Context

As global warming continues to accelerate, it can act as a consequential ‘threat multiplier’ in varying locations. It is estimated that global average temperature increase will exceed 1.5 °C between the 2020s and early 2030s and 2 °C between the late 2030s and early 2070s, and rise to between 2.6 and 3.1 °C above pre-industrial levels this century. Highly populated and agriculturally rich coastal and low-lying areas in the Indo-Pacific and the Pacific small-island states (like Kiribati, Tuvalu, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands) are considered highly vulnerable to existential risk.

When climate impacts combine with other disasters a ‘polycrisis’ can occur, incorporating food and water insecurity; supply chain disruptions; economic slowdown; vector-borne diseases; biodiversity losses; and social and political instability. In 2025, the World Meteorological Organization reported that ‘long-lasting damage’ to marine ecosystems and economies from ocean heat and acidification poses an existential threat to entire island nations. Extreme weather events such as marine heatwaves, ocean anomalies, heavy rainfall, and severe drought are also intensifying. In a 3 °C warming scenario, Australia’s northern coast may become unliveable and trigger a national relocation strategy.  

For these reasons, the Australian Security Leaders Climate Group advocate that ‘climate change is an existential threat to nations and communities, especially those vulnerable to sea-level rise … [a]ddressing this challenge requires global cooperation rather than conflict’. Analysts from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute further contend that ‘climate change … is a systemic crisis that will transform the geopolitical landscape’.

Recently, leading bioscientists observed that ‘our increasing fossil fuel consumption and rising greenhouse gas emissions are driving us toward a climate catastrophe’. Current estimates suggest that US$6.2 trillion per year is needed to meet the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 °C limit; however, total global climate finance remains at US$1.3 trillion per year. Conversely, global fossil fuel subsidies are around US$7 trillion (7.1% of global GDP) meaning that roughly 5 times more is spent on practices that accelerate warming than on environmental preservation.

Pacific responses to climate change

Since the early 1990s (pp. 73–81), Pacific Island states among Small Island Developing States have been among the global leaders on climate action. This has included advocating for insurance schemes for climate-induced ‘damage and loss’ through the UN and at the International Court of Justice.

Pacific Island leaders have also issued landmark declarations (Boe in 2018 and Kainaki II in 2019) calling for ‘urgent’ and ‘transformational’ climate action. The Nadi Bay Declaration on Climate Crisis (2019) similarly called for halting new coal mining projects and phasing out coal power over the next decade, and criticised the use of ‘carryover credits’. They further advocated for preserving maritime zones from sea-level rise, and recognising the ‘Blue Continent’ as the PIC’s territorial zone.

At the 2022 Pacific Island Forum (PIF), PIC leaders declared a climate emergency. Inia Seruiratu, Fiji’s then defence minister and opposition leader, stated:

Machine guns, fighter jets, grey ships and green battalions are not our primary strategic concern. Waves are crashing at our doorsteps, winds are battering at our homes, we are being assaulted by this enemy from many angles.

The Solomon Islands High Commissioner to Australia, Robert Sisilo, has further noted:

Nothing is more central to the security and the economies of the Pacific than climate change. … [W]e must therefore take actions aimed at stopping fossil fuel expansion and exports, ceasing fossil fuel subsidies and expanding climate finance. I think our future here is on the line.

Vanuatu and other PIC supporters of a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty have called on Australia to reduce its fossil fuel exports and implement a broader phase-out. Australia remains among the world’s top 3 fossil fuel exporters, and the government’s recent approval of the North West Shelf gas project extension until 2070 has provoked further PIC consternation. PIC support is particularly important if Australia is to successfully co-host the Conference of the Parties to the UN Climate Convention (COP31) with them in 2026.

In May 2025, the PIF Secretariat (and other partners) released a Climate Security Assessment Guide. Substantiated by expert researchers, it identified 5 key climate security pathways for PICs: maritime economy; vital needs; disasters and resilience-erosion; mobility and territorial boundaries. Importantly, PICs emphasise that intergenerational knowledge, which integrates climate and human security, can also inform disaster response and resilience practices of their communities.

