Gary Brown
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
12 October 1999
Contents
Major Issues
Introduction
The Size of the Defence Force
and Army
How Can Conscription be
Introduced?
Conscription
Mechanisms
Some Indicative Costings
Regular Army Capacity: the
Training Load
Conclusions
Endnotes
Appendix: Personnel
Costs
Major Issues
The need to deploy a substantial force to East
Timor has placed unanticipated stresses on the Australian Regular
Army. It has become clear that rotating the troops sent to Timor is
going to be difficult for an Army of less than 24 000 Regulars, as
Australia's is today.
This difficulty has led some to call for the
introduction of compulsory military service. Conscription is
certainly a quick means of raising large numbers of troops.
However, the need for training means that it would not deliver
personnel fast enough to solve the Timor rotation problem.
Historically Australia has been able to maintain
an Army significantly larger than the present force by means of
voluntary enlistment. In the eighties the Regular Army was almost
8000 stronger than it is now and conscription was not required.
Universal conscription of, e.g., all 18 year old
males is both prohibitively expensive (salary costs alone in that
case are about $2.8 billion per annum) and delivers too many
personnel-if two years service is required, then such a scheme
would increase the Regular Army by almost 100 000 personnel. This
would seriously unbalance the Australian Defence Force (ADF).
Selective conscription avoids this problem, but
unless it is necessary to increase the Regular Army above about 35
000 (which is 11 000 more than at present) voluntary enlistment
should be able to deliver the required numbers.
The Chief of the Defence Force, Admiral Barrie,
has already indicated that the ADF will not be advising the
Government to reintroduce conscription.
Introduction
The
deployment-now substantially under way-of over 4000 Australian
troops to East Timor as part of an international peacemaking and
peacekeeping force is the largest single Australian Defence Force
(ADF) operation since the Vietnam War. It is clear that maintenance
of the Australian contingent will pose substantial stresses on the
ADF, and particularly on the Army.
This is so because it is necessary after some
time (in this case, the Government is indicating nine months; in
Vietnam it was a year) to rotate units home for necessary rest and
recreation. Assuming that the mission is not complete by then, and
that the force required has not diminished in the meantime, this
means by about the middle of 2000 Australia will need approximately
as many troops as are presently allocated to Timor ready to replace
the contingent now arriving there.
Doubts have been expressed as to the Army's
ability to sustain such a level of effort. There have been calls
for the introduction of conscription, either to provide necessary
personnel or simply as a reliable means of increasing Army
strength. The Prime Minister, while indicating that he has no major
philosophical objection to conscription, has said that he would be
guided by professional military advice. For his part, the Chief of
Defence Force (Admiral Barrie) has said that he does not believe
conscription is a useful option for today's modern,
high-technology, Defence Force.(1)
This paper provides some background on decisions
taken about the size of the ADF over the last two decades, and
addresses issues relevant to the use of compulsory military
service.
The
Size of the Defence Force and Army
In late 1964 the Menzies Government introduced
balloted compulsory military service for 20-year-old males. Service
was for two years (later cut to 18 months), and the scheme was
intended to provide enough additional personnel to support the
escalating commitment to the Vietnam War. When the Whitlam
Government came to office in December 1972 the Regular ADF numbered
some 81 144 personnel. The Regular Army numbered 41 290 of which 11
947 were conscripts.(2) (Conscripts were not allocated to the Navy
or Air Force).
Honouring a central election pledge, the Whitlam
Government abolished conscription by immediate administrative
action followed up in 1973 by the National Service Termination
Act. By 1976, when the Fraser Government was in office, the
ADF was effectively an all-volunteer force. At that time it
numbered 68 774 of which 31 430 were in the Regular Army.
