Updated 2 February 2017
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Janet Phillips
Social Policy Section
Executive
summary
- Both Coalition and Labor governments have adopted and maintained
a variety of border protection and anti- people smuggling measures in response
to several waves of asylum seekers arriving unauthorised in Australian waters
by boat since 2001.
- Both major parties are in general agreement on many of the key measures
that have been put in place to deal with these issues. This includes mandatory
detention for unauthorised boat arrivals introduced in the 1990s by the Keating
(Labor) Government, and offshore processing arrangements in the Pacific first
introduced by the Howard (Coalition) Government in 2001.
- However, there are some policy differences, in particular whether
asylum seekers should be offered temporary or permanent protection and what
size Australia’s formal annual intake of refugees and other humanitarian
entrants should be.
- An Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers was established in 2012 to
advise the Australian Government on ‘the best way forward’ to address these
issues. Subsequently, the Panel noted that there ‘were no quick or simple
solutions’ but argued for an integrated set of short-term and long-term
proposals. The short-term proposals included both disincentives (such as the
re-introduction of an offshore processing regime) and incentives (such as an
immediate increase in Australia’s Humanitarian Program). Long-term proposals
included recommendations that the Government create better migration pathways
and protection opportunities for refugees coordinated within an ‘enhanced
regional cooperation framework’.
- Many stakeholders favour a similar approach and have urged the
Australian Government to work towards creating better protection opportunities
for refugees in the region under a variety of burden-sharing arrangements. It
is argued that this could be negotiated within existing regional cooperative
arrangements such as the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in
Persons and Related Transnational Crime.
- Over recent years many short-term deterrence measures have been
introduced by both Labor and Coalition governments, but many more long-term
incentives or proposals along the lines of those recommended by the Expert
Panel have largely not been pursued or are yet to come to fruition.
- While many argue that Australia’s annual humanitarian intake is relatively
generous, the magnitude of the issues arising from the growing number of people
seeking protection globally is daunting and poses huge challenges to all the
destination countries, including Australia. Many stakeholders argue that one of
the biggest challenges for the government of any destination country is to
develop asylum policy that focuses on international, not domestic, concerns and
offers sustainable long-term solutions.
Contents
Executive summary
Introduction
Policy similarities
Offshore processing
Boat turnbacks
Mandatory immigration detention
Regional cooperation, border
protection and anti-people smuggling
Policy differences
Temporary not permanent protection
Australia’s Humanitarian Program.
What are the alternatives?
Conclusion
Appendix
Table 1: A summary of key policy
similarities and differences
Note: all links in this paper were accessed as of 18
January 2017.
Introduction
It has been four decades since the first boats carrying
Indochinese asylum seekers arrived on Australia’s shores.[1]
Since then public perceptions or concerns over unauthorised maritime arrivals continue
to strongly influence government policy and to be an emotive and divisive
political issue.
While the numbers have fluctuated over the years, there was
a significant rise in unauthorised arrivals between 2008 and 2013. This placed
more pressure on both Coalition and Labor governments to adopt and maintain
measures that were seen to address border security concerns, combat people
smuggling and ‘stop the boats’.[2]
In response to these pressures, governments from both major parties have
supported increasingly severe deterrence measures in an attempt to reduce the
number of unauthorised maritime arrivals (UMAs).[3]
Given that there is bipartisan support for several of the
Government’s current deterrence measures (such as offshore processing in the
Pacific) it could be argued that the policy differences between the two major
parties are minimal. In fact, there has been bi-partisan support for most of
the policy responses and deterrence measures developed by successive Labor and
Coalition governments since the 1970s, including the introduction of mandatory
detention for all boat arrivals by the Keating (Labor) Government in 1991.
The Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers established in 2012 to
advise the Australian Government on ‘the best way forward’, acknowledged the
complexities of the issues arising from the arrival of asylum seekers by boat,
noting that there ‘were no quick or simple solutions’.[4]
The Panel argued for an integrated suite of short-term and
long-term proposals that included deterrence measures such as the
re-introduction of an offshore processing regime. Long-term non-deterrence
proposals included recommendations that the Government create better migration
pathways and protection opportunities for refugees coordinated within an
‘enhanced regional cooperation framework’.
However, to date many long-term
proposals along the lines of those recommended by the Panel have not been
pursued by either of the major parties. It is argued that without long-term
effective mechanisms in place, perceptions of ‘good refugees’ and ‘bad
refugees’ will continue to be ‘pitted against one another’ in the public
debate.[5]
This paper provides a comparison of key Labor and Coalition
asylum policies since 2001 when the Howard (Coalition) Government first
introduced the practice of offshore processing to deal with previous waves of
boat arrivals. It includes an overview of the recommendations made by the
Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers in 2012 and analysis by experts in the field
regarding the policy alternatives. A summary of the key policy similarities and
differences is provided in an appendix.
Policy
similarities
Both of the major parties believe that tough deterrence
measures are necessary to stem the flow of asylum seeker boats to Australia. In
particular, both parties currently support the practice of transferring asylum
seekers who have arrived by boat to offshore processing centres in Papua New
Guinea (PNG) and Nauru; the practice of mandatorily detaining all unauthorised
maritime arrivals; and the need to maintain tough anti-people smuggling and
border protection measures in cooperation with neighbouring countries in the
region. In 2015, Labor also softened its opposition to boat ‘turnbacks’ and
conceded that ‘provided it can be done so safely, a future Labor Government
will retain the option of turning boats around’.[6]
Although the Rudd (Labor) Government initially disbanded the
Howard Government’s ‘Pacific Solution’ in 2008, Australia’s offshore processing
regime was reinstated by the Gillard (Labor) Government in 2010 and further
toughened by the Rudd Government in 2013 in response to a rise in boat
arrivals. As a result, it is true to say that both Labor and the Coalition
support the following deterrence-focused measures and policies currently in
place in Australia.
Offshore
processing
In September 2001 the Howard Government introduced the
concept of third country offshore processing through the Migration Amendment
(Excision from the Migration Zone) Bill 2001.[7]
This excised Christmas, Ashmore, Cartier and Cocos (Keeling) Islands from the
migration zone for specific migration purposes in order to discourage unlawful
(without a valid visa) non-citizens from arriving unauthorised on Australia’s
shores by boat.
The excision regime was introduced with the support of both
major political parties.[8]
The amendment meant that any unauthorised maritime arrivals at an excised
offshore place were barred from making valid visa applications unless the Immigration
Minister determined that it was in the public interest to permit them to do so
and 'lifted the bar'.
