Dr J. R. Verrier
27 July 2000
Contents
Major Issues
Introduction
A Legacy of History
The Contribution of Dutch and Australian
Policy to the creation of a West Papuan Nationalism
Indonesia's Contribution to the Development of
West Papuan Nationalism
What Choices for Indonesia, Australia and Papua
New Guinea Now?
Indonesia
Australia
Papua New Guinea
Conclusions
Endnotes
Appendix A
Resolution from the Papuan People's
Congress.
Appendix B
Australian Papuan New Guinea Security
Cooperation
http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/cline/papua/map.jpg
Among the problems facing Indonesia in its
post-Suharto transition to democracy is the heightened expression
of discontent in some of its regions including Aceh, the Moluccas
and the western half of the island of New Guinea which has recently
been renamed West Papua*. Responses expected or required from
Jakarta to this state of affairs range from proposals for
significant regional autonomy to secession or independence.
Parallels are frequently drawn between the situation in West New
Guinea (WNG) and East Timor, i.e. unless Indonesia moves quickly
and convincingly to respond to the situation, a Timor-like
situation is likely to develop.
*Because of these name changes, each of which
had political significance, unless the context suggests otherwise,
the description WNG will be used throughout.
Remarkably, given the province's history, a
Congress of 2700 Papuan representatives was allowed to take place
in Jayapura at the end of May. Surprisingly (to Jakarta) the
resolution which followed it called for West Papua independence.
Unsurprisingly, Jakarta has responded that it will not countenance
any suggestion of threats to its territorial integrity, in effect
that the independence of WNG is not negotiable.
The Congress statement represented the radical
extreme of the West Papuan nationalist movement. But there is no
doubt that it reflects a long and strong history of West Papuan
nationalism which is unlikely to fade away. Particularly in the
present circumstances of different expectations from the changed
regime in Jakarta, unless properly managed, West New Guinea has all
the potential to become a very troublesome issue for Indonesia-and
also for Australia and Papua New Guinea.
This paper sets out briefly to examine the
crucible in which WNG nationalism was created and, in particular,
to remind of Australia's-remarkable from today's point of view-role
in it. Australia has played a small but very significant part in
WNG's history and this is one reason why the situation in WNG is
different from that in East Timor. Another reason for the
difference between the WNG and East Timor situation is that the
basis for Indonesia's claim to it is entirely different and stems
from WNG's place in the former Netherlands East Indies to which the
Republic of Indonesia sees itself as the rightful heir. Thus in one
interpretation of international law, Indonesia has a legitimate
claim to WNG that it did not have to East Timor. And it is for this
reason that Indonesia will not consider independence for WNG for it
could open a Pandora's Box.
The future of WNG is at the centre of issues
currently confronting the Wahid regime and, if mishandled, is
likely to influence not only Wahid's future but the stability of
Indonesia as a whole.
For this reason, the issue is also-or ought to
be-a very central one for Australian foreign policy. This is in
part because of Australia's historical involvement but also because
of the importance of good relations with Indonesia and also on
account of its defence relationship with Papua New Guinea.
Indonesian stability was and is a vital national interest for
Australia. But changes in the nature of international relations
since Australia first became involved by deciding to back Dutch
retention of WNG suggest that, whether it likes it or not,
Australia is unlikely to be able to ignore a deteriorating
situation in WNG.
Introduction
The resignation of President Suharto in May 1998
and the events that followed it acted as a catalyst to opponents of
Indonesian rule in West New Guinea (WNG) which resulted in an
upsurge in incidents between Papuans and Indonesians.(1)
President Habibie responded with a willingness to apologise for
human rights violations but did little in practice and the
incidents continued(2). Following the election of
Abdurrahman Wahid as President in October 1999, some concessions to
political expression were made, from a change of the territory's
name to Papua to permission to hold a Congress to discuss the
future of the territory. These extraordinary concessions, however,
have produced some unintended consequences, at least from
Indonesia's point of view, for they appear to be seen by some as
signals that West Papua, too, can have its independence from
Indonesia. This at best causes grave embarrassment to President
Wahid and to Indonesia and, at worst, could trigger a cycle not
dissimilar to the one that unfolded in Timor.
Allegations of Australian support for West
Papuan independence(3), allegations of Golkar support
for the Congress (including funding) with a view to undermine
Wahid(4) and allegations of Timor-like tactics with
Indonesia's military training of opponents of independence in West
Papua(5) (perhaps to force a crackdown by Wahid) are all
reasons to be concerned about the situation in WNG. WNG has the
potential to destabilise the Indonesian regime(6). WNG
has the potential to exacerbate and complicate the re-building of
Australia's good relations with Indonesia. And WNG also has the
potential to pose some very serious questions for neighbouring
Papua New Guinea (PNG) with whom Australia has a defence
relationship.
It is amazing that the 29 May-3 June Congress
was allowed to take place at all. Credit has to be given to
President Abdurahman Wahid for allowing it to do so. Ever since it
took over the administration of the territory from the United
Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in 1963 and its
sovereignty in 1969, Indonesia has not countenanced any suggestion
of discussions about a status for WNG other than as part of the
Republic of Indonesia. But suddenly West Papuan nationalists have
been allowed to fly their flag at protest meetings when this
provoked repression, imprisonment and worse in the past, and there
has been unprecedented freedom of political expression culminating
in the Congress. But Indonesia had apparently expected the Congress
to be representative of all points of view in WNG and not just the
secessionists. Its Five Point statement affirming the province's
determination to separate from Indonesia made it clear that this
was not the case (see Appendix A).
There is no question that Indonesia would
countenance independence for WNG just as there is no question that
Australia would support a push for sovereignty on the part of WNG,
and this both have repeatedly made perfectly clear. The sovereignty
of WNG is thus not at issue (except for its proponents in the
territory). But that there is a movement for independence in WNG
and that some elements in Jakarta appear to be making allegations
of Australian support for it an excuse for continuing coolness in
the relationship (including continually postponed visits by
President Wahid to Australia), illustrates its seriousness as an
issue. For Indonesia it goes to the heart of its territorial
integrity and thus to its stability. For Australia, because of
proximity, because of history and because of its ongoing links with
Papua New Guinea (PNG), it is likely to be just as challenging to
its relations with Indonesia as was the situation in Timor. But
there the parallel with Timor ends.
There is a great deal of misunderstanding about
the circumstances of WNG most often illustrated by comparisons with
East Timor. In fact the circumstances of the two territories are
very different: Indonesia has a claim in law to WNG that it did not
have to East Timor.(7) In addition, Australia played a
role which, in earlier years, contributed in no small part to
events as they turned out-and clearly Indonesia, or some
Indonesians have not forgotten this.
