The United States 2000 Elections: Implications for the
Asia-Pacific
Dr Frank Frost and Bruce Donald
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
5 December 2000
Contents
Major
Issues
Introduction
The Clinton Record and the 2000
Elections
After the Elections-a Weakened
Presidency?
Political and Security Issues
China Japan The Koreas Southeast Asia
South Asia Multilateral Cooperation
Trade and Economic Issues
The Clinton Administration Gore's
Policies Bush's Policies Impact of Congress
Australia's Interests
Political and Security Issues Trade
and Economic Issues
Endnotes
Glossary-Trade Terminology
APEC
|
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. Established
in November 1989 to promote multilateral economic cooperation on
issues of trade and investment. Current members are Australia,
Brunei, Canada, Chile, China (People's Republic), Hong Kong SAR,
Indonesia, Japan, Korea (South), Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand,
Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan,
Thailand, USA, and Vietnam
|
EU
|
European Union
|
Fast-track
|
Legislative procedures stipulating that once the
US president formally submits to Congress a bill implementing an
agreement (negotiated under fast-track authority) concerning
barriers to trade, both houses must vote on the bill within 90
days. No amendments are permitted. The purpose of these procedures
is to assure foreign governments that Congress will act
expeditiously on an agreement they negotiate with the US
government.(1)
|
G-5
|
Group of Five economies: US, UK, France, Germany
and Japan
|
ILO
|
International Labour Organization
|
IMF
|
The International Monetary Fund is an
international organization of 182 member countries, based in
Washington, established to promote international monetary
cooperation, exchange stability, and orderly exchange
arrangements.(2)
|
MFN
|
Most-Favoured-Nation principle whereby any
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any WTO Member
to any product originating in or destined for any other country
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other
Members
|
MTNs/Rounds
|
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Since 1947,
eight MTNs have been undertaken. They are Geneva (1947), Annecy
(1949), Torquay (1950-1), Geneva (1955-6), Dillon (1960-2), Kennedy
(1962-7), Tokyo (1973-9) and Uruguay (1986-94)
|
NAFTA
|
North American Free Trade Agreement currently
covering Canada, Mexico and the US, applying from 1 January
1994
|
Plaza Accord
|
An agreement reached in 1985 by the G-5
economies to drive down the price of the US dollar, when the US
dollar was at an all time peak in terms of other major currencies,
and the US was running a large trade deficit. The coordinated
effort led to a depreciation of the US dollar by 30 per cent over
the next two years.(3)
The accord is named after the New York Plaza
Hotel where the agreement was announced on 22 September 1985
|
PNTR
|
Permanent Normal Trade Relations-the granting of
normal (ie MFN) trade status on a permanent basis (currently this
is granted by Congress on an annual basis) to China by the US,
essential for the US to gain from the admission of China to the
WTO.(4)
|
Super 301
|
Part of the 1988 United States Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act requiring the USTR to prepare an
annual report identifying 'priority foreign country practices, the
elimination of which is likely to have the most significant
potential to increase US exports' concentrating on systemic unfair
trade practices.(5)
|
Uruguay Round
|
The Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
that ran from September 1986 to April 1994. It started with a
Ministerial meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay
|
USTR
|
United States Trade Representative-chief US
trade negotiator
|
WTO
|
World Trade Organization
|
Major
Issues
The United States, now the world's sole
superpower, has a comprehensive range of interests in the
Asia-Pacific. It has, through its alliances and its strategic
strength, a central role in the maintenance of stability and it is
also a major trading partner for the region. These factors make the
outcome of its recent elections of major relevance to all regional
states including Australia. This paper provides a preliminary
assessment of the key issues and implications arising from the
elections.
The 7 November elections produced an unusually
close result. In
early December the outcome of the presidential poll was still being
contested while the Congress was narrowly balanced between both
major parties, with an equal split in the Senate and a narrow
Republican majority in the House. The nature of this result itself
could be an issue for the Asia-Pacific because there have been
widespread concerns that the new President will have a narrow and
qualified mandate to deal with a potentially highly partisan
Congress. This outcome could impede policy making in foreign
relations and particularly in trade.
After reviewing briefly the Clinton
Administration's Asia-Pacific record (particularly in relations
with China, Japan and the Koreas) the paper notes that foreign
policy matters did not attract heated partisan debate during the
election campaign. On policies towards China and Japan, the
candidates did differ in emphasis. Mr Gore is committed to continue
the direction of the Clinton Administration in engagement with
China and continued emphasis on the Japan relationship. On China Mr
Bush has promised both continued engagement and a robust pursuit of
key US interests, including development of a National Missile
Defence program, which China opposes. On Japan, both candidates are
committed to the relationship but Mr Bush has called for an
explicit increase in the US emphasis on the bilateral security
alliance.
The situation on the Korean peninsula and in
Southeast and South Asia, while they did not attract significant
attention in the campaign, will also demand attention from the new
administration. The recent detente between South and North Korea
has produced promising initial results but is at a delicate stage,
Southeast Asian states are still wrestling with the impact of the
financial crisis (most seriously in the case of Indonesia) and a
stand-off continues between India and Pakistan, both of whom now
possess at least some nuclear weapons.
The outcome of the elections is of particular
concern in relation to trade policy. Mr Gore has actively supported
the promotion of labour and environmental standards in trade
agreements, a stance popular with his domestic constituencies but
likely to be much more acceptable in Europe than in the
Asia-Pacific. Mr Bush is seen as a more concerted supporter of free
trade outcomes with strong commitments to gain 'fast-track'
authority for trade negotiations from Congress and to pursue a new
round of WTO negotiations with an emphasis on agriculture and
little interest in 'new trade agenda' issues like environmental and
labour standards.
In the wake of the close and highly contested
election result, both candidates are likely to have difficulties in
gaining support in Congress for their major trade policy
objectives. These challenges, however, appear to be relatively more
forbidding for Mr Gore than for Mr Bush, since the Republicans will
have the capacity to control (albeit narrowly) the Houses of
Representatives and would have (under a Bush administration) the
casting vote in the Senate.
The next US
administration, whether led by Governor Bush or Vice-President
Gore, will face some sensitive and difficult tasks in the
Asia-Pacific and Australia has direct interests in the character
and direction of the policies to be pursued.
Australia has strong interests in an
administration which can maintain the progress in dialogue with
China which has been (however haltingly) achieved through the
1990s. It will be beneficial for Australia and the region if the US
can pursue its interests in consolidating its allied relationships
(especially with Japan) and in developing new areas of defence
policy (possibly including a potentially controversial form of
National Missile Defence) in a way which does not lead to anxiety
and alienation on China's part. A continued active commitment by
the US to supporting inter-Korean dialogue while encouraging a
continuing opening to the wider world by North Korea is essential
if the recent progress on the peninsula is to be consolidated. A
sympathetic and supportive US interest in Indonesia can be a
positive factor for stability and progressive change. Continued
interest by the US is also likely to be an important element in the
chances for maintaining peace and increasing confidence in South
Asia, where the situation of conflict continues to pose serious
potential dangers both to the two countries directly involved and
to the wider Asia-Pacific region. Australia itself can make a
contribution to the evolution of US policies by playing a role of
pro-active ally, able to offer both detailed advice and positive
criticism.