Unauthorised boat arrivals after that point were intercepted
at sea and either returned to Indonesia (commonly referred to as boat ‘turnbacks’
or ‘turnarounds’) or removed to third countries in the Pacific (either Nauru or
Manus Island in PNG). Any claims made by those people for refugee status could
then be processed outside the jurisdiction of Australian courts, with no
guarantee of a resettlement place in Australia. This practice became colloquially
known as the 'Pacific Solution'. Under this regime a total of 1,637 people were
detained in the Nauru and Manus Island offshore processing facilities from
September 2001 to 2008.[9]
Of these, 1,153 (70 per cent) were ultimately resettled to Australia or other
countries.[10]
Although there was bipartisan support for the introduction
of the excision regime, in December 2002 Labor released its refugee policy, Protecting Australia and protecting the Australian way: Labor's
policy on asylum seekers and refugees which stated that the Nauru and Manus Island
facilities were too costly and the Pacific Solution was unsustainable.[11]
Subsequently, in the lead up to the 2007 election, Labor made it clear that it
would ‘end the so-called "Pacific Solution", with its huge cost to
Australian taxpayers’.[12]
There were almost no boats arriving when the Rudd Government
came to power at the end of 2007. Subsequently, on 8 February 2008 it was announced
that the centres on Manus and Nauru would no longer be used and that any future
unauthorised boat arrivals would be processed on Australian territory, largely
on Christmas Island.[13]
However, in 2010, in response to rising numbers of boat
arrivals, the Labor Government reversed this decision. In her first major
policy speech in July 2010, Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced that the
Labor Government had begun discussions with neighbouring countries over a
proposal to re-establish ‘a regional processing centre for the purpose of
receiving and processing irregular entrants to the region’.[14]
Throughout this period the Coalition also supported the reintroduction of an
offshore processing regime, but favoured the reinstatement of a processing
centre specifically on Nauru.[15]
The Gillard Government subsequently held discussions with a
number of countries including East Timor, PNG, and Malaysia. On 25 July 2011,
the Australian Government signed an asylum seeker transfer agreement with the
Malaysian Government.[16]
The Government also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the PNG Government
on the possible transfer and assessment of certain asylum seekers to an
offshore processing centre in Manus Province in August 2011.[17]
However, on 31 August 2011 the High Court found that the
Immigration Minister’s declaration of Malaysia as a country to which asylum
seekers could be taken for processing was invalid under the Migration Act
as Malaysia was not a party to the 1951 Refugees Convention and did not offer
protection to, nor process, asylum seekers.[18]
Although the Malaysian arrangement remained the Gillard Government’s policy
preference, without the support of the Coalition and the Greens for legislative
amendment it was not possible to pursue this option.[19]
Offshore processing in Nauru and PNG was announced as an
alternative in August 2012.[20]
Prior to that moment the Labor Government had rejected Coalition pressure to
reinstate Nauru as a viable alternative for offshore processing. It was
rejected on the basis that it would cost too much and would not deter asylum
seekers intent on travelling to Australia by boat as most would inevitably end
up being resettled to Australia—as was the case under the ‘Pacific Solution’.[21]
However, in response to a recommendation in the report by
the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers, the Government announced that offshore
processing would be re-introduced at both locations. Certain asylum seekers
would be selected for processing under a ‘no advantage’ principle. Although
this principle was to be applied to all unauthorised arrivals, what this meant
in practice was only ever explained in very general terms: a ‘no advantage
principle’ would apply whereby ‘irregular migrants gain no benefit by choosing
to circumvent regular migration mechanisms’.[22]
On 29 August 2012, the Australian Government signed a MOU
with the Government of Nauru and on 8 September 2012 the Government signed an
updated MOU with the PNG Government.[23]
The first transfer to Nauru was on 14 September 2012 and the first transfer to
PNG was on 21 November 2012.[24]
The Gillard Government also extended the excision policy to
include the mainland through the Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime
Arrivals and Other Measures) Bill 2012. This Bill sought to implement
Recommendation 14 from the report by the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers 2012 that
all unauthorised maritime arrivals must have the same lawful status as those
who arrive at ‘excised offshore places’, chiefly Christmas Island, Cocos
(Keeling) Islands and Ashmore and Cartier Islands.[25] The Bill passed the Senate in May 2013.
In June 2013, Kevin Rudd was reinstated as Prime Minister
and subsequently announced even tougher measures with the following significant
changes to Australia’s asylum seeker policy:
- all asylum seekers (not a selected few) who travelled to
Australia by boat with no valid visa would be sent offshore for processing and
resettlement
- those found to be refugees would not be resettled in Australia
- people found not to be refugees would be returned to their home
country (or a country where they had a right of residence) or held in a transit
facility indefinitely and
- Australian Federal Police would pay rewards of up to $200,000 for
information leading to the arrest and conviction of people organising people
smuggling ventures to Australia.[26]
So, under this policy all, not just some, asylum seekers who
arrived by boat would be transferred to PNG for processing and if found to be
refugees could also be resettled there. The Prime Minister made it clear that
they would never be resettled in Australia. A similar agreement was later
signed with the Government of Nauru in August 2013.[27]
Throughout the Gillard and Rudd governments, a primary focus
of the Opposition was to assert that, if elected, a Coalition government would ‘not
allow illegal boat arrivals and people smugglers to either determine
Australia’s immigration programme or undermine the Australian people’s
confidence in the programme’.[28]
Subsequently, during the 2013 election period the Coalition made it clear that
offshore processing would remain under an Abbott Government and that a
military-led, whole-of-government response, known as Operation Sovereign
Borders, would be introduced to coordinate the Coalition’s offshore processing
and anti-people smuggling measures.[29]
With the election of the Coalition Government in September
2013, offshore processing (including the tougher measures introduced by the
Rudd Government) remained firmly in place. As planned, under the new Abbott
Government, Operation Sovereign Borders was introduced and Australia’s third
country processing regimes in PNG and Nauru continued to operate.[30]
Labor’s continued support for offshore processing under the
Coalition Government was confirmed in July 2015 in Labor's asylum seeker policy.[31]
However, the policy criticised the lengthy processing times under the current
regime and proposed independent oversight of Australian-funded offshore
facilities by the Commonwealth Ombudsman (this stance was reinforced in Labor’s
2016 election policy documents).[32]
In November 2015, the
media reported that Labor MP, Melissa Parke, had put forward a motion to the
Labor Caucus calling on the Government to close the offshore processing centres
on Nauru and Manus Island unless conditions at the centres improved. An amended motion
was passed calling on the Government to ‘ensure the conditions of offshore
detention meet with human rights standards and independent oversight or, if the
Government is unable or unwilling to implement these standards, to close the
centres on Manus Island and Nauru forthwith’. It also committed a future Labor
Government to ensuring ‘the conditions of offshore processing meet with human
rights standards and negotiate with PNG and Nauru for independent oversight of
these facilities and calls on the government to do the same’.[33]
In December 2015, the
Shadow Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, Richard Marles,
delivered a speech to the Sydney Institute reinforcing Labor’s criticisms of processing
delays in offshore processing centres and of the lack of resettlement options.[34]
The speech noted that ‘to really resolve the fate of the bulk of asylum seekers
on Manus Island and Nauru there needs to be a credible third country option
negotiated by the Australian Government’ and
‘Australia must redefine its relationship with the UNHCR. It is this which will
bring our nation in from the cold and offer some sort of hope that sensible
conversations can be had about the future of those asylum seekers and refugees
on Nauru and Manus Island’.
At a United Nations
Summit for Refugees and Migrants in September 2016, UN Member States adopted
the New York
Declaration for Refugees and Migrants which set out a new
approach to responding to refugees through a Comprehensive
Refugee Response Framework.[35]
The Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, attended the Summit and released a
statement shortly afterwards outlining that Australia would ‘participate in a
US-led multilateral program to resettle refugees from Central America’.[36]
The significance of this announcement was unclear, but many argued that this
arrangement would lead to a refugee resettlement ‘swap’ with the US Government.[37]
In November 2016, the
Prime Minister announced that the Australian Government had reached a third
country resettlement agreement with the US Government for an unspecified number
of refugees in Nauru and Manus Island (although is not clear whether this
agreement will proceed under the Trump administration):
The Australian Government has reached a further third country
resettlement agreement for refugees currently in regional processing centres.
