There have been allegations of
serious human rights violations against all parties involved in the conflict in
Afghanistan. The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court is currently conducting
an investigation focused on ‘Alleged crimes against humanity and war
crimes committed in Afghanistan since 1 May 2003’.[3]
On a number of separate occasions since 2006, reports have been published in
the Australian media alleging that a few Australian Defence Force (ADF)
personnel operating in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2013 engaged in criminal
conduct. This chronology is intended to:
For some incidents, the fact that
a death or injury occurred is confirmed by a publicly available official ADF
Inquiry Officer (IO) Report. However, some allegations are contradicted in IO
reports and the circumstances of even the confirmed incidents are contested.
Most incidents have not been publicly confirmed by official sources. Around 30
IO reports into incidents in Afghanistan have been publicly released.[5]
The IO reports usually contain
redactions to anonymise the reports and protect sensitive information. One of
the items routinely redacted from IO reports is the number of enemy/insurgents
killed, wounded or detained. Where it is apparent from the IO Report that the
redacted number was more than one, the term ‘a number of’ has been
used in the chronology. Many of the IO reports indicate that for operational
reasons it was not possible to visit the site of the incident or to interview
in person one or more local witnesses.
Where ADF personnel have been named, or a pseudonym used in a
publication, that name or pseudonym is repeated in this chronology. Several ADF
personnel are named in public reports because they are witnesses or have come
forward with information. Public reports make it clear that a number of
different soldiers are accused of involvement in more than 15 unlawful killings
that allegedly occurred during operations; however, the only soldier accused of
an unlawful killing that has been named to date is former Special Air Service
Regiment (SASR) Corporal Ben Roberts-Smith VC, MG.[6]
Roberts-Smith has not been charged with any offence, denies
all allegations, and has commenced a defamation action against media
organisations that identified him.[7]
The case has been set down for hearing on 7 June 2021.[8]
There have been a number of pre-hearing orders
and judgments in the defamation case. In a judgment dated 8 September 2020,
Justice Colvin summarised certain facts related to the case:
Specific reports, incidents and allegations are described
and sequentially numbered. Undated or multi-date allegations are located within
the general timeframe identified and shaded orange. The deaths of Australian
soldiers killed in Afghanistan and other known notable events that could add
useful context or potentially have some relevance to an incident are included
and shaded lighter green.
A glossary of terms and a list of
library monographs documenting ADF activity in Afghanistan are included at the
end of the chronology.
A note on spelling: Spelling of
place names and personal names is not standardised in Afghanistan and
variations in the English spelling are frequent: for example,
Uruzgan/Uruzgun/Oruzgan; Tarin Kowt/Tarin Kot; Noy Juy/Nawjoy;
Mohammed/Muhamed.
The main sources for the chronology were publicly available media
reports and IO reports. Monographs documenting ADF activity in Afghanistan were
also been consulted as well as annual reports prepared by Government agencies.
Other sources included briefing documents, sometimes referred to as
‘talking points’, prepared by the Department of Defence and
provided to senior officials to assist them when appearing before Parliamentary
Committees or when addressing the media. These briefing documents became public
when they were disclosed under freedom of information legislation.
The Afghan Independent Human
Rights Commission (AIHRC) was launched in June 2002. In 2007, it established a
Special Investigation Team to monitor conflict-related prisoners and implementation
of International Humanitarian Law. AIHRC documents civilian casualties and
advocates for protection of civilians. AIHRC reports are published online in
both English and Persian; however, these reports have not been consulted
directly.[10]
References to AIHRC work or findings in this paper are hearsay derived from
media reports of content.
|
#1
2 June 2006
Koran Ghar,
Chora Valley
Uruzgan Province
|
Journalist report: An SAS patrol was
conducting overwatch from a concealed observation post (OP) on Koran Ghar and
identifying targets during fierce fighting in the Chora Valley on 1 June 2006.
Next day, Trooper Mick and Trooper Jim said they were on watch in the OP when,
around midday, a young, apparently unarmed local national (LN) not wearing a
chest rig, walked across their field of view. Their range finder showed he
was about 76 metres away. The troopers, who were on a clandestine, observation-only
patrol, did not engage but reported the contact.
Soon after the LN was sighted again, walking back the way
he had come, this time carrying a bag. Once again, they did not engage.
Sergeant Locke and Lance Corporal Roberts-Smith allegedly came forward to the
OP and argued that, with the Taliban massing in the valley below, the
troopers should have shot the LN as a he was a spotter who had compromised
the patrol.
It is alleged that the post action report of the patrol
commander, Sergeant Will, said Roberts-Smith and Locke pursued the LN and,
using suppressed (silenced) weapons, killed him. He said a smoke grenade was
deployed or exploded when the man was shot and this triggered machine gun
fire. The soldiers did not have the opportunity to search the body.
Packham reports that Roberts-Smith was awarded a Medal for
Gallantry for his actions on that day as well as other actions during his
deployment May-September 2006.
Roberts-Smith gave a different account in 2011 to an
Australian War Memorial (AWM) researcher: A couple of hours before dark, two
LN had walked up to within 30 metres of the OP then turned sharply away into
a different reentrant [a reentrant is the low ground formed between two hill
spurs; a gully]. Assessing that the patrol was compromised, Roberts-Smith and
Locke pursued the men, killed them and cleared their bodies. Roberts-Smith said
a flare in one insurgent’s chest rig went off when he was shot. (He later
clarified he had confused this incident with a different incident. After checking
his patrol report he confirmed only one insurgent was involved and the body
was not searched.)
The soldiers’ post-incident reports were allegedly
inconsistent. One patrol member insisted the LN appeared to be an unarmed
teenager whose death could have been avoided. Other post-incident reports
stated the insurgent was armed with an automatic rifle.
Trooper Mick alleges that Robert-Smith came up to him
later and said ‘Next time we go out on patrol, if your performance
doesn’t improve I will shoot you in the back of the head’ or
words to that effect. Trooper Mick did not interpret Roberts-Smith’s
comment as a literal threat to kill, but was distressed.
|
C Masters, No
front line: Australia's special forces at war in Afghanistan, Allen
& Unwin, Sydney, 2017, p. 101–109.
N McKenzie, D Wroe and C Masters, ‘Beneath
the bravery of our most decorated soldier’, The Sydney Morning
Herald, 10 August 2018, p. 1.
Australian War Memorial (AWM), Medal
for Gallantry: Lance Corporal B Roberts-Smith, Special Air Service Regiment,
Australian Army, AWM website.
B Packham, ‘“I
will shoot you”: SAS at war’, The
Australian, 10 October 2020, p. 1.
|
|
#2
July 2006
Chora,
Uruzgan Province
|
Journalist report: Haji Malem Mohammed Abdul
Khaliq Khan, a Barakzai member of Parliament, complained that his family had
been attacked by the SAS as they fled Chora. His car was shot up and his wife
blinded, their daughter lost a leg and his brother-in-law, Abdul Baqi, was
killed. His son and a niece and nephew were also injured.
McKenzie reported that military officials in Afghanistan
found information about Australian involvement in the shooting, allegedly
stored on ADF computers in Afghanistan. McKenzie reported the information
found revealed the SAS patrol believed taxis were ferrying Taliban insurgents
to combat hot spots in the area and an SAS patrol reported a contact in the
same geographic area in which the Khaliq family car was hit. He reports a
Defence source as saying there was pressure on Defence personnel in
Afghanistan to cover up the shooting.
McKenzie believes that information was not sent to the
Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) before he told the Senate Foreign Affairs
and Defence Committee on 14 February 2007 that ‘The investigation found
that times, locations and occurrences described by Mr Khaliq and his family
do not correspond to coalition patrol reporting.’
According to Masters, the ADF remain sure none of their
troops was located where the incident occurred.
|
N McKenzie, ‘Military
in Afghan cover-up’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 11 May
2009, p. 1.
Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, Official
committee Hansard, 14 February 2007, pp. 27–28.
Masters, No front line, op. cit., p. 125.
|
|
◊
2006
|
The International
Criminal Court (ICC) investigates and, where warranted, tries individuals
charged with the gravest crimes of concern to the international community:
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression.
In 2006, the previous Prosecutor of ICC, Luis Moreno
Ocampo, opened a preliminary inquiry into possible atrocities committed in
Afghanistan by all parties in the conflict. There has been no indication that
Australian personnel are the subject of inquiry. Ocampo’s successor as
Prosecutor in 2010, Fatou Bensouda continued the inquiry.
|
T Sterling and S van den Berg, ‘Facing
hurdles from U.S., war crimes judges reject Afghan probe’, Reuters,
12 April 2019.
|
|
#3
August 2007
|
Journalist report: Australian soldiers were
photographed flying a Nazi swastika flag from their vehicle while on
operations in Afghanistan. Two separate Defence sources identified a
particular soldier as the individual who took the flag to Afghanistan. One
Defence source who was aware of the flag being flown in Afghanistan in 2007
said it was a ‘twisted joke’, rather than evidence or an
expression of genuine neo-Nazism. The source claimed the flag was up for a
‘prolonged period’.
Oakes reported a Defence spokesperson to have said
‘Defence and the ADF reject as abhorrent everything this flag
represents. Neither the flag nor its use are in line with Defence values. The
flag was briefly raised above an Australian Army vehicle in Afghanistan in
2007. The commander took immediate action to have the offensive flag taken
down. It is totally inappropriate for any ADF vehicle or company to have a
flag of this nature. The personnel involved were immediately cautioned at the
time and subsequently received further counselling. Additionally, steps were
taken to reinforce education and training for all personnel who witnessed the
flag.’
[Note: Display of a hate symbol could constitute a
military discipline offence. Use of a non-standard flag is also problematic
in the rules of war. The ‘principle of distinction’ expressed in
Article 48 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions requires
military units to be clearly distinguishable. A fixed distinctive sign
recognisable at a distance is required.]
During a 2 July 2018 doorstop, Ten News suggested that one
of the men responsible for raising the Nazi flag had risen to very senior
rank within the Army. The Minister declined to comment. Air Chief Marshall
Binskin noted that the incident was abhorrent, action was taken at the lowest
level by the commander at the time, and he was satisfied with that action.
|
D Oakes, ‘Australian
soldiers flew Nazi swastika flag from vehicle in Afghanistan’, ABC
News (online), 14 June 2018, updated 15 June 2018.
M Payne (Minister
for Defence), ‘Offensive
flag’, media release, 14 June 2018
M Payne and M
Binskin (CDF), ‘Doorstop
- Invictus Games and Special Forces inquiry’, media release,
2 July 2018.
For a discussion
of uniform and emblems, see: T Pfanner, ‘Military uniforms and the law
of war’, International Review of the Red Cross, 86, No. 853,
March 2004, pp. 93–124.
|
|
#4
23 November 2007
Tarin Kowt
Uruzgan Province
|
Inquiry Officer (IO) Report: Troops carried
out a planned search and clearance based on operational intelligence.
Significant resistance was encountered over several hours.
- An organised militant force equipped with communications and
heavy and light machine guns was present. A quantity of weapons, ammunition
and equipment was captured.
- At least four Taliban were killed in action (KIA) inside the
compound and more than three outside. One Australian soldier was KIA. A
number of LNs were detained; some released, but four transferred to ongoing
detention by ISAF forces.
- Two LNs (a baby and teenage girl) were KIA. At least three LNs
were wounded. IO found they were not targeted, but were likely hit by
Australian fire correctly directed at enemy. One LN complained he was
mistreated in detention. No evidence of any mistreatment found and allegation
later withdrawn.
IO findings: Australian commanders exerted
effective operational control and coordination. ROE were adequate—the
soldier was able to positively identify his assailant as enemy and fire first
before he was killed. No shortcomings identified in ADF actions, decisions or
training.
|
Colonel P Short, Inquiry
Officer’s report into collateral damage and allegations of mistreatment
of a local national by the [redacted] in Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan on 23
Nov 07, ADF, DoD, 21 December 2007.
|
|
◊
2007–2008
|
Psychological fatigue of SF noted
Journalist report: SASR psychologists were
holding conversations in the mental health space about multiple deployments.
Former SAS psychologist Mark Mathieson said:
We knew fairly early
on—by 2007 and 2008—that fatigue was a big issue within SOCOMD
(Special Operations Command), and by that we don’t mean just physical
fatigue but also psychological fatigue.
|
B Packham, ‘Pawns
in a deadly game’, The Australian, 19 September 2020,
p. 15.
|
|
#5
30 April 2008
Uruzgan Province
|
IO Report: On 29 April 2008, a Special
Operations Task Group (SOTG) conducted a clearance operation and was engaged
by insurgents. During a short intense battle, a number of Taliban were
killed.
- Four suspected Taliban were detained and tactically questioned.
One was released in the early morning. One Afghan National Army (ANA) soldier
complained on 30 April that SOTG was harsh, disrespectful, and violent toward
detainees. Allegations included detainees being pushed or bashed against
wall; hit with a stick; trousers pulled off.
- Detainees were transferred to International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) in late evening. Medical examination by ISAF occurred on
transfer.
- Several days later, ANA commanders alleged four detainees were
stripped naked, beaten and mistreated by SOTG.
- ADF Investigative Service (ADFIS) as well as IO investigated
the incident.
IO findings: One LN was detained not fully dressed:
he did not have the under-trousers usual with a tunic. Soldiers supplied
trousers mid-morning on 30 April. Medical examinations on handover to ISAF
showed only minor bruising and abrasions. Allegations not substantiated.
Detainees were ‘manhandled’ during capture and questioning, but
not mistreated.
|
Colonel D Connery, Inquiry
Officer’s report into the detention of local nationals on 29–30
April 2008 in Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan, ADF, DoD, June 2008.
|
|
#6
5 July 2008
|
Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) Senate
Estimates brief: During a security patrol on 5 July 2008 in the Baluchi
District, members of the Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force (MRTF)
conducted operations against suspected Taliban locations. Observed mortar
fire and direct fire were used during the conduct of the operation. Following
the mortar fire missions, allegations were raised of injuries to one male
youth, the death of a LN and the destruction of livestock.
Two inquiries were conducted into this incident (a primary
and a supplemental). The first inquiry confirmed that mortar fire or direct
fire in support of the MRTF mounted patrol likely resulted in the shrapnel
injury to one local Afghan male youth and a number of livestock were probably
destroyed as a result of the engagement. The supplementary inquiry found it
was highly unlikely that a local national was killed. Both inquiries
found that there were no breaches of the Australian ROE or Laws of Armed
Conflict.
|
VCDF, Senate Estimates Brief, ‘Afghanistan
2: Death or serious injury of Afghan civilians where ADF involvement is
alleged and subject to administrative inquiry’, 1 October 2015, FOI
332/15/16, Item 3.
|
|
#7
17 September 2008
Sarsha Kala,
Uruzgan Province
|
Journalist report: SOTG conducted a night
raid at Sarsha Kala searching for OBJ MUSKET. Khusal Khan, son of the local
police chief Rozi Khan, told journalists the villagers thought they were
being attacked by the Taliban and called the local police chief, Rozi Khan.
When the police arrived, the Australians fired on them, killing Rozi Khan.
VCDF senate estimates brief: During a night patrol,
Australian forces were engaged by small arms fire. In returning fire, four
Afghans were killed, including the Chora District Chief, Rozi Khan, and three
others were wounded. An administrative inquiry was conducted into the
incident. The findings were not published.
|
M Carney, T Cookes and S Sharifi, ‘In
their sights’, Four Corners, ABC, 5 September 2011.
Transcript.
VCDF, Senate Estimates Brief, ‘Afghanistan
2: Death or serious injury of Afghan civilians where ADF involvement is
alleged and subject to administrative inquiry’, 1 October 2015, FOI
332/15/16, Item 3.
|
|
#8
30 December 2008
Location unknown
|
Defence talking points: An off-duty member
of the Afghan National Police who approached a MRTF checkpoint was shot. He
was thought to be carrying an IED.
Inquiries: An initial inquiry, and a review
conducted in 2010 after new information came to light, found that the
soldiers involved acted within their rules of engagement. The 2010 review
identified that the Australian Defence Force Special Investigative Service
(ADFIS) investigation processes associated with this incident may have been
interfered with.
ADFIS subsequently initiated an investigation into that
matter. The outcome of that investigation is not available.
|
ADF, ‘12
February 2009 - Civilian Casualty Incident’
Defence Communication Strategy, 24 March 2011, Attachment B,
pp. 23–24.
|
|
∞
Dates of incidents not given—likely 2008
to 2009.
|
Journalist report: Australian soldiers have
been involved in capture and kill operations against Taliban leaders in
Uruzgan Province. Leaked documents released by WikiLeaks in 2010 reveal
previously unreported alleged incidents:
- A December 2008 mortar engagement with insurgents that left an
Australian soldier wounded.
- LN children taken to hospital after Australian soldiers opened
fire on a military checkpoint.
- Australian ordnance found in Taliban weapons caches.
- allegations that NATO forces operated a ‘black special
operations’ unit outside government control to hunt and kill Taliban
leaders.
Journalist report: A former 2CDO warrant
officer, ‘Soldier H’, claimed in ‘Life on the Line’
military veterans podcast series that, while deployed in Afghanistan in 2008,
he lent himself to unsanctioned missions with counterpart forces including
from Italy, Germany, Canada and local Afghans for up to three weeks in the
month. Soldier H claimed he would disappear for days on these missions, such
was the lack of ADF and 2CDO direction and supervision.
|
J Kerin, ‘Just
don’t mention the war’, The Australian Financial
Review, 29 July 2010, p. 61.
C Miranda, ‘Aussie
soldier a gun for hire’, Herald Sun, 3 August 2020, p.
12.
A Lloyd, ‘‘H’’, vols. 1–5,
‘Life on the Line’, audio podcast, 7 May 2019.
|
|
#9
5 Jan 2009
Baluchi,
Uruzgan Province
|
IO Report: A LN man arrived at White
Compound, Chora with eight wounded LNs in vehicle, one later died that night.
The LN claimed they were injured by [redacted: possibly drone]. He also
claimed ten neighbours had been killed. ISAF initial investigation suggested
indirect mortar fire from SOTG operating in area may have been responsible.
IO sent shrapnel fragments taken from wounded to the
Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) for analysis. Fragments
did not match mortar bombs used by SOTG.
Journalist report: A Predator unmanned aerial
vehicle provided targeting and a laser guided Hellfire missile fired at a
group of fighters including OBJ FLAMBARD (Abdul Rashid) who was later
confirmed killed. There was confusion about overlaid mortar fire.
IO finding: The IO noted a significant degree of
conflicting information from numerous sources. Clear that SOTG not
responsible for incident. IO noted that, while engaged by small arms fire,
SOTG observed a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) and a 107mm rocket aimed at
them pass overhead and detonate south of their position; however, IO was not
able to conclude with confidence that these explosives caused the injuries.
