Research Paper no. 12 2008–09
ASEAN s regional cooperation and multilateral relations: recent
developments and Australia s interests
Dr Frank
Frost
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security Section
9 October 2008
Contents
Executive Summary
- ASEAN is the most prominent regional cooperation group in East
Asia. Australia has had a multilateral relationship with ASEAN
since 1974. In July 2008 Australia appointed an Ambassador
specifically to ASEAN and in August together with New Zealand
signed a free trade agreement with ASEAN. This paper surveys ASEAN
s evolution and recent development and Australia s relations with
it.
- ASEAN was formed in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. ASEAN s cooperation style
stressed respect for national sovereignty, avoiding confrontation,
reaching agreement through consensus and proceeding at a pace all
members were comfortable with. ASEAN after 1995 accepted four new
members (Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia) which bolstered its
claim to represent Southeast Asia, but increased the diversity
within the Association and made some areas of cooperation harder to
pursue. ASEAN members were affected adversely by the Asian
financial crisis from 1997, but this also stimulated the
Association to renew and expand its own cooperation efforts.
- Since the late 1990s, ASEAN has pursued cooperation in three
major ways.
- First, ASEAN in 2003 adopted a commitment to develop an ASEAN
Community among its own members. This involves three pillars : the
ASEAN Economic Community; the ASEAN Political-Security Community;
and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. The paper outlines these
Communities and also assesses some major challenges facing ASEAN in
implementing these goals, particularly its troubled relations with
Myanmar, and its efforts to consolidate its own institutional
identity by adopting its first Charter.
- Second, ASEAN, has continued to engage the major powers in
political and economic dialogue to enhance the overall security and
prosperity of Southeast Asia, placing special emphasis on the big
three Asia-Pacific powers, the United States, China and Japan.
- Third, ASEAN, is sponsoring wider regional cooperation by
playing a leading role in the ASEAN Regional Forum to build
confidence and enhance dialogue on security issues, the ASEAN Plus
Three grouping of the ASEAN ten, China, Japan and South Korea
(whose activities have stressed financial cooperation) and the East
Asia Summit, a leadership dialogue bringing together ASEAN with
China, Japan, South Korea, India, New Zealand and Australia. The
paper reviews recent developments in each group.
- The paper suggests that ASEAN has established a substantial
profile but faces challenges in maintaining its influence and
credibility. In pursuing the ASEAN Community , the Association s
longstanding emphasis on national sovereignty can impede pursuit of
complex economic integration programs and inhibit implementing
commitments made under the new Charter, such as establishing a
human rights body for ASEAN. If ASEAN is not able to secure
convincing progress in its economic and political cooperation, then
it may come to lose cachet as a leading force in wider regional
cooperation, which could be pursued increasingly by other major
actors in more focused and activist groupings.
- Since 1974, Australia has benefited from ASEAN s contribution
to maintaining inter-state stability in its region. Relations have
expanded substantially since 2004 and can benefit further from
ASEAN s integration programs, to which Australia can now be more
closely linked through the promise of the new trade agreement.
ASEAN is also a key part of the regional architecture which the
Australian Government wishes to see enhanced. Australia therefore
has an important ongoing stake in ASEAN s progress in building its
own community and in contributing to wider regional
cooperation.
|
This is a revised version
of a paper prepared at the request of the Joint Standing Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade of the Australian Parliament
to assist with its inquiry into Australia s relationship with ASEAN
(initiated in June 2008). For further details about the Committee
and its inquiry see
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/asean1/index.htm
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor John
Ravenhill (Department of International Relations, Australian
National University) and Professor Carlyle A. Thayer (School of
Humanities and Social Sciences, Australian Defence Force Academy,
University of New South Wales), and Nigel Brew, Jeffrey Robertson
and Richard Webb (Research Branch, Parliamentary Library) for their
most helpful comments on drafts of this paper. The author also
wishes to thank Catherine Lorimer and Doreen White (Research
Branch) for their editorial assistance.
Abbreviations
|
AANZFTA
|
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement
|
|
AEC
|
ASEAN Economic
Community
|
|
AFTA
|
ASEAN Free
Trade Area
|
|
APEC
|
Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation
|
|
APSC
|
ASEAN
Political-Security Community
|
|
APT
|
ASEAN +3
(China, Japan and South Korea)
|
|
ASCC
|
ASEAN
Socio-Cultural Community
|
|
ASEAN
|
The Association
of South East Asian Nations
|
|
ASEM
|
Asia-Europe
Meeting
|
|
ARF
|
ASEAN Regional
Forum
|
|
CEP
|
Closer Economic
Partnership
|
|
CEPEA
|
Comprehensive
Partnership in East Asia
|
|
CER
|
Closer Economic
Relations
|
|
CMI
|
Chiang Mai
Institute
|
|
CSCAP
|
Council for
Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
|
|
CSO
|
Civil Society
Organisation
|
|
DPR
|
Dewan
Perwakilan Rakyat (People s Representative Assembly)
|
|
DPRK
|
Democratic
People s Republic of Korea
|
|
EAFTA
|
East Asian Free
Trade Area
|
|
EAS
|
East Asian
Summit
|
|
EPA
|
Economic
Partnership Agreement
|
|
EPG
|
Eminent Persons
Group
|
|
ERIA
|
Economic
Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia
|
|
EU
|
European
Union
|
|
FDI
|
Foreign Direct
Investment
|
|
FTA
|
Free Trade
Agreement
|
|
FTAAP
|
Free Trade Area
of the Asia Pacific
|
|
GDP
|
Gross Domestic
Product
|
|
IMF
|
International
Monetary Fund
|
|
NAFTA
|
North American
Free Trade Agreement
|
|
NTBs
|
Non-Trade
Barriers
|
|
PECC
|
Pacific
Economic Cooperation Council
|
|
ROK
|
Republic of
Korea
|
|
SCO
|
Shanghai
Cooperation Organization
|
|
TAC
|
Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation
|
|
UN
|
United
Nations
|
|
US
|
United
States
|
|
WTO
|
World Trade
Organization
|
Source: Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, University of
Texas at Austin
Introduction
ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) is the
premier regional association in East Asia and the most prominent
regional grouping in the Third World. Since its inauguration in
1967, during the height of the wars in Indochina, ASEAN has come to
be regarded as an important factor for stability in Southeast Asia
through its own cooperative activities, its policies of maintaining
active dialogues with the major powers and other Asia-Pacific
countries, and its promotion of wider cooperation forums in East
Asia and the Asia-Pacific. In 1974 Australia was the first country
to establish a multilateral relationship with ASEAN. Australia s
interests in ASEAN have been reaffirmed by the Rudd Government,
which in July 2008 appointed an Ambassador to the Association.
After its cautious beginnings in 1967, ASEAN gained a
substantial regional and international profile in the 1970s and
1980s when it pioneered economic cooperation in Southeast Asia and
also played an important political role in both the Indochina
refugee crisis (from 1978 79) and the conflict over Cambodia (after
1978). Since the late 1990s, ASEAN has made substantial efforts to
maintain its profile and prominence. After the end of the Cambodia
conflict and with Cold War tensions reduced in East Asia, ASEAN was
able to realise the intentions of the founders by moving to accept
Vietnam (in 1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999) as
members, so that the group could now represent Southeast Asia
overall. However, the wider membership increased the diversity
within ASEAN and made economic integration harder to pursue. While
most new members accepted the ASEAN rules of the game , Myanmar s
intransigent autocratic regime has damaged ASEAN s cohesion and its
international image. ASEAN s prestige was compromised by the
adverse regional impact of the Asian financial crisis (from July
1997), which reduced growth rates in many members. ASEAN has also
been challenged by the rise of China and India, whose size and high
growth rates have attracted high levels of attention from foreign
investors and trading partners.
As ASEAN enters its fifth decade, it is seeking to reaffirm and
redevelop its strategies for cooperation in three major ways.
First, among its ten members ASEAN is pursuing some enhanced
cooperation goals which it adopted in 2003 and which are aimed at
developing a closer ASEAN Community in economic, political and
socio-cultural terms. Second, ASEAN is moving to redevelop its
organisation and style of cooperation, particularly by adopting a
Charter to give the association a distinct legal identity and a
more rules-based mode of operation. Thirdly, ASEAN is also seeking
to be a hub for cooperation in the wider East Asia region, by
continuing to develop the ASEAN Regional Forum (initiated in 1994),
the ASEAN Plus Three grouping (which since 1997 has brought
together the ASEAN ten and China, Japan and South Korea), and the
East Asia Summit (comprising the 13 ASEAN Plus Three countries
along with India, Australia and New Zealand, which met for the
first time in December 2005).
ASEAN s efforts towards reform and enhanced cooperation are
significant for the region and also for Australia, for whom the
ASEAN states are both major economic partners and a key focus for
regional multilateral dialogue in political and security terms.
This paper provides a guide (or road map ) to ASEAN s major
cooperation efforts and renovation proposals, and to its ongoing
policies in promoting dialogue in the East Asia and Asia-Pacific
regions overall. The paper will suggest that in pursuing
renovation, ASEAN faces some difficult challenges in adapting its
cooperative style and mode of operations. A major issue is that the
principle of non-interference in internal affairs , which was a
bedrock value for ASEAN s members when establishing the
Association, is now in danger of being an obstacle to the closer
cooperation which many in ASEAN see as necessary to maintain the
Association s relevance and credibility.
The paper will discuss the background to ASEAN s origins and
evolution since 1967; the pursuit since 2003 of an ASEAN Community
in economic, security and socio-cultural terms; ASEAN s key
relationships with its external dialogue partners; ASEAN s
contributions to wider regional cooperation through the ASEAN
Regional Forum, the ASEAN Plus Three process and the East Asia
Summit; and Australia s relations with ASEAN since 1974.
A central characteristic of cooperation efforts in East Asia and
the wider Asia-Pacific regions is that they have involved multiple
groupings and forums rather than a set of overarching and inclusive
institutions, such as those developed in Europe by the European
Union.[1] This
institutional diversity has resulted partly because of the great
variety among the regional states, which vary from Japan to Laos.
The diversity has also stemmed from the fact that sensitivities and
competition in relations among the major powers (especially the US,
China and Japan) have impeded development of the common ground and
trust necessary for a regional group with comprehensive membership
to be able to emerge and operate effectively. As a result, a number
of groups and forums with differing and sometimes overlapping
memberships have emerged and have operated simultaneously.
ASEAN, is an association of Southeast Asian states which has
operated alongside other groups, both inter-governmental and
non-official or semi-official. The Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) grouping is an association of economies
inaugurated in 1989 which has 21 members in East Asia, North
America and Latin America.[2] APEC was founded with a commitment to trade and
investment liberalisation and facilitation but since 1993 its scope
has widened to include an annual leaders meeting and its
discussions have extended to include political and security issues.
Other inter-governmental groups have included the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (established in 2001 by China, Russia,
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) which
has interests focussing on East and Central Asia, and the Six Party
Talks process (South and North Korea, the US, China, Japan and
Russia) which has emerged to try to alleviate and resolve tensions
on the Korean peninsula.[3] Other inter-governmental dialogues have continued to
emerge such as the Trilateral Security Dialogue among the US, Japan
and Australia.[4]
Dialogues have also been pursued on a non-official or
semi-official basis. In the broad Asia-Pacific context, discussions
have been sponsored by the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC, a
forum for business leaders across the Pacific since 1967) and the
Pacific Economic Council (PECC) which since 1980 has been a
tripartite dialogue among business, government and academic figures
to advance cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.[5] Another notable example of a forum
initiated by a non-governmental body is the Shangri-La Dialogue on
regional security issues, which has been sponsored by the
London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies and has
since 2000 brought together defence ministers and senior officials
for discussions annually in Singapore.[6]
In this pluralist environment, ASEAN has been and continues to
be a leading contributor to cooperation efforts, both among its own
members and with a wide range of partners.
ASEAN was established by a meeting in Bangkok in August 1967 of
the foreign ministers of Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand and the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia.[7] The founding members of ASEAN had
several major motivations when they first met. In 1967 the Cold War
was at its height as was the war in Vietnam. Each of the founding
members was highly concerned about domestic Communist-led
revolutionary movements and felt acutely vulnerable in relation to
the major powers especially the Soviet Union and China. The
capacity of the major powers for involvement in internal and
inter-state conflicts was seen as one of the major security threats
to the region as was being illustrated so clearly in Indochina.
In addition, the five founding members had only very recently
experienced serious tensions between each other particularly during
Indonesia s Confrontation of the new state of Malaysia (between
1963 and 1966). In its first year of existence, ASEAN was virtually
immobilised by the tensions arising over the Philippines claim to
the Malaysian state of Sabah. There was very little trust or
confidence among Southeast Asian countries in the late 1960s.
Economic development was also a severe worry for all ASEAN
members. In 1967 there was as yet no East Asian miracle but rather
a group comprising one city state and four poor, primarily
agriculture-based economies highly dependent on their primary
product trade, with what they saw as unsympathetic First World
trading partners. In the late 1960s, Singapore was just beginning
to plan the export-oriented process of industrial development which
has since been followed by many other countries in Southeast
Asia.
ASEAN was not initially in a position to exercise any
significant influence on these conditions. What its members did do
was to set up a model of regional cooperation that its very diverse
members could live with and which maximised the members diplomatic
and political strengths. ASEAN s model of cooperation was developed
in several main phases. From 1967 until 1975, the pace of activity
was very low key and the members concentrated on discussion and
confidence building. The end of the wars in Indochina in 1975 was
accompanied by a sense of uncertainty in the region which
stimulated a second phase of development: ASEAN at its first heads
of government summit meeting in Bali (February 1976) upgraded both
regional dialogues and efforts at economic cooperation.
The ASEAN approach to regional cooperation after 1967 involved
several key features:
- a steady process of contact and confidence building was
developed to dampen down the considerable bases for conflict among
the members. In a style known widely as The ASEAN Way , the
Association has emphasised informality and loose arrangements, has
valued personal relations rather than ambitious
institution-building, has stressed the primacy of the sovereign
equality of members and has generally avoided the exercise of overt
leadership, and has sought gradual change based on consensus with
cooperation proceeding at a pace comfortable to all [8]
- strong emphasis was given to the principle of non-interference
in the internal affairs of member countries: ASEAN s founding
declaration in Bangkok in 1967 called upon member states to ...
ensure their stability and security from external interference in
any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national
identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their
peoples [9]
- in Bali in February 1976 ASEAN adopted the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (TAC). The TAC calls for signatories to commit to
non-interference in the internal affairs of one another , a
renunciation of the threat or use of force and the settlement of
disputes by peaceful means .[10] The Treaty has been advanced as a key ASEAN
document which sets out important principles (or norms for
behaviour) for the conduct of relations in Southeast Asia and which
ASEAN invites other states to accede to and endorse, which a number
have done (including Australia)
- ASEAN developed a distinctive style of organisation which
emphasised frequent meetings and discouraged top heavy
institutions. ASEAN s key structure was the annual Ministerial
Meetings, initially of foreign ministers but including economics
ministers from 1976. After these meetings, ASEAN since 1979 has
held the Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) which is attended by the
foreign ministers of ASEAN s dialogue partners .[11] The Association held its first
summit of heads of government in 1976: since 1997 they have been
held annually and became a central focus for ASEAN s
cooperation.[12]
ASEAN has a Secretary General and a small Secretariat but has so
far avoided developing any large bureaucracy
- ASEAN endorsed economic cooperation as a major focus for the
group, but without pursuing programs which would have produced
serious disharmony among its very diverse members. ASEAN also
contributed to building an image for Southeast Asia as a stable and
benign destination for foreign investment
- the members used ASEAN s collective drawing power to gradually
include the major external powers in dialogue a process begun
seriously in 1976 at the Bali summit and now a central feature of
ASEAN
- the members utilised ASEAN to take a stand on key regional
security issues especially the Indochina refugee crisis in 1978
1979, which was a very serious threat to most members, and over the
conflict in Cambodia after Vietnam s invasion in December
1978.
