Defence White Paper 2013 (2013 Defence White Paper)


Synopsis:
Introduction
2013 Defence White Paper
Strategic objectives
Identified capability choices
Defence policy for industry
Alignment of cost, capability and strategic objectives
Conclusion

 

Defence White Paper 2013 (2013 Defence White Paper)

MH60R Romeo Seahawk helicopter and Landing Helicopter Dock

MH60R Romeo Seahawk helicopter and Landing Helicopter Dock (Source: Australian Defence Image Library)

Synopsis:

  • The 2013 Defence White Paper was released in the wake of the Asian Century White Paper and the National Security Strategy, both of which heavily influenced the strategic objectives of the 2013 Defence White Paper.
  • The 2011–12 Force Posture Review informed the 2013 Defence White Paper, both of which recognised the need for Australia to be self-reliant. The ADFs primary role is to defend Australia and Australia’s interests close to home, and these need to be reflected in the ADF’s capability requirements.
  • The 2013 Defence White Paper was widely regarded as a continuation of the 2009 Defence White Paper. However, the former placed greater emphasis on the need to balance capabilities with economic realities.
  • The language of this white paper was softer towards China but still raised concerns about its military development and territorial claims in the region. It also placed greater emphasis on the relationship between the United States and China in the region.
  • The gravity of the cyber threat was elevated and the white paper reinforced an earlier agreement between Australia and the United States that the ANZUS Treaty could be invoked in response to a significant cyber attack.
  • Defence’s role within the newly established Australian Cyber Security Centre, announced in the National Security Strategy, was articulated in the 2013 Defence White Paper.
  • While the 2013 Defence White Paper acknowledged the fiscal constraints imposed in response to the economic downturn, large capability items that were announced in the previous white paper, such as 12 conventional submarines and three squadrons of Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, were still a capability feature of this paper.
  • The Government’s 2010 Defence Industry Policy was reinforced in this white paper and similar Priority Industry Capabilities to those previously identified, remained.
  • No new Defence Capability Plan accompanied the 2013 Defence White paper.
  • The release of this white paper was brought forward one year due to the effects of the global financial crisis on the economy. The 2013 Defence White Paper aimed to change the 2009 defence funding model but the forecast spending for Defence was still unlikely to afford the specified capabilities—especially the Government’s intention to increase defence spending to two per cent of GDP.

Introduction

In the lead-up to the 2012–13 budget release, Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced that a defence white paper would be delivered ‘in the first half of 2013’, rather than in 2014 as had been projected in the 2009 Defence White Paper.[540] The Gillard Government stated that the need for another white paper at this time was based on the drawdown of ADF operational commitments overseas; recommendations from the Force Posture Review; Australia’s economic realities following the global financial crisis; ‘strategic change’ in the region; and major reforms within Defence.[541]

On 3 May 2013, the Defence White Paper 2013 (2013 Defence White Paper) was released with no defined timeframe. Like the 2009 Defence White Paper, it was not tabled in Parliament and it lacked bipartisan support.[542]

As with its predecessors, associated reviews contributed to the 2013 Defence White Paper, with the ADF Posture Review being key to the process. However, a community consultation process was not undertaken.

Australian Defence Force Posture Review

On 22 June 2011, Defence Minister Stephen Smith commissioned a review of the ADF’s posture to assess whether the ADF was ‘correctly geographically positioned to meet Australia’s modern and future strategic and security challenges’.[543] The Force Posture Review was headed by two former Defence secretaries, Allan Hawke and Ric Smith, who delivered the final report to Government in March 2012 (an interim report had been presented in January).[544] This Review was the ‘first strategic review of force posture since the Cooksey Review of Australia’s Defence Facilities in 1988, which followed the 1986 Dibb Review’.[545]

The executive summary and recommendations contained in the final report of the Force Posture Review were released by the Government in May 2012. There were 39 recommendations.[546] At that time, the Government stated that no decisions had been made in terms of those recommendations, but that its formal response would be contained in the 2013 Defence White Paper.[547]