Cause of incident unknown.
|
Colonel S Clingan, Inquiry
Officer’s report into an allegation that an indirect fire mission by
Special Operations Task Group in Afghanistan on 5 January 2009 caused a
number of unintended civilian casualties, ADF, DoD,
20 February 2009.
Masters, No front line, op. cit., pp.
248–249.
|
|
#10
January 2009
Location unknown
|
Journalist report: Alleges an Australian
military operation aimed at finding those responsible for the death of
special forces soldier Greg Sher left four Afghan civilians dead. No other
detail or reference to this alleged incident found. It is possible it refers
to incident #9 above.
|
McKenzie, ‘Military
in Afghan cover-up’, op. cit.
|
|
#11
12 February 2009
Sorkh Morghab
Uruzgan Province
|
Journalist reports: Soldiers from the 1st
Commando Regiment (1CDO) conducted a night-time raid on a compound in the
Sorkh Morghab village, Uruzgan province, Afghanistan. The purpose of the raid
was to capture a Taliban insurgent believed to be located in the compound.
At about 1 am they approached a residential homestead
surrounded by mud brick walls, with only a few windows. The soldiers were
fired upon by a man inside a room in the compound. The resulting heavy
firefight may have lasted only 90 seconds. ANA soldiers identified themselves
and called on the shooter to cease firing, but he continued.
The man may have fired most of three magazines, up to 90
rounds, of 7.62mm ammunition that was bursting through the mud walls around
the soldiers. A sergeant ordered a soldier to throw a grenade into the room.
After the first grenade exploded, there was a new burst of fire from the
room. The soldier threw a second grenade and the shooting stopped.
The shooter, identified later as Amrullah Khan, was found
badly wounded. He was given aid by Australian soldiers, but died later at a
medical treatment facility at the Tarin Kowt base. Five children were killed
by the grenades thrown into the compound to stop the fire. There were other
civilian casualties.
There is conflicting evidence over whether the soldiers
knew, or should have known, that there were women and children in the room,
and whether they heard them screaming.
One soldier did hear screams and countermanded an order to
fire a machine gun.
VCDF Senate Estimates brief: An inquiry was
conducted into this incident as well as an ADFIS investigation. Disciplinary
proceedings involving the three ADF members charged in connection with the 12
February 2009 civilian casualty incident concluded on 29 August 2011. The court martial proceedings involving the
two soldiers were dissolved on 22 June 2011 as a result of a ruling that the
charges against them did not disclose a service offence. Court martial proceedings
against the officer concluded on 29 August 2011, with the withdrawal of
charges by the Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP). The ADF indicated it
did not intend to pursue adverse administrative action against any ADF
members involved in the matter.
|
M Vincent, ‘Soldiers
“incensed” by civilian deaths charges’, ABC News
(online), 30 September 2010.
R Beasley, ‘Duty
of care on the battlefield’, Bar News, Summer,
2011–12, pp. 53–58.
ADF, ‘12
February 2009 - Civilian Casualty Incident’
Defence Communication Strategy, 24 March 2011,
pp. 5–25.
J Kelly, ‘Re
Civilian Casualty Court Martial: prosecuting breaches of international
humanitarian law using the Australian military justice system’,
Melbourne University Law Review, 37(2), 2013, pp. 342–371.
S Davis and H Grasswill, ‘Soldiers
at centre of deadly Afghanistan raid should be exonerated, former Army chief
says’, ABC News (online), 30 May 2016.
Australian Story,
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), Statement
from the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in answer to questions raised in Into
the Fog of War 30 May 2016, media release, 3 December 2017.
S Davis and H
Grasswill, ‘Australian
commandos' role in deaths of five Afghan children questioned’, ABC
News (online), 22 May 2016.
Masters, No
front line, op. cit., pp. 251–254.
VCDF, Senate
Estimates Brief, ‘Afghanistan
2: Death or serious injury of Afghan civilians where ADF involvement is
alleged and subject to administrative inquiry’, 1 October 2015, FOI
332/15/16, Item 3.
|
|
#12
2 April 2009
Jalbay/Chalabi,
Chenartu District
Uruzgan Province
|
IO Report: Reliable intelligence indicated a
senior insurgent, who was identified for deliberate targeting, was at a
compound. Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) led mission with SOTG to
clear the compound. Senior insurgent not found.
Journalist report: Four Corners
alleged the intelligence was that OBJ SABRE, Mullah Ismail, was in Hajji
Mussa’s home. Witnesses Hajji Mussa and his cousin Abdul Razik say they
had gathered the extended family for a mourning ceremony for a recently
deceased granddaughter. The soldiers arrived by helicopter at Jalbay village
after dark and there were immediately two explosions.
Muhammad Mussa went to a window to tell the soldiers to
stop but was shot through the head and killed. Razik’s nephew Janan
Khan fled to his house next door. Before he died, Janan told Razik the
soldiers had picked him up and smashed him to the ground. A hired labourer,
Taza Khan hid behind a haystack in a guest room. Razik alleges that after
Taza was shot, his clothes were removed and an ADF dog attacked him tearing
pieces off his body.
Journalist report: Masters reported that witnesses
said the Taliban had departed earlier in the evening while cloud obscured UAV
reconnaissance. Jalbay locals insisted the men killed were not Taliban.
ADF response reported by Four Corners: There
is no evidence to substantiate the claim that a wounded man was left at the
site to die. ADF tactics, techniques and procedures are appropriate and
‘under constant review in order to do everything we can to minimise
loss of life and impact on civilians’.
IO Report: Three fighting age males were KIA:
- One male lying prone on a bed of chaff observing courtyard
through window.
- Male observed moving tactically and utilising cover in a tree
line to east of compound.
- Male observed attempting to conceal himself in hay.
No shots fired by KIA. KIA were searched and no weapons or
identification recovered. Area surrounding KIA not searched due to limited
time for exfiltration.
Eight fighting age males were detained. Two old weapons
and small amounts of rusty ammunition recovered.
IO findings: Each soldier who fired decided their
target was a threat to themselves or other soldiers based on observations of
target behaviour. Conclusions were reasonable and members acted within their
ROE (though it was ISAF rather than Australian ROE). KIA could not be
identified. Probable that the KIA were associates of the senior insurgent.
IO Recommended:
- SOTG Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to be modified to
require every effort is made to determine the identity of KIA.
- SOTG must also provide more expansive post operation reports
when KIA did not engage and/or no weapon found.
The three dead males could not be identified at the time
and in 2015, the Senate Estimates Brief prepared for VCDF stated DoD had
closed the incident. It relied on the IO findings to report that the
identities of the deceased were unlikely ever to be known with certainty; on
the balance of probability, they were likely to have been associates of the
senior insurgent leader and acted in a manner consistent with taking a direct
part in hostilities.
|
Colonel R Shanahan, Report
of Inquiry Officer–possible civilian casualties resulting from
clearance of compound at [redacted], Afghanistan on 2 Apr 09,
ADF, DoD, May 2009.
M Carney, T Cookes and
S Sharifi, ‘In
their sights’, Four Corners, ABC, 5 September 2011. Transcript.
Masters, No front line,
op. cit., pp. 266–267.
D Oakes and S Clark,
‘What
the documents reveal about killings of unarmed Afghans: Three men killed,
including one hiding in haystack’, ABC News (online),
11 July 2017.
VCDF, Senate Estimates Brief, ‘Afghanistan
2: Death or serious injury of Afghan civilians where ADF involvement is
alleged and subject to administrative inquiry’, 1 October 2015, FOI
332/15/16, Item 3.
|
|
#13
12 April 2009
Kakarak,
Uruzgan Province
|
Journalist report: An airstrike was called
on a compound codenamed Whiskey 108. 24 troops from 2SQN SASR and 7RAR
advanced in daylight and killed a number of enemy in an intense firefight.
When soldiers entered the compound, they heard Australian weapons fire and
saw an older man with a prosthetic leg hurled from a window. He had been shot
and was dead. Another LN was also killed. Afterward, a weapons cache and
tunnel system was discovered.
- Troops later said a ‘rookie’ had been made to kill
a prisoner as a ‘blooding’.
- The prosthetic leg was souvenired and returned to SASR barracks
in Perth as a drinking vessel.
In court documents filed in defence of a defamation
action, Fairfax media alleged that Corporal Roberts-Smith is accused of
killing the old man despite the man posing no imminent threat. Roberts-Smith
denies any wrongdoing.
Journalists reported in 2019 that at least three SAS
members have allegedly agreed to testify against Roberts-Smith.
|
C Masters, ‘A
law unto themselves? Who dares speak?’, The Sunday Age,
10 June 2018, p. 19.
A Greene and D Conifer, ‘Ben
Roberts-Smith rejects Afghanistan allegations and “gossip”
detailed in court document’, ABC News (online),
20 October 2018.
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘New
AFP probe of war hero’, The Age, 16 December 2019, pp.
1, 6; N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘War
hero faces new crimes inquiry’, The Age, 16 December
2019, pp. 1, 6.
|
|
#14
28 April 2009
|
IO Report: Digging observed (apparently by
drone) in area where insurgents active. Tactical movement observed with
5–6 people lurking and two acting as possible force protection.
Assessed to be laying command wire for an improvised explosive device (IED).
Request for visual verification on ground denied as risk too high. A HQ legal
officer remotely observed the targeting assessment.
- [Name redacted] noted that setting IED in an aqueduct would be
unusual.
- Possibility they were farmers who were required to use water
allocation at night (common local practice) was raised during targeting
process. Relevant commander assessed it was not farming
activity—usual equipment not observed.
- Multiple airstrikes authorised. Four LNs KIA, two wounded.
- LN persons from area complained on 28 April that casualties
were local farmers working at night.
IO findings: Noted low light and poor quality of
imagery. Inspection of the site by soldiers on the ground after strike not
possible. Conflicting evidence re identity of KIA. It was frequent Taliban
practice to claim insurgent KIA were civilian. Strike compliant with ROE,
likely that KIA were insurgents. Recommended formal pre-deployment training
be required for all key targeting staff including legal officers.
|
Colonel [redacted], Report
of an Inquiry Officer: possible civilian casualties from close air support
strike at [redacted] Afghanistan on 28 Apr 09, ADF, DoD, June
2009.
|
|
#15
10 June 2009
Noy Juy (Nawjoy)
Mirabad,
Uruzgan Province
|
Journalist report: After heavy fighting
between Australian troops and insurgents, suspected insurgents were seen
leaving the area at dusk in a number of vehicles. Insurgent radio chatter was
heard telling insurgents to turn off their headlights. Two vehicles with
lights off were accordingly targeted and destroyed by a Dutch Apache
helicopter.
Locals later claimed nine civilians had been killed and
four wounded. After a quick assessment inquiry, the ADF assessed that
targeting was legitimate. It found civilian casualties might have resulted
from a large explosion earlier in the day. The ADF chose to conduct no
further inquiry. Journalist reports conflicting evidence from locals who
claim the civilians were targeted by two helicopters.
|
D Oakes and S Clark, ‘What
the documents reveal about killings of unarmed Afghans: Apache helicopter
destroys vehicle that switched off lights’, ABC News
(online), 11 July 2017.
Masters, No front line, op. cit., pp.
276–278.
|
|
#16
11 August 2009
|
IO Report: Troops established vehicle
checkpoint. Motorcycle failed to obey visual and verbal signal to stop.
Soldiers fired multiple rounds. Driver dead, passenger wounded. After
incident, the casualties were identified as Afghan police.
IO findings: Checkpoint was poorly sited and it was
likely verbal and visual warnings could not be seen/heard. Use of pen flare
for visual signalling may have avoided incident. CO had ordered reduction in
use of flares.
- Shooting was within Australian ROE but mandatory ISAF
escalation of force procedures not used (no pen flare).
- Incidents on 24 June and 12 July 2009 also had shots fired
without pen flare being used first. New orders were issued after the first of
those incidents, but learning had not been passed on to troops rotated in
after 12 July.
- ADF training deficiencies in NATO Standard Operating Procedures
(SOP) identified. Additional equipment for use at vehicle checkpoints
ordered. Deployed legal officers require additional training.
|
Colonel [redacted], Report
of an Inquiry Officer into the shooting of two Afghan National Policemen, 11
August 2009, ADF, DoD, November 2009.
|
|
◊
November 2009
|
Formal Army report: Deficiencies in
training, assessment, certification and leadership of Lieutenant
Fussell’s SOTG unit operated to increase the risk that a casualty might
occur. (Michael Fussell 4 RAR was killed on 27 November by a detonating IED).
Unit members had expressed concern about the competence of
the Officer Commanding (OC), a Major, prior to deploying and that concern had
been communicated to superiors. Incidents occurred the day before Lieutenant
Fussell’s death and immediately after which made the OC’s
shortcomings obvious. However, the leadership shortcomings did not directly
contribute to Lieutenant Fussell’s death.
Journalist report: The OC was stood down from
active command but remained in the Army. It is not clear when that action occurred.
No findings were made in relation to the OC’s superior officers with
the failure to deal with the unit’s command deficiencies instead being
attributed to systemic problems.
|
Colonel McCullagh, Inquiry
Officer’s report into the death of Lieutenant MKH Fussell in
Afghanistan on 27 November 2008, ADF, DoD,
23 December 2008.
Vice Admiral Ritchie, Inquiry
Officer’s report into matters relating to the force preparation,
training, certification and leadership associated with the force element
identified in the Inquiry Officer’s report into the death of Lieutenant
MKH Fussell, ADF, DoD, 23 July 2009.
P Dorling, ‘Major
loses command after soldiers death’, Canberra Times,
3 November 2009.
Major General Tracey, Judge Advocate General, Review
of VADM Ritchie Inquiry Report, DoD, 14 October 2009.
|
|
∞
Throughout 2010
|
Journalist report: Journalist alleges there
was a major ramping up of ‘capture-kill raids’ in 2010 while
Major General Gilmore was commander NATO and ADF special forces in
Afghanistan. In a 2011 interview while Special Operations Commander
Australia, Major General Gilmore told journalist the ADF does not use term
‘capture/kill squads’. Journalist states:
- SOTG captured or killed insurgents at least 30 times between
December 2010 and September 2011.
- In 2009 NATO and Australian soldiers went on 675 recorded
missions with 306 ‘adversaries’ killed or captured. In 2011
NATO-led forces had conducted 1,879 missions with 916 ‘targets’
killed or captured by September.
- NATO had a Joint Prioritized Effects List (JPEL) containing
Taliban names with NATO objective code name (OBJ) and JPEL number. For
example, a 2010 NATO document lists Mullah Agha Wali (OBJ HADRIAN, IS0514) and
Malim Taj Mohammad (OBJ FORGE, IS1494).
- Operations targeting JPEL OBJ were more likely to get support
from NATO assets, but stringent targeting process meant many more missions
were cancelled than authorised.
|
R Epstein, ‘The
secret soldiers’, The Age, 5 September 2011, p. 9.
|
|
◊
May–June 2010
|
Formal Army report: From May 2010, the SOTG
conducted a series of daylight helicopter-borne raids, deep into enemy
territory. Raids often resulted in fierce engagements with the enemy.
The mission was to destabilise local insurgent networks
and identify key Taliban leaders. The raids created fractures throughout the
command and control architecture of the Taliban.
|
Australian Army, ‘Battle
Honours: Citation: Special Operations Task Group—Rotation XII’,
Army website, last updated 23 September 2016.
|
|
∞
Dates of incidents not given—context
suggests
2009–2010
|
Journalist report: Allegations by ADF
witnesses:
- SOTG was ‘loading up’ KIA by placing weapons near
bodies.
- SOTG was conducting summary executions.
- Kill counts in 2010 became so high that commanders in Kabul
became concerned.
- SASR had a ‘kill board’ on their door and had a
kill goal.
- Some SOTG members referred to others as having ‘gone up
the Congo’, a reference to the moral wilderness in Conrad’s novel
Heart of Darkness.
- SASR troops would keep their officers outside the target area
until it was secured.
- The SASR chaplain found rampant bullying in SASR in 2009. An
accomplished boxer, he offered to fight the perpetrators one by one. None
turned up. After the chaplain’s cap was shot to ribbons on the Tarin
Kowt range (in either 2010 or 2012), the chaplain confronted and then had a
boxing match with an SASR trooper.
|
Masters, ‘A
law unto themselves? Who dares speak?’, op. cit.
|
|
◊
13 August 2010
Lwar Byala village
near Gumbad
Kandahar Province
|
Lwar Byala
The village was a series of compounds with orchards and
lush vegetation providing ideal cover for insurgents and identified as a
headquarters for Taliban resistance. A full troop of SASR in four Blackhawks
conducted a disruption raid in daylight with three patrols sweeping the
village and one patrol positioned three kilometres away to intercept
‘squirters’—persons escaping the cordon.
They found the area was too large to be effectively cordoned
and decided to withdraw. One patrol was ambushed from dense vegetation as
they moved east. Trooper Brown was shot by a machine gun at close range.
Sergeant David had his clothing and backpack shredded by rounds fired from
metres away as he recovered Brown for first aid. He was recommended for the
Victoria Cross but awarded the Star of Gallantry.
|
Masters, No
front line, op. cit., ‘Rotation XIII, July 2010–December
2010’, at pp. 363–366.
N Butterly, ‘Rare
honour for soldier's great courage’, The West Australian, 30
June 2011
Note: There are several awards of the Star of Gallantry
to anonymous SOTG members in 2011 for which the citations give no details of
the action involved. The full citation for Sergeant David’s award is
not public.
|
|
#17
13 August 2010
Lwar Byala village
near Gumbad
Kandahar Province
|
Journalist report: After the ambush, the
troop moved to high ground for an extraction before dark, but only one patrol
could be extracted before a dust storm drove off the helicopters. The
remaining troops pulled back to high ground above the contact site and a
2,000-pound bomb was dropped on insurgents within 150 metres of their
position.
After dark and using night vision goggles, troops
including Captain Ross entered surrounding vegetation. According to Masters,
‘Three enemy stunned by the bomb were sighted still alive. Armed and
therefore considered a threat, they were shot and killed.’ The
remaining troops were extracted the next day.
|
Masters, No
front line, op. cit., pp. 365–366.
|
|
#18
23 August 2010
Location unknown
|
Defence talking points: Members of the
Afghan National Army Provincial Response Company and of the SOTG were
approached by a male LN who failed to respond to challenges and raised a
weapon in a threatening manner. The LN was shot. The Defence talking points
identify this as an incident resulting in a civilian death.
