The Defence of Australia (1994 Defence White Paper)


Synopsis:
Introduction
1994 Defence White Paper
Strategic objectives
Identified capability choices
Industry for defence
Alignment of cost, capability and strategic objectives

 

Defending Australia (1994 Defence White Paper)

CH-47 Chinook helicopter

CH-47 Chinook helicopter (Source: Australian Defence Image Library)

Synopsis:

  • The 1991 Force Structure Review recommended, as a cost saving measure, a significant reduction in ADF and Defence civilian personnel numbers.
  • By the time of the 1994 Defence White Paper’s release, the workforce had been reduced by more than 16 per cent of Defence civilians and 15 per cent of ADF personnel.
  • In 1992, despite the end of the Cold War, the Government assessed in Australia’s strategic planning in the 1990s that Australia’s strategic environment had changed very little since the 1987 Defence White Paper. Yet one year on, with the release of the Strategic Review 1993, the assessment of Australia’s strategic environment had significantly changed and stability in the region was now much harder to predict.
  • For the first time, a defence white paper included a section on ADF assistance in international and domestic disaster relief operations, but it emphasised that this would not influence defence capability decision-making.
  • The concept of self-reliance remained a high priority.
  • There was a greater emphasis on regional engagement and the Australia-United States alliance remained a key defence policy element.
  • Defence industry priorities were identified in the white paper while simultaneously acknowledging that demand for defence specific goods and services is difficult to support in such a highly-competitive market.
  • The aspiration for defence spending decreased to two per cent of GDP (as opposed to the aspirational 2.6 to 3 per cent outlined in the 1987 Defence White Paper).
  • This white paper emphasised spending on major defence equipment upgrades, arguably at the expense of overall military preparedness levels through a reduction in personnel and training.

Introduction

The Keating Government tabled the 1994 Defence White Paper, entitled Defending Australia, in Parliament on 30 November 1994.[160] The 1994 Defence White Paper reaffirmed Australia’s defence policy of self-reliance while also supporting strategic engagement with regional neighbours and the United States. The white paper’s outlook encompassed the next 15 years.[161] The Opposition expressed disappointment with the 1994 Defence White Paper, arguing that it was not adequately funded and did not do enough to support ADF personnel.[162]

Prior to the 1994 Defence White Paper’s release, the Government initiated a number of key reviews that contributed to the paper.

Force Structure Review 1991

In May 1990, the Government commissioned a Force Structure Review (FSR) and within one year, the Minister for Defence, Robert Ray, released the public version of the report.[163] The FSR aimed to convert some combat capabilities—principally in Army—to the reserves, by greater efficiency in support and maintenance functions for all three Services, and by instituting some adjustments to the major capital investment program’.[164]

The FSR suggested a number of adjustments, including:

    • maximising combat capabilities by reducing the numbers of service personnel involved in headquarters and base support functions; and by using commercial and civilian support and maintenance where operationally feasible, practicable and cost effective
    • meeting the strategic focus on northern and western operations by extending western basing for the Navy and northern basing for further major Army units, and enhancing the forward deployment capacity of the Air Force and
    • making greater use of reserves, including a new form of reserve service, the Ready Reserve, to supplement the current reserve forces of each Service, while maintaining the required overall force readiness.[165]

As a cost-saving measure, the FSR prompted significant cuts to personnel numbers, up to 10,500 over ten years: 1,000 from the RAN; 5,200 from Army; 4,200 from the RAAF and more than 3,800 Defence civilians.[166] The subsequent 1994 Defence White Paper recognised that savings had been achieved through the reduction of the workforce by more than 16 per cent of Defence civilian personnel and 15 per cent of military personnel.[167]

The FSR considered what capabilities the ADF was likely to require in the 21st century, particularly as platforms and equipment became obsolete.[168] For instance, the FSR suggested that the RAN’s fleet of surface combatants should increase from ten to sixteen ships by 2010 and the existing 15 Fremantle Class Patrol Boats (FCPBs) be retained until 2004, to be replaced by 12 new patrol boats.[169] As it turned out, 12 surface combatant vessels were in service with the RAN by 2010 and three Air Warfare Destroyers were under construction.[170] The fleet of FCPBs began to be replaced by the Armidale Class Patrol Boats from mid-2005.[171]

Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s

Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s (ASP 90) was drafted in 1989 to provide guidance to the Department of Defence on government priorities for Australia’s military development. ASP 90 effectively followed the strategic approach previously outlined in the 1987 Defence White Paper. ASP 90 received government endorsement in November 1989 but was not publicly released until September 1992. At the time of release, the Government stated that ‘no previous Government has published the strategic basis series of papers’ and that it was doing this to demonstrate its ‘commitment to more openness in Government’.[172] From that point on, all unclassified versions of strategic guidance documents were published following Cabinet endorsement.[173]

ASP 90 asserted that Australia’s security approach to changing global events (such as the end of the Cold War) required little adjustment from the direction set out in the 1987 Defence White Paper. Furthermore, Australia’s regional defence policy focus meant that ‘events in Europe and elsewhere do not have a direct impact on our strategic planning. Dramatic as the collapse of the Soviet Union or events such as the Gulf War were, they did not change Australia’s immediate security environment’.[174] Nonetheless, another strategic review was conducted and released by the Government in the following year.

Strategic Review 1993

The Strategic Review 1993 departed from ASP 90’s steadfast approach by acknowledging that while it had set the general direction for defence planning, ‘since then Australia and the world have changed considerably’.[175] The aim of Strategic Review 1993 was to begin the process of identifying and adapting Australia’s strategic and defence policies to address emerging challenges in the post-Cold War era. While the Strategic Review 1993 contributed in part to the forthcoming defence white paper process, it only had an outlook of three to five years, whereas the 1994 Defence White Paper would look much further into the 21st century. The Strategic Review 1993 reinforced the defence of Australia doctrine (self-reliance) but also placed a higher degree of importance on supporting broader regional engagement and Australia’s strategic alliances.[176] In addition, it recognised the need for Australian defence and security planners to adapt to ‘growing complexity and uncertainty’ in the region, particularly the:

  • increased modernisation of regional forces
  • United States’ focus and its role in the Asia-Pacific region over the next ten years
  • promotion of international peace and security through the United Nations and emerging regional multilateral organisations
  • strategic posturing of China, Japan and India
  • concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
  • insecurity on the Korean peninsula
  • impact of economic and trade alliances on strategic planning
  • rise of Asian economies and their impact on regional stability
  • socio-economic concerns in the South West Pacific and
  • continuing ‘instability in the Middle East’.[177]

Overall, the Strategic Review 1993 assessed that Australia’s main strategic focus should be pursued through greater engagement in the ‘Asia-Pacific’ region.[178] This concept was reproduced in the 1994 Defence White Paper.

Public consultation—defence white paper process

In the lead-up to the release of the 1994 Defence White Paper, the Australian Democrats unsuccessfully called for the Keating Government to conduct a public consultation process to canvass public opinion on Australia’s defence priorities. The Democrats viewed current defence policy (and thinking) as outdated and prompted the Government to take a fresh look at Australia’s military requirements by involving the Australian public through public hearings and written submissions.[179] The content of previous defence white papers was not informed by input from the public. However, a public consultation process was adopted in the lead-up to the 2000 Defence White Paper and this has been repeated for subsequent defence white papers (discussed below).[180]

1994 Defence White Paper

Strategic objectives

While Defence Minister Robert Ray acknowledged that the 1994 Defence White Paper was ‘not sexy enough’ and did not contain ‘any massive new equipment purchases’ or ‘any shocking revelations’, he argued that this was satisfying because it showed the Government had been doing a good job on defence matters over the last seven years.[181]

The 1994 Defence White Paper reflected a similar concept to that which was outlined in the Strategic Review 1993—that Australia’s strategic outlook should focus on Asia and the Pacific.[182] While previous defence white papers discussed Australia’s engagement within the region, they delineated between South East Asia and the Pacific, whereas the 1994 Defence White Paper focused on the broader Asia-Pacific region as a whole.[183] Subsequent defence white papers continued this trend.