This paper sets out to explain the background to
the nationalist movement in what was Dutch New Guinea or West New
Guinea, became West Irian or Irian Jaya and is now Papua or West
Papua to give the current situation context*. It will examine
briefly the relevant history, look at its legacy and assess what
options appear to be available to Jakarta, to Canberra and also to
Port Moresby.
*Because of these name changes, each of which
had political significance, unless the context suggests otherwise,
the description WNG will be used throughout.
A Legacy of History
As in so many developing parts of the world
where entirely artificial borders were more likely to be drawn
along geographic than cultural or ethnic lines, the situation of
WNG's status is a colonial accident. And as in so many other parts
of the developing world, however illogical those boundaries, for
very practical reasons, there has been an extraordinary commitment
to them in the absence of any realistic alternative. Because any
threat to a colonial boundary anywhere is seen to be a threat to
colonial boundaries everywhere, there has been a remarkable
consensus or cement around these artificial international
boundaries. For once colonial boundaries are questioned, huge parts
of the world as we know it have the potential to unravel. This fear
has been at the heart of the matter for the leaders of Indonesia
since its independence in 1949 right up to the present. What
precedent would an independent Aceh or Irian present to this
'nation' of a thousand islands and its national identity so hard
won through 'unity in diversity'?
The Netherlands cut out its empire in the exotic
east for the same reasons that all small, cold, northern sea-faring
and trading nations did (there or elsewhere) from the
15th to the 19th centuries-for resources and
for trade-and to prevent others from doing so in such degree as to
upset the balance of power in Europe. One consequence was the
division of the island of New Guinea, in one sense a homogenous
ethnic whole for all the multiplicity of separate language groups
within its Melanesian framework, and for all the dilution at the
edges from different, passing or trading peoples.
The Netherlands East Indies staked its claim to
WNG in 1606 and established its first settlement there in 1828. The
141st parallel in the middle of the island of New Guinea
came to mark its eastern perimeter. Germany followed its commercial
interests and went on to claim the north eastern section of the
island (then called New Guinea) in 1884; only ten days later, the
British, reluctantly and, after persuasion by the Australian
colonies fearful of Russian, French or German domination of the
critical trade routes to their north, declared a protectorate over
the south east of New Guinea. (The Papua Act transferred the
territory to Australia in 1906). After Germany's defeat in World
War One, the League of Nations gave Australia the mandate for the
administration of German New Guinea, which it administered along
with Papua as the Territory of Papua and New Guinea (TPNG). The
TPNG, as Papua New Guinea (PNG), was to achieve self-government in
1972 and independence in 1975.
Once the European colonists had made their
claims, there the matter mostly rested, at least for WNG, because
this 'last unknown'(8), was particularly remote and
hostile and there was more incentive to concentrate their
development effort-or more accurately their interests -elsewhere.
But World War Two changed this state of affairs irrevocably. This
was in part a consequence of the role the island played in that
war, with Japanese occupation from 1941 followed by the allies in
1944 and with West New Guinea's magnificent harbour capital,
Hollandia, providing shelter for the allied fleet. More
significant, however, were the forces for change which that war
unleashed. World War II and the role colonial people so often
played in it, was a stimulus to the development of a determination
to have more say in their own affairs and thus, eventually, to the
momentum for movement towards self-government and independence
sooner or later all over the colonised world. And WNG was no
exception. For those exposed to external contact, indigenous
political expression took the form of both pro-Indonesian and
pro-Dutch political association(9) before it eventually
became pro-Papuan and, eventually, pro-independence.
In the Netherlands East Indies this resulted in
a war of independence and the creation of the Republic of Indonesia
in 1949. But for a complex set of reasons of its own, in part
economic-WNG was known to be hugely resource rich-but perhaps also
symbolic and psychological,(10) the Dutch had chosen to
hang on to this half island. Thus just one small part of the former
NEI was excluded from the 1949 transfer of sovereignty to the
Republic of Indonesia with agreement that its future would be
resolved by negotiation thereafter. The new Indonesian Republic
challenged this exclusion and campaigned in the United Nations and
elsewhere for the return of WNG, eventually engaging in
increasingly belligerent campaigns, including military sorties into
the territory itself, to achieve its ends(11).
Paradoxically, however, Australia, which with
great foresight given the attitudes and circumstances of the times,
supported the Indonesian nationalists in their struggle for
independence against the Dutch, for some time yet held out strongly
against its claims to WNG.
Broader strategic calculations were to determine
what followed. These included President Sukarno's flirtation with
communism, and western reaction. They also included the generally
declining security situation in south east Asia as a whole at a
time when Indonesia was also building up to its
Confrontasi of Malaysia and as western support, in the
form of advisers and materials, had begun to be provided to South
Vietnam. Australia feared the prospect of a war on three fronts
(Vietnam, Malaysia and WNG).(12) Exhortations for
support to its great and powerful friends for Australia's position
on WNG fell on deaf ears as the focus of their attentions in this
period of high Cold War were elsewhere. Meanwhile President
Sukarno's increasingly belligerent rhetoric determined upon the
return of WNG 'to the fatherland', Indonesia's developing
association with the Communist bloc and his preparations for war
increased the pressure on the Dutch to cede the territory.
Australia had no choice but to change its policy from one of
support for Dutch retention of WNG to support of Indonesia's
claim(13). The territory was handed over to the United
Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in October 1962 and
to Indonesian administration in May 1963 pending an Act of Free
Choice by 1969 which, as events turned out, was to go resoundingly
in Indonesia's favour.
In history and in law, the Republic of Indonesia
thus saw itself as the legitimate heir of the entire former
Netherlands East Indies of which WNG formed a part. If there was
any doubt about this, this was removed by the UN supervised Act of
Free Choice, Pepera, in 1969. By the Indonesian process of
musjawarah, (consensus) the approximately 800 000
people of the territory chose 1025 representatives in 8
kabupaten (regional) consultative assemblies to vote in
the Act of Free Choice. In spite of the very questionable nature of
that process(14) which Indonesia claimed returned a
unanimous vote in its favour, there was clearly no realistic
alternative-no-one of any account was willing or able to stand in
Indonesia's way(15).