An ADF initial assessment found that the ADF soldiers
acted lawfully in self-defence and the matter was closed.
|
DoD, ‘12
February 2009 - Civilian Casualty Incident’
Defence Communication Strategy, 24 March 2011, Attachment B,
p. 24.
|
|
#19
Date unknown 2010
Location unknown
|
Journalist report: Two SAS soldiers were
guarding an unarmed Afghan man prior to arrest. One of the soldiers alleges
that Roberts-Smith entered the room and unexpectedly attacked the man, who
froze in the foetal position. The witness alleges that Roberts-Smith was
wearing Kevlar gloves and hit the man in the face with his fists and in the
stomach with his knees. The soldier alleges that he intervened to call
Roberts-Smith off.
|
McKenzie et al., ‘Beneath
the bravery of our most decorated soldier’, op. cit.
|
|
#20
17 September 2010
FOB Mirwais
Chora Valley,
Uruzgan Province
|
Journalist report: Hundreds of men and boys
approached Forward Operating Base (FOB) Mirwais, with some running and waving
sticks. The incident was apparently sparked by false rumours that foreign
forces at the base had been burning copies of the Koran. The crowd threw
rocks at the soldiers and the base. Protesters tried to smash their way into
the base, prompting some troops inside the base to open fire at the crowd.
Australian troops dubbed the incident the ‘Chora rock show’.
Journalists report that a defence statement ‘issued
at the time of the incident’ [statement could not be located] noted
Australian troops, coalition forces and members of the Afghan National Army
had helped defend the base. One protester aimed an AK-47 at one of the coalition
soldiers, who then shot the protester. ISAF also stated that an ISAF service
member shot the man in accordance with the ROE.
Journalist report: A later report from the Afghan
Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) stated that five civilians had
been killed and six wounded during the protest. In his book The Dust of
Uruzgan, DFAT staffer Fred Smith wrote that he was later told by NGO
workers that there had been a higher death toll than that first reported.
A Defence spokesperson told the ABC and Middle Eastern
online news service, The National, that coalition soldiers, including
an Australian, engaged the protesters in self-defence. The spokesperson said
Defence was unable to confirm any fatalities from this incident and that an
investigation by the Commanding Officer into the incident found that
Australian and ISAF soldiers acted appropriately and in accordance with their
ROE.
|
R Callinan and M Willacy, ‘Death
toll much higher at Afghanistan protest than NATO publicised, according to
human rights report’, ABC News (online), 21 October 2019.
G Torre, ‘NATO forces shot dead five civilians at
2010 Afghan protest, rights body says’, The
National, (online), 22 October 2019.
|
|
#21
3 October 2010
Zangitan,
Kandahar Province
|
Journalist report: Troops detained two men
and used an interpreter to question them separately. One immediately gave up
the other, Mullah Graan, as Taliban. Graan was then tactically questioned by
a corporal from the Human Intelligence Cell. A nearby IED strike drew
commandos away to provide security to a disabled vehicle and no one was
guarding the door of the hut.
After the questioning, the interpreter left the room
followed by Graan, then the corporal. Graan’s plastic handcuffs
separated and he grabbed a sickle knife from a ledge above a doorway. The
soldier put up his hand to block the blow, drew his pistol, and shot and
killed Graan. Oakes and Clark say the detainee’s death was reported to
ADF as KIA. Masters says the self-defence killing was reported but no quick
assessment inquiry undertaken.
Oakes and Clark allege there was no investigation until
2012 when a journalist asked questions. An investigation determined the man
was a detainee. ADFIS was tasked to investigate and concluded the soldier was
within his rights to shoot detainee.
Oakes and Clark report the Chief of Joint Operations
(CJOPS) expressed disappointment with soldiers’ operational decisions
and reporting.
|
D Oakes and S Clark, ‘What
the documents reveal about killings of unarmed Afghans: detainee whose
handcuffs “separated” shot dead’,
ABC News (online), 11 July 2017.
Masters, No front line, op. cit., pp.
371–372.
|
|
#22
2 November 2010
|
Defence talking points: Following an
engagement between a partnered patrol (soldiers of ANSF and Mentoring
Taskforce 4) and insurgents in the Baluchi Valley region, several locals
approached Afghan and Australian soldiers carrying the body of a male
claiming that he had been killed by small arms fire.
Findings of an IO report were released on 21 September
2012:
-
Afghan and Australian soldiers were fired on from a series of
qualas (walled, mud-brick compounds) during the incident. An Afghan teenage
male was killed and two LN were injured.
-
It was likely the casualties were not Directly Participating in
Hostilities (DPH) at the time they were shot.
- It was highly unlikely that the deceased teenage male and the
two injured Afghan men were hit by Australian fire.
- The IO could not determine whether insurgent fire or the ANA
response during the incident caused the death and injuries.
|
DoD, ‘12
February 2009 - Civilian Casualty Incident’
Defence Communication Strategy, 24 March 2011, Attachment B, pp.
23–24.
S Smith, ‘Ministerial
statements: Afghanistan’, House of Representatives, Debates,
24 May 2012, p. 5459.
VCDF, Senate Estimates Brief, ‘Afghanistan
2: Death or serious injury of Afghan civilians where ADF involvement is
alleged and subject to administrative inquiry’, 1 October 2015, FOI
332/15/16, Item 3.
|
|
◊
2010–2011
|
Psychological strain on SF reported
Journalist report: Former SAS
psychologist Nick Doran said the psychological impact of the mounting death
toll and repeated deployments was ‘really starting to show’ by
the 2010 and 2011 fighting seasons.
Doran and another former SAS psychologist Mark Mathieson
said commanders were aware of the psychological injuries the conflict was
inflicting on SF because reports were sent up the chain of command in
detailed post-deployment reports.
Mathieson said:
People had their values and
morals effectively broken by chronic deployment to a basket case of a country
and seeing good friends do bad things and good friends die.
However soldiers wanted to keep deploying so they sought
to hide their distress, unwilling to be seen as a liability to the unit.
Doran said the SAS leadership were well aware, it was a
major concern, but they were under orders from SOCOMD to do the job.
It was DoD policy for SF soldiers to stay out of the war
zone for a year between deployments. However, there were too few qualified
people at certain ranks, particularly corporal, lance corporal and sergeant.
A waiver system was developed to allow these critical positions and roles to
break the one year rule.
After completing a rotation, soldiers had to complete a
Return to Australia Psychological Screening and a Post-Operational
Psychological Screening three months later. However, psychologists sometimes
had to compress the usual post-deployment psychological screening process
|
B Packham, ‘Pawns
in a deadly game’, The Australian, 19 September 2020,
p. 15.
|
|
#23
27 March 2011
Shah Zafar/
Sah Zafar,
Chora Valley,
Uruzgan Province
|
Journalist report: Australian and Afghan
troops were conducting a ‘cordon and callout operation’ targeting
a high value Taliban target. Troops were fired on from a concealed area; the
Australian troops returned fire and moved to the location where shots were
fired. They found a dead man and a fatally injured child. No weapon was
found. Immediate medical assistance was given to the child who was evacuated
by air to Tarin Kowt but later died.
Locals said the dead man was the boy’s uncle and
they were returning home from a local medical clinic. According to Oakes and
Clark, the IO was heavily critical of the process that led to man being
labelled an insurgent after his death. According to Masters, the IO report
found that not enough effort had been undertaken to establish his identity
and that ‘the deceased male who died at the scene was not actively
taking part in hostilities’.
Senate Estimates Brief: IO report found actions of
Australian personnel were lawful and within ROE. The KIA was not associated
with the insurgents who engaged the patrol.
|
D Oakes and S Clark, ‘What
the documents reveal about killings of unarmed Afghans: man and boy killed
“returning home from local medical clinic”’, ABC
News (online), 11 July 2017.
Masters, No front line, op. cit., pp.
400–401.
VCDF, Senate Estimates Brief, ‘Afghanistan
2: Death or serious injury of Afghan civilians where ADF involvement is
alleged and subject to administrative inquiry’, 1 October 2015, FOI
332/15/16, Item 3.
|
|
#24
29 April 2011
Tarin Kowt,
Uruzgan Province
|
Journalist report: Afghan businessman Hayat
Ustad (OBJ HEGGITT) was shot dead by an SAS operator in daylight in Tarin
Kowt at his warehouse.
The SOTG claimed Ustad had drawn a snub-nosed pistol and
was shot in self-defence. (The pistol was photographed). Masters reported
that rules for use of armed force on JPEL objectives did not require the
targets to be armed or demonstrating lethal intent.
A friend of Ustad, Mohammad Hassan, claims to have been at
the warehouse when Ustad was killed. Hassan told journalists that Australian
soldiers came to the warehouse and asked who the manager was. Ustad raised
his hand and said ‘I am’. An Australian soldier led him out of
sight and shot him dead. Hassan said Ustad was unarmed and not trying to
flee.
In September 2011, Four Corners reported Governor
of Uruzgan Muhammad Omar Shirza stating that there was no report against
Hayat in the national department of security, nor in the national police
department. Uruzgan Senator Heela Achakzai alleged that the SOTG was fed
false intelligence by a business rival of Hayat.
ADF response to Four Corners: Hayat
Ustad’s killing was lawful. The SOTG had a ‘warrant for his
detention’ issued by the Afghan authorities, and he ‘drew a
pistol’.
|
M Carney, T Cookes and S Sharifi, ‘In
their sights’ (transcript), Four Corners, ABC, 5 September
2011.
D Oakes, ‘Investigators
travel to Afghanistan to interview witnesses over alleged Australian war
crimes’, ABC News (online), 6 August 2019.
Masters, No front line, op. cit., pp.
403—404.
|
|
◊
5 September 2011
|
Allegations of misconduct/false intelligence
ABC Four Corners broadcast a 55-minute report
examining the alleged Coalition ‘kill-capture’ strategy of
targeted raids in Afghanistan. Four Corners investigated three
Australian Special Forces raids that allegedly went wrong and examined claims
the strategy, and especially night raids, was alienating the local
population. The program alleged, in two cases, the wrong people were killed
and, in another, a suspect already detained was shot dead at close range.
The report also alleged that Afghan partner Matiullah Khan,
made police chief after the death of Rozi Khan, was providing false
intelligence to eliminate rivals.
ADF response reported by Four Corners: ADF
tactics, techniques and procedures are appropriate and ‘under constant
review in order to do everything we can to minimise loss of life and impact
on civilians’. The ADF noted that it expected Matiullah Khan would act
in an impartial and professional manner
Australian Major General Michael Krause (Deputy Chief of
Staff–Plans, Headquarters International Joint Command, ISAF Afghanistan
from March 2011 to February 2012) told Four Corners the ISAF conducted
as many as 18 operations every night. He stated that the intelligence used in
the planning was extraordinary: ‘We do it with our Afghan partners. The
Afghans are fundamental to the intelligence gathering. They're the ones who
give the go/no go, on an operation.’
|
Carney, Cookes and Sharifi, ‘In
their sights’, Four Corners, op. cit.
|
|
◊
29 October 2011
Patrol Base Sorkh Bed,
Kandahar Province
|
Captain Bryce Duffy 4th Field Regiment Royal
Australian Artillery killed in a small-arms incident.
Corporal Ashley Birt 6th Engineer Support Regiment
killed in a small-arms incident.
Lance Corporal Luke Gavin 2RAR died of wounds
received during a small-arms incident.
IO Report: After morning parade, ADF personnel were
in a loose group discussing the day’s activities. An ANA soldier ran
from a group of ANA personnel nearby. At 10–15m from ADF soldiers, ANA
soldier fired several bursts from a squad automatic weapon. Ten ADF members,
one ANA member (not shooter) and three ISAF interpreters shot. Of those shot,
three ADF members and one ISAF interpreter were killed. Two or three ADF
members returned fire and killed the ANA shooter.
|
DoD, ‘Lest We Forget’, op. cit.
Colonel [redacted], Inquiry
Officer inquiry report – matter concerning Joint Operations Command,
op. cit.
|
|
#25
29 October 2011
Tarin Kowt
Uruzgan Province
|
IO Report Note: Other Government Agency
Platoon (OGA Pl) provided security for the largely civilian Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT).
OGA Pl was providing security to PRT who were attending an
afternoon meeting in Tarin Kowt. OGA Pl was aware of attack at Sorkh Bed that
morning. During task, OGA Pl given threat warning that an attack was planned
using a motorcycle Vehicle Born IED (VBIED) against Uruzgan Chief of Police
who was working nearby.
A motorcycle entered road from a side street about 60m
from ADF position. Soldier 2 in middle of road signalled and called
motorcycle to stop. It continued to approach. Soldier 4 also signalled and
called rider to stop. When motorcycle at 15m, soldier 4 and soldier 3
engaged. Rider fell a few metres in front of soldier 3 and, despite immediate
medical assistance, died shortly afterwards. No VBIED found. There was an
ADFIS investigation as well as an IO Inquiry.
Journalist report: Journalist Jeremy Kelly was in
Tarin Kowt on 29 October and interviewed LNs who claimed eyewitnesses stated
ADF gave no warnings and multiple motorcycles passed checkpoint.
IO findings: IO interviewed Kelly in Kabul and
found Kelly did not interview LNs at scene but at hospital afterward. The IO
found those LNs were likely not eyewitnesses and considered their reports
hearsay evidence. IO inspected site, concluded verbal warning could not be
heard, and soldiers' weapons likely could not be seen. Soldiers 3 and 4 were
not carrying the available pen flares, but would not have had time to use
them. Soldiers believed they were in imminent danger.
The soldiers applied every element of their training and
acted lawfully and appropriately under Australian ROE. The soldiers’
actions were reasonable; they were forced to make a rapid decision to respond
to what they saw as an escalating threat. The IO recommended vehicle checkpoints
must always have access to attention-gaining devices.
|
Colonel [redacted], Report
of an Inquiry Officer into the shooting death of an Afghan local national in
Tarin Kot, 29 October 2011, ADF, DoD, February 2012.
J Kelly, ‘Anger
building as locals ask why young Afghan had to die’, The
Australian, 31 October 2011, p. 2.
VCDF, Senate Estimates Brief, ‘Afghanistan
2: Death or serious injury of Afghan civilians where ADF involvement is
alleged and subject to administrative inquiry’, 1 October 2015, FOI
332/15/16, Item 3.
|
|
◊
8 November 2011
Patrol Base Nasir, Charmestan,
Uruzgan Province
|
IO Report: ANA soldier in security overwatch
position fired a machine gun into patrol base. When the weapon malfunctioned,
he continued firing using squad automatic weapon. Two ADF soldiers returned
fire. Shooter fled in stolen ANA vehicle.
Three ADF and two ANA soldiers shot and wounded.
None killed. It was clear that ADF personnel were deliberately targeted.
|
Colonel [redacted], Inquiry
Officer inquiry report – matter concerning Joint Operations Command,
op. cit.
|
|
∞
2012
|
Journalist report: Former SAS operative
Braden Chapman deployed to Afghanistan in 2012 attached to 3 Squadron SAS as
a signals intelligence officer. He is reported as alleging that, throughout
his deployment, there was systematic use of planted weapons and radios to
justify killings. He also alleged there was a culture of silence among SAS
operators.
Four Corners reported it had obtained hours of
footage shot by members of 3 Squadron SAS during the unit’s 2012
rotation through Afghanistan. Only small portions of the claimed footage were
shown, embedded within the report. Those portions purport to show:
- A discussion between two soldiers about the conduct of another
soldier: ‘[The soldier is] a brother, but, “Bash who I want.
Shoot at whoever. Kill a kid. Oh well, just keep shooting
c***s.”’
- Frightening farm animals, shooting dogs, including dogs chained
up and not a threat.
- Apparently unnecessary damage being done to private homes and
vehicles.
- Harsh language, ‘manhandling’ and threats of
violence toward unarmed and unresisting LNs.
McKenzie and Masters report allegations made to an
inquiry by Dr Crompvoets (see below in 2015/2016):
- Australian special forces ‘would take the men and boys to
these guest houses and interrogate them, meaning tie them up and torture
them’ during operations in Afghan villages. When the soldiers left the
village, ‘the men and boys would be found dead, shot in the head,
sometimes blindfolded and throats slit. These are corroborated
accounts’.
- Another account describes allegations that two ‘14-year-old
boys suspected of being Taliban sympathisers had their throats slit …
the bodies were bagged and thrown into a nearby river’.
Witnesses told Dr Crompvoets that 2012 was by far the
worst year for misconduct. McKenzie and Masters report defence sources have
confirmed that 2012 is the key focus of the Brereton inquiry (see below in
2016).
|
M Willacy, ‘Culture
of cover-up’ ABC News (online), 17 March 2020.
N McKenzie and C Masters ‘“Blood
lust, killings, cover-ups”: Report describes Australia's “Abu
Ghraib” moment’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 October
2020.
|
|
◊
29 Feb 2012
|
ANSF and SOTG partnered operations
‘removed’ five insurgent commanders from Uruzgan Province over a
period of six weeks during what is traditionally a time of lower activity.
Commander of Joint Task Force 633 Major General
Stuart Smith said these operations had degraded the insurgents' ability to
carry out attacks within Uruzgan.
|
DoD, Afghan
and Australian Special Forces maintain pressure on insurgents, media
release, 29 February 2012.
|
|
#26
14–15 March 2012
Sarkhume village,
Uruzgan Province
|
Note: Callinan and Willacy say their report is
based on more than 90 files from AIHRC and interviews in Afghanistan.
Journalist report: Soldiers conducted a raid to
find a suspected Taliban bomb maker. They landed helicopters on the plain
above the village of Sarkhume. Haji Sardar Khan was repairing a door of his
house. He left his house to find out what was happening taking the local
shortcut over a broken-down wall to wash some mud from his feet in a drain
near his house. According to his watching son, Hazratullah, he was shot without
warning and hit in the thigh. Sardar dropped to the ground and was bleeding
but Hazratullah says he was alive, talking and lucid.
The Australian soldiers pulled a bag over Sardar's head
and a soldier hoisted him onto his back and carried him away to a nearby
mosque. Hazratullah said the only thing in Sardar’s possession at the
time was his transistor radio. He heard the old man calling out for an hour
or 30 minutes. No one was allowed to go to him. After the soldiers left,
Hazratullah entered the mosque and Sardar was dead; he had bruises on his
neck and boot marks over his heart. Sardar’s oldest son, Abdul Latif
was also interviewed by an Afghan journalist for the story.
Warrant Officer Dusty Miller was an army medic seconded to
the SAS in Afghanistan in 2012. Miller stated in interviews, without giving
the date and location, that he was treating an unarmed Afghan man for a
non-fatal wound to the leg when an SAS soldier took him away. Former SAS
operative Braden Chapman says he was in Sarkhume that day and confirms Miller
was upset. The experienced operator who allegedly killed Sardar had told
Chapman early in the deployment that Chapman needed to be OK with the
operator putting a gun to someone’s head and pulling the trigger
because the operator did not want to read about it in ten or so years.
McKenzie reports that Afghan human rights investigators
identified the man Miller was treating as Haji Sardar Khan.
|
R Callinan and M Willacy, ‘What
really happened at Sarkhume? New report alleges unarmed civilians killed by
Australian special forces’, ABC News (online), 17 October 2019.
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘How
Dusty escapes demons of war’, The Saturday Age, 22 September
2019, pp. 1, 6.
