Gary Brown, Frank Frost and Stephen Sherlock
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
Acknowledgments
The authors express their appreciation to Dr Harold Crouch
(Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of
Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University) for his
comments on the draft paper, and also to Michael Ong, Susan
Downing, David Richardson and John Gardiner-Garden of the
Parliamentary Research Service for their contribution to the
Workshop.
Major Issues
Introduction
International and Regional Issues
Australia, Indonesia and the Security
Agreement
Defence and Strategic Considerations
Conclusion
Endnotes
Appendix A
The announcement of the Security Agreement between Australia and
the Republic of Indonesia (signed on 18 December 1995) is one of
the most important recent developments in Australian foreign and
defence policy. The Agreement is significant because it means that
Australia - which already has formal associations with New Zealand,
Papua New Guinea, Malaysia and Singapore - now has treaties or
agreements with all its major near neighbours. The Agreement was
also received with some controversy because it was negotiated in
secret and only unveiled shortly before the time of its
signing.
Indonesia's willingness to conclude the Agreement with Australia
surprised many observers. Indonesia, since winning independence
after armed struggle against the Netherlands, had sought to remain
aloof from any formal alliances, preferring to pursue a 'free and
active' foreign policy with extensive links with 'non-aligned'
countries and since 1967 with its neighbours in ASEAN. However in
the 1990s, the post Cold War environment in Southeast Asia has seen
uncertainties about the role of the United States in regional
security and some rising concern about China's role and policies,
'especially in the South China Sea. 'Indonesia has accordingly been
revising its foreign policy priorities. While Indonesia remains
very close to its ASEAN partners, its foreign policy-makers have
not wanted ASEAN to be a 'golden cage' for Indonesia which might
restrict its capacity to assert and defend its national
interests.
Although the post Cold War environment has seen some rising
regional uncertainties, in Australia-Indonesia relations by
contrast there has been a steady pattern of improved communication
and cooperation. 'Economic policy changes in both countries since
the mid 1980s have led to the two economies becoming more open and
also more complementary. Merchandise trade between the two
countries has been increasing rapidly and Australia is now among
the top ten inventors in Indonesia. Both countries cooperated
extensively over the Cambodia peace process and in the development
of APEC. Indonesia's relatively cool relations with the US in the
1990s - with differences over economic relations and human rights
issues - have made defence cooperation with Australia of increasing
relevance to Indonesia. The Agreement has been regarded by many
observers as a valuable way of consolidating recent progress in
Australia-Indonesia relations and of increasing confidence at the
official level. It may also assist in overcoming suspicions still
present in some sections of the Australian community that Indonesia
is an 'aggressive' or 'expansionist' power. The Agreement has,
however, been criticised by some human rights organisations in
Australia as legitimising the actions of the Indonesian government
and armed forces in areas such as East Timor and Irian Jaya.
The paper examines the precise wording of the Agreement and its
defence and strategic significance. The primary commitments made by
the parties are to hold regular ministerial -level consultations,
to 'consult' and 'consider measures which might be taken' in the
event of 'adverse challenges' to either party, and to pursue
'mutually beneficial cooperative activities in the security field'.
The Agreement essentially formalises the patterns of bilateral
cooperation which have been developing because of the expansion of
areas of common interest. The Agreement does not involve either
party in any binding commitments beyond consultation. Were either
party to interpret the Agreement in ways which the other found
inappropriate - for instance, by trying to involve its partner in
its internal security problems - there would be no obligation to do
more than consult
The Agreement is nonetheless a significant development for both
countries. For Indonesia it is a substantial further step in its
responses to the uncertainties of the post Cold War environment.
For Australia it symbolises the progress which has been made
towards developing a vital but often sensitive bilateral
relationship and in winning Australia added recognition as a
substantial player in the East Asian region. For Indonesia to
depart from its traditional foreign policy approach and sign a
bilateral security agreement with Australia can be seen as a
significant achievement for Australian diplomacy.
The ongoing relevance of the Agreement will clearly depend on
the continued development of bilateral Australia-Indonesia
relations but it should also increase confidence about that
relationship.
In December 1995 the then Keating Labor Government announced
that after some months of secret negotiations it had concluded a
Security Agreement with the Republic of Indonesia. The Agreement
was signed in Jakarta on 18 December 1995 by the Foreign Ministers
of both countries, with Prime Minister Keating and President
Suharto also present. The text of the Agreement is reproduced as
Appendix A.
