Grayson Lloyd
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
27 June 2000
Contents
Major Issues
Introduction
A Survey of Current Events in
Indonesia
(I) Indonesia's Unitary State: Origins and
Challenges
Early Challenges to the Unitary
State
(II) Decentralisation in
Indonesia
(III) Demands for Independence
(a) Papua
(b) Aceh
(IV) Australia, the Region and Indonesia's
national unity
Conclusion
Endnotes

Major Issues
This paper argues that the unitary state of
Indonesia, while experiencing a period of deep political, economic
and national identity crisis at the moment, is unlikely to
disintegrate. Historically the Indonesian nation-state has evolved
from colonialist boundaries and developed in an unorthodox fashion.
Yet the territorial integrity of Indonesia has survived numerous
regionalist and separatist campaigns in the past. For it to do so
in the future in part requires domestic political stability in
Indonesia, the effective implementation of a program of
decentralisation to cater to regionalist concerns and the sensitive
handling of the concerns of genuine independence movements in Aceh
and Papua and anywhere else they may arise.
It is easy, (although perhaps misleading) to
believe that the resolve of Indonesians to stay together as a
nation will overcome concerns about national disintegration or
disunity. Indonesia's more than five decades of statehood have been
moulded in part by military force, in part by political and
administrative control (colonialism) from the centre and partly
through the consistent application of assimilationist policies
intended to unify (not always successfully) social, cultural and
ethnic differences. The problems of regional autonomy and
independence movements now threatening Indonesia's national unity
are the legacy of this history. President Abdurrahman Wahid, under
increasing domestic pressure on a number of fronts, is being forced
to walk a fine line on the questions of regional
autonomy/decentralisation. Jakarta must exhibit sufficient control
from the centre to somehow elicit cooperation from the regions.
The post-Soeharto transition towards democracy
and civil society in Indonesia has illustrated the fragility
underlining Indonesia's national slogan of Unity in Diversity
(Bhinneka Tunggal Ika). In the last couple of years calls
have increased for Indonesia to adopt a federalist or decentralised
system and to devolve more powers to regional areas in part to
stymie separatist and independence movements. In April 1999 former
President Jusuf Habibie sparked the decentralisation process with
the signing of two important laws designed to promote regional
autonomy and fiscal balance between the centre and regions. Unlike
President Soeharto's heavy-handed approach, President Wahid has
adopted an approach in Papua and Aceh based on political dialogue
designed to achieve a compromise on the basis of extensive special
autonomy. Whether or not this approach succeeds is a moot point,
especially given the changeability of the Wahid mind-set. The
Government seems disinclined to move to the granting of full
independence in either province and it remains uncertain just how
far the independence movements in both are prepared to push the
issue especially given the continued threat of military
retaliation.
Introduction
There are a myriad issues causing genuine
concern in post-Soeharto Indonesia although none is more important
than the survival of the unitary state and the potential for
national disintegration. At this time of significant economic and
political crisis in Indonesia, the administration of President
Abdurrahman Wahid in fact faces two rising and parallel
challenges.
The first challenge is the requirement to
implement an ambitious decentralisation program designed to deal
with demands for regional autonomy but which is likely to stretch
the administrative and political resources of the Government. The
struggle for more economic and decision making parity between the
highly centralised and often authoritarian Government in Jakarta
and the resource laden but ostensibly disenfranchised and
under-financed regions has shadowed Indonesia's development as a
nation.
The second challenge involves coping with
demands for independence in Aceh and Papua, which of all of
Indonesia's restive provinces are the areas with the most obvious
and credible independence credentials at the moment. Despite
renewed calls for independence from activists within both regions
the central Government in Jakarta is unlikely to sanction
independence in either province. For varying reasons both Aceh
(where there was recently signed a humanitarian pause between the
Government and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh
Merdeka, GAM)) and Papua (scene of the recent landmark Papuan
People's Congress) are important test cases for Indonesia's
national unity. Given its history of close association with the
Republic, especially during the 1945-9 revolutionary period, many
observers in Indonesia fear that the secession of Aceh would mark
the beginning of the decline of the Indonesian state. However, it
does not necessarily follow that independence by one or both
regions would precipitate the domino-like collapse of the
Indonesian nation-state especially given the paucity of genuine
independence (not to be confused with devolutionist) movements in
other provinces. As the East Timor case demonstrated, the
Indonesian nation-state is capable of shrinking without
collapsing.
This Paper is divided into four distinct parts.
After a brief survey of recent developments in the reform and
political process in Indonesia, part one addresses the question of
the formation of Indonesia's unitary state and the challenges it
has faced particularly in the first few decades after independence.
Part two surveys the issue of decentralisation in Indonesia and the
challenges facing this process in the future. Part three focuses on
the struggle for independence in Papua and Aceh. Part four reviews
the significance of these issues for Australia and the region.
A Survey of Current Events in
Indonesia
In this reformist political period, the
Indonesian nation is struggling to effectively integrate an infant
democratic system presently lacking cohesion. Indeed it is a
difficult task for an administration that has been in place for
less than a year to institute a democratic system after more than
thirty years of authoritarianism. While the economy is showing some
signs of improvement, the ramifications from the Asian financial
crisis of August 1997 are still widely evident and will persist for
some time to come. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund
(IMF) backed restructuring and rehabilitation of Indonesia's
banking and corporate sectors is under way but much remains to be
done. The scale of reconstruction required in the judicial
system-needed to institutionalise an equitable justice system and
to restore the faith of foreign investors-is, quite simply,
staggering. Both of these processes-legal reform and corporate and
bank restructuring-are complicated by the uncertainty of the
domestic political situation.