Australia's interests in the trade arena, it is
argued, are best served by a US administration committed to the
multilateral system represented by the WTO, and in particular to
successfully launching a new Round of multilateral trade
negotiations. This is because particular sectors in which Australia
holds a comparative advantage, for example agriculture and
services, or which Australia's export destinations specialise in,
for example textiles in developing Asian economies, are only likely
to be treated more equitably in the world trading system following
a successful Round of trade negotiations. Of the two Presidential
candidates Mr Bush seems to be comparatively more likely to pursue
such policies, and to be able to gain the necessary cooperation
with and support from Congress.
Introduction
The national elections on 7 November 2000
produced an unusually close result. At the time of writing (5
December), George W Bush had claimed victory in the contest for the
Presidency but this was being contested by Vice-President Al Gore.
In the Congress the Senate is now split 50-50 (after the Democrats
picked up a net four seats) and the House of Representatives will
see a narrow majority for the Republicans of only about 9 seats.
The narrowness of the results, and the acrimonious dispute over the
outcome of the presidential elections, have produced predictions
that the next president may well have problems in operating
effectively, especially vis-à-vis Congress.
The Clinton Administration, after a rather
uncertain start, has made some substantial progress for the US in
relations in East Asia. The next administration, however, will
continue to face some major policy issues and challenges in
pursuing relations with China, Japan, the Koreas and in Southeast
and South Asia. This paper provides a brief assessment of the
implications of the 2000 elections for the Asia-Pacific and
identifies the key political and economic issues which will face
the next administration. The paper also identifies differences in
emphasis and policy between Vice-President Gore and Governor George
Bush, differences which, it is noted, are relatively more sharply
defined in relation to trade and economic matters than they have
been on political and security issues.
The
Clinton Record and the 2000 Elections
President Clinton came to office in 1993 with
comparatively little experience in foreign policy. In Clinton's
first term, the US experienced some difficulties in establishing
and implementing a coherent set of priorities in its major policies
in the Asia-Pacific region. In an early initiative, for example,
the Administration sought to explicitly link China's access to
ongoing trade relations with the US (subject to annual review since
1980) with discernible progress on human rights conditions. This
effort proved ineffective and impractical and was abandoned in May
1994. US-China relations were also strained in mid-1995 when the
Clinton Administration, in the face of Congressional pressure, had
to accept a private but highly publicised visit by Taiwan's
President Lee Teng-hui. The visit resulted in intense criticism
from Beijing, and tensions worsened in early 1996 during Taiwan's
presidential elections, when China launched missiles close to
Taiwan and the US responded with a naval deployment near Taiwan.
The United States' relations with its most important ally in East
Asia, Japan, were also subject to some strain as the Clinton
Administration sought to improve market access for US industry by
an assertive stance in trade negotiations, especially in mid-1995
over the automobile industry.(6)
The Clinton Administration, however, worked to
stabilise key US relationships and a major report by Joseph Nye in
1995 reaffirmed US long-term interests in Asia-Pacific security.
The Administration also made some important progress in some key
policy areas. With China, relations improved after the tensions of
1995-96 and contacts were enhanced by a series of high level visits
and by the granting by the US of Permanent Normal Trade Relations
in 2000, which is likely to be regarded as one of the Clinton
Administration's most important achievements in foreign policy.
With Japan, the US worked to improve relations and to facilitate a
gradually enhanced role for Japan in regional security issued
through the guidelines on defence announced in 1997 (and approved
by the Diet in 1999).
The US tackled the difficult issue of how to
contain the widely perceived threat posed by North Korea's nuclear
program by developing and implementing the Agreed Framework (signed
in October 1994) on remodelling North Korea's nuclear energy
industry along lines less likely to lead to proliferation and
weapons development. President Clinton also addressed the
longstanding and emotionally charged issue of redeveloping
relations with Vietnam. After many years of estrangement and
contention (for example, on the issue of searches for the 'missing
in action'), President Clinton normalised diplomatic relations with
Vietnam in July 1995. This was followed five years later with the
conclusion of a bilateral economic agreement between the two
countries which will effectively normalise trade and by the
historic visit by Mr Clinton in November 2000. In addition to
promoting key bilateral relationships, the Clinton Administration
also took the opportunity in the post-Cold War environment to
assist in the promotion of multilateral cooperation, partly through
participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum and particularly through
sponsoring the first of what is now the annual meeting of heads of
government of the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) group in
Seattle in 1993.
After eight years of the Clinton Administration
it was notable that foreign policy issues did not play a major role
in the partisan contest during the 2000 election campaign. George W
Bush and some of his key advisers had certainly set out a range of
criticisms of the Administration and promised a more concerted
assertion of US interests and he and Vice-President Al Gore had
discernible differences on a range of issues (see below). One clear
difference in emphasis was on the overall issue of the extent to
which the US should be willing to intervene internationally,
particularly over specifically political and humanitarian
questions, with Mr Gore indicating a significantly greater
preparedness to support this than Mr Bush.(7) However
opinion polls suggested that only about 2 per cent of the public
considered foreign policy issues to be highly important in the
election and the presidential debate focussing on foreign policy
was not noticeably acrimonious.(8)
After the Elections-a Weakened
Presidency?
The outcome of the elections could have
substantial implications for foreign relations in general and the
Asia-Pacific in particular. At the time of writing, the result of
the presidential race was still being contested with Mr Gore having
won a majority of the popular vote, but facing the prospect of
defeat by Mr Bush if his narrow lead in the crucial state of
Florida (which would give him the required majority in the
Electoral College) is upheld. In the House of Representatives, the
Republicans had 220 seats to the Democrats 212, with two held by
independents and one still undecided. The Senate was split 50-50,
which meant that if the Bush-Cheney team won, Vice-President Cheney
would have the casting vote in the event of a tie, while if the
Gore-Lieberman team took office the Senate balance would revert to
a 51-49 balance in the Republicans' favour (because Senator
Lieberman's successor would, following normal practice, be a
Republican appointed by the Governor of Connecticut, who is a
Republican).
The narrowness of the Presidential and the
Congressional contests, and the intense partisan conflict over the
disputed ballot in the state of Florida, has raised substantial
concerns about the legitimacy and authority of the presidency,
whoever is the victor. As Mark Mitchell (Far Eastern Economic
Review) observed about the next president:
... the chances are good that he will be one of
the most feeble American leaders the world has seen in more than a
century-a leader who will be presiding over a deeply divided
public, an equally divided Congress and a political environment
that has been horribly poisoned by post-election
shenanigans.(9)
If a narrowly elected president has to contend
with an evenly divided Congress, policy making and
administration-which has been a major challenge for most US
administrations including that led by Mr Clinton-could become even
more difficult. One potential problem area could be the process of
gaining Congressional approval for appointments to senior posts in
the executive government. The time period needed to secure approval
has already recently been up to nine months.(10)
Continuing and further delays could inhibit the policy making
capacities of the new administration.