In essence, the Force Posture Review posited that while the location of ADF bases does not require significant change, the ‘ADF posture needs to be adjusted to meet current and future needs’.[548] The Review noted that the ADF’s needs continue to be based on ‘the principle of self-reliance in the direct defence of Australia, and in relation to our unique strategic interests in our neighbourhood’.[549] This meant a greater focus on northern Australia, but the more controversial recommendation was for Defence to ‘upgrade the Cocos (Keeling) Islands airfield facilities to support unrestricted P-8 [maritime patrol aircraft] and UAV operations and KC-30 operations with some restrictions’.[550] The Review team argued that for these reasons, the islands have ‘significant military strategic value’.[551]

The Government’s response and implementation of the Force Posture Review’s recommendations are discussed below in the section on ‘strategic objectives’.

2013 Defence White Paper

The 2013 Defence White Paper was regarded by many as a continuation of the 2009 version, as the strategic objectives and capability priorities espoused in both documents remain largely extant. However, three key themes in the 2013 Defence White Paper particularly stand out as points of difference: the elevated circumstances of strategic uncertainty, increased emphasis on international engagement through defence diplomacy, and the crucial need to balance capabilities with economic realities.[552] While all three elements were present in the 2009 version, their increased emphasis in 2013 was significant.

As previously stated, the 2013 Defence White Paper failed to receive bipartisan support within the Parliament, with the key issue of defence funding being particularly contentious. For example, Shadow Defence Minister David Johnston was highly critical of the white paper’s lack of firm financial details and scheduling commitments.[553] However, Defence Minister Stephen Smith defended it by claiming there was limited budgetary scope contained in previous defence white papers and asserted that defence white papers are not inherently budget documents.[554]

Strategic objectives

Prior to the release of the 2013 Defence White Paper, two key documents were released: the Asian Century White Paper (October 2012) and the National Security Strategy (January 2013). Both documents revealed much of the regional strategic analysis upon which the 2013 Defence White Paper was built. Both documents discussed potential strategic concerns, while optimistically emphasising the importance of the United States-China relationship on regional security.[555] In fact the National Security Strategy and the 2013 Defence White Paper share identical language on this point, in expecting ‘that both the United States and China will work hard to maximise cooperative aspects and minimise the competitive elements in the relationship’.[556]

Although the language of the 2013 Defence White Paper is non-adversarial towards China, it raised the issue of tensions arising from China’s military modernisation and territorial claims in the region.[557] The National Security Strategy was more direct in acknowledging that China’s territorial disputes were exacerbating regional concerns and sought to encourage further openness and transparency from China.[558] The Asian Century White Paper was similarly direct, calling for China to explain ‘the pace and scope of their military modernisation, to build confidence and trust’.[559] While these sentiments were somewhat mirrored in the 2009 Defence White Paper, it is noteworthy that the 2013 Defence White Paper was not as cautious about China’s military intentions.[560]

However, departing from the strategic assessment of the 2009 Defence White Paper, the Asian Century White Paper acknowledged the serious challenges faced in the region but adopted a ‘largely optimistic view of the region’s geo-political future’.[561] The Asian Century White Paper foresaw regional security and stability involving the continuous presence of the United States, ‘engagement with a rising China, the benefits of trade and investment, and evolving regional multilateral institutions’ while cooperating with major powers in the region and multilateral organisations.[562] This optimism could be viewed as ‘appropriate for a policy blueprint that is attempting to motivate government, business, education and community sectors to embrace further domestic reforms and strengthen their understanding of and links with Asia’.[563] On the other hand, the Asian Century White Paper downplayed the reality of security tensions in the region. A more detailed assessment was expected to be addressed in the 2013 Defence White Paper.[564]

The 2013 Defence White Paper’s position on China generated a large amount of public commentary, in comparison to the language delivered in the 2009 Defence White Paper, due mainly to the 2013 version’s statement that ‘the Government does not approach China as an adversary’.[565] The Defence Minister asserted that the Government’s consistent approach to Australia’s relationship with China, as stated in both the 2009 and 2013 Defence White Papers, highlights the crucial nature of the United States-China relationship for security in the Asia-Pacific region.[566] However, it cannot be ignored that the tone regarding China shifted from diplomatic suspicion to a more nuanced perspective, where Australia sees ‘an enduring bilateral US-China relationship at every level—economic, political, strategic and military-to-military’.[567]