The Indonesian military (TNI) is a disillusioned
organisation increasingly sidelined from formal
politics.(1) None the less, despite the broad ranging
reform process experienced by the military in the last few years,
it retains a significant potential to influence political events in
Indonesia through its territorial organisation. The military's
territorial units are dispersed throughout the archipelago
essentially partnering organs of civil Government. As such the TNI
is able to rationalise interference in local politics on the basis
of maintaining 'stability'. This is likely to have significant
ramifications for the democratisation process in Indonesia. The
possibility of increased regional autonomy in Indonesia may result
in greater regionalism in the TNI and hence division along ethnic,
religious and regional lines.(2) Further complicating
the future position of the TNI is the ambiguity over its dual
function role (dwifungsi).(3) This has directly
contributed to the sense of political uncertainty and regional
instability in Indonesia.
President Abdurrahman Wahid has been under siege
recently following the sometimes controversial and perplexing
dismissals of various ministers and advisers. The President's
health and leadership skills have come under intense parliamentary
and public scrutiny-especially from People's Consultative Assembly
(MPR) Speaker Amien Rais, and also from assorted radical Islamic
groups. The Government appears to be foundering amid allegations of
corruption and perceived errors of judgement against the background
threat of a coup. Dealing with calls for regional
autonomy/independence and instituting an effective decentralised
system assume an ever more pressing position on the Government's
agenda. To date President Abdurrahman Wahid's response to the
issues of separatism and decentralisation has been cautious. There
is no sense that Jakarta's elite has a blueprint for overcoming
regional pressures-indeed perhaps none exists. However it is
crucial in addressing this issue that sustained economic
development and durable political stability is achieved. The lack
of both does not augur well for future endeavours to resolve
regionalist issues or to lessen the sense of crisis pervasive in
Jakarta at the moment.
(I)
Indonesia's Unitary State: Origins and Challenges
The Republic formed in Indonesia had a rather
unsettled beginning. This was in part a reflection of the arbitrary
nature of its colonially determined boundaries and the ethnic and
cultural diversity of its people. Indonesian nationalism evolved
quite rapidly after the 'liberation' of the Netherlands Indies by
the allies at the end of the Second World War. However, the growth
of virulent anti-colonialist (anti-Dutch) nationalism was tempered
by the sizeable political and administrative gulf between Java and
Sumatra and the outer islands.(4) The constitution of
the new Republic established on 17 August 1945 made some concession
to the autonomy demands of the outer islands by creating seven
provinces, although it moved away from regional
autonomy.(5) The Republic at this point bore little
resemblance to current day Indonesia. Control had been assumed in
Java, much of Sumatra and somewhat less securely in Bali and South
Sulawesi, although the youth movement (pemuda) was
challenging the Dutch elsewhere notably in Sumatra.
There was deep suspicion among Republican
leaders of the Federal model developed by the Dutch in early 1946.
The model proposed a federal system encompassing four states:
Sumatra, Java, Borneo and Eastern Indonesia each with differing
degrees of autonomy. Republican leaders believed the federal idea
represented a tactical policy of divide and rule designed to split
the nationalist movement and prey on outer island suspicions and
mistrust of Java.(6) It was viewed as a means of
extending Dutch influence after the transfer of sovereignty to the
Republic-making the federated states puppets of the colonial
regime-and thus, as one observer has noted, ensuring that support
for the unitary state became an article of nationalist
faith.(7) It has been observed elsewhere that such a
model did not accord with Javanese perceptions of the unified
nature of authority and power.(8) Full sovereignty was
transferred to the newly created Federal Republic of Indonesia
(Republic Indonesia Serikat, RIS) in December 1949. In
less than a year the federalist model, viewed by Republicans as a
necessary short-term compromise, was replaced by the unitary
Republic proclaimed in August 1945.
Early Challenges to the Unitary
State
The anxiety with which many among Indonesia's
leadership elite view the question of threats to the nation's unity
is sourced in the tumultuous nature of the first decade and a half
after the Republic's birth. The distinguished American
anthropologist Clifford Geertz has written:
Archipelagic in geography, eclectic in
civilization and heterogeneousin culture, Indonesia flourishes when
it accepts and capitalizes on its diversity and disintegrates when
it denies and suppresses it(9)
This statement is as pertinent to the reforming
Indonesia of today as it was to the period of parliamentary
democracy and Guided Democracy in Indonesia during the 1950s and
the first half of the 1960s. Furthermore in many respects the
Indonesian social and political system is as vulnerable now as it
was during the traumatic events in 1965-66 which brought President
Soeharto to power. The collapse of Soeharto's authoritarian regime
on 21 May 1998 produced a vacuum of political authority in
Indonesia. Indonesia is searching for a figure capable of filling
this vacuum and advancing the causes of democracy, civil society
and justice in the present environment clouded by economic hardship
and fragile national unity. In such an environment calls to be
aware (sadar) of threats to the nation's well-being assume
a greater resonance than they did under President Soeharto's
authoritarian regime where they were widely viewed as techniques
for maintaining political control.
The decade and half after independence was
characterised by sporadic regional dissidence, calls for greater
local autonomy and what one observer described as 'centrifugal
pulls of an economic system which the Jakarta Government appeared
quite unable to control.'(10) In the early days of the
Republic the authority of the central Government was challenged by
various movements particularly, but not exclusively, in areas where
the power of the Government in Jakarta was incomplete or
non-existent. In the South Moluccas, for instance, resistance to
the central Government was led by pro-federalist elements unhappy
with the dismantling of the Dutch-sponsored federal state in 1950.
The Government eventually managed to overcome this revolt by
military force.
