Bob Lowry
Consultant, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
29 June 1999
Contents
Major Issues
Summary
Introduction
The Political Impact on
Foreign Policy
Continuing Themes in Defence
Policy
TNI's Internal Security
Role
The TNI's Stance on East
Timor
Continuity of Policy on Irian
Jaya
Handling Pressures for Regional
Autonomy
The Armed Forces in
Politics
Australia-Indonesia Defence
Cooperation
Conclusion
Endnotes
Source: United States Central Intelligence
Agency, map no. (R02495)5-98
Major Issues
Summary
For several months after the fall of Suharto in
May 1998 the Indonesian armed forces particularly the army, police
and marines, withstood a severe buffeting as democratic forces
mobilised to demand total reform of the political, economic and
social structures of the state. This was followed by the outbreak
of communal violence across Indonesia as various communities vented
years of frustration at the failure of the central government to
satisfy regional aspirations and at the brutality of the armed
forces in suppressing regional dissent. The violence has been
prolonged as a consequence both of Indonesia having a caretaker
government whose legitimacy is contested and of a severely
depressed economy.
This was the second major shock that the
Indonesian armed forces (TNI)(1) had suffered in less than a year.
By then it was apparent that the Asian financial crisis which had
spread throughout Southeast Asia in the last quarter of 1997 had
become a severe economic depression. It was a depression that hurt
Indonesia more severely than most. Not only did this crisis produce
the social unrest that toppled the Suharto government but it also
crippled the capability and prospects of the TNI. Operations and
training had to be curtailed and plans for replacement and
upgrading of equipment were cancelled or deferred. Previously,
official Australian analysts had been pointing to the strategic
consequences of regional armed forces, including Indonesia's,
possessing capabilities which might soon rival Australia's.(2) Now,
the focus turned to concern that the TNI and police would be unable
to maintain order and prevent inter-communal violence.
The primary determinant of these issues is
essentially political. Meanwhile, the TNI and police, guided by
deep-seated conceptions of their role as the guardians of the
state, are struggling to keep their own cohesion. At the same time
they are trying to keep Indonesia together until the popular
elections of June and Presidential elections of November 1999 give
birth to the first democratically elected government since
1957.
There are no guarantees that the new government
will have general public acceptance or that it will prove equal to
the challenges it will confront. Even if it has general initial
public acceptance, and is reasonably competent, public expectations
might far exceed the capacity of any government, producing ongoing
social and political tensions, including regional independence
movements.
The TNI's position at the centre of Indonesian
politics is on the wain after 41 years of authoritarian rule.
However, it will continue to play a major role in Indonesia,
despite its battered image, for many years to come. It can make or
break the democratic transition. It can be part of the solution to
regional independence movements or part of the problem, as in the
Suharto era. More specifically, it can provide a firm base for East
Timor's transition to independence or TNI actions can destabilise
it for years to come.
One of the first acts of the new democratic
government is likely to be a total review of defence and security
policy and the organisation and administration of the armed forces.
The success of these measures will also be determined by the
ability of the new government to satisfy the expectations of a long
suppressed population. Failure to at least give some hope that
these aspirations will eventually be satisfied could lead to
another descent into authoritarianism.
Major changes in foreign and defence policy are
unlikely but foreign policy will be more politicised as a
democratic government responds to the predominantly Islamic nature
of Indonesian society. Any conflict in the Middle East, for
example, is likely to raise calls for Muslim solidarity with the
parties involved, including calls for the restriction of passage of
military vessels through the archipelagic straits. Any attempt to
restrict maritime passage by commercial or military vessels through
archipelagic waters and straits would be of concern to the
international community
Although the first signs of the recovery of the
Indonesian economy are becoming visible, it will be some time
before the TNI will be re-equipped and modernised. For the next few
years the main focus of the TNI will continue to be internal
security. However, other roles will get increasing priority as
Indonesia struggles to maintain control of its borders and its
maritime resources, such as the potential Natuna gas fields on the
fringes of waters in the South China Sea disputed with China. Given
Indonesia's resource limitations, the TNI is unlikely to increase
in size or capability for many years but there is scope for
significant qualitative improvement to better cope with the
challenges ahead.
Australia and Indonesia signed an Agreement on
Maintaining Security (AMS) in December 1995. The AMS is an oddity
of history that might be of more practical use as Indonesia makes
its transition to a relatively open political system and the East
Timor issue is settled. Australia has spent about $7 million
annually in the late 1990s on defence cooperation with Indonesia,
including military exercises, training, limited material and
logistic support, and reciprocal visits.
The fall of Suharto has opened up an opportunity
to exchange ideas on how the TNI might adapt to the new political
reality. These activities could prove valuable as the TNI adapts to
more open political structures and revamps its policy, strategy,
force structure, training and administration. However, if the East
Timor issue deteriorates, the clash of 'interests' versus 'values'
in Australia's cooperation with the TNI is likely to intensify.
Whatever disruptions may be caused by the transition process in
East Timor, the prospects for greater cooperation between the
forces of the two countries will be greatly increased as democracy
take hold in Indonesia.
Introduction
In 1998, the
Indonesian armed forces were subject to numerous pressures. The
Asian financial crisis brought severe depression and the consequent
social unrest toppled the Suharto government and crippled the
capability and prospects of the armed forces. Operations and
training had to be curtailed and plans for replacement and
upgrading of equipment were cancelled or deferred. For several
months after the fall of Suharto in May 1998 the Indonesian armed
forces, particularly the army, police and marines, withstood a
severe buffeting from democratic forces. This was followed by the
outbreak of communal violence across Indonesia. The violence has
been prolonged as a consequence of Indonesia having a caretaker
government whose legitimacy is contested, and a severely depressed
economy.
Under pressure to improve it public image, the
armed forces announced it own internal reform program, including
separation of the police from military command and the renaming of
the armed forces. The Indonesian Armed Forces, that is, the three
Services (TNI) and police (POLRI) were known collectively by the
abbreviation ABRI. On 1 April 1999 the police force was separated
from military command with the aim of reducing its military image
and refocussing on police functions. Consequently, the term ABRI
has been dropped and the armed forces are now known as the TNI.