The importance of the United States–China relationship rests largely on the premise that many other regional variables are impacted by either the United States or Chinese politics. This includes the potential flashpoints of the Korean peninsula and East and South China Seas, as well as the growing importance of cyber defence.[568] However, the 2013 Defence White Paper also noted the potential for other contributors to Australia’s strategic uncertainty, such as regional instability closer to our shores, terrorism and increased military modernisation across the globe.[569]

In broad terms, apart from China, Australia’s stated strategic interests are almost identical in both the 2009 and 2013 Defence White Papers. As the core elements of this, the need for ‘a secure Australia’, ‘a secure South Pacific and Timor-Leste’, ‘a stable Indo-Pacific’ and ‘a stable, rules-based global order’ have remained an intrinsic imperative throughout this period.[570] There was also strong analytical continuity across the two documents, as the 2013 Defence White Paper acknowledged that ‘some defining characteristics of the order foreshadowed in the 2009 Defence White Paper are now becoming clearer’.[571] This is especially the case regarding Defence’s understanding of the rising significance of many Asian nations.[572]

While the concept of self-reliance remained in the 2013 Defence White Paper, it cautioned:

... commitment to self-reliance does not reflect any lack of confidence in our Alliance [with the United States] or partners. We would seek and expect help from our friends if Australia came under direct attack. But we should not rely on the combat forces of others to defend Australia.[573]

The 2013 Defence White Paper went on to acknowledge that there are limits to self-reliance and as such, Australia would need to rely on the ‘United States and other partners’ for specific capabilities like intelligence, communications and logistics.[574]

Cyber security featured prominently in the 2013 Defence White Paper.[575] The seriousness of the threat to national security was emphasised in the reinforcement of an agreement with the United States that the ANZUS Treaty would apply to cyber attacks.[576] This meant Australia needed to enhance its cyber capabilities and as part of the National Security Strategy the establishment of the new Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) was announced.[577] The ACSC would build on the existing CSOC structure with ASD continuing to play a primary role in its operation. The new ACSC would comprise cyber security capabilities from ASD, ASIO, the Attorney-General’s Department, the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Crime Commission.[578]

Identified capability choices

There were comparatively few additional capability decisions outlined in the 2013 Defence White Paper, especially when compared with its 2009 predecessor. This was largely due to a lack of available funding and compounded by the economic downturn in the wake of the global financial crisis. In acknowledging these circumstances, the 2013 Defence White Paper asserted that ‘the Government remains committed to fiscal discipline and improving the sustainability of the budget’, despite the ‘challenging’ fiscal environment.[579] However, while there was minimal new spending in the 2013 Defence White Paper, many previously announced acquisitions, such as the 12 Future Submarines and three operational squadrons of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, remained.[580]

Maritime forces

Given the 2009 Defence White Paper’s ambitions for expanding and modernising RAN capabilities, the 2013 Defence White Paper confirmed the Government’s continued commitment to previous capability announcements. This included the decision to focus resources on either a new or ‘evolved Collins’ design for the Future Submarine program, instead of existing ‘military-off-the-shelf’ designs.[581] Additionally, the 2013 Defence White Paper indicated that the RAN will seek to acquire a proven replacement for the Armidale Class patrol boats and bring forward the replacement of its replenishment ships HMA Ships Success and Sirius.[582]

Land forces

The 2013 Defence White Paper confirmed the Government’s commitment to support the Army with protected and armoured vehicles, including wholesale replacement of ageing medium and heavy trucks. Additionally, Special Forces would continue to be provided with appropriate resources ‘to maintain an edge over emerging threats’.[583]

Air power

The 2013 Defence White Paper reiterated the previous decision to acquire an additional 12 EA-18G Growler electronic attack (EA) aircraft for the RAAF.[584] This would allow the retention of its current operational squadron of 24 F/A 18F Super Hornets instead of reconfiguring some of these to generate an EA capability.[585] The 2013 Defence White Paper also indicated the Government’s intention to transition its maritime surveillance capabilities from the current fleet of AP-3C Orions to P-8A Poseidons, with the potential to incorporate UAVs into this fleet sometime in the future.[586]

