5 November 2015
PDF version [520 KB]
Dr Cameron Hill
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security Section
The Government of the
Republic of the Union of Myanmar, hereafter ‘Burma’, announced in July this
year that it would hold elections for national, state, and regional parliaments
on 8 November 2015.[1]
As this has the potential to be Burma’s first credible national poll in 25
years, the expectations surrounding the elections are high. The results of the
national parliamentary election will feed into the selection of the next president
in early 2016. This Quick Guide outlines Burma’s political and electoral
system, major parties and candidates, key issues and challenges, and briefly discusses
the elections’ potential domestic and international implications.
Burma’s political and electoral
system
2008 Constitution
Burma’s 2015 national elections will take place under the political
and legal framework established by the country’s 2008 Constitution. This controversial
document, part of the former military government’s ‘road map to democracy’, was
approved via a referendum in May 2008. The credibility of this referendum, as
well as the subsequent 2010 elections, was vigorously contested by Burma’s main
opposition groups, as well as most Western governments.[2]
The 2008 Constitution establishes Burma’s presidential
system of government through chapters that provide for the ‘basic principles of
the Union’ and the ‘structure of the state’, the selection of the president and
two vice presidents, and a bicameral national parliament. The charter provides
for national elections to constitute this parliament as part of a ‘genuine,
disciplined multi-party democratic system’.[3]
The 2008 Constitution also stipulates that one of its objectives is ‘enabling
the Defence Services to be able to participate in the national political
leadership role of the State’.[4]
Since 2011, the scope of political debate and civic participation
in Burma has widened following the introduction of political and economic
reforms by a quasi-civilian government led by the current president, Thein Sein.
In the lead up to the 2015 elections, there was a renewed campaign by some
members of parliament, as well as civil society and ethnic minority groups, to
reform key elements of the 2008 Constitution. This campaign was not successful and
any future constitutional changes will not occur until after the elections.[5]
Burma’s national parliament
The national Parliament of Myanmar includes the lower House
of Representatives (Pyithu Hluttaw) and the upper House of Nationalities
(Amyotha Hluttaw). When convened together, the two houses form the Union
Parliament (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw), Myanmar’s highest legislative body.
In both houses of the national parliament, 75 per cent of
representatives are directly elected, while 25 per cent are appointed by the military
(Tatmadaw). This gives the military an effective veto power over
constitutional amendments, which require the support of over 75 per cent of
members in each house.[6]
Electoral system
The 2015 elections will involve around 32 million registered
voters—in Burma and overseas—selecting from 93 parties and 6,189
candidates contesting seats at the national, regional, and state levels.[7]
The national House of Representatives has 330 directly
elected members. Elections for the lower house are conducted using a ‘first-past-the-post’
system in which candidates for single member districts who earn the most votes,
win the seat. The 168 elected members of the upper house compete in 12 districts contiguous with the 14 regions and states of Myanmar.[8]
The legislative term is five years and the first session of the new legislature
must be held within 90 days of the election.[9]
Composition
A total of 110 members of the 440-member House of
Representatives and 56 of the 224-member House of Nationalities are military
appointees. The current composition of the remainder of the national parliament
reflects the outcome of the 2010 election, as well as subsequent by-elections. This
includes the April 2012 by-elections which saw Aung San Suu Kyi’s opposition
party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), win 43 out of the 44 seats it
contested. In contrast to the 2010 national election, these by-elections were
deemed credible.[10]
Despite these changes, the parliament remains dominated by
members of the ruling Union Solidarity and Development (USDP) party, which is
made up largely of retired military officers and officials from the former
military regime, as well as the Tatmadaw appointees. There are also a
number of smaller ethnic minority parties represented in the current parliament
(see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Distribution of seats in
Myanmar’s upper, lower houses after 2012 by-elections
Source: V Nehru, Myanmar:
the mechanics of the elections, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 10 September 2015, accessed 2 November 2015.
