Stephen Fallon, Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Security
Key issue
When Defence Minister Peter Dutton announced the establishment of Australia’s Defence Space Command in January 2022, not all commentators took it seriously. However, space is recognised as a warfighting domain. Australia’s decision to establish the Defence Space Command, which was officially stood-up in March 2022, follows the founding of similar organisations in the US, UK, Russia and China.
Space has been a contested domain since the former Soviet Union’s launch of the world’s first artificial satellite, Sputnik I, in 1957. However, the crucial role of military enabling satellites providing surveillance, navigation and communication capabilities, and the deployment of offensive and defensive space systems, has the potential to escalate conflict in the space domain with potentially ruinous consequences.
Space as a military domain
The use of space for military purposes is not a new
phenomenon. The US Air Force launched
the first communications satellite in 1958 (p. 1), which President
Eisenhower used to present a Christmas
message of good will and peace to the world. Satellite technology swiftly
advanced, with the Corona
photo-reconnaissance program providing imagery intelligence from 1960 to
1972. Today the world uses global navigation systems, such as GPS, for military
and civilian activities.
Modern military operations, which involve a
coordinated use of multi-domain capabilities, rely on the use of space-based
technology. Satellites, for example, provide communications and intelligence
capabilities integral to the ability of militaries to find, fix, track, target,
engage and assess. In recent wars against insurgents and Islamist
terrorists in the Middle East, allied forces have enjoyed complete dominance in
the space domain, affording them a significant edge.
The elevation of space as a military domain was
recently acknowledged by the Morrison Government in opening the Australian
Defence Space Command in March 2022. The then Defence Minister Peter
Dutton portrayed the new command as responding to aggressive steps taken by countries
such as China and Russia. He argued that greater Australian space capabilities
would improve the country’s self-reliance and make it a better ally.
The then Shadow Defence Minister, Brendan O’Connor, welcomed the establishment of the Defence Space Command,
noting that the ‘increase in hypersonic missile activity, grey zone activities
and targeting of satellites and space systems and networks has hastened the
need for capabilities in this area’ and that investing in this area will
support Australia’s defence relationships with allies and partners.
As both politicians suggested, as great-power
competition increases, the probability of fighting a peer or near-peer adversary
grows and the threat posed by potential adversaries to Western space-based capabilities
is a growing concern. Countries recognise that militaries depend on the use of
space capabilities to collect and disseminate information rapidly. They are therefore
developing, testing and deploying counterspace capabilities designed to
constrain each other’s freedom of manoeuvre in space in a conflict.
This not only threatens the West’s ability to
prevail in conflict, but also threatens the modern way of life, which depends
on the use of satellites for a variety of everyday, non-military tasks.
Counterspace capabilities
Counterspace capabilities take a variety of forms. Kinetic
weapons are designed to physically damage or destroy a space capability, while
non-kinetic counterspace systems attempt to affect satellites or ground systems
without making physical contact. The Center for Strategic & International
Studies’ (CSIS) 2022
Space threat assessment provides a useful summary of these capabilities
(pp. 3–5):
- Kinetic physical counterspace weapons attempt
to strike directly or detonate close to a satellite or ground station. They
come in three main forms: (1) Direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons,
which are launched from earth to strike a satellite in orbit. (2) Co-orbital ASAT
weapons are placed in orbit then manoeuvred to their target when required. (3) Ground
station attacks are targeted against Earth-based sites controlling satellites or
the communication of satellite data to users.
- Non-kinetic physical counterspace weapons target satellite or ground systems without physically touching them.
For example, lasers can be used to temporarily or permanently blind sensors on
satellites or cause them to overheat. High-powered microwave (HPM) weapons can disrupt
satellite electronics or cause permanent damage to circuits and processors, while
a nuclear detonation in space can cause an electromagnetic pulse that would
affect satellites. Lasers and HPM weapons can be operated from a variety of
platforms, including land, sea, air and space-based platforms. It is worth
noting here that the Outer
Space Treaty Article IV prohibits the use of nuclear weapons in space.
