to Myanmar, Rights Expert Urges’, 22 February 2022.

[51]. Nay Yan Oo, ‘Don’t Give Up On Myanmar’, Southeast Asia Insights, Brookings, 16 December 2021.

[52]. Voice of America, ‘Myanmar’s Military Council Supports Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine’, 25 February 2022; National Unity Government Myanmar (@NUGMyanmar), Twitter.

[53]. Enze Han, ‘China Does Not Like the Coup in Myanmar’, East Asia Forum, 6 February 2021.

[54]. Kaho Yu, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia after COVID-19: China’s Energy and Infrastructure Investments in Myanmar’, Yushof Ishak Institute, 39, 2021.

[55]. Reuters, ‘Analysis: “Chinese Business Out!” Myanmar Anger Threatens Investment Plans’, 11 March 2021.

[56]. Xue Gong, ‘Handle With Care: China’s Economic Engagement in Myanmar’, The Interpreter (blog), 16 February 2022.

[57]. BBC, ‘Aung San Suu Kyi: Myanmar Democracy Icon Who Fell from Grace’, News Asia, 6 December 2021; Robert Bociaga, ‘Myanmar’s Military Mindset’, The Diplomat, 1 February 2022.

[58]. Zoltan Barany, ‘Burma: Suu Kyi’s Missteps’, Journal of Democracy 29, no. 1 (January 2018): 5–19, 6.

[59]. Barany, 13; Andrew Selth, ‘Aung San Suu Kyi: Why Defend the Indefensible?’, The Interpreter (blog), 12 December 2019.

[60]. ICG, Myanmar’s Coup Shakes Up Its Ethnic Conflicts.

[61]. ICG, p. i.

[62]. ICG, p. i.

[63]. ICG, p. ii.

[64]. ICG, p. ii.

[65]. Reuters, ‘Myanmar Shadow Government Drops Objections to ICJ’s Rohingya Genocide Case’, 2 February 2022.

[66]. Julius Borger, ‘US Declares Myanmar Army Committed Genocide Against Rohingya’, The Guardian, 22 March 2022.

[67]. Helen Clark and Gareth Evans, ‘Why the Quad is Failing on Myanmar Human Rights’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 17 February 2022.

[68]. Marise Payne (Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Quad Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’, media release (joint statement by the foreign ministers of Australia, India and Japan and the Secretary of State of the United States), 11 February 2022.

[69]. Greg Barton, ‘As Anthony Albanese Heads to the Quad, What are the Security Challenges Facing Australia’s New Government?’, ABC News online, 23 May 2022.

[70]. Clapp et al., ‘U.S.-ASEAN Summit’.

[71]. Daniel Hurst, ‘Albanese Government Urged to Keep Focus on Human Rights as it Rebuilds Relationships in Asia’, The Guardian, 16 June 2022.

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