In West Java a Darul Islam insurgency began in
1948 and persisted as a movement of regional, social and religious
discontent which the Government was largely powerless to stop until
the death of the movement's leader in 1962. In 1953 a serious
regional revolt broke out in Aceh with political, economic and
religious origins. In South Sulawesi a rebellion influenced by
Darul Islam and led by Kahar Muzakkar began in 1951 and continued
until 1964. In these last two cases, the central Government created
a considerable degree of animosity by appointing outsiders to
important positions over local men (anak
daerah).(11)
However perhaps the most significant
post-revolutionary threat to Indonesia's unity emerged with the
PRRI-Permesta regionalist challenge in 1957-8 in Sumatra and
Sulawesi. These revolts posed a direct challenge to the power and
authority of the central Government. And while they were easily
crushed, the revolts none the less marked the end of Indonesia's
relatively brief flirtation with parliamentary democracy, thus
heralding the re-emergence of the 1945 presidential constitution
and the era of President Sukarno's Guided Democracy (demokrasi
terpimpin). Ostensibly from this point in the late 1950s the
power of the central Government in Indonesia has been all
pervasive, particularly in establishing uniformity in education,
health and numerous other areas extending down to the village
level. With the exception of the Fretilin-led struggle in East
Timor, regional and independence movements in Indonesia struggled
throughout the New Order period to attract domestic understanding
or consistent international support.
The regionalist cause in Indonesian history has
generally followed a well-worn path. Whether conceived religiously,
ethnically or on a broader nationalistic basis it tends to espouse
the feeling that the present system has not justly distributed the
resources derived from the people and argues against the decision
making process in the nation-state as the preserve of a narrowly
defined elite. Invariably regionalist campaigns are also influenced
by local power struggles between religious or political moderates
and radicals and by those who dislike domination by the centre
(Java). Separatist movements, however, are typically more complex
than simple regionalist demonstrations of angst against the centre.
They propound the cause of independence on the basis of long held
cultural, social or historical distinctiveness, and often possess
an international element. Such factors are evident in the cases of
Aceh and Papua which have retained long-term relevance, and have
been treated as serious threats to the long-term stability of the
Indonesian nation-state.
Contrary to the argument of numerous media
reports predicting otherwise, East Timor's independence has not
been a catalyst for general state collapse in Indonesia. Fears
sponsored by the armed forces and ultra-nationalists that the loss
of East Timor would trigger the disintegration of the unitary state
have so far proved unfounded. That said, the independence movements
in Aceh and Papua have certainly been rejuvenated by events in East
Timor. However East Timor was a special case. Its people are
overwhelmingly Catholic, it was never a part of the Dutch East
Indies (the precursor to the Indonesian Republic), and moreover the
United Nations did not recognise the territory's absorption into
Indonesia. In nationalistic terms Indonesia is thus no less
Indonesian after the loss of East Timor-indeed it may be more
so.(12)
In other areas, such as oil-rich East Kalimantan
and the similarly oil abundant Riau in Central Sumatra, the
problems centre on regional autonomy and the ever-present regional
demand for a larger return on oil or other revenues from the
central Government. In Maluku (especially Ambon and Halmahera), and
West Kalimantan the central Government is faced with provinces
afflicted by widespread inter-communal violence and disorder. These
are neither separatist nor independence campaigns, however they do
represent a continuing challenge to the maintenance of national
unity.
Indonesia has not yet reached the point where it
can take its national unity for granted. In reality it is unlikely
to arrive at such a point, but it does not follow that Indonesia
will fracture and collapse. There are at least two significant
reasons why this is unlikely to happen. The first is that no
political, economic or other agenda in Indonesia would be served by
disintegration.(13) The second is that many if not most
Indonesians recognise that the economic and social justice benefits
achieved by remaining united-challenging though this is in the
present climate-outweigh the potential consequences of
disintegration.(14) But the resolve of Indonesians to
stay together as a nation is not in itself sufficient. This resolve
will need to be accompanied by sensitive Government policies and a
genuine desire to overcome real and widespread problems.
The Indonesian nation was constructed in an
arbitrary manner and given the very considerable heterogeneity of
its ethnic groups and cultures, and the spread of the people across
an elongated archipelago, it is surprising that Indonesia has
remained 'unified' for as long as it has. During the authoritarian
New Order (1966-98) period this unity was enforced from above. The
New Order's veto on discussion of racial, ethnic and religious
issues (so-termed 'SARA' issues) combined with pervasive
administrative control from the centre together maintained the
veneer of national unity.(15) Observers of the
Indonesian situation find themselves caught between warning of the
fragility of the nation's territorial integrity and celebrating the
staggering nation-building achievement that has taken place.
President Sukarno's mantra was nation building-a vision he pursued
with much gusto. President Soeharto was described as the one who
could fulfil the nation's potential; in a way giving substance to
Sukarno's vision. However, the results on this front were mixed.
The challenge for Abdurrahman Wahid is to maintain Indonesia's
status as a unified state.
(II) Decentralisation in
Indonesia
Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in
the world. Its people are dispersed over an elongated archipelago
consisting of thousands of islands. These factors, together with
the archipelago's tremendous ethnic and cultural diversity, mean
that Indonesia requires an effective system of local governance.
Along with its neighbour Malaysia, Indonesia appears to meet the
criteria for a federal structure. However for reasons outlined
earlier, Indonesia's experience of such a system has left a lasting
distaste.(16) In April 1999 the administration of
President Habibie signed two very important laws to promote
regional autonomy. The first was Law 22/1999 on regional
Government, and the second, Law 25/99 on balancing finances between
the central and regional Governments. Before examining the nature
and likely ramifications of these laws a little background is
required.
In 1903 the Dutch Government introduced a form
of decentralisation in Indonesia to increase the efficiency of
Government administration.(17) Nearly two decades later
district level Governments were established to create more
representative administrations. However the concept of
decentralisation has experienced a rather vexed history in
Indonesia. Debate on the issue has been inconsistent and vague
despite broad agreement on the need for regional autonomy in a
country the size of Indonesia. During the Sukarno era, from the
late 1950s until the mid-1960s, instead of promoting democratic
Government decentralisation became a mechanism promoting political
stability.