According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Myanmar ranks
low internationally on the proportion of women in its national legislature (130
out of 190 countries), with 6.2 per cent in the lower house and 1.9 per cent in
the upper house.[11]
Choosing the president
Under Burma’s presidential system, the president and the
vice-presidents are nominated and selected by a body called the Presidential
Electoral College (PEC). The PEC comprises three groups—the elected members of
the Pyithu Hluttaw, the elected members of the Amyotha Hluttaw, and
all the appointed Tatmadaw members of both houses. Importantly, ‘while
the Tatmadaw has a quarter of the seats in the parliament, it has a third of
the positions (and thus a greater influence) in the PEC’. [12]
After the public vote for the elected members of parliament:
the PEC is formed to nominate three presidential candidates
who are then vetted for eligibility. Once approved, PEC members vote for the
candidates and the one with the majority of votes becomes president, while the
others become vice-presidents.[13]
The PEC must choose a president prior to the end of March 2016,
the expiration of the current government’s five-year term (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Election timeline
Source: International Crisis Group, Myanmar’s
electoral landscape, Asia report no.266, 28 April 2015, accessed 28
October 2015, p. 11.
Election authorities
Union Election Commission
The Union Election Commission (UEC), Burma’s principal
election management body, operates under the relevant provisions of the Constitution
and the 2012 Union Election Commission Law. The UEC is currently comprised of fifteen
members, including the current chair, Tin Aye, a former USDP legislator and
retired senior member of the Tatmadaw.[14]
According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), whilst serious
concerns about both the independence and capacity of the UEC persist, a number
of decisions suggest that the Commission is making a concerted effort to ensure
a credible poll. These include efforts to build greater trust with political
parties and civil society organisations (CSOs); collaboration with
international electoral support organisations; changes to electoral rules on
issues that were problematic in 2010, such as advanced voting; and a
willingness to allow international observers for the first time.[15]
Judicial bodies
In addition to the UEC, the country’s judicial system,
composed of the police and the courts, is responsible for the adjudication of specific
offences under the 2012 Electoral Law, including bribery, threats, intimidation,
or instigation of violence. Other complaints are adjudicated by specialised UEC
tribunals.[16]
Security forces
The Tatmadaw, which controls all of Burma’s security
forces, remains the ‘ultimate arbiter’ of power in Burma’s ongoing political
transition.[17]
For this reason, its continued support for a credible and peaceful election
will be crucial, both to the conduct of the poll itself and to the prospects
for post-election stability (see below).
Given concerns about election-related violence, particularly
in conflict-affected ethnic minority regions, Burma’s security forces will play
a prominent role in the management of the elections. In October, the UEC
announced that elections would not be held in several hundred villages in
conflict-affected areas of Kachin, Karen, Shan, and Mon states due to security
concerns.[18]
In addition to the presence of the army, it has been reported that 40,000
specialised police officers will be recruited, trained, and deployed to manage
election security across the country.[19]
Incidents of intimidation and sporadic violence, including the stabbing of an
NLD parliamentarian, have occurred in the lead-up to the election.[20]
Civil society and international
electoral support organisations
The preparations for the 2015 elections have been notable
for the prominent involvement of CSOs, as well as international electoral
support organisations such as the International Foundation for Electoral
Systems (IFES) and the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).[21]
This represents a shift from previous elections and reflects Burma’s new political
climate in the wake of the post-2011 reforms. International donors funding this
work include the United States (US), the European Union (EU), Norway, and
Australia.[22]
Significantly, in March 2015, the Government announced that
the US-based Carter Center and the EU would be invited to provide long-term international
election observers.[23]
According to local media, around 470 diplomats from 32 embassies, 465 staff
members from six international election observation groups, 183 staff members
from nine international NGOs, 9,406 people from local election observation
groups, and 290 foreign journalists will observe Burma’s elections.[24]
Parties and candidates
Ninety-three parties have registered to contest the
elections. Many of these are small ethnically and geographically-based parties
that will contest elections at the regional level. The USDP, the NLD, and a
combination of the larger ethnic minority parties are likely to dominate at the
national level.