The next President's authority may also have a
substantial impact on his capacity to implement his foreign policy
goals. In the American system of loose party alliances and highly
active interest and lobby groups, a President usually has to
mobilise support for any significant policy initiative from among
members of both the major parties. Organising a coalition of
support often requires extensive negotiations with individual
Senators and Representatives. President Clinton, for example,
engaged in extensive lobbying in his (ultimately successful)
efforts to secure Congressional support for the granting of
Permanent Normal Trade Relations to China. A President with
compromised authority dealing with a fractious and highly partisan
Congress could have major difficulties in securing stable groupings
to support his key agendas and this could inhibit his effectiveness
in managing foreign policy, both generally and in the
Asia-Pacific.(11)
Political and Security Issues
China
In the Asia-Pacific region China has posed the
most complex set of challenges for the Clinton Administration. The
United States is China's single most important export market and
China in turn is a major focus for US exporters. Trade has expanded
rapidly and has been heavily in China's favour (at a level of $US
68.7 billion in 1999). For two decades China's 'normal' trade
relations status with the US was subject to annual review and
approval by Congress, a process often accompanied by acrimony over
human rights and other issues. The successful achievement of
Permanent Normal Trade Relations status for China was a major step
in relations which also cleared the way for the US to support
China's bid to enter the World Trade Organisation. The US has also
sought to improve its overall dialogue with China and President
Clinton made a nine day visit in June 1998 to advance this.
Discussions on security issues have also increased; Secretary of
Defense William Cohen held a series of talks in China in July 2000,
talks which still underscored continuing substantial differences of
policy (particularly over Taiwan and weapons proliferation
issues).(12)
Alongside this growing dialogue, the US has
continued to pursue a series of contentious issues, including human
rights, aspects of China's exports of weapons (including missiles
and missile technology) and the US interest in developing a
'national missile defence' program) and in commercial relations
(such as protection of intellectual property rights of US
corporations). Taiwan continues to be the most sensitive area in
the relationship with the US maintaining support for a 'one China'
policy while also preserving 'non-official' relations with Taiwan
and rejecting China's right to use force against
Taiwan.(13)
Policy towards China was one of the few clearly
discernible areas of difference on Asia-Pacific issues between the
presidential candidates. Mr Gore maintained the broad emphasis of
the Clinton-Gore Administration in supporting continued engagement
with the PRC while also calling for improved practices on human
rights and strongly endorsing ongoing close ties with Taiwan. Mr
Bush and his advisers have criticised the emphasis of the Clinton
Administration on China which they see as having been pursued to
the detriment of relations with US allies in East Asia, especially
Japan. On 17 May 2000, Bush said that:
China is not our 'strategic partner' ... China
is a competitor, to be faced without ill will and without illusion.
When I am president, China will have no doubts about our power and
purpose in the region-about our strong commitment to democratic
allies throughout Asia.
On Taiwan, Bush reaffirmed the 'one China'
policy but has also said that if China were to use force against
Taiwan it could expect a 'resolute' response from the US. Mr Bush
has also declared his strong support for the development of a
National Missile Defence program for the US, a policy opposed by
both China and Russia.(14)
For its part, China is considered to have
generally preferred a Gore victory because of the expectation of
continuity with the Clinton-Gore Administration. A key question is
whether a Bush Administration would in fact see substantial change
in the overall policy of the US towards China. There has been clear
evidence of some internal dissension within the Republican party
over China policy with some more conservative elements objecting to
those who favour active dialogue and exchanges. There were
reportedly some disputes at the time of the drafting of the
Republican Platform.(15) There has also been an ongoing
pattern of debate in the US in which some conservative elements
(often referred to as the 'blue team') have objected to the views
of those promoting active dialogue and engagement with China and
have highlighted China as a high level national security threat to
the US.
Governor Bush's most important advisers do not
appear to fully share these views, Mr Bush's father pursued a
policy of engagement and dialogue (including in the difficult
period after the Tainanmen massacre in June 1989) and the Bush
family has a considerable background of interest in China,
including some business relations.(16) Nonetheless, a
Bush Administration might well see a shift in tone in China
relations, particularly because of the Bush team's declared
interest in explicitly strengthening the Japan alliance and in
moving to develop a National Missile Defence program.
The reality facing the next administration is
that China will be simultaneously a competitor and a partner and
extensive attention will be needed to manage a multifaceted and
sensitive set of relations. The British analyst James Miles
(International Institute for Strategic Studies) has observed:
The style and presentation of American
engagement with China will be of critical importance ... It should
be aware of the dangers of pushing an insecure Chinese leadership
into a confrontational stance, but it should also be aware that
firmness, consistency and tactful diplomacy in the pursuit of US
security goals in East Asia will help to enhance stability and
prevent Chinese nationalism from triggering
aggression.(17)
Japan
The relationship with the US is central to both
Japan's foreign relations and to the structure of security in East
Asia. The bilateral alliance includes the presence on Japanese soil
of about 40 000 US military forces, which Japan supports
economically. The tensions in the Taiwan Straits between China and
Taiwan in early 1996 reinforced the importance of the US-Japan
alliance. Agreement was reached in October 1997 on revised security
guidelines, which were approved by the Diet in August 1999. The
guidelines allow Japan, within existing constitutional constraints,
to cooperate for the first time with US forces not only against a
direct attack but also in areas surrounding Japan. Under the
guidelines Japan would be expected to provide rear area support,
search and rescue operations, transportation services, hospitals
and other public facilities within Japan and the repair and
maintenance of equipment.(18)
US-Japan economic relations are of great
importance to both countries. The trade tensions of the late 1980s
and early 1990s had abated in the late 1990s with the US enjoying
continued high growth rates and no longer concerned about the
challenge of an 'invincible' Japanese economy. Recently, however,
relations have again become strained as the US has been frustrated
at the slow pace of change in Japan's economic policies and at the
continuing bilateral trade imbalance, which has been exacerbated by
declines in US exports and a continuing strong performance by
Japanese exports: the deficit was $US73.4 billion for 1999.
Useful progress has been made in a number of
areas of the relationship recently including the sensitive issue of
the presence of US forces in Okinawa where there have been demands
for a reduction of the impact of some US facilities on local
communities. However, there has been some concern at the overall
lack of policy attention which the US has appeared to be giving to
Japan in the latter phase of the Clinton Administration. This was
particularly the case at the time of President Clinton's visit to
China in 1998, when he did not also visit Japan. As Yoichi
Funabashi (Chief Diplomatic Correspondent for Asahi
Shimbun) has written:
Japan resented the US-China announcement of a
'constructive strategic partnership', and was even more bitter when
Clinton failed to reaffirm, in talks with Chinese President Jiang
Zemin, the stabilising importance of the US-Japan alliance.
(19)
It has also been argued that negative
perceptions in the US about Japan's prolonged recession and its
'revolving door' politics, which has seen seven different prime
ministers in office during the Clinton presidency have had an
adverse impact on the level of US interest in
Japan.(20)
Both the Republican and Democratic platforms
emphasised the importance of the Japan relationship. The platforms
differed on trade relations. The Democrats criticised Japan on
steel and the auto industry and promised 'an aggressive' effort to
'promote fair trade with Japan and China'. The Republicans charged
that the Clinton Administration's 'managed trade' approach to Japan
has failed.(21) The Republicans have also made a point
of criticising the Clinton Administration for its alleged neglect
of the alliance relationship (with Mr Bush condemning President
Clinton's decision to visit China but not Japan in 1998). Both
candidates expressed their desire to strengthen the security
relationship.(22) However, in the wake of the recent
strain in bilateral relations and the commitment of the Republicans
to re-emphasise the alliance, opinion in Japan, particularly among
policy-makers, is considered to strongly favour a Bush
presidency.(23)
Several major studies of the US-Japan
relationship were underway in the lead up to the elections and it
has been argued forcefully that increased attention to this
relationship should be a major priority for the next US
administration.(24) However, the relationship would need
to be pursued actively by both sides and it is not clear that Japan
at present has a leadership with the focus and commitment to do
this.