Resettlement arrangements for those found to be refugees in Nauru and Manus
Island already exist with Papua New Guinea and Cambodia. This further agreement
is with the United States and it will not under any circumstance be available
to any future illegal maritime arrivals (IMAs) to Australia.[38]
In summary, while Labor is critical of current processing
delays and there have been minor policy differences over the years, both the
Coalition and Labor remain strongly in support of the excision and offshore
processing regimes originally introduced by the Howard Government.
Boat
turnbacks
Until relatively recently, one notable policy difference
between the two major parties centred on the practice of boat ‘turnarounds’ or
‘turnbacks’ as employed by the Howard Government. Before coming to power, the then
Leader of the Opposition, Tony Abbott, insisted that within a week of taking
office he would instruct the Australian Navy to turn boats back and prevent
them from entering Australian waters or arriving onshore:
Within a week of taking office, I would give
new orders to the navy that, where it is safe to do so, under the usual
chain-of-command procedures, based on the advice of commanders-on-the-spot,
Indonesian flagged, Indonesian crewed and Indonesian home-ported vessels
without lawful reason to be headed to Australia would be turned around and
escorted back to Indonesian waters’.[39]
There were only ever a few instances of successful boat 'turnbacks'
during the term of the Howard Government, due in part to the practical
complexities involved.[40]
However, Mr Abbott consistently made it clear on many occasions in the lead up
to the 2013 election that turning boats around could again be an option ‘in the
right circumstances’ under a Coalition Government.[41]
Not long after the Coalition formed Government in September
2013, the new Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, Scott Morrison,
outlined his priorities to ensure people arrived in Australia ‘the right way’:
And we are encouraging people to come the right way...People
who wish to make a contribution to our nation, to our society and our economy
from day one. They're the people we want to come. Disorderly immigration
through illegal arrivals who violate the integrity of our migration programme
damages community support and confidence in that programme.[42]
The Abbott Government promptly implemented its boat
‘turnback’ policy and the first boat was successfully turned around in December
2013.[43]
However, the Abbott Government initially refused to provide
any information on whether there had been any successful ‘on-water disruptions’
or boat ‘turnbacks’, citing operational reasons.[44]
In January 2014 Mr Abbott made the following media comments explaining the
Government’s position:
If stopping the boats means being criticised because I'm not
giving information that would be of use to people
smugglers, so be it ... If we were at war we
wouldn't be giving out information that is of use to the enemy just
because we might have an idle curiosity about it ourselves.[45]
However, on several occasions since the practice was
reintroduced in December 2013, the Coalition Government has acknowledged that a
number of boat ‘turnbacks’ have occurred.[46]
For example, one Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB) update noted that 23 boats
with 685 people on board had been turned back between December 2013 and
December 2015.[47]
Some other details have also emerged since OSB was
established, including confirmation that several (orange) lifeboats had been
purchased ‘to achieve the aims of Operation Sovereign Borders’, presumably to
assist with boat ‘turnbacks’.[48]
Other measures, such as a proposal canvassed in the lead up to the 2013
election to ‘buy back’ boats in Indonesia, do not appear to have been pursued.[49]
During Senate Estimates in November 2013, the Commander of Operation Sovereign
Borders Joint Agency Task Force, Lieutenant General Angus Campbell, made it
clear that no boats had been purchased from Indonesia due to reluctance on the
part of the Indonesian Government to pursue such an option for the foreseeable
future.[50]
Although Labor did not support the Howard Government’s
policies to turn boats around, in the lead up to the 2007 election the then
leader of the Opposition, Kevin Rudd, asserted that a Labor Government would be
prepared to consider turning seaworthy vessels back:
You'd turn them back ... Deterrence is
effective through the detention system but also your preparedness to take appropriate
action as the vessels approach Australian waters on the high seas.[51]
The Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers 2012 report also did
not rule out the use of ‘turnbacks’ if ‘appropriate regional and bilateral
arrangements’ were in place.[52]
During debate on the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the
Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014, Shadow Minister for Immigration and
Border Protection, Richard Marles, foreshadowed that although the Australian
Labor Party (ALP) would be opposing the legislation due to several concerns (in
particular the proposed re-introduction of Temporary Protection Visas), Labor was
open to the question of turning back boats.[53]
In July 2015, the ALP
agreed to amend its position on boat ‘turnbacks’ after heated debate during its
annual National Conference. Subsequently Labor's asylum seeker policy outlined the
detail, stating that ‘Provided it can be done so safely, a future Labor
Government will retain the option of turning boats around’.[54]
Mandatory immigration detention
Australia’s policy of mandatory detention (that is, the
legal requirement to detain all non-citizens who do not hold a valid visa) was
introduced by the Keating (Labor) Government in the early 1990s.[55]
Since its introduction, Labor and the Coalition have continued to support the
policy. Although the numbers fluctuate, the detainee population is usually comprised
of unauthorised boat arrivals, visa overstayers and others (such as those who
have had their visas cancelled).
With a surge in boat arrivals in the late 1990s, the challenge
of providing additional and appropriate accommodation to avoid overcrowding and
a deterioration of conditions was a significant one for the Howard Government.
It proved to be the case again for the Labor Government following a surge in
arrivals between 2008 and 2013.[56]
In response, both the Howard (Coalition) and Labor governments
made provisions for additional accommodation during their terms; however, the
detention of asylum seekers in often remote locations received a great deal of
public attention. In particular, the duration and conditions of their detention
have been controversial issues that have plagued successive governments. During
the Howard Government, the conditions in detention centres, the length of
detention and the physical and psychological effects on detainees in offshore
processing centres and in onshore detention facilities such as Woomera
attracted a great deal of criticism.[57]
Refugee advocates and other stakeholders were also critical of the mandatory
detention regime that continued under the Rudd and Gillard Governments. The
Rudd Government’s temporary suspension in April 2010 of the processing of
asylum seekers from Sri Lanka and Afghanistan arriving by boat was criticised
on the basis that it might lead to their indefinite detention.[58]
The Gillard Government subsequently lifted this suspension, but over-crowding,
delays in processing, and protests and rioting in both onshore and offshore
detention centres attracted further criticism.
Subsequently, in 2010 and 2011, the Gillard Government
expanded community detention (elements of which were initiated originally as a
pilot program under the Howard Government) to ease the pressure on the
detention network.[59]
More criticism followed when the Gillard’s Government’s ‘no
advantage’ principle, introduced in August 2012 (as recommended by the Expert
Panel on Asylum Seekers), prompted concerns about processing delays for asylum
seekers. As mentioned previously, under the ‘no advantage’ principle the Panel
proposed that ‘irregular migrants gain no benefit by choosing to circumvent
regular migration mechanisms’.[60]
In essence, boat arrivals would remain in immigration detention and gain no
time advantage over applicants waiting overseas for resettlement in Australia.