ASEAN was a product of the period of the Cold War in Southeast
Asia and it gained its greatest influence through its role in the
most serious conflict of the Cold War era in the region in the last
two decades: Cambodia. The ASEAN members viewed Vietnam s invasion
as a violation of the principle of territorial sovereignty, and
were also committed to support Thailand, which as a frontline state
in relation to Indochina was concerned at the presence of over 150
000 Vietnamese forces in Cambodia after 1979. ASEAN encouraged
international action to deny legitimacy to Vietnam s actions and
cooperated with the major powers particularly China and the United
States to oppose Vietnam s policies. While the conflict over
Cambodia continued, ASEAN had a very high profile diplomatically
for example, through the resolutions which it sponsored each year
in the United Nations General Assembly.
The decline of Cold War confrontation internationally was
reflected directly in Southeast Asia by Vietnam s move to withdraw
its forces from Cambodia (in September 1989) and by resolution of
the Cambodia conflict as a regional and international problem
(through the Paris Agreements of October 1991). After the agreement
on Cambodia, the ASEAN members faced an improved regional security
situation with new prospects for detente between former
adversaries, particularly China and Vietnam, and Vietnam and the
ASEAN states. ASEAN members, however, also faced an international
climate where many problems competed for the attention of the major
powers. With the Cambodia issue resolved as an international issue,
there were concerns that ASEAN might not be able to hold the
international interest which its members had got used to during the
1980s.
In the early 1990s the ASEAN members, in the third major phase
of the Association s development, moved actively to re-engineer the
Association to keep it at the centre of regional cooperation in the
1990s and beyond.[13] This took several important forms: enhanced cooperation
on security and economic issues, enlarging the membership, and
inaugurating new avenues for cooperation on regional security,
particularly through the ASEAN Regional Forum. [14]
In the second half of the 1990s, ASEAN entered a fourth phase of
its evolution when it faced some difficult developments and
challenges. The Asian financial crisis (from mid-1997) seriously
damaged the economies of a number of regional states, especially
Thailand and Indonesia. Although ASEAN had not been structured to
be able to deal with such a crisis, the image of economic success
for the ASEAN region was at least for some time damaged. ASEAN s
moves to expand its membership were impeded in July 1997 by serious
internal political conflict in Cambodia, which resulted in a delay
in Cambodia s membership in the Association until 1999. ASEAN s
capacity to be seen to be able to respond to security problems in
the region was brought into question by the crisis over East Timor
in 1999. While several ASEAN members took significant parts in the
subsequent United Nations endorsed efforts to stabilise the
situation, ASEAN itself did not pursue an active role. ASEAN s
capacity to influence developments in its region was also
challenged by the emergence of major environmental problems arising
from annual patterns of burning of forest and agricultural areas
particularly in Indonesia, producing a haze which affected several
regional states.[15]
While these developments were affecting ASEAN overall, some
individual members were also experiencing substantial internal
pressures and change. In the wake of the financial crisis, the
government in Thailand of Prime Minister Chaovalit Yongchaiyudt
fell in November 1997. In Indonesia the long-established government
led by President Suharto, an ASEAN elder statesman , came to an end
in May 1998, to be replaced by a less orderly but more democratic
system of political competition.[16] In this environment of regional and national
change, there were also significant debates about the ASEAN Way and
whether some norms particularly in relation to the non-interference
in internal affairs principle might need to be revised when
internal developments in one state (such as political disorder or
burning of forest areas) could clearly affect the interests of
neighbours.
Several regional figures, notably Thailand s Foreign Minister
Surin Pitsuwan and Malaysia s Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim,
suggested that it might now be appropriate for ASEAN members to
take more concerted interest in the affairs of their neighbours.
This approach might involve public comment on particular issues or
policies in relation to individual ASEAN states which might be of
concern to fellow members of the Association. Foreign Minister
Surin termed this possible approach flexible engagement . These
suggestions for revising the basics of the ASEAN Way , however,
were resisted by other members who feared that they might disrupt
the pattern of quiet diplomacy which had been central to ASEAN s
success so far and ASEAN did not adopt the proposed
concept.[17]
Nonetheless, these debates had raised important issues about ASEAN
s style of cooperation, issues which have continued to be relevant
as ASEAN has struggled with the challenges of deepening economic
integration and developing a Charter for the Association (as this
paper points out below).
The developments in the latter half of the 1990s added to the
pressures and stimuli for ASEAN s leaders to try to reaffirm the
Association s relevance and sense of direction. In the early
21st century, ASEAN is continuing its efforts towards
self-renewal, both among its members and with the wider region.
Since the late 1990s, the ASEAN members have pursued efforts to
renew their commitment to cooperation, stimulated by factors
including the adverse impact of the Asian financial crisis on many
members from mid 1997 and the need to cooperate and compete
effectively with the rapidly rising economic power of China and
also of India, whose large markets and low-cost labour have been
highly attractive to foreign investors.
These efforts led to a major declaration at the ninth ASEAN
summit meeting of heads of government, in Bali in 2003, which has
become known as the Bali Concord II (a reference back to ASEAN s
first meeting of heads of government, in Bali in 1976). The
adoption of the Bali Concord II can be seen as ushering in the
fifth and latest phase in the Association s development. In this
Concord, ASEAN declared that, For the sustainability of our region
s economic development we affirmed the need for a secure political
environment based on a strong foundation of mutual interests
generated by economic cooperation . To pursue ASEAN s goals, the
members declared that:
An ASEAN Community shall be established
comprising three pillars, namely political and security
cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation
that are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the
purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity
in the region.[18]
The Bali Concord II declaration also reaffirmed ASEAN s
commitment to enhance economic linkages with the world economy ,
ASEAN competitiveness and a favourable investment environment, and
adherence to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as a functioning
and effective code of conduct for the region.[19] ASEAN has since made some
significant efforts to try to follow up these commitments.
Economic cooperation was a declared goal of ASEAN from its
inception, but it has never been easy to pursue. The ASEAN
economies have tended to be competitive rather than complementary
in character with a heavy orientation towards markets outside the
region, (especially in Japan, the US and Europe). As a result,
early attempts to develop cooperative projects, which following the
fashion of the day, often took the form of industrial planning,
were largely symbolic in nature. However from the early 1990s more
serious efforts towards cooperation developed.
In 1992 agreement was reached to pursue the ASEAN Free Trade
Area (AFTA), which sought to remove barriers to trade and
investment and thus increase the grouping s attractiveness as a
destination for foreign investment. Some progress was achieved
through AFTA in reducing trade barriers, but it did not have the
desired results of liberalising trade comprehensively. A major
reason for this was that most ASEAN members had pursued significant
unilateral reductions in their tariffs in the 1980s and 1990s and
the extra margin of benefit which might be offered by utilising
AFTA was often quite limited for many traders. As a result, only a
small proportion of intra-ASEAN traders took advantage of the lower
tariff levels offered by AFTA (usually only about 5 per cent of
overall trade). AFTA also had relatively little impact on other
important obstacles to trade flows, including non-tariff barriers
and restrictions on services trade.[20]
In the early 21st century it was evident that these
efforts had had a limited impact and were not adequate to meet
ASEAN s needs. ASEAN s then Secretary General Rodolfo Severino
commented in 2002 that:
The process of integration has generally
stalled. To be sure, some progress has been made, notably in AFTA,
but progress has fallen short of measuring up to the challenges
faced by our region and carrying out the leaders vision and
resolve. AFTA has seen little actual use by traders. The other
foundations for regional integration have not been built upon.
Regional economic integration seems to have become stuck in
framework agreements, work programmes, and master plans. [21]
The continuing pressures for ASEAN to achieve more thorough
liberalisation and cooperation were summarised by a report on ASEAN
issued in July 2006 by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade:
Despite solid growth recorded since the Asian
financial crisis in the late nineties, ASEAN s growth rate has not
matched those of its giant regional neighbours China and India over
this period. Nor have ASEAN s merchandise exports grown as rapidly
as China s or India s .
Both China and India present as single markets
and production bases with national laws and regulations which, at
least in principle, apply throughout the country. ASEAN, by
contrast, is still an association of ten diverse economies
separated by different tariff regimes, customs procedures, product
standards and other non-tariff measures. The market is also
fragmented by different regulations in the services sector and for
investment; other behind-the-border barriers such as the
anti-competitive practices of domestic firms; different legal
systems and industrial structures; and inadequate connections
between national infrastructures.[22]
The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) aims to create a seamless
production base and an integrated market among the members. ASEAN s
goals include the elimination of the remaining intra-ASEAN tariffs
and the large number of non-tariff barriers, creating an effective
intellectual property regime, fully liberalising trade in services,
and relaxing barriers to flows of capital and skilled labour in all
sectors. If achieved, the AEC could be expected to increase
production efficiency, attract more investment and generate more
exports. By one estimate, the AEC could boost the ASEAN region s
GDP by 10 per cent and reduce operating costs by 25 per
cent.[23]
However, ASEAN faces many challenges in pursuing the AEC. ASEAN
s members include economies at widely varying levels of development
(eg the difference between Singapore, and Laos and Myanmar) and the
members have not yet been prepared to have either a harmonised
internal tariff regime or a common external tariff policy. One key
issue here is how ASEAN can achieve a common external tariff.
Singapore already has a zero tariff policy and would not be willing
to agree to a common ASEAN tariff level that was above zero.
However some of the less developed ASEAN economies depend on
revenue from tariffs and would face fiscal problems from a zero
level.[24]
A second major issue is that while progress has been made in
reducing tariff levels, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) also pose major
obstacles to trade. Non-tariff barriers can range from cross-border
barriers such as cumbersome customs procedures to internal
technical barriers that can arise from differences in health and
safety provisions, and product quality and testing/certification
procedures. One recent assessment argued that, The protective and
taxing effect of NTBs is substantially higher than that of formal
tariffs that apply to trade. NTBs raise the price of products in
the region, making exports less competitive, and undermining the
impact of tariff reductions.[25] ASEAN policy-makers are well aware of the
problems posed by NTBs and have focused on priority sectors,
adopted relevant WTO guidelines and accelerated implementation of
mutual recognition mechanisms for key areas, including nursing,
architecture and engineering. Progress is nonetheless considered to
have been slow and ASEAN has fallen behind its own schedule. It
also remains to be seen whether ASEAN can strengthen its
institutions to provide for security and certainty in implementing
agreements and to provide effective mechanisms for dispute
resolution. Although ASEAN does have a Dispute Resolution Mechanism
whose powers were enhanced in 2003, the mechanism in practice has
not been used because of the prevailing ASEAN ethos of maintaining
consensus in discussions and decision making.[26] The new ASEAN Charter endorses
the importance of dispute settlement mechanisms and the Association
is currently studying how more effective arrangements may be
developed.[27]
John Ravenhill (Australian National University) has argued (in
mid 2007) that, an enormous distance has still to be travelled
before ASEAN has a set of agreements that are sufficiently specific
that they could conceivably be legally enforceable. It is this lack
of specificity in ASEAN agreements, coupled with the failure of
member states to see their provisions as binding obligations, which
are the principal problems .[28] In this context, a major question is whether the
new ASEAN Charter can begin to add some of the greater
institutional strength that ASEAN needs.
While they are pursuing market integration among themselves, the
ASEAN members are also pursuing a range of trade agreements to
enhance their relations with major trading partners including
China, Japan, South Korea, India, the US and Australia and New
Zealand.[29] The
numbers and range of trade agreements being pursued involve some
potential challenges for ASEAN. Trade with major partners has been
growing rapidly under the existing WTO framework and without
specific bilateral or regional multilateral agreements, and it is
not always clear that such agreements make a major net addition to
trade opportunities. Given that there is no common framework for
the development of FTAs, ASEAN could face some complex issues of
harmonisation of agreements in the future. The agreements are a
further pressure for change and liberalisation of trade
arrangements in the ASEAN region, but some concern has been
expressed by analysts as to whether the range of external trade
arrangements being pursued is in fact distracting the attention and
limited resources of the ASEAN states away from their efforts at
internal market integration. [30]
There appears to be a determination in ASEAN to carry the AEC
process forward. In January 2007 the ASEAN heads of government
agreed to advance the schedule for implementation of the AEC from
2020 to 2015.[31]
ASEAN s capacity to secure the ambitious economic goals it has set
out will clearly be a major test of its coherence and
viability.
In parallel with its pursuit of economic integration, ASEAN
since the late 1990s has been seeking to bolster its own role and
sense of direction to advance regional security. The ASEAN members
have continued to face some difficult security issues, including
ongoing inter-state disputes, the problems created by the
intransigent and dictatorial regime in Myanmar (which has had a
substantial impact on Thailand, including the presence of several
hundred thousand refugees) and the challenges posed by
Islamic-based separatist movements and terrorism. To reaffirm its
role as a force for stability and security in Southeast Asia, ASEAN
decided in 2003 to develop the concept of an ASEAN Security
Community (which has been referred to since 2007 as the ASEAN
Political-Security Community , APSC).[32]
The ASEAN Security Community (ASC) concept was initiated by
Indonesia and adopted as part of the Bali Concord II in October
2003. The ASC was meant to be an evolutionary concept rather than
one which seeks a sharp change or departure in ASEAN practices.
ASEAN s central purpose from its outset was to help the members
achieve a secure environment to enhance prospects for internal
stability and economic progress. The many years of meetings and
discussions have been designed to a major degree to build up
communication and increase trust. It can be argued, then, that
fostering a sense of regional security has always been at the
centre of ASEAN s concerns and that the Political-Security
Community is an extension of this role. ASEAN has issued some
guidelines for its aims for this Community but a detailed blueprint
has not yet been finalised: this is expected to be endorsed at the
next Summit in Bangkok in December 2008.
In the 1970s and 1980s, much of ASEAN s focus on security was
directed towards challenges from outside the member countries: the
implications of the end of the wars in Indochina, the movement of
large numbers of refugees and the dispute over Cambodia. Since the
1990s, it has become increasingly apparent that there are a number
of existing and potential security challenges within the ASEAN
region which are transnational in character and which demand more
cooperation among the members to address.
The APSC initiative aims to use ASEAN s own mechanisms to
resolve disputes among members and to pursue much closer
cooperation on transnational security challenges including
terrorism, narcotics, people trafficking, and maritime security
issues. The APSC also reflects long-term emphases in ASEAN by
ruling out an ASEAN defence pact, military alliance or joint
foreign policy.[33]
It is not yet clear how ASEAN will move to follow through its
initial declarations on the APSC: the forthcoming blueprint may
clarify this. There has been some further development in the ASEAN
region of an increased sense of political community since the
devastating impact of the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004.
The assistance given by ASEAN states to their fellow members was
appreciated: for example, the role of Singaporean medical teams in
Aceh was valued highly by Indonesia.[34] There have also been proposals for
areas in which ASEAN could develop further relevant cooperation,
for example in improving capacities for disaster management. ASEAN
s role in coordinating responses to the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis
in Myanmar from May 2008 has been another important development in
this area (see below).
