Dr Frank Frost
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
Glossary
Major Issues
Introduction
Background: the Paris Agreements, UNTAC,
and the 1993 elections
Cambodia since 1993
- Political tensions in 1995 and 1996: Democratic institutions
under pressure
- The immediate outlook
- King Sihanouk's role
- The Khmer Rouge: down but not out
Economic Developments
Foreign relations
Australia and Cambodia
- Political and diplomatic relations
- Economic relations and the aid program
- Defence assistance
Conclusion
Endnotes
- ASEAN
- Association of Southeast Asian Nations
- BDLP
- Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party
- CGDK
- Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
- CPP
- Cambodian People's Party
- FUNCINPEC
- National United Front for a Neutral, Independent, Peaceful and
Cooperative Cambodia
- ICORC
- International Committee for the Reconstruction of
Cambodia
- IMF
- International Monetary Fund
- KNP
- Khmer Nation Party
- KPNLF
- Khmer People's National Liberation Front
- NGO
- Non Governmental Organisation
- PDK
- Party of Democratic Kampuchea
- RCAF
- Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
- SOC
- State of Cambodia
- UNHCR
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
- UNTAC
- United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
Since the United Nations-sponsored elections in May 1993,
Cambodia has been engaged in a process of attempted recovery from
over two decades of internal conflict and external intervention.
Progress has been made in a number of areas but substantial
problems continue to challenge the recovery process. Cambodia has
been receiving substantial economic assistance and a formal meeting
of donors, the Consultative Group on Cambodia, convenes in Tokyo on
15-16 July to review the country's development and assistance
needs. Australia played a major role in helping to develop the
international agreements through which the United Nations sought to
resolve the conflict in Cambodia and the Australian government has
continued to support actively Cambodia's pursuit of recovery.
Australia, as the fourth largest aid donor to Cambodia, will be a
participant in the Consultative Group meeting.
This paper examines Cambodia's development since 1993, assesses
the problems and challenges still facing the country in the wake of
many years of conflict, and discusses Australia's continuing
involvement in providing support and assistance.
From 1970, Cambodia entered a period of political conflict,
internal war and external involvement, including the traumatic rule
by the Khmer Rouge (1975-1978) which resulted in the deaths of at
least one million people.. The 1993 elections were the outcome of
the Paris Agreements on Cambodia (23 October 1991) which
established one of the United Nations largest peace keeping
operations, pursued with over 20,000 personnel and at a cost of $US
1.9 billion. The Paris Agreements succeeded in ameliorating the
international and regional animosities which had fuelled the
internal conflicts within Cambodia and paved the way for a new era
in international relations for Southeast Asia. However within
Cambodia, the UN had difficulties in fulfilling the ambitious
mandate assigned by the agreements. In particular, the problems the
UN experienced in trying to supervise and disarm the competing
Cambodian parties and the refusal by the Khmer Rouge to adhere to
the agreements they had signed, thwarted the UN's efforts to secure
a fully peaceful environment for the preparation for elections.
Nonetheless, the 1993 elections were held successfully, a new
democratic constitution adopted, and a new government of the
Kingdom of Cambodia was established.
The elections produced two major winners, the Cambodian People's
Party (in power in Phnom Penh with Vietnamese support from 1979)
and the opposition FUNCINPEC (National United Front for an
Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia) To seek a
stable administration, the two major parties established a
coalition with their leaders, Hun Sen (CPP) and Prince Norodom
Ranariddh (FUNCINPEC) serving as co-prime ministers: power was to
be shared between these parties and a third and smaller party, the
Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP). This unusual arrangement
has provided Cambodia with a functioning government since 1993.
However the new government has faced the legacies of past
suspicions and conflicts, armed opposition from the depleted but
still operational Khmer Rouge (with its leader Pol Pot evidently
still alive), administrative weakness, economic debilitation and
some difficult challenges in securing stable relations with the
country's two large immediate neighbours, Thailand and Vietnam.
Politically, the coalition government has come under increasing
strain for two main reasons. Firstly, the liberal political
institutions and environment established through the Paris
Agreements and UN involvement have come under pressure as the
government has responded negatively to criticism (for example from
the recently established Khmer Nation Party led by an expelled
former FUNCINPEC Minister for Finance, Sam Rainsy). The press has
also been pressured by violent attacks, not satisfactorily
explained. Secondly, tensions have increased within the governing
parties, particularly as those parties assess their prospects in
the local elections (due in mid 1997) and the national elections
(mid 1998). Although FUNCINPEC outpolled the CPP in the 1993
elections, the CPP has a stronger organisation and retains a
dominant influence in much of the military, police and militias.
There was considerable tension in the first five months of 1996 and
widespread concerns that the coalition between the CPP and
FUNCINPEC might dissolve.
Coalition tensions were contained by mid 1996 but may well
re-emerge. It is possible that FUNCINPEC might decide to leave the
coalition in the lead up to the next national elections. There is
an ongoing potential for further political violence in a highly
armed society. The role of King Sihanouk also remains a matter of
some uncertainty, partly because of his health problems.
The Khmer Rouge continue to pose an armed challenge to the
government and reports in early June of the death of Pol Pot have
not been confirmed and appear to have been inaccurate. The Khmer
Rouge have suffered a substantial decline in strength since the
period of UN involvement. They no longer have material support from
China and access to supplies from elements in Thailand has been
curtailed sharply. Over 12,000 people have crossed to the
government and the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, after notably
ineffective operations in 1994, have been pursuing internal reform
and training and displayed an improved performance in 1995 and
1996. Nonetheless, while under pressure, the Khmer Rouge are still
likely to be a factor for potential instability and violence in the
period before the 1998 elections.
Amid political conflict and ongoing armed insurgency, Cambodia's
economy has shown some signs of progress. Overall rates of growth
have increased, agricultural production has improved and some
investment has been received. However the long term ill effects of
isolation and weak administrative capacities have left Cambodia and
its natural resources vulnerable to exploitation. The rate of
development of the country's forest resources is an important issue
which has recently been reviewed by an international report that
will be considered at the Consultative Group meeting in Tokyo. The
report found that rates of exploitation were five times higher than
replacement capacities and that Cambodia was receiving an
inadequate financial return. Political instability and the ongoing
activities of the Khmer Rouge still threaten Cambodia's capacities
to attract needed investment and to pursue long term development to
benefit Cambodians, especially those outside the urban areas.
The Paris Agreements opened the way for Cambodia to reduce its
international isolation and much has been achieved. Cambodia has
been improving relations with China, which in a significant sign of
support to the government offered 'non lethal' military assistance
in April 1996. The United States is providing both civil and 'non
lethal' military assistance but is concerned at some recent
internal developments including an evident increase in activities
by traffickers in narcotics in and through Cambodia. Relations with
ASEAN are developing rapidly: Cambodia became an observer in 1995
and has applied to join as a full member, and may be accepted as
early as 1997. Some strain has been experienced in relations with
both Thailand and Vietnam since 1993 but active efforts have been
made to improve both relationships.
Australia's interests in Cambodia grew steadily from the late
1970s and from the early 1980s, efforts to seek a resolution of the
Cambodia conflict became one the main priorities in Australian
foreign policy. Australia played a substantial role in helping to
pursue the negotiations and policy development which ultimately led
to the successful conclusion of the Paris Agreements. Australia
committed over 500 personnel to the United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and provided senior officials, most
notably the Force Commander General John Sanderson. Since 1993
Australia has been an active supporter of Cambodia with a large aid
program ($A92 million over the period 1994-1998) which has included
assistance in the de-mining program (aid increased by the Howard
government in May 1996). Australia is also providing military
assistance, especially in training; a new Australian-sponsored
training facility was opened in late June. Australia thus has a
substantial interest in Cambodia's continued progress towards
stability and recovery and will be reassessing this progress in the
context of the Consultative Group meeting in Tokyo.
The paper concludes by highlighting both the considerable gains
made since the Paris Agreements and the substantial problems still
confronting Cambodia in its path to recovery. As the scheduled 1998
elections approach, a key issue is whether Cambodia will be able to
continue and increase progress towards economic development and
improved administrative capacities, while preserving the liberal
political institutions established through the Paris Agreements,
the UN involvement and the 1993 constitution.
Cambodia was enmeshed in internal conflict for over two decades,
including civil war with external intervention (1970-1975), the
Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1978) during which at least one million
perished, and further externally-assisted domestic conflict after
Vietnam's invasion (1979-1989). The end of the Cold War cleared the
way for a negotiated settlement through the Paris Agreements (23
October 1991) and in May 1993 United Nations sponsored elections
opened a new era in Cambodian politics. It was hoped that Cambodia
could now escape from the internal conflict and external
interference which had caused devastation and left it at the margin
of the Asia-Pacific region.
The Paris Agreements of October 1991 involved the development of
a process of political accommodation by which the warring Cambodian
parties could try to pursue national reconciliation in the context
of a major UN involvement and an internationally supervised
election. Although the Khmer Rouge boycotted the process, the other
three major parties were able to arrive at a coalition arrangement
after the elections which appeared to lay the groundwork for
stability and economic development with international
assistance.