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘Time
for healing after facing war demons’, The Sydney Morning Herald,
22 September 2012, p. 12.
N McKenzie, ‘Secrets
of war’, Sixty Minutes, Nine Network, 22 September 2019.
N McKenzie, ‘Probe
backs medic’s report of execution’, The Age, 8
November 2019, pp. 1, 5.
M Willacy, ‘Culture
of Cover-up’ ABC News (online), 17 March 2020.
N McKenzie, ‘One
last mission’, Good Weekend Magazine, Sydney Morning
Herald, 27 June 2020, pp. 8–11.
|
|
#27
14–15 March 2012
Sarkhume village,
Uruzgan Province
|
Journalist report: In a nearby field below
Haji Sardar's home, mill worker Mirza Khan, aged about 20, left his work at
the mill and in a field encountered a dog belonging to the soldiers.
Hazratullah said he saw the attack from a distance. He said the dogs came at
Mirza, who held them away and hit one with ‘a stone’. The dogs
tore his clothes. Soldiers fired multiple rounds and killed him. Hazratullah
says his corpse had multiple wounds. Mirza's brother, Shaista Khan, did not
witness his killing, but saw his brother's body before burial. He said Mirza
was shot in his lower abdomen, leg, side, and chest. The relatives of the
dead men denied either of them had been armed or were behaving aggressively
towards the soldiers.
The AIHRC report into the incident said a four year old
boy, Zabihullah, was bashed with a knife handle on his back by foreigners
because he was with his father and did not want to separate from him. A
photograph of a boy with a dressed injury at the base of his head was
included in the AIHRC report and published by the ABC.
|
Callinan and Willacy, ‘What
really happened at Sarkhume? New report alleges unarmed civilians killed by
Australian special forces’, op. cit.
Date of the three incidents in Sarkhume given in VCDF,
Senate Estimates Brief, ‘Afghanistan
2: Death or serious injury of Afghan civilians where ADF involvement is
alleged and subject to administrative inquiry’, 1 October 2015, FOI
332/15/16, Item 3.
|
|
#28
14–15 March 2012
Sarkhume village,
Uruzgan Province
|
Journalist report: A farmer's son, Mohammad
Wali, was hit and beaten by the Australian soldiers. Hazratullah said Wali
was deaf and could not understand commands from the soldiers when they
detained him. Hazratullah was told that Wali was taken to the stable where he
was beaten and had his testicles squeezed. The AIHRC file stated that
others—all of them innocent villagers—were detained and
‘hit with gun butts’.
|
Callinan and Willacy, ‘What
really happened at Sarkhume? New report alleges unarmed civilians killed by
Australian special forces’, op. cit.
|
|
#29
28 March 2012
Paryan Nawa,
Kandahar Province
|
Journalist report: An SAS patrol landed by
helicopter near a village at about 11 am. An unarmed, mentally disabled
Afghan man in his early 20s named Ziauddin ran or limped away from the
soldiers. ‘Soldier C’ fired two shots hitting Ziauddin in the
head and killing him instantly.
After the killing, the article claimed that another
soldier put a combat chest rig containing magazines for an assault rifle on
Ziauddin’s body before he was photographed. At a later debriefing
Ziauddin was labelled a legitimately killed high value target.
|
M Willacy and A Blucher, ‘Fellow
soldiers say the SAS operative filmed shooting an unarmed man killed another
civilian’, ABC News (online), 26 May 2020.
|
|
#30
1 May 2012
Deh Rafshan,
(near Derapet)
Uruzgan Province
|
Note: The IO was appointed on 25 May 2012. The
report is dated May 2013. Dates of interviews conducted by the inquiry
suggest neither date is a typographical error. There is no explanation in the
public portions of the report for the inquiry taking a year.
IO Report: SOTG element containing both Afghan and
ADF troops conducted a mission targeting a mid-level insurgent commander
known to conduct insurgent activity regularly in Tarin Kowt.
Journalist report: The insurgent was holding a
meeting with four known key insurgents. A number of blocking positions were
set up around the meeting point to contain the insurgents.
IO report: An Australian sergeant saw two LNs he
assessed were trying to escape the cordon and challenged them in Pashtu to
stop. A local boy was in the vicinity but not seen by the sergeant. The men
paused 50–100m from the sergeant and about 20m from a rock wall. A
witness (possibly the boy) gave evidence he was drawing water at the well
when he saw the men returning from sleeping in a field. He warned the men to
be careful and sit down, as there were soldiers nearby.
(Masters names the boy as Mohammed Hashim Shafiki and the
sergeant as Sergeant Paul.) The Senate Estimates Brief states the boy was
believed to be 12 years old.
Both the sergeant and another witness observed the two LNs
change direction and move in a crouch with urgency toward a rock wall in an
elevated position, while glancing over their shoulders at the sergeant.
The LNs were moving through a field with poppies growing
densely to waist height and a dense population of trees. Foliage and shadow
degraded clarity of vision across the field. The sergeant was unsure if the LNs
were armed, but assessed the rock wall would provide a position of tactical
advantage. Sergeant fired a single shot, which missed but caused LNs to
increase speed. The witness said he followed the LNs in order to convince
them to stop and was within one metre when the sergeant fired.
The sergeant fired again at the lead LN who was
50–100m away and observed a third person, who he had not previously
noticed, fall. The LN then stopped and waited. The sergeant gave evidence
that the actions of LN and boy throughout were consistent with previously
observed insurgent behaviour. Sergeant and another soldier approached,
restrained the LN and commenced first aid. A limited search of the area found
no weapons; the men were questioned (they appeared to know the boy's name)
and released.
Journalist report: Masters says OBJ YARDARM and 15
associates were apprehended without bloodshed. The men with Mohammed were
released for lack of evidence; however, Mohammed was carrying large wads of
local currency and batteries. It is possible the men passed the items to the
boy knowing they would be incriminating.
IO report: The boy’s injury was initially
assessed in operational reporting to be the result of a ricochet, but CO SOTG
believed this assessment was not justified and amended it in later reporting.
A witness gave evidence that, at a meeting with village
elders after the incident, he witnessed a heated argument between two
Australian soldiers, which he thought was about the shooting. The Australian
who led the meeting did not recall any dispute or altercation.
IO findings: The shooting was not in self-defence
since there was no imminent threat as LNs were attempting to evade. Comments
about the sergeant’s decision to fire are redacted. IO found the
sergeant’s belief was reasonable and engagement was within the ROE.
|
Colonel [redacted], Inquiry
Officers Report into an Afghan child sustaining a gunshot wound, in Uruzgan
province, on 1 May 2012, ADF, DoD, May 2013.
D Oakes and S Clark, ‘What
the documents reveal about killings of unarmed Afghans: Afghan boy survives
being shot through face’, ABC News (online), 11 July 2017.
Masters, No front line, op. cit., pp.
463–464.
VCDF, Senate Estimates Brief, ‘Afghanistan
2: Death or serious injury of Afghan civilians where ADF involvement is
alleged and subject to administrative inquiry’, 1 October 2015, FOI
332/15/16, Item 3.
|
|
#31
Day uncertain— May 2012
Location unknown
|
Journalist report: An SAS soldier, Braden
Chapman, says that 3 Squadron SAS was moving toward a target building
when they saw a LN leaving the area. When the patrol was 20–30m from
the LN, he saw the soldiers, grabbed a phone from his pocket and threw it.
The LN then stood still and put up his hands. An experienced member of
3 Squadron shot the man twice in the chest then shot him through the
head as the patrol walked past. Chapman was ordered to go through the LN’s
pockets. Chapman says another Australian patrol with an assault dog then
arrived. The dog started chewing on the head of the man who had been shot.
Chapman asked the handler to get the dog away. Allegedly, the handler said
‘Oh, let him have a taste.’
|
M Willacy, ‘Culture
of cover-up’, ABC News (online), 17 March 2020.
|
|
#32
Day uncertain—May 2012
Shina,
Province unknown
|
Journalist report: Soldiers from 3 Squadron
SAS landed in two helicopters, one near the village and another near the
village reservoir. A witness says two elderly men, Abdul Wahid and Aminullah,
were ordered to approach the soldiers. Neither man was armed or threatening.
Abdul Wahid was shot in the abdomen and neck.
Farmer Sakhi Daad is reported as saying the men of the
village were handcuffed and detained in a compound. They were told not to
look at each other. They heard shots outside the compound. After the
Australians left, they freed themselves and found three bodies. One was Jan
Mohammed who was 20 years old and had some form of mental illness or
disability.
Jan Mohammed was grazing a cow that was startled by the
helicopters and ran away. Jan Mohammed ran after it and was shot. The imam of
the local mosque, Muhibullah, was also shot. Villagers say one man was a
Taliban fighter.
Two of those killed were photographed by the SAS with an
AK-47. The same AK-47 was allegedly used in both photographs Journalists say
the IGADF is investigating the killings and whether the rifle was planted.
The ABC published helmet cam footage, allegedly taken the
following day, with audio of soldiers discussing their concerns about the
killing of a compliant prisoner by a senior soldier the previous day in
Shina.
|
M Willacy and Rory Callinan, ‘The
same AK-47 was photographed on two dead Afghan civilians killed by Australian
soldiers’, ABC News (online), 15 July 2020.
M Willacy, ‘Video
shows SAS soldiers discussing a fellow operator apparently killing a
"compliant" prisoner in Afghanistan’, ABC News
(online), 21 October 2020.
|
|
#33
Day uncertain—May 2012
Deh Jawz-e Hasanzai,
Uruzgan Province
|
Journalist report: An SAS patrol searches
for a man spotted by a helicopter in a wheat field near a mud compound. The
incident was recorded on video through the head cam of the patrol’s dog
handler. The recording shows the military dog is released, finds the man and
pulls him to the ground. ‘Soldier C’ and the dog handler reach
the man. The dog handler calls the dog back and Soldier C trains an assault
rifle on the man who is lying still on the ground. He appears to be unarmed
and no equipment can be seen.
Soldier C asks first the dog handler and then the patrol
commander if he should kill the man. The dog handler defers to the patrol
commander whose response cannot be heard. Soldier C fires three shots
and the man, later identified as Dad Mohammad, is killed.
Willacy reports the killing was investigated by the ADF
after complaints by tribal elders. The ADF report has not been published. The
ADF investigators reportedly concluded the man was lawfully killed because he
posed a direct threat to the Australian soldiers. Willacy claims the
soldiers’ statements to ADF investigators (that Dad Mohammad had been
seen with a radio and Soldier C shot him from 15–20m away in self-defence)
do not reflect what is shown in the video.
|
M Willacy, ‘Killing Field’, ABC Four
Corners, 16 March 2020. (video report)
M Willacy, ‘Video
shows Australian SAS soldier shooting and killing unarmed man at close range
in Afghanistan’, ABC News (online), updated 20 March
2020.
M Willacy and A Blucher, ‘Fellow
soldiers say the SAS operative filmed shooting an unarmed man killed another
civilian’, ABC News (online), 27 May 2020.
M Willacy, ‘Culture
of cover-up’, ABC News (online), 17 March 2020.
|
|
#34
27–28 May 2012
Deh Jawz-e Hasanzai,
Uruzgan Province
|
Senate Estimates Brief: Allegation made by
elders from Dorafshan to Provincial Reconstruction Team–Uruzgan (PRT-U)
that coalition forces operating in the village of Dawjawaze Hasanzai on
27–28 May 2012, shot and stabbed a LN.
It is possible this is the same incident as #33 above.
CJOPS directed an administrative inquiry be held. Inquiry
complete as at 1 October 2015, but findings not released.
|
VCDF, Senate Estimates Brief, ‘Afghanistan
2: Death or serious injury of Afghan civilians where ADF involvement is
alleged and subject to administrative inquiry’, 1 October 2015, FOI
332/15/16, Item 3.
|
|
#35
Date unknown, likely mid 2012
Location unknown
|
Journalist report: An A US marine from US
Marine Corps Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 469 ‘Vengeance’
(HMLA-469) observed commandos on a joint drug operation. There was somebody
just sitting on a wall watching them land. The commandos got of the
helicopter and immediately shot the man a few times in the chest. The marine
later challenged the commandos saying the man wasn’t armed and asking
what happened. A commando allegedly replied ‘Oh, he was armed when we
got through with him.’
Note: HMLA-469 began their 2012 deployment at Camp
Bastion on 15 May 2012.
|
M Willacy, A Blucher and D Oates, ‘US
marine says Australian special forces soldiers made “deliberate
decision to break the rules of war”’, ABC News
(online), 20 October 2020.
L Tourtelot “Vengeance”
takes flight, lifts off for first deployment’, 3rd Marine Aircraft
Wing, US Marine Corps website.
|
|
#36
5 June 2012
Garmab,
Uruzgan Province
|
Senate Estimates Brief: Allegation reported
to PRT-U members by tribal elders from the Garmab area of Uruzgan that on
5 June 2012 a LN was shot and killed whilst moving thorough the
village to check on his son, who was in a nearby field. It is possible this
is the same incident as #32 above.
CJOPS directed an administrative inquiry be held. Inquiry
complete as at 1 October 2015, but findings not released.
|
VCDF, Senate Estimates Brief, ‘Afghanistan
2: Death or serious injury of Afghan civilians where ADF involvement is
alleged and subject to administrative inquiry’, 1 October 2015, FOI
332/15/16, Item 3.
|
|
∞
June 2012—November 2012
|
Journalist report: Multiple defence sources
have confirmed that allegedly compelling evidence exists of Australian
soldiers assaulting or murdering unarmed or handcuffed detainees between June
and November 2012. Many of the incidents occurred during the 18th deployment
of special forces to Afghanistan (it is not clear if this is the same as the
deployment named Rotation XVIII).
Journalists state they have confirmed the alleged
incidents using multiple sources. Some of the evidence is in the form of
recorded confessions from soldiers, both SAS and commandos who were present
to colleagues or supporters. Journalists state that the DoD declined to
respond to questions.
|
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘Commando
members confess to murder’, The Saturday Age, 21 September
2019, p. 1.
|
|
#37
Date unknown—mid 2012
North of Camp Bastion in Helmand Province
|
Journalist report: Marine Corps HMLA-469
was providing aerial covering fire for the Australian soldiers of the 2CDO
during a night raid. the raid was in support of a wider joint Australian SF-US
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) campaign targeting illicit drug
operations that were financing the Taliban insurgency.
A HMLA-469 helicopter door gunner with the pseudonym Josh watched
2CDO soldiers tackle and ‘hogtie’ several prisoners with hands
behind their backs. He heard 2CDO report that they had captured 7 prisoners
and request pick up, the pilot reported they could not carry that many. The
helicopter crew heard a short silence, a pop, and then a 2CDO soldier said
‘OK, we have six prisoners’.
Josh said his crew decided there was no ambiguity, it was
a deliberate decision to break the rules of war. He said the Australians had
a reputation for action—lots of breaching of walls with explosives and
lots of fires and bodies left in their wake.
Two commandos from 2CDO Oscar Platoon deployed at the time
confirmed that after the incident the DEA refused to work with 2CDO November
Platoon:
Our platoon commander pulled
our platoon together and said that the [DEA] has said in no uncertain terms
that they won't operate with [2CDO] November platoon any more due to their
behaviour in the field.
Josh says he flew dozens of missions with other special
forces, including USMC special operations and the British SAS,
‘Everybody else would step on the lines, but the Aussies would just see
the line and just hop right over it.’
|
M Willacy, A Blucher and D Oates, ‘US
marine says Australian special forces soldiers made “deliberate
decision to break the rules of war”’, ABC News
(online), 20 October 2020.
|
|
#38
Date unknown—2012
Location unknown
|
Journalist report: SAS members in
Afghanistan in 2012 allegedly possessed and displayed a large US Confederate
flag with the words ‘Southern Pride’ emblazoned on it.
[Note: Display of a hate symbol would be a military
discipline offence. US anti-hate organisation ADL, explains the Confederate
flag is one of the more popular white supremacist symbols, including beyond
the US. Although still used by non-extremists, especially in the South, as a
symbol of Southern heritage or history, a growing number of people recognize
it as a hate symbol. Whether display of the symbol is racist or white
supremacist should be judged in context.]
The ABC published video, purportedly taken in Afghanistan
in 2012, showing two SAS patrol members using the flag to guide a US Black
Hawk helicopter to a landing zone after an Australian raid. The video appears
to show that, as the helicopter lands, one of the soldiers slings the flag
over his shoulder and helps the patrol escort several bound Afghan men to the
landing zone.
A photograph of SAS soldiers holding the flag allegedly
features in a highlights video edited together by 3 Squadron SAS after its
2012 rotation of Afghanistan.
An SAS member allegedly told ABC Investigations he
remembered the Confederate flag being held out the open door of the
helicopter as they flew over the city of Tarin Kowt on their way back to
their base.
|
M Willacy and A Blucher, ‘Australian
special forces shown posing with 'Southern Pride' Confederate flag in
Afghanistan’, ABC News (online), 21 July 2020.
Anti-Defamation League (ADL), Hate
on Display Hate Symbols Database, ADL website, accessed 2 November 2020.
|
|
#39
Date unknown—2012
Location unknown,
Kandahar Province
|
Journalist report: Australian special forces
soldiers were moving through the remote area during the early hours of the
morning when they shot a boy dead. The family identified the boy as Khan
Mohammed (14–15 years old) and said he was collecting figs in the early
hours of the morning when he was shot in the leg and chest. Photographs of
the dead boy do not show a weapon. Relatives were interviewed by an Afghan
journalist.
A ‘source with knowledge of the incident’
stated that there was no obvious insurgent activity in the area and the
patrol had not been fired upon prior to the boy’s death. The boy was
shot before dawn. The soldiers left his body where it lay. The killing was
allegedly never reported up the chain of command, and was never the subject
of any inquiry. The ABC reports Defence has confirmed it has no record of a
civilian casualty occurring in that area at that time and has referred the
incident to the AFP, which is liaising with the Brereton Inquiry.
|
D Oakes and S Clark, ‘Death
in Kandahar, ABC News (online), 10 July 2017.
|
|
#40
15 July 2012
Chora Valley
Uruzgan Province
|
Journalist report: A patrol led by
Roberts-Smith was tasked to flush out insurgents. During the patrol, a member
was nearly shot by a second SAS patrol in a friendly fire incident. Trooper J
was not responsible for the friendly fire but he was allegedly accused of
breaching protocol by firing his weapon in response and not adhering to
Roberts-Smith's orders.
Multiple witnesses allege that Roberts-Smith castigated
the trooper in front of his patrol, ordering Trooper J to stand up and then
punching him in the head. Trooper J was formally investigated, placed on
administrative duties with another patrol, and soon after left the army.
Roberts-Smith allegedly later threatened to report Trooper J to the
International Criminal Court (ICC) for firing in the vicinity of civilians if
the trooper’s account of the incident did not match his own.