In an attempt to further release pressure on the detention
network, the Gillard Government introduced the practice of releasing
significant numbers of asylum seekers on bridging visas (BVEs) in November
2012.[61]
Others remained in immigration detention (in either closed facilities or in the
community) or were transferred to offshore processing centres in Nauru and PNG.
However, the Gillard Government continued to assert that all
who arrived after 13 August 2012—regardless of whether they were in ‘held’
detention (in a secure detention facility), in offshore processing centres or
released into the community on BVEs—would be subject to the ‘no advantage’
policy, although it was not clear what this meant in practice.[62]
During this period Opposition Leader Tony Abbott continued
to state that while a Coalition Government would continue the policy of
offshore processing, it would send all, not some, boat arrivals offshore and
not detain any new arrivals in onshore detention facilities at all:
‘We really will send illegal arrivals
by boat offshore to places like Manus and Nauru for processing. And it won't
just be one in ten or one in 20—they'll all go off’.[63]
On the return of Kevin Rudd as Prime Minister in June 2013,
the Rudd Government also made the decision that all boat arrivals, not some,
would be transferred to PNG for processing.[64]
A similar agreement with the Government of Nauru was announced in August 2013.[65]
Under these new regional settlement arrangements all UMAs arriving after 19 July
2013 would be subject to transfer, processing and even resettlement offshore:
A cornerstone of this regional approach is
to ensure people smugglers do not have a product to sell because people that
come by boat without a visa will not be settled in Australia.[66]
On the election of the Abbott Government in September 2013
this regime was maintained. Under Operation Sovereign Borders, which commenced
on 18 September 2013, all unauthorised maritime arrivals whose vessels were not
turned back would only remain in immigration detention facilities (usually on
Christmas Island) for a short period before being transferred offshore. At the
first Operation Sovereign Borders media briefing on 23 September 2013, the new
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, Scott Morrison, made it clear
that the Government would transfer all new boat arrivals from Australian
immigration detention facilities to PNG or Nauru within 48 hours of their
arrival.[67]
In summary, both Coalition and Labor governments have
remained firmly in support of Australia’s mandatory immigration detention
policy since it was introduced in the 1990s. The Coalition and Labor also
support mandatory detention for unauthorised maritime arrivals (on board any
boats that are not successfully turned around) while transfer arrangements to
offshore processing centres are made. Australia’s mandatory detention policy
also applies to any asylum seekers temporarily transferred to Australia from
offshore processing centres for medical treatment.
Regional cooperation, border protection and
anti-people smuggling
Labor and the Coalition argue that people smuggling is an
unacceptable organised criminal activity that endangers innocent people’s lives.
Both have remained committed to increased cooperation with Indonesia and other
countries in the region and to creating harsher anti-people smuggling measures. Coalition and Labor governments have also allocated significant
funding towards supporting border protection, regional cooperation and
anti-people smuggling measures in the region for many years.[68]
Following a surge in unauthorised boat arrivals in the late
1990s and early 2000s, the Howard Government introduced a number of new border
protection measures. This included increased border surveillance and a people
smuggling 'disruption' campaign aimed at preventing boats from leaving
Indonesia in the first place.[69]
In 2002, the Australian and Indonesian Governments were also instrumental in
establishing the Bali Process to develop regional cooperation on people
smuggling, trafficking in persons and the irregular movement of people. The
Bali Process is a forum made up of 48 member countries and other key
stakeholders, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).[70]
With another surge in the number of boat arrivals from
September 2008, the Rudd Government was under pressure to further address
border security and people smuggling issues. In the 2009–10 Budget, the Rudd
Government allocated $654 million across several portfolios to fund a
whole-of-government strategy to combat people smuggling and help address the
problem of unauthorised boat arrivals.[71]
The Rudd Government also secured the passage of legislation which created new
people smuggling offences.
Prior to the 2010 election, Julia Gillard made it clear that
her Government would continue to pursue these anti-people smuggling initiatives
through various whole-of-government measures and the Bali Process.[72]
In March 2011, the Bali Process member countries, including Australia, agreed
to a new Regional Cooperation Framework (RCF) that would ‘enable interested
Bali Process members to establish practical arrangements aimed at enhancing the
region’s response to irregular movement through consistent processing of asylum
claims, durable solutions for refugees, the sustainable return of those not
owed protection and targeting of people smuggling enterprises’.[73]
Although a Regional Support Office subsequently
opened in Bangkok on 10 September 2012, many argued that very
little progress was being made in implementing the full objectives of the RCF.[74]
Instead, the UNHCR expressed concerns that a growing focus on ‘regional
deterrence’ was detracting from the progress made through regional cooperative
frameworks such as the Bali Process:
UNHCR is deeply troubled that as long as the
focus remains primarily on deterrence, the humanitarian, ethical and legal
basis of asylum, and the protection of refugees, will be seriously undermined.[75]
... some significant steps have been taken within ASEAN, as
well as the Bali Process framework, notably through the endorsement of a
Regional Cooperation Framework and the establishment of a Regional Support
Office [RSO] ... We now need to move beyond the language of cooperation towards
practical and concrete measures and arrangements ...
Information campaigns, restrictive border practices and
punitive measures have proved not to be adequate to prevent or dissuade
movements in these circumstances. They do not work on their own. Worse, in the
absence of a refugee protection and migration framework, deterrence measures
can raise the stakes and therefore render the market for smugglers and
traffickers more risky, but also more profitable.[76]
In its 2013 election document on a regional deterrence
framework, the Coalition promised ‘a higher level of operational engagement’ in
the region through the Bali Process and committed to both regional cooperation
and regional deterrence activities with Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Malaysia ‘to
combat people smuggling’.[77]
Some commentators were critical of many of these measures (for example, the introduction
of tougher penalties aimed at those arrested on people-smuggling offences) on
the basis that they did not effectively target people smuggling syndicates, but
simply punished low-level offenders, such as the possibly unsuspecting
Indonesian fishermen who operate the boats.[78]
On coming to power in September 2013, the Coalition
Government announced it would boost operational activities with the Government
of Indonesia to prevent people smuggling.[79]
The Abbott Government’s subsequent Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal
Outlook 2013–14 (MYEFO) and 2014–15 Budget included funding for several
significant anti-people smuggling measures, including $40.9 million from
2013–14 to 2015–16 to ‘detect and disrupt irregular movements of people from
source and transit countries and reduce the flow of potential illegal
immigrants to Australia’.[80] The 2015–16 Budget included further funding, including
$1.3 million for that program year to continue activities through the Bali
Process Regional Support Office to support implementation of the Regional
Cooperation Framework to reduce irregular migration in the Asia Pacific region.[81] Funding was also allocated ($4.7 million in 2015–16) to retain
Australian Border Force postings in Indonesia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka to
coordinate activities aimed at preventing maritime people smuggling.[82]
In summary, Labor and the Coalition are largely in agreement
over Australia’s border protection, regional cooperation and
anti-people smuggling initiatives, including support for the Bali
Process. The ALP’s July 2015 asylum policy stated that ‘a
Labor Government will take a leadership role within South East Asia and the
Pacific to build a regional humanitarian framework to improve the situation of
asylum seekers’, but no substantial details were provided on how this would
differ from the Australian Government’s current approach.[83] The ALP’s 2016 election document noted
that a Labor Government would provide more funding to the UNHCR and advocate
for work rights for asylum seekers in the region, but provided no further
detail on the components of a new or enhanced regional humanitarian framework.[84]
However, refugee advocates and other stakeholders continue
to be highly critical of the lack of progress towards achieving comprehensive
regional cooperation under both Coalition and Labor governments:
The so-called Bali process co-chaired by Australia and
Indonesia since 2002 has failed to deal with the global challenge of forced
migration or fully curb the abhorrent trade in people smuggling that has taken
advantage of thousands of people who have risked everything to flee war and
persecution. Instead of an Asia Pacific wide solution that seeks to protect
asylum seekers and provide safe pathways for those in need, Australia has
served its own self-interest and left people seeking asylum in limbo in Nauru
and PNG.[85]
At the Sixth Ministerial Conference of the Bali Process on
People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime co-chaired
by Australia and Indonesia in March 2016, it was agreed that the Bali Process
priorities for the next two years would focus on expanding safe and legal
migration pathways, returns and reintegration, and cross-border operations to
tackle criminal syndicates.[86]
Policy differences
The two major parties disagree on a small number of issues,
in particular whether asylum seekers should be offered temporary, not permanent
protection; and what size Australia’s formal annual intake of refugees and
other humanitarian entrants should be. However, it is worth noting that there
have been times when there has been a certain amount of bi-partisan agreement
on some aspects of both of these issues, as outlined below.