In the period since the 1993 elections, Cambodia has made
progress towards recovery, but that recovery remains threatened by
ongoing internal political conflicts, a diminished but still
operative Khmer Rouge, and substantial problems in achieving
balanced and sustainable economic development. While the coalition
arrangement remains in place, a series of conflicts both within and
between the major parties has given rise to concerns that a stable
government may be difficult to maintain and that the liberal
political institutions established through the Paris Agreements
might not survive in the climate of discord and conflict. Moreover,
Cambodia still faces armed confrontation from the depleted but
still operational Khmer Rouge, which hampers international
confidence and investment prospects. Cambodia's problems are of
concern to its neighbours in ASEAN (which Cambodia has formally
applied to join) and to the country's international supporters and
aid donors, including Australia. The country's progress towards
economic recovery will be reviewed in detail by the meeting of the
Consultative Group on Cambodia in Tokyo on 15-16 July 1996.
This paper provides a review of major recent developments in
Cambodia and considers the prospects for stability and continued
economic progress under the framework established by the Paris
Agreements.
After the defeat and overthrow of the Khmer Rouge (from 25
December 1978), Cambodia entered a new phase of conflict. Vietnam
sponsored the inauguration of an allied regime in Phnom Penh, (the
People's Republic of Kampuchea), government by a pro-Vietnam and
pro-Soviet communist party (the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary
Party, renamed the Cambodian People's Party in 1991). While the Pol
Pot regime had been almost universally condemned, China and the
ASEAN members opposed Vietnam's invasion and its continued presence
(with over 150 000 troops) after 1979. The ousted Khmer Rouge
regrouped and new non-communist 'resistance' guerilla movements
were established, particularly the Khmer People's National
Liberation Front (KPNLF - led by Son Sann) and the National United
Front for a Independent Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia
(FUNCINPEC - which supported the ousted former ruler Prince Norodom
Sihanouk). All three groups operated from bases in Thailand.
Conflict continued through the 1980s, with the Phnom Penh regime
receiving assistance mainly from the Soviet bloc, but otherwise
internationally isolated. It was this conflict which the Paris
Agreements (developed with considerable involvement by Australia)
were designed to bring to an end by the means of a negotiated
settlement and a neutral and extensive international transitional
authority.
The Paris Agreements were signed by nineteen countries,
including all the principal regional and international interested
countries, and by the four Cambodian parties or 'factions'
recognised by the Agreements, the incumbent party in Phnom Penh
(the Cambodian People's Party - CPP), the Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC
and the KPNLF. The UN operation which was established by the Paris
Agreements called for 15,900 military personnel, 3,600 civilian
police and 1,020 civil administration personnel from more than
thirty countries at a total estimated cost of $US1.9 billion. These
resources were deployed to pursue a mandate of daunting complexity.
Under the Paris Agreements, UNTAC's principal tasks were the
supervision of the ceasefire, disarming and demobilisation of most
of the factions' armed forces, the assumption of such
administrative control over the Cambodian parties' administrations
as was necessary to ensure a neutral political environment, the
promotion of human rights, the resettlement of refugees and
displaced persons, the encouragement of the elimination of mines,
and the organisation and conduct of free and fair elections for a
constituent assembly which would prepare a new constitution.
The peace operation was to have two major phases. The first
phase, beginning from 23 October 1991, was to see a complete
ceasefire and the total withdrawal of foreign military forces along
with their equipment, with ongoing verification of their
non-return. The second phase was to produce the regroupment,
demobilisation and disarming of seventy percent of the armed forces
of the four Cambodian signatories to the Agreements, with the
residual thirty per cent remaining in cantonments under UN control
to be either demobilised later (shortly before or after elections)
or incorporated into a new national army. UNTAC would foster a
neutral political environment and organise and hold elections.
In some major areas of its activities, UNTAC had substantial
success. The program to resettle 365,000 people from camps in
Thailand, where many had lived for years, reached a peak in January
and February 1993 with 40,000 returning each month. By April, the
UN was able to declare the program completed. The preparation of
the electoral process including the registration of electors and of
political parties in Cambodia was also a notable success. UNTAC
played a major role in opening up Cambodia's political system by
making possible widespread activity by a range of political parties
and by improving human rights awareness and (to some extent)
practices; for example, a large number of political prisoners were
released. UNTAC's radio station also played a key role in enabling
information about human rights and the electoral registration
process to be spread through the country.(1)
The UN, however, faced severe difficulties in trying to carry
out its ambitious mandate. William Shawcross has observed that:
The UN was lamentably slow in deploying UNTAC's elements and
advance planning in New York was fragmented. It quickly became
clear that the UN was ill-prepared to mount such large peacekeeping
operations.(2)
The development of UNTAC as a result took several months with
delays occurring in a number of key appointments.
The UN also experienced problems in staffing UNTAC's specialist
components. A central part of UNTAC's task was to exercise control
over the operations of the rival administrations in the country so
as to foster a neutral and peaceful political environment in the
lead up to the elections. Since UNTAC never obtained access to
Khmer Rouge areas and since the two non-communist resistance
parties (KPNLF and FUNCINPEC) had very limited administrations,
this meant in effect attempting to monitor and control the
administration of the CPP. UNTAC lacked the trained and experienced
personnel to monitor effectively, let alone 'control', the complex
formal and informal administration of the CPP/SOC.(3) UNTAC's
capacity to try to contain the problem of political intimidation,
which was widespread before the elections, was hampered by the
ineffectiveness of the relatively large police component and by
UNTAC's lack of any independent judicial capacity. As Ken Berry
(legal adviser to the Australian government's task force on
Cambodia in the period of the Paris Agreements) has argued, these
problems inhibited UNTAC substantially:
UNTAC's failure to take rapid and, in some cases, adequate
control of the key areas of the civil administration of the
factions - particularly those of the State of Cambodia (SOC), which
was the largest and really the only effective one - and to initiate
corrective action when necessary (or even only in the most glaring
cases), meant that UNTAC was unable to deal effectively with
corruption and with the continuing SOC intimidation of political
figures from other parties during the election period.
It also served up on a silver platter spurious justification for
the decision of the 'Party of Democratic Kampuchea', the Khmer
Rouge, not to comply with key provisions of the Paris
Agreements...(4)
The Khmer Rouge were highly reluctant to allow the UN access to
their base areas and by May 1992 announced that their forces could
not be disarmed under UN supervision unless the administration of
the SOC was completely dismantled. The UN proceeded with a partial
disarmament and demobilisation of forces of the other three
factions but the Khmer Rouge remained apart from the process. UNTAC
attempted to impose sanctions on the Khmer Rouge. However, while
China had cancelled its material support to the Khmer Rouge in
accord with the Paris Agreements, the movement had built up a
lucrative trade relationship with Thai business interests in gems
and timber and had an income from this which was ample to sustain
their armed resistance. By the end of 1992 the UN effectively
stopped attempting to implement the full extent of the Paris
Agreements and concentrated on promoting the development of a new
Cambodian government with domestic and international legitimacy
through the planned national elections.(5)
UNTAC's problems and an atmosphere of continuing violence
(especially by SOC elements and by the Khmer Rouge, including
brutal attacks on Vietnamese residents in Cambodia designed to
exploit ethnic tensions) led to a pessimistic outlook among many
observers in the lead up to the scheduled elections (on 23-28 May
1993). However, UNTAC's electoral component had done an excellent
job in conducting voter registration and in preparing for the
conduct of the polls. In the event, the elections attracted the
participation of 4.2 million voters, nearly ninety percent of the
enrolled Cambodian electorate. The holding of these obviously
highly popular and credible elections both legitimised UNTAC's
whole effort and provided a basis for the development of a new
government for Cambodia.
The elections ushered in a new era for Cambodia. In the
elections the pro-Sihanouk FUNCINPEC emerged as the largest party
with 45 percent of the vote (and 58 out of 120 constituent assembly
seats) while the formerly dominant CPP gained 38 percent and 51
seats. The Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (representing KPNLF
elements) gained 3.8 percent and 10 seats while a minor party,
Moulinaka, obtained one seat. Since a two-thirds majority of the
new assembly was required to approve a new constitution,
cooperation between the two major parties was a necessity. The two
major electoral winners, FUNCINPEC and the CPP, accordingly
negotiated about formation of a coalition government. A new
constitution was enacted and the Kingdom of Cambodia was
established. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who had been Cambodia's head
of state until 1970, had subsequently been titular leader of the
resistance forces opposed to Vietnam's presence and who had played
a major role in the negotiations to achieve a settlement, was
reinstated as constitutional monarch on 24 September 1993.