Defence policy for industry

The 2013 Defence White Paper dedicated ten pages to defence policy for industry and reinforced the Government’s 2010 Defence Industry Policy document.[587] The policy would mainly focus on:

  • global defence and broader industry trends
  • relations between Defence and industry
  • PICs
  • innovation policy priorities
  • enhancing innovation in this sector and providing support programs
  • promoting and developing competitiveness
  • facilitating international defence trade cooperation
  • developing a skilled workforce, particularly in new fields
  • focusing on the skills market in the maritime sector and
  • facilitating greater linkages between industry and the education sector.[588]

The 2013 Defence White Paper also claimed that the Government’s Plan for Australian Jobs helped to establish a defence hub in the Manufacturing Precinct in Adelaide.[589] The existing PICs model still emphasised self-reliance in support of ADF operational capability.[590]

2012 Defence Capability Plan

The 2009 DCP promised updates ‘every six months to reflect government decisions’, and this was almost achieved up until 2012 when the format changed to include an additional document—the Defence Capability Guide (DCG).[591] Like its predecessors since 2009, the 2012 DCP still kept its four-year outlook but now the DCG would cover the subsequent six years to provide industry with “general guidance” on defence projects.[592] This approach was confirmed in the 2013 Defence White Paper, but unlike the 2009 version, there was no specific promise or timeframe for providing updates.[593]

Alignment of cost, capability and strategic objectives   

A key pillar of the 2009 Defence White Paper was its unequivocal funding commitment ‘for the life of the White Paper’ (out to 2030), where the Department of Defence would receive real annual funding growth of at least 2.2 per cent, in addition to any internal savings generated by the Strategic Reform Program.[594] This commitment proved inherently unsustainable and as such, the 2013 Defence White Paper was drafted in a very different budgetary climate.

The 2013 Defence White Paper acknowledged that defence funding was susceptible to broader pressures, claiming that the ‘continuing adverse effects of the [global financial crisis] have necessitated the bringing forward of this White Paper’.[595] Accordingly, the 2013 Defence White Paper was highly cautious in articulating a defence spending framework, stating:

... the Government has decided that the Defence funding model will be based on the four-year forward estimates cycle, determined on an annual basis taking into account contemporary strategic economic and fiscal circumstances.[596]

It went on to say that the Department of Defence would receive six-year funding guidance from Government, arguing that such an approach would allow for greater flexibility and create a lower burden of expectation.[597]

The 2013 Defence White Paper also indicated that ‘as Australia’s financial and economic circumstances allow, the Government will want to grow the defence budget to around two per cent of GDP.[598] The broad intention to increase the defence budget to this level was shared by both sides of federal politics.[599]

Despite these funding targets, ASPI analyst Mark Thomson argued that the Government’s forecast spending would still be unlikely to be sufficient to afford the 2013 Defence White Paper’s list of proposed capability acquisitions.[600] Thomson further asserted that aspirations to fund Defence at levels of two per cent of GDP would be difficult to achieve and instead stated that a decade of defence funding below 1.7 per cent is more realistic, given the substantial funding shortfall Defence experienced from 2009–13.[601] The Secretary of the Defence Department, Dennis Richardson, also indicated during Senate Estimates in June 2013 that the Strategic Reform Program was unlikely to deliver its anticipated $20 billion in efficiency savings and that since 2009 only $3.3 billion in savings had been generated through the program.[602]

At the release of the 2013 Budget, the Government also stated that it had provided the Department of Defence with ‘funding guidance’ of around $220.0 billion between 2017–18 and 2022–23. However, in the post-global financial crisis world, it is difficult to know what ‘funding guidance’ will mean in reality as long-term plans are likely to ‘remain subject to change as strategic circumstances evolve’.[603]

As previously stated, the only major new addition to the capital equipment program in the 2013–14 Budget was the decision to purchase 12 EA‑18G fighter planes (the Growler variant of the Super Hornet) from the United States. The cost was estimated to be $2.9 billion, with $2.0 billion allocated to Defence in 2014–15 for this purpose.[604]

The 2013 Defence White Paper flagged that the Government would seek to replace the current Armidale Class patrol boats and the supply vessels HMA Ships Sirius and Success ‘at the first possible opportunity’.[605] The Defence budget noted that the replacement of Sirius and Success was set for first pass approval consideration in 2013–14, but there was no mention of specific funding for this or the patrol boats.[606] However, it was possible that the Government’s intentions were covered by the $220.0 billion of ‘funding guidance’.