It was only with Law 5/1974, set forth nearly
three decades after the proclamation of independence by Sukarno and
Hatta, that Indonesia developed a more concerted approach to
decentralisation. However implementation of this law under the
Soeharto administration might be conservatively described as
gradual. This law established the legal basis for the current
system of regional/local Government and emphasised the mobilisation
of the regions in the effort of national
development.(18) The law embodied three principles for
the distribution of Governmental functions: (i) decentralisation of
responsibilities to 'autonomous' provincial and local Governments
(i.e. kotamadya and kabupaten level); (ii)
de-concentration of activities to regional offices of central
ministries at the provincial and local level; (iii)
co-administration whereby provincial and local Governments carry
out activities on behalf of the central Government. The essence of
the law was designed to rein in local autonomy by emphasising
obligations to the central Government over regional
rights.(19) The law governed both the administrative
structure of the central Government and the gradual spread of
regional autonomy without intending to provide every province with
autonomous Governments. Regional autonomy was an almost incidental
detail. Law 5 was ostensibly intended to promote national stability
through the promotion of an authoritarian structure extending from
Jakarta to village level Indonesia.
Law No. 5 was not designed to govern
central-local financial relationships for which purpose a follow up
law was intended. Debate on this issue has been complicated by a
lack of consensus within the Government on the form of
decentralisation to be pursued and by the issue of the distribution
of national resources between regions.(20) This has been
a sensitive issue given the central Government's dependence on
resources from certain outer islands and the subsequent spending of
these revenues in more densely populated and less well endowed
regions such as Java.(21) The issue of regional autonomy
triggered a debate between supporters of the existing unitary
system (notably the Megawati Soekarnoputri headed Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle, PDI-P) and those advocating an
examination of a federalist alternative (especially the leader of
the National Mandate Party, PAN, Dr Amien Rais).
In this context the legislation introduced by
the Habibie administration in April 1999 proposed a radical model
of extending broad regional autonomy within the existing unitary
constitution. The two basic levels of governance under Law 22/99 on
regional Government are the central Government headed by President
Abdurrahman Wahid and the autonomous local Governments of
Kabupaten (districts) and Kotamadya
(cities).(22) The implication of Law 22 is that there is
a division of powers and responsibilities between these levels of
Government that is not strictly hierarchical.(23)
Reinforcing this position, and contrary to the manipulated
elections of the Soeharto period, it provides for the (supposedly
free) election of provincial governors and district heads.
The powers under Law 22 decentralised authority
over all fields except foreign affairs, defence, security, justice,
monetary and fiscal policy, religion and certain economic policy
areas.(24) Interestingly the powers under the law are
devolved to the 300 or so districts throughout Indonesia and not to
the 26 provinces.(25) Provincial Governments will handle
central Government affairs in the regions and any tasks not able to
be dealt with by the district administrations because of lack of
appropriately trained personnel. Doubt has already been raised by
some ministers in the central Government over the state of
readiness at the district level to undertake activities many
ministers see as better carried out by the central organisation in
the name of a 'national' policy.(26)
Law 25/99 on balancing finances between the
central and regional Governments is the corollary of Law 22.
Basically, if properly implemented, it will allow regional
Governments to secure a considerable portion of the revenues
produced in their regions. Under the new law the regions would be
permitted to retain 80 per cent of revenues from forestry,
fisheries and general mining, 15 per cent from oil and 30 per cent
from natural gas.(27) Also within the scope of the law
is a re-allocation of 25 per cent of the central Government's
budget to the regions based on needs and economic potential.
Although intended as a means of placating the resource-rich regions
(East Kalimantan and Riau for instance) which have been
consistently milked for huge profits by Jakarta with little local
benefit, it is easily imaginable how this policy will result in a
decrease in funds flowing to resource-poor
regions.(28)
The problem with both laws is that they have yet
to be implemented and this exacerbates their ambiguity and lack of
clarity and certainty. Full implementation of regional autonomy is
expected to occur in 2001. A number of potential problems will need
to be addressed in the interim. Perhaps the most obvious is the
capability of district Governments-in skill and personnel terms-to
cope with the full range of powers conveyed to them under the new
laws. Concerns also arise over the potential for powerful foreign
or domestic interests to exert economic pressure on individual
district Governments on matters relating to mining or forestry
contracts and negotiations. Even more fundamental is the likelihood
of jurisdictional disputes arising between local and central
Government officials. Examination will now focus on the second part
of Indonesia's parallel crisis-independence movements in Papua and
Aceh.
(III)
Demands for Independence
(a) Papua
At the Hague Round Table conference in August
1949 the status of West New Guinea (or Irian Jaya as it came to be
known under Indonesian control) was not included in discussions
leading to the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to the
Republic of Indonesia. Dispute over the exercise of sovereignty in
the territory continued well into the 1960s. As tensions increased
between Indonesia and the Netherlands in the early 1960s,
culminating in a brief military engagement in 1962, the
international climate moved against the Netherlands. Australia,
which until late 1962 had been supportive of Dutch policy on the
issue, now followed the lead of the United States and urged the
Dutch to form an agreement with Indonesia regarding the future of
West New Guinea. An agreement was signed in New York in 1962 under
which West New Guinea was placed under UN Temporary Executive
Authority (UNTEA) awaiting an 'act of self-determination in
accordance with international practice.'(29) (See
forthcoming Current Issues Brief, 'Is West Papua Another East
Timor?' by Dr. J. R.Verrier).
In 1969 the so-termed 'Act of Free Choice' took
place designed to determine the future status of West New Guinea.
Predictably the 1025 delegates from West New Guinea selected by the
Indonesian Government decided in the popular consultation to join
the Republic of Indonesia. Since the transfer of the territory of
Papua (as it is now referred to by the Indonesian Government) to
effective Indonesian control in May 1963 armed Papuan rebels have
conducted military-style operations against the Indonesian
Government. In the early 1960s those opposed to Indonesian rule in
Papua formed the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua
Merdeka, OPM). In 1971 the OPM announced the formation of a
Provisional Republic of West Papua New Guinea, and proclaimed
independence for the territory. Over the last three decades the OPM
have conducted a dual policy of an intermittent guerrilla campaign
and an international propaganda effort. While portrayed as a
rag-tag bunch of terrorists by the Indonesian Government, the OPM
has none the less managed to be a continuing source of irritation
to the Indonesian Government despite its disorganisation and
frequent leadership changes.