A further reflection of ASEAN interest in security dialogue was
the holding of the first meeting of ASEAN defence ministers in May
2006. ASEAN defence ministers and service chiefs have been meeting
on a bilateral basis for many years and defence officials also take
part in ARF inter-sessional meetings, but it was thought
appropriate that the defence ministers should now meet formally on
a multilateral basis.[35] The need for greater capacities to coordinate disaster
relief was a key theme in the meeting, which also focussed on other
issues of common concern including terrorism, piracy and people
trafficking. The defence ministers declared their commitment to
achieving an ASEAN Security Community by 2020, which they envisaged
would include agreements on extradition treaties, counter-terrorism
arrangements and on a joint ASEAN peacekeeping force.[36]
At their second meeting held in Singapore on 14 November 2007,
the defence ministers endorsed plans for further cooperation in
areas including terrorism, maritime security and infectious
diseases. The ministers also adopted a proposal to expand their
discussions to include other ASEAN dialogue partners defence
ministers in a process termed ASEAN Defence Ministers Meetings-Plus
(ADMM-Plus ). Singapore s Defence Minister Teo Chee Hean said in an
address to the meeting that. ASEAN s future is increasingly
intertwined with the fate of the larger Asia Pacific region. The
ASEAN Defence Ministers meeting should look at tapping the varied
perspectives, expertise and resources of other ASEAN friends and
dialogue partners such as the US, China, India, Japan, Australia,
New Zealand and Korea .[37] The ADMM-Plus concept is expected to be developed in
more detail.[38]
The ASEAN members have continued to pursue multiple strategies
towards advancing security in the region. Individual members have
cooperated on a bilateral and multilateral basis with both regional
and external partners to gain improved cooperation across borders
and to increase interaction in a number of areas of
counter-terrorism activities. ASEAN adopted a Declaration of Joint
Action to Counter-Terrorism at its summit in December 2001 and at
its Cebu summit in January 2007, endorsed the ASEAN Convention on
Counter-Terrorism. While valuable cooperation continues, a recent
Australian study has suggested that more could be done by ASEAN
members to explicitly underscore their commitment in this area by
acceding to and ratifying international conventions and protocols
to combat terrorism.[39] Cooperation has increased in useful ways in maritime
security: since 2004 Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have
conducted coordinated naval patrols and joint air surveillance
operations to increase security in the Malacca Strait. All of these
activities clearly contribute to a more secure ASEAN
region.[40]
However, the ASEAN states face some ongoing obstacles towards
the development of the climate of trust and confidence which can
support a political-security community . Two states, Thailand and
the Philippines, have serious ongoing internal conflicts involving
Islamic movements, and the Philippines faces the last significant
communist resistance movement in Southeast Asia. While no outright
armed conflict has ever occurred between ASEAN members, tensions
have certainly been evident in some inter-state relationships. In
recent years there has been discord between Thailand and Malaysia
(over alleged support from across the Thai-Malaysia border for
insurgency in southern Thailand), Singapore and Malaysia (for
example, over a disputed island, recently awarded to Singapore),
and Singapore and Thailand (over the purchase by a Singapore
state-owned corporation from then Thai Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra of his family telecommunications company).[41]
Another high profile focus for intra-ASEAN dispute has been
relations between Thailand and Cambodia. Bilateral relations were
disrupted severely in late January 2003 by rioting and violence in
Phnom Penh after alleged comments by a Thai actress about the
status of the Angkor Wat temples (which she supposedly said should
belong to Thailand) inflamed Cambodian sentiments. Demonstrations
in Phnom Penh severely damaged the Thai embassy and other
Thai-owned businesses.[42] In June 2008, additional discord arose over the status
of areas of land near the temple of Preah Vihear. The ancient
temple, on the border between the two countries, had been awarded
to Cambodia in a decision of the International Court in 1962, but
its status has continued to be a matter of some sensitivity and
controversy. When Cambodia proceeded to submit the temple for
listing as a World Heritage Site, renewed tensions developed,
including the presence of hundreds of troops from both sides near
the temple area. An offer by the ASEAN foreign ministers at
mediation (made during their annual meetings in Singapore in late
July) was rejected by Thailand. Tensions appeared to ease in
mid-August after Cambodia s national elections had been held but
were still evident in mid-September.[43] The dispute nonetheless illustrated
that nationalism and historical grievances can easily pose
challenges to the spirit of regional accord which ASEAN seeks in
the ASEAN Political-Security Community.[44]
ASEAN also faces a further substantial obstacle to the
development of political and security cohesion from the character
and policies of the regime in Myanmar (see below).
The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) is intended to be the
third pillar of ASEAN s goal of achieving a more integrated ASEAN
Community . The socio-cultural community proposal is a reflection
of views in ASEAN that the pursuit of closer cooperation in the
economic and security areas should also be accompanied by increased
emphasis on developing a shared sense of identity among the member
countries and peoples. Rodolfo Severino, a former Secretary
General, has argued that Southeast Asia cannot be an enduring
security and economic community without being a socio-cultural
community.[45]
ASEAN has set out the goals for the ASCC in a plan of action an
overall and more detailed blueprint is currently being drawn up.
The plan of action states that:
The ASCC reflects ASEAN s social agenda that is
focused on poverty eradication and human development. It is linked
inextricably with the economic and security pillars of the ASEAN
Community. Social inequities can threaten economic development and
in turn undermine political regimes. Economic instability can
exacerbate poverty, unemployment, hunger, illness and disease.
Social instability can emerge from environmental scarcity or the
inequitable distribution among stakeholders of the use of
environmental assets. Failure to address these critical and
persistent social issues can further cause both economic and
political dislocations. [46]
ASEAN members differ widely in their level of socio-cultural
characteristics and economic development. In education for example,
overall literacy rates vary from 67.7 to 95.1 per cent. There are
wide gaps in conditions between the six older members and the four
newer members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam). The ASEAN
Baseline Report (2006) reported that ASEAN members had poverty
rates ranging from 5 to 35 per cent. Health standards also
understandably vary, with life expectancy at between 59 and 79
years.[47]
Individual ASEAN countries have made some major gains in
standards and conditions in recent years. Between 1993 and 2002 the
proportion of people living on an income of less than $US 1 dollar
per day declined in Indonesia from 17.4 per cent to 7.5 per cent
and in Vietnam the proportion dropped from 14.6 per cent to 2.2 per
cent. The proportion of children attending primary school in
Cambodia rose from 69.3 per cent in 1991 to 97.6 per cent in 2004
and in Laos in the same period rose from 67.4 to 81.7 per
cent.[48] Analysts
see many areas in which cooperation can improve standards and
conditions in socio-cultural sectors including labour mobility and
the rights of migrant workers, social safety nets, sustainable
development and health.
Progress towards socio-cultural community goals, however, will
continue to be affected by ASEAN s style of consensus-based
decision-making and the challenge of translating declared
objectives into concrete policies. This ongoing challenge has been
illustrated in the area of forest destruction and the regional haze
problem. In the decade since the haze issue attracted major
attention ASEAN has addressed the matter through a number of
agreements, especially the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary
Haze Pollution. While important dialogue and studies have been
pursued, the impact of the agreement has been limited by the
refusal so far of Indonesia to ratify it because the agreement is
seen as likely to damage the country s economic interests.[49] Reports in August 2008
suggested that the haze issue was likely to continue to be a
problem for neighbouring states, particularly Singapore and
Malaysia.[50] The
haze issue both underscores the relevance of the goals of the ASCC
and also the challenges facing ASEAN states in implementing
them.
The situation in Myanmar is one of ASEAN s most serious
problems. The military regime in Myanmar rejected the outcome of
elections held in 1990 (won by the National League for Democracy
led by Aung San Suu Kyi) and has detained her for long periods
since.[51] When
Myanmar was accepted as an ASEAN member in 1997 there were hopes
within the association that there would be a gradual process of
liberalisation within the country. However the regime has remained
intransigent on the issue of political reform and its stance has
caused problems for ASEAN in relations with major external partners
including the European Union and the US.[52]
Concern within a number of ASEAN members about Myanmar increased
after the re-arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi in May 2003. The subsequent
behaviour of the Myanmar regime has not eased these concerns. The
secretive and isolationist nature of the regime was highlighted by
the announcement in November 2005 of the decision to move the
country s capital from Yangon to the new inland city of Naypyidaw:
Myanmar s ASEAN partners had not been informed in advance about the
move.[53] In 2005
ASEAN faced the potentially embarrassing prospect that Myanmar
would in July 2006 assume the position of Chair of ASEAN for the
next year (under ASEAN s system of rotating the chair annually on
an alphabetical basis). Many members feared that the group would
face both a loss of international credibility and difficulties in
relations with some of its major dialogue partners. The problem was
avoided when Myanmar relinquished its right to the position in July
2005. In December 2005, Malaysia (the Chair of ASEAN in 2005 2006)
indicated that ASEAN might no longer be able to defend Myanmar
diplomatically, and strongly criticised the lack of political
reform.[54]
The problems posed for ASEAN by Myanmar have increased in 2007
and 2008. In September 2007 a series of demonstrations against the
government was led by Buddhist monks. In the days after 17
September, protests by monks and by supporters of the National
League for 7 Democracy were repressed violently by the regime: at
least 31 people were killed and thousands arrested.[55] The ASEAN foreign
ministers, in an informal meeting on 27 September 2007 at the
United Nations in New York, made an unusually strong statement in
response. The Ministers said they were appalled to hear reports of
automatic weapons being used and demanded that the Myanmar
Government immediately desist from the use of violence against
demonstrators. They expressed their revulsion about the use of
violence against demonstrators, urged restraint, called on Myanmar
to resume efforts at national reconciliation and called for the
release of all political detainees including Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi.[56] However,
ASEAN did not have a consensus to attempt to take any further
institutional steps in relation to Myanmar, such as suspending
membership. When ASEAN held its annual Summit in Singapore in
November 2007, Myanmar took part as usual. During the meetings,
Myanmar was able to veto a proposal made by the host country
Singapore that the UN s Special Envoy to Myanmar, Ibrahim Gambari,
should address a working dinner on Myanmar. After objections from
Myanmar, Gambari was told to stay away, a development seen as
embarrassing to Singapore.[57]
The character of the regime in Myanmar was again highlighted by
the onset of Cyclone Nargis which devastated wide areas of the
Irrawaddy delta from 3 May 2008. The cyclone resulted in major loss
of lives (estimated by the government at over 130 000), but the
regime initially restricted communication about the situation and
rejected many offers of assistance from foreign governments and
NGOs. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, however, the regime
did go ahead with a planned referendum on 10 May on its proposals
for a return to elected government the regime claimed that the
referendum was endorsed by 92.5 per cent of voters, but the
government had made it illegal to campaign for a no vote.[58]
The restrictive and limited response of the Myanmar regime to
the cyclone which included refusing access to foreign media and
refusing to accept aid from US and other naval vessels stationed
near the coast of the country produced substantial international
criticism. This environment created a need and an opportunity for
ASEAN to act. ASEAN governments were able to persuade the regime to
allow the deployment (from 9 18 May 2008) of an Emergency Rapid
Assessment Team to many, though not all, of the affected areas in
Myanmar. The regime also agreed to give relief teams from
individual ASEAN countries direct access to many areas, while
accepting money and supplies, but not people, from non-ASEAN
states. ASEAN s Secretary General, Surin Pitsuwan, visited Yangon
on 20 21 May 2008 and gained increased cooperation from the
government. [59]
On 25 May 2008, ASEAN organised a donors conference that secured
additional support from the international community and the Myanmar
Government also allowed increased access for ASEAN relief workers
to the country. The ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force for the Victims
of Cyclone Nargis was established, headed by Dr Pitsuwan, to
mediate cooperation between the Myanmar Government and the
international community, including the United Nations.[60] This cooperation
enabled preparation of the Post Nargis Joint Assessment Report ,
released in Singapore on 21 July during the ASEAN ministerial
meetings, which provided a detailed assessment of recovery efforts
and further needs for assistance. An ASEAN media release about the
Joint Report stated that:
This is the first time that ASEAN has played
such a leading role in responding to a natural disaster affecting
one of its Member States. ASEAN facilitated and coordinated
international assistance to the survivors of the cyclone as well as
the conduct of this assessment. At their special meeting on 19 May
Secretary-General of ASEAN Dr Surin Pitsuwan said, By linking hands
with the UN, the international NGOs, and the rest of the world,
ASEAN has shown how international humanitarian cooperation can work
to help bring relief and assistance to the victims of Cyclone
Nargis. At the same time, ASEAN is putting into action its pledge
to build a caring and sharing community .[61]
While ASEAN had been able to play a useful role in alleviating
the impasse over aid access to Myanmar, the political situation in
the country remained unchanged. During ASEAN s ministerial meetings
in July 2008 in Singapore, Myanmar was again a central focus for
attention. While Myanmar announced during the meetings that it had
ratified the ASEAN Charter, it was also indicated that Aung San Suu
Kyi s house arrest would continue at least until 2009. At the
ministerial meetings, the ASEAN foreign ministers again criticised
aspects of the situation in the country. The ASEAN joint communiqu
noted recent developments in Myanmar s peaceful transition to
democracy , but the ministers urged Myanmar to take bolder steps
and the document also called for the release of all political
detainees, including Aung San Suu Kyi, in order to pave the way for
meaningful dialogue involving all parties concerned .[62]
ASEAN clearly faces major ongoing problems in relation to
Myanmar. While ASEAN ministers have protested about conditions in
the country, the group s capacity to respond is affected by
internal divisions of approach. Members with democratic political
systems (particularly Indonesia and the Philippines) favour taking
a tough stand towards the Myanmar regime, but others (including the
newer members Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam and some members with
substantial economic interests in the country, such as Thailand) do
not support assertive policies towards the regime.[63]
The Myanmar regime, moreover, while resisting ASEAN s efforts at
engagement and dialogue, has moved to deepen its relations with
both China and India; relations which effectively bolster the
regime s capacity to reject ASEAN s attempted influence. China has
developed a substantial relationship which includes projects for
major oil and gas pipelines from Myanmar to southern China that
will enable China to reduce its dependence on shipping routes
through Southeast and East Asia. India has also maintained close
associations and has gained benefit from cooperation with the
government to restrict operations of anti-Indian insurgent forces
operating from Myanmar.[64] ASEAN, as a result, has been left with relatively
little leverage or capacity to deal with a member which refuses to
play the ASEAN game of dialogue and compromise.[65] For the present, the situation
in Myanmar continues as a major obstacle in the way of progress
towards the common accord which would support an ASEAN
Political-Security Community, and as a problem for ASEAN s
international image overall.
For four decades after 1967, ASEAN developed with minimal
institutions, a small central secretariat, and a consensus that
cooperation programs should be essentially voluntary and with only
limited mechanisms for compliance. In this period ASEAN members
entered into a number of agreements which are intended to be
binding on its members. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation sets
out the principles which should govern relations among states in
Southeast Asia (and those external states acceding to it). ASEAN
members have also made commitments on the non-acquisition of
nuclear weapons under the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
Treaty. The agreement on AFTA involved commitments to liberalise
tariff and non-tariff barriers. Other agreements have covered areas
including services trade, intellectual property rights, and
harmonisation of product standards, promotion of tourism, and air
cargo transfers. While some of these agreements have resulted in
adherence to the goals set out (for example in the area of nuclear
weapons), the agreements were not legally binding and ASEAN did not
have a central authority which could monitor compliance or call on
members to account for non-adherence.[66]
In a speech in June 2006, ASEAN s immediate-past Secretary
General Ong Keng Yong, discussed ASEAN s customary approaches to
cooperation in the following terms:
When all the 10 Member Governments come
together to discuss any regional cooperation, what usually results
is not something that is most desirable but more often than not,
ASEAN goes for something that is least objectionable ...
One growing internal challenge undermining
ASEAN s credibility is the lack of compliance and timely
implementation of ASEAN agreements. Many ASEAN agreements were
signed but not fully ratified in good time. Even when they are in
effect, compliance is not always readily forthcoming. Consequently
there is no certainty of implementation; deadlines are often missed
or postponed. And worse still, the culprits are never punished. For
in ASEAN we rely on voluntarism, trust, camaraderie, and
face-saving; but no sanctions and no costs to the laggards.
The problem of non-compliance could also be
attributed to ASEAN s lack of legal personality. It is unclear what
is the legal status of ASEAN agreements within the national law of
each Member Country. What is clear is that violation of ASEAN
agreements seldom pains the guilty party. But it certainly hurts
ASEAN as a whole.[67]
There has been a widespread awareness within ASEAN that this
mode of cooperation would not be sufficient to enable the group to
pursue the ambitious programs for economic integration now
underway. To attempt to address this issue, ASEAN has developed the
ASEAN Charter which was adopted at the ASEAN leaders summit in
Singapore in November 2007. The Charter is one of the most
important recent developments in ASEAN, but is has also been the
subject of debate and controversy.