Union Solidarity and Development
Party
Source: Wikimedia
Commons
Parliamentary elections
Given the popularity of the NLD in central and southern
Burma, many analysts expect that it will be a substantial challenge for the ruling
USDP to retain its current dominance in the parliament if the November elections
are free and fair.[25]
The USDP does have some advantages stemming from incumbency, in particular its
large national network of offices, as well as its links to civil servants and legislators
and the funds they control.[26]
Some are predicting that the USDP may perform better in rural electorates,
where it is seen to be more responsive to the economic concerns of the
populace.[27]
Nevertheless, the ICG concludes that ‘it is hard to see the USDP beating the
NLD in the centre or the ethnic parties in the periphery’.[28]
Possible presidential candidates
The current president, Thein Sein, has not ruled out seeking
a second-term and could be a potential compromise candidate if neither the USDP
nor the NLD command a clear majority in the PEC. Reports suggest, however, that
following the failure of constitutional reform efforts in early 2015, Suu Kyi
has become disillusioned with Thein Sein, lessening his prospects as a viable
compromise candidate.[29]
The commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw, Senior
General Min Aung Hlaing, has also been discussed as a possible next president if
the USDP win a clear majority and vote in a bloc with military members of the
PEC.[30]
A third potential USDP candidate, lower house speaker and
prominent reformer, Shwe Mann, remains a possible contender. The probability of
this has diminished considerably, however, following his sudden removal as chair
of the party in September 2015, reportedly at the behest of party conservatives.[31]
National League for Democracy
Source: Wikimedia
Commons
Parliamentary elections
Although it lacks recent experience in nation-wide campaigns,
the NLD is expected to do well in the elections, given the widespread support
for its charismatic leader, particularly in the Burman heartland. An NLD
landslide similar to that of the 1990 election—after which the military
annulled the results of the poll—would be a major test for Burma’s political
transition.
With 25 per cent of seats already allocated to the military,
the NLD would need to win more than two-thirds of the seats in parliament to
command a majority—‘in this scenario, Suu Kyi could alone decide who the next
president will be’.[32]
Possible presidential candidates
In the 2008 Constitution, Clause 59F bars anyone whose
spouse or offspring owe allegiance to a foreign power from becoming president
or vice-president. As a result, Suu Kyi, whose late husband and two sons are
British citizens, is barred from running for the presidency.[33]
To date, Suu Kyi has not specified who the NLD might choose
as an alternative presidential candidate, saying only that it would nominate ‘a
civilian member of our party’.[34]
Speaking in early October 2015, Suu Kyi stated, ‘I’ve made it quite clear that
if the NLD wins the elections and we form a government, I’m going to be the
leader of that government whether or not I’m the president’.[35]
Ethnic minority parties
Parliamentary elections
Ethnic parties could play a big role in determining the
balance of power in the new parliament and, as a result, in selecting the next
president. These parties achieved some success in the 2010 elections, ethnic
minority politicians have been prominent in the current parliament, and many
new ethnic parties have registered since the 2012 by-elections.[36]
While the NLD has actively campaigned in ethnic minority areas, Suu Kyi is
often negatively identified by minority populations as being aligned with the
interests of the majority Burman populace.[37]
One constraint facing ethnic minority parties is the fact
that multiple ethnic parties are running in many constituencies, potentially
splitting votes and thereby advantaging NLD and/or USDP candidates.[38]
A second constraint, despite an October 2015 partial nation-wide ceasefire agreement,
is the potential that ongoing conflicts and security concerns in Burma’s border
regions could disenfranchise many ethnic minority voters (see below).[39]
Possible presidential candidates
If ethnic minority parties emerge as a unified force—alongside
the NLD and a combination of the USDP and the military—they could hold
significant bargaining power. In this event, they would likely support a
presidential candidate ‘that can promise to improve their status by addressing
issues that matter most to ethnic groups, including greater distribution of
powers to state governments and parliaments, revenue sharing of natural
resources, and direct election of state chief ministers by state parliamentary
ministers.’[40]
Issues and challenges
While the poll will likely have more credibility than the
one held in 2010, ‘there are growing concerns over the elections’ conduct and
the implications for post-poll politics’.[41]
Expectations and legitimacy
As noted, popular expectations surrounding the 2015
elections remain very high. Not surprisingly, however, given decades of harsh repression