Temporary
not permanent protection
In October 1999, the Howard Government formally introduced
the practice of offering temporary, not permanent, protection for asylum
seekers who had arrived unauthorised by boat and had been found to be refugees.[87]
Prior to that, short-term protection arrangements had only been offered for
distinct groups in response to a humanitarian crisis. For example, ‘Domestic
Protection (Temporary) Entry Permits’ were issued during the Hawke Government
for Chinese nationals on student visas present in Australia after the Tiananmen
massacre in 1989.[88]
In May 2008 the Rudd Government honoured an election
commitment and abolished the Howard Government’s Temporary Protection Visa
(TPV) category for asylum seekers and granted permanent protection to those
still in the country on these visas (around 1,000 at the time).[89]
Subsequently, the Rudd and Gillard Governments continued to reject calls by the
Opposition for a reintroduction of TPVs in spite of the rise in boat arrivals.
The Coalition has consistently argued that increases in the
number of unauthorised boat arrivals related directly to the abolition of TPVs (along
with the ending of the Howard Government’s ‘Pacific Solution’), claiming that
TPVs were an effective deterrent to boat arrivals.[90]
Labor argued, along with many commentators and refugee advocates, that the
introduction of TPVs was ineffective in reducing the number of unauthorised
boat arrivals.[91]
Many pointed out that it may actually have led to an increase in women and
children undertaking the journey to Australia by boat, as TPVs did not provide
family reunification rights, so families could not rely on men travelling to
Australia alone and bringing their wives and children out to join them once
they had been granted protection. In 2012, in answer to a question asked in
Senate Estimates, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship provided
statistics showing a rise in the number of women and children arriving after
1999 that added weight to this claim.[92]
However, in an apparent softening of Labor’s position, the
Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, told the Opposition in June 2012 that the
Government was prepared to review temporary protection visas and their
deterrence value.[93]
On 21 November 2012, the Minister for Immigration and
Citizenship announced that people who had arrived by boat after 13 August 2012
would not necessarily be transferred offshore due to the sheer numbers. Instead,
under the ‘no advantage’ principle, if found to be refugees they would not be
issued with permanent protection visas ‘until such time that they would have
been resettled in Australia after being processed in our region’. Others, released
from detention into the community while they waited an outcome on their asylum
claims, would be issued with bridging visas without work rights.[94]
The widespread use of bridging visas was characterised by some observers as a
return to temporary protection under a different name.[95]
Before the 2013 election, the Coalition consistently stated
that, under an Abbott Government, TPVs would be reintroduced as a deterrence
measure and issued to any unauthorised asylum seeker arrival found to be a
refugee onshore (that is, had not been transferred to an offshore processing centre).[96]
After coming to power in September 2013, the Coalition re-introduced TPVs the
following month, via an amendment to the Migration Regulations.[97]
However, on 2 December 2013 a disallowance of the Migration Amendment
(Temporary Protection Visas) Regulation 2013 was moved by the Greens in the
Senate and agreed to with the support of Labor (as of 18 November 2013, only
three TPVs had been granted since their re-introduction).[98]
The Coalition Government continued its attempts to reintroduce
TPVs over the following twelve months, but the efforts were not to be realised until
the successful passage of legislation in December 2014 which reintroduced TPVs
and also introduced a new class of temporary protection visa, valid for
five years, to be called a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV).[99]
At the time, there were approximately 32,000 people considered
to fall into the ‘asylum legacy’ category (almost 23,000 people released into
the community on bridging visas; over 3,000 people in community detention and
just over 6,000 people in held detention).[100] During
the Senate Estimates hearing in February 2016, departmental officers stated
that there were 30,500 people remaining in the ‘asylum legacy’ caseload and
that the Minister had authorised 12,155 of the 24,500 ‘fast track’ caseload who
had arrived after 13 August 2012 to apply for a TPV or SHEV.[101]
In summary, the Coalition Government
remains firm in its resolve to deny permanent protection to any people who
arrived by boat remaining onshore. Although the Gillard Government stated in
2012 that it would be prepared to review the use of temporary protection visas,
in 2013 Labor joined with the Greens in its opposition to the re-introduction,
arguing that due to:
...the PNG Regional Resettlement Arrangement
in place the Abbott Government’s stated rationale for TPVs is redundant. If
TPVs are not to apply to any new arrivals in Australia, because they are being
resettled in PNG, then TPVs cannot act as a deterrent. They will only apply to
a cohort which is already in Australia’.[102]
In its July 2015 asylum policy Labor confirmed its
continuing opposition to the Coalition Government’s TPV regime:
Labor will abolish TPVs which keep people in a
permanent state of limbo. Labor will commit to processing people as quickly as
possible and placing those found to be genuine refugees on permanent protection
visas.[103]
Australia’s
Humanitarian Program
The Australian Labor Party and the Coalition currently
differ slightly in their view on the number of humanitarian entrants Australia
should accept each year, although in the past there has been some agreement on
this issue. There has also been some degree of agreement on family reunion
policy for refugees who wish to sponsor family members under Australia’s
Humanitarian or Migration programs.
Australia is one of only about twenty countries worldwide
that participate formally in the UNHCR’s refugee resettlement program by
accepting quotas of offshore, UNHCR-referred, humanitarian entrants each year.
Australia’s Humanitarian Program annual planning intakes (for both offshore and
onshore entrants) have hovered between 12,000 and 13,750 places since 1996 (with
the exception of 2012–13 when the Labor Government increased the intake to
20,000).[104]
However, in terms of the total number of ‘people of concern’
globally, the UNHCR’s resettlement program contributes to resettling only a
small proportion of the world’s refugees annually (about 1 per cent).[105]
Even if asylum seekers were to cease to attempt to arrive in Australia by boat
completely, asylum flows are still growing globally due to the levels of
conflict and unrest in places like Afghanistan and Syria.[106]
As a result, refugee advocates have argued for an increase in Australia’s
resettlement commitment for many years.[107]
In 2012, the then Minister for Immigration and Citizenship,
Chris Bowen, had supported such an increase and stated on several occasions
that his preference would be to increase Australia’s humanitarian intake to 20,000
per annum.[108]
However, he pointed out that the settlement costs arising from such an increase
would be expensive.