In contrast, to East Timor Indonesia never had a
similar claim. Divided as arbitrarily by colonial powers as the
island of New Guinea, in this case between the Dutch in the west
and the Portuguese in the east, Indonesia has and had no comparable
claim-whatever the geographic, ethnic or strategic logic may
suggest-to the eastern half of the island of Timor which they took
over when it was so unceremoniously abandoned by the Portuguese in
1975. In this way Indonesia's action in seizing East Timor can be
and was seen as an act of aggression in breach of international
law. Indonesia's campaign to win back WNG before 1962, and its rule
of it thereafter, however questionable in democratic or other terms
on the other hand, was ultimately accepted as no more and no less
than the exercise of its legitimate sovereign right.
The Contribution of Dutch
and Australian Policy to the creation of a West Papuan
Nationalism
Having neglected WNG shamelessly-in 1945 there
was next to no development at all in the territory beyond its
harbour capital of Hollandia and one or two other coastal
settlements-the Dutch changed tack. An airport at Biak and
airstrips in the Baliem valley to assist its opening up, improved
harbour facilities in Hollandia, dockyards in Manokwari and a
slipway in Merauke-and housing for the growing expatriate
community-came with the fifties. In addition, once the decision was
made to hold on to the territory, efforts were made to accelerate
the education of a small elite and to create a sense of West Papuan
nationalism. This included, by 1961, the establishment of a
Legislative Council with an indigenous majority and a ten year plan
(the Luns Plan) to bring the territory to independence.
While Australian governments since 1962 have
repeatedly and unequivocally supported Indonesia's claim to WNG,
and continue to do so today, there was a time when this was not the
case. In 1949, Australia had encouraged the Dutch to hold on to the
territory when they had not yet determined to do so(16).
In the early 1950s, Australia was also the prime mover in
initiating a policy of administrative cooperation between the Dutch
and Australian administrations in the island of New
Guinea(17). This culminated in the 1957 Joint Statement
on Administrative Cooperation between Holland and Australia which
Australia's representative at the UN, Mr Walker, declared to be 'a
solemn undertaking of a long-term policy nature'(18).
The statement resurrected speculation about plans for the creation
of a Melanesian Federation including PNG and perhaps also the
Solomon Islands. A vocal proponent of the idea was the then Justice
John Kerr(19). A Melanesian Federation continued to have
currency in both the eastern and western halves of the island of
New Guinea, as well as in sections of Australian opinion, long
after events had moved on and it was clear that no such creation
could ever be entertained(20).
Joint cooperation with the Dutch administration
had begun with practical cross border liaison between Hollandia and
Port Moresby early in the 1950s. The Statement formalised
engagement in 'low key' joint cooperation arrangements including
such issues as land law policy, the question of a common language,
inclusion of indigenous people in the public service, sea and
telecommunications links, study groups, student exchanges and even
dedicated places for WNG students in Australian educational
institutions(21). However pragmatically it had
recognised the need to support Indonesia's independence movement,
Australia had no wish to share a border with Indonesia in the
middle of the island of New Guinea and for some time clearly
pursued policies with another outcome in mind.
We need to recall the mood of the times and in
particular contemporary attitudes towards Europe and Asia to fully
comprehend this state of affairs. Notwithstanding fears raised by
President Sukarno's erratic, strongly nationalistic and
increasingly belligerent style, interestingly, a critical role in
the unfolding WNG dispute was played by Australia's agricultural
interests as much as its defence lobbies. At a time when there were
five Country Party members and four farmers (one of whom was the
Minister of Defence)(22) in the Coalition Cabinet (from
1949-56), the threat to Australia's then major agricultural
exporting interests of Indonesia's takeover of WNG was seen to be
dramatic. Australia would share a land border in the island of New
Guinea with Indonesia. There was a long history of concern over the
danger of plant and animal diseases spreading from WNG and of the
need to keep the island as a disease free buffer. This undoubtedly
contributed to the decision to continue first to back Dutch
retention of the western half of the island of New Guinea and then
to engage in administrative cooperation in managing New Guinea
affairs.
Both, however, were to be shortlived. As well as
the pressures building up against the Dutch position in the United
Nations, the US's determination to improve relations with Indonesia
resulted in a shift from its position of neutrality on WNG to one
which supported Indonesia's claim. West New Guinea was seen to be a
small price to keep Sukarno out of the communist
camp.(23) And australia had no choice but to follow
suit. Instructions went out to its patrol officers in the border
regions of the TPNG to close the border and 'orient its peoples
eastwards'. This was to be followed over the years by efforts to
mark an impossible border in some of the most inhospitable terrain
on earth so that, thereafter, the refugees who periodically crossed
it (often with the Indonesian army in hot pursuit) could be sent
back.(24)
Indonesia's Contribution to the
Development of West Papuan Nationalism
The policies of the Dutch and Australian
governments in the 1950s contributed to the development of a sense
of West Papuan nationalism by creating expectations of a future
other than one incorporated in the Indonesian Republic,
expectations which, in the event, could not be realised. But the
tragedy of the territory's history is that this would have been
unlikely to survive, at least in its militant or extremist form, if
experience under Indonesian rule had been different. Indonesia had
six years, between accession to its administration in 1962 and the
Act of Free Choice in which to win the hearts and minds of the
people. But Indonesia had a major distraction elsewhere in the form
of Confrontation of Malaysia. It pulled out of the UN in 1965 and
declared there would be no plebiscite in WNG. When Suharto replaced
Sukarno and his Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, said that the Act of
Free Choice would go ahead after all, the fact that Indonesia could
not afford to lose the vote meant that repression still took
precedence over development.
After the Act of Free Choice in 1969 came the
need to manage the local reaction to it, including the flight of
refugees across the border into the TPNG. The '70s therefore
continued to be years of tension and the territory was closed to
the outside world. Then came transmigrasi, the importation
of people particularly from the overcrowded island of Java to
settle on land in WNG(25)and the economic exploitation
which followed. This was symbolised by the huge developments of the
world's richest goldmine (at Freeport) and of logging in forested
areas second only to those of the Amazon basin.
Refugee movement into Papua New Guinea continued
to be an issue well into the 1980s and one reason now suggested was
transmigration. A Republic wide policy to ease population pressure
in Java, it was also seen to have development, integration and
border control as its motive.(26) Under Indonesia's
third five year plan of 1979-84, 59 700 transmigrants went to
WNG. For the plan period 1984-89 this number was to rise to from
500 000 to 700 000.
These numbers were not, in the event, achieved.
Nor, it seems, were the attempts proposed to accompany it of more
sensitive policies taking into account Papuan interests, including
those for parallel development and greater attention to
environmental protection.(27) Another ten years on, by
the end of the Suharto era, development policies which exacerbated
the divide between Jakarta and its regions had clearly not changed.
