Dr Frank Frost and Dr Adam Cobb
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
24 May 1999
Contents
List of
Maps
Indonesia Administrative
Divisions
East Timor (pre 1975)
Major Terms/Acronyms
Major Issues Summary
Introduction
Indonesia and East Timor in
1999
President Habibie's Policy Change on East
Timor
The Armed Forces and East Timor
Indonesia and East Timor: Contending
Pressures
Conflict within East Timor
Conflict and Violence in 1999
Economic Conditions and Prospects
The 5 May 1999 Agreements on East
Timor
The United Nations in East Timor: Issues and
Prospects
I: Before the 8 August Ballot
II: After the 8 August Ballot
Australian Policy and Debate on
East Timor
The Australia-Indonesia Talks, 27 April 1999
Conclusion
Endnotes
Major
Terms/Acronyms
ABRI
|
Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia-Armed Forces of the
Republic of Indonesia
|
Apodeti
|
Timorese Popular Democratic Association
|
CNRT
|
National Council of the Timorese Resistance
|
Falintil
|
Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor
|
FPDK
|
Forum Persatuan, Demokrasi dan Keadilan-Forum for Unity,
Democracy and Justice
|
Fretilin
|
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
|
PAN
|
Partai Amanat Nasional-National Mandate Party
|
PDI-P
|
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan-Indonesian Democratic
Party of Struggle
|
SARET
|
Special Autonomous Region of East Timor
|
UDT
|
Timorese Democratic Union
|
UNAMET
|
United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor
|

Source: United States Central Intelligence
Agency Map no. (R02495) 5-98

Source: James Dunn, Timor: A People
Betrayed,Milton, 1983
Major Issues
Summary
East Timor has been an important issue for both
Indonesia and for Australia-Indonesia relations since 1975, when
the collapse of Portugal's willingness to continue colonial rule
(after the fall of the authoritarian Caetano regime in April 1974)
was followed by an attempted declaration of independence in East
Timor and then by invasion by Indonesia. Australia's interest in
East Timor has reflected the legacy of contacts during World War
Two (when Australian commandos operated against the Japanese with
assistance from many East Timorese), and controversy over the
manner of Indonesia's invasion, the deaths of five journalists
working for Australian media in October 1975, and ongoing
allegations of human rights and other abuses while East Timor has
been incorporated as a part of Indonesia.
After 23 years of incorporation into Indonesia,
the people of East Timor now have an opportunity to review the
status of their territory. Agreements signed on 5 May 1999 between
Indonesia, Portugal (the former colonial power) and the United
Nations provide for a ballot on 8 August on a proposal for
autonomy. If the autonomy proposal is rejected, the UN will assume
authority in the territory and independence could soon follow.
However a series of issues and problems in Indonesia and in East
Timor itself could endanger the prospects for a peaceful ballot and
a stable process of transition to either autonomy or
independence.
The paper begins by providing some brief
background to East Timor's current status and recent problems. The
'Dili massacre' in November 1991 brought renewed international
attention to East Timor and the widespread unpopularity of
Indonesian rule. The profound impact of the Asian financial crisis
on Indonesia from late 1997 and the end of the Soeharto regime in
May 1998 opened up new prospects for a review of East Timor's
status.
On 27 January 1999, the Indonesian government
led by President Habibie announced a revised official approach
which would now accept the possibility of independence if the East
Timorese people chose this path and their decision was endorsed by
the Indonesian parliament. However, this announcement has not
received full support either within civil or military circles.
Several prominent opposition figures have reservations about the
prospect of an independent East Timor and elements of the armed
forces oppose it.
Indonesian policy-makers face some complex
cross-pressures on the issue. For Indonesia, accepting the
potential for independence could improve the country's
international standing and save the considerable economic costs
which incorporation has entailed. However, there are also major
concerns that independence for East Timor could exacerbate regional
dissension in other parts of Indonesia. In addition, some powerful
individuals have some significant economic interests in the
territory which they fear they might have to forfeit. Pursuing a
clear policy approach will be difficult, especially during the
period of transition to a more democratic political system this
year.
Within East Timor, prospects for a review of the
territory's status have been clouded by an upsurge of violence. The
pro-independence groups have been challenged increasingly since
late 1998 by pro-integration militia groups, many evidently
fostered and supported by elements of the Indonesian armed forces.
An upsurge of violence in April and early May has caused major
concern. Economic conditions are also uncertain although if
stability can be regained medium term prospects may be more
favourable.
The paper provides a concise summary of the 5
May agreements and the proposal for autonomy for East Timor within
Indonesia which is due be offered for decision on 8 August. Given
the climate of uncertainty and violence, international support and
assistance will be most important both in the period before the
scheduled ballot and after the ballot takes place. The paper
discusses the preparation being made for deployment of a UN mission
and concerns which have been expressed about its likely size and
capacities.
The final section of the paper then reviews
recent Australian policies and debate. The Government has sought to
provide advice and assistance to facilitate a decision-making
process in East Timor. The Opposition has argued for a more
assertive attempt to encourage an early deployment of a UN mission.
with peacekeeping capacities. The talks between Australia and
Indonesia in Bali on 27 April saw Australia commit itself to
providing financial support for the planned ballot (Australia has
agreed to fund about half the overall costs) and announce its
support for Australian police officers to participate in the UN
mission now being prepared.
The paper observes in conclusion that East
Timor's prospects for a free and fair ballot to review its status
depend on several inter-related issues and problems. They are, the
potential for containment of violence within the territory, the
capacity of Indonesia to pursue coherent policies at a time of
profound political transition and the dilemma that the timing for
the proposed ballot in East Timor places it right in the middle of
this transition, after the 7 June parliamentary elections but
before the selection of a new President (in November 1999).
If a stable environment cannot be fostered in
the lead up to the ballot, there is clearly a real possibility that
the opportunity which has now been created for a reassessment of
East Timor's status could be compromised if not lost entirely. This
would cause great damage both to East Timor and to Indonesia
itself. While East Timor is only one of a number of major
challenges with which Indonesia's leaders must attempt to deal,
Indonesia's handling of East Timor is likely to be highly important
to Indonesia's international image, credibility and capacity at a
time when international support is an essential requirement
for prospects for
economic recovery and reform.
Introduction
The profound impact of the Asian financial
crisis, along with the end of the Soeharto era in May 1998, have
opened up the possibility for change in East Timor. Indonesia's
government led by President Habibie announced in January 1999 that
Indonesia would be prepared to agree to the departure of East Timor
from Indonesia if its people so desired. On 5 May 1999, agreements
were reached between Indonesia, Portugal and the United Nations to
provide for a ballot on 8 August on a proposal for 'special
autonomy status' for East Timor. If this proposal is rejected,
authority in the territory would revert to the United Nations and
the way would be opened for possible independence.
For 23 years after its invasion in late 1975,
the Indonesian government adhered firmly to the position that the
territory was an integral part of Indonesia, as the country's
27th province. During this period, Indonesia's presence
in East Timor was accompanied by continuing conflict and
controversy, including allegations and evidence of human rights
abuses by Indonesian forces (including the 'Dili massacre' in
November 1991), both non-violent and armed resistance from many
East Timorese, and extensive international criticism of Indonesia's
policies. President Habibie's dramatic change in position has
opened up new possibilities for alleviating the conflict in the
territory, with the potential for major benefits for the people of
East Timor and for Indonesia, if a peaceful and
mutually-satisfactory process of transition can be pursued.
Indonesia's period of rule, however, has left legacies of ongoing
socio-economic and political divisions within East Timor which now
threaten the potential for peaceful change.
The prospects for peaceful and productive change
in East Timor depend on several major factors. Firstly there is the
issue of whether a stable environment can be established among the
parties on the ground in East Timor (both East Timorese and
Indonesian) which will enable an orderly process of consultation of
the people about the future of the territory to take place, in
accordance with the 5 May agreements. Secondly, there is the
question of whether the Indonesian government and the armed forces
of Indonesia-at a time of economic crisis and profound political
change as Indonesia moves towards its first open elections since
1955-can pursue and implement a constructive and consistent policy
towards East Timor. Thirdly, there is the issue of whether
international assistance, led by the United Nations, can be
implemented effectively to facilitate a process of transition in
East Timor.
Australia has a long term interest in the
security and stability of Indonesia, the world's fourth largest
country and Australia's neighbour. During the current regional
economic crisis, Australia's interest in Indonesia has been
underscored by its commitment of over $A1 billion to support the
International Monetary Fund's assistance packages aimed at
supporting revival and reform of the economy. Australia also has a
major interest in seeing a process of peaceful transition occur in
East Timor. Australia has expressed its willingness to assist in a
process of transition and this assistance could potentially involve
Australian support for, and participation in, peace keeping
activities. While Australia's relations with Indonesia have been a
central part of its foreign policy for more than forty years,
Australia's policies towards both Indonesia and East Timor in the
current circumstances must be seen as of its most important
priorities in foreign relations overall.
This paper will review recent development and
discuss some major issues facing Australia in its policies towards
East Timor. The paper begins by reviewing the current internal
situation in East Timor, the problems of conflict and violence and
economic conditions and prospects. The 5 May agreements between
Indonesia, Portugal and the United Nations are summarised and their
implications assessed. The paper then reviews the challenges facing
the United Nations in seeking to implement the 5 May agreements in
East Timor, both in the period before the 8 August ballot and in
the period after this ballot. Finally, the paper discusses the
implications of recent developments for Australian policies towards
East Timor and Indonesia.
Indonesia and East Timor in
1999
Background
East Timor's recent history has been dominated
by the problems the territory experienced when a long period of
Portuguese colonial rule (since the 17th century) was
followed by a period of instability when Portuguese rule ended
after the ousting of the Caetano regime in Portugal in April 1974.
West Timor had been a part of the territories ruled by the Dutch
and had been brought to independence as a part of the Republic of
Indonesia. In the context of the uncertain regional environment in
the wake of the end of the war in Vietnam in April 1975,
Indonesia's government and armed forces feared that an independent
East Timor might be an unstable state possibly open to external
influence. Indonesia invaded (in late 1975) and incorporated the
territory (in July 1976).(1) Indonesia's incorporation was followed
by internal conflict with the resistance movement Fretilin
(Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor): the conflict
and its impact overall is thought to have resulted in the loss of
between 100 000 and 200 000 East Timorese lives.(2)
Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor was not
recognised by the United Nations, which continued to consider
Portugal as the legitimate authority in the territory. The majority
of the international community also refused to recognise the
incorporation, but about thirty countries extended recognition
either directly or indirectly. Australia gave de facto recognition
to Indonesia's rule in January 1978 and de jure recognition in
February 1979.
The 'Dili massacre' in which over one hundred
people were killed by Indonesian security forces on 12 November
1991 focussed heightened international attention to the situation
in East Timor and the continuance of widespread opposition to
Indonesia's presence. The Dili massacre proved to be a turning
point in the conflict in three ways. Firstly, East Timor became
more of a problem for Indonesia internationally and diplomatically
and the international arm of the East Timorese resistance movement
gained added international attention. Secondly, within East Timor
while the guerilla-based resistance had become less important, a
new generation of East Timorese participated in civil resistance.