The number of DCP projects being prepared for approval had risen modestly since the 2012–13 Budget. There were now 12 projects on the First Pass list (there were six in the 2011–12 budget) and 17 projects on the Second Pass list (there were 19 the previous year). The list of projects set for consideration for Second Pass approval included major acquisitions such as the JSF and the P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft.[607]

Graph 1: Defence spending since 1975–76

Graph 1: Defence spending since 1975–76

Source: GDP: ABS, Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product, Cat. No. 5206.0. 12 months ended June (calculated on the quarterly original series using current prices), CPI – ABS, Consumer price index, June 2015, Cat. no. 6401.0
Department of Defence Annual Reports, ASPI Cost of Defence.

Conclusion

With the change in government in late 2013 came the promise to release the next defence white paper within 18 months of taking office.[608] The Abbott Government has stated that the 2015 Defence White Paper will be ‘costed and affordable’.[609] The Government aimed to achieve this by ensuring there were no further cuts to the defence budget and that they would work towards raising defence spending to two per cent of GDP.[610] Both the 2014–15 and 2015–16 budgets significantly increased spending on defence.[611] Whether this trend will, or can, continue for subsequent budgets remains to be seen given the ongoing concerns about the current economic climate and the many pressures that are exerted on Australian Government expenditure.

As part of the 2015 Defence White Paper process, the Government has been conducting a community consultation process. An Issues Paper was released for discussion in July 2014 and the final report on the outcomes of this process was issued on 1 July 2015.[612] This is the third occasion in which the community has been consulted in the lead-up to a defence white paper: previous occurrences were the 2000 and 2009 Defence White Papers (noted earlier). As with previous defence white papers, it will most likely be difficult to determine the extent to which the public consultation process has influenced the content of the 2015 Defence White Paper.

There is much anticipation surrounding the upcoming defence white paper, not least because the Government has been holding off making some key capability announcements until its release. The capability decisions include important decisions about Australia’s future submarine and future frigate fleets. Accompanying the next defence white paper will be a new ten-year Defence Investment Plan (which will contain the DCP), a Defence Industry Policy Statement and the recently released naval shipbuilding plan.[613] Whether the strategic objectives, identified capability choices, cost of capability, and alignment of these elements can be achieved as part of the overall 2015 Defence White Paper package will be the subject of much debate.

Australia’s significantly changing strategic environment has been reflected in each of the defence white papers produced since 1976—from the end of the Vietnam War and the Cold War to the escalation of international terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, the rise of China, cyber attacks, conflict in the Middle East and fluctuating tensions in the Asia-Pacific. Additionally, each white paper asserted Australia’s need to be self-reliant while correspondingly emphasising the importance of the United States alliance. However, the degree to which these factors translated into changes in ADF capability has been marginal. Key capability decisions were often made outside the white paper process and were generally confirmed retrospectively in subsequent white papers due to the longevity of the projects, regardless of which major party was in government at the time.

In recent years, the role of Parliament in scrutinising and debating major policy announcements contained in defence white papers has diminished. The convention of tabling defence white papers in Parliament was not followed in 2009 and 2013; rather, these key policy announcements were made outside of Parliament. In a recent ASPI publication, Anthony Bergin and former Parliamentarian Russell Trood suggested that the responsibilities of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade might include ‘investigating the contents of Defence or Foreign Affairs white papers’.[614]

There has been a gradual increase in the recognition of the ADF’s assistance to the civil community and aid to the civil authority, as well as its broader support in regional humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. However, only within the last decade has the strategic logic—demonstration of the ADF’s ability to provide a swift response to emergencies—of this capability been fully recognised, resulting in a minimal influence on capability decision-making, such as the importance of maintaining the RAN’s amphibious fleet.[615] Regardless, defence planners must consider capability choices on the basis of the ADF’s core role which is the defence of Australia and its national interests, and it follows that the procurement of military equipment must be primarily for military purposes.