This paper attempts to provide an overview of
the TNI, its role in current developments inside Indonesia and an
insight into its possible future. It begins by looking at the TNI's
characteristics as a conventional military force. This is placed in
context by a discussion of Indonesia's foreign and defence policies
to provide an insight into the TNI's strategic thinking. The impact
upon the TNI of recent economic events, and their consequences for
the development of the TNI's military capabilities is
discussed.
Since the 1950s the TNI has had a 'Dwi fungsi'
(dual function) within Indonesia. As well as its role as a military
service, the TNI has carried responsibility for the economic,
social and political development of Indonesia. It is this role
which has come under criticism most heavily over the last two years
and it is here that the TNI is under most pressure to change. This
paper studies these pressures and looks at their consequences in
areas such as the cohesion of the TNI, its role in East Timor and
other areas and its possible place in the future political
structure of Indonesia.
The paper also includes a brief discussion of
the defence links between Australia and Indonesia and the possible
effects upon them of the current period of turmoil.
The Political Impact on Foreign Policy
Indonesia's general 'independent and active'
foreign policy is unlikely to be affected by the change of regime
but substantive change in its application and form is probable. As
with other regional nations, Indonesia will continue to be jealous
of its sovereignty and the challenges posed by emerging regional
powers and globalising influences. Its policy options, however,
will be severely constrained by a weak economy and a fractious
population.
The re-emergence of Islam as a symbol and basis
of political mobilisation is likely to politicise foreign policy to
a greater extent than under Suharto. Any conflict in the Middle
East, for example, is likely to raise calls for Muslim solidarity
with the parties involved, including calls for the restriction of
passage of military vessels through the archipelagic straits.
This should not be seen as a manifestation of
Huntington's thesis of the 'clash of civilisations'. As with
Christianity, there are many cross currents within Indonesian Islam
and most clashes in the Middle East pit Moslems against Moslems.
Almost inevitably different Moslem streams and organisations will
take different approaches to such problems. The more radical
elements accuse the USA and the IMF of compelling Habibie to ban
the formation of an explicitly Islamic political party.(3) However,
Islam in Indonesia, with minor exceptions, is of a much diluted
form compared to that found in Iran or Afghanistan.
The sense of 'frustrated regional entitlement'
that characterised Indonesian foreign policy through to the 1980s
has been replaced by a more sober assessment of Indonesia's place
in the world.(4) There is a consciousness, especially after the
recent economic crash, that geographic size, a large population,
and great resource potential do not of themselves equal power and
influence. The opening of the economy to global influences and the
Indonesian liberalising of its political structures are also
weakening latent economic nationalism.
Nevertheless, democratic politics will ensure
that economic nationalist policies will continue to be promoted.
The establishment of Islamic Banks, the promotion of small and
medium enterprises, and continued faith in an antiquated network of
cooperatives are, in some circles, considered essential to promote
indigenous business (that is, non-Chinese business) and to provide
a buffer to international capital.
The Policy Adjustments in
Multilateralism and East Timor
The commitment to regionalism through ASEAN and
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) will remain strong but tempered by a
much sharper awareness of the weakness and limitations of these
organisations. The corollary of this will be continuing but muted
support for a USA presence in the region as a moderating influence
until the political tensions in Northeast Asia are resolved and the
political directions of the regions' emerging powers become
clearer. In particular, Indonesia has hosted a series of talks on
the South China Sea dispute between China and several Southeast
Asian claimants to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands with the
aim of promoting a peaceful resolution of those disputes.
Indonesia will probably continue its membership
of peripheral organisations like the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and
the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO) as a means of providing
leeway in relations with the dominant global powers and
institutions and globalising ideologies.
The UN might also become a more important forum
for the expression of Indonesian aspirations. Indonesia has staked
a claim to a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) and might seek to use UN forums to blunt the hegemonic
tendencies of the major powers and globalising forces. Beginning in
1957 Indonesia has contributed units and observers to several
United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa, Europe, the
Middle East and Asia. This included playing a central role, along
with Australia, in bringing the Cambodian elections to fruition in
1993.
Indonesia has an extant dispute with Malaysia
over the sovereignty of the islands of Ligitan and Sipadan off the
East Kalimantan border. After several failed attempts to settle the
dispute bilaterally, including some mutual close quarter shadowing
of naval vessels from the two countries patrolling the disputed
area, both countries have agreed to submit the dispute to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) for adjudication. Apart from
this dispute, Indonesia' borders are settled except for some
uncertainty in relation to the maritime boundary with China in the
South China Sea.
If East Timor opts for independence the land and
maritime borders of the new state will also absorb some diplomatic
effort. The fate of the Occussi Enclave,(5) and the maritime
boundaries between Indonesia and the new state might present some
difficulties but should be settled by diplomatic means. Indonesia's
promotion and ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC)
should assist in the process.
In summary, Indonesian foreign policy will be
influenced much more by domestic political developments than during
the Suharto era but such change is unlikely to produce a drastic
re-orientation.
Continuing Themes in Defence Policy
Fading memories still linger of the latter years
of President Sukarno's tumultuous era in the early 1960s when
Indonesia had acquired large quantities of Soviet Bloc military
equipment. That brief period of bluster and potentially threatening
military force, however, was an exception to the general pattern of
Indonesian defence policy before and since. Indonesian defence
policy has been defensive in nature. It has consistently recognised
the absence of an immediately menacing external threat and its own
geographic and economic vulnerabilities and weaknesses.(6)
Alliances with either side in the Cold War were
not practicable because of ideological cleavages in Indonesian
society. Hence the pursuit of an 'independent and active' foreign
policy and a complementary policy of self-reliance in defence,
although in effect it benefited from US presence in the region.
Self-reliance through conventional defence,
particularly naval and air forces, was not affordable so a policy
of 'total people's defence' was adopted under which the whole
population would be mobilised to ward off any external threat to
the sovereignty of the nation. There is little likelihood that this
general policy will change. Despite the technological advances of
the last half century, it is still a viable policy especially given
Indonesia's limited resources and its vast archipelagic estate.