The 1994 Defence White Paper was the first of its kind produced after the end of the Cold War. The terminology used in it acknowledged the post-Cold War environment and the changed strategic dynamics within the region—recognising that Australia’s ‘future security’ was dependent on stability in broader Asia and in the Pacific.[184] Despite the enhanced focus on ensuring security in the Asia-Pacific, the overarching premise of self-reliance continued to dominate. Primarily, Australia must rely on its own forces because its ‘security environment and national interests are unique’.[185] The strategic posture laid out in the 1994 Defence White Paper was relatively defensive, stating:

We will not use armed force except to defend our national interests, and we do not envisage resorting to armed force other than in response to the use or threat of force by others. We have no disputes with other countries which might be expected to give rise to the use of force, and no reason at present to expect that disputes of that sort will develop.[186]

The White Paper warned of ‘new uncertainties’ as the security environment in Asia became less predictable following the end of the Cold War. Power struggles and political change in the region had the potential to destabilise the region and ‘perhaps quite seriously in the future’ possibly lead to armed force being used against Australia.[187] As such, Australia would need to be prepared to respond, and ‘be capable, without combat assistance from other countries, of defeating any attack which could credibly be mounted against Australia’.[188] Consequently, this objective would determine the capabilities required of the ADF.[189]

Another first for an Australian defence white paper was the inclusion of a specific objective to use the ADF in disaster relief activities, domestically and internationally. The 1994 Defence White Paper emphasised, however, that these activities would not determine the force structure of the ADF or deter the military from their primary role in defending Australia.[190] The use of ADF personnel and equipment in disaster relief operations went on to feature more prominently in subsequent defence white papers.

The 1994 Defence White Paper noted the ongoing post-Cold War presence of the United States in the region but recognised that it would not ‘seek nor accept primary responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the region’.[191] Despite this realisation, coupled with the Australian Government’s emphasis on self-reliance, the United States alliance remained a ‘key element’ in Australia’s defence policy.[192]

In addition, the white paper predicted that over the next 15 years, China’s economy would grow to become the largest in Asia. Consequently, China’s military capabilities, particularly its maritime forces, would expand and influence the strategic and political framework within the Asia-Pacific.[193] Notwithstanding this, the discussion about China in the white paper was relatively minimal.

Just after the 1994 Defence White Paper was released, the Defence Minister stated that while self-reliance was still the principal theme of Australia’s defence policy, this:

... doesn’t mean self-sufficiency, because if we were arguing for a self-sufficient defence force that can supply all its own materiel, you would be looking at doubling or trebling the defence budget.[194]

Given the recession of the early 1990s, it was not surprising that the 1994 Defence White Paper contained some austerity measures and little in the way of new capability announcements. Consequently, the ADF’s preparedness levels were prioritised to concentrate on areas that contribute to sea and air intelligence, surveillance and responses, some strike capability elements and ‘land force surveillance, reconnaissance, ready reaction and Special Forces elements’.[195] Outside of these areas, a lower priority was placed on maintaining high levels of readiness. Specifically, the 1994 Defence White Paper stated that the ADF would ‘continue to emphasise strengthening the long-term capacity of our Defence Force through investment, rather than on sustaining higher levels of preparedness than our present strategic circumstances and levels of activity require’.[196]

This objective mirrored recommendations made by Alan Wrigley (former Deputy Secretary of the Department of Defence and former Director-General of the Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation), following his review of Defence in the 1990s. Wrigley proposed—and later reinforced in an article written in January 1994—that:

... the weight given by the Defence Force to its “requirement” for relatively high combat readiness was out of balance with that given to its longer-term expansion potential. For example, in the absence of any credible prospect of a military threat there is no justification for the overwhelming bias, most notably in the Navy and Air Force, favouring full-time forces over reserve forces which allow a larger number of people to be brought to a rather lower level of readiness for the same cost and so providing a better expansion capacity.[197]

The 1994 Defence White Paper did, however, maintain that the ADF needed to be prepared for short-warning conflicts, recognising that while Australia’s ‘survival as a nation would not be at stake in such a conflict, great damage could be done to our national interests if we were unable to deal with the adversary and to settle the conflict on terms favourable to Australia’.[198] The white paper also stipulated that Australia’s military preparedness needed to be adequate as the ADF ‘would not have time to develop additional capabilities within the relatively short notice we might receive of the development of motive or intention to attack Australia’.[199] In 1999, the ADF’s ability to respond at short notice was put to the test as part of the operation to restore peace and security in Timor Leste. While Australia’s military contribution in support of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) was well executed, the ADF was found to have capability deficiencies in training and equipment, which made it difficult for military units to train additional personnel and marshal equipment at short notice.[200]

Identified capability choices

Considering that the strategic doctrine of self-reliance continued over from the 1987 Defence White Paper, it is hardly surprising that the key capabilities nominated remained broadly similar. Some of the capability intentions outlined in the 1994 Defence White Paper were: [201]