The Koreas
The Korean peninsula will clearly constitute one
of the biggest policy challenges for the next administration. The
US has been a staunch ally of the Republic of Korea (ROK); the 37
000 US forces in the South continue to be its second largest
deployment in the Asia-Pacific. Since 1994 the US has sought to
reduce the threats posed by the Democratic Republic of Korea (North
Korea) nuclear program by redeveloping its nuclear industry through
the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) with
major financial contributions from the ROK, Japan and other
countries including Australia. KEDO is sponsoring the construction
of new and safer reactors in the North. The US has also supported
the development of four party talks involving the two Koreas along
with the US and China as a further way of promoting dialogue and
detente on the peninsula.
Tensions on the peninsula have eased
substantially with the 'sunshine' policy of President Kim Dae-jung
and especially since the leadership summit between the ROK
President and Chairman Kim Jong-il of North Korea in June. The
summit has been followed by further exchanges, family reunions and
commercial contacts. The US has actively supported President Kim
Dae-jung's policies and has sought to encourage a more outward
looking approach in North Korea: Secretary of State Albright
visited Pyongyang in late October and the US received a visit from
Marshall Jo Myong Rok, North Korea's second most important leader.
The US has also been concerned that the rapid progress in
inter-Korean dialogue should not lead to a situation where there is
in the future pressures for the rapid withdrawal of US forces from
South Korea, which are seen widely as a key stabilising factor on
the peninsula. President Kim Dae-jung has emphasised his support
for a continued presence and in the latter part of 2000, North
Korea has also indicated that it does not oppose a US
presence.(25) Nonetheless, if Korean peninsula detente
proceeds, the presence and role of the US forces is likely to be
the subject of increasing debate.
The US was pleasantly surprised by the success
of the June summit but has been concerned to see more substantial
changes of policy from North Korea in major areas of concern,
including its missile development program (which has included
development of medium range missiles and testing of a longer range
model) and its weapons exports (including missiles). The US also
wants to see continued progress in relations between the North and
the South: in late 2000 there has been some concern that the early
signs of progress after Kim Dae-jung's visit to the North have not
been followed by reciprocal gestures from the North Korean regime.
There have also been some reservations in Washington about the
danger of a one-sided process of thaw in US-North Korea relations
in which the DPRK might gain benefits of economic concessions from
the US without pursuing domestic reform or taking serious steps to
reduce tensions on the peninsula.(26) Such reservations
are likely to have been considered when a mooted visit by President
Clinton to North Korea, at the time of his journey to East Asia to
the APEC summit in Brunei and to Vietnam, was postponed.
(27)
There was no significant discussion between the
US presidential candidates over policy towards Korean issues during
the campaign but the search for stability and long-term peace on
the peninsula will continue to be a major interest of the US as
well as for all the major powers.
Southeast Asia
The US has extensive networks of economic and
security interests in Southeast Asia. The US is an important market
for the region's economies, especially in the electronics sector,
and most of the region's economies have an intimate stake in the
overall health of the US economy. The US has longstanding security
associations in the region and these were reaffirmed in the second
half of 2000 by a series of extensive maritime exercises
(Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training) involving phases in
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei and
Singapore.
Southeast Asia overall has been undergoing a
period of uncertainty in the wake of the regional financial crisis
and the next administration will face sensitive issues in some
major relationships, particularly with Vietnam and
Indonesia.(28) As noted above, the US has recently
enhanced its relationship with Vietnam, with a major trade
agreement concluded in July and President Clinton's visit in
November. The agreement commits the Vietnamese government to a wide
range of liberalising measures between 2000 and 2009 covering five
main areas: market access for industrial and agricultural goods,
intellectual property rights, market access for services,
investment provisions and transparency provisions. These measures
will greatly increase access for US business to the Vietnamese
market. In return, the US will reduce tariff barriers to Vietnamese
goods from their present level of about 40 per cent to 3 per cent,
a step which will open up the US market for Vietnamese-made goods
such as shoes, textiles and garments which have hitherto been
priced out of the US market. There will, however, be many detailed
issues to deal with as the trade agreement is presented for
ratification by Congress in 2001. When the agreement is ratified,
Vietnam will still only have normal trade relations on an annually
renewable basis and there will be the potential for ongoing areas
of dispute over issues including human rights and labour
standards.(29)
In Indonesia, the process of profound change
after the fall of the Suharto regime has involved some tensions in
relations with the US. The US has welcomed the progress towards
developing democratic government since the June 1999 elections but
was critical over the events in East Timor before the August
ballot, as well as over other incidences of alleged human rights
violations. The forthright style of US Ambassador Robert Gelbard
has attracted allegations of American 'interference' in Indonesia.
In October the US Embassy was subject to a bomb threat and
Indonesian patrol boats challenged a US Navy ship transiting
Indonesian waters amid claims that it might have been involved in
supplying weapons to separatist movements (charges immediately
denied by the US).(30) The immediate future for the
relationship is clearly heavily dependent on the issue of political
stability and ongoing reform efforts in Indonesia, but is also
likely to need considerable attention from the incoming US
administration.
Southeast Asian issues gained no significant
attention during the campaign. In the region itself, it has been
considered that Mr Bush would be preferred as President in a number
of countries. In Southeast Asia, Mr Gore's identification with the
issue of attempting to advance labour and environmental standards
through trade negotiations has been viewed negatively and his
speech at the APEC meetings in Kuala Lumpur in November 1998 (in
which he was seen to have lent support to opposition elements in
Malaysia) produced critical reactions.(31)
South Asia
Another region providing policy challenges for
the next administration is South Asia and particularly India. For a
number of years the US maintained relatively closer relations with
Pakistan (with which it cooperated closely in relation to the war
in Afghanistan in the 1980s) than with India. However in recent
years strong pressures developed for a reassessment of US
approaches to India, particularly as its relationship with the
former Soviet Union receded and its economy became more outward
looking. Relations have also been enhanced by the role of the South
Asian communities in the US, who have been highly active in 'new
economy' sectors and have the highest incomes of any immigrant
group in the US. Progress in relations was inhibited by the nuclear
tests in 1998 but this issue has not prevented moves on both sides
to improve communications, highlighted by President Clinton's
journey to the subcontinent in March 2000 when he made an extensive
visit to India and brief visits to Bangladesh and Pakistan.
The US and India have continued their high level
dialogue with a visit by Prime Minister Vajpayee in September. The
two sides have important interests to develop with India keen to
receive greater US investment and to gain US support for a greater
presence for India in international institutions including the UN.