It has been rare for capability decisions identified in defence white papers to align with the actual funding needed to achieve them. Since 1976 this has occurred only once: the 2000 Defence White Paper, which was followed by years of strong economic growth, managed to fulfil its funding promise (although, even here, it later appeared that many capability costs had been underestimated and were less affordable than initially thought). The 2009 Defence White Paper did not have the luxury of the sustained economic growth of the Howard years and it quickly came to seem that capability choices were overly ambitious, given the prevailing fiscal climate.[616]

Recognition that Australia’s industry for defence has an important role to play in capability development also gradually gained greater acceptance and was fully acknowledged in the 2001 DCP, in line with the assertions made in the 2000 Defence White Paper.[617] Subsequent white papers, DCPs and Defence industry policies continued this trend. The current debate about the role Australian industry plays in the defence domain has gained significant traction, particularly as a decision about future submarines is pending. State governments are vying for defence-related work, but ultimately defence capability decisions rest with the Federal Government.[618] On 4 August 2015, some clarity was provided on the role of Australian industry when the Abbott Government announced its naval shipbuilding plan.[619] The plan outlines a continuous build program for Australia’s future frigates and offshore patrol vessels. The forthcoming 2015 Defence White Paper is expected to prioritise RAN capability investment and the number of new maritime assets required.

While the strategic objectives identified in each defence white paper seek to justify the level of force structure required by the ADF, the size of the military in terms of personnel has been subject to varying degrees of austerity measures. The ADF’s preparedness levels have also suffered at times due to broader economic factors. Ultimately, the strength or volatility of Australia’s economy is more influential in deciding how much money is spent on defence, regardless of commitments in any defence white paper.

 



[540].      Australian Government, Defence white paper 2013 (2013 Defence White Paper), White paper, Canberra, 2013, accessed 13 January 2015; J Gillard (Prime Minister) and S Smith (Minister for Defence), New defence white paper 2013, op. cit.

[541].      Ibid.

[542].      J Gillard (Prime Minister) and S Smith (Minister for Defence), Release of the 2013 defence white paper, media release, 3 May 2013, accessed 13 January 2015; D Johnston (Shadow Minister for Defence), 2013 defence white paper: no plan, no schedule, no money, media release, 3 May 2013, accessed 13 January 2015.

[543].      S Smith (Minister for Defence), Australian Defence Force posture review, media release, 22 June 2011, accessed 13 January 2015.

[544].      Ibid.

[545].      A Hawke and R Smith, Australian Defence Force posture review, Department of Defence, 30 March 2012, p. 1, accessed 13 January 2015.

[546].      J Gillard (Prime Minister), Release of final Defence Force posture review report, media release, 3 May 2012, accessed 13 January 2015.

[547].      Ibid.

[548].      A Hawke and R Smith, Australian Defence Force posture review, op. cit., p. i.

[549].      Ibid., p. 6.

[550].      Ibid., p. 26.

[551].      Ibid.

[552].      2013 Defence White Paper, op. cit., pp. 1–4.

[553].      D Johnston (Shadow Minister for Defence), 2013 defence white paper—no plan, no schedule, no money, op. cit., accessed 13 January 2015.

[554].      S Smith (Minister for Defence), ‘Interview Peter van Onselen: 2013 defence white paper; federal elections, Sky News, Australian Agenda, transcript, 5 May 2013, accessed 13 January 2015.

[555].      Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), Strong and secure: a strategy for Australia’s national security (National Security Strategy), PM&C, Canberra, 2013, p. 27, accessed 22 July 2013; Australian Government, Australia in the Asian century: white paper, White paper, October 2012, p. 73, accessed 13 January 2015.

[556].      National Security Strategy, ibid., p. 27; 2013 Defence White Paper, op. cit.

[557].      2013 Defence White Paper, ibid., p. 11.