The idea for a Charter was suggested initially by Malaysia. A
Malaysian concept paper argued that if ASEAN were to transform into
an ASEAN Community , its institutional framework would have to
change profoundly. This suggestion was taken up by the eleventh
ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur in 2005 and an Eminent Persons Group
(EPG) was established and asked to provide the ASEAN leaders with
bold and visionary advice and recommendations. Prime Minister
Badawi of Malaysia, the Chair of the 2005 summit, said that ASEAN
needed to be transformed to become a more people-centred
community.[68]
The Eminent Persons Group consulted widely, including with
non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations
(CSOs). The EPG invited 120 participants from CSOs in the region to
meetings in Kuala Lumpur and the first ASEAN Civil Society
Conference took place there from 7 9 December 2005. The Conference
issued a statement to the ASEAN leaders at the 11th
summit which put forward a number of issues for ASEAN to consider
including civil society participation in ASEAN decision-making,
developing channels for civil society inputs to the ASEAN
Secretariat, establishment of an ASEAN Human Rights Commission and
a regional mechanism for the protection of the rights of women,
children and migrant workers.[69]
The Eminent Persons Group s report was issued in January 2007
and distributed widely. The report aroused considerable interest
and expectations for change in ASEAN. As well as calling for the
streamlining of ASEAN s declared principles into a coherent
framework, the report went further by calling for the active
strengthening of democratic values, good governance, [and] the
rejection of unconstitutional and undemocratic changes of
government, through the respect and institutionalization of the
rule of law, including humanitarian law . The report also suggested
the potential need for sanctions in relation to members
transgressing ASEAN values. The EPG report proposed that ASEAN
should have the power to redress cases of serious breach of ASEAN s
objectives, [and] major principles [and] such measures may include
suspension of any of the rights and privileges of membership
.[70]
These proposals from the EPG were clearly a significant
departure from the previous ASEAN ethos of caution, avoidance of
controversy and, in particular, strong emphasis on the
non-interference principle. Mely Caballero-Anthony (Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, Singapore) has argued that, [i]n
brief, the EPG s Report therefore raised high expectations of an
emerging sea change in the thinking among ASEAN elites .[71] The report was also
very challenging for ASEAN overall, given the extent of political
diversity among the countries (from democratic pluralist systems in
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, to countries without
openly contested elections for representative institutions,
including Brunei, Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar).
It soon became evident that ASEAN was unlikely to take a radical
departure in pursuing a Charter. While there have been strong
pressures for ASEAN to develop a rules-based foundation for its
activities, the diversity of its membership and the sensitivities
of members towards encroachments on national sovereignty produced
counter-pressures towards voluntarism and informal cooperation. In
discussing the forthcoming Charter, the Philippines Foreign
Minister Alberto Romulo commented in late July 2007 that, We re not
going to have any phraseology that will lead to the disintegration
of the region ASEAN will be more like the United Nations, an
intergovernmental body No one will agree to a supranational body
.[72]
The Charter endorsed in Singapore on 20 November 2007 was a more
modest document than the EPG and many observers had hoped.
Nonetheless, it has introduced some substantial changes and
adaptations to ASEAN.[73] The Charter gives ASEAN for the first time a legal
personality as an inter-governmental organisation. ASEAN will have
status under international law and can make agreements in its own
right. The Charter affirms the status of the Secretary General as
being at ministerial level, with roles including participation in
ASEAN Summits and other meetings and submitting an annual report to
the Summit on ASEAN activities. Basic principles for ASEAN s
operation are set out, including provision for acceptance of new
members.[74] The
Charter also establishes and outlines the institutional structure
of ASEAN and has adapted this. The Charter has introduced some
significant changes, including:
- convening of the ASEAN Summit twice a year (instead of annually
as before)
- establishment of an ASEAN Coordinating Council to be served by
the ASEAN Foreign Ministers
- establishing two new positions of Deputy Secretary General, to
be recruited openly on merit
- appointment of each member state s Permanent Representative to
ASEAN to form a Committee of Permanent Representation
- single Chairmanship for key high-level ASEAN bodies, and
- establishment of an ASEAN Human Rights Body.[75]
The Charter has made ASEAN a more rules-based organisation,
although the extent to which this has been done is a matter of
debate. In relation to the important area of compliance with ASEAN
agreements, the Charter does not authorise the Secretary General or
the Secretariat to enforce adherence, but calls for cases of
non-compliance to be referred to the ASEAN Summit. Given that the
Summits have operated on the basis of consensus and agreement, it
is not clear how far this will advance ASEAN s capacity to achieve
adherence to agreements. In the area of resolution of disputes, the
Charter states that economic matters can be referred to the 2004
ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Resolution Mechanism. For other
potential disputes (for example over security issues) the Charter
says that the ASEAN Chair and the Secretary General can be
requested to provide good offices, conciliation or mediation in a
dispute . This provision, however, involves only an intermediary
role for the Chair and the Secretary General. Disputes would need
to be referred to the Summit, where the emphasis on consensus is
likely to make any assertive or active ASEAN dispute-resolving role
difficult to achieve, as has been the case in relation to
Myanmar.[76]
Another area where the Charter s contribution has been subject
to question is the funding and capacity of the ASEAN Secretariat.
The Secretariat, based in Jakarta, was initiated in 1976 and has
been expanded in stages since, to reach in 2007 a size of about 60
professional staff, operating on a budget of less than US$10
million per year. The Secretariat has to support 500 600 meetings
annually, including those focussing on ASEAN s ambitious programs
for economic integration. The Secretariat has gained assistance
from several major donor countries to support and increase its
capacities (including the US, Japan and Australia).[77] The Charter did
introduce two new positions of Deputy Secretary General, to be
recruited on merit. However, the Secretariat has been limited by
the size of its overall budget and the fact that contributions to
it are provided by each member equally and not on terms which
recognise members widely varying overall economic size or per
capita incomes. The failure so far of the Charter to revise the
basis of funding for the Secretariat has been seen as a limitation
in its contribution to enhancing the Association s capacities
overall.[78] The
ASEAN Foreign Ministers in their joint communiqu in Singapore in
July 2008 noted the importance of strengthening the Secretariat and
providing it with adequate resources, and effective implementation
of this commitment will clearly be important if the Secretariat is
to be able to handle its wide and growing range of
responsibilities.[79]
The Charter has stimulated considerable debate in ASEAN circles
on just how far it represents a step forward. This was reflected in
a notable public debate in Singapore in July 2008 between two
highly experienced former officials and academic figures. In a
critique in July 2008, Ambassador Barry Desker (head of the
Rajaratnam School of International Studies) argued that while the
Charter had moved ASEAN forward in some ways, it was a
disappointment overall. Desker suggested that Myanmar s involvement
in the preparation of the Charter had meant that ASEAN s
traditional emphasis on non-interference and the sovereignty of
states is upheld. While the Charter had introduced some changes to
ASEAN s organisational style, including the establishment of two
new positions of deputy secretary general, it had not provided for
increased resources for the Secretariat overall. Desker argued
that: The question arises whether ASEAN needed a charter or whether
its energies would have been better spent in increasing functional
cooperation among its member. [80]
In a response to Desker, Ambassador Tommy Koh (Chairman of the
Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore and Singapore s
representative on the group which drafted the Charter) viewed the
Charter in a more positive light. The Charter, he argued, has
introduced a number of new principles and objectives for the
Association, including the promotion of human rights and support
for constitutional government. Myanmar s participation had not
compromised the development of the Charter. Koh also argued that
the Charter should assist ASEAN in the area of compliance with
agreements, because the Secretary General was now able to monitor
these issues and report non-compliance to the Summit. Koh
concluded: The charter is not perfect but it is a good one. Let us
not make the best the enemy of the good. With the charter and the
economic blueprint, we have the possibility to construct a new
ASEAN which we can all be proud of. [81]
As supporters of the Charter have pointed out, it is intended to
be a living document which under Article 50 can be reviewed five
years after it enters into force or as otherwise determined by the
ASEAN Summit .[82]
A key question will be whether the Charter will serve as a
springboard for additional constructive debate and institutional
development in the Association to assist it to adapt further to
fulfil its own ambitious cooperation goals.
In the second half of 2008, the next important steps in relation
to the ASEAN Charter are the ratification process and the
development of proposals for an ASEAN human rights body.
By the end of July 2008, seven states had ratified the Charter:
Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam and Myanmar,
which announced its ratification during the ASEAN meetings in
Singapore on 21 July. Of the three remaining states, Thailand s
parliament endorsed the Charter on 16 September 2008, with full
ratification expected after Royal approval.[83] In the case of the Philippines,
President Macapagal-Arroyo stated during the Singapore ASEAN Summit
in November 2007 that her country would be unlikely to ratify the
Charter unless human rights conditions improved in Myanmar and
opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi was freed.[84] While the Myanmar regime has not
either liberalised its rule or freed Aung San Suu Kyi, President
Arroyo in 2008 established an inter-agency task force to encourage
the Philippines Senate to support ratification. It is considered
possible that the Philippines will be able to secure ratification
even without evident progress in Myanmar.[85]
Ratification has attracted controversy in Indonesia s House of
People s Representatives (DPR), which is probably the strongest
legislative body in the ASEAN region. The DPR has refused to
endorse an Indonesian ambassador to Myanmar for over a year because
of concerns about internal conditions in the country. At the time
of the ASEAN meetings in July 2008, some prominent DPR members
expressed reservations over the Charter and by late July only two
political parties (Golkar and President Yudhoyono s Democratic
Party) had explicitly expressed support for it. Indonesia, however,
is a founding member of ASEAN and the host to the Secretariat and
it is therefore likely that the Charter will ultimately receive
support.[86]
The other immediate challenge for the Charter process is
following through on the commitment in the Charter to establish an
ASEAN human rights body. The proposal has been discussed at a
series of workshops but ASEAN s political diversity has made
arriving at a consensus difficult. Differences in outlook were
apparent at the 7th workshop on the ASEAN Regional
Mechanism on Human Rights in Singapore in June 2008, which involved
over sixty delegates from NGOs, think tanks and governments.
According to Professor Tommy Koh, a key issue has been that
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand already have
national human rights committees or bodies but Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar and Vietnam are not enthusiastic about following this path.
Singapore and Brunei are in neither camp but have not been able to
bridge the gap between the two.[87] It will clearly be difficult to achieve an
outcome which will both receive endorsement from all members while
also satisfying the expectations of public figures and NGOs in
ASEAN s more liberal and democratic polities.[88] Nonetheless, the holding of
detailed discussions about human rights issues at an ASEAN level
represents a major step ahead in ASEAN political dialogue, and is
another reflection of the ongoing impact of the climate of debate
stimulated by the Charter development process.
A key issue for ASEAN in 2008 was the extent of political
leadership which could be deployed by the members to continue to
advance the agendas of the ASEAN Community project, including the
Charter and the human rights body.
Several members were facing pressing domestic political issues
which were likely to preoccupy policy-makers attention. Thailand
was facing ongoing political conflict between supporters and
opponents of the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra which in
August and early September 2008 involved stand-offs between
demonstrators and the police. In late August 2008 ASEAN s Secretary
General Surin Pitsuwan (a former foreign minister of Thailand)
expressed concern that the ongoing political turmoil in Thailand
could adversely affect the country s image as the chair of ASEAN in
2008 and 2009.[89]
Malaysian politics were being dominated by the aftermath of the
elections in March, in which opposition forces increased greatly
their strength in parliament and after the leading opposition
figure Anwar Ibrahim re-entered parliament in a by-election on 26
August were now in a position to pose a more potent challenge to
the long serving coalition led by the United Malays National
Organisation.[90]
Indonesia was entering a phase in which much political attention
would be dominated by the lead up and conduct of parliamentary and
presidential elections in 2009. The Philippines also faces national
elections in the first half of 2010 and, in the latter half of
2008, was also facing renewed conflict in the south amid efforts to
pursue negotiations to try to alleviate the state of disaffection
in the Muslim-dominated provinces.[91]
While domestic issues preoccupied the attention of a number of
members, a sense of some urgency was also evident as ASEAN sought
to advance its cooperation agenda. Singapore s Prime Minister Lee
Hsien Loong, in addressing the ASEAN ministerial meetings in
Singapore on 21 July, warned that ASEAN could not take its regional
position and sense of relevance for granted:
While we work to strengthen ASEAN, we should
also not lose sight of our place in the evolving regional and
international landscape
Because of longstanding tensions and rivalries
between the major Asian powers, ASEAN could play a useful role as a
neutral platform for regional interactions. But major power
relations are improving, and alternative platforms are emerging,
like the Six-Party mechanism and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
The leaders of China, Japan and South Korea are arranging to hold a
trilateral Summit in Japan this September, the first outside an
ASEAN setting. ASEAN cannot take its continued relevance for
granted. If our efforts to achieve faster and deeper integration
falter, ASEAN may well be sidelined.[92]
A key goal of ASEAN from its early days has been to engage the
major external powers with interests in Southeast Asia in regular
dialogue on security and economic issues, particularly through the
Post Ministerial Conference discussions held with the annual
ministerial meetings. This strategy has for ASEAN been a way of
helping to mediate and manage the interests of the major powers in
Southeast Asia, while seeking to forestall the danger of outright
competition and intervention which was a dominant problem in the
region for five decades from the 1940s.[93]
From the late 1970s until the end of the Cold War, these
dialogues were focussed heavily on political and security issues,
as ASEAN engaged its partners to advance ASEAN s interests in areas
including efforts to alleviate the problems caused by large scale
outflows of refugees from the Indochina states after 1975 and then
the conflict over Cambodia (until a series of regional and
international negotiations produced the Paris Agreements of October
1991, United Nations-organised elections and the inauguration of a
new Cambodian government).
Political and security issues continue to be a vital part of
ASEAN s external dialogues and efforts to counter terrorism have
been particularly important since the September 11 attacks in the
US in 2001. Since the late 1990s, there has also been an increasing
focus on economic cooperation, as ASEAN and its partners have been
interested to advance both their economic linkages and their
overall strategic interests through the pursuit of closer external
economic relations, often through a series of free trade
agreements.
ASEAN s most crucial external relations continue to be with the
big three Asia-Pacific states, the US, China and Japan.
The United States, the world s superpower, has
longstanding relationships in Southeast Asia, which include formal
security alliances with the Philippines and Thailand. The US
continues to be the dominant maritime power in East Asia, has
extensive networks of bilateral relationships and has also been
interested to participate in emerging multilateral security
dialogues, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, in which it was a
founding member from 1994. Access to the United States market has
continued to be a central element in the export-led economic growth
of most ASEAN economies (including Vietnam, for whom the US is its
largest export destination).
Table 1: ASEAN Dialogue Partners,
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation Signatories and East Asian Summit
Participants
|
|
ASEAN
DP
|
TAC
|
EAS
|
|
Australia
|
1974
|
2005
|
√
|
|
Bangladesh
|
−
|
2007
|
−
|
|
Canada
|
1977
|
−
|
−
|
|
China
|
1996
|
2003
|
√
|
|
Democratic People s
Republic of Korea
|
−
|
2008
|
−
|
|
European Union
|
1972
|
−
|
−
|
|
France
|
−
|
2007
|
−
|
|
India
|
1995
|
2003
|
√
|
|
Japan
|
1977
|
2004
|
√
|
|
Mongolia
|
−
|
2005
|
−
|
|
New Zealand
|
1975
|
2005
|
√
|
|
Pakistan
|
1997 (sectoral)
|
2004
|
−
|
|
Papua New Guinea
|
−
|
1989
|
−
|
|
Republic of Korea
|
1991
|
2004
|
√
|
|
Russian Federation
|
1996
|
2004
|
−
|
|
Sri Lanka
|
−
|
2007
|
−
|
|
Timor-Leste
|
−
|
2007
|
−
|
|
United States
|
1977
|
−
|
−
|
Source: This table is based on material drawn
with permission from an unpublished paper (2008) by Dr. Malcolm
Cook, Mark Thirwell, Dr. John Ravenhill and Dr. Chris Roberts.