From 1976 to 1982 the all-volunteer Regular
force grew to a peak of 73 185 (32 876 Army). The strength of the
Regular ADF has been falling ever since.(3) Until the Timor issue
arose, the present Government had planned that the Regular ADF
would be reduced to only 50 000 by the year 2000. At 30 June 1999
it was 52 997.(4)
The Regular Army did not precisely follow the
decline in total ADF numbers because reductions were more severe in
the Navy and Air Force. Thus the Regular Army still numbered 32 342
in 1988. However, from the time of the Force Structure
Review in 1991, Army strength has fallen sharply.(5) It was 23
830 in May 1999, and the Government's year 2000 target was 23 000
of a total ADF of 50 000.(6)
The following table sets out data for all the
Regular forces from 1976 to the present.(7)
PERMANENT PERSONNEL OF THE ADF 1976-1999
30 June
|
Navy
|
Army
|
Air Force
|
Total
|
1976
|
15993
|
31430
|
21351
|
68774
|
1977
|
16390
|
31988
|
21703
|
70081
|
1978
|
16298
|
31883
|
21689
|
69870
|
1979
|
16582
|
31813
|
21803
|
70198
|
1980
|
16961
|
32321
|
22249
|
71531
|
1981
|
17298
|
32898
|
22322
|
72518
|
1982
|
17598
|
32876
|
22711
|
73185
|
1983
|
17198
|
33072
|
22512
|
72782
|
1984
|
16692
|
32278
|
22672
|
71642
|
1985
|
16059
|
32460
|
22863
|
71382
|
1986
|
15538
|
31834
|
22677
|
70049
|
1987
|
15803
|
32311
|
22647
|
70761
|
1988
|
15728
|
32342
|
22512
|
70582
|
1989
|
15750
|
31252
|
22627
|
69629
|
1990
|
15656
|
30333
|
21852
|
67841
|
1991
|
15894
|
31143
|
22121
|
69158
|
1992
|
15395
|
30157
|
21502
|
67054
|
1993
|
15041
|
28054
|
19345
|
62440
|
1994
|
14778
|
26347
|
17807
|
58932
|
1995
|
14679
|
26009
|
17500
|
58188
|
1996
|
14404
|
25964
|
17212
|
57580
|
1997
|
14701
|
25885
|
16630
|
57216
|
1998
|
14250
|
24940
|
15984
|
55174
|
1999
|
13666
|
24201
|
15130
|
52997
|
How
Can Conscription be Introduced?
Proclamation
As noted, conscription was abolished by law in
1973. But the Defence Act 1903 as amended retained a
provision that it could be reintroduced by proclamation of the
Governor-General. Potentially all Australian residents between the
ages of 18 and 60 could be called up in this way. However, the
Defence Legislation Amendment Act 1992 further provided
that any such proclamation is of no effect until it is approved by
both Houses of Parliament. Though actual legislation is not
required, the effect of this provision is to make the introduction
of conscription impossible without the approval of both the Senate
and the House of Representatives. Thus, it would be subject to the
same political requirements as would a specific Act of Parliament.
In present circumstances the Government would require the support
of either the Labor Opposition or the Australian Democrats to
obtain the necessary Senate resolution.
Requirement for War
It should also be noted that Governor-General
may only issue such a proclamation in 'time of war'. The
Defence Act defines 'war' and 'time of war' as:
"War" -Means any invasion or
apprehended invasion of, or attack or apprehended attack on,
Australia by an enemy or armed force.
"Time of War" -Means any time
during which a state of war actually exists, and includes the time
between the issue of a proclamation of the existence of war or of
danger thereof and the issue of a proclamation declaring that the
war or danger thereof, declared in the prior proclamation, no
longer exists.
There would, therefore, appear to be significant
doubt as to whether it is legally possible to reintroduce
conscription at the present time in order to support the deployment
to Timor, which arguably does not satisfy the definitions
specified. Further amendments to the Defence Act might be
needed before it would even be possible to issue a proclamation.
However, the remainder of this paper will assume for the purposes
of argument that these objections can be met.
Conscription Mechanisms
Conscription for military service can be either
universal within a specific age group or selective by some
criterion and/or by gender. The selective scheme used for the
Vietnam war rendered all 20-year-old males potentially liable, but
actually selected only those whose birth dates were drawn in
ballots held each six months.
Certain classes of individual (e.g., theological
students) were automatically exempt, while others (e.g., students
undertaking tertiary courses) could obtain deferments of their
liability. It was also possible to gain exemption by joining the
then Citizen Military Forces (CMF), now known as the Army Reserve.