There was intense competition between the CPP and FUNCINPEC
after the elections (including a short-lived secessionist move in
June 1993 by dissident CPP elements). After negotiations in which
FUNCINPEC was placed under heavy pressure from the CPP to agree to
a sharing of ministerial power, the two parties had by October been
able to form a coalition government. This had the unusual
characteristic of having two designated prime ministers, an
arrangement written formally into the Constitution and to apply
until after the next elections, due to be held in 1998. The
government's two leaders, First Prime Minister Prince Norodom
Ranariddh (FUNCINPEC) and Second Prime Minister Hun Sen (CPP), made
several foreign visits together and at first appeared to be
cooperating effectively. The newly formed Royal Cambodian Armed
Forces (RCAF), which had brought together the forces of the SOC
regime with those of its former opponents from FUNCINPEC and the
KPNLF, had begun operations in late 1993. The Khmer Rouge remained
intact but had suffered a severe political reverse through the
success of the elections which their intimidation had signally
failed to disrupt. Cambodia continued to face massive problems of
economic recovery but it now had a functioning and internationally
recognised government and the international community had pledged
to support the reconstruction process with funding through the
International Committee for the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC),
another outcome of the Paris Agreements.(6)
For Cambodia, an optimistic 'honeymoon' period in internal
politics was soon replaced by a more sober reality. It became clear
that, while the UN's involvement had helped give Cambodia a new
start, the long-term damage and debilitation suffered by Cambodian
society from 1970 had left a legacy of political and armed
conflict, poverty and administrative weakness which were likely to
take several decades to overcome.
The problems facing the new Royal Government became evident in
early 1994 when an over-ambitious effort to confront the Khmer
Rouge in several of their base areas resulted in a military rout
for the government side which exposed the inefficiency and
corruption of its armed forces. After the failure of tentative
efforts to develop reconciliation talks, the Khmer Rouge were
banned by the government in July 1994, but this was a policy which
the government did not have the military or administrative
capacities to implement effectively.(7)
Political tensions in 1995 and 1996: Democratic institutions
under pressure
Further political tensions have been evident in 1995 and 1996.
Tensions have revolved around two separate although related issues:
the problems of maintaining the liberal institutions and practices
established after 1993, and the continuation of suspicions and
hostilities both within and between the major political parties,
suspicions which stem from the legacies of over twenty years of
civil war.
As a part of the internationally-agreed process to seek an end
to the Cambodia conflict, the Paris Agreements prescribed that a
new regime should be established through democratic elections and
with ongoing protection for human rights, including the rights to
free political expression and press comment. There was little
historical or social basis for such institutions and values in
Cambodia and so the goal of developing them in a country with
severe damage remaining from the Khmer Rouge years and from over
two decades of internal war was clearly ambitious. There has
continued to be a strong commitment among many Cambodians for the
preservation of liberal values and practices: a number of Non
Governmental Organisations have continued to promote human rights
and these have also been monitored by the United Nations Centre for
Human Rights and by the UN Secretary General's Special
Representative on Human Rights in Cambodia (a position held until
early 1996 by Justice Michael Kirby from Australia). However since
1993, democratic practices in Cambodia have come under considerable
pressure.
In a review of Cambodian politics in late 1995, the American
analyst (and former UNTAC senior official) Steve Heder argued
that:
...the inspiration for Cambodian politics has shifted from the
Western variant of 'democracy' to an eastern and Southeast Asian
one that emphasises 'prosperity' rather than 'pluralism'. In the
name of political stability and economic development, as well as in
order to fight a lingering and murderous insurgency, the country's
current 'multiparty' ruling elite coalition ... has been working to
dampen open political contestation and to deliberalize the
political atmosphere by co-opting, cowing, or marginalising centers
of power, including those that emerged from civil society as a
result of the opening effected by UNTAC, pursuant to the Paris
Agreements.(8)
Several developments have illustrated the illiberal trends
identified by Heder. In October 1994, Sam Rainsy, a FUNCINPEC
member and Minister of Finance, was dismissed from his position
after he had alienated elements in both FUNCINPEC and the CPP by
his pursuit of central government control over finance and by his
opposition to corrupt activities. In 1995 Rainsy was subsequently
expelled from both the National Assembly (in a way which brought
international criticism) and from FUNCINPEC. In November 1995,
Rainsy announced the establishment of a new opposition party, the
Khmer Nation Party (KNP), but the KNP immediately ran into
resistance from the government which refused to accord it legal
status (a dispute which was unresolved in mid 1996). KNP members
have also complained of official harassment.(9)
During the UNTAC period press freedom was re-established and
since 1993 a lively newspaper industry has existed with over twenty
papers being published. In mid 1995 the National Assembly passed a
new press law that aroused concerns among some elements of the
press and human rights groups. The law provided for fines and
possible gaol terms for publishing material deemed to affect
'national security and political instability' without however
clearly defining either term. The law has not been followed by
severe curtailment of the newspaper industry. However the Cambodian
press has experienced some incidences of violent attacks which have
been considered in at least some cases to have been politically
motivated. Several newspapers' offices have been attacked
physically and four editors killed in mysterious circumstances,
most recently in the case of Thun Bun Ly, editor of Udom Kati
Khmer (Khmer Ideal), who was shot on 18 May 1996. After this
killing, several other editors expressed fears for their
safety.(10)
Political tensions have also been fuelled by divisions both
within and between the major political parties (the two types of
divisions have, not surprisingly, sometimes been inter-linked).
FUNCINPEC has experienced internal strain over issues including the
departure of Sam Rainsy (who had been one its best known ministers)
and over its relative degree of influence vis-a vis the CPP (see
below). The CPP has seen internal tensions between Hun Sen and
other senior leaders, notably Interior Minister Sar Kheng and
National Assembly Chairman Chea Sim.(11) The Buddhist Liberal
Democratic Party (BLDP) experienced a split in mid 1995 and the
opposition Khmer Nation Party led by Sam Rainsy has also
experienced (less serious) divisions.(12)
The most serious focus for these intra and inter-party tensions,
however, has been increasing evidence of ongoing suspicion between
the two major governing coalition partners, FUNCINPEC and the
CPP.
When the 1993 elections saw over eighty percent of the votes
gained by the incumbent CPP and the opposition FUNCINPEC, but with
neither party gaining a clear majority in the National Assembly, it
was the cooperation between these two parties which made the
formation of a government possible. In the early months of the new
government, it did appear as if a process of cooperation if not
reconciliation was underway. However the longstanding tensions
between the two parties have come increasingly to the forefront of
Cambodian politics. A key stimulus for this has been the prospect
of the campaign for the next elections scheduled for 1998.
According to the Constitution, the system of two co-prime ministers
in force after 1993 will be replaced by just one prime minister.
This has started to concentrate the major parties' attention on the
need to consolidate their positions and to differentiate their
stances, a process which has brought inter-party resentments
increasingly to the surface.
Inter-party rivalry has had a number of manifestations which
together produced a high level of tension in late 1995 and the
first five months of 1996. FUNCINPEC was placed under strain in
late 1995 by the arrest of its Secretary General, Prince Norodom
Sirivudh, a half brother of King Norodom Sihanouk. Sirivudh, a
former Foreign Minister (who had resigned in October 1994 in
sympathy with Sam Rainsy), was arrested on 18 November after he had
allegedly threatened to kill Second Prime Minister Hun Sen in a
conversation intercepted by the government. Sirivudh went into
exile at the end of the year and was sentenced to ten years
imprisonment in a trial in February 1996. The conduct of the trial
was criticised by foreign governments (including Australia) and
human rights groups. Sirivudh's arrest was seen widely as an
indication of tensions between and within the Cambodian governing
parties, especially between Hun Sen and the CPP and their coalition
partner FUNCINPEC.
Tensions continued at the beginning of 1996. In a move that
seemed calculated to irritate FUNCINPEC, the CPP moved to have 7
January restored as a national holiday. This was a potentially
divisive step because this is the date on which in 1979 Vietnamese
and Cambodian allied forces occupied Phnom Penh after the invasion
which ousted the Khmer Rouge regime. Although the day is celebrated
by the CPP - the party which Vietnam installed in power in Phnom
Penh after the invasion - precisely for this reason the day is
regarded with antipathy by FUNCINPEC and other former resistance
forces. The holiday was reinstated at the instigation of Hun Sen.
First Prime Minister Ranariddh agreed to the move and this was seen
within some FUNCINPEC circles as another undesirable concession to
the CPP. The alienation between the two governing parties was
highlighted again by FUNCINPEC's choice of 21 March for the holding
of its congress: that date commemorated the establishment of the
party as a resistance movement against the Vietnamese presence and
against their Cambodian allies in the CPP who ruled the country in
alliance with Vietnam.
