Issue
Within the early debates of the 48th Parliament, the longstanding
method of allocating federal parliamentarians’ staffing resources has been a high-profile
and contentious issue. It has already been the subject of a Private
Senators’ Bill and motions in August,
September,
October
and
November 2025 to establish a committee inquiry. This policy brief
investigates the methods used in similar Westminster parliaments (the United Kingdom
(UK), Canada and New Zealand), with a view to helping inform future debate
within the Australian context.
Key points
- Compared
with the UK, Canada and New Zealand, Australia is unique in having Prime
Ministerial discretion over all parliamentarians’ staffing decisions.
- These
other Westminster parliaments predominantly use parliamentary processes to
direct non-ministerial staffing allocations, either through committees or the
Speaker’s office.
- Across
the range of decision-making mechanisms, the UK’s Independent Parliamentary
Standards Authority stands alone as being outside both the executive and
parliament.
Context
In Australia, federal parliamentarians are allocated staff
across 2 categories: ‘electorate’ and ‘personal’ employees. Electorate
employees are described
as ‘help[ing] the parliamentarian carry out their parliamentary and electorate
responsibilities, but not responsibilities relating to party business’, while
personal employees are noted as essentially any additional staff. Significantly,
the Members
of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 (MoPS Act) (subsection
12(2)) provides the Prime Minister with discretion over these broad arrangements,
including how many staff are employed and the conditions of their employment.
For electorate employees, the Special Minister of State is delegated
power to make certain determinations, most recently through the Members of
Parliament (Staff) (Employment Arrangements) Determination 2025. Regarding
personal employees, there is no publicly available framework determining their
allocation. The Department of Finance publishes the number and composition of
personal employees 3 times a year, tabled
at the Senate
Finance and Public Administration Committee estimates hearings. The
Parliamentary Library published an analysis
on the history and evolution of personal employees in June 2024.
The United Kingdom
Allocating parliamentarians’ staff
The bicameral UK Parliament incorporates the House of
Commons and House of Lords. Since 2009 the Independent
Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA) has administered the Scheme
of MPs’ Staffing and Business Costs which determines the financial
resources allocated for House of Commons MPs staff. The Parliamentary Standards
Act 2009 established the IPSA and sets out its functions and
activities.
Prior to 2009 House
of Commons MPs voted on government motions which set out staffing
allocations. These motions were based on Members Estimate Committee recommendations.
However, the Review
Body on Senior Salaries, the House
of Commons Commission and the Committee
on Standards in Public Life also published periodic reviews and recommendations
regarding staffing. Notably, House of Lords members do not receive any resources
for staff as part of their entitlements.
Allocating staff resources to non-government
parties
In addition to MP staffing allocations, all non-government
parties receive further financial assistance which can fund additional staffing.
For the House of Commons this resourcing is known as ‘Short
Money’, named after Leader of the House Edward Short when it was established
on 20 March 1975. Short money is set through resolution
of the House
(pp. 1714–6) and since 2016 has a minimum and maximum level. On 27 November 1996,
the House of Lords established a parallel scheme known as ‘Cranborne
Money’.
The House
of Commons Members Estimate Committee provides oversight for Short Money
allocations, having been established under Standing
Order 152D. The Committee has a statutory membership of
the Speaker, Leader of the House of Commons, an MP nominated by the Leader of
the Opposition and 4 other MPs appointed by the House of Commons. Similarly,
the House
of Lords Commission (chaired by the Lord Speaker) has oversight over
Cranborne Money allocations, as part of broader Estimate and financial matters.
Both the House
of Commons and House
of Lords publish annual reports containing the amounts allocated to the
respective parties.
Allocating ministerial staff
The Constitutional
Reform and Governance Act 2010 (section 15) defines ministerial staff
(‘special advisers’) and requires prime ministerial approval for all their appointments.
The Act also mandates that the government produce an annual report regarding
use of special advisers. The Cabinet Office published
the most recent annual report on 17 July 2025, which included number
employed, total cost and full list of appointments. The Ministerial
Code (p. 22) provides additional detail, noting that the Prime
Minister may approve special advisers for Cabinet ministers and those ‘ministers
who regularly attend Cabinet’.
Canada
Allocating parliamentarians’ staff
The bicameral Canadian Parliament incorporates the House of
Commons and Senate. The Parliament
of Canada Act RSC, 1985 (section 50) established the
House of Commons Board of
Internal Economy, which allocates parliamentarians’ staff through the Members’ Allowances
and Services Manual. The Board comprises the Speaker
(as Chair), 2 Government-appointed Privy Councillors, the Leader of the
Opposition (or a delegate) and additional members required to ensure equal
Government and Opposition representation.
The Senate Standing
Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration administers the Senate
Administrative Rules, which allow senators’ to employ staff as part of
their prescribed office budget. The Committee has 15 members in
addition to the Senate leaders of the recognised parties represented within the
Senate (who serve as ex-officio members). In noting this composition, the
Auditor General’s 2015 report
on Senators’ Expenses highlighted that:
A structure in which individuals set
rules that apply to themselves, and have the authority to make final decisions
about how those rules are applied, may give rise to a perceived lack of
objectivity, as those individuals may be viewed as looking after their own
interests (para 42).