Australia’s role in climate security in the Pacific

Australia has traditionally considered the Pacific region to be an ‘arc of instability’, with PIC ties as a strategic priority. More recently, the Australian Government has also acknowledged ‘climate change as the greatest shared threat’ and accordingly supports various regional projects and programs integrating climate action into development assistance. These include:

• infrastructure and fisheries
• oceans and climate resilience
• governance-linked aid
• technical assistance (such as weather forecast products)
• direct humanitarian disaster relief
• policing, law enforcement and cyber security.

In 2022, the Australian Government focused on repairing PIC ties following concerns regarding previous climate policies. It renewed the Pacific aid strategy and rejoined the Green Climate Fund, increasing contributions to $3 billion over 5 years (including $1.3 billion to the Pacific). However, some advocates have suggested further increases to $4 billion annually are required.

In 2023–24, Australia and Tuvalu signed the Falepili Union treaty, which recognised Tuvalu’s sovereignty and statehood, and saw Australia open a new (though likely oversubscribed) visa category to Tuvaluans. Additionally, in 2025, the PIF leaders’ group endorsed the Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility to manage climate-induced displacement.

An evolving regional security landscape

In response to this environment, some Pacific Island states have sought partnerships to leverage closer security cooperation for climate security investments. A recent example is the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Cook Islands and China, which created friction due to concerns over potential South Pacific Chinese military bases.

China represents a large export market for PICs and source of development and infrastructure projects. PICs generally regard China ‘as a model, as an enabler, and as leverage’. Between 1992 and 2021, China-PIC trade reportedly grew from US$153 million to US$5.3 billion, before reaching $6.3 billion in 2024.

A May 2025 China-PIC Foreign Ministers Meeting produced a joint statement regarding various development assistance measures, including direct government budget transfers. Further commitments spanned climate action, disaster prevention/mitigation, and nuclear non-proliferation advocacy and climate leadership from advanced countries. However, debt distress and environmental risks from joint projects remained points of contention.

Regarding security partnerships, most PIF members rebuffed China’s May 2022 ‘Common Development Vision’, involving region-wide security and policing cooperation and a Free Trade Area. Even Solomon Islands and Kiribati (which switched recognition from Taipei to Beijing and have police cooperation agreements with China) remain unlikely to seek basing agreements with China.

For its part, China is likely to prioritise the northern Indian Ocean region through which 95% of its trade with the Middle East, Africa and Europe transits, rather than risk provoking regional insecurity for the limited strategic value of military bases in the South Pacific.

The global demand for critical minerals may see deep-sea mining (DSM) pose further security challenges in the resource-rich Pacific region, especially given insufficient regulation. However, as DSM for military purposes may run counter to UN Conventions, Australia could collaborate with Pacific countries in codifying norms and conduct.

Meanwhile, Australia reportedly remains the Pacific’s largest bilateral donor and biggest development partner, having spent $18.8 billion of a committed $20.6 billion. Additionally, as at 2020, PICs represented 18% of Australia’s total merchandise trade. However, regional climate impacts are imposing greater burdens on Australia’s defence and police forces through expanded humanitarian and community assistance. Such increased demands can mean potential compromises to other ‘core responsibilities’.

Future opportunities

If selected to co-host COP31 in 2026, Australia could gain substantial benefits from associated revenue and policy momentum. Other longer-term policy actions to enhance its climate credentials could include:

• significantly cutting emissions and reducing fossil fuel exports (e.g. through domestic production of green metals), while phasing out carbon-intensive industries
• stepping up climate mitigation efforts, adaptation and resilience measures with PICs (e.g. using multilateral networks and technologies)
• investigating resettlement options for climate-displaced PIC populations.

Pacific Island communities have called for a new and expanded understanding of security that encompasses human security, environmental security, and regional cooperation in addressing climate change and disasters as a priority to protect both their own, and the planet’s, future.

If Australia is to continue to broaden its strategic engagement in the Pacific, it may need to deepen its support for climate resilience within an expanded range of security concerns.

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