Although Indonesia toyed with the idea of
nuclear weapons in the early 1960s, the Suharto regime did not
pursue that option. On the contrary, it became a firm advocate of
the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ). It has
also ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and several
other weapons limitation and control conventions.
Despite an emphasis on self-reliance, Indonesia
has also played a leading role in promoting the concept of
'regional resilience'. This is a region in which the individual
countries strive to achieve internal cohesion and unite to resist
incursions into regional affairs by outside powers. The facts of
geography mean that achieving this objective would provide
Indonesia with a strategic buffer to its north. ASEAN provides the
diplomatic expression of this concept and bi-lateral defence
cooperation, principally with Malaysia and Singapore, provides a
nascent basis for coordinated defence of the South China Sea
approaches.
Indonesia's Regional Defence
Relationships
The Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS)
signed between Indonesia and Australia in 1995 is the only defence
treaty Indonesia has. However, it has yet to be given any
operational relevance.
Indonesia also engages in defence cooperation
with a number of countries across the globe to obtain education and
training and to acquire and maintain equipment and systems. Many
TNI officers and other ranks have undergone education and training
overseas in a number of disciplines since the 1940s and foreign
military officers have been invited to participate in Indonesian
armed forces command and staff college courses since 1964. Training
and technical support teams have also been deployed to Indonesia
for a variety of projects by several countries on a regular basis.
Regular combined exercises, most on a small scale, are also
conducted in Indonesia by various countries.
Historically, Indonesia has focussed its
strategic outlook to the north. The virulent anti-communism of the
Suharto regime meant that it paid particular attention to
developments in China. The Cold War in East Asia began to thaw soon
after China began opening its market to capitalism in 1978.
Subsequently, doubts arose about USA commitment to the region
particularly after the announcement of its withdrawal from the
Philippines when questions were asked about who would fill the
supposed vacuum and what would China do with its growing wealth.
Increasing tensions over disputed islands in the South China Sea
also unsettled the region. Nevertheless, Indonesia has not assessed
that there is any immediate threat from China and has sought, since
unfreezing relations in 1989, to enjoin China to participate in
building a cooperative and peaceful regional community.
Nevertheless, China's size, it nuclear
capability, its potential to develop large military forces, its
uncompromising stance on its ocean frontiers and its domestic
political uncertainties combined with its potential for internal
chaos mean that Indonesia, along with the rest of the region, pays
close attention to developments there. None of this is likely to
change with Indonesia's transition to democracy.
Strategic Policy for Indonesian
Defence
From a strategic perspective the bulk of
Indonesia's population is in the western half of the archipelago.
Most of its economic wealth is also found there. Its main defence
and security concerns are centred on the South China Sea
approaches. And, being a medium regional power like Australia, it
has an interest in moulding a region dedicated to cooperative
relationships and a commitment to the peaceful resolution of
disputes.
Although Indonesia has no formal binding
alliances, it would seek the cooperation of regional countries and
global powers in the unlikely event that its sovereignty was
threatened. Cooperation with the countries of Southeast and Austral
Asia would be sought to deter aggression and multiply military
capability if conflict ensued. Having no nuclear capacity or
missile defences Indonesia might also seek the support of
sympathetic regional and global powers.
Should such efforts fail to stop hostile forces
reaching Indonesia, its military strategy is based on deterring
threats to its sovereignty by demonstrating that it has the
cohesion and determination to resist external aggression on a
sustained basis until the invader is worn down and withdraws or is
ejected by a counter offensive.
To achieve this it has developed a small
conventional military force including an embryonic air defence
system, naval fleet operations and mobile ground forces. They can
be grouped into joint task forces which can be deployed throughout
the archipelago at short notice to handle two trouble spots at
once. This force marks the borders and represents a visible public
declaration that Indonesia will not take lightly incursions on any
scale.
These forces could not sustain intense combat
operations against a major regional power for any length of time,
nor could they protect the whole archipelago. Consequently,
Indonesian defence against a major invasion relies on territorial
forces and coordinated conventional and guerrilla operations to
contain, wear down and evict invading forces. Despite the rhetoric
of self-sufficiency, continued access to external logistic supply
would be an essential element in the success of this strategy.
The likelihood of having to activate this
strategy is very low but it does provide a basis for defence
planning, organisation, doctrine, and training. In addition the
armed forces share routine responsibility with other state organs
for guarding the land, air and sea borders and protecting national
resources from unauthorised exploitation by Indonesian nationals
and foreigners.
In particular, the navy and air force are
responsible for surveillance of the vast reaches of Indonesia's
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and archipelagic waters and
coordinating the activities of the other agencies involved.
Organisation of the Indonesian
Armed Forces
The armed forces are organised on conventional
lines with a separate army, navy and air force under the
operational command of a commander-in-chief (C-in-C). The army
comprises 240 000 personnel organised into two major components,
central forces and territorial forces. The primary central forces
comprise of the Army Strategic Command (Kostrad) with two light
infantry divisions and supporting arms, and the Special Forces
command (Kopassus) with four operational groups, in all about 35
000 troops. Apart from centralised headquarters and agencies, most
of the remaining army forces are distributed between 11 territorial
commands covering the archipelago.
The navy comprises two operational fleets,
Western Fleet based in Jakarta and Eastern Fleet based in Surabaya.
Western Fleet covers the vital South China Sea approaches and the
Malacca and Sunda Straits. Eastern Fleet covers the Pacific Ocean
approaches and the Lombok/Macassar Straits and straits further
east. Each fleet also has several bases scattered throughout its
area of operations to support deployed units and units in
transit.
The air force comprises around twenty squadrons,
including six fighter squadrons. The fighter squadrons are deployed
to provide air defence of Java and the major approaches to Java. It
has virtually no strategic strike capability and very limited
maritime surveillance capacity. There are over 40 bases around the
country capable of supporting limited air operations as
necessary.