The two parties have had further areas of disagreement. The
proliferation of business deals between elements in the governing
coalition and foreign investors has been a source of potential
division. A major deal was concluded in 1995 between the Malaysian
Ariston group and the government to develop the port of
Sihanoukville and one of its elements was to be a monopoly for
Ariston in conducting the lucrative casino industry (see section
below on economic developments). However this deal, which has been
identified particularly with FUNCINPEC, cut across interests which
already have casino licenses issued before the 1993 elections and
which are associated with the CPP.(13) A further source of
irritation was produced by a proposal sponsored by the CPP that
Cambodians holding dual nationality should not be allowed to
compete for office. This concept seemed aimed especially at a
number of FUNCINPEC figures (including First Prime Minister
Ranariddh) and other people including Sam Rainsy. At the time of
writing the proposal is not being proceeded with, but it was
another manifestation of the resentment between the Cambodians who
were in the country during the 1980s, and those who were in exile
and who only returned after the period of UN involvement.
The tensions between FUNCINPEC and the CPP became clearly
evident in March 1996 at the time of the FUNCINPEC party congress.
The congress was the first held by the party since 1992 and its
assumption of office after the elections. As such it served to
focus the frustrations held by many FUNCINPEC members at the fact
that although their party won more votes and seats than its main
rival the CPP, it nonetheless has ended up as very much the junior
partner in the coalition. While the CPP and FUNCINPEC have shared
ministerial office, the CPP has retained control of most of the
armed forces, and of the police and militia. The CPP has also
remained dominant at the provincial and local levels. FUNCINPEC,
which did try to set up a country wide organisation before the 1993
elections, has not since been able to match the CPP in organising
capacity. FUNCINPEC's limited share of power in relation to the CPP
has caused much disquiet in party ranks as have concerns about
allegations of corruption against some senior party members.(14) As
the question of the next elections in 1998 has been gaining more
attention, many FUNCINPEC members have naturally begun to worry
about their prospects of keeping their share of the vote.(15)
In a move which seemed designed to give expression to the
frustration within FUNCINPEC ranks at the party's limited share of
power, Prince Ranariddh declared that if there was no immediate
sharing of power within the coalition, 'FUNCINPEC must pull out of
the government and become an opposition party in the National
Assembly.' The CPP reacted strongly to this comment: in a statement
issued on 26 March, the party condemned Ranriddh's threat to leave
the coalition, saying that this had adversely affected political
stability and that the CPP 'categorically oppose[d] any act...
leading to an early dissolution of the National Assembly'. Hun Sen
also declared that he would use force against anyone who sought to
end the government's term of office early.(16) In the event, the
two parties moved to contain the discord and after further meetings
reaffirmed their determination to remain in coalition.
However, the potential for further clashes remained. In May, Hun
Sen was reported to have expressed his suspicion that pro-FUNCINPEC
senior military officers in the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces had
undermined the recent efforts to capture the Khmer Rouge base at
Pailin. In the same month there were also reports that violence has
been occurring in the provinces directed particularly against
FUNCINPEC and the Khmer Nation Party and this has been the worst
since the period leading up to the 1993 elections. The reports
included the alleged killing of a KNP member, the ransacking of a
FUNCINPEC office in Ratanakiri province, and the confiscation of
weapons belonging to FUNCINPEC members. The intimidation was seen
as part of the CPP's response to the FUNCINPEC threat to pull out
of the coalition government.
On 26 May the Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister (and CPP member)
Sar Kheng said that if the distrust between the CPP and FUNCINPEC
'continues to intensify towards the use of military force',
Cambodia would be taken back to where it was before the United
Nations intervention. He spoke of 'troops and police' which had
been readied 'here and there' and declared that 'the two main
parties cannot be broken up. A break-up means death'. Cambodia's
neighbours in ASEAN also made their concern evident when Malaysian
Foreign Minister Badawi, acting as an informal emissary for ASEAN,
went to Cambodia and had meetings with the two prime ministers: he
is reported to have advised them that if the two leaders resorted
to violence then Cambodia would be on its own.(17)
The immediate outlook
The situation in early July remained strained although the two
major coalition parties appeared to have moved to contain the level
of tensions between them. However, although relations between the
CPP and FUNCINPEC have clearly deteriorated in the past year, it is
not necessarily in either party's interest for the coalition to
break up. For Prince Ranariddh, while the distribution of power to
FUNCINPEC is unsatisfactory, leaving the coalition would hand over
all power to the CPP. Some of Hun Sen's comments suggest that he
would see a departure of FUNCINPEC from the government as a pretext
to suspend the constitutional process altogether. For the CPP,
while sharing power with FUNCINPEC may be distasteful, the
continuation of the coalition prevents the CPP from being accused
of having usurped all power to itself despite its election loss in
1993. If FUNCINPEC departed from the government, this might also
encourage a realignment of the opposition parties and might see
cooperation or an alliance between FUNCINPEC and Sam Rainsy and the
KNP, a development which would not be in the interests of the
CPP.
However even if the coalition remains in operation, the open
antipathy which has been displayed in recent months suggests that
the political climate will remain strained in the lead up to the
local elections which are scheduled for mid 1997 and the 1998
national elections. Further conflict cannot be ruled out and there
are at least three possibilities which could see the situation
inflamed. Firstly, while the CPP and FUNCINPEC are continuing in
coalition at present, it is possible that FUNCINPEC's leaders might
review this position in the lead up to the national elections.
FUNCINPEC might consider that its electoral prospects might be
enhanced by separating from the formal coalition arrangement and
running for office in open competition with the CPP. Such an
electoral contest between the two major parties in the National
Assembly in an election campaign conducted without the balancing
role played by the large UNTAC presence in 1993 might see tensions
generated which could be difficult to contain. Secondly, the
continuation of political tensions in a highly armed society makes
political violence a real possibility. The assassination of a
political leader cannot be ruled out. Such a development could see
the dangers of instability and possibly of armed clashes by rival
groups increase. A third potential source of added tension arises
from the uncertain role and health of the King.
King Sihanouk's role
An additional factor which has added to the sense of instability
in Cambodian politics has been King Sihanouk's apparently declining
capacity to play the balancing role which he has played at times in
the past. During the UN involvement and the period immediately
after the 1993 elections, Sihanouk acted as a symbol of national
unity and of the capacity for the major Cambodian parties to
negotiate and cooperate. However the period since the elections has
seen the King's influence decline and his health problems (at 73
years of age he is suffering from several illnesses including
cancer) have caused considerable concerns about both his own future
and that of the monarchy itself.
In comments in March 1996 King Sihanouk commented in a somewhat
pessimistic vein about his own position and that of the royalist
party, FUNCINPEC. In a letter to Prince Ranariddh on 8 March, King
Sihanouk commented that his future was 'seriously mortgaged'
because of health problems and his health would 'inevitably lead
one day to my incapacitation to work to serve our country and its
well-loved and respected people'. The letter followed an interview
with the Cambodia Daily in which the King said that he
thought that the CPP was gaining popularity 'for many reasons' and
might well win the next elections, with Hun Sen becoming the sole
Prime Minister. He also stated that if he died before the next
election 'Ranariddh will be King' and that Hun Sen had told him
that he wanted Ranariddh to be King. In that event 'FUNCINPEC would
disappear and you would have a very powerful head of parliament and
party. FUNCINPEC would disappear as Ranariddh would be King, and a
King must not have a party, even indirectly'. He expressed the
opinion that Prince Sirivudh might have been the best successor to
Ranariddh as FUNCINPEC leader but since Sirivudh had been
'politically liquidated' and Hun Sen was unlikely to pardon him
'for twenty years' that option was out, and that added to his fears
that FUNCINPEC would disappear. The King added to his pessimistic
comments by saying that astrologers had predicted that he would die
at the age of 74 (ie within the next year).(18)
The King's pessimistic appraisal of his own health is not
necessarily shared by observers. Indeed, in his well known
mercurial and sometimes provocative style, King Sihanouk may well
have been attempting to stimulate FUNCINPEC leaders and members
into more concerted action to protect their party's position and
boost its organisation. However the King's comments also
highlighted the potential problems for Cambodia which might arise
on his death. Under the Constitution the successor to the throne is
to be chosen by a seven member Royal Council of Throne, but this
needs to be established by law and such a law has yet to be passed
by the National Assembly. The question of choosing a successor to
King Sihanouk would be likely to be a difficult challenge for the
Throne Council, because it would be difficult to select a candidate
who would be acceptable to all the major parties. This issue adds
another element of uncertainty to the political situation.
The Khmer Rouge: down but not out
While the political parties compete for power in Phnom Penh, the
Khmer Rouge continue to operate as a diminished but still
operational guerilla force. The death of Pol Pot, who is the
clearly pre-eminent leader of the movement, might well weaken the
Khmer Rouge substantially but reports of his demise in early June
appear to have been premature.