The agreement appears to have stemmed from initial suggestions
advanced by Prime Minister Keating in June-July 1994. Consideration
of the concept of an agreement proceeded but was given added
impetus by President Suharto in September 1995. It is understood
that President Suharto may at that time have been influenced to
expedite pursuit of an agreement which could boost confidence in
the relationship partly by the tensions in bilateral relations
after the unsuccessful attempt to nominate retired General Mantiri
as Indonesia's Ambassador to Australia, a proposal which became
contentious in Australia when comment by Mantiri appearing to
condone the use of force in East Timor in 1991 attracted
criticism(1). The actual negotiations for the agreement appear to
have been conducted by a small number of people from each country,
with General Peter Gration (former Chief of the Defence Force) and
Allan Gyngell (a senior adviser to Prime Minister Keating) and
Minister of State Murdiono playing key roles for Australia and
Indonesia respectively. The negotiations were kept strictly secret:
for example, Indonesia did not consult in advance its co-members of
ASEAN and Australia gave little advance notice to the United
States. The announcement of the Agreement was accordingly greeted
with surprise but also with widespread acceptance: the United
States indicated its support, Singapore described the Agreement as
'positive' and Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia said that 'an
agreement between neighbours for peace is always good'.(2)
Explaining the Agreement, Mr Keating said on 14 December
1995:
[It]...is not simply about external threats, it is about the
whole environment of the region. It is about the foreign policy and
trade policies of the countries.... What we are saying here is that
Australia and Indonesia have a coincidence of views and interests
in the strategic outlook of the region.(3)
The Agreement was seen widely as being both a notable and
somewhat surprising development. For Australia, the conclusion of
an agreement with Indonesia means that Australia - which already
has treaties or arrangements with New Zealand, Papua New Guinea,
Malaysia and Singapore - now has formal agreements on cooperation
with all of its immediate neighbours. The Agreement was seen as
having resulted to an important degree from extensive personal
diplomacy between Prime Minister Keating and President Suharto and
the impact of its announcement in Australia was heightened by the
timing, shortly before the calling of a Federal election. For
Indonesia, the Agreement was a striking development because it is
the first such security agreement concluded by a country which
hitherto has had a longstanding opposition in its foreign policy to
such formal associations.
The Agreement attracted support and also some immediate
controversy in Australia. There was criticism from various sources
in Australia of the secrecy with which it was negotiated, of the
fact that a security Agreement was concluded with the regime which
forcibly occupied East Timor, and of certain provisions of the
Agreement, most notably of the wording of Article 2, which speaks
of 'adverse challenges' to the Parties.
A number of commentators and political figures were critical of
the fact that the Agreement was negotiated privately and signed
without public or Parliamentary scrutiny. Some media reports went
so far as to describe the agreement as being a 'secret treaty with
Indonesia',(4) although this characterisation can refer validly
only to the style of its negotiation not to its present status as a
public document. 'The Keating Government argued that secrecy during
the negotiations was essential to those negotiations' prospects for
success.
In reacting to the announcement of the Agreement, Daryl Williams
QC MP, Liberal Member for the Western Australian seat of Tangney,
did not object to the secrecy of the talks which had produced it,
but maintained that the public should have been aware that talks
were proceeding, though not the substance of the talks themselves.
He stated that a Coalition Government would 'establish a joint
standing Parliamentary Treaties Committee to scrutinise treaties
before they are signed or ratified.'(5) Mr Williams is now
Attorney-General in the Howard Coalition Government: the Coalition
parties have indicated that they will initiate a process through
which prior notice is provided before agreements or treaties are
concluded in the future.
The then Opposition Leader (now Prime Minister), Mr Howard, gave
immediate in-principle support to the Agreement on its announcement
and said nothing about secrecy at that time. He did, however, raise
the question of the wording of Article 2 which, as can be seen at
Appendix A, refers to 'adverse challenges to either Party or to
their common security interests'. His view was that adverse
challenges should have said external challenges (and
indeed it could be argued that it might be better formulated as
adverse external challenges).
The issue could be seen to be important in that this phrasing
determines when the Agreement can be invoked by either partner.
Some might choose to argue that internal instability in one country
might be interpreted by its government as an 'adverse challenge'
capable of activating the Agreement's provisions. Insertion of the
word external would, of course, remove this possibility.
The then Foreign Minister (Gareth Evans MP, now Deputy Leader of
the Opposition) reportedly agreed that some such form of words
might have been better, but maintained that it was not truly
necessary.(6) Indeed, given the comments made in the section in
this paper below entitled Defence and Strategic
Considerations, it can be argued that this phraseological
question is unlikely to be of any real import.
The Foreign Minister in the new Coalition Government (Mr.
Downer) has recently reaffirmed the contents of the Agreement with
the Indonesian Government. He has also announced that the
Government will 'build on the mutual Security Agreement' in
developing further bases for cooperation with Indonesia.
This paper examines the Agreement from several perspectives:
- the international and regional context;
- implications for Australian-Indonesian relations;
and
- defence and strategic considerations.
The paper concludes with a preliminary assessment of the
Agreement..
Indonesia's decision to conclude a security agreement with
Australia has been a notable development given Indonesia's
long-standing commitment to an independent and non-aligned approach
in foreign policy since the Republic's inauguration in 1948.
Indonesia's interest in developing the treaty with Australia needs
to be considered in the context of the country's responses to the
regional and international environment after the Cold War. A series
of factors has exerted pressure and encouragement on Indonesian
policy makers to intensify efforts to develop a more active foreign
policy. The development of interest in an agreement with Australia
can be seen as one reflection of this process.
Indonesia's approach to foreign policy has been influenced
heavily by the country's experiences in securing its independence
from the Netherlands in an armed struggle and then needing to
maintain that independence in a world of superpower competition.