  • consideration of a Fremantle Class Patrol Boat replacement[202]
  • major upgrades to the P3-C Orion maritime surveillance aircraft, Guided Missile Frigates (FFGs), the RAN’s Sea King helicopters and the RAAF’s F/A-18A/B fighter aircraft (within the decade) to extend their life-of-type
  • acquisition of helicopters for the ANZAC Class Frigates (FFHs)[203] (this became the ill-fated Super Seasprite project that was eventually cancelled in 2008 after $1.4 billion had been expended)[204]
  • construction of six Huon Class minehunter ships in Australia
  • the purchase of two heavy landing ships from the United States, which were to be modernised into an amphibious capability (HMA Ships Kanimbla and Manoora were commissioned into service with the RAN in 1994 and decommissioned in 2011 following seaworthiness issues)[205]
  • consideration of a lead-in fighter aircraft for operational and training support[206]
  • acquisition of six mobile ground air defence radars
  • raising a fifth Regular Army battalion, including one Reserve company
  • consideration of a Kiowa helicopter replacement (a decision was made in March 1999 to acquire 22 ARH Tiger Helicopters, which received Initial Operational Test and Evaluation Readiness in June 2014)[207]
  • consideration of a Caribou aircraft replacement (a decision on this particular capability would not be made until May 2012[208]) and
  • a decision was made not to replace Australia’s 103 Leopard tanks with a newer version of the Leopard—the current fleet was described as being ‘adequate’ out to 2010 (by 2004, the Government had decided to replace the Leopard tanks with 59 M1A1 Abrams tanks from the United States, which were introduced into service in 2007).[209]

Industry for defence

Prior to the release of the 1994 Defence White Paper, a number of reviews had been conducted and recommendations concerning defence industry policy were in the process of being implemented. The Defence Annual Report 1993–94 highlighted the Department of Defence’s program for developing greater industry involvement in defence procurement and sustainment.[210] The report listed a suite of measures the Department of Defence was undertaking in this area, including:

  • increased guidance on defence priority for Australian industry capabilities and technologies
  • greater industry awareness of Defence priorities, policies and programs leading towards better involvement in capability planning and procurement processes through awareness training offered to industry
  • the Defence Industry Development (DID) program, which involved $13.8 million worth of activities
  • new defence policy and procedures for intellectual property
  • improvements to the tendering process and costs (based on results from the defence industry survey on tendering costs) and
  • the establishment of a contracting policy and procedural framework, which included better standard contracting documents, regular updates on Departmental Contracting Instructions, as well as a newsletter, a help desk, procurement training, and contracting officer networks.[211]

The 1994 Defence White Paper contained 11 pages dedicated to defence policy for industry (slightly less than the 15 pages dedicated in the 1987 Defence White Paper, but certainly more than the four pages in the 1976 Defence White Paper).[212]

The 1994 Defence White Paper adopted a number of Priority Industry Capabilities that needed government support, which had been identified in the Strategic Review 1993. These included:

    • combat systems software and support
    • data management and signal processing, including for intelligence and surveillance
    • command, control and communications systems
    • systems integration and
    • repair and maintenance of major weapons and surveillance platforms.[213]

The 1994 Defence White Paper asserted that in these areas, the ‘defence-related skills which Australian companies develop will enable them to take advantage of wider commercial opportunities in Australia’ and overseas.[214]

The 1994 Defence White Paper commended the success of the Government’s earlier defence policy for industry, stating that it had encouraged:

... efficient production and work practices and export-oriented Australian manufacturing and services. Major projects, such as the Collins Class submarines and ANZAC frigates, have transferred new technologies to Australia and enhanced important skills, including managing complex engineering development projects, systems integration and software engineering. Other projects, such as the Jindalee Operational Radar Network, have developed new technologies indigenous to Australia. Industry’s capabilities have also been strengthened as the Defence Organisation has set demanding standards for quality assurance, project cost and schedule control. At the same time, the Commercial Support Program has opened significant areas of activity to Australian industry.