and censorship, voters’ awareness of Burma’s political institutions remains
limited. A 2014 survey by The Asia Foundation found, for example, that 82
respondents could not name one branch of government, and that only 12 per cent knew
that the president was elected by the parliament.[42]
These results point to the paucity of voter education efforts,
particularly in rural and minority areas, and a disjuncture between
expectations and knowledge. This disjuncture could undermine the perceived
legitimacy of the election outcome, or lead to disillusionment with the
political process. The potential for disillusionment could be particularly high
in the lead-up to the presidential selection process, a process from which, arguably,
the most popular candidate remains barred and that will likely involve fairly
opaque political bargaining.[43]
Election management and security
While there have been significant improvements in capacity,
there remain concerns about the UEC’s structural weaknesses. These weaknesses
are exacerbated in conflict-affected areas, where rival paramilitaries and
local army commanders exert control and where ‘incidences of fraud and other
electoral abuse are likely to be much higher’.[44]
Apprehensions about the integrity of the electoral roll
remain, with concerns about serious errors and ongoing allegations of abuse.[45]
Non-government parties and CSOs have also raised the issue of advance voting,
particularly by military personnel, as an area vulnerable to manipulation. In
response, the UEC has recently announced that international observers will
observe voting at military bases.[46]
Election security has also been an area of significant
concern. According to the Carter Center:
The lack of transparent security planning about potential
violence is disturbing, particularly in areas with a history of communal and
ethnic tensions.... As the campaign period approaches, it is possible that
nationalist groups and political parties will seek to build support by
appealing to voters on religious grounds, heightening tensions in an already
tense political atmosphere.[47]
Disenfranchisement of minorities
Perhaps the most serious concerns expressed to date have
been those surrounding the disenfranchisement of minority and displaced
populations.
This includes the decision to exclude communities of Muslim
Rohingyas, around 850,000 of whom live in the south-west state of Rakhine, from
voter lists, and to disqualify Muslim candidates. The previous government had
issued so-called ‘white cards’ giving temporary citizenship to many Rohingya
and allowing them to vote in the 2008 referendum and the 2010 elections.[48]
In the face of fervent protests from local Rakhine and Buddhist-nationalist
groups, around 500,000 of these cards were revoked by the Government in February
2015, a move that effectively ‘severs the last link that Muslims in Rakhine state
feel they have with political life’.[49]
The Carter Center has observed:
The decision to disenfranchise former TRC [temporary rights
card] holders immediately prior to the election, without having a timely,
transparent, and fair process for verifying citizenship firmly in place, or a
process for challenging the cancellation of rights, runs counter to a number of
provisions of international human rights documents and good practice. The
effects of the decision also appear to be discriminatory, as they disproportionately
impact members of religious and ethnic minorities, particularly Rohingya, most
of whom are already marginalized from the political process and living in
conditions that prevent them from exercising their full civil and political
rights, including basic freedom of movement.[50]
This was followed, in August 2015, by a UEC ruling that more
than a dozen parliamentary candidates from the Democracy and Human Rights
Party, which is predominantly Muslim, were ineligible to run because their
parents were not Burmese citizens when they were born.[51]
Moves to disenfranchise Rohingya communities and disqualify Muslim candidates
have not faced any real resistance from the major parties and have occurred in parallel
with the rise of the Committee for the Protection of National Race and Religion
(or ‘Ma Ba Tha’), an influential nationalist organisation that ‘accuses Muslims
of threatening Buddhism’s privileged position and affiliation with the state’.[52]
There is also apprehension that around 100,000 internally displaced
people living in camps in Kachin and Shan states will not be able to vote
because of the humanitarian situation and a lack of access to polling stations.
A further concern is that the lack of transparency surrounding election security
in these and other conflict-affected regions, particularly the moves by the authorities
to cancel voting in some areas, could undermine the credibility of the
elections in the eyes of minority populations.[53]
Freedom of association and expression
While political space in Burma has continued to expand since
2011, local CSOs, international observers, and human rights groups have voiced
concerns about the use of potentially arbitrary restrictions on freedom of
association and expression in the lead-up to the elections.