The new Indonesian Republic committed itself in 1948 to pursuing a
'free and active' foreign policy. Indonesia's early foreign policy
concentrated on opposition to colonialism and to securing an
international position apart from the prevailing Cold War
competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. The
hosting of the Bandung conference of non-aligned countries in 1955
and support for the Non-Aligned Movement after its inauguration in
1961 was a major reflection of these priorities. From the late
1950s, Indonesia's foreign policy in the era of the Sukarno
government's 'guided democracy' became much more assertive with
anti-colonial rhetoric increasing and an attempt made to oppose the
development of the Federation of Malaysia from 1963. The period of
'Confrontation' of Malaysia raised tensions both among Indonesia's
immediate neighbours and other countries in and near Southeast
Asia, including Australia which deployed combat forces to support
Malaysia.
After Sukarno's overthrow and replacement by the 'New Order'
government of President Suharto (from 1966) a new era of Indonesian
foreign policy began. Indonesia now concentrated on economic
reconstruction, supported by international assistance coordinated
through the Inter-Government Group on Indonesia (IGGI), established
in 1967. Indonesia now generally eschewed assertive stances in
foreign relations (with the major exception of its strenuous
efforts to secure the end of Dutch rule in West Irian) and
emphasised the rebuilding of regional cooperation through the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN - inaugurated in
August 1967). In its relations with other ASEAN members, Indonesia
concentrated on the development of a consensus approach to
decision-making. After the end of the war in Indochina in 1975
Indonesia led the way towards increasing ASEAN's profile by hosting
the first leaders' summit in Bali (February 1976). During the long
period of regional confrontation over Vietnam's presence in
Cambodia after 1978, Indonesia supported ASEAN joint positions
(which were heavily against Vietnam's position and tacitly in line
with those of China). However Indonesia's leadership also held long
term suspicions about China's regional role (particularly after the
controversies over the coup against the Sukarno regime in 1965) and
had considerable sympathy for Vietnam as the other major Southeast
Asian country which had won its independence after an anti-colonial
military struggle. Indonesia as a result maintained contact with
Vietnam throughout the Cambodia conflict and was thus able well
placed to act as a mediator for ASEAN when negotiations became
possible in the late 1980s.
From the mid 1980s, a third phase in Indonesian foreign policy
has been emerging. Indonesia has retained its close focus on ASEAN
relationships but has also moved to adopt a wider foreign policy
role.
Indonesia's record of sustained economic growth has given its
leaders increased confidence about their country's international
standing (between 1980 and 1993 the country achieved average annual
growth of 5.8 per cent, GDP had reached an estimated $US 144.7
billion in 1994 and GDP per capita for the estimated population of
187 million is expected to reach $US 1000 by 1997)(7). Indonesian
economic policy from the mid 1980s also began to increase efforts
towards deregulation and encouraging a more open involvement in the
wider regional and international economy. Indonesia thus became
increasingly interested in regional economic cooperation and joined
the Australian-initiated Cairns Group of agricultural 'fair
trading' countries in 1986 and the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation group in 1989.
The decline and then the end of confrontation between the US and
the Soviet Union from the mid 1980s has also been a major stimulus
for change and development in Indonesian foreign policy in several
ways. Utilising its good contacts with Vietnam and with the
Cambodian factions, Indonesia took the opportunities provided by
the decline of international tensions to play a major role in
efforts to seek a negotiated solution to the conflict in Cambodia.
Indonesia hosted informal meetings among the factions and other
interested regional parties and became the Co-Chairman of the Paris
Conference on Cambodia. Indonesia's efforts on Cambodia, pursued in
very close cooperation with Australia, were a major reflection of
its long term interest in pursuing a 'free and active' foreign
policy in relation to both the major powers and its regional
neighbours.
While the decline of Cold War competition has brought
substantial benefits to Southeast Asia, it has also been
accompanied by new uncertainties about the roles of the major
powers in East Asia and about how regional security can best be
sustained. Up to the late 1980s the US maintained a major role in
the security of East Asia through its network of alliances and its
presence in bases including those in the Philippines. The US and
ASEAN were aligned closely in regional policies, including over
Cambodia. The 1990s has been a more uncertain time in US relations
with Southeast Asia and with Indonesia. While the US security
presence is still extensive, it withdrew from its Philippines bases
in 1992. The US has remained involved strongly in the security
challenges of Northeast Asia but has shown relatively less interest
in Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War and the achievement
of a Cambodia settlement. As a result, although US influence has
remained strong, there has been uncertainty in Southeast Asia about
the strength of its commitment to continue to underpin regional
security along with increasing discussion about what Southeast
Asian states can do to bolster their own security interests.
The US has also adopted a more critical stance towards Indonesia
in several policy areas including human rights issues, labour
rights and protection of intellectual copyright, particularly since
the killing of East Timorese in Dili in December 1991. These
disputes have had some practical impact on Indonesia for example,
in 1992 the US suspended Indonesian participation in military
training through the International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program, although it appears that this will now be
re-instated in a scaled back form. The IMET suspension has caused
considerable irritation in Indonesian official circles.(8)
Some tensions in relations with the US have coincided with the
rise in the prominence of China as an increasingly powerful state
in East Asia. China's rapid rates of economic growth (exceeding 10
per cent per year in the 1990s) and its much greater involvement in
regional and international trade have raised its profile. After
many years of estrangement, Indonesia and China normalised
relations in 1990 and the two countries were able to cooperate in
the process of developing a settlement process for Cambodia.
