Dr Stephen Sherlock
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
11 November 1997
Contents

Major Issues Summary
Introduction
The Origins of Ethnic Division in
Fiji
The Politics of Ethnic Division
Economic and Social Change
The Upheavals of 1987
Fiji under the 1990 Constitution: The Politics
of Exclusion
The Constitutional Review of 1996
The New Constitution
Fiji's Political Future
Australia and Fiji
Conclusion
Endnotes
Appendices
Table 1: Australia's Trade with
Fiji
Table 2: Total Aid Flows to the South
Pacific by Country 1995-96 to 1997-98 ($m)
Glossary-Fiji's Main Political
Parties
Alliance Party The governing
party from independence in 1970 until the elections of 1987.
Dominated by leaders from the indigenous Fijian chiefly elite such
as Ratu ('paramount chief') Kamisese Mara.
Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni
Taukei (SVT) Roughly translates to
Fijian Political Party. The successor to the Alliance Party, formed
to contest the elections of 1990. Lead by Sitiveni Rabuka
(pronounced Rambuka), leader of the coups of 1987. Less
cohesive than the Alliance and suffered a split in 1994 when seven
of its MPs resigned.
Fijian Association
Party Formed in 1994 out of a split in the SVT when
Josevata Kamikamica (pronounced Kamikamitha) and six other
SVT MPs resigned from the SVT. Remerged with the SVT in 1997.
Taukei MovementExtreme
indigenous Fijian nationalist organisation formed to oppose the
formation of the government elected in 1987 by mainly Indo-Fijian
votes. Continues to operate on the margins of Fiji politics.
National Federation Party
(NFP) Formed in 1963 to advance the interests of the
mainly Indo-Fijian sugar farmers. Became the main party of the
Indo-Fijian community after independence in 1970. Joined with the
Fiji Labour Party in the Coalition of 1987, which won the elections
of that year but which was overthrown in the coup.
Fiji Labour Party (FLP) Formed
in 1985, with a support base in the Indo-Fijian community but also
with indigenous Fijian supporters in the west of the country. Led
by an indigenous Fijian, Dr Timoci Bavadra (pronounced Timothi
Bavandra). Coalition government with the NFP overthrown in the
coup of 1987. Now led by Mahendra Chaudry and with the loss of its
indigenous Fijian support after 1987, generally seen as the smaller
of the two Indo-Fijian parties.
Major
Issues Summary
In July 1997 the Parliament of Fiji passed the
Constitution Amendment Act to move Fiji away from the
discriminatory Constitution of 1990. This move has been important
in improving Fiji's international image, but questions remain about
how far it will contribute to breaking down the ethnically based
divisions which have damaged Fiji economically and politically
since the coups of 1987. This paper examines the origins of the
conflicts which have divided Fiji in the last decade, the findings
of the Constitutional Review Commission and the provisions of the
new Constitution.
The social divisions in Fiji originated under
British rule, when indigenous Fijians were deliberately kept out of
the modern economy and imported labour from India provided the
workforce for colonial industries. The 'traditional' chiefly elite
supported British rule in return for continued control over
indigenous Fijian society, which was itself divided along regional
lines. The different ethnic groups lived, were educated and worked
separately. As independence drew near in the 1960s, Fiji politics
began to coalesce around ethnically-based parties. The Alliance
Party was formed by Fijian chiefs and the National Federation Party
was supported by Indo-Fijian sugar farmers and workers. The
Constitution of 1970 provided for a parliament composed of seats
reserved for the various ethnic communities, as well as
non-communal 'national' seats.
Economic change in the 1980s created strains in
indigenous Fijian society. Young Fijians began to question chiefly
authority, at the same time as resenting the perceived wealth and
education of the Indo-Fijian community. Other Fijians worked
alongside Indo-Fijians and cooperated in the trade union movement.
Thus although the Alliance Party dominated post-independence
politics it was challenged by Fijian-nationalist parties with
anti-Indian ideas and by parties espousing multiracial politics
such as the Fiji Labour Party. Both of these tendencies clashed in
1987 with the election of the NFP-Labour Party Coalition and the
appearance of the militant Fijian-nationalist Taukei Movement. The
perceived threat of a government mainly supported by Indo-Fijians
lead to the coups of 1987 and the rewriting of the Constitution in
1990.
The philosophy underlying the Fiji Constitution
of 1990 was that the interests of indigenous Fijians could be
protected only if Fijian leaders were guaranteed political
ascendancy, a formula based on the effective political exclusion of
the Indo-Fijians. But the removal of the perceived threat of
Indo-Fijian dominance exacerbated divisions within the indigenous
Fijian community and made the formation of stable Fijian-dominated
governments a difficult task. Splits in the Fijian vote reflected
the strains in indigenous Fijian society brought about by rapid
social and economic change. Racial discrimination and political
instability heightened Fiji's economic problems by limiting foreign
investment, continuing the outflow of educated Indo-Fijians and
heightening the country's international isolation.
The outcome of the 1996 Constitution Review
indicates that the majority of indigenous Fijian leaders concluded
that some form of multiracial politics was necessary to secure the
country's economic and political future. The Commission concluded
that progress towards sharing of executive power among all
communities was the only solution to Fiji's constitutional problems
and that Fiji had to make a decisive move away from a
communally-based electoral system to one which encouraged the
emergence of multiracial government. It recommended that two-thirds
of parliamentary seats should be open to candidates of all ethnic
communities.
The new Constitution is a partial move towards
multiracial government, a compromise being necessary because of a
negative reaction by many indigenous Fijians. Parliament will have
two-thirds communal seats and one-third open and the Cabinet will
be made up of representatives of the major parties in
Parliament.
The new Constitution brought immediate
diplomatic benefits to the Fiji Government, including readmission
to the Commonwealth. The effect on internal politics is more
difficult to assess, with misgivings remaining amongst some members
of both communities. A multiparty Cabinet runs counter to the
Westminster tradition and may not be effective when faced with
contentious policy issues. The idea is designed to facilitate the
formation of coalition governments. The indigenous Fijian community
will have to accept Indo-Fijians in government and the Indo-Fijian
community will have to be content with a subordinate role. The
first major problem will be the land issue, which involves a clash
of interests between the two communities in the very important
sugar industry.
Australia has a strong interest in a politically
stable and economically prosperous Fiji and in seeing Fiji take on
a more prominent role in Pacific affairs. Australia is a powerful
player in the Fiji economy and in South Pacific politics, but
influence is difficult to wield without appearing overbearing.
Australia has exerted low-key influence on Fiji politics to reduce
the discriminatory aspects of Fiji's political institutions.
The 1990 Constitution was based on a vision of
traditional Fijian society that had never really been accepted
throughout the islands of Fiji and which politically excluded half
the population. This not only violated Indo-Fijians' rights but
undermined the economic prosperity to which indigenous Fijians
aspired. The new Constitution is a partial step away from racially
biased government. The elections of 1999 will be its first real
test and a test of the capacity of Fiji's leaders to develop a
national rather than a communal vision.