In WNG this still meant the exclusion of Papuans either from
participation in development or a flow back income. It meant
continuing environmental costs of non-sustainable development, in
particular in the forestry and marine sectors. And it meant the
failure of efforts that were made to increase the standard of
living in rural areas because the policies were designed in Jakarta
taking no account of local circumstances and excluding the
participation of local communities.(28)
History had forced perhaps the two most
incompatible peoples on earth-the one animist or Christian,
pork-eating, often koteka(29) clad primitive
Melanesian inhabitant and the other Islamic, elitist,
traditionalist and usually Javanese-to live side-by-side. Even
without political repression and economic exploitation, the
relationship would always have been exceedingly difficult.
Indonesian policies undoubtedly created the conditions for the
continued activities of the Organsasi Papua Merdeke (OPM),
the free Papua Movement. The fall of President Suharto provided the
catalyst for its latest militance.
What Choices for Indonesia,
Australia and Papua New Guinea Now?
Indonesia
There is without doubt a persistent nationalist
movement in WNG, the strength or cohesion of which has never been
reliably established. But it has been robust enough to continue
creating problems for Indonesia for almost 40 years.
That said, the bottom line remains the same. WNG
is, for Indonesia, in some key senses more critical than Timor ever
was because it was an intrinsic part of the former NEI to which the
Indonesian Republic is rightful heir and successor. As well, its
Freeport mine has apparently become the biggest single source of
revenue to the Republic of Indonesia.(30) Just as
importantly, independence for WNG would set a powerful precedent
for Aceh, for the Moluccas or for any other dissatisfied extremity
of Indonesia's empire. And for this very reason, it cannot, like
Timor, be let go. Timor, for the western observer, must be
separated out as a one-off and the distinction be strongly made
between its very different status from that of WNG-or Aceh, or any
other part of the Indonesian Republic. Indonesia cannot and will
not cede independence to any of these movements.
With all the other issues confronting a
democratising Indonesia, Indonesia cannot, either, afford to
continue to respond to its WNG problem with what had become a heavy
hand with all its costs and consequences. In spite of its now much
greater multicultural character, its use of Bahasa Indonesian and
its ethnically mixed population, almost half of which is not
Papuan, WNG's continuing capacity to cause embarrassment or worse
to Jakarta suggests that policies other than those adopted by
Jakarta to date are long overdue, especially in the present
circumstances of perhaps greater national fragility. What Indonesia
needs to do is to work with the peoples of WNG to relieve their
grievances against Jakarta, to include them in their own governance
and, simultaneously, to improve their standard of living.
Indonesia's recent commitment to legislation to
ensure that there is a substantial economic return to resource rich
provinces may be too little too late, but it has to start
somewhere. It is significant that West Papuan nationalism is strong
in the mining area. Parallels could perhaps be drawn with the
situation that unfolded at the Bougainville mine in Papua New
Guinea(31). Indonesia needs to recognise the problem and
make enough compromises and commit to real development to convince
the people of WNG of a new approach. This may need to include
greater devolution to the regions, significant local autonomy-or
even by a return to some form of the federal arrangement that
Indonesia so briefly inherited from the Dutch.
Indonesia could also consider the establishment
of cooperative development councils including representatives of
those with a keen interest in the successful integration of WNG as
the 26th province of the Republic of Indonesia. PNG
would have a lot to offer as a like-minded Melanesian culture,
including with lessons from Bougainville, as would Australia with
its history of involvement with this part of the world. But the
latter, at least, is unlikely to be welcome in the short-term and
in the wake of Australia's involvement in East Timor. Resentment of
Australia's role in Interfet shows little sign of abating as
reaction, particularly in the Indonesian armed forces, to
Australia's recently released defence green paper ('Australian
regional military triumphalism') reveals. (32)
The International Crisis Group suggests that the
international community could facilitate a dialogue on WNG, for
example by providing neutral venues and financial support. Offers
of substantial financial support for post-resolution economic
rehabilitation might provide additional incentives for the parties
to reach agreement.(33) And an obvious candidate for
this is the Netherlands where there is residual sympathy (and
possibly investment interest) in the territory. Practical support
might also come from likely large aid donors, including Japan which
is probably now the largest donor to the region, from the World
Bank and from the US with its interest in the stability of this
fourth largest country on earth.
But the invitation must come from Jakarta.
Whether Indonesia can rise to the very demanding
and long-term challenges in WNG with or without international
support is the greatest of tests for President Wahid and his
successors-and immediate signs are mixed.
Signals of a positive change in Indonesia's
approach to its 26th province include its recent
commitment to legislation to ensure that there is a substantial
economic return to resource rich provinces. President Habibie
introduced legislation in April 1999 both to promote regional
autonomy and to balance finances between central and regional
governments.(34) There have also been commitments to
human rights monitoring in the province(35) which, if
acted upon, could go some way towards convincing Papuans that
Indonesia is genuine in its attempts to change. Perhaps most
importantly 'in contrast to Soeharto's heavy reliance on
repression, the Abdurrahman Government, like the Habibie Government
before it, has emphasised the need for dialogue and a political
approach'.(36) But results have yet to be seen and
meanwhile Wahid has been forced to backtrack.
Unsurprisingly, Vice President Megawati
Sukarnotputri-daughter of the President who made return of WNG so
central a plank in his own nationalist campaign-dissuaded President
Wahid from opening the Papuan Congress.(37) Following
its dramatic results, President Wahid went on to discuss the
meeting as illegitimate since it failed to represent all opinion in
the territory and to assert that Indonesia's security forces would
react decisively to security threats.(38) A number of
the principals behind the organisation of the Congress have
subsequently been questioned and, according to the official Antara
agency, face possible life imprisonment for treason.(39)
The Indonesian navy recently announced plans to build a 3000 man
naval base at Sorong and, according to the Far Eastern Economic
Review of 6 July, the military has been quietly strengthening its
intelligence gathering capabilities in the province.
Australia
As already noted, consistent with a now very
longstanding policy, in the context of reaction to the Papuan
Congress statement of determination upon independence, Australia
has again categorically ruled out support for WNG's independence.
This came in the context of Foreign Minister Mr Alwi Shihab's claim
that several Australian non-government organisations who had
attended the Congress were stirring up independence
sentiment(40). Australia made a pragmatic decision a
long time ago that it has no choice but to support Indonesia's
sovereignty in WNG and this will not change. On account of the
elements in Jakarta which appear to be unconvinced of this state of
affairs, Australia will need to continue to make this abundantly
clear.