However China's medium term intentions in East Asia have been a
source of some concern to Indonesia's leaders particularly because
of its stance over the South Chian Sea. China is one of six states
which claim part or all of the islets and waters of the South China
Sea (along with Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei and
Malaysia). Indonesia is not a claimant to the area but it has been
concerned that territorial conflict should not develop between any
of the claimants. This Indonesian interest has been reflected in
the hosting of a series of non-official workshops on the South
China Sea since 1990 aimed at dialogue and confidence building.
While China has participated in the workshops it has not been
willing to engage in any formal multilateral discussions over the
area. China has also caused some concern in Indonesia by appearing
to imply that its maritime claims overlapped Indonesia's own claims
in the maritime areas around the Natuna islands, which may contain
valuable petroleum resources.
The climate of uncertainty in Southeast Asia after the Cold War
has highlighted the need to review the role of ASEAN. Indonesia has
supported ASEAN's efforts to maintain momentum in its regional
cooperation activities, after the settlement in Cambodia removed
its major focus for regional security cooperation. Indonesia has
supported ASEAN's pursuit of a Free Trade Area by early next
century. Indonesia has also advocated the expansion of ASEAN to
ultimately include all ten Southeast Asian countries. Vietnam's
admission as ASEAN's seventh member in July 1995 was a crucial step
in ASEAN's adaptation to the post Cold War environment and this
occurred with the active support of Indonesia given its long-term
contact with Vietnam though the period of the tensions and conflict
over Cambodia.
ASEAN remains of central importance to Indonesia but there has
been a concern that ASEAN should not be the sole focus for foreign
relations, that in the words of Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a prominent
Indonesian foreign policy analyst, ASEAN should not be a 'golden
cage' for Indonesia.(9) Accordingly, in the 1990s Indonesia has
clearly wanted to widen the scope of its foreign policy both in
East Asia and internationally. This has been reflected in several
ways. Indonesia has taken an active interest in APEC as the premier
vehicle for promotion of economic cooperation in the wider Asia
Pacific. Indonesia and President Suharto took a high profile role
in hosting APEC's second leaders' summit at Bogor in November 1994,
where APEC's members adopted the goal of achieving free trade and
economic relations by no later than 2020.
Indonesia has also taken a higher profile role in the Non
Aligned Movement (NAM). In 1992 Indonesia became the chairman of
the movement for the three year period from 1992 to 1995. The NAM
has struggled to find a sense of ongoing direction after the end of
the Cold War from which its members had sought to remain apart, but
Indonesia gained benefits from its period as chairman. The tenth
NAM summit was held in Indonesia in 1992 and President Suharto used
his position as chairman to widen his country's contacts, for
example by visiting Tokyo at the same time as the G 7 summit in
Tokyo in 1993 to endeavour to advance Third World countries'
positions. Indonesia has also taken an active interest in the
United Nations by endorsing moves towards reform and by indicating
its interest in obtaining a permanent seat on the Security Council
if that body were to be expanded.(10) Indonesia is currently an
elected member of the Security Council for 1995-1996.
While broadening its international associations, Indonesia has
maintained its traditionally strong commitment to independence from
what it perceives to be international pressure or interference.
Indonesia has accordingly sought to resist efforts by some Western
countries to establish a linkage between international economic
assistance and human rights issues. Indonesia made its position
clear in 1992 when it refused to accept further economic assistance
from the Netherlands after criticism from that government on
political and human rights issues and Indonesia also wound up the
IGGI, which the Netherlands had chaired. In 1993 the IGGI was
replaced by the Coordinating Group on Indonesia chaired by the
World Bank. The Indonesian government has also sought to limit the
scope for criticism over its record on human rights, particularly
in East Timor. One major response by the government has been to
establish the National Human Rights Commission as a means of
improving the country's international image in this area.
Indonesia's foreign relations have therefore been going through
change and reassessment in the early post Cold War period.
Indonesia has maintained a strong emphasis on regional cooperation
in Southeast Asia but has not wished to be restricted in its
diplomatic activities by this. Indonesia has been keen to expand
its range of international associations and to bolster its image as
a rapidly and successfully developing country. It has also been
facing the immediate aftermath of the Cold War in East Asia in
which opportunities for greater cooperation (for example between
Vietnam and ASEAN) have been accompanied by uncertainty over the
roles of the major powers, especially the United States and
China.
It is against this background that Indonesia's interest in
consolidating its relationship with Australia through the
conclusion of the security agreement needs to be considered.