The peace process and the 1993 elections did succeed in pushing
the Khmer Rouge to the margins of Cambodian politics. While the
Khmer Rouge have sought to continue to justify their struggle on
the grounds that Cambodia remains in danger of Vietnamese
domination, this rationale has appeared decreasingly relevant to
Cambodians. The Khmer Rouge has been able to retain a number of
armed units which operate with a functional central command. The
movement (as noted above) also has had continuing access to
financial support because of its continued occupation of the gem
mining area of Pailin and of areas of forest which it has exploited
by allowing logging under license. The Khmer Rouge, however, appear
to have lost all material support from China since the Paris
Agreements and informal assistance from elements in Thailand is
thought to have declined substantially since 1994. The ongoing
financial potential from timber concessions and the gem trade have
also increased internal tensions within the Khmer Rouge, as
fighters in the jungle have seen evidence that in a number of cases
commanders have kept for personal use some of the wealth gained by
the movement's commercial activities. The movement has been
weakened severely by large scale defections, which have totalled at
least 12,000 people.(19) Recent estimates of Khmer Rouge strength
suggest that this may be in the region of 3,000 - 6,000 armed
personnel, a substantial decline from the level of up to 30,000
estimated before the Paris Agreements.
In 1995 and 1996 the Khmer Rouge continued to retain strength in
northern Cambodia and were able to maintain pressure on some
communications routes, such as highway 5 which they were attacking
in early 1996. The government's Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF)
have not been able to decisively defeat the guerrillas or prevent
their occupation of key areas such as Pailin (southwest of the town
of Battambang, near the Thai border). However, the RCAF appears to
have been able to operate with greater effectiveness since the
debacles in early 1994. The RCAF has received assistance to improve
its training and organisational capacities from several countries
including the United States, France and Australia (see below). The
government has also made some progress in implementing plans for
reform of its forces.
The RCAF did not suffer severe reverses in the 1995 dry season
and in the 1996 season observers considered that the government
forces were showing further signs of improvement. The RCAF in early
1996 was evidently able to extend its areas of control in northern
Cambodia although the dry season ended with Pailin still under
Khmer Rouge control. The government's failure to delver a decisive
blow against the Khmer Rouge was partially offset by a significant
defection of a high ranking commander. In March, Keo Pong, who is
believed to have been the fourth highest ranking Khmer Rouge
military leader, led the whole of the 18th division (which normally
operated in Kompong Speu province) over to the government; the
defectors, including dependents, numbered 1,665.
After his defection, Keo Pong had said that both Pol Pot (who is
68 years old) and another senior leader, Noun Chea, were in poor
health. The issue of the Khmer Rouge's leadership and prospects was
highlighted further by reports in early June that Pol Pot had died.
These reports turned out to be ambiguous and in late June were
rebutted by a senior Khmer Rouge figure.(20) The death of Pol Pot
would be likely to diminish the Khmer Rouge's capacities: Professor
David Chandler, author of a biography of 'Brother Number One', has
argued that he has always been clearly the predominant leader of
the Khmer Rouge and that there is no obvious successor.(21) Without
Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge would still have effective armed forces
and the capacity to conduct substantial business deals and raise
finance from them; these might help give the group some continued
raison d'etre. Nonetheless, the Khmer Rouge have been marginalised
in Cambodian politics. Even with Pol Pot still able to provide
leadership they appear likely to be able to continue to disrupt
government control in some parts of the country but not to overturn
it altogether. However they appear likely remain as a force with
the potential to cause some disruption in the lead up to the 1998
elections.
While political tensions have continued, Cambodia's economy has
shown some signs of growth and progress towards recovery. This
growth, however, has been largely concentrated in urban areas with
the majority of the rural population experiencing little change so
far. Cambodia's prospects for recovery are also hampered by the
effects of political instability and by severe institutional
weaknesses, which have deterred many investors and attracted those
interested in exploitative developments for short term gain. In
this environment, natural resources such as timber have continued
to be exploited at unsustainable levels.
According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in its latest
regional survey, Cambodia's economy grew in 1995 at 7.5 percent, a
rise from 4 percent in 1994. Agriculture remains the mainstay of
the economy and the sector benefited from an increase in rice
production in 1995 of 25 percent and of rubber by 15 percent.
Investment continued to increase and reached a level of 22 percent
of GDP in 1995, an increase from 14.5 percent in 1993 and 19.5
percent in 1994. Private sector investment in 1995 amounted to
about 70 percent of the total. Inflation in 1995 was contained at
an annual rate of 3.5 percent. The Asian Development Bank has
observed that
The Government's fiscal position is expected to improve over the
next two years as the tax/GDP ratio rises as a result of improved
tax administration under the new tax system, reduced spending on
defence and security, and reforms in the civil service
system.(22)
The ADB also pointed to favourable trends in exports (which rose
by 55.7 percent in 1995). Although Cambodia had a substantial
current account deficit, this was offset by investment and by aid
which amounted to about 40 percent of the national budget.
There have been strong signs of increasing interest in
Cambodia's economy from countries in East and Southeast Asia. Trade
with Asian countries has been increasing rapidly. Singapore was
Cambodia's largest trade partner with two way trade worth $US 485
million for the January-October period compared with $US 350
million for 1994. Interest in the economy from China has also been
growing: about 50 companies have ventures in Cambodia and investors
from mainland China have been able to link up with a revived
Cambodian-Chinese business community. Cambodia has also opened up
non-official links with Taiwan through the 'Phnom Penh Economic and
Cultural Representative Office' which opened in Taipei in January
1996.(23) Another sign of economic revival has been the numbers of
foreign visitors: visitors increased by 24 percent in 1995, with
tourist numbers rising by 38 percent.
However these generally positive trends co-exist with severe
structural problems. Several inter-related factors have damaged
Cambodia's prospects for attracting and benefiting from productive
investment. After over twenty years of internal conflict and
international isolation, Cambodia was left with very limited
administrative resources. The civil service has a limited budget
which allows many officials to be paid at about only $US 20 per
month. Many officials often lack the technical training to enable
them to assess competing investment proposals. The civil service
has also been loosely organised: a census of the government
bureaucracy in February 1995 found that 4,000 positions officially
drawing salaries were not actually occupied. The bureaucracy is
therefore vulnerable to attempts at bribery and corruption. The
fact that Cambodia's government is composed of jealous coalition
partners has also acted as an incentive for competing ministers to
maximise their financial positions by arranging favourable deals
with domestic and especially foreign business.
A number of domestic and foreign business figures and groups
have been keen to benefit from Cambodia's weak infrastructure. As
one recent survey noted:
...both domestic and foreign middlemen are exploiting Cambodia's
nascent investment scene with suspect methods. Deals are won by
paying off government officials, and often the project is resold
for a profit. Projects end up in the hands of firms that are
under-financed, incompetent, or simply greedy. While some middlemen
are bringing higher standards to Cambodia, the broker culture
continues to spawn suspicious deals.(24)
A recent example of a contentious investment project has been
the government's deal with the Malaysian Ariston company for the
development of Sihanoukville. The project proposed by Ariston
included an international airport, a power station, a telecoms
project and a four star hotel and casino on Naga island. Although
several internationally known corporations bid for the project, the
little known Ariston group won the contract: the company's only
other known project had been a 20.8 hectare real estate development
in Kuala Lumpur. The contract was signed by the Cambodian
government on 3 January 1995; on 25 January, Prince Ranariddh
unveiled a jet aircraft which had been given to the government by a
sister corporation of Ariston. It was later reported that Ariston
had gained a monopoly to provide casinos in Cambodia. While a
floating casino owned by Ariston opened in Phnom Penh in May 1995,
the Sihanoukville projects have appeared to make slow progress,
which has led to suspicions that Ariston will gain profits from the
casino without completing the Sihanoukville project.(25)
Cambodia's weak institutions have also attracted dubious
operations in the finance sector. A report by the Ministry of
Finance in 1995 identified 19 of the 29 banks in Phnom Penh as
fronts for money laundering operations. This development has been
associated with concerns that Cambodia is becoming involved heavily
in the narcotics trade and in the laundering of monies from this
trade. This issue attracted international coverage in November 1995
and has aroused considerable concern in a number of countries
including the United States. The government is trying to counter
the problems but they remain substantial.(26)
The administrative and business climate in Cambodia has, not
surprisingly, left its natural resources vulnerable to excessive
exploitation. The country's timber reserves are one of its most
important resources but major concerns have been expressed about
the way they are being depleted. A joint report by the United
Nations Development Program, the World Bank and the United Nations
Food and Agricultural Organisation prepared in late 1995 is
reported to present a pessimistic picture of the state of
Cambodia's forests. The executive summary stated that 'current
policies risk deepening and accelerating deforestation by repeating
mistakes made in other forest-rich developing countries'.
Cambodia's timber resources, the report said, are being exploited
at five times the natural replacement capacity and are being sold
at about a fifth of the available world rate. Cambodia is estimated
to be earning about $US 20 million per year from forest resources.