Introduction
In July 1997 the Parliament of Fiji unanimously
passed the Constitution Amendment Act with the aim of bringing into
effect a new Constitution for Fiji which would move away from the
discriminatory provisions of the Constitution of 1990. The passing
of the Act was the culmination of a two-year review carried out by
the Constitution Review Commission and by a Joint Parliamentary
Committee. The review was begun because it was required under the
Constitution of 1990, but in a wider sense, it became an assessment
of the whole political experiment initiated by Sitiveni Rabuka
following the coups of 1987. The coups of 1987 and their
institutionalisation in the 1990 Constitution were an attempt to
protect indigenous Fijian society from the perceived threat of a
government not entirely controlled by indigenous Fijians. It aimed
to restore the authority of what were said to be traditional Fijian
institutions while at the same time providing prosperity to the
modern state of Fiji. The experiment is generally regarded to have
failed because it excluded half of Fiji's people (the Indians or
Indo-Fijians) and because it was based on a vision of a homogenous
indigenous Fijian society which had ceased to exist in an
urbanising, developing Fiji, if it had ever existed at all.
The coups of 1987 revealed Fiji to be a country
with deep social cleavages, the nature of which are conventionally
analysed in racial terms. Race or ethnicity is of course a central
part of Fiji politics, but the recent history of the country should
not be seen simply as a contest between two ethnic groups. Fiji
politics have also been characterised by cooperation and
competition across ethnic lines and by regional, class and cultural
divisions within the various communities. As their country has
changed economically and socially, many people in Fiji have found
that they sometimes have much in common with groups outside their
own ethnic community. In particular, the events of 1987 were
brought about by divisions within indigenous Fijian society and its
elites, as well as by interracial tensions.
This paper examines the origins of the political
conflict which has divided Fiji in the last decade and the efforts
to find a new ethnic accommodation in the amended Constitution
passed by Parliament in 1997. The paper outlines the origins of
divisions within Fiji society, both ethnic and non-ethnic, and the
long-term pressures and trends which induced certain groups within
the indigenous Fijian community to attempt to introduce a regime
which excluded the Indo-Fijian community from effective political
participation. The paper discusses the findings of the Constitution
Review Commission, the provisions of the new Constitution and
considers the prospects for success for the new political
arrangements. It also discusses Australia's relations with Fiji and
Australia's economic and political interest in a politically stable
and economically prosperous Fiji.
Fiji is a country of over 750 000 people, and as
the second largest of the Pacific island countries after Papua New
Guinea, has often played a leadership role in the region. The
population is composed of over 370 000 indigenous Fijians, about
340 000 people of Indian descent (Indo-Fijians) and about 40 000
people of other races, including Europeans, part-Europeans and
Chinese. Compared with most Pacific countries, Fiji is economically
developed, with exports of tourism services, sugar, gold, garments,
coconut products, timber and fish, but the country still suffers
from problems affecting all the Pacific islands, including
remoteness, limited resources and small population. Its relatively
large size and central location between the islands of Melanesia
and Polynesia have made it a hub of transport and communications in
the region and the headquarters of important regional institutions
such as the South Pacific Forum and the University of the South
Pacific.
The Origins of Ethnic
Division in Fiji
The social divisions in modern Fiji have their
origin partly in the nature of pre-colonial Fijian society, but
principally in the reshaping of the economy and society of the
country under British colonialism.(1) The British facilitated their
rule through accommodating, and partly creating, a Fijian chiefly
elite. These policies, almost identical to those followed in
Malaya, involved a tacit alliance with the 'traditional' rulers,
with the indigenous population kept largely out of the modern
economy, with imported labour providing a workforce for colonial
industries such as sugar and timber.
Indigenous Fijian society has itself always been
divided along regional lines. The Fiji island group was originally
settled by people of Melanesian descent, but in recent centuries
the eastern part of the group (and the southeast of the largest
western island, Viti Levu, where Suva is now located), came under
the influence of Polynesian, especially Tongan, culture and
politics. In the east, the Polynesian chiefly system came to
predominate while the more egalitarian Melanesian traditions
remained strong in the west.(2) Division between the eastern and
western parts of the country have remained an important feature of
Fiji society up to the present day.
By the time of the arrival of British and
Australian settlers in Fiji in the first half of the nineteenth
century, the eastern chiefs had established tenuous control over
most of the islands. With the increasing economic value of Fiji to
the British Empire, the British government decided to intervene
directly and, in 1874, induced the chiefs to sign the Deed of
Cession, giving sovereignty to Britain. In return, the chiefs
received guarantees that their position would not be undermined
and, in fact, they were given a role in the colonial system which
entrenched their power in Fijian society. The former Prime Minister
and President of Fiji, Ratu ('Paramount Chief') Sir Kamisese Mara,
and the former Deputy Prime Minister, Governor-General and
President of Fiji, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, were two prominent
eastern chiefly politicians. The first British governor established
a Great Council of Chiefs to facilitate the colonial government's
control through cooption and strengthening of chiefly authority.
Because chiefly power was weaker and based on smaller territories
in the western part of the country, the Council was dominated by
chiefs from the eastern region.(3) The Great Council of Chiefs has
had great informal power in Fijian politics and, under the 1990
Constitution, had the power to appoint the President and 24
indigenous Fijian members to the Senate, the upper house of
parliament.
The chiefs also have a strong influence through
their control over issues which particularly affect the indigenous
Fijian community (especially land), a control granted to them by
the British and still in effect. Land rents for sugar farming and
revenues from forestry are collected by largely chiefly bodies such
as the Native Lands Trust Board and Fiji Forests Commission. After
taking a commission, such bodies distribute the revenue to the
landowning clans through their chief, who personally retains a
large share. This gives the chiefs a strong stake in blocking
reforms to the system and the past century has shown continual
effort by the Fijian chiefs to inhibit social change in Fijian
society.(4)
The British maintained the economic segregation
of the races in Fiji by ensuring that the majority of Fijians were
engaged in subsistence agriculture, combined with some production
of food for urban and plantation consumption. Laws were passed to
exclude ethnic Fijians from commerce and to restrict their entry
into wage labour to a few industries. These regulations exacerbated
a shortage of labour caused by the death of 40 000 Fijians in a
measles epidemic in 1875.(5) To meet the European settlers' growing
demand for labour, workers were recruited from India to work for
the colonial government and for the sugar industry, which was
dominated by the Australian Colonial Sugar Refinery Company (CSR).
Most of the Indians stayed in the colony permanently. Many have
become small sugar farmers leasing land from the Native Lands Trust
Board. Just as Fijians were excluded from the sugar industry, so
Indo-Fijians were prohibited from living in traditional villages
and from certain areas in the eastern part of the colony. Education
was segregated and as late as 1960 only 6 per cent of schools were
officially described as mixed. The stereotyped association of
Indians with business emerged when some former Indian labourers
went into trading, with their numbers later increased by migration
of small business people, particularly from Gujarat in western
India. Although the majority of Fijians were restricted to
agriculture, from the 1930s the goldmining and stevedoring
industries became an important source of waged employment for
ethnic Fijians. In recent decades, economic development has drawn
Fijians into the towns in search of employment and has led to the
growth of a large urban Fijian population.