Australia will also need to continue to make it
abundantly clear that it has a vital interest in the stability of
Indonesia overall and thus in any implications for that stability
of developments in West Papua.
That said, Australia's interest is also driven
by residual sympathies across the border in Papua New Guinea, by
its own political constituency which includes elements likely to be
vocal in the face of allegations of human rights abuses in WNG and
because of the unavoidable strategic import of the territory to
Australia, including through Australia's defence links with Papua
New Guinea (See Appendix B). Coral Bell has recently written of the
profound normative shift in the society of states over the last
fifty years over which the WNG drama has been played
out.(41) This, she argues, has induced a new
international focus on minorities and on issues like the
environment which reduces what was the absolute sovereignty of
nation states to act at will at least inside their own borders.
Taken to its logical conclusions, this suggests that neither
Indonesia nor Australia will be able to 'manage' the WNG problem
away, largely by denying it exists, as they have been inclined to
do in the past.
In addition, and its support for Indonesian
sovereignty notwithstanding, Australia could not stand idly by if
the situation in WNG deteriorated dramatically and there was
increasing use of force by the Indonesian military. Fifty years on,
there is also a different expectation of the role Australia will
play in the maintenance of the peace and security of the South West
Pacific region. As in the Timor situation where it did take up the
challenge, and as in the Fiji and Solomons situations, where it did
not, there is an expectation of Australia playing a leadership role
in the management of these sorts of disturbances in the South West
Pacific region.(42)
But the WNG question is, in some ways, a much
more complicated issue for Australia than was Timor. This is
because of the role it did play in the past which may be
contributing to current suspicions of its motives in Jakarta and
because of its defence links with Papua New Guinea. This, however,
leaves it with few choices but to continue to strike a balance
between support for the sovereignty of Indonesia and seeking to
re-develop good relations with Indonesia on the one hand and, on
the other, encouragement of the kinds of policies most likely to
weaken the hold of extremist nationalists in Papua.
An Australian role in a deteriorating WNG
situation for the foreseeable future, therefore, will not mirror
the role it played in East Timor. Because of the limits of its
defence capability, but more importantly because of the exigencies
of its relationship with Indonesia, that role is likely to be more
effectively played economically, diplomatically and regionally.
Australia should be saying as often as possible at the highest
levels that what it wants is a unified, secular and stable
Indonesia. In spite of difficulties in the relationship which from
time to time must be expected to occur, it should also point to the
strategic interests that Australia and Indonesia share.
Thus there aren't really any choices for
Australia either. While not wanting to exacerbate the very
difficult situation that the Indonesian Government is in, Australia
could quietly acknowledge its history and, indeed, seek to use it
to convince Jakarta that it has a contribution to make. Australian
decision-makers need to put an enormous effort into convincing
Indonesia of its commitment to Indonesian sovereignty and to its
stability. Recognising that so much of Indonesian stability
generally could hinge on economic progress, this could include a
major diplomatic effort to generate practical support for Indonesia
as it seeks to meet the demands, in particular, of its Papuan,
Moluccan and Acehese constituents.
In addition, while Australia must perhaps be
philosophical about the inevitable agitation of those few who will
inevitably latch onto human rights abuses in WNG to argue their
preference for the coincidence of nation and state, i.e.
self-determination for peoples along ethnic lines, these arguments
cannot be ignored.(43) Canberra needs to convince
Jakarta that reference to this matter should not detract from the
importance of the relationship overall. There is also a very strong
argument to work with Indonesia to make WNG a very central priority
for Australia's aid program(44).
Papua New Guinea
There has always been residual sympathy in Papua
New Guinea for the people of WNG and for their difficulties under
Indonesian administration and this is hardly
surprising.(45) Its very first self-governing elite were
often themselves among the schoolchildren who had gone on the cross
border exchanges encouraged under Dutch-Australian administrative
cooperation arrangements. In addition, those who live in the border
regions know full well that the refugees who came across in numbers
in the lead up to the Act of Free Choice and periodically
thereafter, were not always the nomadic peoples who moved across
the often unmarked border for traditional reasons, or the economic
refugees looking for a better life in a more advanced PNG which
both Australian and PNG governments were inclined to describe them
to be. They were as well, the educated elite fleeing political
persecution; it is these who sought, and were granted, permissive
residence in PNG, where many of them remain today.
The situation in WNG and the refugee movement
that occurred as a result of it caused some tension in particular
in PNG's early days of independence. But PNG governments, like
their Australian counterparts before them, understandably and
inevitably eventually came to take a pragmatic view. PNG has no
choice but to get on with its very large neighbour across the
border; refugees were and are mostly sent back and no support was
or is offered to the OPM.
But PNG governments, too, must expect that a
shared Melanesian heritage will make for continuing sympathy, such
as that expressed by John Tekewie, a PNG provincial governor who
attended the May Congress, who called on Australia, the Netherlands
and the US to take up the cause of Papuan
independence(46). PNG could be caught up in what appears
to be a resurgent Melanesian identity throughout the South West
Pacific, as expressed in Fiji and the Solomons. However, like
Australia, in spite of-or perhaps because of-the exigencies of
managing its own national unity and expectations of development,
PNG must work hard to convince Indonesia of PNG's commitment to
Indonesia's national integrity and seek to contribute what it has
in particular to offer, namely a Melanesian perspective on the
development of neighbouring WNG.
Conclusions
Apart from continuing support from groups in
Holland(47), a little sporadic concern expressed by US
Congressmen and the odd Australian MP(48), the West
Papuan cause, was never to capture the international attention of a
Timor, at least to date. This is unlikely to change, even in the
present situation in which it is being considered alongside Aceh
and the Moluccas as a test for the democratising regime which
replaced President Suharto. What is likely to change in present
circumstances is WNG's capacity to be a greater irritant in the
body politic of Indonesia which will not be easily or quickly
managed.
Australia has at times been deeply involved in
the history of West New Guinea and, from Indonesia's point of view,
not always on the right side of the equation. Events in WNG played
a very significant part in the evolution of Australia's own foreign
policy by assisting its understanding of the limits of alliance
association when greater interests are at stake. Australian
protestation that retention of WNG in Dutch (or friendly western)
hands was a vital national interest counted for nothing when there
were bigger issues at stake (keeping Sukarno out of the communist
camp). The ramifications of an international dispute over the
territory of WNG also had a dramatic effect on what was to become
Papua New Guinea, accelerating what, until then, was a much more
leisurely timetable for the then Territory of Papua and New Guinea
to move towards self-government and independence.