Unlike the campaign waged by the East Timorese,
the OPM has never managed to attract international diplomatic
support for its struggle. Private views aside, no Government has
publicly disputed Indonesia's sovereignty in Papua.(30)
The nature of the armed struggle in Papua is considerably different
from Indonesia's past experiences with armed separatism such as the
Darul Islam movement and the PRRI Permesta Revolt and indeed from
the successful independence campaign waged by Fretilin in East
Timor. While in the past there has been a tendency to dismiss the
struggle in Papua as merely a problem of national integration, such
is clearly not the case now. The fall of President Soeharto marked
an increase in demands for independence in Papua.
Papua is a resource, particularly mineral, rich
territory. It contributes far more to the national budget than it
receives in return, which is a source of considerable angst given
the widespread poverty in the province. Its natural wealth has also
been a major attraction to foreign companies such as the
Freeport-McMoran mining company. Tom Beanal, a leader in the
Amungme tribe and Vice-Chairman of the newly formed Papuan
presidium, has tried in vain to sue Freeport for billions of
dollars in compensation.(31) Of the nearly two million
people who inhabit Papua, between 750 000-850 000 were born outside
the territory.(32) In Jayapura (recently renamed Port
Numbay) 80 per cent of the population are non-indigenous
people.(33) The development of a Papua-wide identity is
a relatively recent phenomenon notwithstanding the cultural and
historical distinctiveness of the Papuan position in the Indonesian
state. Awareness of this identity has been heightened by
transmigration schemes operated by the central Government which
dramatically altered the ratio of non-indigenous inhabitants in
Papua and further increased the numbers of non-Papuans in the civil
service. Papuan identity was further accentuated, and separatist
sympathies heightened, by the brutality of the operations of the
Indonesian military in the territory.
From the late 1990s leadership of the
independence struggle transferred from guerrilla fighters to
prominent figures in Jayapura and elsewhere who viewed the change
in leadership in Jakarta as offering new prospects.(34)
A delegation of 100 Papuan leaders met with President Habibie in
February 1999 where they openly demanded independence-a remarkable
indication of the changed times. Numerous independence-related
flag-raising ceremonies were conducted throughout Papua in the
second half of 1999. The Abdurrahman Wahid administration has
pursued a similar dialogue-based approach maintaining lines of
communication with the Papuan nationalists. There appears little
doubt, however, that if offered independence the overwhelming
majority of Papuans would support such a proposal.
As the People's Congress of Papua which opened
in Jayapura on 29 May 2000 indicated, Indonesia's new laws on
regional autonomy and financing will be inadequate to overcome the
deep anti-Indonesian feeling in Papua. Abdurrahman Wahid's 'act of
good faith' to change the name of the province to Papua in a
ceremony on 1 January 2000, was misinterpreted by many Papuans as
an indication of his preparedness to move further on the issue.
Abdurrahman Wahid was initially supportive of the Congress,
provided it with funding and had intended to attend. His attitude
toward the OPM has been quite progressive given the history of
relations between the organisation and the Indonesian Government.
He has been sensitive to details such as the flying of the OPM flag
(provided it was not flown higher than the Indonesian flag) and has
encouraged the expression of views. However, in defiance of
warnings from Jakarta, the People's Congress ended with a
declaration stating that the Papuan people reject the 1969 Act of
Free Choice, and demand the United Nations revoke UN resolution No.
2504 of 19 December 1969. In essence Papua was declared to be no
longer a part of the Republic of Indonesia and a quasi-legislative
institution-a reformulated Papuan presidium-was formed. As the
Secretary-General of the Congress, Thaha Alhamid, noted, ' West
Papua has been an independent nation since 1 December, 1961.'
(35) This is the date on which the territory was granted
independence from the Netherlands.
The Indonesian President was clear in his
response to this declaration, noting that a state within a state
was not an option and independence would not be countenanced. The
Indonesian Government was particularly concerned about the appeals
made at the congress to international powers (the Netherlands, the
United States and the United Nations) to reassess their recognition
of Indonesian rule in Papua.(36) In an apparent bid to
appease calls for independence in Papua the Indonesian Government
agreed to set up a body to investigate human rights
violations.(37)
However this offer was quickly followed by the
likelihood that Indonesia would send armed police reinforcements to
Papua in the wake of the declaration by the People's Congress. What
is most needed in Papua at the moment is for the central Government
to prudently assess how best it can accommodate the aspirations of
the Papuan people. Blanket rejection of independence by the central
Government, or excessive military involvement, will likely
exacerbate problems of national disunity. One problem for the
central Government, however, is that it cannot be certain of the
intentions of the Indonesian military. There are suspicions in some
quarters that the current escalation of events in Papua is not
entirely related to Papuan demands for independence but rather a
part of a campaign to de-stabilise the administration of
Abdurrahman Wahid. Those pushing for independence in Papua face a
difficult struggle. While approximately 60 per cent of the
population is Protestant, the campaign for unity and sovereignty is
complicated by the diversity of the population speaking hundreds of
different languages and dispersed over mountainous
terrain.(38) None the less the Indonesian Government is
right to be concerned about events in Papua. Indonesia's Minister
for Regional Autonomy, Ryaas Rasyid, believes Papua is a more
serious independence threat than Aceh because of the Christian
basis in the province which, he believes, is more likely to garner
Western sympathy than Islamic Aceh.(39) This is
particularly the case given the lingering resentment in Papua of
the events surrounding the 'Act of Free Choice' in 1969.