The Politics of Ethnic
Division
During the 1960s, as decolonisation and
independence drew near, Fiji politics began to coalesce around
ethnically-based political parties. Fijian chiefly leaders looked
towards Malaysia, identified with the social position of the Malay
bumiputras ('sons of the soil'), and took Malaysia as a
political model. Following the Malaysian example, the Alliance
Party was formed out of an arrangement between the Fijian
Association (founded in the 1950s), the Indian Alliance, created by
Indo-Fijian businessmen, and a General Electors' Party set up by
European and Chinese businessmen. Established in 1966, the Alliance
Party was led by Ratu Mara and dominated Fiji's politics during the
first years after independence in 1970. The Alliance Party's ethnic
Fijian supporters saw the party as the protector of their interests
and as the natural party of government, but it always needed some
support among other ethnic groups in order to stay in office.
Sections of the Indo-Fijian community, though divided along
economic and cultural lines, came together in 1960 to form the
National Federation Party (NFP) and contested the 1963 election.
The NFP was mainly supported by Indo-Fijian farmers, workers,
professionals and smaller businessmen.
Incidents of small-scale ethnic violence in the
1968 elections overshadowed negotiations for independence. These
clashes helped convince leaders on both sides of the ethnic divide
that political compromise would be necessary in the
post-independence Fiji constitution, with Indo-Fijians reconciling
themselves to an ethnically based electoral system with special
representation for the indigenous Fijians. The 1970 constitution
provided for a 52 member House of Representatives with 22 seats
each for the indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian communities and 8
for General Electors. Electors were given a vote in both Communal
and National seats. The Senate comprised 7 nominees of the Prime
Minister, 6 nominees of the Leader of the Opposition, 1 nominee of
the island of Rotuma and 8 nominees of the Great Council of Chiefs.
Constitutional changes required a two-thirds vote of both Houses.
Fiji also inherited from the British a military force which was 98
per cent ethnic Fijian.
The Alliance Party held power from independence
until the 1987 election, based on an accommodation between ethnic
Fijian, European and Indo-Fijian groups at an elite level. A
formula largely inherited from the colonial period, it melded the
interests of the eastern chiefs with Indo-Fijian and European
business groups and maintained a mass base in the majority of the
indigenous Fijian community. Increasingly, however, the Alliance
model came under challenge from more extreme expressions of ethnic
Fijian nationalism and from attempts to build a multiracial
accommodation at a mass rather than an elite level.
In the elections of April 1977 the moderate
policies of Ratu Mara's Alliance came under attack from the Fijian
Nationalist Party (FNP), led by Sakiasi Butadroka, a Fijian MP
expelled from the Alliance because of his racially provocative
statements.(6) The FNP won 24.4 per cent of the Fijian communal
vote and cost the Alliance control of parliament. The National
Federation Party was, however, internally divided over whether to
use its two seat majority to form a government which would
inevitably be branded Indian-dominated. In a second poll called for
September 1977, the Alliance campaigned more effectively and won a
majority. The FNP's challenge had tapped into dissatisfaction
amongst ethnic Fijians about the slow pace of regional economic
development, while pandering to a Fijian tendency to blame the
Indians for such problems.(7) The two 1977 elections underscored
the potential for militant Fijian nationalism and the reluctance on
the part of Indo-Fijian community leaders to inflame these
feelings.
In the elections of 1982 resentment in the west
of the country against the dominance of eastern chiefs was given
expression by the emergence of the Western United Front (WUF). The
west was the site for most of Fiji's gold mines and the
increasingly important tourist industry and saw itself as making a
greater contribution to the economy than the politically dominant
east.(8) The WUF formed a coalition with the National Federation
Party and was able to win 7.0 per cent of Fijian Communal votes,
thus helping to reduce the Alliance's seats by four: 28 to 24. The
WUF was to be less important in the 1987 election, but showed again
that significant economic and social divisions existed in the
indigenous Fijian community. The then President of the Great
Council of Chiefs, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, expressed deep sorrow
at the apparent loss of chiefly influence and attacked those
'commoners' who criticised their chiefs. Some Fijian landowners
threatened their Indo-Fijian tenants with eviction and several
Fijian Senators declared that 'blood will flow' if Indians did not
'cling' to Fijians.(9)
Economic and Social
Change
The growth of east-west regionalism exemplified
the already existing tensions in indigenous Fijian society which
were being exacerbated by economic and social change. From the
early 1980s, a deterioration in the market for Fiji's exports,
mainly sugar, led to economic stagnation, increased unemployment
and underemployment and rising urban poverty.(10) Young Fijians
began to question chiefly authority and resent their privileges,
perceiving that they were becoming wealthy through involvement in
government and government-supported business, while neglecting
traditional obligations to assist their own people. This resentment
was also directed towards the Indo-Fijian community which was seen
to be more wealthy and educated. Newly urbanised indigenous Fijians
came into direct competition with their Indo-Fijian counterparts
for scarce jobs. On the other hand, many Fijians became involved in
the trade union movement where they often cooperated with
Indo-Fijian fellow workers. Many Fijians in the west saw the
possibility of making common cause with sections of the Indian
community against eastern chiefly dominance. Therefore,
paradoxically, these developments had the effect of increasing some
Fijians' resentment against Indians while increasing other Fijians'
links with them. Both of these tendencies found expression in the
rise of the multiracialist Labour Party from the mid-1980s and in
the appearance, in 1987, of the militant nationalist Fijian Taukei
movement.
The Upheavals of
1987
The formation of the Labour Party was the result
of a confluence of factors. The first was the development of the
trade union movement from the end of the 1970s. Post-independence
economic development enabled growth and consolidation within the
trade union movement, and by the mid-1980s about half the waged
labour force was unionised.(11) In 1984 the government responded to
Fiji's growing economic difficulties by unilaterally imposing a
wage freeze, a move which led to the formation, in July 1985, of
the Fiji Labour Party (FLP). The leader of the Labour Party, Dr
Timoci Bavadra, was both a chief of a clan from west Viti Levu
island and head of the Public Servants' Association, a combination
which symbolised the nature of the party's challenge to the eastern
chiefly establishment. The Labour Party was a coalition of
influential ethnic Fijians from the west, ethnic Fijians involved
in the trade union movement and Indian members of trade unions and
farmers' organisations. It was influenced by an emerging Fijian
intelligentsia which espoused a non-racial social-democratic
philosophy.(12) In 1986 the party won 39 per cent of the vote in
the Suva City Council elections.(13) Despite growing
self-confidence, the FLP leadership realised it needed the support
of the NFP in rural areas and formed a Coalition to contest the
1987 election.
The result of the April 1987 election was a
narrow victory to the Labour-NFP Coalition, which won 28 seats to
the Alliance's 24. Voting generally followed the usual ethnic
pattern, but there was a modest flow of ethnic Fijian support away
from the Alliance to the Coalition, which received 8.5 per cent of
Fijian communal votes. The Alliance also suffered from a low
turnout of ethnic Fijians and an increase in support for other
Fijian parties and independents. Nevertheless, as provided for
under the 1970 constitution, the parliament was still composed of
22 indigenous Fijians, 22 Indo-Fijians and 8 General Electors
members, and the chiefs retained their constitutionally-guaranteed
dominance in the Senate. The Coalition Ministry was made up of 6
Fijians and 1 part-Fijian and 7 Indo-Fijians, a balance of
participation between the two main races never before achieved by a
government in Fiji. The government was headed by an indigenous
Fijian, and the ministries considered to be essential to Fijian
interests, such as Home Affairs, Fijian Affairs, Labour, Land,
Forests and Agriculture, were held by indigenous Fijians.(14)
Despite the ethnic balance of the Coalition
ministry, there was an immediate backlash amongst radical
nationalist Fijians. An organised movement of opposition to the
Coalition government, which named itself the Taukei ('Owners of the
Land') Movement, soon developed. A wave of rallies and marches in
Suva and across Viti Levu declared that Fijians had lost control of
their own country. Their numbers were swelled by easterners angry
at the toppling of their paramount chief by a minor chief from the
west. Many chiefs called on ethnic Fijians to respect the authority
of the new government, but on the first day of parliament, only 5
Alliance MPs defied the crowds outside the parliament building and
joined the swearing-in ceremony. One week later, on 14 May 1987,
twelve masked men, led by Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, entered
parliament and abducted the Coalition members at gunpoint.