In an address to the Institute of Public Affairs in April
2012, the then Leader of the Opposition, Tony Abbott, also expressed support
for an increase in Australia’s humanitarian intake under a future Coalition
Government.[109]
This would be achieved through sponsorship options by allowing ‘community
groups to sponsor refugees on a bonded basis that would take the annual intake
to 15,000’.[110]
In June 2012 Mr Abbott went further and made a commitment that a Coalition
Government would increase the Humanitarian Program’s annual intake to 20,000.[111]
In line with recommendations of the Expert Panel on Asylum
Seekers, the Gillard Government announced on 23 August 2012 that, in spite
of the expense, it would be increasing Australia's Humanitarian Program from
13,750 to 20,000 places in 2012–13.[112]
The decision included an immediate commitment to resettle an additional 400
refugees directly from Indonesia.
However, the Coalition’s June 2012 commitment to increase
the Humanitarian Program was reversed after the Gillard Government increased
the humanitarian intake to 20,000. On 23 November 2012, Mr Abbott announced
that, if elected, a Coalition Government would return the annual intake to the
level of 13,750 (with 11,000 of the places reserved for offshore entrants) as a
budget saving measure.[113]
In his announcement Mr Abbott stated that the bulk of the 13,750 Humanitarian Program
places would be reserved for ‘genuine refugees applying offshore’. The Shadow
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, Scott Morrison, stated ‘Not one of
those places will go to anyone who comes on a boat to Australia. They will go
to people who have come the right way’.[114]
Subsequently, in the lead-up to the 2013 election the
Coalition made it clear that, if elected, the Humanitarian Program would be
reduced and that the annual intake would return to 13,750
under the Coalition's
Refugee and Special Humanitarian programs.[115]
When Kevin Rudd returned as Prime Minister in July 2013, he
confirmed that the humanitarian intake would remain at 20,000 per year, with
12,000 places reserved for offshore refugees referred by the UNHCR.[116]
Mr Rudd also flagged that, if regional arrangements with Pacific nations led to
a decrease in boat arrivals, he would be prepared to consider progressively
increasing Australia’s humanitarian intake to 27,000 as recommended by the
Expert Panel:
If the measure announced today and the
international meeting on the Convention that has been flagged lead to a
significant change in the number of people arriving by boat, then the
Government stands ready to consider progressively increasing our humanitarian
intake towards 27,000 as recommended by the Houston Panel.[117]
As promised, upon
taking office in 2013, the Abbott Government reduced the Humanitarian Program
intake to 13,750. However, on 3 December 2014, the then Minister, Scott
Morrison, announced that if the Migration and Maritime Powers
Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 were to
pass, the Government would increase the Humanitarian Program in
the following Budget to 16,250 in 2017–18 and 18,750 in 2018–19 at a cost of
$100 million (although the new legislation also would enable the
Minister to limit or ‘cap’ the number of protection visas that could be granted
in a financial year).[118]
Subsequently,
the new Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, Peter Dutton, announced
during the 2015–16 Budget that the Humanitarian Program intake would remain at
13,750 for 2016–17, but would increase to 16,250 in 2017–18 and 18,750 in
2018–19.[119] Later
in the year (September 2015) the Government also announced a
temporary increase to the Humanitarian Program intake with the creation of an
additional 12,000 places for refugees fleeing conflict in Syria and Iraq.[120]
Labor’s
July 2015 asylum policy included a statement that by 2025 a Labor Government
would further increase Australia’s annual humanitarian intake to 27,000.[121]
In September 2016, the
Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, announced that the Coalition Government’s Humanitarian
Program would be maintained at the increased level of 18,750 places from
2018–19 onwards.[122]
At the same time it was announced that the Government would create ‘new
pathways for refugees to resettle in Australia under a Community Support
Program’.[123]
A community proposal pilot program was first established in June 2013 by the
Labor Government to explore whether some of the settlement support and associated
costs could be provided by non-Government community sponsors. The pilot
program’s objective was also to create ‘additional resettlement pathways’.[124]
However, unlike a similar program in Canada where private sponsorship
supplements the Government’s resettlement program, these places are not
additional and are to be allocated from the existing Humanitarian Program annual
quotas.[125]
Another
area where the major parties appear to differ slightly is on the number of
entrants that they are prepared to resettle through Australia’s Humanitarian
Program directly from Indonesia. In a departure from previous government
practice, on 18 November 2014 the Coalition Government
announced that asylum seekers registered with UNHCR in Indonesia on or after 1
July 2014 would no longer be eligible for resettlement in Australia as ‘part of
the Government's ongoing work in the region to strip people smugglers of a
product to sell to vulnerable men, women and children’.[126]
In response, Labor expressed its concerns and noted that ‘the Abbott
Government’s announcement that it will no longer take refugees from Indonesia
after July 1 of this year raises serious questions about the implementation of
Australia’s humanitarian program’.[127]
In its July 2015 asylum policy Labor stated that it would be dedicating a
portion of the humanitarian intake to resettling refugees from the region which
presumably could include Indonesia:
As part of our commitment to demonstrating
leadership in our region, a portion of the program will be dedicated to
resettling refugees from the region.[128]
However, although there is some disagreement on the size and
makeup of Australia’s annual humanitarian intakes, both major parties have supported
limiting family reunion options for those accepted under the Humanitarian
Program who originally arrived unauthorised by boat.
In 2012, the Gillard Government accepted one of the Expert
Panel’s recommendations and announced all people arriving by boat after 13
August 2012 could no longer sponsor family members under Australia’s
Humanitarian Program (instead they had to propose family members under the
family stream of the Migration Program). The changes also removed access to Special
Humanitarian Program (SHP) family reunion concessions for people arriving by
boat before 13 August 2012.[129] To accommodate the expected
increase in demand for visas in the family migration stream, the Government
announced it would increase the number of family stream places by 4,000 per
year. These would be quarantined specifically for humanitarian entrants (both UMAs
and non-UMAs). In response, refugee advocates expressed concerns that strict
eligibility requirements and high application costs under the Migration Program
would effectively prevent access to family reunion options for most UMAs and
that the barriers to resolving these issues would be significant.[130]
In contrast, the Coalition prefers the option of granting
TPVs with no family reunion rights at all. In the lead up to the 2013 election the
Coalition was adamant that any asylum seekers who arrived unauthorised by boat
would not receive a permanent visa or have access to family reunion options under
a Coalition Government.[131]
In December 2013, before TPVs were successfully reintroduced, the Abbott
Government announced that family stream applications from unauthorised maritime
arrivals would be given the lowest processing priority with the expected result
that ‘applications will not be processed for several years’.[132]
While Labor does not support the Coalition’s stance on TPVs,
it is not clear whether a future Labor Government would continue to bar all
people arriving by boat after 13 August 2012 from sponsoring family members
under Australia’s Humanitarian Program—as was the case under the previous Labor
Government.