(b) Aceh
Aceh is a province containing some four million
people and vast resources of oil and natural gas. Indonesia is the
world's leading exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), and forty
per cent of the country's LNG comes from Aceh's northern
coast.(40) For decades the Acehnese have seen a much
greater proportion of their resources siphoned to the central
Government than have been remitted back to the province.
In Aceh armed resistance opposed rule from
Jakarta as early as 1953 only to fade and re-emerge in the late
1970s. The fact that Acehnese supporters of the Darul Islam
movement in 1953 proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia in Aceh
(Negara Islam Indonesia, NII) is not particularly
surprising. Aceh has enjoyed a long history of Islamic identity, a
trade based economy and resistance to colonial intrusion. After a
thirty year war the Sultan of Aceh eventually surrendered to the
Dutch in 1903 who established a civilian administration in the
region allowing the Acehnese a good deal of autonomy. Aceh was the
only major region to remain almost entirely free of Dutch control
during the 1945-9 independence struggle in
Indonesia.(41) Many Acehnese felt that their role during
the national revolution and their historical separateness would be
recognised in the formation of an Indonesian state. Aceh confirmed
its 'nationalist' credentials by refusing to participate in a
Dutch-sponsored conference to establish a state of Sumatra. In
early 1949 the central Government appointed military governor of
Aceh, Tengku M. Daud Beureueh, noted in response to the proposal
for Aceh to become self-governing in a Dutch sponsored federal
system: '... we have no intention of establishing a Great Aceh
state as we are Republican spirited... The Acehnese people are
convinced that separate independence, region by region, state by
state, can never lead to enduring independence.'(42)
The Acehnese were none the less united behind
the creation of an Islamic state. This perspective was at odds with
the national trend in Indonesia which was against the creation of
an Islamic state for the nation as a whole. Relations between Aceh
and the central Republican Government deteriorated when the latter
moved to dissolve the province of Aceh and incorporate Aceh in a
larger province of North Sumatra. With this policy in place by the
early 1950s, the Acehnese felt their autonomy and identity
threatened by the appointment of many Javanese and non-Acehnese to
senior positions in the new province. The TNI units in Aceh were
replaced by non-Acehnese units. Many Acehnese resisted the changes,
but the situation was complicated by the lack of unity within the
Acehnese community stemming from the divisive social revolution in
Aceh in 1946-7.(43)
A considerable transformation took place in Aceh
between 1950 and the establishment of the Negara Islam
Indonesia in 1953. This involved a central Government
crackdown on dissent and a de-Islamisation campaign. The remainder
of the decade was a turbulent period. Leaders of the Aceh rebellion
had no intention of separating the region from Indonesia but
envisaged it as an autonomous province. In 1955 the State of Aceh
(Negara Bahagian Aceh, NBA) was announced and an
Acehnese Government was established under the authority of Tengku
M. Daud Beureueh. Negotiations between the NBA and the Indonesian
Government continued until 1957 with Tengku M. Daud Beureueh
calling for a separate state. In April of that year a cease-fire
was agreed including a package promising a separate province and
promotion of Islam. The rebellion in fact persisted and fluctuated
in intensity for the next four years until August 1961. Despite
occasional expressions of dissatisfaction over the status of the
province Aceh remained relatively trouble free until the launching
of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) and
the proclamation of the independent state of Aceh in 1976. This
decision by GAM's leader, Tengku Hasan M. di Tiro, was based on
several factors at least. The first was a realisation that a
federalist structure was not going to solve Aceh's problems. The
second was dissatisfaction with the New Order Government's lack of
commitment to development in the territory and its emphasis on
policies of assimilation.
The activities of GAM continued on an episodic
basis throughout the 1980s. In truth GAM is now a small group whose
main architect, Tengku Hasan M. di Tiro, lives in self-imposed
exile in Sweden. The campaign for independence is now increasingly
led by student groups. None the less in response the Indonesian
military initiated a severe counter-insurgency campaign in Aceh in
the late 1980s. In fact between 1989 and 1998 Aceh was placed under
military rule, during which period special army units engaged in
the routine torture and murder of suspected members of the Free
Aceh movement.(44) Since the start of the 1990s the
Acehnese had come to feel increasingly threatened by the migration
of Indonesians from other provinces attracted by economic
opportunities in Aceh.(45) The fall of the Soeharto
regime raised the possibility of change and as a consequence
military atrocities were widely publicised and head of the
Indonesian armed forces, General Wiranto, apologised to the
Acehnese for abuses committed by his troops. President Habibie
promised an investigation into human rights abuses, and many
Acehnese held out hope for a change in their fortunes.
Habibie's focus wavered, however, as
preoccupation with the power struggle in Jakarta left little time
for attention on Aceh. And despite the public apology, military
abuses and a terror campaign continued unabated in Aceh. The terror
campaign conducted by the Indonesian military in Aceh far from
crushing dissent, in fact broadened the wide cross-section of
resentment in the territory against Indonesian rule. In other
words, many students and people who would otherwise not have
associated themselves with GAM reacted in unity against the
brutality of Indonesian rule in Aceh via the forum of GAM. The
commission appointed by President Habibie in mid-1999 to inquire
into human rights abuses in Aceh eventually brought a number of
cases to trial in April-May 2000. However, the long delay in
arranging a trial and the absence of high-ranking culprits meant
that the process lacked credibility.
Large scale strikes and demonstrations were held
throughout the province in support of a referendum on independence.
A particularly large demonstration occurred supporting this goal in
Banda Aceh on 13 November 1999. Aceh's historical distinctiveness,
revolutionary history and 'national' struggle, comparatively high
ethnic homogeneity (relative to other areas in Indonesia) and
strong Islamic underpinning elicited considerable support for its
cause among many Indonesians. It is doubtful, however, if this
positive feeling extended to support for Aceh's independence. While
sympathetic to the cause, Abdurrahman Wahid prevaricated on the
question of independence which did not endear him to many
Achenese.