Rabuka's stated motivations in the coup of 14
May was to protect traditional chiefly-based society. He was,
however, also attempting to balance the radicalism of the Taukei
Movement with the authority of the chiefs who supported the coup
but who were concerned that the Taukei Movement could lead to
violence and undermine the post-independence accommodation between
the chiefs and Indo-Fijian and European business interests.(15) The
Taukei Movement acted in the name of defence of the chiefly system
and the traditional 'paramountcy of Fijian interests', but the
Movement was a new form of politics for Fiji, 'commoners on the
fringes of the Fijian establishment'(16) and drawing its strength
from an ability to mobilise disaffected Fijian youth. The previous
Prime Minister, Ratu Mara, joined Rabuka's government and a meeting
of the Great Council of Chiefs endorsed the coup. But when Ratu
Mara, the Governor-General, Ratu Ganilau, and the ousted Prime
Minister, Dr Bavadra, drew up the Deuba Accord, under which a
caretaker government drawn from both the Alliance and the Coalition
would be formed, an outraged reaction from the Taukei Movement
induced Rabuka to stage a second coup on 25 September 1987. When
Ratu Ganilau refused to step down as Governor-General, Rabuka
dismissed him, revoked the 1970 constitution and declared Fiji a
republic.
In June 1990 the Great Council of Chiefs agreed
to a Constitution which provided for a House of Representatives
with 70 seats, 37 held by indigenous Fijians, 27 by Indo-Fijians, 5
by other races of General Electors and 1 by a representative of the
remote island of Rotuma. As well as the racial bias in the
Constitution, the regional boundaries of seats were weighted to
reinforce traditional patterns of influence. While Indian seats had
an average of 5500 voters against 4159 for Fijian seats, there was
an even greater weighting given to provincial versus urban Fijian
seats - 3457 to 8655 respectively. Urban Fijian voters totalled
13.7 per cent of the voting population but received only 7.1 per
cent of seats. In addition, provincial areas which were
traditionally most supportive of chiefly candidates received
greater representation. Voters per seat in the various provinces
ranged from 950 to 5700.(17) The position of the Great Council of
Chiefs was further reinforced through its nomination of 24 of the
34 Senate members.
Fiji under the 1990
Constitution: The Politics of Exclusion
The philosophy underlying the Fiji Constitution
of 1990 was that previous arrangements were 'inadequate to give
protection to the interests of indigenous Fijians'(18) and that
such protection could be afforded only if the indigenous Fijian
leaders were guaranteed political ascendancy. While the pre-1987
balance allowed for a degree of accommodation with Indian
interests, even if only at an elite level, the 1990 Constitution
was motivated by the desire to exclude permanently any possibility
of Indo-Fijian parties forming a government. Political developments
since the introduction of the 1990 Constitution could be seen as
the consequence of the problems inherent in this formula which have
suggested that Fijian ascendancy is both politically and
economically unsustainable.
The first problem was that the heavy electoral
weighting given to indigenous Fijian voters still did not make the
formation of stable Fijian government an easy task. The removal of
the perceived common threat of Indo-Fijian dominance had the effect
of exacerbating divisions within the indigenous Fijian
community,(19) a tendency worsened by the communal electoral system
which set Fijians in political competition with each other. In the
1992 and 1994 elections, the successor to the Alliance Party, the
Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) (which roughly
translates to Fijian Political Party) was unable to form a
government in its own right. In 1992 the Fijian vote was split
between independents and two Fijian-nationalist splinter parties.
The SVT, with 30 seats in the 70 seat parliament, was short of a
majority. This set off a struggle for the Prime Ministership
between Rabuka and the former Deputy Prime Minister, Josevata
Kamikamica, who was supported by Ratu Mara. Rabuka was only able to
become Prime Minister with the help of the Labour Party, which
agreed to support Rabuka in parliamentary votes of confidence on
condition that Rabuka immediately begin a review of the 1990
Constitution and undertake reform of tax, land and labour
laws.(20)
The unlikely alliance between Rabuka and Labour
only lasted until June 1993, when Labour withdrew its support and
began an indefinite boycott of Parliament following Rabuka's
failure to fulfil the terms of their agreement. Rabuka's government
collapsed at the end of the year when seven SVT members voted
against the Budget. In the subsequent election of February 1994,
the indigenous Fijian vote was again split between the SVT, lead by
Rabuka, and a breakaway Fijian Association Party, lead by
Kamikamica. The SVT survived Kamikamica's challenge and increased
its representation to 31 (the Fijian Association Party secured 5
seats), but could only form a government by entering into a
coalition with the General Voters' Party, which held 4 seats.
The splits in the Fijian vote evident in the
elections of 1992 and 1994 reflected the strains in indigenous
Fijian society brought by rapid social and economic change and the
growth of new political configurations. The 1987 coups were, in
part, an attempt to restore the power and authority of the old
chiefly-dominated Fijian order. But the trigger of the coups, the
Taukei Movement, represented a new kind of urban mass-based
politics of non-chiefly Fijians which also represented a challenge
to the primacy of the chiefs, even though its self-declared aims
were to defend traditional structures. The coups were led not by a
chief, but by a commoner who has had an uneasy relationship with
the traditional power-brokers of Fijian politics. Rabuka's second
coup of 1987 was, after all, a strike against a compromise
formulated by the traditional Fijian leadership. These tensions
continued with the contest for the Prime Ministership between
Kamikamica and Rabuka, with Kamikamica, supported by Mara,
representing a current of thinking which wanted to preserve as much
as possible of traditional Fijian political ways. Rabuka's
candidacy, on the other hand, depended for its success on seeking
support outside established circles of power. Ratu Mara made no
secret of his misgivings about Rabuka, calling him an 'angry young
man'.(21) For his part, Rabuka made the very revealing accusation
that Mara was a:
ruthless politician who has been allowed to get
away with a lot. Maybe it's part of the Fijian culture that he is a
big chief and because he was groomed well by the colonial
government.(22)
The profound sense of uneasiness felt by many
ethnic Fijians about the future of their own particular social and
political arrangements as well as about the future of Fiji as a
modern state were exacerbated by international pressures and
economic difficulties experienced after 1987 and when the political
exclusion of the Indo-Fijian community was institutionalised in the
Constitution of 1990. The coups were very economically damaging to
Fiji, with a massive slump in the tourism industry, a flight of
educated Indian labour and investment, and a fall in foreign
investment and economic and other aid from Western countries.(23)
Apart from support from some other Melanesian countries such as
Papua New Guinea, the government was diplomatically isolated. In
October 1987, Fiji was effectively expelled from the Commonwealth,
with its membership being deemed to have ended following Rabuka's
revocation of the 1970 Constitution and deposition of the Queen as
Head of State.