Plans are in progress to increase the number of
territorial commands (Kodam) from 10 to 17 with the aim of
intensifying the army's capacity to maintain internal security
across the archipelago.(7) There are also proposals to interpose
joint operational commands (that is, a single headquarters
commanding units of all services in a given operational area)
between the C-in-C and the existing primarily single service
commands (that is, army, navy and air force commands).(8) This
would allow the C-in-C to concentrate on strategic functions and
his interactions with government. Ideally, such changes should flow
from an overall government review of defence and security
arrangements by the new government rather than being implemented on
an ad hoc basis.
Pressures for Change
Some of the problems experienced since the fall
of Suharto stem from General Wiranto's decision to retain the
positions of both Minister for Defence and Security and C-in-C. He
has done this for political reasons, that is, to limit the scope
for President Habibie to impose policy on the military, to promote
and appoint senior officers, or to generally subordinate the TNI to
the presidency.(9) It also gives Wiranto the power base from which
to seek the presidential or vice presidential nomination in
November 1999 if other factors allow. Furthermore, it gives him the
independence to foil the UN process in East Timor if that is deemed
necessary.
Apart from the proposals mentioned above, the
general structure of the armed forces will probably remain largely
unchanged but comprehensive qualitative reforms are needed at all
levels. Some superficial changes have been made since May 1998. The
police were separated from the armed forces on 1 April 1999 and
placed under the Minister for Defence and Security pending the
election of a new government and their decision on administrative
arrangements for the police.
The social-political role has also been adjusted
by demanding that all armed forces personnel seconded to
non-military roles be retired from the service. The
'social-political staff' of armed forces headquarters was also
retitled 'territorial staff' but retained a social-political
sub-section to manage armed forces political representation in
parliament and in cabinet.
Some people have called for the abolition of the
army's territorial chain of command because it was the means by
which the armed forces suppressed the people in the past and that
its continued existence is a latent threat to a democratic
transition. There is some basis for these fears but other means of
constraining the latent political menace of the command
arrangements will have to be found if the territorial structure
remains appropriate to Indonesia's defence and security policy and
strategy.
These measures could include legislation to
define and restrict the military's role, separating the position of
minister and C-in-C, a major reduction in personnel deployed in
territorial commands and units, oversight of the intelligence
system, improvements in conditions of service, enforcement of
supervision of the role and functions of the territorial commands,
enforcement of restrictions on business activities by serving
personnel, and the impartial application of the law against all
offenders, including those from the military.
Limited Prospects for TNI's Capability
Development
The current organisation of the armed forces has
been outlined above. Prior to the fall of Suharto there was a 25
year plan for the development of armed forces. These included
expanding the army to 330 000 men and strengthening conventional
defences provided by the navy and air force. These plans have been
set back by the economic depression Indonesia has suffered and will
probably be reviewed by the new government.
The scale of the challenge can be glimpsed from
the fact that Indonesia's GNP before the economic crash was about
half that of Australia's but Indonesia has over ten times
Australia's population and a fraction of its infrastructure. Its
official defence budget was a little less than 10 per cent of the
government budget or less than one third of Australian's defence
budget. Although the armed forces were able to draw on other
official and unofficial sources of funding these were mainly
expended on personnel and operating costs rather than capital
equipment purchases.
The dollar value of the defence budget has also
collapsed causing the cancellation of the purchase of German
submarines and Russian fighters and helicopters. The TNI has also
cancelled contracts for the local production of French artillery
and all orders for transport and maritime patrol aircraft and
helicopters from the Indonesian aircraft manufacturer IPTN.
Although capital expenditure has been
drastically reduced from an already low level Indonesia will
proceed with the purchase of an additional squadron of Hawk
multi-role aircraft, bringing the total to 40. The squadron will be
based at Pontianak (West Kalimantan) and, along with the squadron
based at Pekan Baru (Sumatra), provide air defence, close air
support and maritime strike on the South China Sea approaches
including the Natuna Islands.
The navy is in the most desperate condition with
a fleet of ageing surface combatants and support vessels mostly
overdue for replacement. It is also left with a submarine force of
only two vessels after the cancellation of the order for five
German vessels. The navy is also responsible for coordinating, and
much of the conduct of, maritime surveillance but it is
inadequately equipped and funded for the task and poor conditions
of service detract from effective implementation.
Given the state of Indonesia's defence and
security challenges and the state of its armed forces there is
scope for a total review and some imaginative thinking on the whole
gamut of Indonesian defence and security from the highest levels of
policy down to conditions of service for the private soldier before
any further major capital expenditure is contemplated.
TNI's Internal Security
Role
Internal security has been the principal
employment of the armed forces since 1949, increasingly so since
1957 when martial law was declared and Indonesia descended into a
long period of authoritarian rule. Although regional revolts and
insurgencies were overcome or contained, the failure to address the
underlying political causes of those movements left a growing list
of grievances and frustration that erupted when Suharto was
deposed.
Compounding these grievances were the racial,
ethnic, religious and social cleavages that have bedevilled
Indonesian politics since the rise of nationalism early in the 20th
Century. In 1945, the founding fathers adopted the formula of a God
fearing but secular state which, with the promotion of Indonesian
nationalism, was designed to unite this diverse community.
Unfortunately, these policies were undone by other policies like
favouritism of the politically neutered Chinese in business, unfair
land acquisition for politically sensitive projects like
transmigration, golf courses, forestry and dam building, and the
exploitation of religion for political purposes, especially in
Suharto's later years.
The armed forces were both the agents of many of
these dysfunctional policies and the repressers when discontent
arose. It must be acknowledged that the armed forces became very
sophisticated at managing discontent with minimum force during the
Suharto era. Suharto's political adroitness and a prolonged period
of economic growth were also crucial factors in the regime's
longevity. The exceptions to this were on the periphery of the
state, particularly Aceh, Irian Jaya and East Timor, where
grievances were deeply entrenched and the brutality of the military
response only served to deepen the resentment of Jakarta.