Thirdly, the internal security climate within the territory
deteriorated and clashes occurred between East Timorese and recent
immigrants from other parts of Indonesia. Indonesian attempts to
deal with the internal unrest continued to attract international
attention and criticism, for example when the resistance leader
Jose 'Xanana' Gusmao was captured in 1992.
The impact on Indonesia of the Asian financial
crisis from late 1997 and the resignation of President Soeharto in
May 1998 ushered in a new period of change and uncertainty in
Indonesia generally and also in East Timor.(3) In the new climate
of Indonesian politics from May 1998 movement towards change in
relation to East Timor increased-both within and outside Indonesia.
In late June, three European ambassadors (from the United Kingdom,
Austria and the Netherlands) visited East Timor and issued a report
stating that there would be no lasting solution 'without a firm
commitment to direct consultation' of the wishes of the East
Timorese. In July, a resolution adopted by the United States Senate
called for an internationally supervised referendum on East Timor
and in October Congress voted to support a ban on the use of
US-supplied weapons in the territory.(4) In December Prime Minister
Howard wrote to President Habibie and advocated a revision in
Indonesia's approach. While Australia maintained its recognition of
Indonesia's sovereignty the Australian government now supported the
concept of a substantial period of autonomy for East Timor which
could be followed by an act of self determination. (5)
These external pressures for change were
accompanied by developments within Indonesia. In June 1998,
President Habibie announced that Indonesia would be willing to
grant 'genuine autonomy' to East Timor and shortly afterwards
thirty Timorese political prisoners were released. In July and
August, the government announced some troop withdrawals from East
Timor. On 4-5 August, preliminary agreement was reached between
Indonesia and Portugal in New York on East Timor's proposed
'special autonomy' status in UN-sponsored tripartite talks
involving UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.(6)
While the end of the Soeharto era has opened up
the potential for change in Indonesia's policies towards East
Timor, the issue of the territory's future has continued to be
highly contentious for several related reasons. In January 1999
President Habibie declared his willingness to see East Timor attain
independence if its people chose to reject an offer of autonomy.
However it has become clear that there has been substantial
resistance to this change in policy, both within the ranks of the
Indonesian government and armed forces and among some principal
opposition figures. Within East Timor the prospect of possible
change in the territory's status has heightened tensions between
pro-independence supporters and pro-integration groups, including a
series of armed militias. A series of violent clashes, many of
which have been perpetrated by the pro-integrationist groups, have
fostered a climate of fear and instability. Progress has been made
in the talks between Portugal and Indonesia and an agreement on an
autonomy proposal was reached on 5 May, but the prospects for a
successful testing of opinion in East Timor have been placed in
jeopardy by the ongoing violence. A United Nations monitoring and
assistance group is now being deployed to East Timor, but
uncertainties continue about its prospects for effective
operations. Meanwhile socio-economic conditions in East Timor
continue to be poor even if the medium term prospects, given a
climate of stability, may be comparatively favourable.
President
Habibie's Policy Change on East Timor
The most important catalyst for change in East
Timor in 1999 was the policy change announced after a Cabinet
meeting in late January. On 27 January the government announced
that Indonesia would be prepared to consider granting independence
to East Timor if its people rejected the planned offer of
autonomy/special status within Indonesia. However, such a move
would not take place until the People's Consultative Assembly
convened after the 7 June elections.(7) The government at the same
time offered to transfer the pro-independence leader Jose 'Xanana'
Gusmao from Cipinang prison (in Jakarta) to a government compound
in Jakarta. These developments were supported by the head of the
armed forces and Defence Minister General Wiranto, who said on 28
January that the armed forces would respect a decision to allow
East Timor to separate in a dignified manner if that was how
matters progressed.(8)
This announced policy change was complicated by
the process of political change underway in Indonesia and the
accompanying limitations in the political authority of President
Habibie. While the announcement on 27 January represented the views
of President Habibie and his principal advisers it appears that his
Cabinet was not united behind the policy change. In particular,
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas has been reported to have been opposed
to the granting of independence for East Timor.(9)
Other civilian leaders have also been uncertain
and divided on the Timor issue. Among the major leadership
contenders Amien Rais (leader of the National Mandate Party-Partai
Amanat Nasional-PAN) has clearly supported the concept of
independence for East Timor. However other prominent figures such
as Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri (leader of the
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle-Partai Demokrasi
Indonesia-Perjuangan-PDI-P), while possibly prepared to accept a
decision of the East Timorese to depart from Indonesia, have been
critical of the Habibie government for pursuing the option of
possible independence when they consider that government to be a
transitional one. In early May, for example, the PDI-P vice
chairman, Dimyati Hartono, said that the party would not accept the
proposed ballot on East Timor's future planned for 8 August. He
said that Dr Habibie, whom he regarded as a transitional leader,
should not have tried to overturn the decision made by the
parliament in 1976 which had incorporated East Timor into
Indonesia.(10) On 14 May, Megawati reaffirmed her critical attitude
towards the proposed ballot in East Timor, saying that, 'The
problem of East Timor cannot be decided by Mr Habibie's Government
because it does not have the legitimacy to do so'.(11) Megawati
Sukarnoputri's views are significant because her party is
considered likely to be a major presence in the new parliament
after the 7 June elections. A critical attitude by the PDI-P
towards the 8 August ballot could add further complexity to efforts
to resolve the future status of East Timor.
The Armed
Forces and East Timor
The attitudes to the East Timor issue within the
armed forces (ABRI) are both highly important and complex.
Indonesia's armed forces have played a central role in politics
since their successful struggle to obtain independence from the
Dutch. Under President Soeharto's 'New Order' regime the armed
forces, as well as being responsible for national security, also
had a major role in civil administration and in sectors of the
economy. The impact of the financial crisis on Indonesian politics
and the fall of the longstanding Soeharto regime have placed
Indonesia's armed forces under great strain as Indonesia faces the
uncertain prospect of a more open and democratic political
environment and as the economic recession has affected adversely
the armed forces' own business interests. In this situation it has
been difficult to maintain the morale and internal cohesion of
ABRI.(12) The military have also been disquieted by the outbreaks
of conflict and violence in several areas of Indonesia, including
Ambon and Aceh.
In March 1999, President Habibie's foreign
policy adviser, Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar, commented frankly about the
military's problems. She warned that ABRI may have significant
problems in maintaining effective internal lines of authority.
Expressing concern that ABRI was at its 'weakest point',
'disorientated' and 'spread thin' around the country, she commented
on recent riots in Ambon and elsewhere that:
if the armed forces and Indonesia's people as a
whole fail to check these inter religious and inter ethnic
conflicts, they may trigger more devastating social unrest in
Indonesia. Hence there is an urgent need for the armed forces to
put the situation under control effectively, for failing to do so
would drive Indonesia to enter a stage of State failure, the cost
of which would not only be unbearable for the country but for the
region as a whole.(13)
In this difficult environment there have been
differences among observers as to how best to interpret and explain
ABRI's position and approach to the issue. Some observers have
argued that there appear to be some divergent views within ABRI on
East Timor. While some senior leaders may have been willing to
accept the change in policy announced by President Habibie, other
elements are thought to have opposed any policy change. As the
Australian correspondent Mark Baker argued in late April
'...powerful elements in ABRI...[are] trenchantly opposed to any
move towards independence-elements who will not countenance a
policy that repudiates the 1975 invasion and the lives of the 1500
soldiers lost securing and enforcing that control'.(14) Some ABRI
elements have also gained economic benefits from business
activities in East Timor, for example trade in timber, marble, and
coffee as well as interests in tourism and hotels, which would be
likely to be lost if East Timor gains independence. Some elements
are therefore likely to strongly oppose independence and to have an
interest in attempting to help block movement towards it.(15)
Other observers, however, have suggested that
ABRI does have a coherent command structure and that the activities
of the military in East Timor should be seen as being in line with
the wishes of senior commanders. Peter Hartcher (Australian
Financial Review) drawing on the arguments of Bob Lowry (an
Australian specialist on Indonesia's armed forces) wrote that the
army's objective is in fact clear. 'The army took East Timor in
1975, has held it by force and is not interested in relinquishing
it... While President B. J. Habibie has decided to allow East Timor
the option of independence, the army... has decided to subvert his
Government's policies...'(16)
However their approach may be precisely
interpreted, the attitudes of the armed forces are a central
element in the challenges and dilemmas confronting Indonesia's
leaders over East Timor.
Indonesia
and East Timor: Contending Pressures
The issue of the status of East Timor obviously
poses difficult issues for Indonesia's leaders. Given the complex
process of political change in progress and the diversity of
opinion within Indonesia's government, there is no concerted
'Indonesian position' on East Timor. There are in fact several
complex issues and questions about East Timor running in parallel
and which, it can be argued, may be seen as contending
pressures.
Ever since incorporation in 1976, East Timor has
been a major ongoing source of difficulty for Indonesian foreign
policy. Promoting a process of political consultation and being
willing to accept a rejection of the autonomy proposal can be seen
as an opportunity for Indonesia to dispense with a substantial
political and foreign policy 'problem' that had never been
resolved.
However, the East Timor issue is now being
considered in the midst of an economic crisis and a period of
intense political strain in the form of a process of
democratisation of the political system and substantial unrest and
demands for devolution in several regions of Indonesia, including
Irian Jaya, Ambon and Aceh.(17) The Indonesian government is
attempting to ameliorate some of these issues by pursuing a process
of administrative and financial devolution to the provinces, but
this is necessarily a difficult process. There have clearly been
substantial concerns among both civilian and military leaders in
Indonesia that an acceptance of the legitimacy of a demand by East
Timor for independence could have a 'demonstration effect' in other
parts of Indonesia and thus make the maintenance of national unity
more difficult. For some Indonesian leaders these issues may act as
a pressure to oppose independence for East Timor.(18)
In relation to economic issues, contending
pressures can also be seen. Indonesia has had to direct substantial
economic resources to East Timor. It is estimated that the overall
cost since 1975 of supporting the Indonesian government structures
in East Timor have been at least $US750 million and the ongoing
military conflict against Falintil (Armed Forces for the National
Liberation of East Timor) has cost an estimated $US1 million per
day.(19) An independent East Timor could obtain international
assistance and thus the demands on Indonesian resources could be
ended.
However while there could be substantial overall
benefits to Indonesia from an acceptance of independence for East
Timor, particular individuals and groups might stand to lose
specific economic interests and benefits gained from continued
integration with Indonesia. Dr George Aditjondro (University of
Newcastle, Australia) has argued that a number of powerful civilian
and military figures, including members of the family of former
President Soeharto, have extensive economic interests in East
Timor. These interests, he argues, include over 500 000 hectares of
land including timber and sugar plantations, marble deposits,
textiles, tourism and oil. Dr Aditjondro has written that 'They are
holdings that CNRT, the umbrella organisation of the East Timorese
resistance movement, has made it clear it would seize if Timor
becomes an independent state.'(20)
Handling and endeavouring to resolve these
contending pressures will pose major challenges for the current
Habibie administration, the new parliament to be elected on 7 June
and the new President due to be selected in November. Furthermore,
these problems of developing a coherent policy at the national
level have been accompanied by major problems of division and
violence within East Timor itself.