The economic effects of the coups lessened in
the next few years, with tourist arrivals recovering, aid flows
gradually recommencing and a series of economic policy reforms
allowing the growth of new industries such as garment
manufacturing. Nevertheless, the country's discriminatory
constitutional arrangements were regarded with opprobrium in much
of the international community and tended to limit the extent of
financial and technical assistance from international donors and to
deter investors who feared racially-based instability. Business
investment, government administration and the provision of
professional services also continued to suffer from the ongoing
exodus of Indo-Fijians and people of other races. Symbolic of
Fiji's international isolation was its exclusion from the
Commonwealth, a situation which was particularly distressing to
members of the chiefly elite, who placed high value on links with
the British Crown. Although Fiji had declared itself a republic,
its flag retained the Union Jack and Queen Elizabeth's image
continued to appear on the country's coins.
The Constitutional Review of
1996
During his terms as Prime Minister, Rabuka has
made contradictory moves which have, on the one hand, alienated the
Indo-Fijian community while, on the other, indicating that he is
willing to move Fiji away from the politics of exclusion towards a
new multiracial accommodation. In October 1992, for example, in an
Australian television interview he made remarks that suggested he
supported the repatriation of Indo-Fijians to India. Yet on a
number of occasions he has made offers to the opposition parties to
form an all-party government of national unity or to include
representatives of these parties in Cabinet. In general, however,
most observers have concluded that Rabuka has been moving towards a
conciliatory position, despite the often strident criticism of
Fijian nationalist groups.(24) Developments in the last year have
encouraged the view that, notwithstanding the deep divisions in
Fiji society, the majority of indigenous Fijian leaders have come
to the conclusion that some form of multiracial politics is
necessary to secure the country's economic and political
future.
Such an interpretation has been strengthened by
the outcome of the 1996 Constitutional Review and the subsequent
amendments to the Constitution. The genesis of the Review was the
1990 Constitution, which was regarded by its authors as a
transitional document and which included a provision that it had to
be reviewed by July 1997. Despite initial controversy about the
composition of a Constitutional Review Commission to carry out the
review, the Commission's terms of reference were, in the opinion of
one of its members, 'themselves an historic achievement of
consensus and compromise'.(25) The Commission was directed to
'recommend constitutional arrangements' promoting 'racial harmony
and national unity and the economic and social advancement of all
communities and bearing in mind internationally recognised
principles and standards of individual and group rights'.
Constitutional recommendations should guarantee the protection of
indigenous Fijian interests as well as those of 'all ethnic groups
of people in Fiji'.(26)
The Chair of the Commission was Sir Paul Reeves,
a former Archbishop and Governor-General of New Zealand with a
Maori background. The other Commissioners were Mr Tomasi Vakatora,
an indigenous Fijian businessman and former Cabinet member, and Dr
Brij Lal, an Indo-Fijian historian at the Australian National
University. The Commission held five months of public hearings
throughout Fiji and received some 800 written and oral submissions.
The Commission commissioned papers from local and overseas
researchers on issues concerning economic and social conditions in
Fiji and on international constitutional arrangements. It also
visited Malaysia, Mauritius and South Africa to examine those
countries' approach to political representation in multi-ethnic
societies.
The Report of the Commission reviewed the
history of constitutional developments in Fiji since independence
and argued that conflict in the recent past had been based on
differing interpretations of the meaning of indigenous Fijian
'paramountcy'. Most Indo-Fijians had regarded the concept as a
protective one designed to ensure that the special social and
economic needs of the Fijian community were promoted, while many
indigenous Fijians interpreted paramountcy to mean 'keeping a
predominantly Fijian government in office' on a permanent basis to
balance the economic predominance of Indo-Fijians and other races.
Many indigenous Fijians therefore saw the pre-coup Coalition
government of 1987 as a breach of trust by Indo-Fijians, while
Coalition voters considered that the democratic process guaranteed
them the right to representatives who could participate directly in
executive government.(27) The 'remedy' to this impasse embodied in
the 1990 Constitution was based on the assumption that if
indigenous Fijians were guaranteed a majority in parliament they
would be able to hold on to political power. In the view of the
Commissioners, this idea was found to be faulty because, like any
ethnic group, indigenous Fijians did not vote as a bloc but
supported parties which reflected regional, social and ideological
divisions in their community. The 1990 Constitution did not achieve
Fijian unity but tended to accentuate divisions, as well as
undermining the traditional role of Fijian institutions such as
provincial councils and the Great Council of Chiefs by turning them
into mouthpieces of a particular political party.(28)
To overcome the problems of the 1990
Constitution, the Commissioners concluded that:
progress towards the sharing of executive power
among all ethnic communities is the only solution to Fiji's
constitutional problems. Constitutional arrangements which will
encourage the emergence of multi-ethnic governments should be the
primary goal.(29)
The principal obstacle to the emergence of
multi-ethnic governments had been the system of communal
representation in parliament which made it difficult or impossible
for people of one community to vote for candidates from other
communities. This system provided no incentive for party leaders to
formulate policies which would appeal to the people of Fiji as a
whole, regardless of their ethnic background, but, on the contrary,
encouraged parties 'to take a narrow, communal view of their best
interests'.(30) The identification between each party and one
particular ethnic group had become almost total, with the electoral
system making the growth of multi-ethnic parties virtually
impossible.
The Commissioners therefore recommended that
Fiji move away from a system of communally-based elections and
towards 'open' non-communal seats where all Fiji citizens would be
eligible to stand for election and to vote for candidates
regardless of race. As a transitional measure, the Commission
proposed that there be some 'reserved' seats for each community.
This was proposed because the Commission thought that many people
in Fiji might be 'unwilling to move to a totally open system in a
single step', but it cautioned that too great a proportion of
'reserved' seats would frustrate the whole purpose of open
seats.
The people of Fiji have to make a conscious
choice about whether they wish to take a decisive step away from
the communal system that has made ethnic politics inevitable since
before independence.(31)
The Commission recommended that the Bose Lawa
(House of Representatives) should be constituted in the following
way:
Reserved Seats
|
|
Fijians (including Pacific Islanders)
|
12
|
|
10
|
|
2
|
|
1
|
Open seats
|
45
|
TOTAL
|
70
|
The 45 open seats would be filled by voting in
15 three-member constituencies, with boundaries drawn in such a way
as to ensure, as far as possible, that the constituencies have a
heterogeneous, multi-ethnic composition. The Commission also
recommended that the Senate (renamed as the Bose e Cake) should be
composed of 35 members, two elected from each of Fiji's 14
provinces, one from Rotuma and 6 appointed by the President to
represent groups unrepresented in parliament (religious and
cultural groups, women, youth). Elections to both Houses should be
held under the proportional representation system.(32) In
accordance with the Westminster tradition, executive power should
rest with the Cabinet formed from Members of the Lower House. There
should be no provision in the Constitution about the ethnicity of
the Prime Minister. The President, as titular Head of State, should
be an indigenous Fijian and the Vice-President from another
community.(33) The role of the Great Council of Chiefs should be to
provide advice to the government on 'any matter relating to the
well-being of the Fijian people but also matters affecting the
nation as a whole', as well as to nominate candidates for the
office of President and to approve Bills affecting the special
rights of the indigenous Fijian community relating to land and
customary rights.(34)
The New
Constitution
In September 1996, the Report of the
Constitution Review Commission was tabled in Fiji's Parliament.