In summary, it is true to say that currently the Coalition
supports a slightly smaller Humanitarian Program intake of 18,750 by
2018–19 compared with Labor’s previous intake of 20,000 in
2012–13 (and its more recent commitment to an intake of 27,000 by 2025). However,
other measures, such as some of the family reunion restrictions for UMAs, have
received support from both major political parties in recent years.
What are the alternatives?
While the numbers of people seeking protection around the
world ebb and flow in response to specific global conflicts, the number of
people of concern to the UNHCR each year has continued to grow—with over 65
million people displaced worldwide in 2016.[133]
The magnitude and complexity of the issues arising from these global asylum flows
poses huge challenges for all of the world’s destination countries, not just
Australia.
Destination countries all struggle to create policies that
maintain an acceptable balance between the perceived need to control national
borders while still fulfilling protection obligations towards the millions of
displaced people in need of assistance. However, as ‘unauthorised’ migration
flows grow, States are increasingly resorting to more restrictive border
control policies and disruption measures to try and control the movements of
‘irregular’ migrants.[134]
In Australia, there was a significant rise in the number of
asylum seekers arriving unauthorised by boat between 2008 and 2013. This placed
increasing pressure on both Labor and Coalition governments to adopt and
maintain measures that are seen to address border security concerns and combat
people smuggling. Although the Coalition’s boat ‘turnback’ policy has prevented
most boats from entering Australian waters since December 2013, the pressure to
prevent any future waves of boat arrivals remains firmly embedded in government
policy.
The Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers established in 2012 to
advise the Government on ‘the best way forward’ to address these issues, noted
that there ‘were no quick or simple solutions’ and that there should be ‘no
single focus’. The Panel argued for an integrated suite of short-term and
long-term proposals that included both disincentives (such as the
re-introduction of an offshore processing regime) and incentives (such as an
immediate increase in Australia’s Humanitarian Program). Long-term proposals
included recommendations that the Government create better migration pathways
and protection opportunities for refugees coordinated within an ‘enhanced
regional cooperation framework’.[135]
However, to date many long-term
proposals along the lines of those recommended by the Expert Panel have not
been pursued. Without long-term effective mechanisms in place and an expansion of
protection opportunities in the region, it is argued that ‘different categories
of vulnerable people in need of protection’ will continue to be ‘pitted against
one another’ in the public debate.[136]
The UNHCR has long been aware of the tensions specific to
the Asia Pacific region, posing challenges for all the regional governments,
including Australia. However, it questions the effectiveness of increasingly
harsh deterrence measures in stemming asylum flows, arguing that in the
long-term the threat of detention or even drowning may be perceived to be the
lesser evil for desperate asylum seekers.[137]
Former United Nations Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, Erika Feller,
asserts that investment in deterrence is inevitably ‘doomed to failure’ for
those reasons:
Investment in deterrence as the preferred solution to the
challenge posed [to] States by irregular boat arrivals is doomed to failure ...
boats ... have long been and remain a lifeline for the desperate ... the boats will
continue as long as the root causes of departure remain unresolved.[138]
In the long-term, greater cooperation with
our regional neighbours on a burden-sharing basis is seen by the UNHCR to be a
key component of future progress.[139]
Many other stakeholders agree, arguing that there should be
more focus on genuine cooperative engagement and burden-sharing with our
neighbours.[140]
Under such an approach, regional processing
of asylum seekers under the auspices of the UNHCR and the IOM might be
negotiated through a regional cooperative framework such as the Bali Process. Other
long-term burden-sharing options might include the development of programs like
the Comprehensive Plan of Action (established to deal with the Indochinese
asylum flows) together with the creation of more protection space for those
found to be in need of protection along the ‘displacement corridors’.[141]
Conclusion
For many years, both Labor and Coalition governments have
supported increasingly severe deterrence measures in an attempt to stem the
flow of asylum seeker boats to Australia.
There are some policy differences between the major parties,
including whether asylum seekers should be offered temporary or permanent
protection and what the size and composition of Australia’s formal annual
intake of refugees and other humanitarian entrants should be. However, both
Labor and the Coalition are in general agreement on many of the key measures in
place to deal with these issues, such as mandatory detention for unauthorised
boat arrivals and offshore processing arrangements in the Pacific. Given the
level of bi-partisan support, it could be argued that the policy differences
between the two major parties are minimal.
The Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers recommended an integrated
suite of short-term and long-term initiatives to address the issues. Long-term
proposals included recommendations that the Government create better migration
pathways and protection opportunities for refugees coordinated within an
‘enhanced regional cooperation framework’.
Such a framework is already in existence through the
Regional Cooperation Framework (RCF) agreed to by the Bali Process in 2011
which aims to develop a more consistent approach to dealing with asylum flows
to the region. Both Labor and the Coalition support the Bali Process, but to date there has been little progress in implementing
the objectives of the RCF.
The UNHCR has commented on the lack of progress in the
region and continues to urge states to work towards creating more protection
opportunities through the RCF:
UNHCR is becoming increasingly concerned by the sharp
deterioration in the overall quality of protection for asylum seekers and
refugees coming into the region ... We understand that the increasing number of
people arriving by boat, including growing numbers of families and
unaccompanied children, present many complex challenges that must be addressed.
But at the heart of any response is the need to carefully balance border
management responsibilities with the humanitarian imperatives of protecting,
and treating humanely, those people fleeing conflict and persecution in their
home countries and the dangers of exploitative boat journeys to Australia. The
broad suite of increasingly severe and ‘deterrence-based’ measures introduced
over the past 18 months give UNHCR deep concern as to whether this balance now
exists...
We hope that the Regional Cooperation Framework (RCF) and the
Regional Support Office (RSO) can now give some practical impetus to
cooperation, especially in dealing with a challenge common to most states in
the region – that of irregular maritime movements.[142]
While the generosity of Australia’s annual humanitarian
intakes is widely acknowledged, the magnitude of the issues arising from the
growing number of people seeking protection globally poses huge challenges to
all destination countries, including Australia. One of the biggest challenges
for the government of any destination country is to develop asylum policy that
focuses on international, not domestic, concerns and offers sustainable
long-term solutions through burden-sharing and regional cooperative
arrangements.[143]
Appendix
Table 1: A
summary of key policy similarities and differences
Policy |
Coalition |
Labor |
Offshore processing |
Yes |
Yes |
Boat turnbacks |
Yes |
Yes |
Mandatory immigration detention |
Yes |
Yes |
Regional cooperation, border protection and anti-people
smuggling measures |
Yes |
Yes |
Temporary Protection Visas |
Yes |
No |
Humanitarian Program annual intakes |
18,750 by 2018–19 |
27,000 by 2025 |
[1]. J Phillips
and H Spinks, Boat
arrivals in Australia since 1976, Research paper series, 2013–14, Parliamentary
Library, Canberra, 23 July 2013; and J Phillips, Boat arrivals and boat ‘turnbacks’ in Australia since 1976: a quick
guide to the statistics, Research paper series,
2016–17, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 2017.
[2]. J Phillips, Boat arrivals and boat ‘turnbacks’ in Australia since 1976: a quick
guide to the statistics, op. cit.