By auctioning concession rights, raising royalties in line with
world prices, and enforcing environmental rules, it estimated that
the Kingdom could realise $US 100 million annually, and the logging
could be sustainable. The report argued that foreign timber
companies had not done proper resource assessments and 'have
systematically overestimated timber availability'. Companies would
therefore have to log so much land to realise their commitments
that the demands on Cambodia's resources would be unsustainable The
report advocated a revision of policy which would restrict the rate
of exploitation of logs per hectare. Any companies not adhering to
commitments could be declared in default and the concessions
reallocated after transparent and competitive bidding. This would
encourage smaller operations employing more local labour. The
report is due to be considered by the next meeting of donor
countries of the Consultative Group in mid July 1996.(27)
The Paris Agreements and the 1993 elections provided a basis for
Cambodia to escape from its extended period of relative
international isolation. The Agreements played a crucial role in
alleviating regional and international tensions over Cambodia and
paved the way for the substantially improved relations between a
number of regional states, especially Vietnam and both China and
the ASEAN countries (in July 1995 Vietnam joined ASEAN as a full
member). While internal conditions remain uncertain, Cambodia has
been able to open up much wider international and regional
relationships although its relations with its larger immediate
neighbours, Thailand and Vietnam, have experienced some strain.
Cambodia has retained considerable international goodwill in the
wake of the UN involvement and relations with a number of major
powers have improved. Cambodia, for example, has an agreement on
economic assistance with the European Union, which pledged further
aid in May 1996. Japan is also a substantial donor.
The United States provides both civil and 'non-lethal' military
aid and Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited in September
1995. A process is underway which should see Cambodia granted 'Most
Favoured Nation' (ie normal) status in trade relations with the US
although the required bill has not yet passed through the Congress.
The US government has viewed with some concern Cambodia's political
tensions and at the end of 1995 relations were strained by comments
by Hun Sen in which he criticised the US for what he saw as delays
in the MFN approval process. The US has also been concerned at
recent reports of narcotics trafficking through Cambodia. In March
1996 the US administration announced that it had placed Cambodia on
its list of 'drug watch countries'; a country placed on this list
has one year to satisfy the US that it has taken action to redress
drug related problems, or risk having its aid cut.
Cambodia has also been improving relations with China, until
1991 the most bitter international opponent of the regime in Phnom
Penh and of Vietnam's presence and policies in Cambodia. In a
striking development in policy, China since 1993 has been prepared
to grant some economic assistance and in April 1996 took the
further step of providing some military aid as well. A Chinese
military delegation led by the Vice Chairman of the Central
Military Commission, Zhang Wannian, visited Phnom Penh and after
meeting the two prime ministers and senior military officials
announced the granting of $US1 million in 'non-lethal' assistance
and also offered to provide training. China's move was considered
to reflect its desire that Cambodia should not receive military
assistance solely from Western countries.(28)
Since 1993 Cambodia has developed much closer relations with the
members of ASEAN, especially Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, as
well as Thailand. This trend resulted in Cambodia's acceptance as
an observer in ASEAN in July 1995. King Sihanouk had held long term
reservations about ASEAN as a group but in 1995 had to concede to
the pressures for closer association. He made official visits to
Malaysia and Indonesia in 1995 to consolidate this process.
Cambodia has now applied formally to join ASEAN, a development it
hopes will occur in 1997. Cambodia would have substantial problems
in meeting the demands of ASEAN membership (not least the numerous
consultations and committees involved) and its economy is not
likely to be ready to take part in the planned ASEAN Free Trade
Area for many years. Nonetheless, ASEAN seems likely to accept
Cambodia as a member in the near future and this would enhance its
international image considerably.(29)
While relations with ASEAN as a group have been developing
rapidly, Cambodia has difficult relations with two of its members
who are also immediate neighbours, Thailand and Vietnam. Cambodia
has traditionally had difficult relations with its large and
dynamic neighbours and its economic and administrative weakness has
not enhanced its position. Relations with Thailand have been
clouded by the legacies of the conflict during the 1980s between
Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea against the
resistance guerilla forces, which operated from Thai territory. The
formation of a new Cambodian government after the 1993 elections
provided new opportunities for relations but problems have
remained. In 1994 tensions between the two countries were
considerable, after allegations of Thai involvement in a coup
attempt in July and of continuing assistance from elements in
Thailand to the Khmer Rouge. From 1995, relations have improved as
Thailand has appeared to curtail sharply the capacity of the Khmer
Rouge to obtain material supplies from Thai territory. Several
ministerial visits resulted in agreements on the re-opening of
border checkpoints and on transport links.
Thai Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-Archa visited Cambodia in June
1996 and signed agreements for studies for a hydro-electric dam
project and for further trade and economic cooperation. Prime
Minister Banharn also stressed to the two Cambodian prime ministers
the concerns Thailand and ASEAN have about the state of cooperation
between the coalition partners, (although his attempt to
symbolically link hands with the two Cambodian leaders was received
negatively by Prince Ranariddh, who considered it intrusive).(30)
The two co-prime ministers sought to reassure Banharn that this
cooperation was still in operation. The two countries also agreed
to discuss problems of overlapping claims in territorial waters in
the gulf of Thailand and through the joint Boundary
Commission.(31)
Cambodia's relationship with Vietnam is also a source of
existing and potential tensions, but with the level of suspicion
much higher among many Cambodians, partly because of Vietnam's
presence from 1979 to 1989. Vietnam was a signatory to the Paris
Agreements and moves were made soon after the inauguration of the
new government in 1993 to create an improved relationship but some
problems have continued. Difficulties were experienced after a
large number of Vietnamese residents in Cambodia were forced to
flee to the Cambodia-Vietnam border after Khmer Rouge attacks in
1993. Several thousand people remained on the border for over a
year before they could be repatriated. Some friction has also been
experienced because of the activities of Vietnamese groups in
Cambodia who are opposed to the government in Hanoi and who have
allegedly received financial support from the US. The Cambodian
government has expressed its opposition to such activities.(32)
The issue of border demarcation has also been controversial and
a joint commission has been established to handle it. In 1996
further controversy arose over the issue of border crossings by
Vietnamese farmers who were alleged to be occupying Cambodian
territory. The issue seems rather to have been the result of
Vietnamese having leased land in Cambodia for agriculture after
payments to Cambodian landholders, but the matter was inflamed by
comments by Cambodia's political leaders including Prince
Ranariddh.(33) The comments were also a reflection of domestic
political tensions within the coalition, since many members of
FUNCINPEC see the issue of attitudes to Vietnam as a point of
differentiation with the CPP, which ruled in alliance with Vietnam
for a decade. As the Economist Intelligence Unit has observed,
'being tough on Vietnam is a sure vote winner in Cambodia'.(34) The
immediate problems in early 1996 were eased after a visit to Phnom
Penh by Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet, which resulted in the creation
of mechanisms to enable border problems to be dealt with at the
local or provincial levels: Prince Ranariddh subsequently described
the outcome as 'very, very positive'.(35) While some contention is
likely to continue, both countries have incentives to contain the
level of disputation.
Australian interest in Cambodia grew steadily from the late
1970s and the efforts to contribute towards development of a
settlement for the conflict in Cambodia was one of the most
significant elements in Australian foreign policy in the past
decade. Australia's extensive involvement in UNTAC and the peace
process has given it a strong interest in the progress of Cambodia
since the elections.
Australia had limited involvement in Cambodia up to the late
1970s but the aftermath of the Khmer Rouge regime and the long
period of conflict which followed saw a substantial increase in
Australian interest. Australians contributed generously to the
efforts to provide relief aid in 1979 and public antipathy to the
Khmer Rouge played a role in the decision of the Fraser
Liberal-National Party government to withdraw diplomatic
recognition from the ousted Khmer Rouge regime (a decision
implemented in February 1981). From 1983, the Hawke Labor
government increased emphasis on pursuit of an Australian
diplomatic contribution to try to explore dialogue over Cambodia
and avenues for a resolution of the conflict.
In the late 1980s, with the decline of Cold War confrontation,
the climate for Australian interest improved greatly. Senator
Gareth Evans (Foreign Minister from September 1988) devoted
substantial attention to Cambodia and the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade developed proposals for a transitional role for
the United Nations in Cambodia into a detailed blueprint for such
an involvement. This concept was taken up by regional countries
including ASEAN and was ultimately adopted by the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council. Intensive diplomacy (including
many missions by Senator Evans' special envoy, Michael Costello)
paved the way for the conclusion of the Paris Agreements in October
1991 which provided for the establishment of the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).
Australia made a substantial contribution to UNTAC in 1992-1993.
Australia provided the Force Commander, Lieutenant-General John
Sanderson, the Deputy Electoral Commissioner and over 500 other
personnel (mainly military communicators). In April 1993, just
before the elections, Australia sent a further 100 personnel and
six helicopters to bolster UNTAC. Australia welcomed warmly the
successful conduct of the elections and the formation of the new
Royal Government.
Political and diplomatic relations
Australia, as a major proponent of the peace process and United
Nations involvement in Cambodia, has continued to be closely
interested in the progress of the newly re-established Royal
Government. Australia has maintained an active bilateral
relationship and has given concrete backing to recovery efforts
through both strong support in the ICORC and a bilateral aid
program of $A92 million over four years (1994-1998). Some areas of
contention have been evident, however, as Australia has maintained
the hope that Cambodia would be able to both pursue economic
recovery and also maintain the liberal political institutions and
practices which were established through the Paris Agreements of
1991.