The two sides, however, also continue to have major differences
over nuclear proliferation issues with India refusing to formally
disavow nuclear testing and the US continuing to ban exports of
certain potentially defence related technologies. India also wishes
to balance its association with the US with a redeveloped
relationship with Russia including a major defence cooperation
program.(32)
With India and Pakistan still locked in conflict
over Kashmir and both now with a nuclear capacity, the situation on
the sub-continent is of substantially greater significance for
Asia-Pacific security than it was at the outset of the Clinton
Administration and compels continuing attention from its successor
in Washington.
Multilateral Cooperation
The Clinton Administration increased US interest
in multilateral activities in the region and the next
administration will also face challenges in this area.
The post Cold War environment has seen increased
efforts to advance multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) remains the
premier regional grouping but it has been challenged by the impact
of the Asian financial crisis, by its expansion to include all ten
Southeast Asian states (which has made cohesion harder to maintain)
and by the troubles of its leading member, Indonesia. The ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF, initiated in 1994) is a promising attempt at
promoting dialogue on issues of security concern in the region and
the US has been a member from the outset but it is still at a
relatively early stage of development. The US gave added status to
APEC by inaugurating the annual leaders meetings in 1993 but APEC
since the late 1990s has had difficulties in maintaining steady
progress towards trade liberalisation and the US has not been able
to provide as much leadership on trade issues as might have been
hoped several years ago (see below).(33)
The regional states are continuing to seek ways
to pursue useful multilateral cooperative efforts. One reflection
of this has been the efforts between ASEAN members and China to
develop a code of conduct to help reduce the potential for conflict
in the South China Sea. The impact of the regional financial crisis
has also stimulated regional states to explore new bases for
groupings, with ASEAN moving to hold regular meetings with China,
Japan and Korea in the 'ASEAN plus three' process. China in
particular has seen these as useful avenues for discussions that do
not involve the US directly and (from China's perspective) can help
to limit US influence by promoting concepts of economic and
security cooperation which emphasise dialogue among regional states
with less involvement by external powers.(34) In
developing its regional policies, the next US administration will
therefore need to consider carefully how the US can relate
constructively to the range of cooperation initiatives now being
developed. As Professor Carlyle Thayer (Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies, Hawaii) has observed in relation to ongoing
discussions about regional security issues:
The United States must work hard to ensure that
China and the US proposals do not become a zero sum game. The US
will have to be more accommodating and sophisticated in its
response to the 'ASEAN way' and security multilaterlism under ARF
auspices.(35)
Trade and Economic Issues
In order to assess the implications of the US
elections on trade and other economic issues it is useful to
briefly assess how trade policy works in the US. There is no
Department of Trade: rather most negotiating authority is allocated
to the Executive, in fact in the Executive Office of the President
under the auspices of the US Trade Representative (or USTR), which
is currently Charlene Barshefsky.(36) However
administrative responsibility for most trade issues rests with the
Department of Commerce. In the absence of Presidential 'fast-track'
authority both Houses of Congress have the right to micro-manage
essentially the full range of trade issues as well as to impose
specific requirements on the USTR.(37) Thus it is not
only the outcome of the Presidential contest that will determine
the United States' trade policy for the next four years: this is
even more true with a less than overwhelming mandate for the
President (whoever he is). It is also important to understand the
state of US trade policy at the end of the Clinton
Administration.
The Clinton Administration
President Clinton was elected in 1992 under the
catchcry 'It's the economy, stupid!' Measured by this
yardstick-growth in GDP, reduction in unemployment and control of
inflation-the Clinton presidency has been unprecedentedly
successful. Other major economies, i.e. Japan and Europe, have been
remarkably less successful over the same period, so at least some
of the credit for US economic success must be attributed to
policy-makers. Foremost among these is the Federal Reserve
Board,(38) and its chairman Alan Greenspan, which
manages monetary policy. However the cooperation of President
Clinton and the (Republican controlled) Congress to generate a
substantial surplus at the federal level also deserves much of the
credit.(39) Many commentators have given this freeing up
of funds credit, in particular, for the expansion of the hi-tech
sector in the US. A by-product of the economic success has been an
extremely strong US dollar,(40) which in turn has been
credited with lowering the cost of imports and thus helping contain
inflationary pressure during a period of such strong economic
growth.
The first few years of the Clinton presidency
were indeed devoted primarily to economic issues, including trade.
In fact many international relations experts 'fretted that Clinton
seemed to think that trade policy could substitute for a coherent
foreign policy'.(41) A number of important advances on
trade issues were made during this period, including the completion
of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations and the
consequent establishment of the WTO, initiatives in APEC and
NAFTA.(42) However the second Clinton term has been
characterised by much less interest in trade issues, and therefore
a reduction in successful initiatives. This was obvious from before
the start of his second term,(43) and from President
Clinton's failure to secure fast-track negotiating authority from
Congress following the 'Republican Revolution' from November 1994,
when the Republican party gained control of both houses of Congress
for the first time in forty years.
In addition there was a stronger interest in the
Asia-Pacific economy from 1993 to 1996 in Washington than in recent
years. In part this reflects the slide of the Japanese economy and
the drift in Tokyo toward insularity, as well as the onset of the
Asian financial crisis in 1997. But it also reflects a feeling in
Washington that the previous emphasis on Asian initiatives for
example the creation and strengthening of APEC had not been
followed by commensurate results. Even the highly charged conflicts
between the US and Japan over trade policy have faded, as both now
pursue issues in the WTO dispute settlement system (a good example
of what it was designed to do) rather than bilaterally, for example
under the highly resented US Super 301 actions.(44) The
main issue of continued interest to US lawmakers has been the
negotiation of China's entry to the WTO, and the related granting
of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) to China by the US.
The other important trade issue in the late
Clinton presidency was the Seattle WTO Ministerial held in December
1999. This was supposed to launch a new round (possibly to have
been called the Clinton Round) of multilateral trade negotiations
and was very important from an Australian perspective due to the
mandated inclusion of agriculture in the
discussions.(45) While much attention has been paid to
the role of protestors in scuttling the launching of a new round,
in fact the lack of consensus (the basis of agreement in the WTO),
particularly between the US and EU and developing countries, made
the failure inevitable. Much of the lack of consensus flowed from
the US(46) and EU push to include WTO-irrelevant issues
such as labour standards and environmental issues, and in
particular President Clinton's threat-just before the Ministerial
was to open-to enforce these with trade sanctions (the equivalent
of a new form of protection).(47)
Gore's Policies
Much in line with the Clinton Administration as
a whole, Vice-President Gore developed a highly respected trade
role in the first two years in office. The highlight of this was a
debate with protectionist Ross Perot over the NAFTA legislation in
November 1993. It was widely considered that Vice-President Gore
had easily won the debate and public support with his formidable
presentation of an articulate free-trade agenda. Since then it has
become apparent that Mr Gore has drifted from the position of the
moderate Democratic Leadership Council(48) on trade in
order to woo support from the influential labour and environmental
lobbies within the Democratic Party.(49) This was
represented by his role in scuppering the first deal hammered out
between the US and China on China's WTO entry, and the push to late
this year to grant China PNTR which he eventually supported, but
'in a remarkably lukewarm way'.(50)
Al Gore, while at times advocating positions
reasonably compatible with an open trading system, has a stronger
ideological interest in pursuing European type policies of
restricting access to the international trading system to those
with developed country standards for labour rights and the
environment, i.e. 'fair trade'. The negative role taken by
President Clinton at the Seattle Ministerial Meeting of the WTO,
was clearly taken with more than half a view to the interests of Al
Gore vis-à-vis (import competing) unions and environmental
groups. Al Gore's proposed policies are available, in considerable
detail, in Chapter 6 of his 192 page economic plan(51).