John Haseman, a former US military attache to
Jakarta with several postings in Indonesia, has declared that:
'There is still no substitute to the territorial structure of the
army for effective local government in rural Indonesia. The
volatile Indonesian society needs the firm hand of the security
forces to maintain domestic stability both nationally and
locally.'(10) However, as mentioned above, some Indonesians have
called for the dismantling of the territorial command system
because its primary purpose has been to maintain authoritarian
rule.
Options for a New Stance in the Internal
Security Role
There is some truth in both arguments but much
of the volatility Haseman refers to has arisen from the failure to
develop legitimate political structures and norms and address the
political grievances and aspirations of the people. Moreover, no
amount of military rule, no matter how well intentioned, is a
substitute for responsive local and regional government within an
appropriate national structure.
The armed forces can provide a firm base on
which the democratic transition can take root, assuming that an
effective government emerges from the 1999 electoral process. It
also assumes that the creative and productive forces of the regions
are unlocked by genuine decentralisation of political authority and
appropriate economic incentives. These are sensitive matters in a
multi-ethnic empire with an understandable history of suspicion and
antipathy toward the central government and its regional agents.
Inappropriate actions by the military could easily foil reform
efforts.
The turmoil in Indonesia during the caretaker
period of the Habibie government and the prominent role of the
military in containing the violence is indicative of both years of
pent-up tensions and the absence of legitimate government in the
interregnum between the fall of Suharto in May 1998 and the
formation of democratically elected national and regional
governments at the end of 1999. This has put the military in the
difficult position of having to maintain internal security without,
in many cases, effective political leadership to formulate and
coordinate community responses to unrest and violence. Such
leadership is essential if military operations are to complement
the search for political solutions to such problems rather than
aggravate them as has often happened in the past.
If any progress is to be made, the military will
have to step back as the new government takes control and the
police are given the appropriate authority, organisation, doctrine,
training and conditions of service essential to their gaining the
respect of the public. The military might still be required to
assist the government and police in prescribed circumstances but
under the general direction of the civil authority.
The military's internal security doctrine is
well developed but its application often deviated from doctrine.
Correcting that shortcoming requires a review of doctrine, the
implementation of appropriate governmental and military oversight,
the effective application of civil and military law, appropriate
training, and appropriate conditions of service.
Even in the latter years of Suharto's reign the
military had been influenced by calls for respect for human rights
in the performance of its duties. Human rights considerations were
incorporated in some training programs and some local commanders
issued aide memoirs to guide their troops. However, without
appropriate political oversight and enforcement, infringements
continued. In the current environment, and probably even more so
under the new government, the military will need to pay greater
attention to this aspect of doctrine and training.
Current signs are not encouraging. The military
has shown contempt for the rule of law in its handling of the case
of politically motivated kidnappings involving the disappearance of
thirteen activists and the kidnapping of another nine in the last
months of the Suharto era. Lieutenant General Prabowo, Suharto's
son-in-law, and the officer responsible for many of these crimes,
was given an honourable discharge and told to remain overseas until
the dust had settled(11). Eleven of his subordinates were then
tried for the kidnapping offences and given light sentences(12) for
which they will undoubtedly be compensated later.
Some of the leniency shown towards Prabowo stems
from a fear that his more radical Islamic support base might have
caused trouble within and outside the armed forces had justice been
allowed to prevail. Prabowo had cultivated the more radical
elements of Islam who also backed Habibie's rise to power and
supported him against those elements of the reform movement which
sought to unseat Habibie in late 1998. Along with others, they
opposed calls for Habibie's replacement by a collective leadership
at the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) meeting held in
November 1998 and helped mobilise counter-demonstrations and
auxilary units to assist police protect the MPR session from
disruption by demonstrators demanding Habibie's dismissal.
A Prabowo trial might also have uncovered
dubious actions by other senior military officers and Suhartos
involvement in the case. This would have created difficulties for
the military's undertaking to preserve the honour and dignity of
Suharto and his family after he resigned. The case will be left to
haunt the new government along with the more general question of
what to do about past abuses of power.
Problems of Cohesion Within the
TNI
Discipline within the military has also
deteriorated as the economic crisis has lowered their standard of
living and welfare, and the intensity of employment has increased
with the rise in political unrest. In April 1999 the C-in-C's chief
of general staff said that some groups in society were trying to
weaken the military's cohesion and solidarity by destroying respect
for law, discipline, and good order among soldiers. He said
breaches of law, discipline and traffic regulations by servicemen,
the police and defence bureaucrats was still high and could affect
the achievement of the military's tasks.(13)
The dispersion of the military's loyalties
contributes to the problem of declining morale as reflected by the
decline in disciple. Although members of the armed forces cannot
vote they live in a very plural society where mono-loyalty to the
governing party and the figure of Suharto has disappeared overnight
leaving many disoriented. In these circumstances loyalty to family,
ethnic group and region can at times transcend their over-arching
duty to the armed forces as an instrument of the state. The
accusations of bias by some troops deployed to trouble spots around
the archipelago is indicative of this as is fighting among members
of different military units and between members of the armed forces
and the police(14).
Nevertheless, the military still maintains a
high level of cohesion relative to the rest of the nation and is
still capable of providing a firm base for the democratic
transition. But, could this base be used to bridle political reform
or even reassert military rule? The answer depends on the election
results and the inclinations and capacity of the new
government.
The TNI's Stance on East
Timor
From a strategic perspective it does not matter
whether the East Timorese vote for autonomy within Indonesia or for
independence in the de facto referendum being conducted under UN
auspices in August. With the demise of the communist threat, with
Indonesia's transition to democracy and, in the absence of any
military threat from Australia or Papua New Guinea, an independent
East Timor would be no loss to Indonesia.
A poor East Timor might pose non-military
security concerns but these are law and order problems which arise
from a host of other sources. One more source will not overwhelm
any neighbouring state. Moreover, an independent East Timor would
be forced by geography and economic reality to establish
comprehensive relations with its immediate neighbours.