There are few neighbouring countries in the world as different
as Indonesia and Australia. The gulf between their history,
culture, economy and politics almost guarantees that relations
between the two countries are likely to be difficult and fraught
with the danger of misunderstanding. Australians were amongst the
earliest supporters of Indonesia's post-War independence struggle,
yet in the mid-1960s soldiers of the two countries were pitted
against each other in the jungles of Borneo. The establishment of
President Suharto's New Order regime after 1965, however, changed
the dynamic of relations between Australia and Indonesia. As the
then Prime Minister, Mr Paul Keating, emphasised when the
Australia-Indonesia Security Agreement was signed, the
stabilisation of Indonesian politics after 1965 was one of the
single most important developments in providing Australia with a
secure regional environment, including saving Australia from much
greater defence expenditure.(11)
But while Indonesia has achieved important economic successes
and relative political stability in recent years, recurrent
problems of government and the economy after 1965 and into the
1970s caused the country to be regarded as a continuing potential
source of instability. This was exemplified by the signing of the
Five Power Defence Arrangements in 1971 (by Australia, New Zealand,
UK, Malaysia and Singapore) which was mainly designed to assure
Malaysia that its sovereignty would be protected against any repeat
of former Indonesian President Sukarno's 'confrontation' during the
mid-1960s. Even as links between Australia and Indonesia gradually
strengthened during the 1980s, there were still major tensions in
the relationship over issues such as East Timor, and President
Suharto's affront at allegations of corruption made against members
of his family in the Australian press in 1986 which led to a major
diplomatic rift between the two countries. Underlying these
problems has been some mutual popular ignorance and misconception,
with many Australians still seeing Indonesia as a potential
aggressor, and many Indonesians' perceptions of Australia being
limited to media coverage of flag-burnings and myths about a
continuing White Australia policy.(12)
In the context of this difficult relationship between two very
different countries, there has been important progress in
developing Australia-Indonesia relations since the late 1980s. Both
governments have attempted to give more substance to the
relationship by building upon economic and cultural as well as
security links, with regular ministerial and official-level talks
between the two governments since 1989. The Timor Gap Treaty of
1989 was controversial in Australia, but gave both governments the
opportunity to show clear commercial benefit from the developing
connections. Progress has also been embodied in a range of other
agreements on matters such as double taxation, extradition,
fisheries, protection of investments, copyright protection and
technical cooperation. At the level of security, defence
cooperation links have expanded, the high profile example of which
was the participation of Indonesian troops in the Kangaroo 95
defence exercises. Indonesia is also the second largest recipient
of Australian aid, receiving various forms of development
assistance totalling $129 million in 1995-96.(13)
The impetus for closer and more sophisticated relations between
Australia and Indonesia has not only come from the energy of
ministerial and official meetings. The increasing connections have
been grounded in some convergence of bilateral and regional
economic interest between Australia and Indonesia. While there was
little complementarity between the two economies even a decade ago,
the opening up of the Indonesian economy to the world market in
recent years has been mirrored by the increasing
internationalisation of the Australian economy. Indonesia's
development from an agricultural country whose foreign exchange
earnings came mainly from oil, to an economy with a growing
manufacturing sector, has created openings for expansion in trade
and investment between the two countries. Australia's greater
economic and political orientation towards its Asian neighbours
have allowed these opportunities to be taken up. Merchandise trade
between Australia and Indonesia almost tripled in the five years to
1993 and reached $3.3 billion in 1994-95, trade in services has
increased substantially, particularly in tourism and education, and
Australia is now one of the top ten foreign investors in
Indonesia.(14) In this economic sense at least, Indonesia and
Australia have recently become a little less different.
Recognition of these economic links, as well as awareness of
common interests in the development of economic integration in the
Asia-Pacific region, facilitated the close cooperation between the
Indonesian and Australian government in the development of APEC.
Co-operation on APEC was important in fostering the confidence to
allow the sensitive negotiations on the Security Agreement to
proceed.
While the economic, security and other connections between
Australia and Indonesia have gradually built up since the late
1980s, there has been limited awareness of these developments
amongst the people of the two countries or amongst the regional
community. The Security Agreement represented an opportunity for
the two governments to make a public declaration of the increasing
closeness of the two neighbours and their confidence in the future
of the relationship. The principal achievement of the Agreement was
thus symbolic: rather than committing the parties to new
arrangements it affirmed a security relationship which made sense
because of developing common interests.
The symbolic significance of the Agreement is particularly
important for Australia. There have long been fears within sections
of the Australian community about a threat to Australia from
Indonesian expansionism, a perception which was fuelled by the
Indonesian takeover of East Timor in 1975. While these perceptions
had little grounding in reality, they have continued to live in the
recesses of popular imagination in Australia, underscoring a degree
of uneasiness amongst some Australians about their place in a
region about which they have little understanding. A major benefit
of the Agreement lies in its ability to assuage some of these fears
by presenting Indonesia as an 'ally' rather than an 'adversary'. In
a wider sense, the Agreement gave a boost to the Australian
government's attempts to focus the community's attention on the
importance for Australia of the Southeast Asian region. As
journalist Greg Sheridan expressed it, the Agreement told 'the
Australian people, and others, the truth about where our long-term
national interests lie'.(15)
The Agreement can also be seen as an outcome of the Australian
Government's efforts to play, and be seen to play, a role in
regional affairs. Following upon Australia's contribution to the
Cambodian peace settlement and its important role in giving impetus
to APEC, the Agreement implies not only recognition by Indonesia of
the importance it accords its relationship with Australia, but also
affirms Australia's presence as a significant power linked into the
web of relationships in the Southeast Asian and wider Asian region.