[558].      2009 Defence White Paper, op. cit.; National Security Strategy, op. cit., p. 29.

[559].      Australia in the Asian century white paper, op. cit., p. 228.

[560].      2013 Defence White Paper, op. cit., pp. 10–11.

[561].      C Hill, ‘Australia in the Asian century: regional security and foreign policy dimensions‘, FlagPost, Parliamentary Library blog, 12 November 2012, accessed 13 January 2015.

[562].      Ibid.

[563].      Ibid.

[564].      Ibid.

[565].      A O’Neil, ‘Defence white paper pulls its punches on China’, Lowy Institute for International Policy, blog, 6 May 2013, accessed 13 January 2015; B Schreer, ‘Introducing nuance: the white paper and great power competition’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, blog, 3 May 2013, accessed 13 January 2015; R Medcalf, ‘Sweet and sour in defence take on China’, Australian Financial Review, 6 May 2013, p. 47, accessed 13 January 2015; 2013 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 11.

[566].      S Smith (Minister for Defence), ‘Interview Peter van Onselen’, op. cit.; 2009 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 34; 2013 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 9.

[567].      2009 Defence White Paper, ibid., p. 34; 2013 Defence White Paper, ibid., p. 10.

[568].      2009 Defence White Paper, ibid., p. 95; T Feakin, ‘Squaring up for round one—cyber intrusion knock out‘, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, blog, 6 June 2013, accessed 13 January 2015.

[569].      2013 Defence White Paper, op. cit., pp. 14–16 and 18.

[570].      Ibid., pp. 24–27.

[571].      Ibid., p. 7.

[572].      2009 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 95.

[573].      2013 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 28.

[574].      Ibid., p. 29.

[575].      Ibid., pp. 20–21 and 78–79.

[576].      At the September 2011 AUSMIN talks in the United States, both parties ‘endorsed a Joint Statement on cyber declaring that cyber attacks could be invoked under the ANZUS Treaty...’ Cited in S Smith (Minister for Defence), Australia-United States ministerial consultations (AUSMIN), media release, 16 September 2011, accessed 13 January 2015. This position was reinforced in the 2013 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 20.

[577].      National Security Strategy, op. cit.

[578].      Ibid.

[579].      Ibid., p. 71.

[580].      2009 Defence White Paper, op. cit., pp. 70 and 78.

[581].      2013 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 83.

[582].      Ibid., pp. 84–5.

[583].      Ibid., pp. 86–7.

[584].      Ibid., p. 88.

[585].      Ibid., p. 88.

[586].      Ibid., p. 88.

[587].      Ibid., p. 115.

[588].      Ibid., pp. 115–124.

[589].      Ibid., p. 115.

[590].      Ibid., p. 118.

[591].      The first update was dated December 2009 but released publicly in February 2010. The second update was released in December 2010. In June 2011, the government issued two supplements that were in table format, which was closely followed by the release of a full update in August 2011. In July 2012, the Government changed the format of the DCP to include a Defence Capability Guide (DCG). The DCP retained its four year outlook and the DCG covered the subsequent six years providing ‘general guidance’ to industry on potential projects. Cited in Library Catalogue, ‘Project update summary‘; S Smith (Minister for Defence) and J Clare (Minister for Defence Materiel), Public defence capability plan—update 2, media release, 17 December 2010, accessed 13 January 2015; S Smith (Minister for Defence) and J Clare (Minister for Defence Materiel), Release of the 2011 on line public defence capability plan, media release, 18 August 2011, accessed 13 January 2015; S Smith (Minister for Defence) and J Clare (Minister for Defence Materiel), Defence capability plan, media release, 10 July 2012, accessed 13 January 2015.

[592].      S Smith (Minister for Defence) and J Clare (Minister for Defence Materiel), plan, media release, Ibid.

[593].      2013 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 89.

[594].      2009 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 137.

[595].      2013 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 3.

[596].      Ibid., p. 72.

[597].      Ibid.

[598].      Ibid., p. 2.

[599].      D Johnston (Shadow Defence Minister), Doorstop interview: 2013 defence white paper: Coalition response, Canberra, transcript, 3 May 2013, accessed 13 January 2015.