In a rather desperate attempt to keep Aceh
within the fold the Government compromised and offered to hold a
referendum on the implementation of Islamic law-a move which fell
well short of Acehnese demands. The Government's negotiations with
the Acehnese (which included intervention by the Malaysian Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohammad) has been complicated by the diverse
strains of political opinion within the province. The Government
has focused attention in this respect on the Islamic religious
leaders (ulama) in an attempt to reduce the efficacy of
the students, GAM and other pro-independence forces.(46)
In May 2000 an agreement was reached for a 'Humanitarian pause' in
hostilities in Aceh. (47)
This agreement may lead to more talks and
perhaps the realisation on the part of the Indonesian military that
the Aceh issue will not be resolved militarily. Yet herein lies the
paradox for Aceh and Indonesia. While ever there is a prospect for
Acehnese independence Indonesia's national integrity remains under
threat and the military (or the police who now have responsibility
for internal security) will be involved. However to conceive of
Aceh as an independent democratic state within the Indonesian
nation, a distant but not implausible possibility, the central
Government in Indonesia must lessen its emphasis on national unity
enforced by the military.(48) While Aceh has a number of
legitimate grievances, the future of the territory will be
determined in significant part by the attitude in Jakarta and need
not involve independence. An autonomous Aceh, for instance within a
broader federalist state, may preserve Aceh's sense of place.
(IV)
Australia, the Region and Indonesia's national
unity
Fears of the break up of Indonesia, partly
validated by the independence campaigns in Aceh and Papua, an
uncertain decentralisation process, a central Government lurching
from one crisis to another and the increased frequency of outbreaks
of inter-communal violence heighten concerns among Indonesia's
neighbours. The absolute priority for ASEAN leaders and for the
Australian Government (and the United States for that matter) is
the stability of the Indonesian nation-state. The security and
stability of the Southeast Asian region is contingent upon the
survival of the unitary state of Indonesia even if this assumes a
slightly different form in the future. While it needs to be
considered, the alternative is a confronting possibility. The
emergence of an independent Islamic Republic of Aceh, for instance,
and its potential impact on Islamic insurgency in the southern
Philippines and Thailand would be of obvious concern. Potentially
huge scale refugee flows to Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and
other areas in the wake of the fracturing of Indonesia would be
extremely worrying.
However for Australia, lingering ill-feeling
within the Indonesian elite over the East Timor episode means that
many suspicions have to be overcome to convince Indonesia of the
genuineness of Australia's support for Indonesian national unity.
The situation in Papua looms as another important test case for
relations between Australia and Indonesia. A number of individuals
within the elite in Jakarta believe that Australia is fomenting the
independence movement in Papua.(49) Australian Foreign
Minister Alexander Downer has explicitly refuted such allegations
saying on 30 May, 'Australia has always [supported] and continues
to support and to recognise the integration of West Papua within
the Republic of Indonesia'.(50) Prime Minister Howard
asserted that Australia 'fully and unequivocally supports the
sovereignty and integrity of Indonesia'.(51) On this
point Australia's foreign policy appears to have bipartisan support
as opposition leader Kim Beazley noted in a speech in Jakarta on 2
May, 'Australia respects Indonesia's territorial integrity and is
aware of the difficulties of maintaining stability in such a
diverse and widespread grouping of islands.'(52) It is
conceivable Australia will face future challenges to this position,
particularly if border disputes intensify between Indonesia and
PNG. For the moment, Australia can do little but reinforce its
support for Indonesia and hope that the decentralisation/regional
autonomy process in Indonesia proceeds relatively smoothly.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that Indonesia is in a chronic
state of crisis. However, the Indonesian nation-state is unlikely
to disintegrate at the moment. This situation could change in the
future if the authority of the Abdurrahman regime wanes, if the
decentralisation laws fail when implemented and if Aceh and Papua
succeed in their bids to achieve independence. In the interim the
outbreaks of inter-communal violence in Maluku province (especially
Ambon and Halmahera) and West Kalimantan and in other areas
exacerbate the sense of crisis. The nature of Indonesia's national
unity is unusual because the basis for this unity has rested at
least as much upon geographical propinquity, historical accident
and cultural and ethnic homogeneity imposed from above as it has on
a sense of national togetherness. The Indonesian nation-state was
the product of a colonial regime and has henceforth evolved in
piecemeal fashion. There is a fundamental need for sensitive
Governmental policy making in order to preserve national unity in
Indonesia. There is a reasonable prospect that given creative
policy initiatives on this issue, and other factors
notwithstanding, Indonesia can maintain its national integrity even
if in a slightly altered form.
Endnotes
-
- In an official seminar in September 1998 a so-termed 'new
paradigm' was adopted by the military foreshadowing a dramatic
reduction (but not abandonment) of its political role.
- Greg Sheridan, 'Neighbours' Priority is a Stable Archipelago',
The Australian, 11 September 1999.
- Following a seminar in 1965 the Indonesian army produced the
doctrine of the Dwi Fungsi (Dual Function) of the armed
forces endorsing their dual role as a military and social-political
force.
- In 1938 the Dutch administration sought to decentralise their
administration by creating three autonomous regional Governments in
Sumatra, Borneo and the 'Great East'. During the interim allied
administration, and indeed the Japanese occupation prior to this,
the outer islands were governed separately from Java and Sumatra.
- These were East, West and Central Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan,
Sulawesi, Maluku (including West New Guinea) and Sunda Kecil. See
Ron May, 'Ethnic Separatism In Southeast Asia', Pacific
Viewpoint, vol. 31, no. 2, 1990, p. 29.
- J. D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in
Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration 1950-1960, Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, 1961, p. 8.
- ibid.
- B.R.O'G. Anderson, 'The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture' in
C. Holt, ed., Culture and Politics in Indonesia Cornell
University Press, Ithaca 1972, p. 23.
- Clifford Geertz, 'The Integrative Revolution' in Old
Societies and New States, The Free Press, Glencoe, 1963.