Conflict
within East Timor
Indonesia's invasion and incorporation of East
Timor have produced legacies of conflict and division which now
threaten prospects for a peaceful process of decision-making on the
territory's future. The forces committed to independence have been
increasingly challenged by parties and armed militias committed to
continued integration, whose numbers and activities have expanded
since late 1998 with, it is widely alleged, assistance from ABRI
elements.
While historically there were at least three
major contending political organisations (Fretilin, UDT and
Apodeti), the political spectrum has recently essentially focussed
on two major orientations, those in favour of and those against
independence from Indonesia. The two main spokesman groups for and
against independence respectively are the National Council of the
Timorese Resistance (CNRT) and the Forum for Unity, Democracy and
Justice (Forum Persatuan, Demokrasi dan Keadilan-FPDK). Both are
umbrella groups, representing a wide variety of actors and
viewpoints, although the CNRT is clearly the most substantial
grouping of the two. While the CNRT has gained prominence in the
international media and is generally perceived to be representative
of its diverse support base, it is currently unclear whether the
Forum is representative, and whether there is a coherent policy
position.
Pro-Independence Groups
Created in April 1998, the National Council of
the Timorese Resistance (CNRT) combines several elements of the
pro-independence movement-principally Fretilin which has been the
leading movement in support of independence since the 1970s-with
Jose 'Xanana' Gusmao as its President. Until his arrest in 1992,
Xanana Gusmao led the East Timor guerilla resistance movement.
Released from prison in January 1999 and transferred to house
arrest in Jakarta by President Habibie, Xanana Gusmao has become
the unofficial pro-independence leader. He is supported by Nobel
prize-winner Jose Ramos Horta who acts in the role of 'unofficial
foreign minister in exile' from his base in Portugal. In East Timor
itself, the pro-independence movement is strongly associated with
the Bishop of the very influential Catholic Church, Carlos Belo,
who shared the Nobel Peace prize with Mr Horta in 1996.
The links between these three major figures are
strong but informal as occasional contradictions that have appeared
in comments by Mr Gusmao and Mr Horta on the issue of a UN presence
in the territory demonstrate.(21) While Jose Ramos Horta has
represented the East Timorese resistance movement to the world
outside the territory for the past twenty five years, Xanana Gusmao
was leading the armed resistance on the ground until his capture by
ABRI in 1992. Since Mr Gusmao was allowed by the Indonesian
government to meet with representatives of world governments, he
has become the un-official leader of the pro-independence movement
and is considered by many as a likely Presidential candidate in the
event that East Timor becomes self-governing.
Fretilin suffered very severe losses in the 23
years of conflict with Indonesian forces. Many leaders were killed
in this period, and Xanana Gusmao is one of the few senior figures
to have survived. Fretilin's armed forces (organised as Falintul)
have recently been estimated to have a strength of between
500-1200.(22) While support for independence in the territory has
commonly been estimated at well over 50 per cent-a senior officer
of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade indicated in early
May that DFAT assumed such support at around 70 per
cent(23)-Falintil is not in a strong position to protect its
civilian supporters since it remains heavily outnumbered both by
the Indonesian military (recently estimated at around 15 700)(24)
and the large numbers of pro-integration militia.
Pro-integration
Groups
The cause of integration with Indonesia had some
limited support in the mid 1970s and the period of Indonesian
control has produced the potential for a base of support for this
policy, for example among government officials and elements
associated with the Indonesian economic presence, who have included
some prominent East Timorese. From the mid 1990s another basis for
support for the Indonesian presence was encouraged with the
fostering by elements of the armed forces of armed militia
groups.
The pro-integration militias grew out of
attempts by ABRI, and in particular the Special Forces
(Kopassus), to create from the mid 1990s a civilian-based
resistance force. The purpose of the forces was to counter civilian
support for Falintil (the military arm of Fretlin). Drawing members
from the Apodeti party, whose members have benefited through the
years from close political and economic relations with Jakarta, the
first militia established was the Garda Paksi. Following
several tours of duty in East Timor, General Prabowo Subianto, a
son-in-law of former President Soeharto and former commander of
Kopassus, was responsible for raising the militia (General
Prabowo was subsequently dismissed from his senior position by the
current Defence Minister General Wiranto). The militia he
sponsored, however, have continued to grow largely due to ongoing
ABRI encouragement.(25)
The main known pro-integration Militia
groups
Name
|
Location
|
Estimated Strength
|
Aitarak ('The Thorn')
|
Dili
|
5000
|
Gadapaksi ('Youth guard for upholding integration')
|
Dili
|
N/A
|
Darah Merah ('Red blood right wing militia')
|
Dili
|
N/A
|
Besi Merah Putih ('Red and White Iron')
|
Liquica
|
2000
|
Naga Merah
|
Ermera
|
N/A
|
Mahidi
|
Ainaro
|
2000
|
Laksaur
|
Suai
|
500
|
AHI ('I will uphold integration')
|
Ailiu
|
N/A
|
Halilintar ('Thunderbolt')
|
Bobanaro
|
800
|
ABLAI ('I will fight to Preserve the Mandate for
Integration')
|
Manatuto
|
100
|
Saka
|
Baucau
|
970
|
Tim Alfa
|
Lautem
|
300
|
Makikit
|
Viqueque
|
200
|
Source: Bruce Woodley 'Red and White Terror',
The Weekend Australian, 1-2 May 1999
From October 1998, with major political change
in prospect in both Indonesia and East Timor with the passing of
the Soeharto regime and the likelihood that any consultation of the
local population in a free and fair ballot would see a vote in
support of independence, it is understood that military
intelligence gave added support for the establishment of additional
militia groups. By early April 1999 it is thought that there were
about 15 000 members of these units. Many were coerced into joining
the militias while others were attracted by the provision of a
daily payment of 20 000 rupiah ($US 2.3) by the army.(26)
A report in early May 1999 identified a total of
eleven militia groups with estimated strengths ranging from 100 to
5000 and by late May UN Secretary General Kofi Annan estimated that
there were 24 such groups operating in the territory.(27) Several
major leaders have been prominent. For example, Mark Davis of ABC
TV's Four Corners reported from East Timor in March that
Joao Tavares, 'major landlord and patron in this region and head of
the militia group, Halilintar' (or 'Thunderbolt' based in
Bobonaro), has had a long association with Indonesia. 'He was the
leader of the militia group which joined with the Indonesians in
killing the five journalists here, at Balibo, in 1975'.(28) As
perhaps the most senior militia commander, he represented
pro-integration interests together with the chairman of the Forum
for Unity, Democracy and Justice, Domingos Soares, in a meeting
with Xanana Gusmao that was held to attempt to start a process of
reconciliation between the FPDK and CNRT. In addition to Tavares'
militia, Halilintar, the leaders of other regional militia
such as Eriqo Gueteres who now leads the Aitarak militia
and Cancio Cavallio leader of the Mahidi (an acronym for
'Live or Die for Integration') in Ainaro are also noted
pro-integration leaders, but as the Four Corners program made
clear, they answer to Tavares. On 8 April, a number of militia
groups held a rally in Maliana, in support of continued integration
with Indonesia.(29)
At the time of writing the pro-Indonesian
militias would be best described as an array of organisations,
rather than a coherent political and military force. This
description is not to discount the possibility that the size,
cohesion or composition of the militia might change in the near
future. The militia have had particular strength near the border
with West Timor but by May 1999 were active in nearly every
district of the territory.(30) A common feature of reporting on the
actions of the militia suggest that they undertake their activities
in very close proximity to ABRI units, suggesting that their
popularity or support in the event of an ABRI withdrawal could
suffer. There have also been suggestions that the various militia
could operate to form the basis of an armed resistance to the
government in the event of the creation of an independent East
Timor and conduct operations from across the border in Indonesian
West Timor. However the cohesiveness of the militias is also
uncertain and it has been suggested that some groups could
conceivably come into conflict with others.(31)
Conflict and
Violence in 1999
1999 has seen an increased pattern of conflict
and intimidation in East Timor. After President Habibie's
announcement in late January, the Falintil forces observed a
de-facto ceasefire at the direction of Xanana Gusmao from Jakarta,
and all pro-independence demonstrations were called off. This left
the pro-integrationist forces with an essentially free hand.
Beginning in Suai and Viqueque in the south coast, a pattern of
intimidation spread throughout the four western districts of
Covalima, Bobonaro, Ermera, and Liquica before spreading to the
eastern districts of Lautem and Baucau (see map 2).
The situation deteriorated in April and a rising
pattern of violence ensued. On 4 and 5 April, a Besi Merah
Putih (Red and White Iron) militia unit entered the hamlet of
Mauboke near Liquica and on the second day killed four people. On 6
April members of the same militia group attacked a group of 2000
people in Liquica as they fled from a church where they had sought
refuge; up to 57 people were reported to have been killed. (32)The
Liquica massacre raised the level of tensions in East Timor
substantially. On the same day, Xanana Gusmao announced an end to
the Falintil ceasefire and called for a general uprising of the
people of East Timor against the militias. Gusmao later softened
this call but conditions have remained tense. On 17 April a large
rally of militia groups was held in Dili in front of their overall
commander Joao Tavares. After the rally the militia groups took
over the streets of Dili and launched attacks against several areas
including a market, a bus depot, the office of the local newspaper
and the house of Manuel Carascalao, a senior leader of the CNRT.
Twelve people were killed at Carascalao's house including his
teenage son and a total of at least 25 people were killed in the
attacks overall.(33)
With conditions of violence attracting
increasing attention and concern in Indonesia and internationally,
President Habibie directed the Defence Minister and armed forces
commander General Wiranto to visit East Timor. On 21 April in Dili
he produced a peace agreement which was signed in Jakarta by Xanana
Gusmao and in Dili by representatives of both the pro-independence
and pro-integrationist movements. General Wiranto urged the
military not 'to take sides' in the conflict. However the 21 April
agreement did not provide for the disarming of the militias and it
made no mention of the role of the Indonesian military in providing
assistance to the militias.(34)
Recent reports suggest that the 21 April
agreement has not been effective in ending the climate of
intimidation and violence. On 7 May it was reported that militia
groups had been rounding up thousands of East Timorese villagers
and forcing them into refugee camps. Aid workers were reported to
have seen film of a large camp on the outskirts of Liquica where
people were guarded by members of the military as well as by
militias. The villagers in the camp had been gathered there in
operations since the Liquica massacre in early April, allegedly for
political indoctrination. It was reported at the same time that
Indonesian authorities have prevented foreigners from travelling
outside Dili and aid representatives from groups including the
International Committee of the Red Cross have not been able to gain
access to the camps. The Dili secretary of the Catholic relief
organisation Caritas, Estanislas Martins, said in early May that
'They (the militias) are sweeping the outlying villages and
bringing the people to centres so they can make sure they vote the
right way'.(35)
Australia's Ambassador to Indonesia John
McCarthy, during a visit to East Timor, also commented on the issue
of possible intimidation of East Timorese. Lindsay Murdoch
(Southeast Asia correspondent for The Age) wrote in a
report published on 10 May:
Asked whether he believed Indonesia's military
intended to corrupt the vote and pressure people to vote to remain
part of Indonesia, Mr McCarthy said; 'I have seen evidence that
could lead one along the lines of that sort of conclusion'.(36)
Amid some continuing conflict and violence,
which on 9 May included further attacks in Dili by
pro-integrationist militias which resulted in one death, additional
concerns were expressed about the prospects for an orderly ballot
in August. Florentino Sarmento, East Timor's representative on
Indonesia's human rights commission, expressed concern that holding
the ballot in such a short time will provoke widespread bloodshed
from all the warring groups. Mr Sarmento said that:
Already there is a vicious cycle of violence
that is becoming greater and greater. I hope I am wrong. But one
side will lose the ballot and will not accept the result. I am
afraid that whoever loses will provoke violence against the
winners.(37)
Economic
Conditions and Prospects
Another significant issue for East Timor in 1999
is economic conditions for the immediate and medium term future.