- Electronic counterspace weapons target
the electromagnetic spectrum that space systems use to transmit and receive
data. ‘Uplink jammers’ interfere with signals travelling from Earth to a
satellite, such as signals that control the satellite, while ‘downlink jammers’
jam the signal from the satellite to Earth-based users. A ‘spoofer’ can be used
to introduce false information into data streams or even issue false commands
to a satellite. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a UK defence think-tank,
observes that jamming is generally
neither difficult nor costly.
- Cyberoperations against satellites can monitor
data traffic patterns, intercept data, or insert false or corrupted data. Such
operations can target a number of nodes in the system: satellites, ground
stations or end-user equipment.
Writing from an American perspective, the 2020 US Defense
space strategy warned:
China and Russia present the greatest strategic threat due to
their development, testing, and deployment of counterspace capabilities and
their associated military doctrine for employment in conflict extending to
space. China and Russia each have weaponized space as a means to reduce U.S.
and allied military effectiveness and challenge our freedom of operation in
space (p. 1).
The US Defense
Intelligence Agency’s 2022 unclassified
report on challenges to security in space assessed that China and Russia grew
their in-orbit assets by
approximately 70% (combined) between 2019 and 2021. The CSIS
report also corroborates these
assessments, describing China and Russia as among the most sophisticated actors
in space operations, while India, which aspires to great-power status, is also
making significant strides towards becoming a space power. However, the US is still
considered to be the pre-eminent space power. Competition between these powers
is driving the development of capabilities that create the potential for
miscalculation and destructive military operations that threaten the ability of
all nations to access space, as discussed later in this paper.
United States
In its 2022
global counterspace capabilities study, the Secure World Foundation judged that the US ‘currently has the most advanced military space capabilities
in the world’ (p. 01-01). According to the foundation:
… the United States fields one acknowledged
counterspace system that uses electronic warfare capabilities to interfere with
satellite signals, but it also has multiple other operational systems that
could be used in counterspace roles. There is evidence to suggest a robust
debate is underway, largely behind closed doors, on whether the United States
should develop new counterspace capabilities, both to counter or deter an adversary
from attacking U.S. assets in space and to deny an adversary their own space
capabilities in the event of a future conflict. The impetus for this debate is
renewed Russian and Chinese counterspace development and the recent conclusion
that the United States is engaged in great power competition with Russia and
China [p. 01-01].
Among these systems that could be used in a
counterspace role, according to the foundation, are technologies to approach
and rendezvous with spacecraft, which would allow the US to develop a
co-orbital capability quickly if it chose to do so (p. 01-01). While the US has
not acknowledged a direct-ascent ASAT capability, it does have missile
capabilities that have been demonstrated in an ASAT role (p. 01-10).
The US also has non-kinetic options in the form of
electronic warfare systems:
… the Counter Communications System (CCS),
which can be deployed globally to provide uplink jamming capability against geostationary
communications satellites. It is working on Meadowlands, an updated version of
the CCS system, which is intended to be used in an offensive capacity against
satellite communications [p. 01-17].
The US has also conducted extensive research on the
use of ground-based high-energy lasers for counterspace purposes and it
possesses low-power laser systems that can dazzle and possibly blind imaging
satellites. However, there is no evidence, according to the foundation, that the
US has a space-based directed energy weapon (DEW), or laser, capability (p.
01-21).
In terms of US cyber capabilities, the
International Institute for Strategic Studies has identified the US as a tier
1 cyber power with a capacity for ‘offensive cyber operations [that] is
probably more developed than that of any other country’, suggesting that the US
is probably at least as capable as any other nation of using cyberoperations in
a counterspace role.
China
CSIS assesses that China
has a ‘robust arsenal of space and counterspace capabilities’ (p. 10). Perhaps most notably, this was
demonstrated in 2007 when China used a
direct-ascent ASAT weapon
to destroy one of its own satellites, creating a dangerous debris field.
Furthermore, China has demonstrated the ability to rendezvous with other
satellites in orbit, which, while not an official counterspace weapon
demonstration, nevertheless proves that China has the experience and knowledge
required to operate co-orbital counterspace weapons (p. 10).