Roberts-Smith denies allegations he is a bully or that he
ever assaulted or bullied a fellow soldier.
|
McKenzie et al., ‘Beneath
the bravery of our most decorated soldier’, op. cit.
|
|
◊
29 August 2012
Patrol Base Wahab,
Uruzgan Province
|
Sapper James Martin 2CER killed in a
small-arms incident.
Lance Corporal Stjepan Milosevic 2/14 Light Horse
Regiment killed in a small-arms incident.
Private Robert Poate 6RAR killed in a small-arms
incident.
Journalist report: DoD and ISAF confirm three
soldiers died when ‘an individual wearing an Afghan National Army
uniform turned his weapon against ISAF service members’. Later reports
identified the individual as an Afghan Army sergeant named Hekmatullah.
|
DoD, ‘Lest We Forget’, op. cit.
Staff reporter, ‘Diggers
confirmed dead in “green on blue” attack’, ABC News
(online), 30 August 2012, updated 14 February 2014.
D Oakes, ‘Death
in Darwan’, ABC News (online), 10 June 2018.
|
|
∞
29 August 2012—September 2012
|
Journalist report: After the attack by
Hekmatullah at Patrol Base Wahab, special forces were sent on ‘mission
after mission’ hunting for him. Sources told the ABC ‘things did
get a bit heavy-handed’ and ‘things went a bit sideways
there’.
|
Oakes, ‘Death
in Darwan’, op. cit.
|
|
#41
31 August 2012
Sola, a suburb on the eastern fringe of Tarin Kowt,
Uruzgan Province
|
Journalist report: After OBJ EMERALD PANTHER
was captured during the hunt for Hekmatullah; his mobile phone identified a
compound of interest in Sola. SAS troops were deployed there at night by
helicopter and truck.
An SAS trooper, Corporal Shane, wrestled an LN later named
as Mullah Jalil Akhund (Jalil), to the ground. After being initially
compliant, Jalil tried to grab the trooper’s weapon, so the trooper
shot him dead. Masters says Corporal Shane thought he was wrestling with
Hekmatullah. Each man allegedly struggled to bring his weapon to bear and Jalil
was shot under the chin.
Another LN, named as Mullah Janan Akhund (Janan), was seen
talking on a radio as an Australian helicopter approached the area. That LN
failed to comply with orders to stop and appeared to be manoeuvring to a
covered position so was shot dead. Masters alleges Janan was shot by Corporal
Ben (Oakes and Clark later identified this soldier as Ben Roberts-Smith).
Oakes and Clark state that the IO report said
troops acted within the ISAF ROE they were using but noted they were not using
Australian ROE. They also reported that the IO stated that the troops’
assessment that the Afghan man was demonstrating insurgent tactics,
techniques and procedures was based on their own experience rather than any
approved criteria. Notes accompanying the report recommended it not be made
public.
In the second report, Oakes and Clark state, citing a
briefing paper (no date given) for Minister of Defence David Johnston, that
Janan was ‘assessed by SOTG members to be manoeuvring to gain tactical
advantage through a covered position and potentially accessing a cache of
weapons’. Janan was allegedly shot multiple times in the head and chest
by two Australians, one of whom was purportedly Corporal Roberts-Smith. The
briefing reportedly stated ‘The scope of the legal concept of direct
participation in hostilities … is necessarily subjective in nature
… there is no compelling reason to second-guess the judgement of the
soldiers involved’.
Journalists say the IO report identified ‘a
number of concerns in relation to the application of Australian ROE with
respect to individuals taking a direct part in hostilities’. They claim
this prompted CDF to issue clarification of ROE in April 2013.
Senate Estimates Brief: During the operation, an
insurgent leader known to have been involved in improvised explosive device
attacks in Uruzgan province was detained. The insurgent leader was one of 12
persons of interest detained during the operation. Eleven people were later
released after initial questioning indicated there was insufficient evidence
to support their continued detention. The Brief stated: The Inquiry Officer
found that the operation was appropriately authorised and that two Afghan
nationals were engaged and killed within the ROE. The inquiry report has not
been released in order to protect the safety of Australian and coalition
personnel who remain in Afghanistan.
|
D Oakes and S Clark, ‘ What the documents
reveal about killings of unarmed Afghans: on the hunt for deadly Afghan
soldier, two men killed’, ABC News (online),
11 July 2017.
D Oakes and S Clark, ‘Who
is the enemy? Australia’s secretive rules of engagement’, ABC
News (online), 11 July 2017, updated 15 July 2017.
Masters, No front line, op. cit., p. 489.
VCDF, Senate Estimates Brief, ‘Afghanistan
2: Death or serious injury of Afghan civilians where ADF involvement is
alleged and subject to administrative inquiry’, 1 October 2015, FOI
332/15/16, Item 3.
|
|
#42
11 September 2012
Darwan,
Uruzgan Province
|
The Darwan raid—deaths of Yaro Mama Faqir
and Haji Nazar Gul
Oakes report: Australian soldiers were acting on
intelligence reports that Hekmatullah was being sheltered at the house of
Haji Mohammad Gul in Darwan. Darwan lay in an area controlled by the Taliban.
Many relatives of Gul were staying at his compound that
night, including his brother, Haji Nazar Gul, who had travelled from Helmand;
his nephew, Ali Jan Faquir, who had come down from the mountains to buy
flour; and his brother-in-law, Yaro Mama Faquir.
Two sons of Gul, Sayed Hamid Khan and Sayed Jan, gave
recorded interviews about the events to an Afghan journalist retained by the
ABC, Bilal Sawary. The men claimed they had not sheltered Hekmatullah.
A village elder interviewed later said the family had
sheltered Hekmatullah and that other villagers were angered by that. However,
he said he did not believe the family had ties to the Taliban.
Soldiers arrived in Darwan by helicopter at dawn.
Hekmatullah was not there. The facts around the way the Darwan raid was
conducted and what occurred are contested.
McKenzie/Masters/Oakes report: During the search of
Haji Mohammad Gul’s compound, soldiers found two weapons and detained
more than 50 LN. Yaro Mama Faqir and Haji Nazar Gul were two of those
detained. Other detainees were present in the room when soldiers questioned
the two men about where they had come from and why they were in Darwan. After
the questioning, the soldiers took the two men to a room where almonds were
stored.
Witnesses heard noises like silenced pistols firing. No
one saw what happened, but later that day the two men were found dead.
Photographs later shown to a LN witness allegedly showed the men dead with
guns beside them.
Journalists report that, in the post-mission debrief,
soldiers claimed the two men were armed. Villagers say they were not.
Six of the detainees were taken back to Tarin Kowt by
helicopter for questioning.
Note: McKenzie, Masters and Oakes say they
conducted hours of interviews with dozens of current and former soldiers and
obtained confidential documents and briefings.
Maley report: On 27 September 2019, Maley reported
a different account of the Darwan raid. According to this report, a force of
about 100 soldiers from SASR, ANA and commandos arrived by helicopter.
An initial assault team engaged two LNs as it cleared the
village, killing both. Civilians were mainly confined in the village. A second
patrol, alleged to have included Roberts-Smith, positioned itself several
hundred metres away as a blocking force and had little contact with
civilians.
|
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘Did
the SAS kick cuffed man off cliff?’, The Saturday Age, 9 June
2018, p. 1.
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘SAS’s day
of shame’, The Saturday Age, 9 June 2018, pp. 1,
10–13.
Oakes, ‘Death
in Darwan’, op. cit.
Greene and Conifer, ‘Ben
Roberts-Smith rejects Afghanistan allegations and “gossip”
detailed in court document’, op. cit.
McKenzie, ‘Secrets
of war’, op. cit.
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘SAS
hero subject of war crime inquiry’, The Age,
23 September 2019, p. 1.
P Maley, ‘Battle
on the home front’, The Australian, 27 September 2019,
p. 11.
P Maley, ‘War
crimes defamation case: “witness wasn’t there”’, The
Australian, 14 December 2019.
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘New
AFP probe of war hero’, The Age,
16 December 2019, pp. 1, 6.
|
|
#43
11 September 2012
Darwan,
Uruzgan Province
|
The Darwan raid—deaths of Ali Jan Faqir
(and the ‘spotter’?)
The facts around the death of Ali Jan Faqir are contested.
Reports appear to differ on whether two men or only one were killed by a
patrol.
McKenzie/Masters/Oakes report: Villagers say that
when the soldiers arrived, Ali Jan Faqir had already loaded his donkeys and
started the journey back to his family; however, as the helicopters came into
view, he turned back and sought refuge in the home of a villager called Man
Gul.
Soldiers questioned Ali Jan Faqir and led him away. Ghulab
Shah, Ali Jan Faqir’s brother, claims villagers told him Ali Jan was
kicked or thrown off a high retaining wall into a ditch. Sayed Hamid Khan
says villagers told him that they had seen Ali Jan Faquir with his hands
cuffed, shot and then thrown from the wall. They said when he was thrown from
the wall he screamed.
Two witnesses working with the SAS allege an SAS soldier
with the pseudonym ‘Leonidas’[11]
kicked the handcuffed detainee off the edge of a small cliff badly injuring
his face on rocks. The impact of the fall to the dry creek below was so
significant that it knocked Ali Jan's teeth out of his mouth.
‘Leonidas’ then agreed with others to execute the detainee.
Another soldier is suspected of shooting Ali Jan. Villagers later reported
finding Ali Jan’s body with a radio next to it beneath a bush near the
cliff.
On 23 September 2019, McKenzie and Masters reported that
serving SAS soldiers identified the soldier alleged to have kicked Ali Jan
off the cliff as Corporal Ben Roberts-Smith.
In December 2019, journalists reported Roberts-Smith
denies the alleged wrongdoing, and relies on the testimony of another SAS
soldier who claims to be the one who shot Ali Jan because he deemed Ali Jan a
hostile insurgent posing a threat.
The journalists report other SAS witnesses and support
staff cooperating with the AFP contest that claim.
Maley report: A second patrol alleged to have
included Roberts-Smith acted as a blocking force and positioned itself
several hundred metres away from the village. This second patrol reportedly
engaged two LNs.
The patrol observed a ‘squirter’ across the
Helmand River. At least one soldier fired at the man who hid in a rocky
outcrop above the riverbank. Thinking it might be Hekmatullah; Roberts-Smith
swam across the river, climbed the bluff and shot the LN.
The LN was searched and allegedly had valuable
intelligence material – Iranian made IED detonators. The LN also had an
old AK-47 with an Australian bullet lodged in it. Roberts-Smith allegedly
took the weapons and then pushed the body down the bank so another soldier
could photograph it.
The patrol encountered a small number of civilians as it
manoeuvred from the river back toward the village but none were fighting-age
males. As they crossed a cornfield toward the end of the mission,
Roberts-Smith’s patrol allegedly shot and killed a Taliban spotter who
allegedly had a radio.
This second account of the raid is similar to that
reportedly given by lawyers for Roberts-Smith during preliminary argument in
a Federal Court defamation claim. The lawyers argue two combatants were
killed by Roberts-Smith’s patrol and the killings were lawful.
|
McKenzie and Masters, ‘Did
the SAS kick cuffed man off cliff?’, op. cit.
McKenzie and Masters, ‘SAS’s day
of shame’, op. cit.
Oakes, ‘Death
in Darwan’, op. cit.
Greene and Conifer, ‘Ben
Roberts-Smith rejects Afghanistan allegations and “gossip”
detailed in court document’, op. cit.
McKenzie, ‘Secrets
of war’, op. cit.
McKenzie and Masters, ‘SAS
hero subject of war crime inquiry’, op. cit.
Maley, ‘Battle
on the home front’, op. cit.
Maley, ‘War
crimes defamation case: “witness wasn’t there”’,
op. cit.
McKenzie and Masters, ‘New
AFP probe of war hero’, op. cit.
Maley, ‘They’re
calling me a murderer: war hero’, op. cit.
|
|
#44
3 October 2012
Location not given
|
Journalist report: A commando of
‘November platoon’ was told by a more senior commando to
‘take the prisoner … and get rid of them’ in a discreet
location.
He questioned the order but was told to ‘get on with
the job’ and that ‘it was OK because he was a ‘bad
guy’. The commando was sure the prisoner was innocent; however, he has
confessed that he executed the prisoner with his pistol, shooting the
prisoner in the back of the head at point blank range.
The document detailing his admissions suggests that other
members of the platoon had also carried out orders to get rid of prisoners by
shooting them and that other commandos had participated in a summary execution.
|
McKenzie and Masters, ‘Commando
members confess to murder’, op. cit.
McKenzie, ‘Secrets
of war’, op. cit.
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘Walking
the line’, The Saturday Age, 21 September 2019,
p. 29.
|
|
#45
October 2012
Location not given
|
Journalist report: Two ADF witnesses allege
that SAS soldier ‘Leonidas’ instructed and pressured an Afghan
soldier to execute an unarmed prisoner of war suspected to have secreted a
cache of arms in the wall of a house.
|
McKenzie and Masters, ‘Did
the SAS kick cuffed man off cliff?’, op. cit.
McKenzie and Masters, ‘SAS’s day
of shame’, op. cit.
|
|
◊
22 November 2012
|
ANA takes responsibility for security in Uruzgan
Province. The Special Operations Task Group continues to conduct partnered
combat operations to disrupt the insurgency.
|
S Smith (Minister for Defence), Transition
in Afghanistan, media release, 22 November 2012.
|
|
#46
December 2012
Sara Aw,
Kandahar Province
|
Journalist report: Villagers allege that at
about 11 am three helicopters landed carrying SAS patrols ‘Zulu
1’ and ‘Zulu 2’ which were to be partnered with Wakunish
(Afghan police special forces). Three armed Taliban located in nomad houses
near the village resisted and were killed by the Zulu 2 patrol. Their weapons
were recovered.
At least five farmers were allegedly shot by the Zulu 1
patrol near a tractor. No weapons were recovered from that group. Abdul Salim
was driving the tractor when he was shot dead. Other villagers working on
irrigation or with a crop of onions were also killed, including one named
Mohammad Azam. Abdul Qadus was wounded and taken to the Afghan National Army
hospital at Kandahar airbase. Accounts vary, but up to five Taliban and ten
civilians were allegedly killed.
|
M Willacy and A Blucher, ‘Witnesses
say Australian SAS soldiers were involved in mass shooting of unarmed Afghan
civilians’, ABC News (online), 13 July 2020.
|
|
◊
21 December 2012
|
ANSF and the SOTG destroyed significant quantities
of narcotics and weapons and removed insurgent commanders from the
battlefield in operations over the three months to December 2012.
Partnered missions were carried out in the Daykundi, Helmand, Kandahar and
Uruzgan provinces of Afghanistan from September through to December.
SOTG Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel I said that,
during 2012, SOTG and their Afghan special police partners combined to remove
a large number of insurgent commanders from the battlefield.
|
DoD, Successful
rotation for SOTG comes to an end, op. cit.
DoD, Afghan
National Security Force and Australian Special Forces help cut insurgent
funding, media release, 21 December 2012.
|
|
#47
7 January 2013
Noy Juy (Nawjoy)
Uruzgan Province,
|
Journalist report: Villagers say Australian
troops arrived in Nawjoy by helicopter. The Imam of the village was allegedly
with some of the village women, teaching the children. The women reported an
Afghan interpreter accompanying the patrol asked the Imam his name. After he
gave his name as Mawlawi Sher Mohammad, he was allegedly pulled away from the
women and taken to the stable next to his home. The women say two shots were
fired.
Villagers say he was left lying in the doorway with his
head in the stable and his feet outside. He had been shot with two bullets in
the chest. They complained he had no links with the Taliban and his corpse
was in a disrespectful situation dragged into a place for animals.
ABC Investigations alleged that the dead man was a
civilian who shared the same name as a Taliban target and ‘that he was
killed in cold blood’.
Villagers also accuse the SAS of burning motorbikes and a
car belonging to villagers. They say 16 villagers were detained at Tarin Kowt
airbase before being released days later.
|
M Willacy and R Callinan, ‘The
mistaken identity that led to Australian soldiers allegedly killing the wrong
man’, ABC News (online), 21 July 2020.
|
|
◊
8 February 2013
|
SOTG Rotation XVIII handed over to the incoming
rotation. Hekmatullah escaped to Pakistan; however, intelligence generated by
Rotation XVIII led to his later arrest in Pakistan and extradition to
Afghanistan.
|
Masters, No front line, op. cit., p. 502.
|
|
#48
28 February 2013
Char Chineh,
Uruzgan Province
|
Journalist report: While troops were
conducting a sweep through a remote region, radio chatter from insurgents
indicated an imminent threat. SAS soldiers identified two insurgents 1.3km
away from a checkpoint. An SAS officer, Captain Andrew Hastie, called in a
helicopter strike to correct coordinates, but the helicopter fired on an area
a few hundred metres away. The SAS patrol found two dead Afghan boys and
three dead donkeys. Masters names the dead boys as Toor Jan and Odood.
Journalists reported the ADF said no Australian was to
blame; however, a NATO enquiry found the Australian commander on the ground
and the pilot of the US attack helicopter failed to fulfil targeting
obligations when they did not coordinate observation and fire onto same
point.
|
D Oakes and S Clark, ‘What
the documents reveal about killings of unarmed Afghans: helicopter strike
kills boys and donkeys’, ABC News (online), 11 July 2017.
It is unclear, but likely, that this is the same incident
reported by B Nicholson and J Kelly, ‘Diggers
in attack that killed two boys’, The Weekend Australian, 2
March 2013, p. 6.
Masters, No front line, op. cit., pp.
507–508.
McKenzie, ‘Secrets
of war’, op. cit.
|
|
#49
9 or 10 March 2013
Southern region of Uruzgan Province
|
Journalist report: Australian and Afghan
troops were conducting an armed reconnaissance of insurgent high activity
zones. Australian troops saw a motorbike carrying two LNs moving in a
‘stop/start’ fashion. An Australian said he tried using hand
gestures and verbal commands to get the motorcyclist to stop but believed the
motorcycle was heading to an area that would provide a tactical advantage.
Another Australian shot and killed the rider; the female passenger fell off
and was apparently unhurt.
The Australian did not tell anybody at the time that he
had shot the motorcyclist, and it was erroneously reported that Afghan troops
were responsible.
Journalist reported that an IO found the killing was within
ROE. Commando was cleared because intercepted communications revealed
insurgents were active in the area, and the motorcyclist had exhibited
behaviour consistent with ‘spotter’ behaviour (that is, ignoring
commands to stop and watching Australian troops).
In the second report, journalists cite further documents
and claim:
- Chief of police, Matiullah Khan, said in a meeting with
Australian Special Forces that he was agitated about shooting civilians,
especially females, who do not target ISAF or ANSF.
- A NATO investigation team noted the local head of the Afghan
national intelligence service (NDS) stating that Uruzgan citizens blamed the
NDS for civilian casualty incidents arising from Special Operation raids.