Responses to the Commission's findings followed fairly predictable
lines, with the NFP and the Labour Party generally supporting the
recommendations and indigenous Fijian parties and other
representatives divided in their views. Kamikamica's Fijian
Association Party reacted favourably to the Report, but the ranks
of the ruling SVT were split. Rabuka was reported to have come
under pressure from within Cabinet to oppose what were seen as
anti-Fijian aspects of the Report.(35) The more militantly Fijian
nationalist organisations, as well as a number of provincial Fijian
leaders, condemned the Report as disregarding the views and
interests of the indigenous Fijian people. The General Voters'
Party was critical of the proposed reduction in parliamentary
representation for the 'other races' group. (36)
After presenting the Report to Parliament, Prime
Minister Rabuka appointed a Joint Parliamentary Select Committee to
examine the Commission's findings and to make final recommendations
which would be incorporated into a new Constitution to be passed by
Parliament by July 1997. Attention shifted away from the
Parliamentary Committee, however, when the negative response to the
Report amongst many indigenous Fijian representative raised the
prospect that Rabuka might feel pressured into rejecting most of
its recommendations. In a counter move, the leader of the
Opposition, the NFP's Jai Ram Reddy, indicated to Rabuka that his
party would be willing to settle for a compromise over the crucial
question of the ethnic composition of Parliament in return for
concessions over the make up of the Cabinet.
The negotiations between Rabuka and Reddy were
eventually reflected in the findings of the Parliamentary Committee
and in the Constitution Amendment Bill (1997) which was passed by
both Houses of Parliament in July 1997. The motion in the House of
Representatives was seconded by Reddy as Leader of the Opposition.
Under the new Constitution, the 71 member House of Representatives
will be composed as follows:
Reserved seats
|
|
Fijians (including Pacific Islanders)
|
23
|
|
19
|
|
3
|
|
1
|
Open seats
|
25
|
TOTAL
|
71
|
Thus although the new Constitution reflects the
major recommendation of the Constitution Review Commission that
Fiji should move away from totally communal elections, the new
arrangements represent a much less decisive move than was proposed.
The suggested two-thirds to one-third balance between open and
reserved seats has been reversed, with only one-third of seats to
be elected on an open basis.
The other important modification to the
Commission's proposals, which flowed from the negotiations between
Reddy and Rabuka, is the provision that the Prime Minister will
establish a Cabinet whose members 'as far as possible'
proportionally reflect the parties represented in the House of
Representatives. The Prime Minister's first obligation will be to
the parties of any formal coalition, but the Cabinet may also
include other parties with at least 10 per cent of the seats in the
House. The new Constitution also embraces the idea of an appointed
Senate rather than the elected body proposed by the Commission. The
32 member Senate will comprise 14 members appointed by the Great
Council of Chiefs, 9 appointed by the Prime Minister, 8 by the
Leader of the Opposition and 1 by the Council of Rotuma. The
President will be appointed by the Great Council of Chiefs, but, in
another significant move away from the 1990 Constitution, neither
the President nor the Prime Minister are required to be of a
particular ethnic background.
Special provision for protecting the interests
of the indigenous Fijian community has also been made in a clause
which states that any legislation impinging on the affairs of
Fijians or Rotumans, or that seeks to alter the Agricultural
Landlord and Tenant Act, must be approved by 9 of the 14 Senators
appointed by the Great Council of Chiefs. With the passing of the
Constitution Amendment Act, the new Constitution will come into
effect in July 1998. This is to allow amendments to be made to a
range of legislation which will be affected by the new
Constitution. A clause in the Act also allows a two-year grace
period for the removal of all discriminatory legislation.
Fiji's Political
Future
The new Constitution brought immediate political
benefits to the Fiji Government in the international arena. The
move away from a racially constituted parliament, despite its
limited scope, was widely welcomed by powers such as Australia, New
Zealand, Britain and the US.(37) Fiji's readmission to the
Commonwealth at the CHOGM of September 1997 in Edinburgh was also a
major dividend brought by the change. Although, in Australia, the
Commonwealth is often regarded as anachronistic or rather quaint,
Commonwealth membership was held in high esteem by many indigenous
Fijian leaders, and readmission will assist in Rabuka's efforts to
rebuild his relationship with the chiefly elite. The development
was also significant because it was achieved with the support of
India, which had previously opposed any suggestion of Fiji's
re-entry to the Commonwealth while a discriminatory Constitution
was in effect.
The effect of the new arrangements on internal
political developments in Fiji is, however, more difficult to
assess. Immediately after the passing of the new Constitution there
was a general feeling of relief that a period of tension within the
country and of ill-repute internationally might be drawing to a
close. The idea that reconciliation between the communities in Fiji
might be possible was symbolised by the unanimous vote in favour of
the new Constitution in the House of Representatives and by the
speech to the Great Council of Chiefs by the NFP leader, Jai Ram
Reddy, the first time an Indo-Fijian had addressed the Council.
Later developments have indicated, however, that misgivings remain
amongst some members of both communities. The leader of the Labour
Party, Mahendra Chaudry has been especially sceptical about the new
arrangements, although he appears to have had little support for
his criticism from other leading figures in the Party.(38) The
resounding by-election defeat of the SVT by a nationalist candidate
in a rural Fijian seat in mid-October suggests that the Government
has yet to convince some Fijians that the new arrangements do not
threaten their interests.
There are also questions about the practicality
of the idea of a multiparty Cabinet. The prospect of opposition
parties being represented within executive government runs counter
to the Westminster tradition and raises questions about how
effective decision-making will be when faced with contentious
policy issues. The proposal has, however, been designed to
encourage the formation of coalition governments and may lead to
arrangements under which the parties in a coalition agree not to
stand against each other in the open seats. This would give people
of both the major communities the opportunity to vote for a
candidate from outside their own community with the reassurance
that the candidate would not be in a position to act on narrow
communal lines. A likely outcome of such a scenario would be a
SVT-NFP coalition government under a SVT Prime Minister. The
possibility of such developments occurring will depend crucially
upon how well the major parties are able to convince their
respective constituencies of the merits of multiracial government.
Within the indigenous Fijian community there would have to be
acceptance that the presence of significant numbers of Indo-Fijians
in government is not a threat to indigenous interests and the
Indo-Fijian community would have to be willing to have their
representatives take on a subordinate or non-leading role in
government for the indefinite future. Elections under the new
Constitution are due in February 1999.
One of the most crucial issues which will
confront any Fiji government in the near future is the question of
land tenure in the sugar industry. Sugar is Fiji's largest
merchandise export and the industry is the country's largest
employer. Production is carried out on land owned by indigenous
Fijians but leased by mainly Indo-Fijian farmers, most of whose 30
year leases are due to run out in the next few years. Many lease
holders have threatened to abandon the industry if they do not
receive the security of new long-term leases, but many landowners
have expressed reluctance to grant such terms, an impasse which is
holding up investment in an industry which urgently needs
modernisation to maintain international competitiveness. The issue
thus touches on some of the most sensitive questions facing Fiji
today, involving a conflict of interests between the two main
ethnic groups over an industry at the heart of the Fiji economy and
centring on the question of land, a matter of key symbolic
importance for indigenous Fijians. The Rabuka government has
established a Parliamentary Committee, with Opposition
participation, to examine proposals for long-term solutions to the
land issue, including ideas to diversify land use away from
dependence on sugar production. Resolution of this issue will be
critical to both the economic and political future of Fiji.