CSIS also observes that
China has a growing list of jamming and spoofing capabilities that can be used
against space and non-space signals. On cyber, it acknowledges that little is
known about China’s counterspace cyber capabilities; however, pointing to its
cyber capabilities in other domains, it assesses that China has a useful
foundation that could be directed towards counterspace operations (p. 10).
The Secure World
Foundation’s 2022
Global counterspace capabilities report agrees with CSIS’s conclusions, noting that there ‘is
strong evidence indicating that China has a sustained effort to develop a broad
range of counterspace capabilities’ (p. xvii), including ASAT weapons and
electronic warfare counterspace capabilities targeting navigations systems,
such as GPS, and satellite communications. It also concludes that China is
likely building directed energy weapons (DEW) for counterspace purposes. DEW
capabilities have been pursued by China since the 1960s, though evidence about
Chinese capability in this field is scarce. However, the report observes that a
December 2013 article in a Chinese scientific journal stated that a successful
laser blinding test had been carried out in 2005 against a satellite at an altitude
of 600 km (p. 03-18).
Russia
Russia has a comprehensive
suite
of counterspace weapons,
according to CSIS (p. 13). It conducted
an ASAT test on 15 November 2021,
destroying one of its own satellites. This test was
criticised because it
created a significant field of debris and endangered the crew on the
International Space Station. Russia also recently demonstrated its ability to jam
satellite communications and GPS signals in conflict areas. RUSI highlighted,
for example, that satellite communications providers
are experiencing
offensive cyberoperations and GPS signals above Ukraine have been jammed. The US has blamed
Russia for the latter issue,
while the former is likely also, at least partly, due to Russian action – as
RUSI highlights, Russian military doctrine prioritises ‘information dominance’.
Of note, CSIS reports that
a recent focus of Russia’s efforts appears to be the
collection of intelligence via satellites designed to capture communications and detect
ground-based objects (p. 13). It does not appear to regularly use cyber means
to target space systems, though CSIS highlights that Russia is capable of doing
so (p. 13).
The Secure World
Foundation supports
the CSIS analysis. It also
expands on it, observing that a resurgence in Russian rendezvous and proximity
operations (RPO) – basically, positioning one space object close to another –
is raising concerns that Russia is developing new co-orbital anti-satellite
capabilities. It appears to be putting craft into orbit that are capable of
manoeuvring to approach other objects in space. In one instance, for example, a
Russian payload, identified as Cosmos 2504, positioned itself to move within 2 km
of a piece of Chinese space debris created by China’s 2007 ASAT test in what
the Secure World Foundation speculates was a mission that may have been seeking
intelligence on the Chinese direct-ascent ASAT program (p. 02-07).
India
While it lags behind the US, China and Russia as a
spacefaring nation, India is seeking to progress in this domain, driven
by a combination of a desire to build India’s prestige, capture business
opportunities and advance its national security (pp. 7–10). In the security
sphere, it has been investing heavily in
military intelligence satellites and focusing on its contested border with
China (p. 15).
India tested its ASAT capability in 2019,
destroying an Indian satellite. According to the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, India took steps to limit the orbital life of the debris
created by the test, which
was aimed at deterring China. From a counterspace perspective, CSIS
assesses that although it has demonstrated its direct-ascent ASAT capability, there
is no public evidence that confirms India possesses non-kinetic
counterspace capabilities – it is unclear whether India used electronic warfare
and cyberoperations to target space systems (p. 15).
Australia in the space
domain
The establishment of the Defence Space Command brings
together members of Air Force, Army, Navy and the Australian Public Service
under an integrated headquarters reporting to the Chief of Air Force. It aims to drive
space priorities in Australia and with allies and partners, create a cohort
of trained specialists and conduct strategic planning.
While Australia is in the early stages of
developing sovereign space capabilities, it is able to leverage its alliance
with the US to obtain significant benefits, including, for example,
intelligence derived from US space capabilities. Australia is also
collaborating with the US on its Space Surveillance Telescope, operated by the US Space
Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center and located in Western Australia,
which will improve space domain awareness available to Australia, the US, and allies.