Moreover, with the weight of Indonesia's
strategic interests being at the other end the archipelago why is
the Indonesian National Army (TNI) wasting its soldiers lives and
its limited resources on trying to keep a strategic, political and
economic backwater? Why is it defying its own government's
commitment to the letter and spirit of the UN process? And, why
does it enjoy independence from government direction in this
matter?
Although East Timor is a drain on the Indonesian
economy, individuals have benefited from exploiting its resources
and the contracts awarded for public works. George Aditjondro has
written of the land holdings and business interests of the Suharto
family, members of the East Timorese elite and past and present
members of the TNI leadership in East Timor.(15) He also asserts
that there are untapped oil resources in East Timor that the
Suhartos want to retain. Evidence of oil in East Timor has been
known for decades but there is no evidence that the resources are
prolific or that they are economically exploitable. Material
interests are a factor but not a deciding factor.
Military pride and an unwillingness to admit
defeat is a factor, especially when one of the military's doctrinal
slogans, inherited from its Japanese army antecedents, is that it
does not accept surrender, it does not give up. In some cases
strong bonds of comradeship have also grown up between TNI officers
and men who have served for long periods of time in the province
and their East Timorese comrades, subordinates and agents. Some
have also married local women further cementing these emotional
linkages.
Another factor is the continuing influence of
former President Suharto and the army officers whose reputations
will be diminished by a vote for independence in East Timor.
Suharto was reluctant to take East Timor by force but having done
so he was implacable in keeping it. He refused to accept
concessions or proposals for autonomy, even those suggested by his
son-in-law, Prabowo, a special forces officer who took a personal
interest in operations in the province. Ironically this issue
unites many formerly estranged parties in trying to foil the UN
process.
The Attitude of General Wiranto
General Wiranto has been deeply influenced by
the aura of Suharto and his way of thinking and problem solving.
Wiranto owes his worldly success not only to his own undoubted
abilities but also to the patronage of Suharto. Despite Suharto's
fall from power Wiranto still has culturally ingrained obligations
to him that continue to influence policy. These cultural
obligations are compounded by the legacy that authoritarian regimes
do not encourage independent conceptual thinking about fundamental
political questions by their military officers. With few
exceptions, the TNI's senior officers are still trapped in the
dogmatic formulas of the past.
It has also been suggested that the TNI does not
want to encourage a snow-balling of demands for independence that
might follow East Timor's independence. However, the Irianese and
the Acehnese would press their respective political demands
regardless of what happens in East Timor. They will certainly use
whatever political leverage they can, including that of East
Timorese independence when it comes, but the fate of these other
movements will not be determined by what happens in East Timor.
This argument carries little weight but has historically been
effective in dampening criticism from foreign governments.
Nevertheless, the combination of all the factors mentioned above
confounds the formulation of sensible policy by the TNI
leadership.
Wiranto has the freedom to ignore the
injunctions of President Habibie because of the way he came to
power in May last year. Habibie had never been a favourite of the
military, with some important exceptions. He owes his elevation to
the vice presidency to Suharto. When Suharto fell the military
agreed to Habibie's succession on the understanding that he would
not interfere in what the military considered its internal affairs.
In particular, Habibie does not have the political clout to dismiss
Wiranto or to curtail his authority by leaving him as Minister for
Defence and Security but appointing another officer to command the
armed forces.
Wiranto has been careful not to openly flout
government policy but actions on the ground in East Timor leave no
doubt about TNI policy. Some observers suggest that Wiranto has no
control over his subordinate commanders. But how can that be when
he personally appointed them in mid-1998 and has the authority to
dismiss them at will? Nevertheless, although a change of policy
would have to be carefully managed to neutralise the influence of
some senior officers who would oppose it and to preserve morale in
the army generally, most of the TNI would be glad to be done with
East Timor.
The fact that Wiranto has set the policy does
not mean that he authorises every act of violence undertaken but
the general strategic direction comes from Jakarta. The TNI
strategy indicates that they do not believe that they can win a
vote for autonomy without resort to intimidation. At some point
they will have to decide whether intimidation will secure the
desired result and let the vote go ahead; or accept the possibility
of a vote for independence; or drive the UN back to New York before
the vote is taken.
A rigged result or the foiling of UN process
will only lead to renewal of the insurgency and leave an
unnecessary legacy for the new Indonesian government to grapple
with. It is to be hoped that the TNI leadership will see the wisdom
of supporting the UN process before it is too late.
Continuity of Policy on Irian Jaya
Gaining the allegiance of the Irianese will be a
challenging endeavour for the new regime. Irianese society, like
that in neighbouring PNG, is highly fragmented and diverse
reflecting the provinces' size and difficult geography. Indonesia
has been able to play on this diversity to forestall or stunt the
creation of Irianese identity while trying to superimpose
Indonesian identity. A recent, hastily announced intention to
divide Irian into three provinces this year is also underpinned by
a desire to further fragment Irianese identity. With only two
million people it is doubtful that Irian needs more government,
despite its size.
What it does need is greater participation by
the Irianese in government and greater opportunities for them to
gain higher education and equality, if not priority, of employment
in Irian. Fears for security, low levels of education, and
patronage flowing to non-Irianese has kept Irianese participation
in government and state agencies low. The brutality and duplicity
of the armed forces in dealing with dissent has also left a legacy
of bitterness that will not be easily forgotten.
Although Indonesia might be convinced to let the
East Timorese determine their own fate they will not countenance
the same fate for the Irianese. Irian was part of the Netherlands
East Indies and so falls within the boundaries of Indonesia's
colonial legacy. The fact that it took twelve years for the Dutch
to relinquish sovereignty to Indonesia and that it entailed a
fraudulent face saving plebiscite, for the benefit of the Dutch,
does not diminish Indonesia's claim to Irian under international
law. Moreover, Indonesia would be very reluctant to forgo the
resource potential of Irian.
Consequently, although Irianese nationalism
might grow, Indonesia will vigorously resist calls for
independence. To avoid a more muscular insurgency the Indonesian
government will have to find ways of channelling Irianese
aspirations into building their own province for their own benefit
while at the same time offering them equality of access to the
privileges of membership of the wider nation. Critically, the
political leadership in conjunction with the military and police
will have to find ways of dealing with armed separatists in ways
which do not alienate the general population or close legitimate
channels of political expression.