In 1994–95, some 80 per cent of Defence’s expenditure on facilities, equipment, goods and services will be spent in Australia. This percentage, which represents a major increase over the last decade, results from the high levels of Australian industry involvement in major equipment projects. These projects increased the share of capital equipment expenditure in Australia from 25 per cent in 1984–85 to 64 per cent in 1994–95.[215]

However, the white paper warned that demand for defence specific goods and services would remain uneven and would inevitably be insufficient to sustain the whole range of companies. As such, Australian industry would need to continue diversifying into other markets to remain sustainable in the long term.[216] The risk with Australian companies branching out into other markets was that defence-related work could potentially be sidelined and as a result, defence contracts could be lost to other countries, which was the case when Australian firm ASTA lost the F/A-18 fighter aircraft maintenance contract to New Zealand.[217]

The Government promised to provide specific information for each major procurement project, regarding the level of industry capacity required to provide through-life support to the ADF. Additionally, to promote better industry involvement in the capability development process, the Department of Defence would ‘consider modifying the timing of its defence projects where this improves the continuity of work-flow, encourages the sustainability of high priority skills, and does not jeopardise the capability’ of the ADF.[218] To allow Australian industry to provide input to procurement and sustainment solutions, the Department of Defence also promised to release forward procurement plans. Similarly, it would seek Australian industry’s contribution to technically complex capability solutions.[219]

The Government’s contracting policy in 1994 resolved to ‘buy Australian’, and as such, all Defence acquisitions worth more than $5 million formally required the involvement of local industry considerations.[220]

The 1994 Defence White Paper promised that the Department of Defence would prioritise and support industry capabilities by improving ‘its Industry Development Program to ensure it promotes those industrial processes which are critical to developing adaptable and versatile defence capabilities’.[221] It also noted that there was limited industry involvement in defence-related research and development (R&D). In response, the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) expanded its interaction with industry under its new Industry Support Office to seek greater local R&D contributions to major projects.[222]

The defence export market plays a crucial role in maintaining Australia’s own industry capabilities, but at the time of the 1994 Defence White Paper, efforts in this area remained quite modest. The sale of defence and defence-related goods in 1993–94 totalled just $70.6 million and the white paper acknowledged that Australia was unlikely to become a major exporter in this market. However, it also noted that if Australia’s defence industry continued to focus on ‘niche markets’, further export opportunities would likely develop, particularly under the defence investment program.[223] Despite the long-term benefits to the Department of Defence for supporting defence industry exports, the Government expected ‘Australian firms to take the lead in marketing and exporting defence products’.[224] Nevertheless, the Government also undertook to consult with industry in developing an export and materiel cooperation strategy, especially given the strict controls the Department of Defence placed on defence exports.[225]

While the 1987 Defence White Paper emphasised the benefits of the Defence Offsets Program (via the Australian Industry Involvement program) as a way to promote and support local defence industry, the 1994 Defence White Paper did not feature Offsets as a defence industry policy measure. The reason for its omission can be traced to the Price Review in 1992, which recommended that Australian industry involvement in defence purchasing should be achieved by more focused provisions in contracts and that ‘Defence offsets are to be maintained as a measure of last resort’.[226]

Alignment of cost, capability and strategic objectives

At the time the 1994 Defence White Paper was released, the Keating Government committed to spending two per cent of Australia’s GDP on defence and was committed to making ‘a five-year defence budget commitment from 1996–97’. The two per cent expenditure figure stated in the 1994 Defence budget was less than that committed by the Hawke Government on the release of the 1987 Defence White Paper. At that time, the Government promised to maintain defence spending at between 2.6 and 3 per cent of GDP.[227]

Defence Minister Robert Ray argued that while the Department of Defence budget had decreased by 1.25 per cent in 1994, this was minimal compared to other countries. For instance, in that same year, it was reported that Canada’s defence budget decreased by 11.3 per cent, New Zealand’s by 23.6 per cent, Britain’s by 13.3 per cent and the United States’ by 21.9 per cent.[228] The Defence Minister predicted that the Australian defence budget would need to increase in 1997–98 to allow the white paper targets to be met.[229] Minister Ray warned, however, that capability gaps in Australia’s combat aircraft, surface combatant fleet and Army tanks could develop around the year 2010 if governments in the years 2000 and 2002 neglected to make decisions about replacement capabilities.[230]

Efficiency savings that had previously been put in place were still being implemented through the reduction of the Department of Defence’s civilian workforce—the number of civilian employees declined from 25,006 in 1991 to 20,966 by 1994.[231] The number of civilian employees was further reduced to 17,664 by 1997–98.[232]