The emphasis is on a mercantilist-type aggressive opening of
foreign markets, while protecting the US from competition by
imposing worker rights and environmental conditions on other
nations. This is even more notable considering that his running
mate, Senator Lieberman, was chairman of the moderate Democratic
Leadership Council.(52)
The current US Trade Representative (USTR)
Charlene Barshefsky has apparently claimed that there is no
pressing need for fast-track,(53) a position at odds
with almost all outside observers.(54) A possible Gore
appointee would be Laura D'Andrea Tyson-who created difficulties
within Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers due to her positions
on trade and relations with Japan. The absence of a specific trade
plan, and the contested nature of many of the specific policy
positions that are mentioned, probably mean that President Gore and
his USTR would not successfully conclude many international trade
negotiations.
It would be reasonable to expect that a
President Gore (as at the Kuala Lumpur APEC Leaders Meeting) would
be more troubled than Mr Bush by human rights standards in many
APEC economies and hence be less able to separate economic and
political interests. Neither Bush nor Gore has focussed
specifically on APEC, although there is unlikely to be a further
downgrade from that witnessed under Clinton.(55) Under
President Gore, however, it would be likely that the United States
would upgrade trade relations with the EU, perhaps reviving the
Trans-Atlantic economic initiatives, because of the greater
compatibility of his positions with those fashionable in Europe. On
the other hand the need to cooperate with a Republican controlled
Congress and the intellectual coherence of a free-trade position,
might see a President Gore's actual trade policies return to a more
moderate position.
Bush's Policies
Presidential candidate Bush has proposed a
number of changes to current US trade policy, and to international
economic institutions. At this stage he is proposing a return to a
much clearer US line supporting free trade, and seeking to
accelerate progress in multilateral fora such as the WTO. In some
ways this stands in contrast to his approach to other multilateral
institutions such as the World Bank and IMF (although there is an
economic rationale for the distinction.(56)) While
Vice-Presidential candidate Cheney also has a reputation as a
supporter of free trade,(57) his expertise is in defence
policy, and he appears to believe that not selling weapons for
foreign policy reasons is an abrogation of a free trade principle.
Bush has proposed new initiatives in NAFTA,(58) and the
possibility of trade 'agreements in other regions with individual
countries or groups of countries'.
The important policy initiatives proposed by the
Bush-Cheney team are outlined at the Bush campaign website. In
particular, proposed specific approaches are outlined there on
international trade(59) and agriculture.(60)
The approaches outlined there are much closer to the approach taken
by Australia at the recent WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle than
recent US policy and include seeking to get Presidential fast-track
authority, support for a new WTO Round with an emphasis on
agriculture, and little emphasis on the 'new trade issues' such as
trade and labour. Possible appointments to the USTR position
include Larry Lindsey, Robert Zoellick or Warren
Maruyama.(61)
Neither Gore nor Bush has received high acclaim
from economists for their overall economic
proposals.(62) Both are likely to put at risk the
current US budget surplus through spending (Gore) or spending and
tax cutting (Bush) plans. If they are actually able to implement
their plans, there are likely to be implications for the
international community as well as the US economy. In particular
the military spending/tax cuts proposed by Mr Bush have many
parallels with the Reagan years. By the middle of President
Reagan's term it was discovered that a strong US dollar (such as
now exists) is incompatible with trade balance and such fiscal
policies. In order to salvage the export sector the Plaza Accord to
drive down the US dollar was considered necessary. Such pressures
are likely to emerge for either set of policies, but more acutely
for the Bush program.
Impact of Congress
As mentioned above Congress has important powers
in terms of trade policy, and these are accentuated during periods,
as now, when the President has not negotiated fast-track authority.
In the past, Republicans in Congress have been much more reliably
supportive of an open international trading system, while Democrats
have been aligned to protectionist interests in the labour
movement. In one assessment of the previous Congressional session
(the 105th 1997-98) this remains true, although
Republican Revolution members (i.e. those elected in November 1994
under the leadership of Newt Gingrich) were less likely to vote
along free trade lines than traditional Republicans.(63)
On individual issues Republicans can be as responsive as Democrats
to special interest lobbying.(64) The House Democratic
Leader, Dick Gephardt is particularly associated with protectionist
policies. This all becomes critical in a situation where the
President must seek congressional approval for any trade
initiatives. While Congressional Democrats are 'determined that
labour and environmental concerns should receive higher priority in
trade agreements, Republicans were adamantly opposed to such
linkage'.(65) Building a consensus has been difficult
enough even for a renowned dealmaker like President Clinton; it
will be much harder for a weak President facing an embittered and
more narrowly divided Congress, such as will be the case for the
107th Congress.
The increased polarisation between Democrats and
Republicans, often overstated in the past, now seems to be a more
impassable obstacle for any President. This is well illustrated by
the functioning of the US Trade Deficit Review
Commission.(66) The Commission was created in October
1998, and was to run from August 1999 to August 2000, with the
purpose of studying the nature, causes, and consequences of the
United States merchandise trade and current account deficits. The
Commission had 12 members, 3 each appointed by the House and Senate
Majority and Minority Leaders respectively. Although all appointees
were experts in some way on the issue, this body was not able to
issue a joint report; rather there was a straight split on party
lines. That such a body should be so riven with dissent that it
could not issue a joint report pointing the way forward for reform
of US policies that impact on trade, indicates the remoteness of
the possibility of achieving consensus or even working majorities
for most serious trade issues likely to face the US in the
forthcoming four years. While one of the agreed recommendations
'was to favour a fiscal policy that substantially increases
national saving' neither Presidential candidate is in fact
proposing policies consistent with this. This also implies the
likely revival of ad hoc and inconsistent unilateral trade
policies(67) such as the use of Super 301 trade action
to pressure foreign nations to buy otherwise uncompetitive US
products.
Australia's Interests
Political and Security Issues
The way in which either a Bush or a Gore
administration pursue policies in the Asia-Pacific will have a
substantial bearing on Australia's own regional environment. The
2000 US elections have occurred at a time of some important
processes of change in the Asia-Pacific. China and Taiwan have been
engaged in a reassessment of policy which is still in progress but
which could lead to a new basis for dialogue if the concept of 'one
China' can be redefined in a manner that is acceptable to both
parties.(68) There is also however some continuing
potential for instability, miscalculation and even of outright
conflict. The process of detente between the two Koreas has
progressed in a positive manner so far, but there have yet to be
decisive steps taken to reduce the scale of the military
confrontation across the Demilitarised Zone. In Southeast Asia, the
future of Indonesia remains highly uncertain, with economic
recovery still fragile and the democratic government led by
President Wahid facing pressures for decentralisation of power and
control over resources while at the same time needing to deal with
substantial disaffection and demands for independence from many
people in the provinces of Aceh and Irian Jaya. In South Asia,
India and Pakistan remain in a bitter dispute over Kashmir and both
are now in possession of at least some nuclear weapons.