Table 2: Participation in Regional
Institutions
|
|
ASEAN
|
ASEAN +3
(China, Japan and South Korea)
|
East Asian
Summit
|
ASEAN Regional
Forum
|
Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation
|
|
Brunei Darussalam
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
|
Indonesia
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
|
Malaysia
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
|
Philippines
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
|
Singapore
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
|
Thailand
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
|
Cambodia
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
−
|
|
Lao PDR
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
−
|
|
Myanmar
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
−
|
|
Viet Nam
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
|
Japan
|
−
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
|
China
|
−
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
|
Republic of Korea
|
−
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
|
Australia
|
−
|
−
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
|
New Zealand
|
−
|
−
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
|
India
|
−
|
−
|
√
|
√
|
−
|
|
Bangladesh
|
−
|
−
|
−
|
√
|
−
|
|
Canada
|
−
|
−
|
−
|
√
|
√
|
|
Chile
|
−
|
−
|
−
|
−
|
√
|
|
Democratic People s
Republic of Korea
|
−
|
−
|
−
|
√
|
−
|
|
European Union
|
−
|
−
|
−
|
√
|
−
|
|
Mexico
|
−
|
−
|
−
|
−
|
√
|
|
Mongolia
|
−
|
−
|
−
|
√
|
−
|
|
Pakistan
|
−
|
−
|
−
|
√
|
−
|
|
Papua New Guinea
|
−
|
−
|
−
|
√
|
√
|
|
Peru
|
−
|
−
|
−
|
−
|
√
|
|
Russian Federation
|
−
|
−
|
−
|
√
|
√
|
|
Sri Lanka
|
−
|
−
|
−
|
√
|
−
|
|
Taiwan
|
−
|
−
|
−
|
−
|
√
|
|
Timor-Leste
|
−
|
−
|
−
|
√
|
−
|
|
United States
|
−
|
−
|
−
|
√
|
√
|
Source: This table is based on material drawn
with permission from an unpublished paper (2008) by Dr. Malcolm
Cook, Mark Thirwell, Dr. John Ravenhill and Dr. Chris Roberts.
Since September 11 2001, the desire of the US to combat the
presence and capacities of international terrorist groups, and
particularly al-Qaeda, has led to increased cooperation with almost
every government in Southeast Asia (with the exception of Myanmar).
In 2003, both Thailand and the Philippines were accorded the status
of major non-NATO allies and security contacts have been enhanced
with other states including Malaysia and Indonesia.[94]
While US bilateral relations in Southeast Asia have generally
been progressing effectively, there has been some concern that this
has not been matched fully by progress in multilateral relations
with ASEAN. The US has been an official dialogue partner of ASEAN
since 1977 and its Secretary of State normally has regular annual
meetings with her/his ASEAN counterparts. The US s heavy emphasis
since September 2001 on counter-terrorism issues, however, has been
seen as being sometimes narrow in focus and the US administration
has not always given ASEAN the individual attention it has sought.
For example, concerns were expressed when Secretary Rice was unable
to attend the annual ASEAN foreign ministers meetings and the ARF
in July 2005 and again in July 2007. At the same time, China since
the late 1990s is considered widely to have been very effective in
its development of relations with the ASEAN region.[95]
The US has recently sought to raise the profile of its
multilateral association with ASEAN. In November 2005 the US and
ASEAN endorsed a Joint Vision Statement on the ASEAN-US Enhanced
Partnership which called for pursuit of a wide range of political,
economic and social cooperation.[96] The US and ASEAN concluded a Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement (seen as a potential precursor to an FTA) in
August 2006.[97]
The US, having concluded a bilateral free trade agreement with
Singapore in 2003, has also pursued bilateral free trade
discussions with Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam although none of
these had come to fruition by mid-2008 and further progress seems
unlikely before the advent of a new administration in Washington in
2009.[98]
The profile of US relations with ASEAN was to have been raised
further in 2007 with a joint US-ASEAN summit meeting of heads of
government to have been held in Singapore on 5 September 2008.
However, ASEAN s expectations for the meeting were disappointed
when it was announced that President Bush would be unable to
participate: it is hoped to convene the meeting later.[99]
The US has taken additional steps in 2008 to reaffirm relations.
In April, the US became the first country to nominate an Ambassador
to ASEAN: Scott Marciel would take up the position (which he would
hold concurrently with his role as Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Southeast Asia). It was reported that the US hoped that
the appointment would encourage other countries to follow suit and
help establish a group of diplomats from ASEAN partners who could
encourage the group s evolution. While progress on bilateral trade
agreements with Malaysia and Thailand was limited by the
pre-election political climate, the US and ASEAN reached another
multilateral agreement in February 2008 (the ASEAN Development
Vision to Advance National Cooperation and Economic Integration
known as ADVANCE ) intended to build on ongoing cooperation through
joint policy studies and faster movement towards a single window
arrangement to streamline customs clearance for ASEAN imports and
exports.[100]
While efforts to progress multilateral political dialogue remained
inhibited by the problem of Myanmar, Secretary of State Rice
participated in the July 2008 ASEAN dialogues and the ARF. In a
meeting with Singapore s Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo,
Secretary Rice praised ASEAN as a place where people can rally and
try to solve problems. Dr Rice also reaffirmed the US view that
ASEAN has an important role to play in bringing about change in
Myanmar.[101]
Some concerns have continued in the US about the potentially
adverse impact of the US s preoccupation with issues in the Middle
East (especially Iraq) for its interests in Southeast and East
Asia. However, the US remains a central factor in the security and
economic well-being of the region and its role is congenial to
almost every ASEAN member. As the International Institute for
Strategic Studies has observed:
Washington s security interest, which includes
a substantial military presence in Southeast Asia s neighbourhood,
in effect relieves the ASEAN governments of the need for immediate
concern over China s increasing presence. The US is still playing a
vital role as a regional balance The present major power
equilibrium in Southeast Asia suits ASEAN members, which are mainly
keen to enjoy positive relations with both parties and want, above
all, to avoid having to choose sides between either the Chinese or
the Americans. [102]
ASEAN s relations with China have advanced
substantially in the past decade. Relations between the People s
Republic of China and Southeast Asia were for many years marked by
mutual suspicion and reservations, as China gave support to
Communist Parties in regional states. China also has overlapping
claims in the South China Sea with four ASEAN members (Brunei,
Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam). However, since the
mid-1990s, China-Southeast Asia relations have improved markedly.
The period of the Asian financial crisis (from mid-1997) was a
watershed for relations. China was seen to have been supportive
towards the region and its maintenance of the value of the Yuan (so
that China did not undercut its neighbours when they were
attempting to stabilise their economies after several states had
experienced currency devaluations) was appreciated by ASEAN s
members. In the wake of the financial crisis, trade and access to
foreign direct investment were of particular concern to ASEAN
members and they were highly aware of China s growing presence as a
factor in the regional as well as in the international economy.
There were particular anxieties that ASEAN states would not be able
to compete effectively with China s booming economy in attracting
investment.[103]
Since 1997, China has pursued closer relations with the ASEAN
region both bilaterally and multilaterally. China and ASEAN have
concluded protocols in areas including human resource development,
public health, information and communications technology,
transportation, environment and culture. At the ASEAN-China summit
in November 2002 the two sides signed agreements including the
Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and
documents covering non-traditional security threats, economic
cooperation and agricultural cooperation. At the ASEAN summit in
2003, China took the important step of formally acceding to ASEAN s
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. At the same summit, ASEAN and
China signed the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for
Peace and Prosperity, which addresses a wide range of political,
economic, social and security issues.[104]
A very significant area of cooperation now underway is the
commitment by both sides to implement an ASEAN-China Free Trade
Agreement (ACFTA, to include China and the six older ASEAN members
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand by
2010 and the four newer members Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and
Vietnam by 2015). A key motivation on China s part in pursuing the
ACFTA was to allay ASEAN concerns about the potential adverse
impact on their economies of China s rapid rise in economic
strength, particularly when it joined the WTO in 2001 and was able
to gain access for its highly competitive manufactured products on
similar terms to ASEAN exporters in major world markets. The ACFTA
brings together member states which will have a combined population
of about 2 billion and a collective gross domestic product of US$3
trillion.[105]
The appeal of the agreement to ASEAN members has been enhanced by
China s offer of early harvest reductions of tariffs on some
products much earlier than the scheduled date for inauguration of
the overall agreement (so that exporters from ASEAN members can
gain some rapid and evident advantages from the agreement). With
the ACFTA agreement, China has been able to both boost its image in
the ASEAN region and assert a strongly competitive position in
economic cooperation in relation to Japan, which reached a
multilateral economic partnership agreement with ASEAN in April
2008.
While China-ASEAN relations are close they also involve some
tensions and potential discord. In relation to the South China Sea,
it has not been possible to extend the 2002 accord to the level of
a legally-binding Code of Conduct; China has preferred to deal with
ASEAN members on a bilateral basis rather than multilaterally.
Myanmar is a focus of some difference in emphasis given that China
s close relationship with the Myanmar government is a major
obstacle to ASEAN efforts to promote more liberal approaches by the
regime. China also faces the ongoing and very strong influence in
the region of the US and Japan. China is understood to be working
on further ways to advance its ASEAN relations. It announced the
appointment of an ambassador to ASEAN during the July 2008
meetings. Some new initiatives may be announced at the next Summit
in Bangkok in December 2008, including a multi-billion dollar
development fund to be used for infrastructure and public works in
the ASEAN and Mekong sub-region.[106]
Since the end of World War II Japan has
developed close and cooperative relations in Southeast Asia. In
these relations Japan has faced fewer problems from legacies of
past involvements than it often encounters in Northeast Asia: Japan
was not a long-term colonial occupying power in Southeast Asia and
its presence during World War II was viewed in some countries (such
as Indonesia) at least partly as a catalyst which helped to
facilitate the decline of European colonial authority. Japanese
trade and investment have played a major role in Southeast Asian
economic development and from the 1980s Japanese industry relocated
many manufacturing facilities to the region.
Japan has supported ASEAN s development and has been a dialogue
partner since 1977. Japan was a major contributor to the
international response to assist regional economies affected by the
Asian financial crisis from mid-1997. Japan has acceded to ASEAN s
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (in 2004) and has participated
actively in ASEAN s efforts towards wider regional dialogue,
including through the ARF, the ASEAN Plus Three grouping and the
East Asia Summit (see below). Japan announced plans to nominate an
ambassador to ASEAN in July 2008, once the ASEAN Charter comes into
effect.[107]
Japan s interest in and support for ASEAN has continued to grow and
encompasses many areas of cooperation, including human resource
development and counter-terrorism. In December 2005, at the
11th ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur , Japan and ASEAN
issued a joint declaration affirming their commitment to deepen
relations. Japan provided a commitment of US$70 million to support
ASEAN s regional integration projects and the two sides pledged to
continue cooperation in areas including the threat of terrorism,
transnational crime, avian influenza (with Japan committing US$135
million to assist in preventative measures), rising oil prices and
natural disasters.[108]
In the last decade Japan s prominence as a regional partner for
Southeast Asia has been challenged strongly by the rising economic
and political influence of China. Concerned to maintain its
influence and involvement in the region, Japan for its part has
pursued its own economic agreements which it terms Economic
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) in the ASEAN region. The Economic
Partnership Agreements are intended to cover not only trade
liberalisation but also areas including free (or at least freer )
movement of labour and provisions on investment protection,
intellectual property rights and cultural and educational
cooperation. Japan has so far signed EPAs with Singapore, Thailand,
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. The EPA signed with the
Philippines (in September 2006) was notable for the inclusion of
provisions for Japan to accept nurses and care workers (albeit
under strict conditions, including Japanese language
proficiency).[109]
Japan has also been negotiating an overall trade agreement with
ASEAN. Japan has faced the problem that its key domestic
agriculture sectors have been unwilling to accept liberalisation
proposals. The EPA reached with the Philippines, for example,
excluded key agricultural items from liberalisation, including
rice, wheat, barley, beef and pork.[110] In April 2008, multilateral
relations took a significant step forward when Japan and ASEAN
announced agreement on a comprehensive economic partnership. The
agreement is wider than a FTA in that it also covers services and
investment. ASEAN within the next ten years is expected to benefit
from the elimination of tariffs on 93 per cent of their exports to
Japan. ASEAN members will lower tariffs on Japanese goods, with the
more developed members such as Indonesia and Thailand moving more
quickly than the newer members. The EPA should help Japan tie
itself further into the ASEAN region and bolster its position as a
partner vis a vis China.[111] Alongside these developments, Japan
has also announced an ambitious proposal for a wider 16 country
trade and economic agreement (covering the members of the East Asia
Summit) which has added another strand to the debate and diplomacy
over economic cooperation in East Asia (see below).
ASEAN s other significant partners include South
Korea, which has been a dialogue partner since 1979 and is
a signatory to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. ASEAN has
negotiated a Free Trade Agreement with South Korea which was
concluded in 2006.[112] The end of the Cold War opened up new prospects for
ASEAN s relations with Russia, hitherto marked by
distance and suspicion. Russia has valued the chance to participate
in ASEAN s Post Ministerial Conferences (since 1991), becoming a
full dialogue partner in 1996 and holding its first leadership
summit with ASEAN in December 2005. Russia offers ASEAN cooperation
in science, technology and arms procurement but its profile is
limited overall by its comparatively small-scale trade
relationship, which is dwarfed by those of other partners such as
the US, Japan and China.[113] India is becoming an increasingly
relevant partner for ASEAN and its greater interest in the East
Asia region was symbolised by its membership in the East Asia
Summit in 2005. In August 2008, the two sides announced that a free
trade agreement had been arrived at and would be presented for
formal agreement.[114]
The European Union (EU) became ASEAN s first
dialogue partner in 1972 and a substantial multilateral
relationship has been developed. Relations were pioneered by the
two sides economics ministers, with ASEAN keen to increase access
for its exports to European markets. Dialogue at foreign minister
level began in 1978 and has since been conducted every two years.
The two sides entered into a Cooperation Agreement in 1980 which
has involved many areas of contact and activity. The issue of
Myanmar, however, has been a problem in the relationship: the EU
refused to allow Myanmar to sign the Cooperation Agreement and the
situation in that country has been a regular focus for discussions
between the EU and ASEAN. The two sides began negotiations for a
free trade agreement in 2007 and on 22 November 2007 the first ever
EU-ASEAN Summit was held in Singapore (during ASEAN s Summit) to
celebrate 30 years of cooperation.[115] In September 2008 it was announced
that the EU plans to sign ASEAN s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
in 2009.[116] A
further channel for dialogue has been provided by the Europe-Asia
Meetings (ASEM), initiated in 1996, which have brought together
every two years the EU members and the ASEAN members along with
Japan, China and South Korea. EU concerns about Myanmar prevented
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar from joining ASEM until 2004. ASEM has
continued as a top-level forum of government leaders: it has been
supported by the Asia-Europe Foundation, based in Singapore.
[117]
ASEAN s other dialogue partners include New Zealand, Canada and
the United Nations Development Programme: Australia s relationship
is discussed in detail below.[118]
While it has sought to consolidate relations among its own
members and to engage major partners in regular dialogues, ASEAN
has also sought to play a role in fostering institutional dialogue
and cooperation on a wider regional basis in East Asia and the
Asia-Pacific regions. These efforts have, since the mid-1990s, been
one of ASEAN s most prominent areas of emphasis. The three major
expressions of this have been the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN
Plus Three process, and the East Asia Summit.
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was initiated in 1994 to extend
ASEAN s role in sponsoring dialogue on security issues in the East
Asia region. It was conceived as a process not an institution
.[119] The ARF
now has 27 participants including the ASEAN ten, the US, China,
Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.[120]
The ARF emerged from discussions among ASEAN members and their
dialogue partners on how the role of the Post Ministerial
Conference might be extended to sponsor multilateral discussions on
regional security issues. The Forum was conceived as a group that
would be inclusive in membership but with ASEAN playing the leading
role. Thus at the second Forum meeting in Brunei in 1995 the
chairman s statement declared that, A successful ARF requires the
active, full and equal participation and cooperation of all
members. However, ASEAN undertakes the obligation to be the primary
driving force. [121] To affirm ASEAN s role, it was declared that the ARF
should take place annually in the context of ASEAN s ministerial
and Post Ministerial Conferences. The Forum s method and approach
were clearly patterned after ASEAN s. The view that the ASEAN Way
was the only feasible one for the Forum was reflected clearly in
the 1995 chairman s statement: The ARF process shall move at a pace
comfortable to all participants The approach shall be evolutionary
Decisions of the ARF shall be made through consensus after careful
and extensive consultations among all participants. [122]
The ARF was established in an environment of strategic
uncertainty in East Asia after the demise of the Soviet Union and
in a region which had no multilateral forums for security dialogue.