[3]. In this paper
asylum seekers arriving by boat will be referred to as ‘boat arrivals’ or more
formally as ‘unauthorised maritime arrivals’ as defined under the Migration
Act 1958 (Cth), section 5AA.
[4]. Expert Panel
on Asylum Seekers, Report of the
Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers, Canberra, August 2012.
[5]. J McAdam, ‘Australia
and asylum seekers’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 25(3), 1
October 2013, pp. 435–48; and D Corlett, ‘Who’s jumping the queue? Fairness and
the asylum seeker debate’, in B Douglas and J Wodak (eds), Refugees
and asylum seekers: finding a better way, Australia21 Ltd. website,
December 2013.
[6]. Australian
Labor Party (ALP), A humane
and compassionate approach to asylum seekers, Australian Labor Party
policy document, Labor (ALP) website.
[7]. M Coombs, Excisions
from the migration zone: policy and practice, Research note, 42, 2003–04,
Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 1 March 2004.
[8]. K Beazley (Leader of the Opposition), 'Second
reading speech: Migration Amendment (Excision
from Migration Zone) Bill 2001 and cognate bills',
House of Representatives, Debates, 19 September 2001.
[9]. J Phillips, The
‘Pacific Solution’ revisited: a statistical guide to the asylum seeker
caseloads on Nauru and Manus Island, Background note, Parliamentary
Library, Canberra, 4 September 2012.
[10].
C Evans (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship), Last
refugees leave Nauru, media release, 8 February 2008.
[11]. Australian
Labor Party, Protecting Australia and protecting the Australian way: Labor's policy
on asylum seekers and refugees, Australian Labor Party policy
document, December 2002.
[12]. Australian
Labor Party, Australian Labor Party National
Platform and Constitution 2007, Australian Labor Party policy document,
2007.
[13]. C Evans
(Minister for Immigration and Citizenship), Last
refugees leave Nauru, op. cit.
[14]. J Gillard
(Prime Minister), Moving Australia forward, address to
the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 6 July 2010.
[15]. For example,
see T Abbott (Leader of the Opposition), Joint
doorstop interview, transcript, 7 July 2010.
[16]. H Spinks, Australia-Malaysia
asylum seeker transfer agreement, FlagPost, Parliamentary Library blog,
27 July 2011.
[17]. C Bowen
(Minister for Immigration and Citizenship), Australia
and Papua New Guinea sign MoU, media release, 19 August 2011.
[18]. Plaintiff
M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship; Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 244 CLR 144, [2011] HCA 32.
[19].
E Karlsen, Can
Oakeshott’s bill end the asylum impasse?, FlagPost, Parliamentary
Library blog, 16 March 2012.
[20]. J Gillard
(Prime Minister) and C Bowen (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship), Joint
press conference, transcript, 13 August 2012.
[21]. C Evans
(Minister for Immigration and Citizenship), Last
refugees leave Nauru, op. cit.
[22]. A Houston, Report
of the Expert Panel of Asylum Seekers released, media release, 13
August 2012.
[23]. C Bowen
(Minister for Immigration and Citizenship), Australia signs Memorandum of Understanding with Nauru, joint media release, 29 August 2012;
and Australia and Papua New Guinea sign updated memorandum of understanding, joint media release, 8 September 2012.
[24]. C Bowen
(Minister for Immigration and Citizenship), First transfer to Papua New Guinea, media release, 21 November 2012; Nauru designated for regional processing, media release, 10 September 2012; and Asylum
seeker transfer to Nauru, transcript, 14 September 2012.
[25]. I McCluskey, Migration
Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) Bill 2012,
Bills digest, 84, 2012–13, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 8 March 2013.
[26]. J
Clare (Minister for Home Affairs), $200,000
bounty on the head of local people smugglers, joint media release, 21
July 2013; K Rudd (Prime Minister), Australia and Papua New Guinea Regional Settlement Arrangement, joint media release, 19 July 2013; and Department of
Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC), ‘Regional
resettlement arrangements’, archived from the DIAC website, July 2013.
[27].
K Rudd (Prime Minister), New
arrangement with Nauru Government, joint media release, 3 August 2013.
[28]. Liberal Party
of Australia and the Nationals, Our
plan: real solutions for all Australians – the direction, values and policy
priorities of the next Coalition Government, Coalition policy document,
January 2013.
[29]. Liberal
Party of Australia and the Nationals, The
Coalition’s Operation Sovereign Borders policy, Coalition policy document,
Election 2013, July 2013.
[30]. T Abbott
(Prime Minister), Swearing-in
of the new Coalition Government, media release, 18 September 2013.
[31]. B Shorten
(Leader of the Opposition) and R Marles (Shadow Minister for Immigration and
Border Protection), Labor's
humane and compassionate asylum seeker policy, media release, 25 July
2015; and ALP, A humane and
compassionate approach to asylum seekers, op. cit.
[32]. ALP, Immigration—mandatory
reporting and more transparency, ALP policy document, 2016 election.
[33]. S Anderson, ‘Labor
backs MP Melissa Parke's call to improve conditions at offshore immigration
detention centres’, ABC News Online, 10 November 2015.
[34]. R Marles (Shadow
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection), Offshore
processing: the way forward, speech to the Sydney Institute, 3 December
2015.
[35]. UN, Summit for Refugees and Migrants,
19 September 2016, UN website.
[36]. M Turnbull
(Prime Minister), Leaders’
summit on refugees, joint media release, 21 September 2016.
[37]. J Song, ‘What do we know about the Central American refugee deal between the
US and Australia?’, Guardian (Australia), 25
November 2016.
[38]. M Turnbull
(Prime Minister), Refugee
resettlement from regional processing centres, joint media release, 13
November 2016.
[39]. T Abbott (Leader of the Opposition), The Coalition’s plan for more secure borders, address to the Institute
of Public Affairs, Melbourne, speech, 27 April 2012.
[40]. Expert Panel
on Asylum Seekers, Report
of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers, Attachment 8, Canberra, August
2012, op. cit.
[41]. T Abbott
(Leader of the Opposition), Restoring
sovereignty and control of our borders, op. cit.; and Liberal Party of
Australia and the Nationals, Our
plan: real solutions for all Australians – the direction, values and policy
priorities of the next Coalition Government, op. cit., p. 47.
[42]. S Morrison
(Minister for Immigration and Border Protection), Address
to the Migration Institute of Australia national conference, Canberra,
speech, 21 October 2013.
[43]. J Phillips, Boat arrivals and boat ‘turnbacks’ in Australia since 1976: a quick
guide to the statistics, op. cit.
[44].
Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Official
committee Hansard, 19 November 2013, pp. 71–2.
[45]. J Swan, ‘Abbott
goes to war with press release diplomacy’, Sydney Morning Herald, 11
January 2014, p. 7.
[46]. J Phillips, Boat arrivals and boat ‘turnbacks’ in Australia since 1976: a quick
guide to the statistics, op. cit.
[47]. DIBP, Operation Sovereign Borders monthly update: December 2015, DIBP website. Note: for definitions of the difference between
‘takebacks’ and ‘turnbacks’ and updates on the numbers see J Phillips, Boat arrivals and boat ‘turnbacks’ in Australia since 1976: a quick
guide to the statistics, op. cit.
[48]. Lieutenant
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