In the region itself, a majority of countries
probably prefer a Bush Administration, because this would be
expected to be more clearly committed to trade agendas pursued
without attempts to incorporate labour and environmental standards
and because a number of countries would (at least privately) view
with favour Bush's promise of a cooperative but robust approach
towards China. The Australian Government has been reported as
predominantly preferring a Bush presidency but it may be expected
that Australia would clearly work closely and cooperatively with an
administration led by either candidate.(69)
The next US administration, whether led by
Governor Bush or Vice-President Gore, will face some sensitive and
difficult foreign policy tasks in the Asia-Pacific. Australia has
strong interests in an administration which can maintain the
progress in dialogue with China which has been (however haltingly)
achieved through the 1990s. It will be beneficial for Australia and
the region if the US can pursue its interests in consolidating its
allied relationships (especially with Japan) and in developing new
areas of defence policy (possibly including a form of National
Missile Defence) in a way which does not lead to anxiety and
alienation on China's part. A continued active commitment by the US
to supporting inter-Korean dialogue while encouraging a continuing
opening to the wider world by North Korea is essential if the
recent progress on the peninsula is to be consolidated. A
sympathetic and supportive US interest in Indonesia can be a
positive factor for stability and progressive change. Continued
interest by the US is also likely to be an important element in the
chances for maintaining peace and increasing confidence in South
Asia, where the situation of conflict continues to pose serious
potential dangers both to the two countries directly involved and
to the wider Asia-Pacific region. Australia itself can make a
contribution to the evolution of US policies by playing a role of
pro-active ally, able to offer both detailed advice and positive
criticism.(70)
Trade and Economic Issues
Australia's interests in the trade arena are
best served by a US administration committed to the multilateral
system represented by the WTO, and in particular to successfully
launching a new Round of multilateral trade negotiations. This is
because particular sectors in which Australia holds a comparative
advantage, for example agriculture and services, or which
Australia's export destinations specialise in, for example textiles
in developing Asian economies, are only likely to be treated more
equitably in the world trading system following a successful Round
of trade negotiations.(71) Of the two Presidential
candidates Mr Bush seems to be much more likely to pursue such
policies, and to be able to do the necessary negotiating with
Congress.
In terms of regional trade issues, which are
important to Australia but perhaps less critical, the issues are
more ambiguous. APEC has not been a focus of either candidate, and
in the absence of a US initiative, is likely to stagnate into
irrelevance. The Clinton Administration has recently started to
pursue a free trade agreement with Singapore.(72) This
was (in American terms) a 'no-brainer'(73) due to the
high labour and environmental standards (and lack of agriculture)
in Singapore which make the move uncontroversial. Further regional
initiatives are likely to be very difficult for Mr Gore due to the
issues of labour and environmental standards. Australia has
traditionally opposed the idea of having to choose between trade
deals with the US and Asia. Thus a President who could negotiate
numerous free trade agreements in the region with economies in APEC
would be preferable, but perhaps unlikely. Mr Bush is more likely
to focus on NAFTA for regional trade initiatives.
In terms of bilateral trade relations, because
so much depends on the lobbying of individual industries (for
example lamb or sugar) it is difficult to predict whether either
Presidential candidate, in the absence of multilateral initiatives
would be substantially better for Australia in
practice.(74) The Clinton administration has had a
variable record, despite its early success with the WTO. In terms
of relations with our important trade partners, for example Japan,
China or Korea, it is likely that Mr Bush's trade policies
are less likely to cause irritation (due to the imposition of fewer
political strings), but this is very much subject to the level of
interference by Congress.
Endnotes
-
- Excerpted from American Trade Policies 3rd ed.,
Institute for International Economics, 1995, see http://www.iie.com/FOCUS/focfast.htm.
- see http://www.imf.org
- The Dictionary of Financial Risk management at
http://newrisk.ifci.ch/glossary.htm.
- See http://www.chinapntr.gov/.
- Walter Goode, Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms, 1997.
- For a detailed review of US policies in the first three years
of the Clinton Administration see 'The United States and East
Asia', Frank Frost, Research Paper No. 18, 1995-96, Department
of the Parliamentary Library, 21 December 1995.
- David E. Sanger, 'Rivals Differ on US Role in the World',
The New York Times, 30 October 2000.
- Sebastian Mallaby, 'The Irrelevant Election', Foreign
Policy, September-October 2000.
- Mark Mitchell, 'The American Election: Either way-A bad
precedent', Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 November 2000.
- Norman Ornstein and Thomas Donilon, 'The Confirmation Clog',
Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 4, November/December 2000,
p. 87-99.
- Mark Mitchell, loc cit.
- Bonnie S. Glasor, 'Clinton and Jiang Hail PNTR Passage, But
Agree on Little Else', Comparative Connections, Third
Quarter 2000.
- For a comprehensive assessment of China-Taiwan relations see
Gary Klintworth, 'China and Taiwan-From Flashpoint to
Redefining One China', Research Paper no. 15, 2000-01,
Department of the Parliamentary Library, 7 November 2000.
- For a discussion of the National Missile Defence issue see Gary
Brown and Gary Klintworth, 'The US National Missile Defense
Program', Research Paper no. 16, 2000-01, Department of the
Parliamentary Library, 5 December 2000.
- Steven Mufson, 'In GOP, a simmering struggle on China policy',
The Washington Post, 22 August 2000.
- Murray Hiebert, 'Red Scare', Far Eastern Economic
Review, 2 November 2000.
- James Miles, 'Chinese Nationalism, US Policy and Asian
Security', Survival, vol. 42, no. 4, Winter 2000-01, p 64.
- Michiyo Nakamoto, 'Japan: Defence Role Strengthened', The
Financial Times, 30 April 1999.
- Yoichi Funabashi, 'Japan's Moment of Truth', Survival,
vol. 42, no. 4, Winter 2000-01, p. 76.
- Lee Siew Hua, 'First Japan bashing, then Japan passing, now
Japan nothing', The Straits Times (Singapore), 21 July
2000.
- See Robert Zoellick, 'Who Won the Trade War?', The National
Interest, no. 41, Fall 1995, pp. 78-81.
- Michael Jonathan Green, 'Small but important steps',
Comparative Connections, Third Quarter 2000, p. 5.
- Andrew Cornell, 'Japanese would never say it, but many want it
to be Bush's week', Australian Financial Review, 6
November 2000.
- Michael Jonathan Green, 'Security and economic ties stabilize
before the Okinawa summit', Comparative Connections,
Second Quarter 2000, p. 6.
- 'North/South Korea: Regional repercussions', Oxford
Analytica Daily Brief, 25 October 2000.
- Nayan Chanda, 'Marching to Kim's tune', Far Eastern
Economic Review, 2 November 2000.
- Ralph A. Cossa, 'US-North Korea: Right Decision, But for the
Wrong Reasons', PacNet Newsletter (Pacific CSIS, Hawaii),
no. 46, 17 November 2000.