The Forum aimed to bring together the major powers with interests
in regional security, including Japan, China and the United States.
Ralf Emmers (Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore)
has observed that:
ASEAN s decision to establish the ARF resulted
from several motivations. It was regarded by ASEAN as a diplomatic
instrument to promote a continuing United States involvement in the
region and to encourage China into habits of good international
behaviour. The ARF was thus viewed as a means to both socialise
Beijing in a comprehensive fashion while keeping Washington engaged
in the region. Furthermore, the creation of the ARF was meant to
ensure the ongoing relevance of ASEAN. Its members needed to avoid
being excluded from a new strategic architecture that was chiefly
dependent on a Sino-Japanese-US triangle. ASEAN hoped therefore to
consolidate its diplomatic position by further developing its
stabilising role in Southeast Asia and beyond. [123]
The ARF has largely succeeded in fulfilling ASEAN s original
goals for it. The ARF has been useful as a venue for China to gain
experience in regional multilateral dialogue, which has been a
positive step as China was initially unenthusiastic about the
concept. The US, with its strong set of bilateral security
relationships in the region, was initially cool towards the ARF but
under the Clinton administration increased its involvement,
although its bilateral security relationships remain paramount in
its regional strategies.[124]
ARF meetings are held at Foreign Minister level annually in
July, in conjunction with the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference
(PMC). The ARF has minimal institutionalisation, consensus decision
making and uses both first and second track (i.e. official level
and NGO/academic level) diplomacy.[125] The ARF agreed in 1995 on a gradual
three-stage evolution of confidence building, preventive diplomacy
and in the longer term, approaches to conflict resolution.[126] ASEAN spokespersons
continue to emphasise the Forum s value. At a meeting in September
2006 Malaysia s Minister for Defence stated that, Through this
forum we can sit down together to understand the root causes of
these security issues, create awareness and build up confidence
which will allow us to narrow the gap of uncertainty. [127]
The ARF is so far generally considered to have been a modest
success as a useful vehicle for discussion and confidence building.
The Forum s plenary and inter-sessional discussions have had some
practical results. These include the issuing of annual defence
policy statements and additional White Papers, which contribute to
greater transparency ; military exchanges at staff college level;
growing involvement of defence officials in ARF discussions; and
the creation of an ARF Register of Experts/Eminent Persons, who can
be called on by Forum members in conflict situations.[128] However, the ARF s
premium on non-confrontation means that it does not have a mandate
to intervene directly in security disputes. The Forum s limits were
illustrated clearly during the crisis over East Timor in 1999.
Although the crisis involved a core member of ASEAN (Indonesia),
the ARF was not able itself to take any significant action,
although several ASEAN members did take part in the United Nations
sponsored peacekeeping efforts led by INTERFET and UNTAET.[129]
The Forum has recently pursued practical cooperation in areas
including disaster relief (with a desk top planning exercise held
in Jakarta in May 2008 and a live exercise to be hosted by the US
and the Philippines in 2009), meetings of experts to discuss
peacekeeping, and cooperation on maritime security, including a
desk top exercise in 2007.[130] The ARF has also begun to move beyond its agreed
first stage of confidence-building, to explore possibilities for
preventive diplomacy. At its 2007 meeting in Manila, the ARF
members adopted provisions for a rapid response group able to
respond to emergencies. The group, called the Friends of the ARF
Chair , will comprise three ARF foreign ministers who can assist
the chairman and will be convened for specific tasks such as
immediate threats to security. In addition The ARF agreed on a
Cooperative Framework on Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime
which covers eleven areas including transport security, information
exchange and management of the impact of terrorist acts.[131]
However it is not clear how much further the ARF can go to
extend its role in security dialogue in the region. Its membership
is wide and diverse and finding a consensus among the members has
not been easy. It is not in a position to address directly some of
the most significant security issues in the Asia-Pacific region,
such as the situation of Taiwan, the North Korean nuclear issue or
the situation in Kashmir (because particular member countries would
veto such attempts). The limitations of the diverse and
consensus-based ARF have been illustrated by the advent of the Six
Party Talks process in relation to North Korea s nuclear program.
This group is smaller and confined to those major parties with
immediate interests in the issues being addressed. The operations
of the Six Party Talks process so far (while not yet a success)
have led to suggestions that they could ultimately evolve into a
Northeast Asia security forum which would not have ASEAN
participation and would be seen to be performing roles the ARF had
not been able to. The ARF also faces the challenge that additional
regional groups could come to assume a greater cogency in relation
to security dialogue, including ASEAN Plus Three, which is more
geographically focused than the now very diverse ARF. Having
achieved its original aims for ASEAN, the Forum now faces the
challenge of extending its role and relevance to its
members.[132]
ASEAN members have also been interested in developing wider
dialogues with a special focus on interactions specifically among
the countries of East Asia.
There was some support within East Asia for an Asia-focused form
of cooperation at least from the early 1990s when Malaysia s Prime
Minister Mahathir proposed an East Asia Economic Group which would
have an exclusively Asian membership. At this time, the concept of
an East Asian-focussed grouping did not meet with thoroughgoing
approval in the region. Japan, in particular, did not support the
concept.[133]
Furthermore, attention on regional cooperation in the early 1990s
was focused on the development of the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) grouping of Asia-Pacific economies.
However a series of factors from the mid-1990s increased support
for an East Asian-focussed grouping. These included;
- the inauguration of the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) in 1996,
which explicitly involved dialogue between Europe and an Asian
side
- the traumatic impact on many regional economies of the Asian
financial crisis from mid-1997, which prompted many regional states
to consider the desirability of greater cooperation to forestall
any future crisis and to add greater weight for Asia in relations
with international institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund
- APEC s inability to maintain the momentum towards trade
liberalisation it had in the mid-1990s
- a continuing sense that the ongoing development of regional
groupings in Europe (the European Union) and the Americas (the
North American Free Trade Agreement) should be accompanied by
greater East Asian cooperation; and
- China s dynamic economic growth which stimulated a rise in the
importance of trade among the countries of East Asia.
All these developments contributed to the opening up of
political space for an East Asian grouping.[134]
ASEAN s first major step towards wider cooperation in East Asia
was the inauguration of the ASEAN Plus Three process, which stemmed
from a meeting of the ASEAN members and China, Japan and South
Korea in Kuala Lumpur in 1997. ASEAN Plus Three (APT) is not a
formalised organisation but is a loose cooperative framework based
on conferences and dialogue. The APT members have pursued dialogues
at several different levels simultaneously: among all thirteen
members, among the ASEAN ten and one other member (which has
enabled China and Japan, in particular, to maintain and develop
their own specific relationships with ASEAN), and among the three
Northeast Asian members (China, Japan and South Korea) who held
their first trilateral meeting in 1999.[135]
The APT process has involved annual meetings of the members
leaders (held during ASEAN s Summits), and many meetings of
ministers and senior officials in areas including politics and
security, trade, labour, agriculture and forestry, tourism, energy
and environment. China has also sponsored a study to explore the
feasibility of an East Asia Free Trade Area among the thirteen APT
countries.[136]
The most significant element in APT activities so far, however, has
been the promotion of regional financial cooperation, in two major
ways.
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis from 1997, there
were widespread sentiments in East Asia that reliance on
international financial institutions (particularly the
International Monetary Fund) was no longer entirely adequate for
the economies of the region. Some adversely affected countries
considered that the IMF had been unduly tough in its conditions for
assistance to the East Asian states. One initial response to these
views came from Japan, which proposed that an Asian Monetary Fund
should be established in which Japan could be expected to play a
leading role. This proposal met with opposition from the US and
also from China. From 1999, however, the APT group sponsored
another proposal to increase financial communication and
interaction among the East Asian economies through the Chiang Mai
Initiative , which involves a series of currency swap arrangements
(initially on a bilateral basis) between the central banks of
participating states. The arrangements provide the potential for
regional countries to offer assistance to an ASEAN Plus Three
member which faces financial difficulties and currency instability
without having to wait for action from the IMF or other
authorities. The arrangements involve a surveillance mechanism so
that the performance of the assisted country could be overseen by
other regional states. The total amount committed to the currency
swap arrangements is now over US$83 billion, although the amount
available to any one member would be only a fraction of this
total.[137]
On 4 May 2008 the APT finance ministers announced a further
development of their financial cooperation. The Chiang Mai
Initiative would now be extended to involve the commitment of US$80
billion on a multilateral basis into a regional fund to help
protect regional currencies from speculative attacks. This
announcement has been made in an environment where most East Asian
economies are now in substantially different positions from those
faced at the time of the 1997 financial crisis. Most economies now
have current account surpluses and are not seen to be in danger of
speculative attacks or liquidity crises. The finance ministers
announcement also made it clear that major technical issues have
still to be finalised on exactly how such a fund would operate. The
proposed multilateral fund has, however, been seen as a further
useful avenue towards regional economic cooperation and one which
is being pursued in association with, and not in opposition to, the
existing international arrangements, especially the IMF.[138]
The second major aspect of regional financial cooperation has
involved the development of an Asian bond market. The intention of
this program is to enable increased access for regional investors
to funds from the large stocks of savings in the East Asian
economies. In particular, the Asian bond program is intended to
enable East Asian entities to borrow funds from other East Asian
countries reserves which are denominated in local currencies,
rather than the currencies of the major industrial economies.
Development of an Asian bond market has also been seen as a
valuable way of enhancing interaction between China and other
regional economies. To date, however, the progress has been very
modest, in large part because of domestic regulations that prevent
bond markets from operating effectively[139]
The APT grouping faces some significant internal tensions and
obstacles to the consolidation of accord and cooperation. The group
is highly diverse in character, given that it includes advanced
market economies, the two most significant Communist led market
oriented systems and a number of less developed states. The three
northeast Asian members have also faced major differences and
tensions in their bilateral relations. China and South Korea have
developed a notably close economic relationship since their
diplomatic relations were normalised in 1990 but the existence of
ongoing suspicions was evident in a dispute over a historical claim
in 2004. Relations between Japan and China, and Japan and South
Korea have also had substantial tensions. While economic relations
in both cases are very extensive, suspicions and tensions over
history and especially the legacy of World War II remain, although
the Japan-China relationship has recently improved after further
dialogue in 2008 between Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and President
Hu Jintao.[140]
The potential for further development of ASEAN Plus Three
cooperation will depend especially on the climate of China-Japan
relations.
At the meeting of the APT foreign ministers in Singapore on 22
July 2008, the ministers held talks in retreat format for the first
time and expressed satisfaction that their relations had reached a
high level of comfort They also reaffirmed the priority they attach
to their cooperation. The Chairman s Statement after the meeting
stated that:
They reaffirmed that the ASEAN Plus Three
process would continue to be the main vehicle towards the long-term
goal of building an East Asian community, with ASEAN as the driving
force. At the same time they recognised and supported the mutually
reinforcing and complementary roles of the ASEAN Plus Three and
such regional fora as EAS, ARF, APEC and ASEAN to promote East Asia
community building.[141]
The ASEAN Plus Three grouping has become a significant focus for
regional dialogue and it has encouraged regional leaders to think
further about how that dialogue can be best advanced. The ASEAN
Plus Three leaders have accordingly commissioned studies and
reports to explore bases for further East Asian cooperation which
encouraged development of proposals for an East Asia Summit
.
The East Asia
Summit
The idea for an East Asia Summit (EAS) arose from discussions
within ASEAN Plus Three and was raised in a report which that
grouping commissioned from the East Asia Study Group in
2002.[142] At
ASEAN s annual summit in Vientiane in December 2004, Prime Minister
Badawi of Malaysia (as the host of the next ASEAN summit, to be
held in Kuala Lumpur in 2005) announced that an East Asia Summit
would be convened during those meetings. On the issue of possible
participation, ASEAN, as the convenor of the first EAS , made it
clear that Summit participants must be signatories of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (or be prepared to sign it), needed to be full
ASEAN Dialogue Partners, and had to have substantial relations with
ASEAN.
The political sensitivities involved in East Asia cooperation
soon became evident, particularly because of the competing
interests of China and Japan. As Mohan Malik (Asia-Pacific Center
for Security Studies, Honolulu) has suggested:
The EAS began with a backdrop of intense
diplomatic maneuvering and shadow boxing, and ended with the power
game being played out in the open. China and Japan were locked in a
bitter struggle for supremacy, with Beijing attempting to gain the
leadership position in the planned EAC (ie East Asian Community),
and Tokyo trying to rein in its rival with the help of other China
wary nations in the Asia-Pacific.[143]
China was initially enthusiastic about the Summit proposal and
argued that it should most appropriately be based on the 13 member
countries of ASEAN Plus Three. However it was evident that some
other states were reserved about the prospect of a Summit based
solely on the APT membership, since this could be seen to be
possibly open to a high level of influence from China. Japan, with
the support of a number of the members of ASEAN, argued that other
relevant countries, in particular India and Australia, should be
invited to join the new forum. China continued to argue against
this proposal into the early months of 2005, but most ASEAN members
supported the Japanese position. It was ultimately resolved that
India, Australia and New Zealand would be invited as inaugural
members of the Summit.[144]
After the issue of the participation in the first Summit was
agreed, disputation continued about the character and possible role
of the Summit.[145] China argued that the APT membership should be
considered to be a core group in subsequent efforts to develop an
ultimate East Asia Community and is understood to have gained some
support for this approach from South Korea, Thailand, Myanmar and
Malaysia. China s notion of a two tiered EAS, with the ASEAN Plus
Three grouping as the centre for concerted cooperation efforts was
resisted by Japan, India, and Australia, with support from
countries including Singapore and Indonesia. Tensions between China
and Japan were evident during the period of the first Summit in
Kuala Lumpur, when Premier Wen Jiabao refused to hold a bilateral
meeting with his counterpart Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi.[146]
The initial Summits have been cautious attempts to develop
dialogue and bases for consensus. The first East Asia Summit on 14
December 2005 was relatively short (at three hours) and few
specific decisions were made. The emphasis was on developing
communication among the members. The main issues discussed included
the need for de-nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, terrorism,
avian flu, sustainable development, the need for progress in the
Doha round of World Trade Organization negotiations and the role
which the EAS should play as a complement to existing cooperation
dialogues (including ASEAN Plus Three) in the process of community
building in the region.
The leaders statement issued by the Summit (the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on
the East Asia Summit ) affirmed that the EAS is intended to be
an open, inclusive, transparent and outward-looking forum, in which
we strive to strengthen global norms and universally recognised
values, with ASEAN as the driving force working in partnership with
other participants of the East Asia Summit . The Summit would be
convened regularly , would be hosted and chaired by an ASEAN member
and would be held back to back with the annual ASEAN Summit .
[147]
The second EAS, in Cebu on 15 January
2007, continued the cautious style of the first. The discussions
covered much the same ground addressed in 2005, with an additional
emphasis on energy efficiency and conservation and climate change,
with a range of cooperative programs and voluntary endeavours
promoted. The third Summit held in Singapore in November 2007
placed emphasis on developing dialogue on energy and climate change
issues. The third Summit also endorsed the establishment of a new
research body for the region, the Economic Research Institute for
ASEAN and East Asia, known as ERIA. ERIA, a primarily
Japanese-backed think tank, was launched in May 2008 and will be
based initially at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta. ERIA is
expected to serve as both a policy making and training forum and is
also expected to be involved in infrastructure planning and the
development of further plans for regional economic integration,
particularly Japan s proposal for a Comprehensive Economic
Partnership in East Asia.[148]
Discussion and debate on how best to pursue East Asia
cooperation have been continuing in the aftermath of the first East
Asia Summit. China had offered to host the second meeting of the
Summit in Beijing. However, it was decided that ASEAN would assume
the role of convening the Summit alongside the ASEAN Summits, and
therefore in Southeast Asian states only.