Australia’s
Defence space strategy acknowledges that Defence has limited
sovereign space capabilities, forcing it to rely on the US, other international
partners and commercial entities. As a consequence, Australia is investing
significant sums to improve its self-reliance. The strategy highlights that the
2020
Defence strategic update includes ‘over AUD $17 billion investment in
space capabilities to 2036’ aimed at delivering ‘a mix of sovereign and
collaborative systems to Defence including Positioning, Navigation and Timing,
Satellite Communications, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, and
Space Domain Awareness’ (p. 13). In particular, the strategy notes the
importance of ‘resilience, survivability and the ability to continue operating
under gradual degradation of national and allied space capabilities’ (p. 13).
The Defence
strategic update also emphasises the importance of investing in space
situational awareness, including sensors and tracking systems and states that
Defence will continue to work with government agencies and industry to advance
its space capabilities (p. 39).
Elements of the strategy appear to be in train. For
example, a February 2022 media report observed that the Morrison Government had
issued a tender for a contract to deliver at least 2 and as many as 4 military
communication satellites worth $4 billion. The project scope includes ground
stations, launch and life-cycle costs. As the report notes, perhaps the biggest
challenge will not be procuring the equipment, but staffing it: building a
cohort with the appropriate skills to fully exploit the satellite constellation
will be a challenge.
Furthermore, according to Air Vice-Marshal
Catherine Roberts, Commander of Defence Space Command, Defence is currently developing
kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities to deal with adversary satellites
without creating risk debris fields. The Morrison Government was also investing
in developing
Australian-made satellites and was promoting cooperation
between Australia’s space industry and India.
On the need for resilience, survivability and the
ability to continue combat operations as space capabilities are degraded, Malcolm
Davis, an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, has argued that
Defence
should aim for a ‘high-low mix’, buying sophisticated satellites from
allies and complementing them with ‘small, many and cheap’ satellites, some of
which are available from Australian manufacturers. Ideally, Davis points out, Australia
requires a sovereign launch capability that can quickly reconstitute
satellite capabilities lost to enemy action, providing a resilient, survivable
constellation.
Risks presented by the
militarisation of space
As noted above, contemporary warfare depends upon
the use of space. This offers enormous advantages, facilitating high-speed,
time-sensitive military operations. However, it creates an environment in which
escalation is a significant risk.
For example, in a crisis between 2 great powers,
both of which rely on space capabilities to facilitate military operations, both
sides will possibly be motivated to attack their opponent’s space assets first.
As US Space Force deputy chief of operations Lt Gen. B Chance Saltzman has
stated, ‘We are seeing a shift to where the first strike advantages are
encountered in space … They’re the first mover advantage, whoever
can go first on the offense has an advantage’. An awareness of the
advantage offered to whoever strikes first will possibly create ‘use
it or lose it’ scenarios (p. 46), raising the risk of tension escalating
into conflict.
The ability to attack satellites without killing
adversary personnel may also lead to miscalculations that make conflict more
likely. For example, a belligerent might calculate that an attack on its adversary’s
satellites, which kills no one, is less
likely to prompt retaliation than an attack on a satellite ground station
operated by personnel. Similarly, the use of ‘soft-kill’ techniques, such as
using a laser to dazzle a satellite, might be considered by an attacker to be
less escalatory than destroying a satellite. However, the target of such attacks
may not appreciate the distinction and retaliate.
Perhaps of greatest concern is that nuclear
powers typically rely on satellites for ‘early warning of missile launches,
communications, geopositioning, navigation, and timing and synchronization of
NC3 [nuclear command, control, and communication] systems and networks’. Such
satellites also commonly serve tactical
and strategic, nuclear and conventional roles. If such satellites are
targeted, even in a non-nuclear confrontation, there is a risk that their user
will believe that the enemy is attempting to ‘blind’ them as a precursor to a
nuclear strike.