In practice this latter exemption had the unfortunate effect of
filling up the Reserve with thousands of reluctant members
primarily interested in evading fulltime military service and the
possibility of being sent to Vietnam. This resulted in considerable
dilution of the Army Reserve's quality.
Conscientious Objection
Exemption could also be gained by registering as
a Conscientious Objector (CO). The objection, which had to be to
all wars-not just a particular war-had to be proved to a magistrate
before exemption would be granted.
The 1992 Defence Legislation Amendment
Act, however, changed the conscientious objection provisions
so that objection to a particular war became an acceptable ground
for exemption. It also reshaped the machinery for dealing with
applications for CO status. Conscientious Objection Tribunals would
be established, each consisting of three members. Presiding members
must be legal practitioners of at least seven years standing (they
do not have to be magistrates), the other two members need not be
legally qualified. The onus of proof rests with the applicant for
CO status. The likely effect of the more liberal CO provisions is
noted below.
Some Indicative Costings
To obtain indicative minimal costings, it is
necessary only to make one assumption and know three numbers. The
assumption is that conscripts will be paid as Army trainees and,
after completion of training, as new Army privates. The first
number required is the number of individuals it is proposed to
conscript, the second is the total annual remuneration of an Army
private and the third is the rate of pay of an Army trainee.
Multiplying the number of conscripts by the
appropriate remuneration figure will give the initial additional
annual cost of the proposal.
However, there are numerous additional costs,
harder to quantify, which must also be considered and which will
add significantly to the base personnel cost. These include
rations, health care, accommodation, weapons and other equipment
needed for the extra personnel. Moreover one must allow for the
lower rate paid to an Army trainee as distinct from a private who
has completed training. Further, there is the cost to the existing
Regular Army of diverting personnel to large-scale training: this
is discussed further below.
Below two schemes will be indicatively costed.
First, a scheme whereby all 18-year-old males are liable; second,
one in which ten thousand 18-year-old males are required to join
the ADF each year. In both cases service is proposed to be for two
years (including training time). As essential training takes about
six months, 24 months service is needed to obtain a reasonable
return on the investment. Based on experience in the 1965-72
scheme, approximately half of the persons called up will not meet
the Army's health and fitness standards. It is also assumed that
conscripts will be paid at the minimum rate for a new Regular
soldier (currently $25 465 per annum, plus Service Allowance of
$6407 per annum for members who have completed training-a payment
for the unusual demands and requirements of Service life). This
totals $31 872 per annum The rate of pay for basic trainees (in
approximately the first six months) is $19 517 with no Service
Allowance.
It should be noted that in modern Australian
society there may be a view that conscription, if introduced,
should be extended to women on the grounds of avoiding gender
discrimination. Over recent years the Defence Force has been
actively phasing out gender discrimination, which used to be quite
extensive. However, even today ADF policy still excludes women from
positions categorised as Direct Combat. This includes Army
armoured, artillery, combat engineer and infantry units. As these
are the core of the Army, and as conscription is usually confined
to the Army, the inclusion of women does not appear to be a
practical proposition unless, of course, the Direct Combat
exclusion is removed.
It might be argued that conscripts could be paid
less than ordinary soldiers. This is certainly possible, but
unlikely to be practical in either political or military terms.
Politically, it could easily be represented as government forcing
young people into the Army at an artificially low pay rate.
Militarily, it would be seriously subversive of Army morale and
esprit de corps, because it would create an 'underclass'
of lowly-paid soldiers who would obviously be looked down upon by
Regulars and who would in turn resent being forced to serve in such
conditions for less money. In Vietnam, conscripts were effective
because-though called 'nashos' by Regulars in a friendly sense-they
were on the same scales of pay and benefits. These considerations
work powerfully against any argument for lower pay.
All 18-year-old Males
The Australian Bureau of Statistics gives the
June 1998 18-year-old Australian population as 133 468 (say 133
000) men and 126 386 (say 126 000) women.(8)
Using proportions taken from the previous
scheme, of the 133 000 eligible men, some 1.4 per cent (1862)
would be exempted because they are ministers of religion,
theological students or court-approved conscientious objectors.