- The NATO report (written by an Australian officer) said
acceptance of ANSF as the lead security agency made discretionary ISAF
unilateral actions less acceptable to local government and population. The
shift might require a review of the burdens of proof for engaging
‘spotters’.
|
D Oakes and S Clark, ‘What
the documents reveal about killings of unarmed Afghans: Motorcyclist gunned
down for stopping and starting’,
ABC News (online), 11 July 2017.
Oakes and Clark, ‘Who
is the enemy? Australia’s secretive rules of engagement’, op.
cit.
|
|
◊
Date unknown
2013
Perth
|
Journalist report: In 2013 at SASR barracks
in Perth, a group of senior non-commissioned officers heard certain
allegations and reported matters up the line. Unit psychologists and the
chaplains also raised concerns.
|
Masters, ‘A
law unto themselves? Who dares speak?’, op. cit.
|
|
◊
April 2013
|
Journalist report: Journalists claim to have
seen ADF documents instructing troops that unarmed LNs could be legitimately
killed if they were directly participating in hostilities (DPH). A person
could be DPH if:
- Moving in a tactical fashion.
- Moving to an area where weapons might be stored.
- ‘Spotting’ for insurgents.
The documents stressed that mere suspicion or instinct was
not sufficient to assess DPH. A soldier must have a solid basis for suspicion
based on knowledge of insurgent ‘tactics, techniques and
procedures’.
Journalists report that in April 2013, CDF, CJOPS and
Commander Joint Task Force 633 each issued directives stressing that
Australian soldiers must have a high degree of confidence that a targeted
person is directly participating in hostilities. Journalists quote General
David Hurley’s CDF Directive:
An ADF member is exposed to
criminal and disciplinary liability, including potentially the war crime of
murder … for opening fire on a person when there is a substantial risk
that the person is not DPH.
|
Oakes and Clark, ‘Who
is the enemy? Australia’s secretive rules of engagement’, op.
cit.
|
|
#50
28 April 2013
Olum Ghar,
Zabul Province
|
Journalist report: Journalists stated they
had access to an IO Report. A photograph accompanying the article shows the
title as: Inquiry into incident involving sensitive site exploitation by
members of SOTG on 28 APR 13 (F69031).
SOTG were searching for an insurgent OBJ RAPIER who was a
priority target. A total of 120 troops from SAS and commandos involved
including Captain Andrew Hastie. A high intensity battle occurred during the
patrol.
Masters reported a squirter was tracked by overhead
surveillance and a military working dog to a cave and shot by a five-tour
veteran SAS Corporal. He recovered a Makarov pistol and conducted a time
sensitive examination (TSE).
The patrol then moved by helicopter across the valley to
intercept more squirters. They shot and killed two more LNs, one carrying an
AK-47. Another insurgent was killed by a different patrol. Two of the KIA had
been shot in the face and were not recognisable. Journalist reported that an
SAS corporal searched the bodies and cut the right hand off each of three
corpses with a surgical scalpel.
Hastie had to scramble down a slope to reach the KIA and
by the time he got there, the helicopters were warning of fuel shortage. He
saw the hands and with a sergeant questioned the corporal, who did not answer.
Another trooper said: ‘This is a tactical necessity. This is a
procedure to conduct latent fingerprints in the laboratory to take explosive
residues.’
An SOER sergeant who was tasked and equipped to conduct
the examination was busy elsewhere. The troop had to run 2,000 metres to a
landing zone to extract. Once in the air and back at base Hastie further
questioned the men. He told them not to sever any more hands and next day
reported the incident up the chain of command.
Journalists noted Australian troops were required, where
possible, to collect fingerprints and eye scans of every insurgent killed.
Site exploitation required soldiers to take photographs of corpses, remove
weapons, phones, documents and collect fingerprints and DNA samples via hair
samples and swabs for a digital database. ISAF guidance called for biometric
enrolment to be conducted with dignity.
SAS troopers claimed that ADFIS officers had sanctioned
the practice of cutting off hands at a training session on
19 April 2013. The corporal said he had severed the hands because
there was time pressure to retrieve the biometric material and to get back to
the helicopters for extraction.
On 2 May the SOTG were put on an operational pause. The
Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Beesley, was allegedly not informed of
the incident until 1 May 2013. He concluded that the intent was professional
and in no way trophy hunting. No locals raised allegations, and the incident
was wholly self-reported by the SOTG. On 15 May, the operational pause was
partly lifted.
The SASR corporal and his sergeant were later sent home.
Journalists report that the IO Report concluded:
- ‘The views expressed [by other SAS members] appeared to
go beyond mere support for [the corporal] and demonstrated a drift in values,
or at least a degree of desensitisation’.
- ‘It would be imprudent for commanders to assume that
these members are in a position to make value judgements, in a way that will
align with the judgement of the commanders …’
ADFIS commenced an investigation. Journalist reported ISAF
also stated they would investigate. In October 2013, the commanding officer
of the SOTG complained in writing to the head of ADFIS that the ADFIS team
were deliberately seeking to charge members of the SOTG to prevent any
adverse action against ADFIS members over their instructions to troops.
The AFP commenced a two-year investigation into whether
the soldier committed a war crime. The AFP did not find evidence of a war
crime and referred the matter back to the ADF. It is not clear if any
disciplinary action was taken against the soldier who severed the hands. No
ISAF inquiry outcome has been reported.
|
M Brissenden, ‘Australian
special forces troops under investigation for cutting off hands of dead
Afghan insurgent’, ABC News (online),
30 August 2013.
D Oakes and S Clark,
‘“What
the f*** are you doing”: chaos over severed hands’, ABC
News (online), 11 July 2017.
D Oakes and S Clark, ‘SAS
soldier cleared of war crimes after cutting hands off dead Taliban suspects
in Afghanistan’, ABC News (online),
14 September 2017.
Masters, No front line, op. cit., pp.
516–522.
|
|
◊
April 2013
|
Journalist report: Corporal M made an
official complaint against Corporal Roberts-Smith alleging that he was
bullied and harassed by Roberts Smith. Corporal M alleged Roberts-Smith had
complained of his performance while on deployment in 2006 and threatened to
shoot him in the back of the head if it didn’t improve. Corporal M also
alleged that Roberts-Smith demeaned his character and ability as an SAS
patrol member during a 2012 squadron conference.
Roberts-Smith told the investigator: “These
allegations are simply not true and have been fabricated … (Corporal M)
has been communicating with other members of the unit to try and concoct
stories and statements to verify his allegations.”
The SAS conducted a quick assessment inquiry into the
allegations and a four page staff-in-confidence briefing was given to the
SASR commanding officer. In his official report, the investigating captain
found ‘there is sufficient evidence to suggest that CPL Roberts-Smith
may have verbally insulted (Corporal M)’, and that ‘an act of
unacceptable behaviour may have been carried out by CPL Roberts-Smith during
that deployment’.
|
B Packham, ‘“I
will shoot you”: SAS at war’, The
Australian, 10 October 2020, p. 1.
|
|
#51
23 September 2013
Chenartu, Patan,
Uruzgan Province
|
Journalist report: Journalists claimed to
have access to a quick assessment IO report. Afghan and Australian troops
were conducting a clearance operation. Soldiers detained three persons of
interest. They were handcuffed and taken to a nearby hut. Afghan troops
conducted interrogation, concluded they were Taliban and should be taken to
Tarin Kowt for questioning.
The first two were questioned and taken outside. After the
third was questioned, an Australian soldier was alone with the detainee. The
soldier removed the detainee’s plastic handcuffs ‘in order to
transfer him to the helicopter’ and the detainee grabbed for the
soldier’s rifle. The soldier called for help, then regained control of
the weapon and fired two or three shots point blank, which killed detainee.
There were no witnesses.
According to journalists, the IO report cleared the
soldier. ADFIS decided to investigate whether it was a wilful killing. During
the ADFIS investigation, the commander initially denied ADFIS access to the
weapon used. There was a heated dispute between investigators and commanders
over the usefulness of the evidence and the legality of the warrant. The
weapon was eventually handed over. No one was charged.
|
D Oakes and S Clark, ‘What
the documents reveal about killings of unarmed Afghans: detainee shot dead in
hut prompts war crime probe’, ABC News (online), 11 July 2017.
D Oakes and S Clark, ‘An
interrogation, a shooting and no witnesses’, ABC News
(online), 11 July 2017.
|
|
#52
26 September 2013
Spin Kecha village,
North West Uruzgan Province
Alternative location:
Ala Balogh village on outskirts of Tarin Kot
Uruzgan Province
|
Journalist report: While searching a
compound targeting a high value Taliban target, soldiers saw a man, named as
Bismillah Azadi, pointing a pistol at them. He was shot and killed by two
SOTG soldiers who were unaware that his son Sadiqullah was hidden in blankets
near him. The child was discovered with a single gunshot to the abdomen and
died.
Relatives of the dead man told journalists that Azadi was
unarmed when killed and had no links to the Taliban.
Oakes and Clark report a defence inquiry found the
soldiers had fired in self-defence and exercised appropriate restraint.
Inquiry reportedly said there was insufficient evidence to conclude Bismillah
was an insurgent; however, use of pistol and lack of local outcry suggested
he was supportive of insurgency.
Note: Willacy and Callinan say their report is based on
more than 90 files from the AIHRC and interviews in Afghanistan.
Journalist report: Target of raid was Taliban
commander Mula Sardar, who was captured. Soldiers from SOTG Rotation 20
climbed onto roof of Mula Sardar’s neighbour. Soldiers entered a house
[not clear which one] and shot and killed Bismillah Jan and his six year old
son Sadiqullah while they were asleep under a blanket on the veranda.
Mohammad Masoom (Bismillah’s cousin and neighbour)
said he found the man with the boy lying in his father’s arms under the
blanket, which had bullet holes, and they were bleeding out of the blanket.
The boy had bandages and syringes on him. Esmat Khan (Bismillah’s son)
said his father and brother were asleep when the soldiers arrived. He says
there were boot marks on his father’s shoulder and head.
Bismillah's family made a detailed complaint to the AIHRC
about the killing, alleging it was completely unwarranted and that the farmer
did not own a pistol.
|
D Oakes and S Clark, ‘Death
in Kandahar: Father and son gunned down in raid’, ABC News
(online), 11 July 2017.
D Oakes and S Clark, ‘What
the documents reveal about killings of unarmed Afghans: child found under
blankets with bullet wound’, ABC News (online),
11 July 2017.
Oakes, ‘Investigators
travel to Afghanistan to interview witnesses over alleged Australian war
crimes’, op. cit.
M Willacy and R Callinan,
‘A
boy and his father were shot dead by Australian soldiers in Afghanistan. New
reports claim they were unarmed’, ABC News (online),
16 October 2019.
|
|
◊
2 October 2013
|
Journalist report: Corporal Roberts-Smith
resigned from the Army to move into a business career but looked forward to
continuing to serve in the Army Reserve, and working with various Defence
Force charities.
The SASR commanding officer, ‘Lieutenant Colonel G’,
said Roberts-Smith had made a significant contribution to the unit since
2003. For almost a decade he faithfully served his country and the SASR
in a period of continuous and unprecedented operational tempo. His
awards for valour in Afghanistan are testament to his fierce
determination and his absolute commitment to the profession of arms, in
keeping with the SASR ethos that all regimental members uphold.
The CA, Lieutenant General David Morrison, thanked
Roberts-Smith for his service, ‘Ben represents the best of the
Australian soldier and has been a wonderful ambassador for the Australian
Army’.
|
M Willacy and R Callinan, ‘Victoria
Cross recipient Ben Roberts-Smith leaving Army for career in business’,
ABC News (online), 2 October 2013.
|
|
#53
7 December 2013
Kabul
|
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security
(IGIS), Dr Vivienne Thom, reported a ‘serious incident involving an
allegedly inappropriate action by an officer of another Australian government
agency towards an ASIS officer’ in her 2013–14 Annual Report.
IGIS found that the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) did not yet
have adequate controls in place to ensure that a person with a blood alcohol
content above zero would not have carriage of a weapon. IGIS also found that
she had been provided with inaccurate information, and her review of the ASIS
investigation revealed substantial discrepancies.
Journalist report 2014: A source said the incident
reported by IGIS referred to an Australian SAS trooper pulling a loaded
handgun on an ASIS agent.
Journalist report 2017: Journalists claimed access
to a 36-page report marked Secret AUSTEO (Australian Eyes Only) which
explained the incident. A few ASIS officers and nine Australian soldiers who
were deployed to guard them were present at a BBQ, as well as two Afghan
interpreters and some Canadians. Alcohol was consumed. All soldiers at the
event, except A35, initially denied they had been drinking. However, later
they said senior members in their chain of command also drank alcohol and
were aware that the soldiers drank. An order of 12 cases of beer and 40
bottles of spirits had been supplied through the Australian Embassy. The
report found that, while ASIS officers were allowed to consume alcohol under
certain circumstances, ADF personnel were not.
SAS soldier ‘A35’ and ASIS ‘Officer
L’ were to some degree intoxicated. A35 left the event walking toward
his room carrying his loaded pistol. Officer L followed shortly after. As she
entered a courtyard, A35 pointed his pistol directly at her. He lowered the
pistol, they talked and then he raised it again and placed it under her chin.
His finger was not on the trigger. Officer L walked away, and when at what
she thought was a safe distance, turned and called A35 ‘a complete
dickhead’. She immediately told a colleague, who noticed that she was
‘visibly shaking and had a quavering voice’.
Journalists state that A35 denied placing the weapon under
Officer L’s chin but admitted he was ‘possibly waving (the
pistol) around and “talking with his hands”’. A35 and
Officer L were both sent back to Australia within days of the incident.
|
Inspector General of Intelligence and Security
(IGIS), Annual
report 2013–14, The Office of the IGIS, p. 11.
C Uhlmann, ‘Special
forces soldier pulled handgun on Australian spy during drinking session in
Afghanistan’, ABC News (online), 21 October 2014.
D Oakes and S Clark,
‘The
spy and the SAS soldier with a loaded Glock’, ABC News
(online), 11 July 2017.
|
|
◊
26 January 2014
|
Corporal Ben Roberts-Smith awarded a
Commendation for Distinguished Service as a patrol commander with the Special
Operations Task Group in Afghanistan from June to November 2012. Citation
for the Award.
|
Australian Army, ‘Corporal
Ben Roberts-Smith, VC, MG’, Army website, last updated
5 April 2019.
|
|
◊
Date unknown, early 2014
|
Journalist report: Three SAS patrol
commanders (still serving with the regiment) signed a complaint written by
one of them, Sergeant L. The complaint allegedly urged senior officers to
investigate Roberts-Smith’s mentoring, leadership, and treatment of
Trooper J (see Incident #38, above). The complaint allegedly stated ‘As
SAS soldiers, we are responsible for accurate reporting and honesty, in the
field and in camp. This citation is a contradiction of those values.’
|
McKenzie et al., ‘Beneath
the bravery of our most decorated soldier’, op. cit.
|
|
◊
Date unknown, likely late 2015–early 2016
|
Crompvoets inquiry
Journalist report: Responding to rumours and
internal accounts of misconduct, then Special Operations Commander, Major
General Jeff Sengelman, allegedly commissioned Canberra-based sociologist Dr
Samantha Crompvoets in 2015 to write a report on ‘Special Operations
Command Culture Interactions’. Crompvoets’ report was provided to
Sengelman in early 2016 and then briefed up to then Chief of Army (CA) Lieutenant
General Angus Campbell. The report was tightly held and has not been publicly
released; however, journalists Nick McKenzie and Chris Masters claimed in June
2018 to have obtained a copy. They also stated in October 2020 that The
Age and The Sydney Morning Herald had recently seen the report.
Note: The reports of McKenzie and Masters contain some
conflicting information about the date of the Crompvoets report and who
commissioned it. Nicholson says Sengelman raised concerns with Campbell in
2015 and they commissioned the report together.
Journalists said in 2018 that the report described
a culture of impunity that may have normalised allegedly disturbing behaviour.
The report also allegedly identified serious ‘governance and
behavioural lapses’.
In 2020 the journalists reported more of the content; Crompvoets
recorded allegations made by multiple special forces insiders that war crimes
were normalised among cliques of soldiers, while others who confronted the
bad behaviour were marginalised. It says unarmed civilians and prisoners were
shot or had their throats slit by some Australian soldiers with a ‘large
number of illegal killings often gloated about’. The report contained
extracts of lengthy and candid interviews with SF soldiers and
whistleblowers.
Crompvoets says that, according to some whistleblowers,
those most responsible for war crimes were a very small number of patrol
commanders. She was told repeatedly that everyone knew who the culprits were.
Witnesses emphasised that disturbing events happened all the time. Crompvoets
assessed the allegations were particularly grave because there was a
disturbing regularity and normality to serious misconduct and witnesses felt intense
pressure not to report things up the chain of command. Insiders alleged that
some investigations were ‘set up’ and ADF lawyers failed to
properly investigate war crimes.
Crompvoets warned CA that the risk of serious reputational
damage as a result of the misconduct extended beyond the SF and even the
Army.
Crompvoets recorded ‘countless references’
from the special forces insiders ‘to exceptional soldiers and officers
who upheld Army values and whose character was unquestionably upstanding’:
This was one of the most
consistently conflicting pieces of information I was given, because the
obvious question is: why did they not intervene or do anything to stop what
was happening? To this question came the various answers: they were too high
up the chain to see it; the tempo was so high the priority was just to keep
everything ticking over; they did try to do something but were
dismissed/marginalised/ moved on; they only saw one incident not the pattern
over time; eventually they left quietly.
Special forces insiders disclosed concerns about the:
… diaspora of SF alumni
who are powerful, have a great deal to lose and will no doubt fight to
protect their personal reputation as well as the SF brand should they be
implicated…
The Crompvoets report was the catalyst for the Brereton
Inquiry.
|
D Oakes, ‘Claims
of “illegal violence”, drug and alcohol abuse alleged in leaked Australian
Defence report’, ABC News (online), 9 June 2018
N McKenzie and C Masters,
‘Former
spy chief heads new “war crimes” inquiry’, The Age,
11 June 2018, pp. 1, 6.
N McKenzie and
C Masters, ‘SAS
soldiers committed war crimes: secret report’, The Sydney Morning
Herald, 8 June 2018, pp. 1, 6.
F Kelly, ‘Sociologist
who sparked ADF war crimes inquiry speaks out’, RN Breakfast, 27
February 2020.
B Nicholson, Focus
on ethical soldiering, The Australian, 3 October 2020, p. 16.
B Nicholson, ‘Australian
Army rebuilding special forces culture ahead of Afghanistan war crimes report’,
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), The Strategist, 3 October
2020.