A commentator in Time magazine observed that Australia's
initiatives on APEC and the Security Agreement with Indonesia had
'done more to bring Australia into the regional consciousness than
most observers would have thought possible a decade ago.'(16) For
Indonesia to depart from its traditional foreign policy approach
and sign a bilateral security agreement with Australia can be seen
as a significant achievement for the Australian Government.
President Suharto was personally committed to the Agreement (which
was negotiated without the knowledge of Foreign Minister Ali
Alatas), a commitment which can be understood in the context of his
close relationship with the then Prime Minister, Mr Paul Keating,
and the support provided to President Suharto by Mr Keating on
issues such as Indonesia's hosting of the 1994 APEC summit, and
during Indonesia's dispute with the US over human rights issues in
1993.(17)
From Indonesia's point of view, the Agreement is an opportunity
to dispel popular Australian fears of Indonesia. The Indonesian
Minister of State, Murdiono, quoted President Suharto as saying
that the Agreement 'should wipe out any doubts among certain
elements in Australia about Indonesia's position'.(18) Murdiono
was, however, realistic enough to add that it was impossible to
eliminate 'the feeling of mistrust completely', a comment which
echoed Foreign Minister Ali Alatas' plea to observers not to expect
the two countries to 'suddenly ... agree sweetly on
everything'.(19) Murdiono's statement that 'the two countries have
agreed not to interfere in one another's affairs'(20) could also
suggest that the Indonesian Government hopes the Agreement might
place an obligation on Australia not to pressure Indonesia over
issues such as East Timor and Irian Jaya. The Agreement has also
cemented into place the security aspects of Indonesia's
strengthening relationship with Australia and affirmed that defence
cooperation activities will continue. One Indonesian strategic
analyst said that the Agreement would 'neutralise Indonesian
aversion' to the Five Power Defence Arrangements'.(21) The
Agreement might have the additional benefit of marking a small step
in fulfilling Indonesia's ambition to be recognised on the world
stage as a significant player by demonstrating Indonesia's
closeness to a country intimately linked into Western security
networks.
Concerns have been expressed within Australia that the Agreement
represents some kind of endorsement of the authoritarian character
of the Indonesian Government or, more specifically, that it implies
support for Indonesia's policies and practices in East Timor. Jose
Ramos-Horta of the Timorese National Resistance Council called the
Agreement 'a political statement which gives credibility and
legitimacy to Indonesia'.(22) It has even been suggested that the
Agreement might draw Australia into internal conflicts in
Indonesia.(23) East Timorese organisations in Australia have argued
that the Agreement might be invoked by the Indonesian Government to
place pressure on Australia to clamp down on the activities of
Timorese exiles in Australia.
It is unlikely that the Agreement would be used by Indonesia in
such a blunt and direct manner, but successive Australian
governments will have to cope with the risk that its close security
relations with Indonesia could be a source of embarrassment. Not
only are there regional conflicts in Indonesia such as East Timor,
Irian Jaya and Aceh, but economic and social change is bringing new
potential sources of conflicts as pressure for democratisation
grows, the emerging working class pushes for trade union rights and
Islamic organisations spread their influence. Since the prime
function of the Indonesian military will, for the foreseeable
future, remain internal security, individuals or units of the
Indonesian military are liable to be accused of human rights
abuses. The possibility that they might be revealed to have had
training in Australia or had other links with Australia should not
be ruled out.
Most commentators have concluded that Australia has gained more
from the Agreement than has Indonesia. The domestic political
significance for Australia is much greater because popular
perceptions of Indonesia as a threat are not reciprocated in
Indonesia, and Australia needs to engage with its Southeast Asian
neighbours more than they need to engage with Australia. In these
circumstances the political and defence establishment in Jakarta
probably sees the Agreement as less significant than do their
counterparts in Canberra. Public presentation of the Agreement in
Indonesia has tended to emphasise those aspects covering defence
cooperation activities such as joint exercises and training, rather
than those parts which infer a commitment to mutual defence. The
Jakarta Post reported Murdiono as saying that the
Agreement 'will only formalise existing security cooperation
programs'.(24)
The Agreement does have the important practical result of
creating an impetus for future cooperation between the two
countries and in providing a framework in which cooperation can
develop, in particular by providing for regular ministerial
consultation on security matters. During his visit to Jakarta in
April 1996, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Alexander Downer,
said that he and his Indonesian counterpart, Mr Ali Alatas, had
discussed their common desire to 'build on the mutual Security
Agreement' and that there was 'substantial scope for further
cooperation in the area of security'.(25) The Minister for Defence,
Mr Ian McLachlan, has also said that the Agreement will be a useful
framework for the discussion of bilateral issues with
Indonesia.(26)
Article 1 of the Agreement provides for regular Ministerial
level consultations and for the development of cooperation 'that
would benefit [the Parties'] own security and that of the
region'.