In 12 short years, the Dutch did create an
expectation of a future for WNG other than as part of the Republic
of Indonesia. Subsequent Indonesian mal-administration ensured that
WNG nationalism survived and grew as, perhaps, some might argue,
did Australia's refusal to concede that there was a problem of
mal-administration at all. So central had become the determination
of good relations with Indonesia, that Australia chose to turn a
blind eye to the deteriorating situation in WNG, sending back the
waves of refugees who fled across the border into TPNG and
encouraging a subsequent independent Papuan New Guinea to do
similarly.
It can therefore be argued that as well as the
logic of propinquity and region, Australia has a more than usual
responsibility to seek to mitigate the worst effects of what at
best can be described as an unfortunate history. Paradoxically, how
this can be done, or even whether this can be done, will depend on
the strength of the relationship it builds up with the new
Indonesian administration which has shown the first signs of
tolerance and enlightenment in WNG, albeit within the clear limits
of the union of the Republic. Perhaps the greatest challenge for
Australia is to win the confidence of Indonesia on the question of
WNG so that it can play a constructive role.
So is West Papua another Timor? Yes and no. The
answer to the question is 'yes' in that, in the worse case
scenario, WNG could become just such a continuing conflict as much,
or even more, a reason for tension in the Australian-Indonesian
relationship. To avoid the development of such a circumstance,
decision-makers in both Jakarta and Canberra, and also in Port
Moresby, should be giving this situation the highest possible
attention and preferably also in tripartite consultation.
The answer is also 'yes' because, like Timor,
developments in WNG, or perceived policy failures in WNG,
especially if these lead to any diminution of the nation, or the
unity of the nation, will either build on the pressure mounting
against President Wahid or contribute to the campaign to undermine
him. Its significance for the stability of Indonesia as a whole,
therefore, cannot be underestimated any more than its significance
for Australian-Indonesian relations themselves.
The answer to the question is 'no' because the
nature of the situation is different. In East Timor, Indonesia
invaded a territory in breach of international law. In WNG
Indonesia has sought, and seeks, to maintain its sovereign
territorial integrity. However resource rich this land of now
approximately two million people, it is the Republic of Indonesia's
sovereign integrity which remains the vital issue, but this at a
time when sovereignty alone is no longer the primary or sole
determinant of the way international relations are played.
For Australia, while also driven by a particular
history and, to some extent by public reaction to perceptions of
human rights abuses, interest in Timor is interest in regional
security and stability. It is also acceptance of international
expectation to play a contributing role to that end. In WNG it is
different. Here Australia has a national interest because of
history, geography, political responsibility and, significantly,
because of its relationship with PNG across the border, including
in defence.
This being the case, a primary challenge for
Australia's Government is to de-link the situation of East Timor
and of West New Guinea in the public mind. Just as the Government's
policy on East Timor as it unfolded particularly from 1999 was to
expressly exclude the question of East Timor from any other
possible separatist claim in Indonesia, so it needs to continue to
make this distinction clear to its domestic constituency, and to
the international community at large, including Indonesia.
Endnotes
-
- A detailed account of the troubles which followed the end of
the Suharto era can be found in Human Rights Watch, December 1998.
- Examples of recent incidents include Indonesian troops firing
on 2000 demonstrators at Timika, near Freeport in December 1999
resulting in 55 wounded and 30 arrests, while 15000 were alleged to
have gathered in Jayapura to commemorate the anniversary of the
declaration of an independent West Papua 38 years ago, AP, 'Irian
protest ends bloodily', The Australian Financial Review, 3
December 1999. There were subsequent troubles in Fak Fak the
following March and the burning of the Indonesian Governor's
waterfront office in Jayapura in May.
- Peter Hartcher, 'West Papua shaping as Howard's next East
Timor', The Australian Financial Review Weekend, 10-12
June 2000, p. 9, and Lindsay Murdoch, 'Our enemies in Jakarta are
telling tales', Comment, The Sydney Morning Herald, 14
June 2000, p. 13.
- Lindsay Murdoch and Andrew Kilvert, 'Golkar youth funding
separatists: Indonesia', The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 June
2000.
- Ibid., see also Michael Maher, 'Melanesian Meltdown: Papua',
The Bulletin, June 27 2000, p. 39. The SBS's
Dateline program of 5 July 2000 also presented a
substantial case on the use of Timor-like tactics and noted that
the current Governor, General Musiran, was an intelligence
operative in East Timor. A pro-Indonesian militia, Satgas Mera
Puti, is said to have received funds from Jakarta to oppose the
Satgas Papua, the pro-independence militia, and to be infiltrated
by Pemuda Pancasila, the terror organisation used by Suharto to
undermine his opponents.
- Amien Rais, the Speaker of the Indonesian Parliament (and
Presidential candidate in the 1999 election) was reported to say in
a recent TV interview that the problem of Papua is bigger than
Indonesia's economic crisis because it threatens national
integration. Geoff Mulherin, 'Zigzag act over Papuan choices',
The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 June 2000.
- Indonesia did, however, consider that it had a legitimate claim
for its presence in East Timor after invasion in 1976. While not
accepted by most nations or by the UN, Australia gave de jure
recognition to Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor in February
1979, see Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign
Relations in the World of the Nineties, Second Edition,
Melbourne University Press, 1995, p. 200.
- A description coined by Gavin Souter, as the title of his book,
New Guinea: The Last Unknown, Angus & Robertson,
Melbourne 1964.
- See Paul W Van der Veur, 'Political Awakening in West New
Guinea', Pacific Affairs, vol-XXXVI, No1 Spring 1963, pp.
57-73.
- This thesis is developed by Arendt Lijphart in, The Trauma
of Decolonisation: The Dutch and West New Guinea, Yale UP,
1966.
- This is described in chapter 5 of Australia Papua New
Guinea and the West New Guinea Question 1949-69 'The WNG
Dispute from February 1959 to August 1962: Brinkmanship
Internationalisation, Escalation, and Settlement', by J. R.
Verrier, PhD Thesis, Monash University 1976.
- This was made clear in a statement made by Prime Minister
Menzies on defence expenditure in 1963, Commonwealth Parliamentary
Debates, vol. 38, p1669.
- J. R. Verrier loc. cit., Chapter 6, 'Australia's West New
Guinea Policy from February 1959: Dispute, Settlement and Defence
Development'.