N McKenzie and C Masters ‘“Blood
lust, killings, cover-ups”: Report describes Australia's “Abu
Ghraib” moment’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 October
2020.
|
|
◊
March 2016
|
Brereton Inquiry
In March 2016, the CA requested the IGADF conduct a
scoping inquiry to ascertain whether there was any substance to rumours of
unlawful conduct by the Special Operations Task Group during deployments in
Afghanistan. The IGADF Annual
Report 2016–2017 stated the Inquiry commenced in May 2016 but
as a result of changes in legislation pertaining to the IGADF, since December
2016 the Inquiry has continued at the direction of the CDF.
The IGADF appointed Major General Paul Brereton, then a
Justice of the Supreme Court of NSW, to conduct The Inspector-General of
the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry (also known as the
Brereton Inquiry). The date of that appointment is not known.
Confidential nature of inquiry
The IGADF has explained that the Inquiry is being
conducted in private:
- Because it involves matters of operational security and
protected identities.
- For the protection of witnesses and of the reputations of
individuals who may be unfairly harmed by publication of rumours that turn
out to be unsubstantiated.
- To protect lines of inquiry.
In relation to an application for the production of
certain documents confidential to the Brereton Inquiry, Justice Colvin of the
Federal Court observed:
There is a demonstrated public
interest in being able to maintain the private nature of the [Brereton]
Inquiry up until a decision is taken as to the extent to which the Inquiry's
report is made public. That public interest includes the need to provide
procedural fairness through a confidential delivery and response to PAP
[Potentially Affected Person] Notices. The process that has been adopted in
the conduct of the Inquiry is one that is contemplated by, indeed provided
for, in the Regulation … This is not an instance where the Executive
seeks to maintain secrecy, it is an instance where the Legislature has put in
place regulations to facilitate that course and to sanction its breach with
offence and contempt consequences.
|
DoD, Inspector-General
of the Australian Defence Force annual report 2016–2017, DoD,
Canberra, 2018, p. 3.
K Elphick, ‘The
Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry
(Brereton Inquiry): a quick guide’, Research paper series,
2020–2021, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 3 September 2020.
DoD, Inspector-General
of the Australian Defence Force annual report 2018–2019, DoD,
Canberra, 2018, pp. 7–8.
Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited
(No 6) [2020]
FCA 1285, 8 September 2020, per Colvin J at [66].
|
|
◊
April 2016
|
Special Operations Commander letter to SOCOMD
Journalist report: Special Operations Commander,
Major General Jeff Sengelman, wrote to SF soldiers making clear that he
believed shocking behaviour had occurred while SF were deployed to Afghanistan
between 2001 and 2015. He describes SF misconduct and cover-ups as shameful
and embarrassing and warns a failure to reform would render the SAS and
Commandos ‘strategically irrelevant’.
Sengelman’s letter outlines cultural and systemic
failings including weak leadership and a compromised chain of command. Some
officers and soldiers championed a ‘warrior’ culture at the
expense of ‘ethical behaviour, moral outlook, or integrity of
character’.
Many have opined to me the
unacceptable behaviours ... were somehow justified by operational
imperatives, our sacrifice, and the stressors associated with combat
operations. While I am not insensitive to how this attitude may have arisen
and am the first to acknowledge the exceptional commitment and sacrifice that
operational service has required; this is not and never will be a
satisfactory justification for deviation from standards or unacceptable
behaviour. This cannot be in doubt. If it is for you, then we need to speak.
|
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘"Collapse
in morality" behind SAS war crimes’, The Sydney Morning
Herald, 26 September 2020, pp. 1, 4.
|
|
◊
Date unknown,
before Irvine report in 2018.
|
SOCOMD ‘redemption initiative’
Journalist report: Irvine reportedly commented in
his 2018 report on the importance of a ‘redemption initiative’
introduced by Special Operations Commander, Major General Jeff Sengelman. It
provided SF soldiers the opportunity to confess to transgressions and hold
themselves to account. That enabled personnel who had conducted themselves in
ways inconsistent with army values to be ‘managed out’.
It is not clear whether the reference to being
‘managed out’ is to soldiers being removed from the SF or the Army.
|
B Nicholson, ‘Australian
Army rebuilding special forces culture ahead of Afghanistan war crimes report’,
op. cit.
|
|
◊
13 October 2017
|
Harassment of Brereton Inquiry witness
Journalist report: A person using a false email
address emailed then federal politician Nick Xenophon falsely alleging a
serving SASR member who had earlier testified before Justice Brereton was
mentally unstable and at risk of performing a repeat of the ‘Los [sic]
Vegas Massacre’, a reference to a US incident on October 1 in which a
gunman killed 58 people.
Defence and law enforcement sources said the message to Mr
Xenophon was designed to force police to launch an urgent raid without
assessing the accuracy of the allegation. Details in the letter confirmed it
was sent by a serving or former regiment insider.
The complaint compelled border force and WA police to
conduct a raid, which found no weapons.
|
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘Special
forces in "witness threats"’, The Age, 15 June 2018,
pp. 1, 6.
|
|
◊
November 2017
|
International Criminal Court
ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, requested authorisation to
commence a formal investigation into alleged war crimes and crimes against
humanity. Between 7 December 2017 and 9 February 2018, the ICC Victims
Participation and Reparations Section provided a total of 699 victims’
representations; however, on 12 April 2019, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC
unanimously rejected the request of the Prosecutor to proceed with the
investigation. Among other reasons, the judges decided that an investigation
into the situation in Afghanistan so long after the events occurred
‘would not serve the interests of justice’.
|
ICC-02/17, ‘Situation in the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan’, ICC website.
T Sterling and S van den
Berg, ‘Facing
hurdles from U.S., war crimes judges reject Afghan probe’, Reuters,
12 April 2019.
International Criminal
Court (ICC), ‘Situation
in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: questions and answers’,
ICC, 15 April 2019.
|
|
◊
Early 2018
|
Irvine Inquiry
Defence statement: David Irvine, former
Director-General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, was
appointed in 2018 by the CA, Lieutenant General Burr, ‘... to conduct
an independent assessment of reform measures implemented within Special
Operations Command. As part of the broader army and Australian Defence Force
cultural review and reform measures, Special Operations Command has
implemented a number of cultural and governance reforms since 2015. The
Irvine review will assist army leadership to determine the effectiveness of
reform initiatives and identify whether additional improvements are
required.’
Journalist report: McKenzie and Masters report
‘senior Defence sources’ said Irvine would examine ‘why so
few soldiers or officers have been held accountable for a litany of alleged
problems from 2001 to 2016, ranging from skylarking, excessive drinking or
drug abuse and bullying to alleged war crimes’.
Paul Maley reported on 26 October 2018 that Irvine had
submitted his report and this was confirmed by a Defence spokesperson.
In October 2020 Brendan Nicholson reported that Irvine
found that after a decade of constant combat, SOCOMD was worn out and run
down. He warned that in an elite unit, esprit de corps could quickly turn
into arrogance. Irvine noted a culture among some soldiers that they did not
report crimes to senior officers.
Irivine stressed the importance of a ‘redemption
intiative’ introduced by Sengelman and recommended the appointment of a
senior officer with considerable command experience from outside SOCOMD as an
independent special forces adviser.
|
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘Former
spy chief heads new “war crimes” inquiry’, The Age,
11 June 2018, pp. 1, 6.
Defence Statement quoted
in McKenzie
and Masters, ‘Former
spy chief heads new “war crimes” inquiry’, op.
cit., p. 6.
P Maley, ‘Inquiry
into ADF misses deadline’, The Australian, 26 October
2018, p. 3.
B Nicholson, ‘Australian
Army rebuilding special forces culture ahead of Afghanistan war crimes report’,
op. cit..
|
|
◊
June 2018
|
Inquiry into threats against Brereton Inquiry
witnesses
Journalist report: A key inquiry witness and
member of the SASR was sent a threatening letter in early June 2018
threatening retaliation if he did not recant his testimony to an inquiry led
by NSW Supreme Court judge Paul Brereton.
The letter, which contained information suggesting it was
prepared by an SAS insider, was received after the soldier was summoned to testify
before the Brereton Inquiry. The letter was seized by the SASR commanding
officer and sent to CDF. Defence launched an internal inquiry.
A Defence spokesperson confirmed the threat and said:
Making such a threat is a
criminal offence and Defence has referred the matter to the police. Witnesses
are protected by law from intimidation and from liability for what they tell
the inquiry
Some SAS members told colleagues they were concerned about
their physical safety.
|
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘Special
forces in "witness threats"’, The Age, 15 June 2018,
pp. 1, 6.
|
|
◊
June 2018
|
AFP investigation commences
Journalist report: The AFP allegedly launched what
was intended to be a covert war crimes investigation into allegations made
against Ben Roberts-Smith after receiving two referrals from the office of
the IGADF as part of the Brereton Inquiry.
The AFP Offshore and Sensitive Investigation taskforce, at
the time under the leadership of deputy commissioner Neil Gaughan, was
reportedly investigating.
|
A Greene, ‘Australian
soldiers investigated by AFP for alleged war crimes in Afghanistan’,
ABC News (online), 29 November 2018.
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘SAS
“war crimes” witnesses speak’, The Age, 20
September 2019, pp. 1, 6.
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘Keelty
revealed war crimes probe’, The Age,
17 August 2020, pp. 1, 12.
|
|
◊
June 2018
|
ACLEI investigate leaking of AFP information to
Roberts-Smith
In June 2018, former AFP chief Mick Keelty met
Roberts-Smith twice to give him welfare support. In a written statement to The
Age and The Sydney Morning Herald Keelty confirmed he passed on
information about the existence of three highly sensitive and confidential
referrals to the AFP about Roberts-Smith’s alleged criminal conduct
(one referral was unrelated to conduct in Afghanistan). Keelty said that
while he was told by AFP officers of the three Roberts-Smith referrals, he
was not told if they were still in the assessment phase or had progressed to
full-blown inquiries. Keelty noted that a referral to police is not a
guarantee of an investigation. There is no suggestion Keelty acted with
intent to compromise the AFP inquiry.
The Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI)
confirmed that the AFP notified it on 21 June 2018, of allegations that
Roberts-Smith had been told sensitive information about the AFP’s
interest in him. On 27 June 2018, it launched a joint covert operation with
the AFP to investigate the alleged leak. ACLEI said its inquiry ‘has
not uncovered admissible evidence against any person within ACLEI’s
jurisdiction’. McKenzie and Masters note that ACLEI only has power to
investigate allegations of corrupt conduct by serving AFP members. Keelty is
not within the ACLEI’s jurisdiction because he left the AFP in 2009.
The journalists note that ‘[t]here is no suggestion Mr Keelty has
engaged in corruption, only that his disclosures compromised a covert
inquiry’.
|
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘Keelty
revealed war crimes probe’, The Age,
17 August 2020, pp. 1, 12.
Editorial, ‘Compromised
war investigation stains our honour’, The Sydney Morning Herald,
18 August 2020, p. 20.
|
|
◊
10 August 2018
|
Roberts-Smith commenced defamation action
Five actions have been filed in the Federal Court by
Roberts-Smith alleging defamation against several journalists and news
outlets. An action filed against Fairfax Media on 10 August 2018 was
dismissed by consent and is closed (NSD1440/2018).
Three actions filed on 15 August 2018 against Fairfax
Media, the Age and the Federal Capital Press and various named journalists
are ongoing. The Federal Court file numbers are NSD1485/2018,
NSD1486/2018
and NSD1487/2018.
An action filed on 2 June 2020 against Jonathan Pearlman
was discontinued/withdrawn (NSD1826/2018).
|
Federal Court records accessed through the Federal Law Search on
the Commonwealth Courts Portal.
|
|
◊
Date unknown,
2019
|
Special forces adviser appointed
Journalist report: Major General Shane
Caughey appointed as independent special forces adviser. The role is to
support and monitor implementation of reforms. In future operations the
adviser would ensure SOCOMD maintained good governance and oversight.
A former Warrant Officer of the Army has also been
appointed to ensure clear communication between the adviser and the soldiers
in SOCOMD.
|
B Nicholson, ‘Australian
Army rebuilding special forces culture ahead of Afghanistan war crimes report’,
op. cit.
|
|
◊
1 March 2019
|
Army ‘Good Soldiering’ initiative
launched
CA, Lieutenant General Burr launched the ‘Good
Soldiering program, Army’s cultural optimisation program.
The Good Soldiering program is
what we will use to take the next step, to optimise our culture. It is
fundamental to the success of our warfighting philosophy. Good soldiering
emphasises high-performance teams, and it details the signature behaviours
that build a good culture. It is about getting the best from our people, our
teams and from Army. It is about developing character. It is about achieving
the mission.
The Good Soldiering program will help us achieve our aim - to be
professional, prepared, delivering through our people to achieve our
individual and collective potential. Everyone in Army owns our culture.
|
Australian Army, ‘Launch of Good
Soldiering’ Facebook post, 4 March 2019 accessed 2 November
2020.
R Burr, ‘Good
Soldiering’, Army News, Edition 1437, 7 March 2020, p. 5.
|
|
◊
Date unknown,
mid 2019
|
AFP officers interview witnesses in Afghanistan
Journalist report: AFP agents travelled to
Afghanistan and interviewed potential witnesses. They were reportedly seeking
to corroborate eyewitness testimony from SAS soldiers and support staff who
had given signed statements to police. An Afghan defence source confirmed to
journalists that AFP agents were in Afghanistan and spoke to many people.
Federal police representative: investigators
recently deployed to Afghanistan in support of the war crimes investigations.
Afghanistan authorities in country supported the AFP and inquiries with
international partners remain ongoing.
|
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘SAS
hero subject of war crime inquiry’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 23
August 2019.
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘AFP
seeks Afghan “war crime” testimony’, The Sydney
Morning Herald, 20 September 2019, pp. 1, 6. See also N McKenzie and
C Masters, ‘SAS
“war crimes” witnesses speak’, The Age, 20
September 2019, pp. 1, 6.
|
|
◊
December 2019
|
AFP invited Roberts-Smith to be interviewed
During legal argument in a Federal Court defamation case
brought by Ben Roberts-Smith, Barrister Sandy Dawson SC, Counsel for news
outlets being sued, told the court that, in relation to the death of Ali Jan
(incident #43 above), the AFP:
- Wrote to Roberts-Smith through his lawyers in December 2019
telling him it had obtained certain evidence in relation to the operation.
- Considered Roberts-Smith a suspect in that investigation on the
basis that Roberts-Smith contended that Ali Jan was a spotter who was
legitimately killed, whereas the AFP had information and eyewitness accounts
to the contrary.
- Had interviewed Roberts-Smith about that incident.
|
C Knaus, ‘Australian
police told Ben Roberts-Smith they had witnesses to alleged Afghanistan war
crimes, court hears‘, The Guardian (Australia) (online),
1 September 2020.
A Cooper, ‘Police
“consider ex-soldier a suspect”’, The Age,
2 September 2020, p. 8.
|
|
◊
25 February 2020
|
IGADF Annual Report tabled in Parliament
In his 2018-19 annual report, IGADF James Gaynor reported
that at 30 June 2019 the Brereton Inquiry had 55 separate incidents or issues
under inquiry covering a range of alleged breaches of the Law of Armed
Conflict, predominantly unlawful killings of persons who were non-combatants
or were no longer combatants, but also ‘cruel treatment’ of such
persons.
|
DoD, Inspector-General
of the Australian Defence Force annual report 2018–19, DoD,
Canberra, 2018, p. 8.
|
|
◊
Date unknown,
2020
|
Threat made against Justice Brereton’s
family
Journalist report: A threat was allegedly
made earlier this year against the family of Assistant IGADF Justice Brereton.
ADF investigators and police conducted raids in 2020 and are still carrying
out investigations in relation to the alleged threat and other materials
found during the raids.
|
D Oakes and J Story Carter, ‘Australian
special forces Instagram account mocks war crime allegations, calls to
“Make Diggers Violent Again”’, ABC News (online),
3 September 2020
|
|
◊
5 March 2020
|
International Criminal Court
ICC Prosecutor, Fatou
Bensouda, appealed the April 2019 ICC decision to deny permission for a
formal investigation.
On 5 March 2020, the Appeals Chamber found that the
Prosecutor is authorised to investigate the crimes alleged to have been
committed on the territory of Afghanistan since 1 May 2003, as well as
other alleged crimes that have a nexus to the armed conflict in Afghanistan,
are sufficiently linked to the situation in Afghanistan, and were committed
on the territory of other States Parties.
The ICC Prosecutor’s Office stated the Prosecutor
can request that the court’s judges issue summons to appear or arrest
warrants ‘no matter who the perpetrator’, for alleged atrocity
crimes. The Prosecutor is focused on investigating grave crimes where there
are no relevant national proceedings against those who appear to be most
responsible.
Ms Bensouda will investigate crimes against humanity and
war crimes by the Taliban and their affiliated Haqqani Network; war crimes by
the ANSF and in particular, members of the National Directorate for Security
(NDS) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). The Prosecutor will also probe
alleged war crimes by US military personnel in Afghanistan and by members of
the Central Intelligence Agency in ‘secret detention facilities’
in Afghanistan ‘and on the territory of other States Parties to the
Rome Statute, principally in the period of 2003-2004’. The news report did
not mention Australian personnel.
|
Staff reporter, ‘“Unanimous”
ICC gives go-ahead to probe Afghanistan alleged war crimes’, UN News Service, 5 March 2020.
ICC-02/17, ‘Situation in the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan’, ICC website.
|
|
◊
19 March 2020
|
Further incident referred to AFP
On 16 March 2020, the ABC Four Corners program
‘Killing Field’ broadcast video of a person identified as Soldier
C apparently executing an Afghan man in a field in 2012. This appears to be
incident #33 above.
Ministerial statement: Defence Minister Linda
Reynolds formally referred the incident to the AFP on 19 March 2020 for
investigation.
ABC Investigations reported on 19 March 2020 that
Soldier C had been suspended from duty. The date of suspension is not clear
but it appears to have been in response to the Four Corners program
aired on 16 March 2020.
|
L Reynolds (Minister for Defence), ‘Statement—Four
Corners Report’, media release, 16 March 2020.
L Reynolds (Minister for
Defence), ‘Four
Corners Report’, media release, 19 March 2020.
ABC Investigations,
‘Soldier
who shot an unarmed Afghan man suspended from duty by Australian Army’,
ABC News (online), 19 March 2020.
|
|
◊
Date unknown, March 2020
|
Special Operations Commander personally briefs
SAS Regiment
Journalist report: Major-General
Adam Findlay reportedly told SAS soldiers in a confidential briefing that
Brereton had identified ‘trigger pullers’ and ‘names that
come up beyond trigger pullers’ and had a very strong evidential basis
for finding some soldiers had acted criminally.
Findlay reportedly praised SAS soldiers who were brave
enough to blow the whistle on war crimes and explained that the genesis of
the Brereton Inquiry was SAS soldiers writing to senior military officers
about misconduct.