These provisions are in large part self-explanatory. The
provision for regular meetings between Ministers is new, that on
cooperation more a recognition of a trend which has been developing
ever since Australian-Indonesian security relations returned to an
even keel after the Sydney Morning Herald article affair a
decade ago. It has yet to be made clear whether the consultations
will involve both sides' Defence and Foreign Ministers, or
only one Minister from each country.
The significance of these provisions lies less in real security
gains for either party than in the formalisation and recognition of
conditions already in place. Nevertheless, regular dialogue at
Ministerial level on security matters can only be considered a
positive development.
Formal security treaties have been uncommon events in recent
times. The best known one to which Australia is party is
undoubtedly the 1951 ANZUS Treaty with the US and New Zealand.
Though the latter country has not been actively involved for ten
years the treaty, as between Australia and the United States,
remains operative. Another well-known security treaty is the North
Atlantic Treaty (NATO) signed in Washington in 1949.
The NATO Treaty is strongly worded. Article 5 declares that:
...an armed attack against one or more of [the parties]...shall
be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they
agree that, if such an attack occurs, each of them...will assist
the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually
and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems
necessary, including the use of armed force...(27)
By contrast, the ANZUS Treaty of 1951 contains no such strong
words. In particular, it does not say that an armed attack against
one party would be considered an attack against all, nor is there
any reference to the use of armed force. Instead, Articles III and
IV of the ANZUS treaty state:
III. The parties will consult together whenever in the opinion
of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or
security of any of the parties is threatened in the Pacific.
IV. Each party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific
area on any of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and
safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in
accordance with its constitutional processes.(28)
Thus the ANZUS Treaty obliges the parties to do no more than
consult if one or more of them is attacked. This is not to
say that more might not be done; but the treaty of itself imposes
no obligation to do more.
In this context the recent Indonesian Agreement more closely
resembles ANZUS than NATO. Article 2 obliges the parties to
'consult' and 'consider measures which might be taken' in the event
of 'adverse challenges'. It is fully open to either party, or both,
once having consulted, to do nothing at all if that is what is
judged to be in the national interest.
This being so, the debate about the use of the term "adverse
challenges" can be put into context. Were either party to interpret
this phrase in ways which the other found inappropriate - for
instance, by trying to involve its partner in its internal security
problems - there would be no obligation to do more than consult. A
reply could then be made to the effect that, in the particular
case, it was not felt that any action should be taken; and this
would be wholly consistent with the Agreement's provisions.
The third Article of the Agreement provides for 'mutually
beneficial cooperative activities in the security field' in areas
to be identified.
This really represents no more than a statement of what has been
going on for some years, with Indonesian forces visiting Australia
for training or exercises and vice-versa. The Australian
and Indonesian navies have been conducting exercises on an
opportunity basis - so-called PASEXs, where ships which encounter
each other in the normal run of events will conduct a suitable
small-scale drill or exercise - for several years. Recently
Indonesian elements participated in the 1995 iteration of
Australia's major military exercise, the KANGAROO series.
Nevertheless, the formalisation which the Agreement provides
affirms the success of previous activities and suggests that (funds
being available) some expansion may be possible. The provision that
cooperative security activities are to take place in areas
identified by the parties refers less to geographical areas than to
types of activities which both countries might agree to
conduct in cooperation.
Given that Indonesia's powerful Minister for Science and
Technology, Dr B.J. Habibie, was reportedly 'impressed by the
sophistication of military hardware he saw during a visit to
Australia' in 1994, one type of cooperation which may be sought by
Indonesia under the Agreement is likely to be in the field of
defence science.(29)
The Article is strictly limited in its application, however, by
the rider that all activities will be 'in accordance with the
policies and priorities of each [partner]'. This provides both
countries with an escape hatch, permitting either to reject any
proposed activity - eg, one which might involve a sensitive
technology transfer - without in any way violating the
Agreement.
The Indonesia-Australia Agreement on Security is a product of
the increasingly close relations between the governments of the two
countries and of the development of substantial common interests in
trade, investment and regional security. Indonesia's decision to
break with tradition and sign a bilateral security agreement should
be understood in the context of its efforts in recent years to
develop a wider and more active foreign policy. While ASEAN remains
Indonesia's prime focus, a new confidence born of the country's
economic success, combined with emerging regional and international
uncertainties in the post-Cold War world, has induced the
Indonesian government under President Suharto's leadership to
enlarge its network of relationships. These developments have
dovetailed with the increasing internationalisation of the
Australian economy and with Australia's push to develop closer
relations with the countries of Southeast Asia.
For Australia, the Agreement symbolises the progress the
Australian Government has made in developing one of the country's
most important but most difficult bilateral relationships, and in
winning recognition as a significant player in regional affairs.
The Agreement will also assist in assuaging community fears about
Indonesian intentions towards Australia. For Indonesia, the
Agreement formalises the defence cooperation relationship with
Australia, and contributes towards its long-term goals of winning
recognition as a stable, rapidly developing country with
substantial international connections, including with Western
democracies.