- Writing after observing the first act at Merauke, Australian
journalist and author, Peter Hastings, reported that 'every
conceivable instrument available to the Indonesian Government-the
good and the bad-was brought to bear on the people in the south
west corner of West Irian'. There was bribery-clothes, cigarettes,
consumer goods-all these things rushed to the territory before the
Act to persuade the people of Indonesia's good intentions, along
with promises of the high positions and rewards that would follow.
There were cheer squads at the meetings reminding some of Sukarno's
days and other festivals with flags, bunting and dancing
'brilliantly managed somewhat like a last minute giant cargo cult',
The Australian, 16 July 1969.
- Writing in A Thousand Days: John F Kennedy in the White
House, Andre Deutsch, London 1965, p. 466, Arthur Schlesinger
Jr concluded that critics could plausibly attack the settlement as
'a shameful legalisation of Indonesian expansion, and indeed it
was; but the alternative of a war over West New Guinea had perhaps
even less appeal.'
- H. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in
Indonesia, Cornell UP Ithaca, New York 1962, concludes that
the LCP government of Menzies 'waged an exceedingly active
diplomatic campaign in favour of the status quo in the territory
since it came to office in 1949.
- The issue was raise by Foreign Minister Spender on a visit to
The Hague as early as 1950 and press speculation at the time
reflected this (Canberra Times 23 and 30 August 1950). The
issue is explored in J. R. Verrier op. cit., Chapter 2,
'Australian-Dutch Administrative Cooperation in New Guinea from
1949 to 1957.'
- Addressing the General Assembly on 21 November 1957,
Current Notes on International Affairs (CNIA) vol. 28, no.
11 (November 1957), p. 898.
- Kerr gave a paper to this effect at the 1958 Political Science
Summer School. It appears as chapter four of New Guinea and
Australia, AIPS Summer School, Angus and Robertson, Sydney
1958, pp. 138-163.
- In 'The New Guinea Villager', F. W. Cheshire, Melbourne 1965,
p. 7, C. D Rowley observed wryly '... the proposed Melanesian
Federation had its day, until reality burst in with Soekarno'.
- This was indicated by the statement released before the first
annual conference on administrative cooperation following the Joint
Statement which took place (in camera) in Canberra, CNIA, vol. 29
no. 10 (October 1958) pp. 654-655.
- The CP Members were Fadden, McEwan, Page, Anthony and Cooper,
the farmers were McBride, McEwan, Anthony and Cooper, and the
Minister for Defence was McBride.
- 'Just as Cold War considerations influenced the US to intervene
in the years of 1949 and 1958, so this would be the lever in
1961-62'. F. P. Bunnell, The Kennedy Initiative in Indonesia
1962-63, PhD Thesis, Cornell University, September 1969, p.
37.
- Minister Hasluck had been concerned about border demarcation
for some years and it was not until July 1962 that he obtained
Cabinet approval to start aerial mapping of the international
border in NG. There remained doubt as to where the border was at
the time of the Indonesian takeover and for sometime afterwards. P.
Hasluck, A Time for Building, Melbourne University Press,
1976 p. 369.
- One result is reported to be that Papuans make up 1.3 million
of the province's 2.2 million population today, Pacific News
Bulletin, February 2000, p. 10.
- Peter Hastings, 'National Integration in Indonesia: The Case of
Irian Jaya', in Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia, edited
by Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
Singapore 1984, p. 141.
- Ian Bell, Herb Feith and Ron Hatley were optimistic about a
more enlightened approach to WNG in their article 'The West Papuan
Challenge to Indonesian Authority in Irian Jaya: Old Problems New
Possibilities', Asian Survey, vol. XXVI, no. 5 May 1986,
pp. 548-555.
- See 'Rural Community Development in Irian Jaya: In Search of an
Appropriate Model' by Cliff Marlessy, chapter 13 in Indonesia
Assessment 1995 edited by Colin Barlow and Joan Hardjono,
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 1996, especially
pp. 245-248.
- The koteka is the penis gourd traditionally worn in
WNG.
- I am indebted to the comments of Dr Ron May Senior Fellow
Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of
Pacific and Island Studies, Australian National University for this
observation.
- ibid.
- Paul Daley, 'Defence plans rile Indonesia', The Age, 7
July 2000.
- 'Indonesia Crisis: Chronic But Not Acute', International
Crisis Group Indonesia Report no. 2, Jakarta/Brussels, 31 May
2000, p. 33.
- This is described in Information and Research Services
Current Issues Brief no. 17 1999-2000 'Indonesia's Future
Prospects: Separatism, Decentralisation and the Survival of the
Unitary State' by Grayson Lloyd.
- AFP, 'Indonesia promises probe into rights in Irian Jaya',
The Canberra Times, 11 June 2000 reported 'an initiative
to increase efforts to investigate human rights violations in the
territory with Human Rights Minister, Hasballah Saad, suggesting
that a special team would be established for this purpose.'
- ICG Indonesia Report no. 2, op. cit. p. 16.
- This occurred following her visit to the province, Lindsay
Murdoch and Andrew Kilvert, 'Independence meeting to defy Jakarta's
warnings: Papua', The Sydney Morning Herald, 29 May 2000.
- President Wahid was reported to warn of a military crackdown in
Papua and against international interference in the province's
affairs in Lindsay Murdoch, 'Military threat to curb self rule
move: Papua', The Sydney Morning Herald, 6 June 2000, p.
10.
- AFP, 'West Papua activists face life sentences', The
Canberra Times, 21 June 2000.
- Lindsay Murdoch, 'Australians blamed for violence: Papua',
The Sydney Morning Herald, May 31, 2000. This has been
more recently repeated by Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, in an
address to the Sydney Institute on 17 July, AAP, 'Australia will
not support secession in Irian Jaya', The Canberra Times,
18 July 2000, p. 2.
- Coral Bell, 'A Mixed Bag of Dilemmas: Australia's Policy-Making
in a World of Changing International Rules', Information and
Research Services Research Paper no. 24 1999-2000, DPL,
Canberra, 2000.
- This was made perfectly clear by US Defence Secretary, William
Cohen, visiting Australia in the lead up to Australia's defence
white paper which will establish the framework for Australian
defence for the future. He said that the US saw Australia as a key
anchor of its Asia-Pacific regional defence strategy and looked to
Australia for leadership on important issues such as a fall-out
from Fiji's hostage crisis. Editorial, 'The message from America',
The Sydney Morning Herald, 18 July 2000, p. 16 and AAP,
'US flags role for Australia in space defence', The Canberra
Times, 17 July 2000.