Discussion has continued about membership. The first EAS had
attracted interest from some major countries not invited to
participate. Russia made an attempt to gain representation. While
its request was not agreed to, Russia did attend the first Summit
as an observer and may be invited to join as a full member in the
future.[149]
The United States has viewed the Summit with interest. Ever
since the formation of APEC in 1989, US policymakers have favoured
modes of regional cooperation in East Asia in which the US can
participate and have been wary about institutional arrangements
which might divide the region from the US. Some American observers
have expressed concern that the East Asia Summit will be a venue
where major East Asia states including China and Japan will be
represented but the US will not, and which could be another avenue
for China to sponsor dialogues and discussions which define East
Asian cooperation as not needing to include the US.[150] Other analysts have
argued that the US does not have to be a member of every major
regional forum and that this need not compromise its regional
involvement or role.[151]
The question of how the US reacts to, and is able to interact
with, the East Asia Summit will be one of the most significant
issues in the early phases of the new grouping s activities. If the
US was to develop an interest in joining the Summit, it would need
first to sign the TAC. This possibility has been viewed with
reserve by elements in the US government concerned that this might
impinge on US alliance relationships or defence deployments.
However, all the US s allies in East Asia have acceded to the
Treaty with no evident adverse impacts on their alliance
relationships with the US. It is possible that a new US
administration after the 2008 elections may look again at this
issue and the potential relevance for the US for participation in
the EAS.[152]
The issue of the relationship between the EAS and the ASEAN Plus
Three grouping also remains under debate. Some countries, and
particularly China, continue to consider that the APT should remain
at the centre of substantive cooperation and community building .
For example, Malaysia s Prime Minister Badawi said in a speech in
May 2007 that the ASEAN Plus Three process was the best vehicle for
East Asia community building. The EAS and APEC were important
forums but he said that, Building a community involves co-operation
not only in the economic and trade areas but in every major aspect
of human activity, including economic, social and political areas.
Only the ASEAN Plus Three process seeks to build an Asian
community, or more specifically an East Asian community. [153]
By contrast, Japan has advanced the concept of a Comprehensive
Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) to contribute to economic
integration across East Asia. In discussing this concept, Japan has
suggested that it should be a broad ranging effort to achieve
cooperation in areas including trade, investment, intellectual
property, services, and common rules of origin. The coverage of
this effort would be the membership of the EAS, and would therefore
include India, Australia and New Zealand.[154] The CEPEA proposal was raised in
late August 2006 and it is being studied by a track two inquiry
which is due to report to the fourth EAS in December 2008. The
proposal indicates that Japan continues to wish to argue for a
concept of regional cooperation which extends beyond the ASEAN Plus
Three membership.
The emergence of what are in fact two competing regional
groupings with two conceptions of how best to pursue East Asian
integration is now an important issue for the region. Malcolm Cook
(Lowy Institute for International Policy) has observed that:
The reason for why suddenly there are two
overlapping East Asian regional bodies and why they both let the
ASEAN tail wag the East Asian dog is the same reason for the
historic lack of East Asian regional bodies (and the continued lack
of a Northeast Asian one). China and Japan do not trust each other
and will not accept the other as the paramount regional power,
while Southeast Asian countries individually and as a group do not
fully trust either northern giant. China s rising power and new
interest in regional engagement, has triggered the change from no
regionalism to competing regionalisms. China favours the smaller
ASEAN+3 process and Japan favours the larger East Asian Summit,
with both accepting that each organization is less threatening with
ASEAN in the proverbial driving seat. [155]
As Cook has noted, the existence of two competing models for
integration may be of benefit to ASEAN in that it can play a role
in shaping how the proposals evolve, although it may be necessary
to decide which of the approaches EAS or ASEAN Plus Three is
ultimately preferable. There is also an ongoing potential danger
that the competition for influence between Japan and China, which
was evident in the debate over the appropriate membership for the
EAS, could have a divisive influence in ASEAN itself.
ASEAN and Australia
Australia has an important stake in the
success of ASEAN s revitalisation and consolidation in its fifth
decade and beyond. ASEAN s development of cooperation and regional
confidence has benefited Australia s own security environment.
ASEAN s rapid economic growth has made its members a major focus
for Australia s trade. As a result, successive governments have
affirmed the value of the Australia-ASEAN relationship.
Australia was the first country outside Southeast Asia to
establish a joint relationship with ASEAN, inaugurated in Canberra
in April 1974. Cooperation focused initially on multilateral
economic assistance to ASEAN, which became the Australia-ASEAN
Economic Cooperation Program. In the 1970s, Australia and ASEAN
clashed on trade issues at a time when Australia was continuing
substantial protection for its manufacturing industries. In the
late 1970s, Australia also cooperated closely with ASEAN to
alleviate the serious problems posed by the large-scale departures
of refugees from the countries of Indochina.[156] Since 1979, Australia has
participated in the Post Ministerial Conferences held after the
annual meetings of ASEAN foreign ministers, when ASEAN formally
consults with its dialogue partners. This has given Australia s
foreign ministers regular direct communication with all of their
ASEAN counterparts.
In the 1980s, cooperation was enhanced by economic reforms in
Australia (including financial deregulation and tariff reductions)
and in a number of ASEAN countries. From the late 1980s, Australia
also worked very closely with key ASEAN members particularly
Indonesia to resolve the long-running Cambodia conflict.
Australia was also keen to see ASEAN enhance its role in
dialogue on regional security. Australia accordingly played an
active role in the discussions which led to the establishment of
the ASEAN Regional Forum and has been an active participant since
its inauguration in 1994.[157]
After the mid-1990s, while cooperation with ASEAN continued,
Australia encountered some challenges and limitations in relations.
The Asian financial crisis from mid-1997 dampened, at least for a
time, ASEAN s image as a region of economic success. Australia made
major contributions towards the assistance packages pursued by the
International Monetary Fund for several of the worst affected
countries especially Thailand and Indonesia, but the potential for
progress in multilateral relations was impeded by the
crisis.[158]
As this paper has noted, the financial crisis encouraged moves
which had been underway since the early 1990s to develop more
clearly East Asia-focused avenues of cooperation. Prime Minister
Mahathir of Malaysia was a leading proponent of these moves but a
major obstacle for Australia was that Dr Mahathir did not favour
Australia s direct participation in the newly emerging East Asia
oriented dialogues.[159] From ASEAN began to hold meetings with the European
Union in 1996 (in the Asia-Europe Meetings) and a further
reflection of the East Asian focused cooperation approach was the
advent of the ASEAN Plus Three process from 1997. Australia was not
a part of these significant new dialogues.
Australia in the 1990s also experienced some strain in key
bilateral relations with ASEAN members. At a political level,
relations with Malaysia were cool although economic and security
relations remained close.[160] After the end of the Suharto regime in Indonesia
in 1998, Australia s support for moves by the United Nations to
hold a ballot on East Timor s status in August 1999 and then its
major role in leading UN-endorsed stabilisation efforts helped
restore security to East Timor, but also saw major strain in
relations with Jakarta.[161]
In this regional climate, Australia after 2000 experienced some
setbacks in its ASEAN relations:
- Australia from the early 1990s had expressed strong interest in
developing a link between the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic
Relations (CER) agreement and the AFTA. However, in October 2000,
ASEAN economic ministers at a meeting in Chiang Mai decided against
pursuing any such direct linkage. Instead ASEAN ministers approved
development of a useful but more limited closer economic
partnership to pursue trade facilitation and capacity building
(inaugurated from 2000)[162] and
- Australia had a further setback in 2002 when it sought as a
dialogue partner to gain participation in ASEAN s annual leadership
meetings, held that year in Phnom Penh. Australia s bid was not
accepted. At the 2003 ASEAN summit meetings in Bali, it was
reported that Australia did not renew its efforts to gain
representation and that the issue of Australian representation had
been dropped from the agenda for discussion and had been shelved
indefinitely.[163]
In 2004, the climate for progress in Australia-ASEAN relations
improved significantly. In April 2004 the 30th anniversary of the
first multilateral Australia-ASEAN agreement ASEAN s economics
ministers, meeting in Singapore, made two important announcements.
They proposed that the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand
should be invited to attend a special commemorative summit during
ASEAN s annual summit meetings, in Vientiane in November 2004.
Second, they declared that it would be beneficial to both regions
to upgrade economic relations to the next level by asking for a
review of the proposal for a linkage between AFTA and CER.[164] The invitation to
the summit was duly made by ASEAN foreign ministers at the end of
June 2004.
Several factors seem to have been important in encouraging the
positive climate since 2004.
Australia s regional relations were clearly affected by the
post-September 11 international climate and concerns about
terrorism. From late 2001, attention has been focused on the
threats posed to the ASEAN region by terrorist movements of which
Jemaah Islamiyah has been the most prominent. Attention was
heightened after the bombings in Bali in October 2002, at the
Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2003, outside the Australian
Embassy in Jakarta in September 2004 and again in Bali in October
2005.
Australia has taken a series of actions to expand cooperation on
counter-terrorism, signing bilateral agreements with a number of
ASEAN members and a multilateral declaration with ASEAN itself. The
Australian Federal Police has also engaged in very close
cooperation with its regional counterparts.[165] This has extended the sense of
mutual interest between Australia and many ASEAN members. ASEAN s
then Secretary General, Ong Keng Yong emphasised in April 2004
that: Australia is a peaceful and stable country. It has a great
influence in counter-terrorism initiatives and, in this area at
least, we are working together and through that we can socialise
more and be more comfortable together. [166]
In a parallel development, key bilateral relationships improved.
With Malaysia, there was a noticeable increase in warmth in
relations with Australia after the retirement from office of Prime
Minister Mahathir. Relations with Indonesia also improved
substantially after the chill in the period of 1999 this
improvement continued under the presidency of Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono and was symbolised by the attendance of Prime Minister
Howard at President Yudhoyono s inauguration in Jakarta on
20 October 2004.[167] The tragic impact of the tsunami in December 2004
produced a large scale response from both the Australian community
and the government which has added additional depth to the
relationship.
The ongoing impact of the rise of China has been a further
important factor. ASEAN members have been keenly aware that China s
continued remarkable growth is posing challenges for the ASEAN
members capacity to maintain economic dynamism and to continue to
gain access to foreign investment. The need to achieve more
concerted market integration among the ten ASEAN members to help
them attract investment has been regarded as a major motivation for
ASEAN in promoting AFTA and the ASEAN Economic Community. In this
context, an association with the economies of Australia and New
Zealand would help boost ASEAN s access to markets and relevant
technical skills to enhance economic growth and
competitiveness.[168]
The rise in popularity of regional free trade agreements has
also been a significant factor. With the World Trade Organization
talks moving slowly and reaching an apparent impasse in 2008 and
with APEC s plans for trade liberalisation in the Asia-Pacific
having lost momentum since the late 1990s, there has been a trend
towards bilateral FTAs (for example Singapore-US, South
Korea-Chile, Australia-Singapore and Australia-Thailand) and
proposals for wider regional arrangements, most notably between
ASEAN and China. Australia also concluded an FTA with the US during
2004. These developments stimulated ASEAN to review the
desirability of closer economic links with Australia.[169]
Australia s record of continuing favourable rates of growth
since the early 1990s has also bolstered its relevance as a
regional partner.[170]
Since 2004, Australia s relations with ASEAN have continued to
advance in both the economic and political arenas.[171]
The ASEAN countries, as a grouping of more than 575 million
people with a combined GDP of more than US$1 trillion, are
important economic partners for Australia. As a group, ASEAN is for
Australia a larger trading partner (16 per cent) than any single
country, including China (13 per cent), Japan (12 per cent) or the
US (11 per cent). Two way merchandise trade with ASEAN totalled
A$55.2 billion in 2007, with exports at A$18 billion and imports at
A$37 billion. Australia s total investment in ASEAN at the end of
2007 was A$31.4 billion, with ASEAN investment in Australia at
A$52.8 billion. Australia has already signed bilateral Free Trade
Agreements with Singapore and Thailand, negotiations are underway
with Malaysia, and a feasibility study is being undertaken with
Indonesia. Education is a key export with over 65,000 students from
ASEAN now studying in Australia in 2007. ASEAN countries have been
a popular tourist destination for Australians for many years and
Australia received over 600 000 tourists arriving from ASEAN
countries in 2006.[172]
Aid continues to be an important part of bilateral and
multilateral relationships. Australia s total development
assistance to ASEAN countries in 2008 09 is estimated at A$902.4
million. Bilateral programs focus on Indonesia ($463 million),
Vietnam ($93.1 million), the Philippines ($109.3 million), Cambodia
($55 million) and Laos ($27.8 million). A number of regional
programs involve assistance to ASEAN members in areas including
control of infectious diseases and narcotics, and the combating of
people-trafficking and child sex tourism.[173]
A significant area of assistance is directed towards supporting
ASEAN s programs for further integration. In 2002 the
ASEAN-Australia Development Cooperation Program was inaugurated as
a six year $A45 million program which sought to strengthen regional
economic and social cooperation, enhance regional institutional
capacities, increase science, technological and environmental
cooperation and assist the newer ASEAN members in their integration
into ASEAN.[174]
Under the ASEAN-Australia Development Cooperation Program (phase
two) Australia is providing $57 million over seven years. With this
program Australia aims to support ASEAN s goal of establishing an
ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. The program will focus strongly
on helping the poorer ASEAN members to meet the UN Millennium
Development Goals through stronger economic growth and integration.
There will be a much stronger emphasis on partnership, with the new
program managed jointly with the ASEAN Secretariat, and utilising
ASEAN Secretariat systems. It will also provide high quality
economic research and policy advice and implementation support on
priority regional economic integration issues.[175]
Australia, along with New Zealand, has also negotiated a
multilateral free trade agreement with ASEAN. A study of a possible
AFTA-CER agreement prepared by the Centre of International
Economics (CIE) in Australia in 2000 concluded that there could be
net gains of US$48 billion over the period 2000 2020. The
gains would amount to about 0.3 per cent of additional GDP for both
AFTA and CER by 2010. These benefits would also be likely to
stimulate additional inflows of foreign investment.[176] Linkage would have
other benefits. The CIE study noted that As economies integrate, so
contacts, networks and trust grows so that confidence in business
relationships follows . An AFTA-CER link could also have a useful
effect in encouraging further liberalisation in APEC
overall.[177]
On 28 August 2008, an agreement was announced for the
long-anticipated ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement
(AANZFTA). The agreement was introduced with enthusiastic
statements by the twelve trade ministers involved. The joint
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand statement said that:
The Ministers noted that the Agreement is an
important milestone in the long-standing ASEAN-CER comprehensive
partnership. As a living document, the Agreement brings to a new
height the level of cooperation and relationship between the
governments of ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand as well as its
peoples.
The Ministers see the Agreement as paving the
way to enhancing the region s economic integration and acting as an
impetus to deepen and broaden the trade and investment among the
twelve participating countries. The Ministers noted that the
Agreement is comprehensive in scope covering trade in goods,
investment, trade in services, financial services,
telecommunications, electronic commerce, movement of natural
persons, intellectual property, competition policy and economic
cooperation.[178]
In an individual statement on the same day, Australia s Minister
for Trade Simon Crean said that Australia stood to gain
considerably from the agreement across many sectors:
We ve locked in goods market access gains in a
wide range of sectors including agriculture and industrial
products. We ve also secured a good outcome on services, which will
create more certainty for exporters in sectors such as engineering,
education and the financial sector. The agreement includes
provisions providing greater certainty and transparency for
Australian investors. We have achieved significant tariff
reductions and are working to secure further improvements with two
countries. In particular, we are also seeking to strengthen the
outcome for our automotive industry with Indonesia and Malaysia.
Importantly, we ve got a commitment from our negotiating partners
to build on these outcomes into the future.
AANZFTA seeks to capitalise on new trade and
economic opportunities that will arise from the establishment of
the ASEAN Economic Community. To put this FTA in perspective it is
the most comprehensive trade agreement that ASEAN has ever
negotiated. In terms of coverage, it s the largest FTA Australia
has ever negotiated covering 16 per cent of Australia s trade in
goods and services, worth $71 billion. This is a big market of 570
million people with a combined GDP of US$1 trillion. AANZFTA will
strengthen our trade and investment ties with ASEAN .