According to the Carter Center:
Party representatives and civil society organizations
reported that their activities are rarely restricted, despite being subject to
burdensome administrative procedures (especially at the township level).
There is nonetheless concern that local authorities will
unfairly enforce campaign restrictions in favor of a particular party. Parties
and civil society sometimes reported intrusive surveillance by the Special
Branch police, although the surveillance did not appear to be specifically
election-related. In Kachin State, concerns were raised about the possibility
that provisions of the Unlawful Associations Act could be used to target
members and supporters of Kachin parties.[54]
The pre-election media environment has been more concerning:
Restrictive and vaguely worded laws at the national level
(including the Official Secrets Act, Media Law, Printing and Publishing Law,
and sections of the Penal Code) make it difficult for journalists to know what
falls within the permissible range of publishable speech. Recent arrests of
journalists, defamation cases brought by the Ministry of Information, and a
tightening of media access to the parliament have raised concerns that the
government may further restrict media coverage in the pre-election period.
Self-censorship is widespread, and more common than overt
threats. However, instances of intimidation were reported to The Carter Center
in Bago, Rakhine, and Magway. Fear of social sanction, or criminal liability,
were commonly cited as reasons for avoiding politically charged topics.
Journalists also reported limited access to government officials and
parliamentarians.[55]
The October 2015 arrest of two activists for allegedly ‘defaming’
the military on social media has been widely cited as an example of an
increasingly restrictive media environment and ‘the military’s readiness to
strike when its interests are at stake’.[56]
Implications
Domestic
The perceived credibility of the November elections will play
a key role in shaping the extent to which Myanmar’s ongoing political transition
will be one characterised by political compromise and accommodation or a
reversion to ‘zero-sum’ conflict and contention.[57]
It is in this sense that the elections, along with recent peace efforts and
economic reforms, need to be seen as just one part of a longer-term attempt to craft
a more responsive, transparent, and trusted set of institutions through which Burma’s
multiple and longstanding political fractures can be successfully healed.[58]
The disenfranchisement of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya prior to the
elections is unlikely to assist this process.
Given their prominence in shaping Burma’s politics, the
elections and their aftermath will also be important in illuminating the Tatmadaw’s
political disposition. In the event of a large NLD victory, the period following
the elections will be a key test of where the military elites see their core
interests, and how far they are willing to go to protect these. Widespread
political, ethnic, or sectarian violence would likely undermine any Tatmadaw
propensity to support further political reform.
Whatever the result, accommodation between the country’s traditional
centres of political power will remain crucial given that Burma’s leadership
will, in all likelihood, ‘continue to be drawn from the top rungs of the armed
forces, from distinguished political lineages, and from other elite strata’.[59]
International
While the United States and EU countries have largely
decoupled their Burma policies from the individual fortunes of Aung San Suu
Kyi, the elections will be an important input into decisions about how to calibrate
their future engagement. It is likely that the West ‘will be strongly
influenced by opposition parties’ assessment of the polls, and will react
negatively if the polls are perceived unjust, particularly hindering aid flows’.[60]
The possibility of constructively addressing the place of Rohingya, and Muslim
minorities more generally, in Burma’s polity and society through an inclusive 2015
poll has now been foreclosed. As a result, the plight of these communities will
remain a serious constraint to closer engagement with the West.[61]
China—Burma’s largest source of trade and investment in
recent years—has remained largely silent on the elections. The potential for election-related
violence targeting Burma’s large ethnic Chinese populations, or further unrest
in the border regions, will likely be among Beijing’s immediate concerns.[62]
According to one analyst, over the longer term, China is likely to continue to
adopt a pragmatic approach to Burma’s transition:
...Beijing knows that Naypitaw needs it. China is still
Myanmar’s biggest trading partner, and its simplest source of capital. Many of
Myanmar’s major projects are beyond local engineering capacity and savvy. While
Chinese firms’ micro-management of major projects—extending from resources to
labour—may grate, the ability of these firms to deliver huge infrastructure to
tight schedules is a major contribution to the Myanmar economy. It is hard to
imagine that the know-how necessary for the pipelines from Kyaukpyu in Rakhine
State to Ruili over the border will be readily available in Myanmar.