The Defence Minister also highlighted key changes to funding arrangements which would allow the Department of Defence to ‘carry over up to $100 million of planned expenditure on major capital equipment and facilities projects into the following financial years’.[233] Previously, the Department of Defence had to spend its entire budgetary allocation or risk any underspend being deducted from future funding.[234] The capital investment expenditure allocated to the Department of Defence for the year 1994–95 amounted to $2.9 billion. This was expected to cover approved planned procurement projects, such as the ANZAC Frigates, Collins Class submarines, JORN and the Australian light armoured vehicle.[235]

Following the Government’s budget announcement, the Opposition raised concerns about the risk of lowering the ADF’s preparedness levels. Shadow Defence spokesperson Peter Reith argued that the Government should prioritise bringing ‘the capital equipment, personnel and operating cost equations back into a more sensible balance’ to ensure levels of preparedness were maintained.[236]

The reduction in the 1994–95 Defence budget had been forecast in the previous year’s Budget. The Chief of the Defence Force at the time, Admiral Alan Beaumont, warned that ‘defence spending had already been cut to the bare bones and that a further fall in spending would directly harm combat capability’.[237] The Defence Minister was quoted as agreeing with Admiral Beaumont, saying that he did not ‘think the defence budget [could] be reduced much further without cutting capabilities’.[238] Nonetheless, Minister Ray was adamant the current defence allocation would ‘enable Defence to continue with its planned capital investment programs and its ongoing schedule of exercises, deployments and training activities’.[239]

The Government’s 1994–95 Defence budget measures drew widespread criticism, particularly from the Australian Defence Association (ADA) which argued that the budget measures had effectively dismantled Australia’s national defence. ADA spokesperson Michael O’Connor stressed that the ADF was ‘being reduced to a care and maintenance organisation as it had been in the 1930s’ and was ‘simply unable to support the government’s foreign policy in Asia, much less’ defend Australia; ‘the ADF is just one more major national asset being sold off by the government’.[240]

 



[160].      Australian Government, Defending Australia: defence white paper 1994 (1994 Defence White Paper), White paper, November 1994, accessed 13 January 2015; R Ray, ‘Ministerial statements: Defence white paper‘, Senate, Debates, 30 November 1994, accessed 13 January 2015.

[161].      Ibid., pp. iii–iv.

[162].      J Newman, ‘Ministerial statements: Defence white paper‘, Senate, Debates, 30 November 1994, accessed 13 January 2015.

[163].      Australian Government, Force structure review: report to the Minister for Defence, Department of Defence, Canberra, May 1991, accessed 13 January 2015.

[164].      Ibid., p. v.

[165].      Ibid., p. 1.

[166].      R Ray, ‘Ministerial statements: Defence policy‘, Senate, Debates, 30 May 1991, accessed 13 January 2015.

[167].      Department of Defence, Defending Australia: defence white paper 1994, op. cit., p. 59.

[168].      R Ray, ‘Ministerial statements: Defence policy’, op. cit.

[169].      Australian Government, Force structure review: report to the Minister for Defence, op. cit., p. 4.

[170].      RAN, ‘Ship histories‘, ‘Guided missile frigate‘, ‘Frigate helicopter‘ and ‘Future ships‘, RAN website, accessed 13 January 2015.

[171].      RAN, ‘Patrol boat‘, RAN website, accessed 13 January 2015.

[172].      Australian Government, Australia’s strategic planning in the 1990s, op. cit., p. iii, accessed 13 January 2015.

[173].      S Frühling, A history of Australian strategic policy since 1945, op. cit., pp. 35–36.

[174].      Ibid., p. iii.

[175].      Australian Government, Strategic review 1993, Departmental Publications, 8009/93, Canberra, 1993, p. iii, accessed 13 January 2015.

[176].      R Ray (Minister for Defence), Strategic review 1993, Defence Publication, Canberra, 1993, p. iii, accessed 13 January 2015.

[177].      Ibid., pp. 1–2.

[178].      Ibid.

[179].      J Woodley (Senator for Queensland), Democrats call for expert public inquiry to precede defence white paper, media release, 30 June 1994.

[180].      J Moore (Minister for Defence), Community consultation team report released, media release, 9 November 2000, accessed 13 January 2015.

[181].      Editorial, ‘Australian Defence Studies Centre Conference: Ray ‘opens up’ on defending Australia’, Defence Industry & Aerospace Report, 4, 16 December 1994, p. 1; G Cheeseman, ‘Defending Australia from Defence: Labor’s 1994 White Paper’, Current Affairs Bulletin, June/July 1995, p. 37. 