Handling Pressures for Regional Autonomy
The success and speed of democratisation and
economic recovery will in large measure be determined by the way
regional autonomy is designed and implemented. It will also
determine whether separatist movements flourish or disappear.
Obviously, those people benefiting from centralisation will resist
such moves, including some within the military. Nevertheless, there
are genuine security concerns with establishing regional
autonomy.
A prime issue is to what level autonomy should
be delegated-to existing administrative divisions, that is,
province or district; or according to ethnicity, or geography. The
prime security concern is to avoid forming political entities which
might develop separatist ambitions. Consequently, Indonesia has
chosen to delegate autonomy to district level, of which there are
327, with supposedly limited coordinating functions being performed
by the 27 provincial governments. There are doubts about the
economic rationality of having such a large number of autonomous
units and whether Indonesia has the human and other resources to
make it work. Previous studies had examined the idea of reducing
the number of districts to about 60 but trying to restructure
provincial government at a time of political and economic
uncertainty would only add to the current turmoil.
If decentralisation to district level fails,
Indonesia will have to switch rapidly to some other form of
political and economic devolution if it is to avoid centrifugal
pressures. The police and military could come under extreme
pressure in the political foment which will accompany these
adjustments. Firm control from the centre combined with
responsiveness to local conditions will be essential to maintaining
control and respect for law and order during these turbulent times.
Consequently, the risk of the military using force against
political movements with possible violations of human rights will
continue.
The
Armed Forces in Politics
To use Harold Crouch's term, it was a 'disguised
coup' in 1966 which put Suharto in power and it was the armed
forces which kept him there until the very end.(16) To maintain the
support of the armed forces Suharto, among other measures,
allocated a percentage of seats in regional and national
parliaments to military officers. He also allowed them to occupy
civil posts from village chief to cabinet minister both as a means
of purchasing loyalty and to balance the power of the
bureaucracy.
Military participation in all aspects of
government, which came to be known as the dual function of the
armed forces (Dwi fungsi ABRI), grew out of dissatisfaction with
the inability of the governments of the 1950s to address
fundamental political questions due to the alleged priority
accorded to personal and sectoral interests over national
interests. Military participation was supposed to instil some
discipline and concern for national interest into the political
process and executive agencies. Implementation of the concept
sprouted under Sukarno and bloomed under Suharto.
Since Suharto's fall TNI participation in
national policy making and the placement of officers in executive
agencies has come under political pressure. The TNI allocation of
parliamentary seats has been retained for the coming parliamentary
term (1999-2004) but the percentage of seats in the national
parliament has been reduced from 15 to 8 per cent. This might still
provide the TNI with a decisive influence if, as expected, no one
party or combination of aligned parties wins an absolute
majority.
Shifting parliamentary coalitions need not
destabilise government in Indonesia's presidential system of
government. Consequently, the critical issue will be the
presidential elections in November following the parliamentary
elections of June. The president is elected by the Supreme
Consultative Assembly (MPR) which is a combination of the
parliament plus two hundred members elected/appointed on a regional
and functional basis, some according to proportions of votes won by
successful parties in the June elections and others as appointed
representatives of professional groups (farmers, professions, etc).
This arrangement allows scope for conservative forces to manipulate
the voting patterns of the additional two hundred members thus
subverting the majority established in the parliament and perhaps
giving the armed forces a decisive directed vote in the
presidential elections.
Retention of parliamentary seats by the armed
forces allows them some influence on the direction and pace of
democratic reforms but it also has some disadvantages. According to
doctrine the armed forces stand above all Indonesia's diverse
social, ideological, racial and ethnic cleavages. It thus declared
its neutrality in the June parliamentary elections. However, when
it comes to some issues in parliament, and, in particular, the
presidential elections it will have to declare its hand and this
will inevitably establish a pattern that will align the TNI with
certain political forces and undermine its non-partisan
proclamations.
It could also create a situation in which the
C-in-C, who is also an ex officio member of cabinet-unless the new
president changes the cabinet structure-could direct his faction to
lobby and vote against government legislation. Given the
president's prerogative to appoint and dismiss the C-in-C, the
armed forces faction could equally become a mere cipher of the
president. In either case the armed forces doctrinal position and
rationale for involvement in politics is undermined.
Options for the TNI's Political
Role
Amien Rais, leader of the Partai Amanat Nasional
(National Mandate Party) has suggested that the armed forces
faction could avoid this dilemma by giving up their voting rights.
This would allow their views to be represented in parliament,
giving the national perspective they fear many parties and
politicians lack, while allowing some distance from partisan
politics. This solution also has some dangers. It might, for
example, allow the armed forces to represent themselves as the only
true moral force in the nation above the fray of day-to-day
politics and provide some justification for a coup should
'authoritarian nostalgia' emerge in the wake of the elections and
the massive challenges the new government will face.
The TNI has reformed the system of seconding
officers and other ranks to government, the bureaucracy and
government business enterprises by giving incumbents the choice of
resigning or returning to the armed forces. It has also severed its
political direction of seconded personnel, and directed that in
future they will only be seconded in competition with appropriately
qualified civilians. It is too much to expect that nepotism will
disappear overnight but the measures adopted will gradually reduce
the influence of the TNI in non-military posts.
The compromises that will be needed in forming
the new government in late 1999 will give the military some scope
for bargaining but the military's political role will fade away;
the only question is how fast and under what conditions. General
Wiranto forecast the political debate to come when he said that
three extreme tendencies had to be prevented: the military
over-reaching its authority, the isolation of the military from the
people, and excessive civilian interference in the internal
management of the military.(17)
Australia-Indonesia Defence Cooperation
Australia and Indonesia signed an Agreement on
Maintaining Security (AMS) in December 1995. The AMS is an oddity
of history which might be of more practical use as Indonesia makes
its transition to a relatively open political system and the East
Timor issue is settled. Meanwhile, for Indonesia it is largely
irrelevant, while for Australia it provides a bureaucratic umbrella
for cooperation which would have proceeded regardless of whether
the AMS existed or not.(18)
Australia's Department of Defence (DOD) has
spent about $7 million annually in the late 1990s on defence
cooperation with Indonesia. Cooperation includes low level combined
exercises with all three services, training in Australia and
Indonesia, limited material and logistic support, and reciprocal
visits between senior officers and officials.