[600].      M Thomson, ‘Budget 2013: defence: second chance: will they deliver?’, The Australian, 25 May 2013, p. 1, accessed 13 January 2015.

[601].      M Thomson, ‘We’re still not paying enough for the defence force we need’, Canberra Times, 4 June 2013, p. 6, accessed 13 January 2015.  

[602].      Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Official committee Hansard, 3 June 2013, p. 50, accessed 13 January 2015.

[603].      Australian Government, Portfolio budget statements 2013–14: budget related paper 1.4A Defence Portfolio, p. 13, accessed 13 January 2015.

[604].      J Gillard (Prime Minister) and S Smith (Minister for Defence), 2013 defence white paper: air combat capability, media release, 3 May 2013, accessed 13 January 2015.

[605].      2013 Defence White Paper, op. cit., pp. 84–85.

[606].      Defence Portfolio budget statements 2013–14, op. cit., p. 119.

[607].      Ibid., pp. 118–119.

[608].      T Abbott (Opposition Leader), D Johnston (Shadow Minister for Defence) and S Robert (Shadow Minister for Defence Science, Technology and Personnel), The Coalition’s policy for stronger defence, media release, 2 September 2013, accessed 13 January 2015; D Johnston (Minister for Defence), Speech to ASPI, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, transcript, 3 December 2013, accessed 13 January 2015.

[609].      Ibid.

[610].      Ibid.

[611].      D Watt, ‘Defence budget overview‘, Budget review 2014–15, Research paper series, 2013–14, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, May 2014, accessed 13 January 2015.

[612].      D Johnston (Minister for Defence), Defence Minister releases white paper public consultation, media release, 28 July 2014, accessed 13 January 2015; Australian Government, Guarding against uncertainty: Australian attitudes to defence, Department of Defence, 1 July 2015, accessed 2 July 2015.

[613].      K Andrews (Minister for Defence), ‘Budget 2015–16: defending Australia and its national interests‘, Department of Defence, brochure, May 2015, accessed 2 July 2015; N Brangwin, ‘Defence materiel‘, Budget review 2014–15, Research paper series, 2013–14, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, May 2014, accessed 13 January 2015.

[614].      A Bergin and R Trood, ‘Creative tension: Parliament and national security‘, Strategic Insights, 94, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, August 2015, p. 14, accessed 11 August 2015.

[615].      Following Cyclone Yasi in February 2011, the RAN’s amphibious fleet was found to be non-operational and was unable to assist the Queensland Government in recovery operations. The RAN began to charter vessels to supplement its amphibious fleet and procured the MSV Skandi Bergen (offshore support vessel), primarily to provide the RAN with a humanitarian and disaster relief capability. HMAS Choules (landing ship dock) was also purchased from the UK Government. The RAN’s new Landing Helicopter Docks also have the potential to provide a humanitarian assistance role but the platform’s main purpose is to provide the ADF with an amphibious assault capability. The RAAF’s strategic air lift capabilities, such as the C-17 Globemaster and C-130 Hercules aircraft, already play a significant role in supporting government intent when responding to regional and domestic emergencies. Royal Australian Navy, Ocean Shield arrives in Australia, media release, 30 June 2012, accessed 13 January 2015; RAAF, ‘C-17A Globemaster III‘, RAAF website, accessed 13 January 2015;
RAAF, ‘C-130J Hercules‘, RAAF website, accessed 13 January 2015.

[616].      Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), ‘Submission to the National Commission of Audit from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)‘, ASPI, website, p. 6, accessed 13 January 2015.

[617].      2000 Defence White Paper, op. cit., pp. 98–106.

[618].      Parliament of Australia, ‘Future of Australia’s naval shipbuilding industry‘, Senate Standing Committee on Economics, website, accessed 2 July 2015; Australian Government, Guarding against uncertainty: Australian attitudes to defence, op. cit.

[619].      T Abbott (Prime Minister) and K Andrews (Minister for Defence), The Government’s plan for a strong and sustainable naval shipbuilding industry, media release, 4 August 2015, accessed 11 August 2015.

 

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