[182].      The Strategic Review 1993 used the term ‘Asia-Pacific’ to broadly incorporate the following: Australia’s ‘region’ refers to the ‘Subcontinent, South-East Asia, North-East Asia and the South West Pacific. Australia’s ‘nearer region’ refers to South-East Asia, the South-West Pacific and the nearer reaches of the Indian Ocean. South-East Asia comprises the six members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, The Philippines, Thailand and Brunei) as well as Burma and the three countries of Indochina. The South-West Pacific includes Papua New Guinea, the other South Pacific Forum states, French, New Zealand and United States territories’. Cited in Australian Government, Strategic Review 1993, op. cit., p. 1. The 1994 Defence White Paper used the term ‘Asia and the Pacific’ and included the states described in the Strategic Review 1993 with varying levels of importance—1994 Defence White Paper, op. cit., pp. 85–93.

[183].      Ibid., 1994 Defence White Paper, pp. iii–iv.

[184].      Ibid., p. 3.

[185].      Ibid., p. 3.

[186].      Ibid., pp. 3–4.

[187].      Ibid., p. 4.

[188].      Ibid., p. 14.

[189].      Ibid., p. 14.

[190].      Ibid., p. 5.

[191].      Ibid., p. 8.

[192].      Ibid., pp. 13 and 16.

[193].      Ibid., p. 9.

[194].      Editorial, ‘Australian Defence Studies Centre conference: Ray ‘opens up’ on defending Australia’, Defence Industry & Aerospace Report, op. cit., p. 2.

[195].      1994 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 31.

[196].      Ibid., p. 32.

[197].      A Wrigley, ‘Defence forces must live in real world—and on a real budget’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 January 1994.

[198].      1994 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 24.

[199].      Ibid., pp. 24–25.

[200].      ANAO, Management of Australian Defence Force deployment to East Timor, op. cit., p. 10.

[201].      1994 Defence White Paper, op. cit., pp. 14 and 43–51.

[202].      The 1994 Defence White Paper noted that Australia was scoping a collaborative arrangement with Malaysia for an offshore patrol combatant/joint patrol vessel. This program was not pursued by the Government at the time and the life-of-type of the Fremantle Class Patrol Boat was extended until a suitable replacement could be sourced. The patrol boat replacement program commenced in 1999 under Project SEA 1444 with the contract awarded to Defence Maritime Services in December 2003, with Austal Ships as the builder. Cited in Sea Power Centre Australia, ‘Welcome to the Armidale Class‘, Semaphore, 4, 4 February 2006, accessed 13 January 2015.

[203].      This became known as the ill-fated Super Seasprite project. Defence signed a contract with Kaman Aerospace International Corporation in June 1997 but by 1999 the project was already in trouble. After more than 12 years and $1.4 billion later, the Rudd Government cancelled the project in March 2008. Cited in ANAO, The Super Seasprite: Department of Defence, Audit report, 41, 2008–09, ANAO, Barton, ACT, 2009, p. 13–14, accessed 13 January 2015.

[204].      Ibid., pp. 13–14.

[205].      Despite these ships being launched in the United States in the early 1970s, the Australian modernisation program was expected to enable the ships to remain in service until around 2015–16. Both ships were decommissioned in 2011 following significant maintenance issues. Cited in S Smith (Minister for Defence) and J Clare (Minister for Defence Materiel), Team of experts to plan way forward on amphibious ships fleet, media release, 15 February 2011; RAN, ‘HMAS Manoora II‘, RAN website, accessed 13 January 2015; RAN, ‘HMAS Kanimbla II‘, RAN website, accessed 13 January 2015.

[206].      The A27 BAE Hawk 127 lead-in fighter entered into service with the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in October 2000 and remains in service today. Cited in RAAF Museum, ‘A27 BAE Hawk 127‘, RAAF Museum website; RAAF, ‘Hawk 127‘, RAAF website, accessed 13 January 2015.

[207].      ANAO, 2013–14 major projects report: Defence Materiel Organisation, Audit report, 14, 2014–15, ANAO, Barton, ACT, 2014, p. 280, accessed 3 August2015.