So, in the excitement and awe, expect China to sit back and
wait—it will be hoping that cheque signing will win out over flag waving, no
matter who wins on 8 November.[63]
Burma’s Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
neighbours will also be approaching the elections pragmatically. Some will be mindful
that fragile democratic norms and institutions have been under renewed pressure
in their own countries. Following a May 2014 coup, Thailand once again has a
military government and ‘competitive authoritarianism’ remains dominant in Malaysia,
Singapore, and Cambodia, despite recent elections in all three countries.[64]
Single party rule endures in Vietnam and Laos. Even in democratic Indonesia,
there are concerns that the military is gaining increased political influence.[65]
Seen in this context, recent calls for the West to re-impose punitive sanctions
should the military not fully withdraw from politics might be seen as unfairly
singling out Burma from its peers, thereby strengthening the position of Naypitaw’
s hardliners.[66]
The potential for post-election unrest in Rakhine to spark
renewed outflows of Rohingya migrants and asylum seekers will also be a concern
for Burma’s ASEAN neighbours, as well as Bangladesh.[67]
In what would be a regarded as a controversial move, there are reports that
Thailand is looking to repatriate large numbers of (mainly ethnic Karen)
migrants and asylum seekers living on the Thai-Burma border after the November
vote.[68]
Australia has been actively supporting Burma’s reform
efforts over the last several years, including the preparations for the 2015
elections.[69]
While the November poll will be important in shaping this engagement, the 2015
elections represent just one milestone in Burma’s ongoing transition. Questions
surrounding Australia’s long-term interests and strategies—encompassing support
for Burma’s post-election political, economic and development agenda, as well
as debates surrounding increased engagement with Burma’s defence, security and
police forces—will endure and will need to be constantly re-assessed in light
of Burma’s complex and shifting political landscape.
Annex A: Regions, districts, townships, and lower house constituencies (2012)
Source: Australian National University, Myanmar
2012 boundaries, accessed 2 November 2015.
[1]. ‘Burma’ is
used in accordance with the terminology employed currently by the Australian
Government.
[2]. See:
International Crisis Group, Myanmar’s
post-election landscape, Asia briefing no. 118, 7 March 2011, accessed
29 October 2015.
[3]. Constitution of
the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008, accessed 28 October 2015, p.
3.
[4]. Ibid., p. 3.
[5]. ‘Parliament
votes to postpone planned charter referendum’, The Irrawaddy, 22
July 2015, accessed 29 October 2015.
[6]. S DuPont et
al., Elections
and political transition in Myanmar, Woodrow Wilson School of
Public and International Affairs, accessed 29 October 2015, p. 5.
[7]. C Win, ‘Will
growing pains mar the Myanmar election?’, East Asia Forum, blog,
Australian National University, 30 October 2015, accessed 2 November 2015.
[8]. DuPont, Elections
and political transition in Myanmar, op. cit.,
pp. 5–6; International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), Myanmar
2015 general elections, fact sheet, 15 September 2015, accessed 2
November 2015, p. 1.
[9]. International
Crisis Group (ICG), Myanmar’s
electoral landscape, Asia report no.266, 28 April 2015, accessed 28
October 2015., p. 11.
[10]. Ibid., p. 5.
[11]. Inter-Parliamentary
Union, Women in national
parliaments, updated 1 September 2015, accessed 29 October 2015.
[12]. R Thompson,
‘How Myanmar’s presidency will be won (part I)’, The Interpreter, blog,
Lowy Institute for International Affairs, 5 December 2014, accessed 29 October
2015.
[13]. Ibid.
[14]. IFES, Myanmar
2015 elections, op. cit., p. 7; ‘The Leaderboard: Tin Aye’,
cogitAsia, blog, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 21
April 2015, accessed 29 October 2015.
[15]. ICG, Myanmar’s
electoral landscape, op. cit.,p. 12.
[16]. DuPont, Elections
and transitions, op. cit.,p. 13.