The recent uncertainty and conflicts have exacerbated economic
problems in the territory and economic assistance will need to be
an important element in international support for a process of
transition.
Socio-economic conditions have been affected
adversely by recent instability and conflict. An Australian
government assessment in March 1999 reported that the health system
in the territory was near collapse as a consequence of the
departure of many doctors, leaving (at that point) only one surgeon
who was located at a military hospital in Dili that few people are
prepared to use.(38) A very large number of engineers, technicians,
retailers, medical workers, and government employees have left the
territory. Port Authority data showed 13 000 embarking passengers
in the first 2.5 months of 1999 'equivalent to the total number of
embarking passengers for 1998.'(39) While basic medical and food
stocks appeared to be holding, their distribution had been affected
adversely by the departure of transport drivers and retail
shopkeepers.
Recent violence and instability has also
affected agriculture adversely, particularly the major cash-crop,
coffee, which is the primary economic support for nearly half the
indigenous population. The annual harvest for the $A40 million crop
requires a labour force of 40 000 and it is estimated that 45 000
families are involved in coffee production. However recent
displacements of people, for example in the area around Liquica,
are reported to be disrupting the 1999 harvest.(40)
The possible aid requirements of East Timor in
the context of either autonomy or independence are difficult to
estimate precisely. East Timor has a population estimated at 850
000, there are few serviceable roads and energy distribution has
been further hampered by the departure of technicians. Non-East
Timorese have dominated the business community and civil service. A
recent Australian official assessment (reported in The Age
in February) of the possible consequences of an Indonesian
withdrawal from East Timor stated that eight of 13 district leaders
are non-indigenous, as are up to 70 per cent of teachers. The
assessment estimated that 75 per cent of the formal economy, as
well as the majority of the civil service and technicians are all
non-East Timorese. There appears to be only one indigenous
doctor.(41) The Australian report estimated that with a gross
annual domestic product of about US$100 million (about US$115 per
capita), 90 per cent of East Timor's revenue comes directly from
Jakarta, including between 50-70 per cent of its GDP being derived
from the Indonesian government sector.(42) The Foreign Minister, Mr
Downer, has estimated that between US$50-80 million or between
50-80 per cent of the GDP of East Timor would be lost if Indonesian
was to withdraw.(43)
Portugal, the internationally-recognised
governing authority for East Timor, stated in February 1999 that it
is prepared to fund the entire annual budget of East Timor 'during
a transition period to self-determination, with agreed help from
its European Union partners'.(44) While the period of the funding
offer was not specified the Portuguese government did state that it
was prepared to pay the full US$100 million annual budget currently
being paid by Indonesia. At the same time Portugal appealed to
others for assistance.
The medium term economic prospects for East
Timor would clearly depend on a variety of factors, not least the
outcome of the process of political decision-making provided for by
the 5 May agreement, the potential to maintain a stable internal
environment after the ballot and the maintenance of cooperative
relations with Indonesia under either autonomy or independence.
Given a stable process of transition, it has been argued that East
Timor's economic prospects and potential may be comparatively
favourable.(45)
In addition to its various natural resources,
such as gold, manganese, copper, coffee, very high quality marble,
and sandalwood in abundance, it has been argued that East Timor
could take advantage of tourism by becoming a gambling enclave, in
much the same way as another Portuguese colony Macau has done. Like
another small island state-Tonga-East Timor could also reserve
rights in the International Telecommunications Union for
geostationary satellite spots and gain major financial benefits
from the proceeds. It could fully follow the Tonga example and
acquire a satellite and exploit its location near the both the
equator and large satellite audiences by selling transponders to
commercial operators, something that could prove very popular with
Australian media companies. Finally, the East Timorese diaspore and
the Chinese East Timorese could become strong sources of
investment, along with initial input from Portugal and others.
None of these developments can happen without a
successful and peaceful process of political transition in line
with the 5 May agreements. Nor could they happen without
assistance, especially in the early stages of a transition. But
East Timor, if managed well, could prove the economic sceptics
wrong in the long run.
The Timor Gap
Treaty
The potential petroleum resources in the area of
ocean known as the Timor Gap are considered by many Timorese as one
of the territory's most important economic assets. While the
possible resources cannot be precisely estimated some industry
analysts have placed a potential value of $A11 billion on the
reserves.(46) In 1989, after eleven years of negotiations,
Australia and Indonesia concluded the Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation
Treaty. The Treaty divided the 'gap' into three areas: Zone C to
the north is controlled by Indonesia but has a provision of a 10
per cent royalty payment to Australia on any oil or gas produced,
Zone B is in the south with the same arrangement in reverse (with a
10 per cent payment to go to Indonesia), and Zone A lies between
them with a 50-50 percent split in royalties. The main oil and gas
reserves are thought to be in Zone A and in July 1998, a consortium
led by BHP began to pump some crude oil from the Elang Kakatua
field.(47)
Some concerns have been raised that the Timor
Gap treaty and the associated ongoing agreements between Indonesia
and Australia could be disrupted by either autonomy or independence
for East Timor. However in July 1998 the CNRT, while asserting the
rights of East Timor to benefit from the resources of the Timor
Gap, sought to reassure the Australian government and Timor Gap
contractors. A CNRT statement said that:
The National Council of Timorese Resistance will
endeavour to show the Australian Government and the Timor Gap
contractors that their commercial interests will not be adversely
affected by East Timorese self-determination. The CNRT supports the
rights of the existing Timor Gap contractors and those of the
Australian Government to jointly develop East Timor's offshore oil
resources in cooperation with the people of East Timor.(48)
In late February 1999, Foreign Minister
Alexander Downer held discussions with Indonesian Ministers and
Xanana Gusmao in Jakarta, after which Mr Downer said that, 'Mr
Gusmao told me that they would honour the Timor gap treaty and that
they were happy to share on an equitable basis with Australia
resources that were between East Timor and Australia'.(49) During
his visit to Indonesia at that time, Mr Downer also said that:
If East Timor chooses independence then
according to the principle of successor states the treaty would
remain in place. But at this point the Timor Gap Authority has an
equal number of Indonesians and Australians, so it would have to
have equal numbers of East Timorese and Australians. Obviously, if
the new East Timorese state wants to pursue further amendments or
adjustments, that would be a matter for negotiation.(50)
Indonesia's Minister for Resources, Kuntoro
Mangkusubroto, stated during Mr Downer's visit that in the event of
a change of status for East Timor, Indonesia would be willing to
relinquish its claim: the Minister said, 'We have no quarrel with
that-so long as the new borders are drawn up, that area will belong
to the new country'.(51)
While the resources of the Timor Gap could
assist East Timor greatly, the returns so far have been modest,
with Indonesia and Australia each earning only $US1.1 million in
1998 and an expected $US2.2 million in 1999. Extensive development
of the area's resources still faces major obstacles including the
high cost of start up investments and the currently unfavourable
world market conditions. The potential benefits from the Timor Gap
therefore cannot be taken for granted.(52)
The 5 May 1999 Agreements
on East Timor
While East Timor has been experiencing an
increasing pattern of internal conflict, attempts were being made
to develop an agreement under the auspices of the United Nations
which would enable the people of the territory to decide on its
future status. The negotiations have revolved around proposals for
East Timor to attain autonomy within Indonesia. It has been
envisaged that East Timor would remain part of Indonesia but be
given control over internal affairs, including security and the
administration of justice. Foreign and defence policy would remain
with Jakarta. Autonomy, it has been argued, would provide the time
and the opportunity to marshal financial support to enable East
Timor to establish and develop a series of vitally important public
and private services and infrastructure.
The principal recent obstacle to the current
round of the UN-hosted talks had been the terms for surveying
popular opinion in East Timor. The Portuguese had recommended a
referendum but that option was consistently resisted by Indonesia.
However on 5 May 1999 the parties did conclude agreements which
provided for a popular ballot on a detailed proposal for autonomy
for the territory.(53)
The major elements of the 5 May agreements
are:
-
- Ballot Question: East Timorese voters at home and abroad will
be asked two questions on the ballot: 'Do you accept the proposed
special autonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State of the
Republic of Indonesia?' Or 'Do you reject the proposed special
autonomy for East Timor leading to East Timor's separation from
Indonesia?'
-
- Voter eligibility: Voters must be 17 years or older. Those
eligible are 'persons born in East Timor, persons born outside East
Timor but with at least one parent having been born in East Timor,
and persons whose spouses fall under either of the two categories
above'.
-
- Security: The Indonesian authorities will 'ensure a secure
environment' for a free and fair vote. A number of UN security
guards will be deployed to protect UN personnel and a number of
international civilian police will advise Indonesian police before
and during the ballot.
-
- Education: The United Nations will make available the main text
of the autonomy agreement. UN officials will also conduct an
information campaign.
-
- Campaign period: The UN will propose a campaign code of conduct
for supporters and opponents of the autonomy proposal. The
governments of Indonesia and Portugal may not participate in the
campaign, which will run from 20 July to 5 August.
-
- Observers: Indonesia and Portugal can send an equal number of
representatives to observe the ballot. Other international
observers will also be present.
-
- Registration: Eligible voters will be registered between 13
June and 17 July in 200 centres in East Timor and in places around
the world with large Timorese populations (including Sydney,
Darwin, Perth and Melbourne).
The autonomy proposal which is being presented
for decision on 8 August would establish the Special Autonomous
Region of East Timor (SARET). Major provisions of the agreed
constitutional framework for the SARET include:
-
- The central government would retain control over defence and,
for that purpose, elements of the Indonesian Armed Forces would
remain in East Timor.
-
- East Timor would remain part of the Indonesian monetary and
customs unit and the central government would retain control over
taxation.
-
- Natural resources would be under the control of the SARET
'except those considered to be strategic or vital under national
laws'.
-
- The SARET may adopt its own coat of arms but the Indonesian
flag and anthem would be retained.
-
- The SARET would have control of all areas not specifically
mentioned in Chapter 1 of the agreement (that is foreign affairs,
defence and fiscal policies). Specifically, SARET powers would
include the establishment of political, economic and social
policies in SARET, cultural and educational matters, designation of
a second language, rules of family law, and the establishment of an
East Timorese police force 'responsible for enforcement of all laws
and regulations in the SARET, in accordance with the law and
regulations of the Republic of Indonesia'.