It is important to emphasise, however, that the terms of the
Agreement are largely symbolic. This is not to downplay its
importance; symbolic statements are central to the conduct of
international affairs. Rather, it means that the Agreement does not
commit either party to the defence of the other or draw them into
any kind of binding pact. The elements of the Agreement which deal
with defence cooperation have only the effect of formalising
activities which already exist. The main potential problem in the
Agreement from the Australian Government's point of view might come
from the perception that the Agreement gives legitimacy to the
internal security activities of the Indonesian military,
particularly in East Timor and Irian Jaya. Suggestions that the
Agreement might be invoked by Indonesia to place pressure on
Australia, or to involve Australia in internal Indonesia conflicts
seem far-fetched, but as defence cooperation between the two
countries is expanded, the Australian Government will have to act
with care to ensure that it is not embarrassed by being linked to
possible human rights abuses by the Indonesian military. Such
considerations apart, however, the Indonesian-Australia Security
Agreement highlights the progress which has been made in
Australia-Indonesia relations in recent years, in the field of
security and in the wider arena. The Agreement also provides
impetus for future cooperation between the two countries and
creates a framework in which cooperation can develop.
- Sydney Morning Herald, 27 June 1995; The
Australian, 27 and 29 June, 3 July 1995.
- Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 December 1995/ 4
January 1996.
- Transcript of the Prime Minister, the Hon. P.J. Keating,
MP, Interview with Kerry O'Brien, ABC TV 7:30 Report, 14 December
1995, p.1. (Issued by Prime Minister's Office).
- Karen Middleton, 'Secret Treaty with Indonesia', Age,
15 December 1995.
- Keating wrong on secrecy for Indonesia treaty, News
Release from D. Williams, 19 December 1995.
- Michelle Grattan and Karen Middleton, 'Evans concedes some
ambiguity in Indon treaty', Age, 19 December 1995.
- Asia Yearbook 1996, p 14, 140.
- Donald E. Weatherbee, 'Southeast Asia at Mid-Decade:
Independence through Interdependence', Southeast Asian Affairs
1995, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1995,
pp 3-27.
- Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy after the Cold
War', in Southeast Asian Affairs 1994, Singapore,
Institute of Southeast Asian Affairs, 1994, p 150-155.
- ibid, p 155-160.
- Statement by the Prime Minister, Hon. P.J. Keating,
- For a study of some Australians' attitudes to Indonesia see Rob
Goodfellow, 'Ignorant and Hostile: Australian Perceptions of
Indonesia', Inside Indonesia, Sept 1993, pp.4-6
- Budget Related Paper No. 2, 1995-96, p.14.
- Dept of Foreign Affairs, Country Economic Brief: Indonesia,
June 1994, pp.30-35. Composition of Trade Australia 1994-95,
p.192.
- Australian, 15 December 1995, p.5.
- Roff Smith, Time, 26 February 1996, pp.32-37
- Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 December 1995 & 4
January 1996, pp.18-19.
- Jakarta Post, 19 December 1995, p.1.
- Reuters, 17 December 1995.
- Jakarta Post, 15 December 1995, p.1.
- Jusuf Wanandi of the Centre for Strategic and International
Studies, quoted in Jakarta Post, 15 December 1995,
p.2.
- Interpress Service, 28 December 1995.
- See for example Alan Wrigley, Australian, 15 December
1995, p.5.
- Jakarta Post, 15 December 1995, p.1. Jakarta
Post, 19 December 1995, p.1.
- Text of Joint News Conference by Alexander Downer and Ali
Alatas, Jakarta, 16 April 1996.
- Financial Review, 22 April 1996, p.8.
- Text of the NATO Treaty from J.A.S. Grenville, The Major
International Treaties 1914-1973, London 1974, pp.335-6.
- Text of the ANZUS Treaty from Grenville, p.338.
- Reported in The Nikkei Weekly, 15 January 1996.
THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF INDONESIA (hereafter referred to as 'the Parties'),
DESIRING to strengthen the existing friendship between them;
RECOGNISING their common interest in the peace and stability of
the region;
DESIRING to contribute to regional security and stability in
order to ensure circumstances in which their aspirations can best
be realised for the economic development and prosperity of their
own countries and the region;
REAFFIRMING their respect for the sovereignty, political
independence and territorial integrity of all countries;
REAFFIRMING their commitment to the settlement of all
international disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations and international law;
RECOGNISING that each Party has primary responsibility for its
own security;
MINDFUL of the contribution that would be made to their own
security and that of the region by cooperating in the development
of effective national capabilities in the defence field and hence
their national resilience and self-reliance;
NOTING that nothing in this Agreement affects in any way the
existing international commitments of either Party;
THEREFORE AGREE as follows:
- The Parties undertake to consult at ministerial level on a
regular basis about matters affecting their common security and to
develop such cooperation as would benefit their own security and
the region.
- The Parties undertake to consult each other in the case of
adverse challenges to either party or to their common security
interests and, if appropriate, consider measures which might be
taken either individually or jointly and in accordance with the
processes of each Party.
- The Parties agree to promote - in accordance with the policies
and priorities of each - mutually beneficial cooperative activities
in the security field in areas to be identified by the two
Parties.
- This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the later
notification by either Government of the fulfilment of its
requirements for entry into force of this Agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorised by
their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.
[Signed by Senator Evans for Australia and Mr Ali Alatas for
Indonesia on 18 December 1995].
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