Today s agreement sends a positive signal of
the economic dynamism of our region and provides a building block
for regional integration.[179]
Details of the agreement were not released at the time of the 28
August announcement; they are expected to be revealed at the time
of the formal signing process, due in December 2008. It has been
reported that Australian wine, beef, dairy and horticultural
producers are expected to be among the prime beneficiaries. In
comments in Singapore, Mr Crean said that the agreement would also
open opportunities for Australian insurance and financial sectors
in Indonesia and education services in Malaysia, Vietnam and the
Philippines. Engineering, architectural and construction firms are
also expected to benefit. Sugar producers may not be among those to
gain, after resistance to liberalisation of this sector from
Indonesia and the Philippines. Agreement had not been reached with
Indonesia and Malaysia on tariffs in relation to cars. Overall it
was reported that the deal should cover about 95 percent of all
two-way trade among the parties but more detailed assessments will
have to await the release of the full terms of the
agreement.[180]
Australia s political interactions with ASEAN have been enhanced
in the past four years. The Prime Ministers of Australia and New
Zealand participated in a special commemorative summit meeting with
the ASEAN heads of government at the ASEAN summit in Vientiane on
30 November 2004. A major outcome from the meeting was an agreement
to pursue development of a free trade agreement on a multilateral
basis between Australia and New Zealand and the ASEAN members. A
further important development at the Vientiane summit was the
suggestion by Malaysia that an East Asia Summit would be convened
at the next ASEAN summit, to be held in Kuala Lumpur in December
2005.
In the early months of 2005 some controversy arose over
Australia s approach to ASEAN s 1976 Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation. The Treaty is essentially a declaration of desirable
goals for the conduct of international relations in Southeast Asia
but it is valued by ASEAN as an expression of their capacity to
contribute to a peaceful regional environment.[181] In April 2005, the ASEAN
foreign ministers indicated that adherence to the Treaty would be a
pre-requisite for states who wished to participate in the
forthcoming East Asia Summit. By then a number of other states had
acceded to the Treaty including Papua New Guinea (1989), China and
India (2003), and Japan, Pakistan, South Korea and Russia (in
2004).[182] The
Australian Government had expressed some reservations about the TAC
but in July 2005 Australia agreed to accede to the Treaty and this
was done in formal terms in December 2005. This cleared the way for
Australia to participate in the first EAS.[183]
The advent of the East Asia Summit offered a new and high
profile venue for Australia to interact at leadership level with
the ASEAN members and other major Asian countries. Prime Minister
John Howard participated in the first EAS meetings, in Kuala Lumpur
in December 2005 and Cebu in January 2007, and Foreign Minister
Downer attended in Singapore in November 2007 (when the Summit took
place in the final stages of Australia s 2007 election
campaign).
Australia has continued to pursue its engagement with ASEAN. In
a further important step, Australia and ASEAN signed on 1 August
2007 a Joint Declaration on the ASEAN-Australia Comprehensive
Partnership . The then Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Downer
stated on 1 August that:
The Declaration reflects the breadth and
maturity of the ASEAN-Australia relationship. It builds on the
momentum of this relationship and provides a framework for our
future engagement with ASEAN, covering political and security,
economic, socio-cultural and development cooperation. For example,
the Declaration signals Australia s and ASEAN s intention to
enhance cooperation in support of deeper economic integration,
environmental conservation, communicable and emerging infectious
diseases, and disaster preparedness and emergency response. The
agreement will also promote cooperation in combating transnational
crimes, including terrorism and drug trafficking.[184]
The Rudd Government has reaffirmed Australia s ASEAN
relationship. In June 2008 Prime Minister Rudd visited the ASEAN
Secretariat, the first head of government of an ASEAN dialogue
partner to do so. During his visit, Prime Minister Rudd announced
on 13 June the inauguration of the second phase of the
ASEAN-Australia Development Cooperation Program, through which
Australia will provide high level policy advice, research and
implementation support to assist ASEAN in key areas of economic
cooperation, including harmonisation of standards, elimination of
tariffs and reduction of non-tariff barriers.[185]
During the ASEAN ministerial meetings in Singapore in July 2008,
the Minister for Foreign Affairs Stephen Smith announced that
Australia would nominate an Ambassador to ASEAN. The ambassador
will be a senior Canberra-based diplomat whose duties would include
participating in meetings at the ASEAN Secretariat and in other
regional ASEAN meetings. Mr Smith said that since 1974, we have
invested considerable effort in building a partnership that spans
people-to-people links, development co-operation, economic and
trade links and defence and security matters. Our extensive
co-ordination on these and other issues will be significantly
increased through the appointment of an ambassador. [186]
Another strand in Australia-ASEAN dialogue was added in June
2008 when Prime Minister Rudd argued in a speech in Sydney that it
was desirable to review the long-term vision for the architecture
for the Asia-Pacific region. He argued that this vision needed to
embrace, [a] regional institution which spans the entire
Asia-Pacific region including the United States, Japan, China
India, Indonesia and the other states of the region and [a]
regional institution which is able to engage in the full spectrum
of dialogue, cooperation and action on economic and political
matters and future challenges related to security. Mr Rudd argued
that, At present none of our existing regional mechanisms as
currently configured are capable of achieving these purposes. He
noted that:
Such a debate does not of itself mean the
diminution of any of the existing regional bodies. APEC, the ASEAN
Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Plus Three and ASEAN
itself will continue to play important roles, and longer-term may
continue in their own right or embody the building blocks of an
Asia Pacific Community. There will be wide ranging views about this
across the region some more supportive than others. New bodies and
new ideas will continue to emerge
I said before that this is the Asia Pacific
Century. Ours must be an open region we need to link into the
world, not shut ourselves off from it. And Australia has to be at
the forefront of that challenge, helping to provide the ideas and
drive to build new regional architecture something we have not done
for over a decade.[187]
Mr Rudd announced that he had invited Richard Woolcott, a highly
experienced diplomat and former Secretary of the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, as Australia s envoy to explore
attitudes and approaches towards the concept he had proposed.
In the period since this speech, reactions in the ASEAN region
have varied. In July, Prime Minister Badawi of Malaysia suggested
that it would be desirable to develop the existing regional
institutions: he said that, We already have a forum, the ASEAN
Regional Forum. We can continue with the existing institutions.
Indonesia s Vice President Yusuf Kalla commented that, For me, its
not necessary to make a new body. We already have ASEAN and APEC.
There is no need for all countries in Asia Pacific to make one
objective. [188]
Other responses have been more supportive. ASEAN s Secretary
General Surin Pitsuwan said on 13 June during Mr Rudd s visit to
the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta:
You are now dreaming bigger dreams, scaling
another awe inspiring height, swimming a wider ocean of hope and
vision for a larger Asia-Pacific Community. We welcome your new
vision. We want to know more about it. We want to help you
construct that Community of a wider expanse with the existing
institutions serving as its foundation. We hope that you will
accommodate us ASEAN in that grand vision of yours, recognizing our
traditional role and contributions to the many architectures of
cooperation existing today in East Asia. Australia has always been
a catalyst and a strong pillar of those regional architectures of
cooperation and prosperity in the past.[189]
At the time of ASEAN s Ministerial Meetings in Singapore in
July, the official spokesman for the meetings, Andrew Tan,
commented in a measured vein that:
On this subject of a pan-Asian regional forum,
or whatever name it is to be called, I think ASEAN countries have
said that they are still waiting for more details of this
proposal.
The region itself is already quite complex so
if there can be another regional process that can help us better
manage this, there is no reason why we should stop it from being
developed, but it also has to take into account the region s view
as well as regional sensitivities and regional
circumstance.[190]
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stephen Smith, speaking on 18
July, shortly before the ASEAN ministerial meetings, had affirmed
Australia s interest in engaging in dialogue about the future of
regional cooperation. He said that:
Shaping our evolving regional architecture in
ways that suit the diverse nation states of our region is a
challenging task, but it s a task which the Government believes
Australia must be engaged in. The Prime Minister s initiative has
started a conversation with our friends and neighbours about how
the Asia Pacific regional architecture might evolve to meet future
strategic, security, economic and political challenges and
opportunities It s about what best regional architecture might
prepare us for these emerging regional and global challenges
This conversation doesn t diminish any of the
existing regional bodies. On the contrary, they will continue to
play their essential roles. There could be a new piece of
architecture, as ASEAN and APEC once were. Or it could evolve and
emerge from and through the existing architecture, as the ASEAN
Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit have.[191]
For his part, Prime Minister Rudd, in a lecture in Singapore on
12 August 2008, made it clear that his government views ASEAN as a
prime example of cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.
At the height of the Cold War, 41 years ago,
the leaders of five South East Asian nations got together to form
ASEAN. Singapore was one of the nations that helped to chart the
future course for ASEAN as a founding member. The world has changed
a lot in the intervening 41 years, but ASEAN has endured.
In fact, ASEAN has done more than just endure,
it has grown and it has matured. During Singapore s Chairmanship of
ASEAN over the past 12 months, the ASEAN Charter was signed a new
milestone in ASEAN s evolution. I think that ASEAN s most
impressive achievement and one that is often under-appreciated is
building a sense of regional identity, a sense of community, and a
sense of neighbourhood. The countries of South East Asia have
diverse histories, political systems, religious beliefs, social
systems and cultural backgrounds. But a real sense of community has
been forged where there had been historically few substantive
ties.
In fact when ASEAN was formed, the member
states themselves had been riven by conflict then raging through
Indochina. Forty years later, by absolute contrast, the habits of
cooperation have crafted a sense of genuine community. It is a
community that defaults first towards dialogue rather than
confrontation. It is a neighbourhood whose residents seek, first
and foremost, to cooperate more closely with each other. In this
sense, ASEAN represents an outstanding essay in institutional
success for which member states, including Singapore, should be
congratulated.
Some criticise ASEAN for being insufficiently
activist. I argue that this criticism is misplaced because it fails
to appreciate that ASEAN s great success has been to avoid conflict
among member states and allow economic development to progress
unimpeded by intra-regional security concerns. That is why I argue
that ASEAN has been a remarkable success story
Mr Rudd reaffirmed his government s support for dialogue about
the future shape of regional architecture and the concept of an
Asia Pacific Community (APC). He stated that:
All of our existing regional mechanisms have a
critical role to play both now and into the future including ASEAN,
APEC and the EAS. But, at the same time, we need to begin our
conversation about where our wider region goes from here. And this
is where the wider region needs to learn from ASEAN s success how
to build the institutions, habits and practices of cooperation
across the policy spectrum and across historically uncomfortable
national divides
Australia remains open to the suggestions of
our regional partners as this discussion unfolds. Because by
definition, an APC by 2020 is very much a long-term project for the
future.[192]
Since 1967 ASEAN has established a substantial presence as a
regional group in Southeast Asia. Its continuous process of
dialogue has not removed all cases of inter-state suspicion and
tension (as the dispute between Thailand and Cambodia in mid 2008
illustrated vividly) but it has contributed to the achievement of a
regional security environment which is very much more stable and
secure than was the case in the late 1960s. It has been able to
accept five additional members since 1984. ASEAN has been able to
engage major external powers in regular dialogues and to extend the
scope of its cooperation to sponsor wider forums and discussion in
both East Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific region, through the ARF,
ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asia Summit.
While all these activities have given ASEAN an identity and
recognition internationally, the group clearly faces some major
problems in maintaining its utility and credibility. Its membership
is diverse in both economic and political character. The expansion
of membership in the late 1990s resulted in the presence of
Myanmar, whose autocratic government has performed very poorly in
both political and economic management and has resisted ASEAN
efforts at political influence. ASEAN has been able to play a
valuable role in 2008 as an intermediary and a sponsor of aid in
the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, but overall Myanmar has been an
embarrassment to the Association in its relations with major powers
(including the US). Faced with the ongoing economic challenge of
China and also of India, ASEAN is moving to deepen its cooperation
in economic, security and socio-cultural areas. All of these
projects face big challenges in securing effective implementation
and adherence from members who are highly reluctant to forego any
of their own sovereignty and national interests. At the same time,
the process of political liberalisation in a number of members
(most notably in Indonesia since 1998) has led to an increasing
profile for non-governmental organisations which are keen to see
ASEAN live up to its declared goals. The challenges for ASEAN in
meeting the needs of its diverse membership have been illustrated
clearly in the debate over the Charter adopted in November
2007.
A central issue which ASEAN is contending with in a number of
areas of activity is the appropriate relationship and balance
between national sovereignty and the demands of regional
cooperation. ASEAN was founded on the basis of the principle of
non-interference in the affairs of member states. In the tense
environment of the late 1960s this principle was necessary to make
any form of cooperation feasible. The growing awareness of the
significance for the membership of many transnational issues and
the more ambitious goals involved in the ASEAN Economic Community
have made it evident that individual sovereignty cannot be the only
valid factor to be considered in regional relations. In practice
ASEAN has already stepped across the boundaries of a strict
adherence to this principle, for example in the statements by its
foreign ministers in condemning the violent behaviour of the
Myanmar regime (as they did strongly in September 2007).
ASEAN, however, is still wrestling with the issue of how far it
can go in revising the precise balance of sovereignty and
collective interest and action in its cooperation plans and
programs. As this paper has suggested, this tension has been
evident in a number of areas including the need to increase
adherence to economic agreements in relation to the ASEAN Economic
Community and the question of whether ASEAN can go any further to
pressure or censure the Myanmar regime. The tension is also very
evident in relation to the planned ASEAN human rights body, the
very concept of which suggests that there are indeed principles and
values which can potentially be held in common by the ASEAN
membership and peoples, and which cannot be considered to be held
on a national basis only. These issues have not yet been resolved
and are likely to continue to be prominent in ASEAN policy
debates.
ASEAN s capacity to live up to its own declared goals especially
its commitments in relation to the three pillars of the ASEAN
Community adopted in the 2003 Bali Concord II will be vital for the
association s external image and reputation. ASEAN has presented
itself as a group which can offer examples to the wider region on
how to pursue cooperation. It has asserted its claim to continue to
be a driving force in groupings including the ARF and EAS. However
as ASEAN leaders have recognised, if ASEAN is seen to be unable to
extend the substance of its internal cooperation (including the
process of economic integration) and is unable to assert
constructive influence among its members (for example through the
human rights body it has committed itself to establishing) then it
may come to lose cachet as a leading force in wider cooperation,
which could be pursued increasingly by other major actors in more
focused and activist groupings.
These issues are all significant for Australia. Since the 1970s
Australia has gained benefits from ASEAN s contribution to
stability in the region. Australia s engagement with the major
powers in East Asia has been facilitated by ASEAN s annual dialogue
process and its associated groups including the ARF and the East
Asia Summit. Economic growth has broadened the basis for Australia
s engagement with the ASEAN region. The process of deeper
integration can add to Australia s political and economic
involvements and Australia therefore has a major stake in ASEAN s
ongoing capacity to achieve its declared goals.
[1]. Regions in
international politics are often not geographically defined but
socially-constructed entities, and appropriate definitions of them
are frequently contested. For the purposes of this paper, the term
East Asia refers to the states of Southeast Asia along with China,
Japan, and the two Korean states. The term Asia-Pacific commonly
refers to those just mentioned states, along with other interested
countries including, Russia, the United States, Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, the Pacific islands and some states in Latin America
who have declared significant identities in this wider region. In
this paper, unless otherwise stated, Asia-Pacific will refer to the
member countries of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation group
(APEC see next footnote). For recent comparative analyses of East
Asia and Asia-Pacific cooperation groupings see William A Tow,
Tangled Webs: Security Architectures in Asia, Australian
Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, July 2008 and Alan Gyngell,
Design faults: the Asia Pacific s regional architecture , Lowy
Institute for International Policy, 18 July 2007 at http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=638
[19]. Etel
Solingen, ASEAN Cooperation: The Legacy of the Economic Crisis ,
International Relations of the Asia Pacific, vol. 5, no.
1, 2005, p. 20.
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