-
- The Government of SARET would have jurisdiction over crimes
committed in the SARET 'with the exception of those related to
treason and terrorism, narcotics and other international crimes,
over which Indonesian laws and jurisdiction shall prevail'.
-
- Legislative power will be vested in a Regional Council of
People's Representatives and an independent judiciary is to be
established to have jurisdiction over all civil, criminal,
administrative and other matters under SARET control.
While the autonomy proposal would devolve some
substantial powers to East Timor, the extensive ongoing control by
Indonesia especially over foreign affairs, defence and major
economic policy areas would mean that the proposal is likely to be
fully acceptable to most of the pro-integration advocates.
In a memorandum issued at the time of the
signing of the agreement, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated
that it was crucial that violence be ended and he noted that
President Habibie had given his word that he would do his utmost to
uphold law and order. Annan stated that all armed groups must
disarm before the vote, and Indonesian military forces must also be
redeployed. There must also be an immediate ban on rallies by armed
groups as well as freedom for both sides to conduct peaceful
political activities and have access to the media.(54)
There were cautious immediate reactions to the
agreement in East Timor and among other observers. A central issue
is clearly whether a peaceful and secure environment can be
maintained for the period leading up to 8 August. From the
pro-integrationist side, Basilio dias Araujo from the Forum for
Unity, Democracy and Justice said in Jakarta that his group would
accept 'any outcome' from the ballot. However he was not able to
give a guarantee that the East Timor population would be free from
intimidation during the period leading up to the vote. He indicated
that although his group no longer opposed the ballot it was a
reluctant supporter and said that the ballot period 'might not go
smoothly'. Araujo added that 'From our point of view we see that
once we have a ballot, then we will have losers and winners and
then the conflict remains'.(55)
Other comments emphasised the difficulty of
achieving a peaceful and free ballot. Indonesia's Foreign Minister
Ali Alatas said that disarmament of the parties in East Timor
required the cooperation of all groups including independence
fighters hiding in the mountains, 'And that requires some doing' he
said. Australia's Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said that the
presence of UN officials in East Timor in the pre-ballot period
would help build confidence but that further violence was
inevitable. 'This is a very tough task. For the ballot to be free
and fair will be an incredible achievement'.(56) The reactions to
the 5 May agreement highlighted the challenges facing the officials
and police who will enter East Timor under UN auspices.
The United
Nations in East Timor: Issues and Prospects
The signing of the 5 May agreements has
introduced a new phase both in the history of East Timor and in its
relationships with Indonesia and the international community. In
particular, the agreement provides the basis for explicit
assistance from external sources to help in the process of
political transition in East Timor. There are likely to be two
major phases in relation to this process of transition: the period
of preparation for the 8 August ballot and also the period after
that ballot, especially if the proposal for special autonomy is
rejected. There are many uncertainties in relation to developments
in East Timor and the outcome for either phase clearly cannot be
predicted. Nonetheless, it is useful to discuss in a preliminary
way some of the issues that may arise in relation to efforts to
provide United Nations-sponsored and supported assistance to the
transition process in each of the two possible phases.
I: Before the 8
August Ballot
The 5 May agreements have made some provisions
for the preservation of security in East Timor in the lead up to
the proposed ballot. As set out in Section G of the 'Agreement
Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of the East
Timorese Through a Direct Ballot', responsibility for security
rests with Indonesia. A supplementary 'Agreement Regarding
Security' provides additional detail on what is envisaged in the
pre-ballot phase. This agreement states:
A secure environment devoid of violence or other
forms of intimidation is a prerequisite for the holding of a free
and fair ballot in East Timor. Responsibility to ensure such an
environment as well as for the general maintenance of law and order
rests with the appropriate security authorities. The absolute
neutrality of the TNI (Indonesian Armed Forces) and the Indonesian
Police is essential in this regard.
The agreement states that the Commission on
Peace and Stability (established on 21 April in Dili) should come
into operation without delay and should establish a code of conduct
for all parties '... for the period prior to and following the
consultation, ensure the laying down of arms and take the necessary
steps to achieve disarmament'. Prior to the registration period
(scheduled to start on 13 June) the UN Secretary General will
ascertain that the necessary security situation exists for the
peaceful implementation of the consultation process. Indonesian
police will be solely responsible for the maintenance of law and
order but:
The Secretary General, after obtaining the
necessary mandate, will make available a number of civilian police
officers to act as advisers to the Indonesian Police in the
discharge of their duties and, at the time of the consultation, to
supervise the escort of ballot papers and boxes to and from the
polling sites.
At the time of writing the UN is preparing for
the commitment of its personnel, in a group to be called the United
Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). It has been
announced that the mission will include 241 international staff
members, 420 United Nations Volunteers, a police contingent of up
to 280 and about 4000 local staff.(57) The chief UN adviser on
police issues, Om Rathor, arrived in Dili on 8 May to assess
requirements. He was reported as stating that the UN was moving
rapidly and should be able to organise the group of advisers
quickly but he was not able to say whether the police would carry
side arms: 'These details are yet to be worked out'' he
said.(58)
Much clearly depends on the effectiveness of
arrangements by the Indonesian authorities for security and of the
capacities of the police advisers to operate effectively and
safely. It will clearly be a difficult task for the comparatively
small number of UNAMET police advisers to ascertain and monitor the
character and fairness of security arrangements in East Timor.
Indonesia's Defence Minister General Wiranto stated on 19 May that
'They (the UN police) will only give suggestions to the Indonesian
Police, while the responsibility for peace and order during the
vote will still be in the hands of Indonesian security
personnel'.(59) It is understood that the Indonesian authorities
plan to assign a local police 'buddy' to each of the UNAMET police
and one experienced observer has argued that such an arrangement
would provide many opportunities for the advisers' activities to be
monitored and impeded.(60)
The UN group's own security will obviously
require careful attention, given the large number of armed groups
in the territory and recent patterns of violence. Prime Minister
Howard in a comment on the 5 May agreements, said that they put
Indonesia under heavy international pressure to ensure that the
ballot went ahead, but added that he could not guarantee the safety
of UN advisers: Mr Howard stated that 'I am not going to pretend to
the police that might go and their families that there isn't some
element of danger'.(61) On a visit to East Timor from 6 May,
Australia's Ambassador to Indonesia John McCarthy was reported to
be seeking assurances, particularly from the pro-integrationist
groups, that Australian personnel deployed as part of the UN
mission would be safe.(62)
The Immediate Outlook
As the UN has been developing plans for the
planned deployment of personnel authorised by the 5 May agreements,
concerns have continued about internal conditions in East Timor. On
17 May in the wake of further reported attacks, this time in the
village of Atara (near Atsabe), the UN expressed its concern to
Indonesia over the activities of militia groups. The UN's spokesman
in East Timor, David Wimhurst, said that:
The security situation in East Timor has not
improved. Our concern is that the Indonesian authorities take swift
action to curtail these violent attacks. There is little evidence
they have so far. These attacks are designed to create a climate of
fear and terror to undermine the consultation process which is why
we are here.(63)
Several days later, additional concerns were
aroused when UN observers came across what appeared to be a
training camp for militias where 33 militia members were being
advised by an instructor wearing military-style fatigues. In
response Mr Wimhurst said that the training was in clear violation
of the recently signed 5 May accords. He said: 'Under the accord
all militia activity has to cease. There has to be a secure and
safe environment for everybody to campaign. The active training of
militia is in breach of the accord.' Mr Wimhurst said the incident
would be reported to the UN in New York.(64)
The comments by the UN's representatives in East
Timor drew a critical reaction from the Indonesian Foreign
Ministry, which was reported to have argued that the UN had no
right to investigate the activities of the military in East Timor
or make unannounced visits to villages and that the UN was ignoring
attacks by Falintil guerillas against the Indonesian military. UN
officials in response, defended their right to make unannounced
visits to villages which they argued are necessary to enable the UN
to assess the state of security in East Timor. Senior UN officials
were reported as saying that they were attempting to deal with a
'delicate teething period' following the signing of the 5 May
agreements.(65)
At the same time, further concerns about the
prospects for the August ballot were expressed in a report by the
Dili-based non-governmental organisation, the Foundation for Human
Rights (Yayasan-Hak). The Foundation said that attacks by militias
and their political allies had brought an atmosphere of fear not
seen since the period from 1975 to 1989, when East Timor was a
province closed to foreigners. The Foundation's report said
that:
Every day has been marked by violence,
kidnapping, torture, killings, looting and arson directed towards
East Timorese throughout the territory... Intimidation and terror
directed towards civil servants has included forced signings of
statements of allegiance, threats of dismissal and confiscation of
vehicles and pay by military force. This has contributed to a
condition of ingrained fear towards the time of the UN-sponsored
ballot, tipping the balance towards a pro-integration vote.
The role of Indonesian security forces was
singled out for special criticism:
The security apparatus which should guarantee
security and enforce the law seems to side (with) and tolerate
these violent acts. It is a fact that the perpetrators, which
clearly violate Indonesian law, have not received any sanction or
due process of law. Statements by the military and police claiming
that perpetrators have been disarmed and detained are merely for
political impact.(66)
These expressions of concern by observers and
officials in East Timor were joined on 22 May by comments by UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan in a report to the Security
Council.(67) Noting that he had sent an assessment team to East
Timor from 4 to 15 May, Mr Annan said:
Despite repeated assurances that measures would
be taken by the Indonesian authorities to ensure security in East
Timor and curtail the illegal activities of the armed militias, I
regret to inform the Security Council that credible reports
continue to be received of political violence,, including
intimidation and killings, by armed militias against unarmed
pro-independence civilians. I am deeply concerned to learn from the
assessment team that, as a result, the situation in East Timor
remains extremely tense and volatile... Furthermore, there are
indications that the militias, believed by many observers to be
operating with the acquiescence of elements of the army, have not
only in recen6t weeks begun to attack pro-independence groups, but
are beginning to threaten moderate pro-integration supporters as
well. Truckloads of pro-integration militia are able to roam about
freely in the towns and set up checkpoints along the roads without
any intervention from the army or police... Most of the
pro-independence leaders have fled from Dili or gone into
hiding.
Mr Annan reaffirmed the measures which need to
be taken by the Indonesian authorities to ensure a free environment
for the consultation:
These include the bringing of armed civilian
groups under strict control and the prompt arrest and prosecution
of those who incite or threaten to use violence, a ban on rallies
by armed groups while ensuring the freedom of association and
expression of all political forces and tendencies, the redeployment
of Indonesian military forces and the immediate institution of a
process of laying down of arms by all armed groups well in advance
of the holding of the ballot.
Secretary General Annan also reaffirmed his
responsibilities under the 5 May agreements:
I would like to recall that, as stipulated in
the Agreement regarding security, I am called upon to ascertain,
prior to the start of the registration and based on the objective
evaluation of UNAMET, that the necessary security situation exists
for the peaceful implementation of the operative phases of the
consultation process. I wish to assure the Security Council that I
intend to carry out that responsibility with the utmost care.