Findlay reportedly admitted that war crimes may have been
covered up and blamed the crimes on one common cause—poor moral
leadership. He said a small number of commissioned officers had allowed a
culture where abhorrent conduct was permitted and a handful of experienced
soldiers including patrol commanders and deputy patrol commanders, who
typically led five-man SAS teams on missions, had also enabled this culture
to exist. Findley is reported to have said:
If you have led a command
climate that has permitted people to think [it was OK to do] egregiously
wrong acts, you need to be rooted out. One, as an individual and, two, as a
group … You’ll have to sleep once you leave the services. If your
honour has been compromised, it will affect you for the rest of your life.
Findlay reportedly warned those soldiers who had lied to
Justice Brereton out of ‘misguided loyalty’ would be identified
in the report as perjurers and would be removed from the SAS ‘as a
minimum’.
|
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘General
speaks out over atrocities’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 29
June 2020, p. 1.
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘SAS
men committed war crimes, says chief’, The Age, 29
June 2020, pp. 1, 8.
E Ritchie, ‘Inquiry
points to war crimes, says SAS chief’, The Australian, 29
June 2020, p. 3.
|
|
◊
Date unknown, March 2020
|
CA asked Irvine to examine progress of reforms
Journalist report: CA, Lieutenant General Burr,
asked David Irvine to re-examine progress of the cultural and professional
reforms within SOCOMD. According to Nicholson:
Irvine concluded that the
command was on track to meet its targets of major renewal and regeneration
but the challenge remained substantial. The three main goals were to deal
with the most serious issues from Afghanistan, to reset the command to meet
Australia’s special operations requirements and to prepare it for the
changing strategic environment to come.
In terms of cultural change,
there remained some pockets of resistance among old hands in the units, and
these had been described as ‘pockets of permafrost’. And while
pleasing progress had been made to restore the unit’s ethical base,
more work could be done.
CA is reported as saying that Irvine assured him that Army
was doing the right things but needed to stay focussed on further
implementation and consolidation of the initiatives.
|
B Nicholson, ‘Australian
Army rebuilding special forces culture ahead of Afghanistan war crimes report’,
op. cit.
|
|
◊
16 April 2020
|
Brereton explains welfare support provided by
Inquiry
Journalist report: Justice Brereton responded by
letter dated 16 April 2020 to concerns raised by the RSL and SAS Association
about the impact of the Brereton Inquiry on current and former soldiers. Justice
Brereton wrote that from the outset he had been conscious of the potential
for its proceedings to have an impact on the mental health of witnesses and
others who may be affected or involved. The prospect that the report would
some people could not be completely avoided but explained that any person
potentially the subject of an adverse finding would be afforded procedural
fairness.
Justice Brereton noted welfare for serving personnel and
veterans was generally offered by Defence and the Department of Veterans'
Affairs, but the IGADF had also provided support. He revealed that his
inquiry team had taken steps to provide psychological support to soldiers
ahead of the investigation's findings including expanding its witness support
program by appointing additional Witness Liaison Officers. These Witness
Liaison Officers are Reservists who were formerly permanent force SF
soldiers. they are not privy to the evidence before the inquiry, their
function is to monitor the welfare of witnesses.
|
A Greene, Findings
from Afghanistan war crimes investigation will cause 'distress' for some
elite soldiers, judge warns, ABC News (online), 21 May 2020,
updated 24 May 2020.
P Brereton, Letter
from Major General Paul Brereton to Major General Greg Melick and Lieutenant
Colonel Peter Fitzpatrick [Re: IGADF Afghanistan Inquiry], 16 April 2020.
See DoD, Afghanistan
Inquiry welfare support, DoD webpage
|
|
◊
Date unknown, mid 2020
|
AFP submit brief to prosecutor
Journalist report: The AFP has reportedly submitted
a brief of evidence against Ben Roberts-Smith alleging he was involved in the
execution of prisoner Ali Jan in September 2012. Roberts-Smith denies any
wrongdoing and his lawyers issued a statement on 7 May 2020 saying they had
received assurances from police that the reports a brief of evidence had been
submitted were false. The AFP declined to comment.
If a brief has been submitted to the Commonwealth Director
of Public Prosecutions (CDPP), it does not imply a prosecution will occur.
The CDPP will examine the brief and determine if there is sufficient evidence
to prosecute.
McKenzie and Masters report that more of
Roberts-Smith’s fellow SAS soldiers have come forward to allege he was
involved in other serious war crimes, including murders other than that of
Ali Jan, during his various tours of Afghanistan.
|
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘Afghanistan
veteran may face charges’, The Age, 7 May 2020, p. 3.
P Maley, ‘Military
hero denies war crimes referral’, The Australian, 8 May
2020, p. 7.
|
|
◊
Date unknown, around May 2020
|
Appointment of specialist CDPP prosecutor
The CDPP has reportedly appointed leading Sydney
barrister, David McClure, SC, a former special forces officer, to lead
efforts to prosecute Ben Roberts-Smith for alleged war crimes. McClure was a
defence barrister in the Re Civilian Casualty Court Martial (see
incident #11 above).
|
A Galloway, ‘Top
silk to lead war crimes probe’, The Age, 19 May 2020,
p. 4.
|
|
◊
Date unknown, likely mid 2020
|
Brereton Inquiry issues PAP Notices
Journalist report: Journalist Ellen Whinnet
reported in July 2020 that a number of current and former special forces
soldiers had been served with the Potentially Affected Person (PAP)
Notices by investigators. Whinnet said that the report of the Brereton
Inquiry had been delayed ‘to give the soldiers time to respond to
formal notices that essentially accuse them of committing war crimes.’
Evidence of Deputy IGADF: Deputy IGADF, Commodore
Fiona Sneath, swore an affidavit for use in Roberts-Smith v Fairfax (date
unknown but, from list of court documents filed, likely around July 2020). As
at the date of Sneath’s affidavit, the Brereton Inquiry had commenced
the process of using PAP Notices; however, not everyone likely to receive a
PAP Notice had then been issued with a notice. Sneath noted that while
preparation of the report of the Inquiry is underway, lines of inquiry have
continued to emerge as the Inquiry has progressed, including in recent times.
The Brereton Inquiry has not disclosed the identity of any
person who has or is likely to receive a PAP Notice.
Sneath explained that a PAP notice is not a pro forma
document; each notice is tailored to the circumstances of the individual
recipient. A PAP Notice will:
- Identify each finding or recommendation relevant to the PAP
that the Inquiry is considering whether to make
- Provide the relevant factual background and
-
Provide a summary, in many cases a lengthy and highly specific
summary, of the evidence relevant to each of those findings or
recommendations.
Colvin J judgment on 8 September 2020: The Brereton
Inquiry was required to be conducted in private and continues to be conducted
in private:
The purpose in providing PAP
Notices to individuals is to afford them the opportunity to present
submissions and further information as to matters that may be the subject of
adverse findings against them. In the course of a private investigation it is
likely to be the first and only opportunity that a party has to provide a
response to the nature of claims made and the basis for them because up until
then, other than by providing evidence personally, the party will not have
participated in the process by which evidence has been gathered from others
and considered by those with the conduct of the Inquiry …
After receiving a response to a PAP Notice an inquiry
might be persuaded to make different findings or no adverse findings. For
that reason, it is important that the existence and content of any PAP
Notices remains confidential.
|
E Whinnet, ‘Report
into accusations against SAS is delayed’, The Sunday Telegraph,
19 July 2020, p. 25.
Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited
(No 6) [2020]
FCA 1285, 8 September 2020, per Colvin J at [4],
[60]–[62].
|
|
◊
Date unknown 2020
|
Crompvoets report circulated to senior military
officers
Journalists report: The 2016 Crompvoets report to CA
was circulated to senior military ranks during 2020. Prior to that wider
circulation, it was one of the most tightly held documents in Canberra.
|
N McKenzie and C Masters ‘“Blood
lust, killings, cover-ups”: Report describes Australia's “Abu
Ghraib” moment’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 October
2020.
|
|
◊
August 2020
|
Defence Minister warns Brereton report will be
confronting
Journalist report: The Defence Minister told an
Australian Strategic Policy Institute webinar that, though she had not read
Justice Brereton’s findings, they would be confronting and that they
would make Australians uncomfortable and dismayed.
The Minister reportedly said the army and its special
forces regiments had done ‘a significant amount of self-reflection on
how some of these reported circumstances could have happened, and what needs
to happen structurally and culturally to make sure that these events do not
happen again.’
The Minister stressed that the past behaviour documented in
the report in no way reflected the behaviour of currently serving ADF members
who were doing an extraordinary job.
|
B Packham, ‘War
crimes report uncomfortable reading: Reynolds,’ The Weekend
Australian, 8 August 2020, p. 2.
M Grattan, ‘Government
bracing for damning report on alleged Special Forces' incidents in
Afghanistan’, The Conversation, 11 August 2020.
|
|
◊
August 2020
|
Frame study into ethical standards and command
culture
Journalist report: CDF Angus Campbell has
commissioned Professor
Tom Frame, (respected military historian, Director of the Howard Library,
and former Anglican Bishop to the ADF) to examine cultural and leadership
failings that contributed to the alleged murder of prisoners and civilians by
Australian forces in Afghanistan.
Frame’s study will ‘aim to provide an
understanding of Australia’s Special Forces, including consideration of
the ethical standards and command culture of Special Operations Command and
its people on operations from 1999 until the present day, with a focus on
service in Afghanistan.’ Publication is expected in 2022, and it will
used as an academic reference to contribute to professional development of
the ADF.
Defence told The Australian that Professor Frame
would begin interviewing serving special forces personnel and veterans after
the IGADF’s findings were handed down. The study was to be independent
of the IGADF inquiry and would not be a historical record, the department
said. As at 14 September 2020 a public Defence media release relating to the
Frame study could not be found.
Professor Frame has a strong record of academic publication
on military ethics[12]
and has a leading role in the University of New South Wales Canberra
‘Moral Injury in Modern Warfare’ project.
|
University of New South Wales (UNSW), ‘UNSW
Canberra academic to undertake study of Australian Special Forces, media
release’, 11 August 2020.
M Grattan, ‘Government
bracing for damning report on alleged Special Forces' incidents in
Afghanistan’, The Conversation, 11 August 2020.
B Packham, ‘How
SAS succumbed to tribal and untouchable culture [How SAS gave in to tribal
culture],’ The Australian, 11 August 2020, p. 1.
B Packham, ‘Top
brass can't duck war crime scandal [Brass must answer to war crimes’, The Australian,
12 August 2020, pp. 1, 2.
Editorial, ‘Reckoning
time for ADF elite forces in Afghanistan’, The Australian,
12 August 2020, p. 11.
|
|
◊
3 September 2020
|
Instagram account ‘State Sanctioned
Violence’ reported
Journalist report: Current and former SF soldiers
were operating an Instagram account mocking allegations of war crimes
allegedly committed by SF in Afghanistan. The account featured a series of
graphic and troubling posts, including videos of combat killings set to rap
music. the account had several thousand followers.
The account was selling merchandise including bumper
stickers reading ‘Make Diggers Violent Again’ and ‘Taliban
Tears’, and T-shirts with ‘High Velocity Atrocities’.
One video, which included a mock advisory warning normally
used on ABC broadcasts, featured a mash-up of aerial footage of people being
killed by missiles, gun fire and drone strikes, while rap music played in the
background.
The ABC reported the account has been pulled down and put
back up a number of times. It reportedly caused significant concern among
senior ADF officers. CA Burr issued a statement on 3 September 2020:
Army has commenced
investigations into these allegations and into the content on this account.
Such behaviour does not align with Army values… I want to assure the
Australian public that if these allegations are substantiated through our
investigations, those at fault will be held accountable. This account has now
been closed.
The ABC reported DoD stated that Defence personnel found
to be associated with extremist ideologies will be investigated and may face
administrative sanctions.
DoD said it was not appropriate to discuss whether the
State Sanctioned Violence Instagram account was linked to an alleged threat
made against Justice Brereton's family (see above), as New South Wales police
are still investigating the incident.
|
D Oakes and J Story Carter, ‘Australian
special forces Instagram account mocks war crime allegations, calls to
“Make Diggers Violent Again”’, ABC News (online),
3 September 2020
|
|
◊
24 September 2020
|
Brereton announces that inquiry is in final
stages
The Inspector General of the Australian Defence Force
announced on Thursday that the inquiry into alleged breaches of the laws
of war by Australian soldiers in Afghanistan was ‘in its final
stages’ and the Inquiry did not intend to issue any further notices to
potentially affected persons.
Journalist report: Intense discussions are now
under way over the amount of evidence obtained by Justice Brereton that can
be made public or passed to the AFP without jeopardising future trials.
|
B Packham, ‘Immunity
could threaten war crimes trials,’ The Australian, 25
September 2020, p. 3.
IGADF, IGADF
Afghanistan Inquiry, DoD website.
|
|
◊
Date unknown, early October 2020
|
CA emails whole Army re Brereton Inquiry
Journalists report: CA, Lieutenant General Richard
Burr, has sent an internal email to all army officers, soldiers and employees
noting that allegations of war crimes are extremely serious and deeply
troubling and at odds with ‘who we aspire to be’.
CA explained he had not yet seen the Brereton inquiry
report because the IGADF inquiry is independent from the ADF chain of
command. CA therefore does not yet know the character and scale of the
actions that will be required. He vowed to act on the findings when they are
presented to CDF. He told Army that:
We all have a role to build on
the actions we have already taken to address shortcomings that our social
research programs and reforms have identified.
|
N McKenzie and C Masters ‘“Extremely
serious": Chief of Army prepares ground for war crimes report’,
The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 October 2020.
B Packham, ‘Special
forces get training in ethics,’ The Australian, 4 October
2020, p. 3.
|
|
◊
Date unknown, 2015–2020
|
Restructuring of SOCOMD
Journalist report: SOCOMD has been restructured to
position it to implement the findings of the Brereton Report. ADF commanders
have been working to rectify ‘catastrophic cultural and professional
shortfalls’ within SOCOMD and ‘corrosive’ friction between
the SAS and the commandos.
Under the pressure of 20 intense rotations in Afghanistan
over 11 years, the SF had become isolated from the rest of the army. It has now
been reintegrated within the broader army structure and the command embraced
significant organisation, cultural and capability reforms. CA Burr is quoted
as saying:
The leadership, structures and
plans are now in place to assure the momentum of this substantial cultural
and professional transformation.
Reportedly, the natural flow of new personnel through the
ADF means that 80% of those now serving in the SAS had not deployed to
Afghanistan in a SOTG.
|
B Nicholson, ‘Australian
Army rebuilding special forces culture ahead of Afghanistan war crimes report’,
op. cit.
|
|
◊
Date unknown,
Likely late 2020
|
New ethics courses for SF
Journalist report: The ADF has introduced a special
forces military ethics course aimed at strengthening the ability of SF
soldiers to make values-based decisions under immense pressure. The ‘Special
Operations — Live Better’ initiative encourages the
nation’s most elite soldiers to focus on all aspects of their lives,
including ‘cognitive, social, spiritual and physical
performance’.
The course was developed by the University of NSW, the
Australian Graduate School of Management and King’s College London
University.
|
B Packham, ‘Special
forces get training in ethics,’ The Australian, 4 October
2020, p. 3.
|
|
◊
Date unknown,
Likely October 2020
|
ADF reform ahead of the Brereton Report
CDF has unveiled a new set of values to apply to the whole
ADF emphasising ‘service, courage, respect, integrity and
excellence’. The new values are listed on the websites of each of the
services.
CA has introduced an army-wide Ethics Enhancement Plan n
to help soldiers ‘understand ethical decision-making in chaotic,
uncertain and violent situations that typify conflict, but are applicable
every day’.
A new Defence Special Operations Training and Education
Centre and improvements to SF management and governance have also been put in
place to deal with ethics and discipline problems that came to a head during
the Afghanistan war.
Further reforms to the SAS and Commando units are
expected. Potentially including the introduction of a combined SF training
course, which SAS members and veterans are opposed to because theirs is
reputedly the toughest. The 2020 SAS selection round is reportedly under way
this month, but it could be the last one in its current form.
|
B Packham, ‘Special
forces get training in ethics,’ The Australian, 4 October
2020, p. 3.
There were no relevant media releases on the DoD website
as at 29 October 2020 and the report could not be confirmed.
|
|
|
Anticipated content of Brereton Report
Journalist report: Masters and McKenzie report insiders
with knowledge of the Brereton report say the Brereton report has confirmed
many of the key findings of the 2016 Crompvoets report. Multiple sources say
Justice Brereton's findings will identify a small group of special forces
soldiers as responsible for murders and make war crimes referrals to the
Australian Federal Police.
The Brereton report is expected to expose:
- a rogue group of SAS soldiers, variously consisting of four to
five men, executed multiple bound or defenceless prisoners
- a small number of Commandos and SAS soldiers executed prisoners
believing more senior soldiers had given tacit support for unlawful killings
- poor leadership and oversight, with some officers blind to
warning signs that pointed to a collapse in basic morality among small
soldier cliques.
Packham suggests the Brereton report will focus on 8–10
serious crimes identified in interviews with about 330 witnesses.
McKenzie and Masters report their sources said they did
not believe senior or mid-level officers had direct knowledge of war crimes.
The evidence suggests small cliques of soldiers with relatively low ranks
either participated in or witnessed war crimes but covered them up from the
chain of command.
Masters and McKenzie suggest the Brereton report is likely
to remain largely classified except for a redacted public summary of key
findings.
|
N McKenzie and C Masters, ‘"Collapse
in morality" behind SAS war crimes’, The Sydney Morning
Herald, 26 September 2020, pp. 1, 4.
N McKenzie and C
Masters ‘“Blood
lust, killings, cover-ups”: Report describes Australia's “Abu
Ghraib” moment’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 October
2020.
B Packham, ‘Special
forces get training in ethics,’ The Australian, 4 October
2020, p. 3.
|
|
◊
6 November 2020 |
Chief of the Defence Force General Angus Campbell
received the Afghanistan Inquiry report from the IGADF.
|
A Campbell (CDF), ‘Statement
- IGADF Afghanistan Inquiry report’, media release, 6 November
2020.
|
For copyright reasons some linked items are only available to members of Parliament.
In essence, you are free to copy and communicate this work in its current form for all non-commercial purposes, as long as you attribute the work to the author and abide by the other licence terms. The work cannot be adapted or modified in any way. Content from this publication should be attributed in the following way: Author(s), Title of publication, Series Name and No, Publisher, Date.
To the extent that copyright subsists in third party quotes it remains with the original owner and permission may be required to reuse the material.
This work has been prepared to support the work of the Australian Parliament using information available at the time of production. The views expressed do not reflect an official position of the Parliamentary Library, nor do they constitute professional legal opinion.
Any concerns or complaints should be directed to the Parliamentary Librarian. Parliamentary Library staff are available to discuss the contents of publications with Senators and Members and their staff. To access this service, clients may contact the author or the Library‘s Central Enquiry Point for referral.