- Foreign Minister Downer made this point in an address to the
Sydney Institute on 17 July when he urged Jakarta to proceed 'with
full regard' to human rights in dealing with sectarian strife in
WNG and elsewhere. He acknowledged that it was too late to redraw
colonial boundaries and instead advocated the development of
multicultural, tolerant societies within them. Alexander Downer,
'Three ways to answer outraged cries of "do something'', [This is
an extract of a speech the Minister for Foreign Affairs delivered
in Sydney last night], The Sydney Morning Herald, July 18
2000, p. 17.
- While Indonesia has been cautious about Australian development
assistance programs to Eastern Indonesia generally, AusAid does
support a number of NGO's in WNG but limits these to non-political
areas such as rural water supply and agriculture, see Barlow and
Hardjono, op. cit., p. 249. Australia has also engaged in joint
projects with other international agencies in WNG. For example, $3
million was provided from July 1991 to Sept 1997 through World
Vision to improve Dani women and children's health and nutritional
status through the Women and their Children's Health (WATCH)
project in the Jaya Wijaya district (Baliem Valley). AusAid also
worked with Indonesian authorities and the ICRS to help with
drought relief, including with Blackhawk helicopters, in 1998,
(Focus July 1998).
- Even Michael Somare, who went on as Chief Minister to develop a
much more pragmatic view, in debate in the Papua New Guinea House
of Assembly leading up to the Act of Free Choice, then took the
view that: 'we are the same people and, therefore, we have every
right to talk about these problems which are so close to us and are
concerning the people who are brothers to us'. He was echoed by
many more of the then PNG's first representatives, e.g. Angmai
Bilas, 'I am very sympathetic towards the West Papuan people, the
West Irianese, who are the same race of people as we Papuans and
the New Guineans' and Tei Abal 'these people in West Irian are the
same as us and are our 'wantoks'' see House of Assembly Debate,
vol. II no. 5 pp. 1346-1442, 25 and 27 June 1969.
- Lindsay Murdoch, 'Australians blamed for violence: Papua', op.
cit. Tekwie's wife is West Papuan.
- A seminar on West Papua on 20 November 1999 organised by the
Foundation for Studies and Information of Papuan Peoples led the
Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs, J. J. van Aartsen, to agree to
an investigation into circumstances of WNG's incorporation into the
Republic of Indonesia. Pacific News Bulletin, December
1999, p. 3.
- The left wing of the Labor Party, e.g. Senators McIntosh and
Gietzelt, raised a series of questions on the issue in the
Australian Parliament in the lead up to Act of Free Choice in 1969
and on through the refugee problems in the 1970s and 1980s. Most
recently WNG has featured in Australian Commonwealth Parliamentary
debates in the form of a motion on notice on West Papuan
self-determination placed by Senator Bob Brown in November 1999,
which received no support, Senate, Debates 23 November
1999, p.10423.
Appendix A
Resolution from the Papuan People's
Congress.
Following a lengthy preamble, the Port Numbay
Resolution of 4 June 2000 declared:
"We the people of West Papua want to separate
ourselves from the Unitary Republic of Indonesia to be fully
sovereign and independent among other nations in the world."
Recognising the importance of respecting and
protecting the civil rights of every citizen of West Papua,
including minority groups;
Further recognising the importance of adopting a
constructive attitude to ventures for capital investment in West
Papua, where such ventures respect the environment and the rights
of the indigenous people;
The 2nd Papuan Congress formally
adopts the Numbay Resolution 2000 and calls on the United Nations,
the governments of the Republic of Indonesia, the Netherlands, the
United States of America and all other members of the international
community to undertake urgent action, jointly and severally,
to:
Accept responsibility for a resolution of the
situation in West Papua and for the life, liberty and security of
the people of West Papua;
Immediately revoke United Nations resolution
2504 of 19 December 1969;
Facilitate recognition of the aspirations of the
people of West Papua for truth, justice, peace and
self-determination;
Facilitate a just and enduring settlement of the
political status of West Papua through meaningful negotiations
between the legitimate representatives of the people of West Papua,
the governments of Indonesian, the Netherlands, and the United
States of America, conducted under the auspices of the United
Nations;
Facilitate the establishment of a framework for
political negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations to
resolve the legitimate political and sovereign rights of the people
of West Papua;
Investigate thoroughly the crimes against
humanity which have been committed against the people of West Papua
and bring those responsible to account before a competent
international tribunal;
Investigate their involvement in the annexation
of West Papua by Indonesia and to provide a report on their
investigations to the people of West Papua by 1 December 2000;
The Second Papuan Congress confirms the mandate
of the Presidium of the Papuan Council:
To undertake coordinated efforts to gain the
international community recognition of the sovereignty of the
people of West Papua and to investigate and bring to justice those
responsible for crimes against humanity in West Papua;
To establish an independent team to undertake
peaceful negotiations with Indonesia and the Netherlands under the
auspices of the United Nations to prepare for a referendum to
recognise the sovereignty of the people of West Papua; and
To report on progress in the pursuit of the
above-mentioned tasks by 1 December 2000.
Appendix B
Australian Papuan New Guinea Security
Cooperation
The Joint Declaration of Principles Guiding
Relations Between Papua New Guinea and Australia (JDP) signed
9 December 1987 includes the principles:
-
- Security co-operation will continue to be conducted with mutual
respect for each country's independence, sovereignty and
equality.
-
- Exchanges and other forms of co-operation will be based on the
principle that national security is primarily a national
responsibility; take full account of capacity, resources and needs
in both countries: ensure reliability, consistency and quality; and
be based on full participation by both countries.
-
- Both Governments retain the right to determine whether or not
to supply requested equipment or resources to the other, bearing in
mind their respective foreign and strategic commitments and their
policies, principles and values.
-
- Both Governments recognise each other's right to develop and
strengthen relations, including security links, with other
countries.
Expectations of Australian assistance in the
event, for example, of the situation in WNG leading to a
significant increase of refugees could create problems because of
the comparatively small size of the Australian Defence Force, the
current Defence budget crisis and lack of any other similarly
capable agency in the Southwest Pacific region. This point has been
made by IRS defence specialist, Derek Woolner, who, in his comments
on an earlier draft of this paper, noted:
Providing human and material relief to large
numbers of refugees in the Western Highlands, for example, would
over tax the air assets of the RAAF and Army and create budget
management problems with possible long-term effects for the
development of the Australian Defence Policy-especially if it
occurred in the next 2-3years while ADF remains actively involved
in East Timor.