These comments make it clear that the Secretary
General's assessment of the security environment in East Timor in
the lead up to the registration period (an assessment which should
therefore be delivered in mid June) will be the next crucial stage
in the implementation of the 5 May agreements.
A UN 'Peacekeeping' Role Before the
Ballot?
In the period both before and since the
conclusion of the 5 May agreements, the issue of the appropriate
size and capacity of a UN mission to East Timor has been discussed
and debated. A number of calls have been made for a commitment
greater than that envisaged under the arrangements announced at the
time of the agreements. In particular it has been suggested that a
larger 'peacekeeping force' should be deployed. Arguments for
deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission have been advanced by
representatives of the pro-independence groups, and non
governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Human Rights Watch(68),
as well as the Australian Shadow Foreign Minister, Laurie
Brereton.(69) In a commentary on this issue in late March 1999, the
Australian analysts Alan Dupont and Anthony Bergin have argued that
'the inability of the East Timorese to resolve their differences
does not augur well for the vote on independence... or for the
prospect of a peaceful transfer of power should the East Timorese
opt for full independence as expected'.(70) They argued that the UN
should act immediately by sending a peace enforcing military force
to East Timor to prevent the crisis from turning into a civil war
and that Australia should take a leading role in such a force.
Debate on the possibility of a more extensive UN
involvement before the planned ballot is likely to continue but in
the wake of the 5 May agreements, pursuit of this concept seems
unlikely. Even before the signing of the agreements, Indonesian
officials had made it clear that they did not approve of the
presence of an external force which would attempt to assume direct
responsibility for security in East Timor. In addition, with the
attention of the United States and members of the European Union
currently preoccupied by the conflict over Kosovo, it seems
unlikely that support could be marshalled for a large scale
involvement in East Timor. At the time of writing, it appears that
the prospects for the successful pursuit of the 8 August ballot
will need to depend on the fulfilment by Indonesia of the security
provisions of the 5 May agreements, with assistance from UN
officers on the scale proposed so far.
II: After the 8
August Ballot
The period after the completion of the 8 August
ballot raises another set of issues about security and possible
peacekeeping in East Timor. The political and security environment
in East Timor after the ballot clearly can not be predicted.
However some comments can be made about the potential for external
assistance.
If the vote were to be cast as a majority in
favour of the autonomy proposal then East Timor would remain a part
of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. A majority vote
in favour of autonomy would enable Indonesia to claim international
legitimacy for the status of East Timor. Were this to be achieved,
it would seem likely that Indonesia would wish to retain full
responsibility for stability in the territory and would therefore
be most unlikely to request assistance for any purpose directly
related to security from the United Nations.
If the 8 August ballot were to result in a
majority rejecting the autonomy proposal then a different set of
issues is raised. The 5 May 'Agreement Between the Republic of
Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question of East
Timor' states in Article 6 that:
If the Secretary-General determines, on the
basis of the result of the popular consultation and in accordance
with this Agreement, that the proposed constitutional framework for
special autonomy is not acceptable to the East Timorese people, the
Government of Indonesia shall take the constitutional steps
necessary to terminate its links with East Timor thus restoring
under Indonesian law the status East Timor held prior to 17 July
1976, and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the
Secretary-General shall agree on arrangements on a peaceful and
orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations.
The Secretary-General shall, subject to the appropriate legislative
mandate, initiate the procedure enabling East Timor to begin a
process of transition towards independence.
Article 7 then states:
During the interim period between the conclusion
of the popular consultation and the start of the implementation of
either option, the parties direct the Secretary-General to maintain
an adequate United Nations presence in East Timor.
In line with Article 6, if the ballot results in
rejection of the autonomy option and authority is to be transferred
to the UN then there could be seen to be a requirement for a UN
involvement in a peacekeeping role. The prospects for such a role
being undertaken by the UN are difficult to assess and would depend
on several major factors including the security conditions in the
territory, the prospects for dialogue and accommodation between the
contending political movements and the willingness of the
international community to pursue an ongoing commitment to East
Timor. (The issues which might arise in relation to a possible
peacekeeping role in the post August ballot period will be
considered in a separate Information and Research Services
paper.(71))
Australian Policy and Debate on East
Timor
Since the end of the Soeharto regime, both on
the ground and as a policy issue in Jarkarta, Lisbon, Canberra, and
New York, the East Timor issue has become highly charged and has
been changing with great rapidity. The Australian Government's
public strategy has focused on encouraging all parties to the
dispute to resolve their differences and on liaising with other
states, international organisations and NGOs that are interested in
the future of the territory. Prime Minister Howard's visit to Bali
for discussions with President Habibie and other senior Indonesian
leaders on 27 April was a notable illustration of the priority now
being assigned to the East Timor issue by Australia.
Australia in February 1979 had recognised
Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor, both in fact and in law.
On 12 January 1999, the Foreign Minister Mr Downer announced what
he described as an historic shift in Australia's East Timor policy
that centred on support for 'an act of self-determination at some
future time, following a substantial period of autonomy'.(72) Both
the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister stressed that the
Australian government preferred a prolonged period of autonomy for
East Timor.
At the same time Mr Downer noted that Australia
was following the UN negotiations closely and that he had engaged
in extensive consultations with UN Secretary-General Annan as well
as US, EU, Portuguese and Indonesian representatives over the
future of the territory.(73) Mr Downer, has also met with most
parties to the East Timor dispute, as well as seeking to garner
support for an international coalition to assist in both the
physical and financial aspects of a United Nations mission to help
secure a free and fair ballot for the people of East Timor to
determine the territory's future status.
In early March, the UN Secretary General
confirmed that a number of countries had been approached to assist
in a UN mission, but said that the exact nature and scale of a UN
presence had not yet been decided. Speaking on SBS Television on 13
March Mr Annan said that 'we would want [an] Australian
contribution' to a UN mission to East Timor that he said at that
time could be sent as early as late April. (74)
The Australian government's declared position
subsequently shifted to publicly discuss a possible UN mission to
East Timor. While Mr Downer initially rejected the possibility of
an Australian Defence Force component in such a mission, he later
publicly accepted that the Australian Defence Forces could have a
role in assisting in a possible peacekeeping operation.(75)
Likewise the government has publicly accepted that if the people of
the territory are given the opportunity to decide, they will almost
certainly choose independence.(76)
The East Timor issue has also been the focus of
substantial inter-party debate. For the first time in a number of
years a significant division has arisen between the two major
parties over a foreign policy issue. A significant development was
a speech made by the Shadow Foreign Minister, Laurie Brereton, to
the Queensland branch of the Australian Institute of International
Affairs (AIIA) on 4 February 1999 when he presented a revisionist
interpretation of recent Australian policies towards East
Timor.(77) Critical of all past Australia governments, Labor and
Liberal-National Coalition, he asserted that 'the story of
Australia's policy towards East Timor is a sorry tale that reflects
little credit on either side of politics'(78) and called for 'both
sides of politics... [to] accept our collective responsibility for
what is widely seen as a profound foreign policy failure'.(79)
Advocating a shift in Australian policy toward 'wholehearted'
political, diplomatic and economic support for an 'independent and
sovereign East Timor'(80), Mr Brereton repeated his earlier calls
for international intervention (first initiated in October 1998)
and urged the Howard government to actively press the Indonesian
government to accept an international peacekeeping presence in the
territory without delay and strongly supported Australian
participation in such a force. Reaction to this speech was swift
and intense, especially from within the ALP. Former Prime Minister
EG Whitlam and Mr Brereton publicly engaged in a dispute over
criticisms of the Whitlam Administration in Mr Brereton's
speech.(81)
The Government has argued that its influence
over the situation in East Timor is limited, but that what
influence it does have is enhanced by its close relations with the
Indonesian government. It argues that the most that it can do is to
advise and attempt to persuade the Indonesian government on the
future of the territory.(82) Following the Prime Minister's 19
December 1998 letter to President Habibie urging a change in
Indonesian policy toward East Timor, there have been over fifteen
meetings at Ministerial and senior official level. Nevertheless,
the ALP and the Democrats have continued to criticise the Howard
government's approach to the question of East Timor, arguing that
more pressure should be put on the Indonesian government to accept
an international presence in the territory and to disarm the
opposing forces. Likewise, the opposition parties have argued that
Australia should make representations to the UN Security Council to
intervene in the territory as soon as possible.
The
Australia-Indonesia Talks, 27 April 1999
Australian policy concerns about East Timor
heightened in April in reaction to the increasing instances of
violence, particularly those apparently perpetrated by the
pro-integrationist militias. Reports about the killings in Liquica
(6 April) and Dili (17 April) gained extensive attention. On 18
April, Prime Minister Howard said that Australia would convey its
'huge and immediate concern' about the latest violence and he said
that 'You would have to wonder whether these pro-integrationist
militias are not getting some permissive response from the
Indonesian army'.(83) On 20 April, Mr Howard telephoned President
Habibie and proposed a meeting of senior leaders: this took place
in Bali on 27 April.