[17]. A Selth, ‘Will
Aung San Suu Kyi be president? Odds are lengthening’, The Interpreter,
blog, 30 June 2014, accessed 30 October 2015.
[18]. ‘Myanmar
election body cancels vote in two more Shan State townships’, Radio Free
Asia, 27 October 2015, accessed 30 October 2015.
[19]. ‘Special
police get ready for Burma elections’, The Irrawaddy, 26 October
2015, accessed 30 October 2015.
[20]. ‘Myanmar election: opposition
rally attacked with swords’, BBC, 29 October 2015, accessed 30 October
2015.
[21]. International
Foundation for Electoral Systems, Myanmar,
accessed 2 November 2015; Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Myanmar, accessed 2
November 2015.
[22]. UK Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, Joint
statement on election support from the Embassies of Australia, Denmark, EU,
Norway, Switzerland, UK and the US, media release, 3 March 2015,
accessed 30 October 2015.
[23]. ‘Myanmar
to invite Western observers for general election’, Reuters, 24 March
2015, accessed 30 October 2015.
[24]. ‘Thein
Sein highlights achievements in pre-poll radio address’, The Irrawaddy,
3 November 2015, accessed 4 November 2015.
[25]. See:
Economist Intelligence Unit, Country
report: Myanmar, updated 23 October 2015, accessed 30 October 2015
(subscription only); ICG, Myanmar’s
electoral landscape, op. cit., p. 15; ‘Change
in the air’, The Economist, 31 October 2015, accessed 1 November
2015.
[26]. ICG, Myanmar’s
electoral landscape, op. cit., p. 16.
[27]. ‘USDP
eyes big wins in Burma’s rice bowl’, The Irrawaddy, 30 September
2015, accessed 29 October 2015.
[28]. ICG, Myanmar’s
electoral landscape, op. cit., p. 16.
[29]. Selth, ‘Will
Aung San Suu Kyi be president?, op. cit.
[30]. S Aung, ‘The man to watch’,
Foreign policy, 15 January 2014, accessed 30 October 2015.
[31]. N Farrelly, ‘The
USDP faces the people’, New Mandala, blog, Australian National
University, 26 October 2015, accessed 30 October 2015.
[32]. V Nehru, Myanmar:
the mechanics of the elections, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 10 September 2015, accessed 2 November 2015.
[33]. E Brennan, ‘The
Lady, the constitution and Myanmar’s political manoeuvring’, The
Interpreter, blog, 24 June 2015, accessed 30 October 2015.
[34]. ‘Change
in the air’, op. cit.
[35]. ‘Myanmar election: Suu Kyi
vows to lead government’, BBC, 7 October 2015, accessed 30 October 2015.
[36]. Transnational
Institute (TNI), Ethnic
politics and the 2015 elections in Myanmar, Myanmar policy briefing, 16
September 2015, accessed 30 October 2015, pp. 6–11.
[37]. A Din, ‘Burma:
the rise of ethnic parties in the political system (part II)’, cogitAsia,
17 April 2014, accessed 2 November 2015.
[38]. TNI, Ethnic
politics, op. cit., p. 17.
[39]. ‘Ceasefire
pact is ‘historic gift’: president’, Myanmar Times, 21 October 2015,
accessed 30 October 2015.
[40]. Din, ‘The
rise of ethnic minority political parties’, op. cit.
[41]. ‘Myanmar election fears
could mar post-poll politics’, Oxford Analytica,18 September 2015,
accessed 29 October 2015 (subscription only).
[42]. E Brennan, ‘Why
institutions, not elections, should be Myanmar’s yardstick in 2015’, The
Interpreter, blog, 16 January 2015, accessed 2 November 2015.
[43]. K Thant, ‘Myanmar’s
fragmented ethnic politics mean post-election horse trading will likely be
messy’, cogitAsia, blog, 2 November 2015, accessed 3 November 2015.
[44]. ‘Myanmar election
fears could mar post-poll politics’, op. cit.
[45] ‘Scramble
to fix Myanmar's error-riddled voters roll’, Channel NewsAsia, 16
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[46]. ‘Myanmar
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