- J. A. C. Mackie, 'Integrating and Centrifugal Factors in
Indonesian Politics Since 1945', in J. A. C. Mackie ed.,
Indonesia: The Making of a Nation, Canberra: Research
School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1980.
- ibid., Mackie, p. 672. As Mackie notes, in the eyes of those in
the central Government revolutionary records did not compare with
educational attainment or bureaucratic seniority.
- A similar argument is proffered in Donald Emmerson, 'Will
Indonesia Survive?', Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 3,
May-June 2000.
- Robert Cribb, 'Not the Next Yugoslavia: Prospects for the
Disintegration of Indonesia', Australian Journal of
International Affairs, vol. 53, no. 2, 1999, p. 175.
- ibid., p. 177. Cribb further argues that the impact of
globalisation and the trend toward small state development in
international relations are unlikely to make much of an impact in
Indonesia.
- SARA refers to Suku, Agama, Ras and
Antar-golongan-basically ethnicity, religion, race and
inter-group relations public discussion of any of which was taboo
during the New Order.
- Nick Devas, 'Indonesia: what do we mean by decentralization?',
Public Administration and Development, vol. 17, 1997, p.
354.
- Terence H. Hull, 'Striking a Most Delicate Balance: The
Implications of Otonomi Daerah for the Planning and Implementation
of Development Cooperation Projects', Final Report of the AusAID
funded ANU-LIPI project on Population Related Research for
Development Planning and Development Assistance, 3 December 1999,
p. 2.
- ibid., p. 2.
- M. Morfitt, 'Strengthening the Capacities of Local Government:
Policies and Constraints', in C. MacAndrews, ed., Central
Government and Local Development in Indonesia (Singapore:
Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 59.
- Devas, op. cit., p. 355.
- Booth, ed., Oil Boom and After: Indonesian Economic Policy
and Performance in the Soeharto Era, Oxford University Press,
Singapore 1992.
- Law 22 was the initiative of the Minister for Regional
Autonomy, Ryaas Rasyid, when he was Director General of the
Department of Internal Affairs.
- Hull. op. cit., p. 3.
- The decentralisation is embodied in Article 7, (1) of Law 22.
The economic policy areas include macro-development planning, state
economic institutions, development of human and natural resources
and high technology.
- Indonesia now has twenty-six provinces with the loss of East
Timor.
- See the statement by the Indonesian Minister for National
Education quoting research from Gajah Mada university concluding
that only 5 out of 300 Kabupaten were prepared for the new
autonomy status (Jakarta Post, 2 November 1999).
- International Crisis Group Report, 'Indonesia's Crisis: Chronic
But Not Acute', 31 May 2000.
- It is estimated that application of the fiscal law will
dramatically alter provincial economic relations and induce
bankruptcies among the less well financially endowed regions.
International Crisis Group Report, p. 19.
- R. J. May, 'Ethnic Separatism in Southeast Asia', Pacific
Viewpoint, vol.31, no. 2, 1990, p. 40.
- ibid., p. 43.
- Theys Eluay is Chairman of the presidium. Before the formula
for revenue sharing was fixed, Papua had demanded a share of the
overall revenue range of between 75-80 per cent. This roughly
approximates the figure the regions will be allowed to keep of
forestry, fishery and mining resources under proposed Law 25.
- Louise Williams, 'Strangers In Their Own Land', The
Age, 10 July, 1998.
- ibid.
- International Crisis Group Report, op. cit., p.21.
- 'West Papuans Declare Independence from Indonesia', The
Jakarta Post, 5 June 2000. Papua is the name now used by the
central Indonesian Government to refer to the area previously
referred to by the Indonesian Government as Irian Jaya. Some
Papuans refer to the territory as West Papua.
- Lindsay Murdoch, 'Military Threat to Curb Self Rule Move',
Sydney Morning Herald, 6 June 2000.
- 'Indonesia Promises Probe into Rights in Irian Jaya', The
Sunday Canberra Times, 11 June 2000.
- Donald K. Emmerson, 'Will Indonesia Survive?', Foreign
Affairs, vol. 79, no. 3, May-June 2000, p. 101.
- ibid., p. 105.
- ibid., p. 98
- R. J. May, 'Ethnic Separatism in Southeast Asia', Pacific
Viewpoint, vol. 31, no. 2, 1990, p. 35.
- Semangat Merdeka, 23 March 1949, quoted in Dua Windhu
Kodam-I/Iskandar Muda, p. 154.
- Aceh's domestic political situation at this time was
complicated by a struggle between Islamic conservatives and
reformists. In early 1946 extremist members of the All-Aceh
Religious Scholars' Association, (PUSA) purged elements of the
traditional aristocracy in Aceh.
- International Crisis Group Report, op.cit., p. 20.
- International Crisis Group Report, op.cit., p. 20.
- Ed. Aspinall, 'Whither Aceh?', Inside Indonesia, no.
62, April-June 2000.
- This agreement was intended as a symbolic recognition by the
Indonesian Government of Tengku M. Hasan di Tiro's position,
although it is understood implicitly by the Indonesian Government
that he no longer has effective control over events in Aceh.
- Anthony Reid has argued that Indonesia can survive Aceh
becoming a state if it does not remain hostage to its military. See
Anthony Reid, 'Which Way Aceh?', Far Eastern Economic
Review, 16 March 2000, p. 36.
- Peter Hartcher, 'West Papua Shaping as Howard's Next East
Timor', Australian Financial Review, 10 June 2000. The
argument is taken to extraordinary lengths by some who feel that
Australia wishes to see the fracturing of the archipelago as a way
of limiting Jakarta's future power in Southeast Asia.
- Robert Garran, 'W Papuans to Stay Put: Canberra', The
Australian, 31 May 2000.
- ibid.
- Kim Beazley, 'Australia and Indonesia: Neighbours in Geography,
Neighbours in Democracy' Address to the Australia-Indonesia
Business Council, Jakarta, 2 May 2000, p. 8.