In the longer term, transcendence of
ethnically-based political tensions in Fiji will depend upon
whether the country can achieve the sustained economic development
necessary to provide a material basis for prosperity amongst all
communities. In Malaysia, the country whose colonial history and
post-independence racial policies most closely resemble Fiji's,
rapid economic growth has been crucially important in easing ethnic
tensions and encouraging the Malay led government to move gradually
away from some of its discriminatory policies towards the ethnic
Chinese and Indian communities. The economic future of Fiji is,
however, more uncertain than Malaysia's since Fiji does not have
the size, resource base and proximity to a growing region which
have underpinned Malaysia's economic success. On the political
side, Malaysia never introduced communal representation in
parliament and has had a stronger tradition of cross-ethnic voting.
The limited nature of the recent move away from communal politics
in Fiji may be insufficient to encourage multiracial politics and a
wider political accommodation.
Australia and
Fiji
Australia, as one of the two 'great powers' in
the South Pacific (with New Zealand), has long had an important
role in developments in Fiji. Australians were amongst the first
European settlers in the country and the Australian Colonial Sugar
Refinery Company dominated the economy of Fiji through control of
the sugar industry until selling out to the newly independent
government of Fiji in 1973. Australia is Fiji's most important
trading partner, accounting for 39 per cent of Fiji's imports and
24 per cent of its exports (1995 figures) and, until
recently overtaken by Japan, Australia was for many years Fiji's
largest aid donor.(39) (See Appendix for figures on
Fiji-Australia trade and aid.) Australia is also Fiji's most
important source of tourists and a major source of investment in
tourism developments and the garment manufacturing industry.
Australia provides duty-free access to its domestic market for
goods from Pacific countries under the South Pacific Regional Trade
and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA), an arrangement which
has been important for facilitating the development of Fiji's
garment export industry.
Economic and historical connections, however, do
not necessarily translate into diplomatic leverage, as the
Australian government found when it attempted to influence events
in Fiji in the aftermath of the 1987 coups.(40) The Australian
government condemned the May coup, suspended the provision of new
aid to Fiji, suspended the defence cooperation program and
cancelled a round of bilateral economic talks. The imposition of
economic sanctions was discussed in Cabinet but publicly ruled out
by the government.(41) Although Australia's stand was joined by New
Zealand, it attracted little support amongst other Pacific
countries. At a South Pacific Forum meeting just two weeks after
the first coup, representatives from the deposed Bavadra government
were not allowed to speak and the meeting adopted a resolution
which merely expressed 'concern' at events in Fiji. That many
Pacific leaders identified with the aims of the coup leaders was
made clear from a strongly-worded statement against foreign
interference in Fijian affairs by the Melanesian Spearhead Group
(Papua New Guinea, Solomons and Vanuatu).(42)
As the Rabuka government consolidated its
external and internal support, the Australian and New Zealand
governments softened their stance. Australia's reaction to the
second coup was muted and by 1988 a number of new aid projects had
been resumed. This reflected the Australian government's desire to
maintain support for the return of elected government while not
jeopardising its influence in Fiji and the region. Normalisation in
relations moved a step closer when the Australian government
welcomed the 1990 constitution as 'restor[ing] a degree of
representative government to Fiji by providing for an early return
to elected government'.(43) Following the 1992 elections complete
normalisation of the Australia-Fiji relationship was signalled by
restoration of Australia's Defence Co-operation Program with Fiji
to coincide with the visit of the newly elected Prime Minister
Rabuka to Australia in September 1992. Shortly before the visit
Rabuka also made gestures of conciliation by announcing that his
government would commence a review of the 1990
Constitution.(44)
From the beginning of the Constitutional review
process until its culmination with the passing of the Constitution
Amendment Act in July 1997, Australia has exerted consistent but
low-key influence on all relevant players in Fiji politics to
eliminate the most obviously discriminatory aspects of Fiji's
political institutions. This approach was based on the assessment
that overt pressure would not only be counterproductive within
Fiji, but would be badly received in other South Pacific countries.
Australian Government representatives argued that it was in Fiji's
own interests to work towards multiracial government, both for
reasons of domestic harmony and because of the damage to the
country's already fragile economy from an unstable investment
climate and a continuing exodus of skilled labour and capital.
Australia has a considerable interest in
political stability and economic development in Fiji. Fiji provides
one of the few examples of a Pacific island country with the human
and physical resources to develop a range of export industries and
sustainable economic growth without reliance on foreign assistance.
This not only provides the potential for the development of
Australia's already significant trade and investment links with
Fiji, but would also open up the possibility of Fiji taking on a
more prominent role in Pacific affairs. There is a huge asymmetry
in the power relationship between Australia and the Pacific island
countries, an imbalance which makes it very difficult for
Australian policy-makers to avoid being seen as overbearing.(45)
The emergence of Fiji as a small but significant regional economic
and political power would provide a model for other Pacific
countries and help foster a more equal relationship between the
Pacific islands and the larger littoral states.
Conclusion
Fiji is a society marked by deep social
divisions which follow regional and economic as well as ethnic
lines, cleavages which have been complicated by the country's
transition from an isolated colonial territory to an independent
state in a competitive world economy. Conventional explanations of
Fiji politics which suggest that there is a simple division between
two ethnic groups with broadly homogenous interests ignore the
social and regional diversity within the various communities and,
in particular, the transforming pressures on the indigenous Fijian
community as it is brought into the market economy and the urban
environment. The political experiment played out by Sitiveni Rabuka
and his supporters in the Fijian community, from the coups of 1987
until the recent Constitutional changes, were a largely
unsuccessful attempt to shield indigenous Fijians from the effect
of this transformation and to restore the Fijian chiefly elite to
what was seen as its traditional leading role. The political
institutions which emerged from the experiment not only deepened
hostility between the indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian communities
but also highlighted the growing divisions within indigenous Fijian
society. The crucial weaknesses of the experiment were that it was
based on an idealised vision of traditional Fijian society that had
never really been accepted throughout the islands of Fiji and which
necessitated the political exclusion of half the country's
population. The result was not only a violation of Indo-Fijians'
rights but an undermining of the economic growth and prosperity to
which indigenous Fijians have aspired.
The actions of Prime Minister Rabuka and the
mainstream of the indigenous Fijian leadership in recent years have
indicated an awareness that the politics of exclusion implicit in
the 1990 Constitution was unsustainable. The appointment of the
Constitution Review Commission with members respected in all Fiji's
communities provided the opportunity to make a clean break from the
conflicts and divisions of the recent past and to move towards a
multiracial accommodation. That opportunity was taken up only in a
partial way in the amended Constitution to take effect in 1998 and
it remains to be seen how well the new arrangements will provide
incentives for Fiji's leaders to campaign and to govern in a
non-communal way for the benefit of all the country's communities.