Training with the special forces has been
suspended because of political sensitivities and the scale of other
exercises reduced. There have been accusations, like those aired on
the Channel 9 Sunday program on 30 May 1999, that Special Air
Service Regiment's (SASR) training with their Indonesian
counterpart, Kopassus, included ambush techniques taught by
Falintil prisoners. By implication, counter-measures to these
techniques were then applied against Falintil (the military arm of
the Timorese independence movement) in East Timor. This assumes
that Kopassus could not have discovered such techniques for
themselves and that the SASR made a contribution to the development
of minor tactics applied by Kopassus in East Timor. Both
assumptions are questionable. Nevertheless, the moral question of
whether the SASR should have been involved in such training with a
unit renowned for it callousness in East Timor and other areas of
operations remains a matter for political judgment.
The fall of Suharto has opened up an opportunity
to exchange ideas on how the TNI might adapt to the new political
reality. In March 1999 senior officers and officials met in Jakarta
to explore the nature of conflict; relations between civil and
military institutions; roles that governments expect militaries to
play in promoting security; and reform and organisational change.
They also agreed to establish working groups on a number areas of
mutual interest. These activities could prove valuable as the TNI
adapts to more open political structures and revamps its policy,
strategy, force structure, training and administration.
However, if the East Timor issue deteriorates,
the clash of 'interests' versus 'values' in Australia's cooperation
with the TNI is likely to intensify. In the absence of other
pressing interests the government might have to accept a temporary
souring of relations with the TNI to force it to reconsider its
strategy in East Timor. If successful it would be in the long term
interests of all the parties concerned. Whatever disruptions may be
caused by the transition process in East Timor the prospects for
greater cooperation between the forces of the two countries will be
greatly increased should democracy take hold in Indonesia.
Conclusion
The TNI's position at the centre of Indonesian
politics is on the wain after 41 years of authoritarian rule. The
political structure is still in transition but the forthcoming
elections will probably produce a fledging democracy. It will take
some years to consolidate democratic institutions and norms and the
TNI could play an important role in maintaining national cohesion
during that time.
To be effective, however, the new government
will have to order a total review of defence policy and ensure the
subordination of the TNI to executive government at national and
lower levels. The success of these measures will also be determined
by the ability of the new government to satisfy the expectations of
a long suppressed population. Failure to at least give some hope
that these aspirations will eventually be satisfied could lead to
another descent into authoritarianism.
Major changes in foreign and defence policy are
unlikely but foreign policy will be more politicised. For the next
few years the main focus of the TNI will continue to be internal
security. However, other roles will get increasing priority as
Indonesia struggles to maintain control of is borders and its
maritime resources.
Given Indonesia's resource limitations, the TNI
is unlikely to increase in size or capability for many years but
there is scope for significant qualitative improvement to better
cope with the challenges ahead.
Endnotes
-
- The Indonesian Armed Forces, that is, the three Services (TNI)
and police (POLRI) were known collectively by the abbreviation ABRI
until 1 April 1999 when the police force was separated from
military command and the term ABRI was dropped.
- See, for instance, Department of Defence, Defending
Australia, Defence White Paper 1994, Canberra, 1984, p. 9ff
and Department of Defence, Australia's Strategic Policy,
Canberra 1997, p. 10.
- Ahmad Sumargono, 'Islam Yes, Partai Islam Yes!', Media
Dakwah, June 1998, p. 47.
- The best analysis of Indonesian foreign policy up to the early
1980s is provide by Michael Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign
Policy, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1983.
- East Timor is less than one quarter the size of Tasmania or
more than twice the size of Singapore. The Occussi enclave is a
small pocket of land in West Timor about 120 kilometres west of the
East Timor/West Timor border. Prior to 1975 it was part of
Portuguese Timor.
- Full coverage of Indonesian defence policy and strategy and its
armed forces can be found in Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of
Indonesia, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1996.
- 'Pemekaran 17 Kodam Pertimbangan Teritorial', Suara
Pembaruan, 22 May 1999.
- 'Mana Yang Efektif, 17 Kodam Atau 13 Kodam Plus 2
Kowilhan?, Suara Pembaruan, 24 March 1999.
- For a description of the power play between Habibie and Wiranto
in the months after May 1998 see Marcus Mietzner, 'From Suharto to
Habibie: the Indonesian Armed Forces and Political Islam during the
transition', in Geoff Forrester, Post-Suharto Indonesia:
Renewal or Chaos, Crawford House Publishing, Bathurst, 1999,
pp. 65-102.
- John Haseman, Southeast Asian Affairs 1999, Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1999, forthcoming.
- 'HOT NEWS: Prabowo Dipecat', Suara Pembaruan, 24
August 1998.
- 'Delapan Anggota Tim Mawar Naik Banding', Suara
Pembaruan, 7 April 1999.
- 'Kasum ABRI: Ada Yang Inginkan Anggota TNI Dan Polri Tidak
Kompak', Suara Pembaruan, 8 April 1998.
- 'Polisi Dikeroyok Puluhan Lelaki Berbadan Tegap', Suara
Pembaruan, 7 April 1999.
- George Aditjondro, Is Oil Thicker Than Blood? A Study
of Oil Companies Interests and Western Complicity in Indonesia's
Annexation of East Timor, Nova Science, 1999.
- Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia,
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1988, p. 179.
- 'Wiranto: Cegah Kewenangan Terlalu Jauh Bagi Militer',
Suara Pembaruan, 24 May 1999.
- Robert Lowry, Australia-Indonesia Security Cooperation: For
Better or Worse?, Working Paper No. 299, SDSC, ANU, 1996.