After a period of initial optimism about the prospects for
recovery in Cambodia, bilateral relations between Australia and
Cambodia in 1994 came to be dominated by two separate incidents
involving the traumatic capture and execution by Khmer Rouge
elements of two Australians, Kellie Wilkinson and David Wilson, in
April and July respectively. These events naturally attracted
substantial public attention in Australia and also highlighted the
difficulties faced by the new Royal Government in organising and
coordinating its efforts to both maintain internal security and
combat the Khmer Rouge. In the second half of 1994, the Khmer Rouge
had sought to exploit their capture of David Wilson (along with his
British and French companions) to try to pressure the Australian
government into refusing to extend assistance to the Royal
Cambodian Armed Forces. The crisis delayed an Australian decision
on military assistance by several months. The confirmation at the
end of October 1994 of David Wilson's death was followed by the
announcement on 29 November of a reaffirmation of Australia's
commitment to support Cambodia and an increase in Australian
assistance to the RCAF in a package of measures designed to improve
its training and organisation.(36)
Bilateral relations since late 1994 have continued to be close,
with a number of high level visits being made from both countries,
including that of Governor General Bill Hayden in April 1995, which
was the first by a foreign head of state to Cambodia since the 1993
elections. However, comments in March 1995 by Gordon Bilney
(Minister for Development Cooperation and Pacific Island Affairs)
in Parliament and in an address to the ICORC in Tokyo, signalled a
new and more critical note in Australia's ongoing policy of support
for the new Cambodian government. Speaking to Parliament on 8 March
1995, Bilney highlighted Australian concerns about recent reports
about corruption in Cambodia which he said he feared '... are of
considerable substance'. He said that:
Having been given a fresh start by the Paris peace accords,
Cambodia has now reached a crossroads where it can choose the path
of a jungle economy where the power of the bribe is greater than
the power of law, or sound economic management, transparency and
the supremacy of the legal process. Australia is, of course, a
major donor of development assistance to Cambodia and all the
donors are saying to the Cambodian government that now is the time
to nip the trend of corruption in the bud - difficult as it is -
and not later, when it is too late.
Bilney emphasised the importance of entrenching what he termed
'good governance' in Cambodia, which should involve not only
suppressing corruption but also strengthening protection for human
rights. He said that in recent discussions with Cambodian
ministers, Australia had stressed 'our concern about good
governance, economic management, human rights and
corruption'.(37)
The Australian government has continued to monitor the state of
'governance' in Cambodia, with some developments causing some
further concern. The expulsion of Sam Rainsy from the National
Assembly in mid 1995 brought criticism from both the Government and
the Opposition: Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Alexander Downer said
on 22 June that 'the Coalition regards this as a setback for
Cambodia's democratic institutions'.(38) The arrest of Prince
Sirivudh also brought criticism from Australia over its
implications for political liberty and expression in Cambodia. On
22 November, Gareth Evans said that while he was not able at that
stage to make a judgement on the case, he was 'concerned that this
may represent an exercise in dealing with a political opponent
rather than a serious concern about ...[an] assassination attempt
or conspiracy'.(39)
Senator Evans also criticised the trial of Prince Sirivudh in
February 1996, saying that the ten year sentence 'was very
depressing because I think it does demonstrate that the Cambodian
judiciary is less than wholly independent.' Evans' comments were
rejected by Cambodia's Minister for Justice and the Australian
government was also criticised in a student demonstration outside
the house of Ambassador Tony Kevin which appeared to be officially
sanctioned if not organised.(40)
Under the Howard Coalition government from March 1996, Australia
is maintaining its emphasis on supporting Cambodia's drive towards
economic recovery while advocating continued reform and adherence
to the institutions adopted through the Paris Agreements. In a
public statement on 10 May 1996 in Phnom Penh at a preparatory
meeting to the conference of the Consultative Group (the successor
to ICORC as the grouping of donors to Cambodia) in Tokyo on 15-16
July, Ambassador Kevin said that:
...our government continues to be committed to support the
efforts of the Cambodian government with your program of
development and nation building. At the same time, the Australian
government will expect the Cambodian government to continue to work
to improve the quality of governance and to commit all reasonable
resources to increasing the basic living standards of all Cambodian
citizens, particularly those in rural areas.
Australia noted with satisfaction the economic progress being
made by Cambodia including the achievement of 7 percent growth,
single figure inflation and the stability of the riel. At
the Consultative Group meeting, donors would be looking at a
continuing commitment to gaining high quality investment, a
reaffirmed commitment to the development of democratic, transparent
and accountable processes, maximisation of good management of
resources, continued efforts to extend the domestic revenue base
(including tax reform, and sustainable development in the forestry
sector). Ambassador Kevin also stated that security and political
stability will be an important indicator for potential investors
and for donors.
The Coalition will need to ensure stability during the period
leading up to the national election. A free election, open to all
parties, with full acceptance of the results by all, will reflect
well on the Cambodian government and nation.
Mr Kevin emphasised the Australian government's continued
commitment to Cambodia by reaffirming the announcement by Foreign
Minister Downer on 6 May that Australia would provide $A11 million
to assist in the eradication of landmines in Cambodia, including
$A9.8 million in the next three years to contribute to demining
through the work of the Cambodian Mine Action Centre, and a further
$A1.2 million to NGOs to assist mine victims.(41)
Economic relations and the aid program
As a small and underdeveloped economy with an estimated GDP per
capita of about $US 210, Cambodia has offered few opportunities for
Australian business or investment. The heart of Australia's
economic involvement in Cambodia remains the aid program and the
activities of several major enterprises, especially Telstra.
Cambodia has been a small market for Australian merchandise
exports. During UNTAC's involvement, exports reached $A46.2 million
in 1991/92 and $A45.8 million in 1992/93 (much of which was
prefabricated housing) but in 1993/94 exports fell to $A9.1
million. Exports showed a modest rise in 1994/95 to $A19.3 million,
with the major items being telecommunications equipment, alcoholic
beverages and electrical equipment. Imports have remained very
limited, reaching just $A279,000 in 1994/95, with dried seafood the
only significant item.
Telstra continues to be the most substantial Australian
commercial involvement. Telstra has invested over $A16 million and
has established infrastructure including earth stations, an
international telephone exchange and a payphone network. Telstra
expected to break even on its investment in 1995 and to earn
profits from 1997.
Australia's aid program continued as a central element in the
bilateral relationship. Australia's four year program of providing
$A92 million from 1994/95 to 1997/98 is one of Australia's most
important aid commitments and places Australia as the fourth
largest donor to Cambodia after Japan, the United States and
France.
Australian aid in 1995 continued at the planned level of around
$A23 million and Cambodia also benefited from other AusAID regional
programs to a value of an additional $A5 million. Australian
assistance to infrastructure has included the Australian Bridges
Project which has been replacing more than 16 damaged bridges on
Routes 1 and 5, while providing institutional development for the
Ministry of Public Works and Transport. A Program Planning Mission
in August 1995 investigated several areas of possible assistance to
urban infrastructure including water supply and electricity. In the
agriculture sector early aid concentrated on placement of advisers
in the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries and support for
the Australian Catholic Relief Agricultural Extension Project. In
October 1995, a larger bilateral project, the Cambodia-Australia
Agricultural Extension Project, began and aims to build on the ACR
project to establish an effective and responsive national extension
service. Australia has also been assisting the Cambodia-Australia
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) Project since 1987 and
a review in early 1995 recommended that the project continue for a
further five year period. Assistance to health has included
placement of a Mother and Child Health policy adviser in the
Ministry of Health and a Provincial Health Adviser in Kompong Cham
province, and support for a number of Australian NGO projects
including HIV/AIDS awareness, basic hospital infrastructure and
biomedical equipment maintenance. A further major five year health
project on health education and primary health care for Kompong
Cham Province was being developed during 1995.
Another important area of assistance has been to support
government reform. Senior policy advisers have assisted in key
ministries including Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation,
Health, Education and Agriculture. Australia has also assisted in
the development of an aid coordination agency, the Council for the
Development of Cambodia. Australia has contributed funds to the UN
Centre for Human Rights. A major three year program of assistance
to the justice sector which was under consideration during the year
was designed to develop basic standing orders and associated
training, basic investigative techniques, documentation, and
improved administrative systems. The assistance would focus on
police, courts and prisons.
Other areas of Australian assistance included food aid which was
needed because of a combination of floods, drought and continuing
Khmer Rouge activity in rice-growing areas. From May 1994 to
December 1995 Australia provided approximately 29 000 tonnes of
rice to Cambodia: the cost of $A17.3 million comprised $A9.3
million from the bilateral program with the remainder coming from
the Humanitarian Relief appropriation. Cambodia has also benefited
(to a value of about $A5 million per year) from a number of other
AusAID programs including the South East Asia Regional Program, the
International Seminar Support Scheme, the Women-in-Development Fund
and the Professional Development Program.