The encouragement given to coalition politics by the provision for
a multiparty Cabinet may succeed in allowing an evolution to
multiracial politics, but on the other hand, it may only lead to
coalitions of entrenched communal leaders. The elections of 1999
will be the first real test of the new Constitution and the
intervening period will be a test for the capacity of Fiji's
political leaders to develop a national rather than a communal
vision.
Endnotes
- Bill Standish, 'The End of "A New Era" in Fiji: Towards an
Interpretation', Parliamentary Research Service Background
Paper, 1987.
- Robert Norton, Race and Politics in Fiji. University
of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1990, pp.18-20.
- William Sutherland, Beyond the Politics of Race. ANU,
Canberra, 1992, pp. 27, 46, 46.
- Standish, op. cit. p. 5.
- Sutherland, op. cit. p. 29.
- Brij Lal, Broken Waves: A History of the Fiji Islands in
the Twentieth Century, Honolulu, 1992, p. 235.
- Michael Howard, Fiji: Race and Politics in an Island
State, Vancouver, 1991, pp. 94-95.
- Nicholas Thomas, 'Regional Politics, Ethnicity, and Custom in
Fiji'. Contemporary Pacific, vol.2 no.1, Spring 1990, pp.
132-136.
- Brij Lal, 'Politics Since Independence: Continuity and Change,
1970-1982', in B. Lal, ed., Politics in Fiji: Studies in
Contemporary History. Sydney, 1986, p.79.
- Norton, op. cit., pp.122-125. See Bill Emmott, 'Fiji:
Islands in the Wind', The Economist. 27 July 1985, pp.
23-30, for a good and often quite prescient survey of economic and
political conditions in Fiji in the early 1980s.
- Alexander Mamak, Colour, Culture and Conflict: A Study of
Pluralism in Fiji. Sydney, 1978, pp. 67-77. Craig Skehan,
'From Colonialism to Unionism', Pacific Islands Monthly,
April 1992, pp. 6-8.
- For a highly critical discussion of the influence of University
of South Pacific academics on the Labour Party and on the party's
political program, see Deryck Scarr, Fiji: The Politics of
Illusion. The Military Coups in Fiji, Sydney, 1988, pp.
28-36.
- Lal, Broken Waves, p. 259.
- ibid., 269-270.
- 'All Power to the Fijians'. Islands Business Pacific,
January/February 1993: pp. 19-23. Norton, op. cit., pp.
140-148.
- Robert Robertson and Akosita Tamanisau, Fiji: Shattered
Coups. Sydney, 1988, p. 99.
- Sutherland, op. cit., pp. 201-202.
- Preamble to the 1990 Constitution, quoted by Peter Larmour,
'Introduction', in Brij Lal & Peter Larmour, Electoral
Systems in Divided Societies: The Fiji Constitution Review,
Canberra, 1997, p. 1.
- Sutherland, op. cit., p. 9.
- Pacific Islands Monthly, June 1992, pp.7-10.
- Rowan Callick, 'Chiefs, Indians and the Colonel', Modern
Times. July 1992, p. 14.
- Daily Post, 11 Dec. 1991. Cited by Brij Lal, 'Chiefs
and Indians: Elections and Politics in Contemporary Fiji', text of
article for Contemporary Pacific, vol. 5, no. 2, p.
7.
- Howard, op. cit., pp. 279-286.
- The proposal for a government of national unity was attacked by
the Taukei Movement which branded Rabuka as a traitor who had 'sold
Fijian interests and aspirations to the Indian leaders for his own
political security'. Sydney Morning Herald, 8 April 1993,
p. 11.
- Brij Lal, 'Towards a United Future: Report of the Fiji
Constitution Review Commission', Journal of Pacific
History, vol. 32, no. 1, 1997, p. 72.
- Fiji Constitution Review Commission, The Fiji Islands:
Towards a United Future. Report of the Fiji Constitution Review
Commission 1996, Suva, 1996, Appendix B.
- ibid., pp. 9-11.
- ibid., pp. 14-16.
- ibid., p.18.
- ibid., p. 20.
- ibid., p. 293.
- ibid., pp. 300-302.
- ibid., pp. 273-275.
- ibid., pp. 261-262.
- Fiji Times, 1 February 1997, p. 1.
- Fiji Times, 11 September 1996, pp.1,2&3; 1
February 1997, pp.1&3.
- Fiji Times, 10 September 1997, p. 44.
- Fiji Times, 11 September 1997, p. 1.
- Economist Intelligence Unit, Pacific Islands Country
Report, 3rd Quarter 1997, p.11.
- Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant. Australia's Foreign Relations
in the World of the 1990s. Melbourne: Melbourne University
Press, 1991, p. 177.
- Howard, op. cit., p. 280.
- ibid., p. 281.
- Dr. Neal Blewett, then Minister for Trade and Overseas
Development, to Fiji-Australia Business Council meeting, Suva, 5
September 1991, 'Australia and Fiji: Pacific Partners'. The
Monthly Record, Sep. 1991, pp. 571.
- 'Rabuka Wins Over Australia'. Pacific Islands Monthly,
Oct. 1992, p. 10.
- See Richard Herr, 'Australia and the Pacific Islands', in F.A.
Mediansky, Australian Foreign Policy into the New
Millenium, Melbourne, 1997, pp. 231-250 for a discussion of
these problems.
Appendices
Table 1: Australia's Trade with
Fiji
A$'000
|
1991-92
|
1992-93
|
1993-94
|
1994-95
|
1995-96
|
Total Exports
|
245 918
|
327 200
|
324 753
|
378 169
|
474 525
|
Total Imports
|
101 418
|
130 146
|
163 439
|
184 540
|
235 110
|
Balance of Merchandise Trade
|
144 499
|
197 053
|
161 314
|
193 630
|
239 415
|
Source: Department of Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Trade, Composition of Trade 1995-96.
Table 2: Total Aid Flows to the
South Pacific by Country
1995-96 to 1997-98
($m)
|
Expenditure Estimate
|
1995-96
|
1996-97
|
1997-98
|
Fiji
|
21.8
|
19.7
|
19.7
|
Vanuatu
|
14.3
|
12.9
|
12.9
|
Solomon Islands
|
11.6
|
11.1
|
11.1
|
Western Samoa
|
11.5
|
11.0
|
11.0
|
Tonga
|
10.7
|
10.0
|
10.0
|
Kiribati
|
6.5
|
6.0
|
6.0
|
Nauru
|
2.9
|
2.9
|
2.9
|
Tuvalu
|
3.9
|
2.4
|
2.4
|
Federated States of Micronesia
|
1.6
|
1.3
|
1.3
|
Cook Islands
|
1.9
|
1.7
|
1.7
|
New Caledonia
|
1.2
|
1.4
|
1.4
|
Palau
|
0.3
|
0.3
|
0.3
|
Marshall Islands
|
0.6
|
0.6
|
0.6
|
Niue and Tokelau
|
0.8
|
0.9
|
0.9
|
French Polynesia
|
0.5
|
0.4
|
0.4
|
Policy & Management Reform (PMR)
|
4.6
|
9.0
|
11.0
|
Regional/Multicountry Programs
|
36.0
|
33.8
|
31.1
|
Total
|
130.7
|
125.4
|
124.7
|
Source: Australian Agency for International
Development (AusAID), 1997-98.