With the more liberal CO laws now in place that proportion would
probably be greater today than in the sixties. A further 16 per
cent (21 280) would gain exemption because they are married or have
joined the Army Reserve as an alternative to conscription into the
Regulars. Ten per cent (13 300) would gain deferments of liability
to serve because they are pursuing studies which cannot be
interrupted, because of hardship considerations, because they are
'draft dodgers' under police investigation (who would-if
apprehended-go through the courts eventually), etc. This means that
of the original 133 000 men, about 36 000 would not even be
examined by a doctor as part of the scheme.
Of the remaining 97 000 about half will fail the
medical unless standards are reduced from the 1965-72 scheme (or
unless the youth population is healthier now than then). Thus,
about 48 500 18-year-old men would be conscripted into the Forces
each year of the scheme, probably in two intakes of 24 250
each.
Because the scheme is for two years service,
this means that on maturity (after the first two years are
complete) there will be 97 000 conscripts in the Army-48 500 in
their first year of service and 48 500 in their final year. Of
these 97 000, of course, there will always be 24 250 in
training.
Based on the figures given above, and allowing
for the lower salary cost of trainees (who do not receive Service
Allowance), the scheme would have personnel-only costs of
about $860 million in Year 1, $2.41 billion in year 2 and $2.79
billion in each subsequent year. (The Appendix gives the basis of
these figures).
It should be noted that this estimate is
an unrealistic minimum figure. This is so because it takes
no account of:
-
- additional equipment required to train 24 250 men at
once. Just how much equipment would be needed is
unknown, but the Army has never had to deal with so many recruits
at once since the end of World War II. It will not have the
necessary modern equipment to train so many people without taking
it away from the Regulars or buying more;
-
- requirement for additional accommodation. The
Army is not presently capable of accommodating the extra recruits
and significant capital outlays would be needed to provide the
necessary barracks, recreation facilities, etc. This problem has
been exacerbated by the selloff of many ADF properties and
facilities in recent years;
-
- the cost of administering the scheme. As with
the 1965-72 scheme, a considerable bureaucracy, plus computers,
would be needed to run the scheme. There would be costs associated
with determining exemptions, paying doctors to examine people (the
Commonwealth Medical Officer system would need to be used, as
before, because the Army has insufficient doctors for the task) and
enforcing the law (police investigators, courts, etc);
-
- restructuring the Army to manage a larger force. This would be
a significant issue for a scheme which conscripted all available
18-year-old males, but less so for a more modest Army expansion of
(say) ten thousand.
Selective Service Option: Ten Thousand
18-year-old Males
The personnel cost figure arrived at-nearly
three billion dollars per year-can be reduced by making the scheme
selective (a birthday ballot) as was the 1965-1972
scheme. The arithmetic is quite simple: if we
select only one in two the personnel cost will be
halved. If it is one in four, the cost will be cut
to a quarter, and so on.
If it were decided to conscript not all eligible
males but, say, enough to increase the Army by ten thousand, costs
would be reduced. On the same basis as used above, a scheme which
brought an additional ten thousand personnel into the Army (in two
intakes per annum of 2500 each) would, on maturity, have a minimum
annual personnel cost of $144 million. As before, additional
costs would accrue (at a lower rate due to the lower numbers) for
equipment, accommodation, administration, etc.
However, on past experience it would be possible
to increase the Regular Army by ten thousand by simply using
voluntary enlistment.
Regular Army Capacity: the Training Load
The Regular Army at the time conscription was
introduced in 1964 numbered some 22 681
volunteers. By 1970 this had grown to 28 325
volunteers but in addition there were some 16 208 conscripts.(9) In
other words, of a total Regular Army in 1970 of 44 533 some 36 per
cent (say, a third) were conscripts. It is
generally agreed that the Army-which was of course fighting in
Vietnam-was fully stretched, if not overstretched, in training and
handling this number of conscripts without serious loss of
efficiency.
The problem is that only experienced Regular
personnel, especially NCOs and junior officers, can train and lead
conscript recruits properly. Thus an influx of recruits places
great stress on these ranks to the detriment of activity outside
the training sphere.