[208].      S Smith (Minister for Defence) and J Clare (Minister for Materiel), New battlefield aircraft for the Air Force, media release, 10 May 2012, accessed 13 January 2015.

[209].      1994 Defence White Paper, op. cit., pp. 37–55; R Hill (Minister for Defence), M1 Abrams chosen as Australian Army’s replacement tank, media release, 10 March 2004, accessed 13 January 2015.

[210].      Commonwealth of Australia, Defence annual report 1993–1994, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1994, pp. 191–196.

[211].      Ibid., pp. 193–195.

[212].      1994 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 13 and 113.

[213].      Ibid., pp. 115–116.

[214].      Ibid., p. 116.

[215].      Ibid., pp. 113–114.

[216].      Ibid., p. 114.

[217].      S Dolan, ‘Dispute over $2.5 m aerospace deal’, Herald Sun, 6 February 1995.

[218].      Ibid., p. 117.

[219].      Ibid., p. 117.

[220].      Commonwealth of Australia, Defence annual report 1995–1996, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1996, p. 144.

[221].      1994 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 121.

[222].      Ibid., p. 121.

[223].      Ibid., p. 122.

[224].      Ibid., p. 123.

[225].      Ibid., pp. 122–123.

[226].      R Price, Defence policy and industry: report to the Minister for Defence, Department of Defence, Canberra, January 1992, p. vii.

[227].      1987 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 112.

[228].      Editorial, ‘Australian Defence Studies Centre conference: Ray ‘opens up’ on defending Australia’, Defence Industry & Aerospace Report, op. cit., p. 4.

[229].      Ibid.

[230].      Ibid., p. 5.

[231].      P Keating, ‘Ministerial statements: Defence Australia: defence white paper 1994‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 8 December 1994; ibid., p. 60, accessed 13 January 2015.

[232].      Department of Defence, Defence annual report 1997–1998, Canberra, 1998, p. 24.

[233].      R Ray (Minister for Defence), New defence budget arrangements to maximise value for money, media release, 10 May 1994, accessed 3 August 2015.

[234].      Editorial, ‘Defence cuts continue’, Royal Australian Air Force News, June 1994; Editorial, ‘Ray ‘trumps’ Beazley on Budget overflow: Defence budget report’, Defence Industry & Aerospace Report, 13 May 1994, p. 3.

[235].      Ibid.; M Hawkins ‘Defence update’, Australian Aviation, July 1994, p. 41.

[236].      P Reith (Shadow Minister for Defence), Defence cuts exacerbate Labor’s record of mismanagement, media release, 10 May 1994; Editorial, ‘Defence spending down $42.5b: Reith’, The Canberra Times, 26 June 1994, p. 3.

[237].      G Ferguson, ‘Australian Defense [sic] chief warns against more budget cuts’, Defence News, 18–24 October 1993, p. 40; C Stewart, ‘Defence capability in doubt as allocation sliced again’, The Australian, 11 May 1994, p. 21.

[238].      Cited in Editorial, ‘Funding can’t be cut, says minister’, The Australian, 11 October 1993, p. 7.

[239].      Cited in C Stewart, ‘Defence capability in doubt as allocation sliced again’, op. cit.

[240].      M O’Connor, Government is dismantling national defence, media release, Australian Defence Association, 11 May 1994.

 

For copyright reasons some linked items are only available to members of Parliament.


© Commonwealth of Australia

Creative commons logo

Creative Commons

With the exception of the Commonwealth Coat of Arms, and to the extent that copyright subsists in a third party, this publication, its logo and front page design are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Australia licence.

In essence, you are free to copy and communicate this work in its current form for all non-commercial purposes, as long as you attribute the work to the author and abide by the other licence terms. The work cannot be adapted or modified in any way. Content from this publication should be attributed in the following way: Author(s), Title of publication, Series Name and No, Publisher, Date.

To the extent that copyright subsists in third party quotes it remains with the original owner and permission may be required to reuse the material.

Inquiries regarding the licence and any use of the publication are welcome to webmanager@aph.gov.au.

This work has been prepared to support the work of the Australian Parliament using information available at the time of production. The views expressed do not reflect an official position of the Parliamentary Library, nor do they constitute professional legal opinion.

Any concerns or complaints should be directed to the Parliamentary Librarian. Parliamentary Library staff are available to discuss the contents of publications with Senators and Members and their staff. To access this service, clients may contact the author or the Library‘s Central Entry Point for referral.  

Top