Allocating staff resources to non-government
parties
The House of Commons Members’ Allowances and Services
Manual also prescribes allowances for National Caucus Research Offices,
which recognised parties can use to employ additional staff. According to the Members
By-Law, a ‘recognized party’ requires 12 or more sitting parliamentarians
within the House of Commons, so parties outside this threshold are ineligible
for such funding. This most
recently impacted Canada’s National Democratic Party, which went from 24
MPs to 7 following the 2025 House of Commons election. The Bloc Quebecois Party
has also previously criticised this process, with the Speaker
rejecting their request
for additional staff.
In the Senate, the Administrative
Rules (section 5:04(6)) allow for political parties (and the
Independent Senators Group) to receive specified ‘research funds’, based on their
number of parliamentary members. For minor parties (of at least 5 members) this
funding is inclusive of allocations given to specific office holders (party
leader/whip), whereas the Government and Opposition receive their allocation on
top of specific office holder funding (see p. 6-2).
Allocating ministerial staff
The Public
Service Employment Act (section 128) provides the legislative basis for
ministers to employ staff. Additionally, the Policies
for Ministers’ Offices (section 3.2.1.) requires the Prime Minister to approve
all chief of staff appointments and any increases to the allocated staff
budget, which is funded via the Treasury Board.
The Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics
Commissioner reports the overall number of ministerial staff employed in its Quarterly
Statistical Reports and Annual
Reports. Additionally, the Government publishes
annual expenditure for each minister’s office, including specific staffing
costs. More broadly, ministerial staff are also recorded and searchable in the
Government’s Departmental
Listing database.
New Zealand
Allocating parliamentarians’ staff
In November 2025, the Parliament
Act 2025 came into force, as the enabling legislation for support
services to New Zealand’s unicameral House of Representatives. Paragraph 85(1)(d)
of the Act requires the Speaker to determine administrative and support
services (including staffing) to parliamentarians. This operates through the Speaker’s
Directions, which were most recently updated on 5 August 2025.
Under the Act (section 154), the Parliamentary
Service Commission advises the Speaker regarding administrative and support
services. The Commission incorporates representatives from each of the parliamentary
political parties, alongside the Speaker, who serves
as Chair (see sections 155, 158). Notably, the Act will disband the Appropriations
Review Committee, an external oversight mechanism which periodically
assessed support service issues, including staffing arrangements.
Parliamentarians are allocated ‘member funding’ to employ
staff, funded through appropriations
to the Parliamentary Service. The level of funding varies
depending on whether the parliamentarian is in the ministry, or has a standard
or ‘large’ constituency. The result is a ‘triangular’ employment agreement
between the parliamentarian, the employee and the Parliamentary Service.
Allocating staff resources to non-government
parties
The Speaker’s Directions (and related appropriations)
also provide for party funding resources which can be used for additional
staffing. This funding is available to all recognised parties but not
independent members. It is based on a ‘per caucus member’ methodology
and provides specific additional funding for party leadership.
Allocating ministerial staff
The Prime Minister – in their capacity as Minister
Responsible for Ministerial Services – has broad oversight of ministerial
staffing, which is funded
and administered
through the Department of Internal Affairs. The Department does not routinely
publish data regarding ministerial staff; however, an ‘Official Information
Act’ request
response from 6 March 2025 provides the most recent available information. Within
this, it notes that ministerial staff can include assigned or ‘roving’
departmental staff and portfolio private secretaries who are seconded from
external government agencies.
Conclusion
As the above analysis demonstrates, there is no standard
convention across Westminster parliaments for staffing allocations. Additionally,
these various methods are often contested, including within the Australian
context. From as early as December 1983, the Department of the Prime Minister
and Cabinet contended that ‘staff for MPs should be controlled by Parliament’
in its analysis
of broader public service reform (p. 159). Yet the MoPS Act charted a
different path, to be uniquely outside either parliamentary or independent
decision-making. While change to an independent model (such as the UK’s IPSA)
would be a significant shift, the independent Remuneration Tribunal previously
advised on staffing allocations prior to April 1984 (p. 225). The
establishment of the Independent Parliamentary
Expenses Authority (in 2017) and the Independent
Parliamentary Standards Commission (in 2024) further emphasise the
continued public focus on transparency and accountability in such matters.
Further reading
United Kingdom
- Independent
Parliamentary Standards Authority, Policy
Review: Funding for MPs’ staff, March 2020.
- Richard
Kelly, Short
Money: Funding for Opposition Parties, (London: House of Commons
Library, 29 July 2025).
- Lucinda
Maer and Ray McCaffrey, Special
Advisers, Briefing paper, no. 3813, (London: House of Commons Library, 5
March 2018).
- Rebecca
McKee, ‘The
Evolution of MPs’ Staffing Arrangements: How Did We Get Here?’, The
Constitution Unit (blog), 26 May 2022.
Canada
- Daniel
Dickin, ‘Organizing
the halls of power: federal parliamentary staffers and members of parliament’s offices’,
Canadian Parliamentary Review, Summer, (2016): 8–9.
- Alex
Smith, Ministerial
staff: Issues of Accountability and Ethics, Background paper, no. 2006-02-E,
(Canada: Library of Parliament,17 May 2012).
- R. Paul
Wilson, ‘A
profile of ministerial policy staff in the government of Canada’, Research
Note, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 48, no. 2, (June 2015):
455–471.
New Zealand