- Peter Hartcher, 'Markets point to a new Asian crisis',
Australian Financial Review, 29 November 2000.
- 'Vietnam: US Trade Accord', Oxford Analytica Daily
Brief, 19 July 2000.
- Richard C. Padock, 'New chapter in Indonesia ties open with
threats, warnings', Los Angeles Times, 5 November 2000.
- Greg Sheridan, 'Asia prefers Bush and so do we', The
Australian, 3 November 2000.
- 'India/US: Tenuous Warmth', Oxford Analytica Daily
Brief, 22 September 2000.
- G. Pierre Goad, 'Rethinking Asia The US flops on free trade',
Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 July 1999, Florence Chong,
'Free trade, rogue ways', The Australian, 10 October 2000.
- Carlyle A. Thayer, 'China's "New Security Concept" and ASEAN',
Comparative Connections, Third Quarter 2000, p. 1-7.
- ibid, p 7.
- According to Oxford Analytica, even in 1996, Barshefsky was
considered unlikely to introduce a clear trade agenda to the
Clinton Administration, and was even noted to be 'technically in
violation of a law that would prohibit her from serving in the
post', 'United States: Trade Agenda', Oxford Analytica Daily
Brief, 19 November 1996.
- For an excellent summary of the organization of trade policy in
the US see I. M. Destler 'US Trade Policymaking: Organizational
Options', June 2000, http://www.ustdrc.gov/research/research.html
or for more dated material I. M. Destler, American Trade
Politics: System Under Stress, Institute for International
Economics, Washington DC, 1986.
- The US central bank.
- This cooperation, of course, has neither been amicable nor
voluntary: rather neither side has been willing to support the
other's spending or tax cutting initiatives, beyond very minimal
levels. The outcome, then, of the process has been to generate a
surplus.
- At times the Administration seems to have claimed the strong
dollar as a deliberate policy. In terms of the trade deficit
generated this policy may not be able to be maintained beyond the
medium term.
- Douglas Brinkley, 'Democratic enlargement: The Clinton
doctrine', Foreign Policy, Spring 1997, p. 111. See also
'Clinton's first year: The year of loving dangerously', The
Economist, 15 January 1994.
- For an economist's glowing report card on Clinton's first term
see Professor DeLong's site http://econ161.berkeley.edu/Politics/clintonpolicy.html.
He concludes that Clinton's previous terms as Governor had made him
understand at a gut level the importance of trade to economic
success.
- 'United States: Trade Agenda', Oxford Analytica Daily
Brief, 19 November 1996, see also endnote 32 above.
- Paula Stern 'The road from here: US trade policy in the second
Clinton administration', Vital Speeches of the Day, 1 February
1997.
- For more details of the agenda and scope of the Ministerial see
Bruce Donald, The World Trade Organization (WTO) Seattle
Ministerial Conference, December 1999: Issues and Prospects,
Current Issues Brief, No. 12, 1999-2000, Department of the
Parliamentary Library, 30 November 1999.
- For details of the US agenda see 'Crafting a Global Trade
Strategy: The US and the WTO', Economic Perspectives, vol.
5 no. 1, February 2000.
- Fundamentally there was no prospect of agreement once he had
given an interview with a local newspaper, endorsing sanctions to
enforce labour standards, see Michael Paulson, 'Clinton says he
will support trade sanctions for worker abuse', Seattle
Post-Intelligencer, 1 December 1999. Charlene
Barshefsky's assessment of his comments was 'My God, he's blown it'
(see Brendan Pearson, 'No trade-offs in a sleepless Seattle',
Australian Financial Review, 6 December 1999, p. 14).
- See Jenny Bates, 'Lifting Labor', Blueprint Magazine,
1 June 2000 at http://www.ndol.org/blueprint/summer/2000/bates2.html.
- Although the Clinton administration as a whole has shifted in a
similar direction after its first two years, if not as far, see
Brendan Pearson, 'Repairing trade relations', Australian
Financial Review, 16 November 2000, p. 49.
- 'Globalisation blues', The Economist, 30 September
2000, see also David Sanger & Katharine Seelye, 'Gore Back in
Step With White House Over China Trade', New York Times,
19 February 2000.
- Available at http://www.algore.com/pdf/gore_prosperity.pdf.
- See
http://www.ndol.org/ndol_ci.cfm?kaid=86&subid=85&contentid=1943;
the general position of the DLC is available at
http://www.ndol.org/ndol_ci.cfm?kaid=108&subid=133&contentid=2746
and places much more emphasis on labour standards being addressed
in the ILO rather than in the trade context.
- See Richard Leaver 'It's Barchevsky's rules now', Canberra
Times, 6 November 2000, p. 11.
- Such that it is reported that (Democratic) US trade officials
were openly hoping for a Democratic loss in the Presidential
elections, see Brendan Pearson, op cit.
- Although the current situation has led The Economist
to ask 'if APEC has served its natural term'? ('Whatever happened
to the Pacific Rim?', The Economist, 12 November
2000).
- See Daniel Griswold, 'Free Trade, Free Markets: Rating the
105th Congress', at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-006es.html.
- A speech related to this topic is at http://www.cato.org/speeches/sp-dc062398.html.
- This highlights the importance that Governors attach to trade
initiatives, due to the facts on the ground at state level.
- See http://www.bush2000.com/issues/internationaltrade.html.
- See http://www.bush2000.com/issues/agriculture.html.
- See 'The Bush Team-Possible formations', Financial
Times, http://specials.ft.com/uselections/FT3SVBBAODC.html.
- 'Poor grades for Al and George', The Economist, 28
September 2000 and Paul Krugman 'Land of the brave, home of the
fiscal free-fall', Sydney Morning Herald, 14 November
2000, p. 16.
- See Daniel Griswold, 'Free Trade, Free Markets: Rating the
105th Congress', at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-006es.html.
- For example the recent push to impose heightened trade barriers
on Australian lamb due to the low A$, Doug Palmer, 'US senators
want tougher lamb tariffs', The Age, 20 November 2000, p.
9. In neither party was support for free trade a majority position.
- Globalisation blues', The Economist, 30 September
2000.
- See http://www.ustdrc.gov/.
- The Democratic representatives explicitly thought that
targeting Japan and China was reasonable given their trade
surpluses with the US.
- See Gary Klintworth, op cit.
- Greg Sheridan, 'Asia prefers Bush and so do we', The
Australian, 3 November 2000.
- The case for such an active Australian approach has been
advanced recently by John Baker and Douglas H. Paal in 'The
US-Australia Alliance', in Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb eds,
America's Asian Alliances, The MIT Press, Cambridge
Massachusetts, 2000, pp. 87-109.
- For more of the reasoning behind this see Bruce Donald, The
World Trade Organization (WTO) Seattle Ministerial Conference,
December 1999: Issues and Prospects.
- See US and Singapore to Launch Negotiations for a Free Trade
Agreement, 16 November 2000, http://www.ustr.gov.
- That is an initiative requiring no brain effort, due to its
simplicity and straightforwardness.
- It should be noted that many States important to Mr Bush, for
example Montana and Florida, have protectionist agricultural
lobbies i.e. lamb and sugar. This does not mean that Mr Bush will
necessarily pander to these lobbies, but must raise the
possibility.