The Regular Army (excluding 1886 members in
training) numbered 21 944 in May 1999.(10) If the proportions of
conscripts to Regulars which existed in the Vietnam conscription
period are useful as a guide, then an Army of this size could
handle the burden of training up to about 7300
conscripts. Beyond this number increases in
Regular Army strength (which must also be paid for) would be needed
to cope with the recruits.
Conclusions
Calls for conscription to assist in rotation of
the East Timor Force are clearly misplaced. It would be upwards of
a year before a scheme of any type, even if introduced today, could
provide significant numbers of trained personnel for deployment to
a sensitive environment such as East Timor. Rotation will be
necessary well before then.
At the same time, the pressure placed on the
Army by the Timor operation shows that the Regular Army is at
present arguably too small. Reductions in strength put in place by
the previous government and accelerated by its successor would have
the Regular Army at only 23 000 by next year. This will need to be
reversed and, of course, the reversal will need to be paid for as
part of the increases in defence spending now being mooted.
A universal-type conscription scheme (e.g., all
18-year-old males) would be massively expensive. Salary costs alone
are estimated at about $2.8 billion per annum. Moreover it would
unbalance the ADF by raising Regular Army strength by some 97 000.
Selective conscription of course can be designed to induct only as
many as needed. However there would appear to be ample scope for
voluntary recruitment as the primary means of raising Regular Army
strength. In the eighties the Regular Army was maintained at well
over 30 000 members with no requirement for conscription.
Endnotes
-
- 'Defence Chief Reiterates Conscript Remarks', Media Release
296/99, 28 September 1999.
- Defence Report 1972, p. 38.
- These figures are from Allan Shephard, Trends in Australian
Defence: A Resources Survey, ADSC 1999, Table 7.
- Department of Defence, Portfolio Budget Statements
1999-2000 (BRP 1.4A), p. 23.
- Shephard, Trends, Table 7.
- Figures from the Army submission to the Joint Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade inquiry into the suitability of
the Army for peacetime, peacekeeping and war. See:
www.army.gov.au/framer.cfm?area=/special/index.html.
- Shephard, Trends, Table 7 (to 1998). Figures for 1999
are from Department of Defence, Portfolio Budget
Statements 1999-2000, 'Defence Portfolio', Canberra, May 1999.
Figures are for the Estimated 'personnel' numbers for the end of
June 1999 as predicted at the time of presenting the Budget in May
1999. At the time of writing the 1998-99 Defence Report, which
contains the actual figures, was not yet available.
- Australian Bureau of Statistics, Population by Age and
Sex, issued 18 December 1998.
- Defence Report 1970, p. 34.
- Source in note 5.
Appendix: Personnel Costs
Estimating personnel costs
There are 133 000 18-year-old males (June 1998).
Of these, as discussed in the paper, only 97 000 are likely to
be examined by a doctor for fitness. Of these about half will fail
the medical. This leaves 48 500 males for induction, in two intakes
of 24 250 each per year.
The salary of an Army trainee is $19 517 per
annum with no Service Allowance. Six months training at this rate
thus costs $9759.
A trained Private base grade receives a salary
of $25 465 plus $6407 Service Allowance-a total $31 872 per annum
($15 936 per six months).
6 month period
|
Intake numbers
|
Salary for period
|
Members continuing
|
Salary for period
|
Total ($m)
|
First
|
24250
|
$9759
|
Nil
|
Nil
|
$236.6
|
Second
|
24250
|
$9759
|
|
|
$236.6
|
|
|
|
24250
|
$15936
|
$386.5
|
Third
|
24250
|
$9759
|
|
|
$236.6
|
|
|
|
48500
|
$15936
|
$772.9
|
Fourth
|
24250
|
$9759
|
|
|
$236.6
|
|
|
|
72750
|
$15936
|
$1159.3
|
It is apparent that by maturity (in the fourth
six month period) the personnel cost is $236.6 million for the
latest batch of 24 250 inductees, plus $1159.3 million for the
continuing group of 72 750-that is, $1 395.5 million. The full year
cost, then is twice that-$2791.8 million (say $2.8 billion).
The fifth and subsequent periods will return
similar results because intakes will be matched by departures.