The talks in Bali included participation by
Australia's Foreign Minister Mr Downer and the Defence Minister Mr
Moore while the Indonesian side included Foreign Minister Ali
Alatas and the Defence Minister General Wiranto: the discussions
included a 90 minute session between Prime Minister Howard and
President Habibie. In a press conference after the talks, President
Habibie said that he had approved the draft agreements with
Portugal and the UN and he said that if the autonomy option was
rejected, then Indonesia and East Timor 'could separate in peace,
as friends, and with honour'. Mr Howard said he had made clear his
concern about the violence in East Timor 'in recent weeks in
particular' and had told the President that it was essential that
'a greater measure of stability' be restored. He also warned that
it was important that there be no perception that the Indonesian
security forces were turning 'blind eyes' to the violence. At the
press conference after the official talks, Mr Howard said that
Australia wanted the East Timorese to be free to decide their own
status, but rejected the assertion that Australia supported
independence for the province. Mr Howard said it would be 'better
for them [the East Timorese], for the republic [of Indonesia] and
for the region' if the province remained part of Indonesia under
the autonomy package.(84)
The talks resulted in several specific
Australian commitments. Australia would contribute $A20 million to
assist in funding the ballot on 8 August (about half the total
cost), Australian police would participate in a UN mission to be
sent to East Timor, and with Indonesian agreement Australia would
re-establish a consulate in East Timor. The Opposition spokesman on
Foreign Affairs, Mr Brereton, said in a comment on the Bali talks
that Mr Howard had failed to secure agreement on the necessary
measurers to ensure that the people of East Timor would be able to
decide their own future free from fear and intimidation. Given the
Indonesian armed forces complicity in the violence in East Timor,
he said, no one could rely on them to guarantee security for a free
and fair ballot. Mr Brereton said, 'a small number of UN civilian
police acting as advisers to Indonesian police will provide the
East Timorese with no confidence that the planned ballot will be
conducted in an environment free of violence and
intimidation'.(85)
Policy debate on East Timor has continued in the
period following the signing of the 5 May agreements. Some further
controversy over the issue was raised when it was announced that
Indonesia had refused to issue a visa to enable Shadow Foreign
Affairs Spokesman Laurie Brereton to visit East Timor, an
announcement which was followed by criticism by the government of
Mr Brereton.(86) Mr Brereton for his part continued to express
concern about the security situation in East Timor. In the
aftermath of the killings reported at Atara on 16 May, Mr Brereton
said:
News of this latest atrocity committed by
pro-integrationist militia can only reinforce how little reliance
can be placed on the Indonesian military and police to ensure the
planned ballot on East Timor's future will be conducted in an
atmosphere free of violence and fear. Just how many more killings
will it take for the Howard government to stop turning a blind eye
and press Jakarta to accept an effective UN peacekeeping force and
allow the East Timorese to decide their future, free from violence
and intimidation?(87)
In a statement in Parliament on 11 May, the
Foreign Minister Mr Downer said that preparations were continuing
for Australia's support for the 8 August ballot. Australia expected
to provide about 50 police officers to the UN mission. Two
Australian Electoral Commission officers were also being assigned
to UN headquarters to assist in election planning. Mr Downer added
that:
... we have no illusions about how tough the
road ahead is going to be. It will be an extremely difficult thing
to work through the tension that exist in East Timor-the rivalries,
the jealousies, the history of conflict-to a successful ballot
which we very much hope and expect to take place on 8
August.(88)
Australia in mid-May offered to host talks
between the contending East Timorese parties although the offer was
not taken up by Indonesia, which insisted such talks should take
place in that country.(89) In late May, Australia also supported
the critical comments made by Secretary General Kofi Annan on 22
May on the security situation in East Timor. On 25 May, Mr Downer
said:
Indonesia's armed forces must act to restore
security, bring those responsible for the violence and killings to
account, and take action to create an environment in which the East
Timorese can vote free from... intimidation.'(90)
Conclusion
East Timor since 1975 has suffered continued
instability and conflict in the aftermath of Indonesia's invasion
and incorporation. While many people in the territory appear to
support strongly continued integration, it is equally clear that a
large proportion of the population is dissatisfied with this status
and would wish to advocate independence if given the opportunity to
express their opinion. The continuing discord and conflict over the
status of East Timor has been a substantial problem for Indonesia
internationally and with some if its key bilateral relationships,
including Australia.
The end of the Soeharto regime has opened up a
new period of political change in Indonesia in which it has been
possible to reconsider many issues, including the status of East
Timor. The conclusion of the 5 May agreements between Indonesia,
Portugal and the United Nations provides a framework for a decision
to be made on the future of East Timor by the East Timorese
people-for the first time in the history of this territory. However
the realisation of this opportunity is threatened by problems both
within and outside East Timor.
Three inter-related issues are especially
important in relation to prospects for a peaceful and productive
reassessment of East Timor's status.
Firstly the legacy of conflict and bitterness
stemming from Indonesia's 23 year presence in East Timor now
threaten prospects for stability and decision-making on the
territory's future. The commitment of a large sector of the
population to independence is challenged by the commitment of those
who oppose this. The Indonesian armed forces-who have waged an
intense and costly struggle against the pro-independence
forces-have fostered and assisted pro-integrationist forces and
this has led to an increased potential for internal conflict. There
appears to be a real danger that the pro-integrationist militias,
with passive or active assistance from ABRI elements, will promote
a climate of instability which will make implementation of a free
and fair ballot difficult, if not impossible.
Secondly, the issue of East Timor's status has
been given increased attention at a time of acute strain in
Indonesia's economic and political situation. An attempt to create
a new democratic order is being made at the same time as the
country is attempting to cope with a severe set of economic
problems that saw GDP decrease by over 14 percent in 1998. The
impending parliamentary elections on 7 June, and the corresponding
scheduled delay of selection of a new President until November,
mean that the authority of the incumbent government of President
Habibie may well be open to question shortly. There have also been
evident divisions of opinion over the East Timor issue both within
the government and within the military. This is obviously a very
difficult political environment in which Indonesia's leaders must
attempt to pursue coherent policies towards East Timor.
Thirdly, the timing of the consultation process
in East Timor is a further factor for complexity because it is
placing a major decision on the territory's future in between
decision-making processes being conducted at the national level.
The Indonesian political system and national leadership must
attempt to address the East Timor issue in a situation in which the
8 August ballot occurs after the national parliamentary
elections on 7 June but before the election of a new
President and the installation of a new government, which are not
due to take place until November. Thus the people of East Timor are
attempting to decide on their future in the middle of a process of
political change and possible realignment at the national level.
The timing of the ballot in East Timor may well add to the
difficulties of securing a stable outcome which can be supported by
a stable and coherent government in Indonesia.
The signing of the 5 May agreements on East
Timor provides a framework for a decision on East Timor's future.
The key immediate question is whether a combination of Indonesian
forces, committed to a stable outcome, and international advisers
and monitors can be marshalled which can provide the secure
environment necessary for a credible act of consultation. It is
particularly important that progress be made rapidly in containing
and reducing the violence and intimidation which has been evident
in 1999, especially since April. The UN mission which is now being
prepared-with Australian support and participation-has an
opportunity to act as a catalyst to help break the cycle of
violence and encourage all the East Timorese parties and the
Indonesian police and armed forces to live up to the provisions of
the 5 May agreements.
If a stable environment cannot be fostered in
the lead up to the ballot, there is clearly a real possibility that
the opportunity which has now been created for a reassessment of
East Timor's status could be compromised if not lost entirely. This
would cause great damage both to East Timor and to Indonesia
itself. While East Timor is only one of a number of major
challenges with which Indonesia's leaders must attempt to deal,
Indonesia's handling of East Timor is likely to be highly important
to Indonesia's international image, credibility and capacity at a
time when international support is an essential requirement for
prospects for economic recovery and reform.
The successful implementation of the 5 May
agreements is also highly important for Australia's relations with
Indonesia. East Timor has been a divisive issue in the bilateral
relationship for the past 24 years. The 8 August ballot offers an
opportunity to resolve the status of East Timor and clear the way
for improved prospects for stability and economic progress for its
people. If this opportunity is delayed or lost, then the status of
East Timor is likely to continue to be a source of strain between
Australia and Indonesia at a time when the process of transition
and democratisation in Indonesia should be opening up new prospects
for productive and enduring relationships.
Endnotes
-
- For a detailed concise survey of East Timor's recent history
see Stephen Sherlock, A Pebble in Indonesia's Shoe, Information and
Research Services, Research Paper No. 8. 1995-96.
- Ibid, p. 5.
- Indonesia's transition process has been analysed in another
recent Information and Research Services paper-see Stephen
Sherlock, Indonesia's Dangerous Transition: The Politics of
Recovery and Democratisation, Research Paper No 18,
1998-99, 28 April 1999.
- 'Indonesia: East Timor Outlook', Oxford Analytica Daily
Brief, 10 September 1998.
- Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer, 'Australian
Government Historic Policy Shift on East Timor', Media Release, 12
January 1999.
- 'Indonesia: East Timor Outlook', Oxford Analytica Daily
Brief, 10 September 1998.
- The decision was announced by the Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ali Alatas and the Minister for Information Junus Yosfiah, see
'Timor Independence possible', The Canberra Times,
28 January 1999.
- 'Indonesia: Independence Offer', Oxford Analytica Daily
Brief, 2 February 1999.
- Tim Dodd, 'East Timor's fate rests on elections',
Australian Financial Review, 24 April 1999.
- Tim Dodd, 'Megawati to scrap Timor ballot: report', The
Australian Financial Review, 3 May 1999.
- John Aglionby, 'Megawati puts UN ballot in jeopardy', The
Sydney Morning Herald, 17 May 1999.
- Bob Lowry, Indonesia: Political Futures and Regional Security,
Working Paper No. 53, Australian Defence Studies Centre,
Canberra, March 1999, p. 9-13. Mr Lowry is the author of a
forthcoming Information and Research Services Research Paper on the
role of the Indonesian armed forces in the post Soeharto era.
- Don Greenlees, 'Spectre of Vietnam over riot-torn nation',
The Australian, 20-21 March, 1999.
- Mark Baker, 'Divided Conquerors', Sydney Morning
Herald, 24 April 1999.
- 'Indonesia: East Timor Violence', Oxford Analytica Daily
Brief, 13 April 1999.
- Peter Hartcher, 'Army is lying in wait for independence
voters', The Australian Financial Review, 1 May 1999; see
also Nicholas Stuart, 'Military follows orders', The Canberra
Times, 22 May 1999.
- See Stephen Sherlock 'Indonesia's Dangerous Transition: The
Politics of Recovery and Democratisation', Research Paper No
18. 1998-99, Information and Research Services, 28 April
1999, pp. 24-28.
- See for example Mark Baker, 'Divided conquerors', The
Sydney Morning Herald, 24 April 1999.
- 'Indonesia: East Timor Outlook', Oxford Analytica Daily
Brief, 10 September 1998.
- George J. Aditjondro, 'ABRI Inc' The Sydney Morning
Herald, 8 May 1999.
- Mr Gusmao has consistently called for a UN presence-see for
example, Peter Cole-Adams, 'Xanana asks Labor to push for UN
police', The Sydney Morning Herald, 9 March, 1999, However
Mr Horta has repeatedly said the opposite, for example, Nicholson,
B., 1999, 'No Need for troops, say Timorese', The Age, 9
March 1999.
- Mark Dodd, 'Militia law', Sydney Morning Herald, 24
April 1999.
- Comments by John Dauth Deputy Secretary, Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, to Senate Estimates Committee, 5 May 1999.
- Ibid.
- 'Indonesia: East Timor Violence', Oxford Analytica Daily
Brief, 13 April 1999.
- Ibid.
- Bruce Woodley, 'Red and white terror', The Weekend
Australian, 1-2 May 1999; Question of East Timor: Report
of the Secretary General, New York, 22 May 1999.
- Mark Davis, 'East Timor: licence to kill', in ABC TV Four
Corners program, 15 March, 1999, transcript p. 4.
- Bruce Woodley, 'Red and white terror', The Weekend
Australian, 1-2 May 1999.
- Lindsay Murdoch, 'Riot squad took part in massacre', The
Sydney Morning Herald, 9 April, 1999; John Zubrzycki,
'Observer mission into fear', The Australian, 25 May 1999.
- Comments by John Dauth, Deputy Secretary, Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, to Senate Estimates Committee, 5 May 1999.
- Lindsay Murdoch, 'Riot squad took part in massacre', The
Sydney Morning Herald, 9 April, 1999.
- 'The wild bunch', The Economist, 24 April 1999.
- Don Greenlees, 'Timorese rush to sign pact', The
Australian, 22 April 1999.
- Lindsay Murdoch, 'Villagers forces to camps', The Age,
7 May 1999.
- Lindsay Murdoch, 'Militiamen run riot in Dili', The Sydney
Morning Herald, 10 May 1999.
- Ibid.
- The best example being the AusAID, 1999, Report of AusAID
Fact-Finding Mission to East Timor 10 to 20 March 1999, issued
by the Office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 23 March
1999.
- AusAID, 1999, Report of AusAID Fact-Finding Mission to East
Timor 10 to 20 March 1999, issued by the Office of the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, 23 March 1999, p. 3.