This would create another ‘use it or lose it’
scenario: would the targeted country wait and risk losing more control over its
nuclear forces, or would it feel compelled to escalate to the nuclear level
before its ability to do so, and to detect its opponent doing so, deteriorated
further as a result of possible future attacks? As the academic Sitki
Egeli observes, there would be a risk that ‘impending decisions will be
made on the basis of insufficient and potentially erroneous information, and
the climate will be ripe for unfounded presumptions and predispositions’. According
to Egeli, the US has already threatened to use nuclear weapons if its NC3 comes
under attack with non-nuclear weapons.
Finally, kinetic attacks on satellites risk
creating extremely
dangerous debris fields. CSIS has highlighted the consequences:
Russia’s latest direct-ascent anti-satellite
missile test unleashed a debris field of approximately 1,500 trackable pieces
when it destroyed Cosmos-1408, a defunct Soviet satellite. NASA reported that the
astronauts and cosmonauts aboard the International Space Station took emergency
measures as the station passed “through or near the cloud every 90 minutes” for
several hours. From this event alone, the risk of contributing to a Kessler
Syndrome event increased by five percent according to France. This is alarming
for all states, explains former NATO secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen,
because “even a fleck of paint can cause critical damage to infrastructure in
space” assuming it’s traveling at an average of 10 km per second.
According to the U.S. nonprofit Union of
Concerned Scientists, orbital debris in LEO—orbits with an altitude of 2,000
kilometers or less—can travel “30 times faster than a commercial jet aircraft.
At these speeds, pieces of debris larger than 1 cm (half an inch) can severely
damage or destroy a satellite, and it is not possible to shield effectively
against debris of this size.”
The Kessler Syndrome, named after former NASA
scientist Donald Kessler, describes a scenario in which a cascade of orbital
debris could potentially hinder humanity’s space ambitions and activities. Academic Wendy N Whitman Cobb
explains, the environmental
consequences of space warfare, highlighting that ‘Debris-creating conflicts
in space would likely lead to the environmental degradation of the near-earth
environment, potentially restricting use of some orbits if not making them
completely unusable’. Given that so much of modern life depends on the use of
space, this alone is cause for concern.
Space is contested, but it is also increasingly
congested, which adds to the risk of an extremely damaging Kessler Syndrome
event. According to The Conversation, there were 7,941
satellites orbiting Earth as of 16 September 2021. This number is rapidly
growing, with 1,400
new satellites launched between 1 January and 16 September 2021.
This is largely a result of the ‘democratisation
of space’. Access to space is no longer restricted to the wealthiest and
most technologically advanced countries. Instead, ‘[l]arge space agencies,
multimillion dollar budgets, and big satellite missions have given way to
private companies, universities, and research centers, smaller budgets, and
small satellites’. This has broadened access to space-based capabilities. As an
illustration, open-source researchers are now able to obtain access to commercial
satellite imagery, which they have used to identify
military developments. This has led CSIS to conclude that the
democratisation of space ‘and commercialization of satellite images are quickly
becoming creative tools to affect foreign policy in ways that, just
a few decades ago, were next to impossible’.
Australian firms are exploiting these reduced
barriers to space. For example, Skycraft, a Canberra-based firm, designs, builds and operates satellite
constellations, while companies such as Southern Launch,
based in South Australia, offers launch services to put payloads into space.
This burgeoning industry offers the prospect of Australia building a degree of
sovereign space capability.
Further reading
Department of Defence (Defence), Australia’s Defence Space Strategy, (Canberra: Defence, 2022).
Todd Harrison et al., Space Threat Assessment 2022, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, April 2022).
Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson (eds), Global Counterspace Capabilities, (Washington, DC: Secure World Foundation, 2022).
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Challenges to Security in Space, (DIA, 2022).
Back to Parliamentary Library Briefing Book
For copyright reasons some linked items are only available to members of Parliament.
© Commonwealth of Australia
Creative Commons
With the exception of the Commonwealth Coat of Arms, and to the extent that copyright subsists in a third party, this publication, its logo and front page design are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Australia licence.