Defence assistance
Since the new Cambodian Royal Government was inaugurated in 1993
it has been clear that one of its most significant problems was its
top heavy and poorly trained and coordinated armed forces. The
RCAF's deficiencies had been evident both in fighting with the
Khmer Rouge in early 1994 and in the ineffective attempts to assist
the Western hostages later in that year. Australia in 1995 and 1996
has been moving to implement the program of increased assistance to
the RCAF which had been announced in November 1994.
Australia's assistance program emphasises English-language
training, military communications, maritime support and medical
assistance. The package announced in November 1994 included helping
the RCAF design a training program, bringing two RCAF personnel to
Australia to observe training methods, training RCAF personnel in
Australia (carried out in October-November 1995) and providing
design assistance and funds so that the RCAF can develop another
training facility, specialising in counter-insurgency. In June 1996
Australian and Cambodian military officials opened the country's
first jungle warfare school at Pich Nil. The school, which includes
barracks, firing range and training area, is expected to train
battalions of the RCAF in three month programs. The training would
be conducted by 55 Cambodian personnel who underwent courses in
Queensland in 1995 for counter insurgency instructors.(42)
The developments in Cambodia since 1993 have illustrated that
the damage to Cambodia and its society since the late 1960s cannot
be overcome rapidly. In retrospect the striking success of the 1993
elections probably created some unrealistic hopes that change and
recovery might be more rapid than was ever likely to be possible.
The Paris Agreements and UN involvement created new opportunities
but old problems have continued, as has the need for a long period
of rebuilding.
Cambodia has clearly derived considerable gains from the peace
process, UN involvement and the period since the elections. The
environment for political expression is much more open than it was
before 1991, when the country was effectively a one party state.
Human rights conditions have improved and Non Governmental
Organisations are active in monitoring them. There has been
considerable progress towards reconciliation, ongoing tensions
notwithstanding. The country retains the interest of a group of
donor countries who are actively following its progress. While
economic conditions remain difficult there are encouraging signs of
growth, as the restoration of rice exports in 1995 for the first
time in 25 years illustrates. The Khmer Rouge have suffered a
substantial decline in strength, appear to have lost the major
sources of external assistance they formerly enjoyed, and have
experienced increasing internal tensions under the pressures of
their continuing efforts to promote an armed struggle which has
lost relevance to most Cambodians. Cambodia also has much wider
international and regional associations and has the chance to
re-establish for improved long-term stability in its relations with
its neighbours. All of these gains are significant and it is likely
that few if any could have been realised without the advent of the
Paris Agreements.
Cambodia's path to recovery also faces severe obstacles.
Cambodian society was profoundly damaged by the Khmer Rouge years
in a way which is tragically unique in Southeast Asia. Governmental
and financial institutions are weak and leave the country and its
resources open to highly undesirable patterns of 'development' and
exploitation. The improvement in the capacities of the Royal
Cambodian Armed Forces since 1994 shows that these problems are not
intractable but they are nonetheless deep-seated. In politics, the
divisions among the parties who contested for power through
military struggle up to 1991 have been contained but not resolved
by the peace process and electoral competition. The coalition
arrangement between the two major winners of the 1993 elections has
provided a functioning government but also has built in tensions
and contradictions between parties of unequal strength in control
of resources and organisational capacities. While the coalition
arrangement between the CPP and FUNCINPEC was able to operate in
the first three years after the 1993 elections, the onset of
further electoral competition at the local and national level is
producing renewed difficulties. Cambodia's democratic institutions,
while undoubtedly popular with many Cambodians, are fragile and may
not easily stand the pressures of open competition.
These issues are important for Cambodia, for its regional
neighbours especially in ASEAN, and for the international
community, especially the members of the Consultative Group. The
Paris Agreements set out not only to encourage national
reconciliation and economic recovery in a poor and devastated
country but, simultaneously, to sponsor liberal democratic
institutions of a character matched by few other Third World
countries at a similar level of economic development. International
donors understandably wish to see continued progress towards
institutional reform and political accommodation and stability.
Cambodia faces the challenge of whether it can achieve progress
towards social and economic recovery and strengthening of its
administrative capacities, while preserving the liberal
institutions and political environment which the Paris Agreements
made possible.
- William Shawcross, Cambodia's New Deal, Washington,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994, p 12-19.
- ibid, p 12-13.
- see Lyndall McLean, 'Civil Administration in Transition: Public
Administration and the Neutral Political/Electoral Environment', in
Hugh Smith ed, International Peace Keeping: Building on the
Cambodian Experience, Canberra, Australian Defence Studies
Centre, 1994, p 47-58.
- Ken Berry, 'UNTAC as a Paradigm: A Flawed Success',
Pacifica Review, 7, 2, 1995, p 85.
- Shawcross, op cit, p 15.
- See Shawcross, op cit, for a useful summary of these
developments; and also Frank Frost, The Peace Process in
Cambodia: Issues and Prospects, Centre for the Study of
Australia-Asia Relations, Griffith University, Brisbane, 1993.
- Nate Thayer, 'Govt crisis as military option fails', Phnom
Penh Post, 20 May-2 June 1994; Canberra Times, 7 July
1994.
- Steve Heder, 'Cambodia's Democratic Transition to
Neoauthoritarianism', Current History, December 1995, p
425.
- Ker Munthit, 'KNP in hostage row; armed police surround HQ',
Phnom Penh Post, 9-22 February 1996.
- Huw Watkin, 'Other editors warn "this is not the end of
it..."', Phnom Penh Post, 31 May-13 June 1996.
- 'King defuses tension among factions', Phnom Penh
Post, 3-16 May 1996.
- Pierre P. Lizee, 'Cambodia in 1995: From hope to despair',
Asian Suvey, XXXVI, 1, January 1996, p 85; Economist
Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Cambodia, Laos, 2nd quarter
1996, p 9-10.
- Ker Munthit, 'Donors eager to help PM', Phnom Penh
Post, 12-25 January 1996.
- Jamie Factor, 'Funcinpec: deaf to the sounds of dissarisfaction
- CPP: self-preservation coveted above all else', Phnom Penh
Post, 3-16 May 1996.
- See for example Jason Barber, 'FUNCINPEC wrestles with its
future', Phnom Penh Post, 22 March - 4 April 1996.
- Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Cambodia, Laos,
2nd quarter 1996, p 5.
- Jason Barber, 'Co-PMs still at odds as war of words cools',
Phnom Penh Post, 31 May-13 June 1996.
- Jason Barber, 'Royal trumps on the table, aces up the sleeve',
Phnom Penh Post, 22 March - 4 April 1996.
- 'Cambodia Khmer Rouge may be losing fighting spirit ', Reuters,
24 June 1996.
- 'Cambodia's Pol Pot said still alive and active', Reuters, 24
June 1996.
- David P. Chandler, Brother Number One: A Political
Biography of Pol Pot, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1992 p
165-188.
- Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook
1996/97, Manila, 1996, p 77.
- Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, 2/1996, p 13.
- 'Cambodia investment: Field day for shady middlemen', Economist
Intelligence Unit, EIU ViewsWire, 21 May 1996.
- ibid.
- Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia Yearbook 1996, p
104.
- Matthew Grainger, 'Govt rapped over logging practices',
Phnom Penh Post, 5-18 April 1996.
- 'New found generosity', Far Eastern Economic Review, 9
May 1996.
- Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Cambodia, Laos,
2nd Quarter 1996, p 13.
- 'Thailand, Cambodia sign trade and cooperation agreements',
Agence France Press, 20 June 1996.
- 'PM - Khmer co-leaders won't use force to settle conflicts',
Reuters, 21 June 1996.
- Matthew Grainger and Ker Munthit, 'Vietnamese supported, funded
by US group', Phnom Penh Post, 22 March- 4 April
1996.
- Adam Schwartz, 'Struggle or Smuggle?', Far Eastern Economic
Review, 22 February 1996.
- Economisit Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Cambodia, Laos,
2nd Quarter 1996, p 13.
- ibid.
- For a more detailed account of bilateral relations in 1994 see
Frank Frost, 'Cambodia', in Russell Trood and Deborah McNamara,
eds, The Asia-Australia Survey 1995/96, Melbourne,
MacMillan, 1995, p 101-122.
- Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of
Representatives, 8 March 1995, p 1828-1829.
- 'Mr Sam Rainsy, Cambodian MP', Alexander Downer MP, Shadow
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Member for Mayo, Media Release, 22
June 1996.
- 'Evans concerned at arrest', Canberra Times, 23
November 1996.
- 'Cambodia angered by Evans comments', Canberra Times,
26 February 1996.
- 'Statement by Ambassador of Australia, Friday 10 May 1996,
preparatory meeting for the First Consultative Group Meeting to be
held in Tokyo, 15-16 July 1996'.
- 'We teach Cambodia jungle warfare', Sydney Morning
Herald, 24 June 1996.
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