- Tim Dodd, 'Trouble brewing for Timorese', The Australian
Financial Review Weekend, 15-16 May 1999.
- Paul Daley, 'Timor chaos poses tough choices for Canberra', in
The Age, 19 February 1999.
- Geoffrey Barker, 'Royalties can't support East Timor', in
The Australian Financial Review, 18 February 1999.
- Figures quoted by Geoffrey Barker, 'Royalties can't support
East Timor', The Australian Financial Review, 18 February
1999; Mr Downer confirmed the figures on the ABC TV's
Lateline program, 18 February 1999.
- Jill Jolliffe, 'Old colonist Portugal throws financial lifeline
to E Timor', The Sydney Morning Herald, 25 February 1999.
- J. R. Horta, 'Give East Timor's people their chance', The
International Herald Tribune, 4 March, 1999; and Michael
Backman, 'Can a Free East Timor Get Rich?', in The Asian Wall
Street Journal, 11 March, 1999.
- Louise Williams, 'New nation to get oil and gas wealth',
The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 February 1999.
- Louise Williams, 'New state will want a slice of Gap', The
Sydney Morning Herald, 27 February 1999.
- 'CNRT Statement on Timor Gap Oil', 21 July 1998.
- Greg Earl, 'Gusmao assures Gap treaty is safe', The
Australian Financial Review, 27 February 1999.
- Louise Williams, 'New nation to get oil and gas wealth',
The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 February 1999.
- Ibid.
- Ibid, and Louise Williams, 'New state will want a slice of
Gap', The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 February 1999.
- Two major agreements were signed on 5 May: the 'Agreement
Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of the East
Timorese Through a Direct Ballot', and the 'Agreement Between the
Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question
of East Timor'. The latter agreement includes a detailed Annex on
'A Constitutional Framework for A Special Autonomy for East Timor'
which sets out the powers of the proposed 'Special Autonomous
Region of East Timor'. Copies of the full text of these agreements
are available to Senators and Members on request.
- 'Indonesia signs East Timor agreement', Associated Press, 6 May
1999.
- Tim Dodd, 'Timor pledges to accept ballot', Australian
Financial Review, 7 May 1999.
- 'Next Timor hurdle to curb militia', The West
Australian, 7 May 1999.
- Question of East Timor: Report of the Secretary
General, New York, 22 May 1999.
- Karen Poldglaze, 'Gesture made, but Timor in a gun', The
Canberra Times, 9 May 1999.
- 'RI still responsible for law and order in East Timor', The
Jakarta Post, 20 May 1999.
- Hamish McDonald, 'Wiranto's military power threatens East Timor
vote', The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 May 1999.
- 'Next Timor hurdle to curb militia', The West
Australian, 7 May 1999.
- Lindsay Murdoch, 'Militia hand over guns', The Sunday
Age, 9 May 1999.
- Mark Dodd, 'UN demands action on militia violence', The
Age, 18 May 1999.
- Mark Dodd, 'Military caught in the act', The Age, 21
May 1999.
- Mark Riley, 'UN defends its victim bias', The Sydney
Morning Herald 22 May 1999.
- Mark Dodd, 'Human rights in East Timor at new low: report',
The Sunday Age, 23 May 1999.
- Question of East Timor: Report of the Secretary
General, New York, 22 May 1999.
- See http://www.hrw.org/.
- See for example, the Hon. Laurie Brereton, 'East Timor: Reports
of Killings at Liquica', News Release, Office of Laurie Brereton
MP, 7 April, 1999.
- Alan Dupont and Anthony Bergin, 'UN force critical to peace in
Timor', The Australian Financial Review, 29 March 1999.
- A Current Issues Brief by Dr Adam Cobb will discuss issues and
scenarios in relation to a possible UN peacekeeping role and the
implications for Australia if Australian forces were to be
involved.
- Alexander Downer, 'Australian government historic policy shift
on East Timor', Media Release, Officer of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, 12 January 1999.
- Geoffrey Barker, 'Indonesian Ambassador rebukes Brereton',
The Australian Financial Review, 6 February, 1999.
- Michelle Grattan, 'Australia ready to join UN election team in
Timor', The Sydney Morning Herald, 15 March, 1999.
- Paul Daley, 'Downer sets out Timor troops plan', The
Age, 1 April 1999.
- Comments by John Dauth Deputy Secretary, Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, to Senate Estimates Committee, 5 May 1999.
- Laurie Brereton, 'Australia and East Timor', speech to the
Queensland Branch of the AIIA, 4 February 1999.
- Ibid, p. 22.
- Ibid, p. 2.
- Ibid, p. 18.
- Paul Daley, 'Whitlam's Timor tragic', The Age, 5
February 1999; Paul Cleary, 'Labor's unlikely conscience', The
Sydney Morning Herald, 20 February 1999.
- 'Timor more bloodshed warning', The Canberra Times, 27
April 1999.
- Lindsay Murdoch and Peter Cole-Adams, 'Freedom slaughtered',
The Sydney Morning Herald, 19 April 1999.
- Tim Dodd, 'Australia commits to Timor poll', Australian
Financial Review, 28 April 1999.
- Don Greenlees, 'A full and free choice', The
Australian, 28 April 1999.
- Gervase Greene, 'Brereton ban backed by Downer', The
Age, 12 May 1999.
- 'Violence stifles start of campaign', The Sydney Morning
Herald, 20 May 1999.
- Australia, House of Representatives, Debates, 11 May 1999, p.
4111.
- Lindsay Murdoch, 'Alatas spurns bid for Australian peace
talks', The Age, 21 May 1999.
- Mark Riley and Peter Cole-Adams, 'UN steps up Timor pressure',
The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 May 1999.
Appendix
A: Chronology of Major Events
Chronology of East Timor
1642 - Portuguese invade Timor in strength and
set up a trading post. Use the island as a source of sandalwood,
prized for its aroma and medicinal oil.
1749 - Battle of Penfui, between Dutch and
Portuguese forces, results in Timor being split, with the Dutch
taking the western half and the Portuguese the east.
1942 - Japanese forces invade East Timor,
fighting fierce battles with Australian troops in which up to 60
000 East Timorese are killed. Low level guerrilla fighting
continues but territory under Japanese administration until
1945.
25 April 1974 - Armed forces coup in Portugal
ends dictatorship of Antonio Salazar, leading to a new government
which begins a policy of decolonisation.
27 August 1975 - Portuguese governor and
administration withdraw from East Timor capital Dili to offshore
island of Atauro.
6 October 1975 - Five Australia-based
journalists are killed in the East Timor border village of Balibo.
Indonesia says they were killed in crossfire during a skirmish.
Others allege they were deliberately killed by an army unit led by
Indonesia's current information minister, Yunus Yosfiah.
28 November 1975 - After a brief civil war,
left-wing Fretilin party declares East Timor independent.
29 November 1975 - Indonesian Foreign Minister
Adam Malik signs a declaration integrating the territory into
Indonesia.
7 December 1975 - Indonesian troops invade East
Timor. An estimated 200 000 people-a third of the population-die
during the military crackdown and famine that follow.
17 July 1976 - President Soeharto signs bill
formally declaring East Timor Indonesia's 27th province. United
Nations does not recognise this and says Portugal remains
administering power.
20 January 1978 - Australia gives de
facto recognition to Indonesia's control of East Timor.
February 1979 - Australia extends de
jure recognition to Indonesia's rule in East Timor.
12 November 1991 - Indonesian troops open fire
on a procession on the way to Dili's Santa Cruz cemetery after a
funeral for an anti-Indonesia activist. An official report says 50
people died, while human rights groups say at least 180 were
killed.
20 November 1992 - Guerrilla leader Xanana
Gusmao captured. The following year he is convicted of subversion
and sentenced to life in prison, later commuted to 20 years.
12 January 1995 - Indonesian troops kill six
civilians after Fretilin attack in which one soldier was
wounded.
11 October 1996 - East Timor Bishop Carlos Belo
and self-exiled resistance spokesman Jose Ramos Horta awarded Nobel
Peace prize.
24 December 1996 - Tens of thousands greet Belo
on his return from Europe. Off-duty Indonesian soldier carrying
pistol killed by crowd at Dili cathedral amid rumours of plot to
kill Belo.
1 May 1998 - Indonesian President Soeharto is
forced from power amid a crippling economic crisis, mass protests
against his 32-year rule and savage riots in Jakarta. He is
replaced by BJ Habibie.
9 June 1998 - Habibie tells Reuters in an
interview he will consider offering 'special status' and wider
autonomy to East Timor but insists the territory will remain part
of Indonesia. Portugal rejects the idea.
10 June 1998 - Thousands of students hold a
pro-independence rally in East Timor. In following weeks, several
mass rallies are held by Timorese students in East Timor and
Jakarta.
18 June 1998 - Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali
Alatas offers new proposals to Portugal to try to settle the East
Timor dispute.
27 June 1998 - Hundreds of pro-independence
protesters clash with government supporters in Dili after a youth
is shot by troops trying to quell an earlier clash outside the
city.
29 June 1998 - Troops open fire on protesters in
Baucau, killing one, during a visit of three European Union
envoys.
24 July 1998 - Indonesia announces a program of
troops withdrawals from the territory.
4 August 1998 - Indonesia and Portugal begin a
new round of UN-sponsored talks. They agree to discuss Indonesia's
proposals for autonomy for East Timor.
8 August 1998 - Indonesia says all combat troops
withdrawn.
30 October 1998 - After persistent allegations
over the month that Indonesia has been secretly building up troops
and attacking rebel forces, leaked military documents show troop
numbers in East Timor have not been cut despite the government's
claims.
22 November 1998 - A former governor of East
Timor says 44 people were killed in a military crackdown. The
International Committee of the Red Cross says its investigations do
not substantiate the report.
12 January 1999 - Australia announces a major
change of policy on East Timor, saying it backs allowing the
territory to vote on whether to become independent after a period
of autonomy.
27 January 1999 - Indonesia announces it may let
East Timor break away if East Timorese reject an offer of autonomy
within Indonesia. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas says East Timor rebel
leader Xanana Gusmao will be moved from jail to house arrest, still
in Jakarta.
30 January 1999 - Indonesian and Portuguese
diplomats arrived in Lisbon and Jakarta to establish the first
diplomatic ties between the two countries since Indonesia's
invasion of East Timor.
5 February 1999 - Gusmao says he has no
ambitions to lead East Timor, either as an independent nation or as
part of Indonesia with substantial autonomy.
10 February, 1999 - Gusmao is moved to house
arrest at 47, Jalan Percetakan Negara VII, near Cipinang Prison in
Jakarta. The residence of a former prison official is officially
designated a branch of the prison.
17 April 1999 - 25 people reported to have been
killed by militia forces in Dili
27 April 1999 - Prime Minister Howard and
President Habibie and senior ministers meet in Bali for talks on
East Timor
5 May 1999 - Agreements signed in New York
between Indonesia, Portugal and the United Nations to provide for a
ballot on 8 August on a proposal for special autonomy for East
Timor
Source: Based on Australian Associated Press
report, 12 January 1999