Dr Frank Frost
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
25 August 1997
Contents
Major Issues Summary
Introduction
ASEAN Since 1967
ASEAN after the Cold War
ASEAN at 30: Issues and Challenges
ASEAN's Enlargement
Vietnam and Laos
Burma
Enlargement: Costs and Benefits
Regional Security and the ASEAN Regional Forum
Economic Issues and AFTA
Political Transition and 'National Resilience'
ASEAN and Cambodia
The 5-6 July 1997 Conflict and
ASEAN's Response
'Constructive Engagement' and 'Constructive Intervention'
ASEAN and Australia
Conclusion
Endnotes
Appendix A (hard copy version only of these
charts; not available on Internet at present)
ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), the premier
regional association in East Asia, this year celebrates its 30th
anniversary. ASEAN has sought to enhance regional security and
economic development in Southeast Asia by pursuing cooperative
activities and maintaining active dialogues with the major powers
and other Asia Pacific countries, including Australia. Since the
end of the Cold War, ASEAN has moved to boost its activities and to
enlarge its membership with the aim of including all ten Southeast
Asian countries. ASEAN accepted Burma and Laos as new members on 23
July 1997, but the outbreak of conflict in Cambodia from 5-6 July
forced ASEAN to postpone that country's entry into the association.
P> This paper reviews ASEAN's development and character, its
strategies to redevelop its cooperative role in the post-Cold War
era, the challenges posed by enlargement and by the conflict in
Cambodia, and ASEAN's significance for Australia.
ASEAN was formed by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand in August 1967 at the height of the Vietnam
war and just after the destabilising period of 'Confrontation' by
Indonesia of the new state of Malaysia. In its first years of
operation the members quietly developed communication and worked to
build up trust and confidence. After 1975, the members upgraded
their activities. ASEAN played an important role for its members
during the Indochina refugee crisis in 1978-79 and after Vietnam's
invasion of Cambodia. During the 1980s, ASEAN attained a high
international profile through its role in coordinating opposition
to Vietnam's presence in Cambodia and through its demands for a
negotiated solution.
The decline of the Soviet Union ushered in a new phase of
international relations in East Asia. With the Cambodia conflict
effectively removed as an international and regional problem by the
Paris Agreements of October 1991, ASEAN was anxious that it should
not lose momentum or profile. Accordingly, ASEAN in the 1990s has
been 're-engineering' its strategies in several major ways. The
paper suggests that in these efforts ASEAN faces five major issues
and challenges: enlargement, regional security cooperation,
economic issues and cooperation, leadership transitions in ASEAN's
members, and the renewed problems in Cambodia.
Enlargement has been seen by ASEAN's senior
leaders as a way of adding to the associations 'weight' and
credibility as a grouping able to represent the whole of Southeast
Asia. However, enlargement also poses the question of whether ASEAN
can accommodate new members with (in some cases) substantial
internal political problems and keep the community of interests and
cohesion that it has developed over 30 years. Burma's membership
has been especially contentious, both within and outside ASEAN. The
paper provides a concise outline of the costs and benefits which
may result from ASEAN's enlargement.
ASEAN has faced a complex regional security
environment in the 1990s. China's economic growth has benefited the
whole East Asian region but its rise in regional prominence has
also produced uncertainties, especially in relation to the South
China Sea. To contribute positively to post-Cold War security in
East Asia, ASEAN has established the ASEAN Regional Forum to engage
the Asia Pacific major powers in dialogue and confidence building
measures. ASEAN now faces the challenge of maintaining its leading
role as an organiser of this important focus for security
discussions.
A consistent goal for the ASEAN members has been to maintain
their region as an attractive focus for investment and economic
growth. The ASEAN region's image of economic confidence has been
affected since mid 1997 by the currency stability problems
experienced by several countries, especially Thailand, but long
term prospects for continued sustained growth remain favourable. To
maximise the gains that can be realised from economic relations
within their own region, ASEAN is pursuing the implementation of
the ASEAN Free Trade Area. AFTA is being developed
in parallel with the trade and investment liberalisation policies
of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group, but AFTA is
intended to be effected more rapidly. Progress has been made in
reducing trade barriers but ASEAN's enlargement could make
development of AFTA more complex.
ASEAN's internal cohesion may also be affected by the issue of
leadership transition and whether ASEAN's emerging
leaders will continue to give the development of relationships
among members the high priority that has in the past been assigned
to this by the group's founders and senior leaders, including
President Suharto and Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew.
ASEAN's most serious immediate challenge has been posed by the
violent conflict in Cambodia since early July
which has forced the delay of that country's entry into the
association. Since mid-July, ASEAN has sought to mediate in the
conflict but has met with resistance from Cambodia's now dominant
leader Hun Sen. ASEAN is now emphasising the importance of the
conduct of the scheduled 1998 elections in a free and fair manner,
but the effort to accept the country as ASEAN's tenth member
remains in abeyance.
ASEAN's move to accept new members has been accompanied by
discussion about the role which the association might be able to
play in encouraging positive internal change and reform within
member countries-in a process of 'constructive
intervention'. However, the paper suggests that it will be
difficult to pursue such policies within ASEAN's diverse membership
without placing the association's own cohesion under strain.
Australia has a strong stake in a stable and prosperous ASEAN
region and the ASEAN members are important economic partners for
Australia. Australia has welcomed ASEAN's enlargement while
expressing the hope that this will be accompanied by positive
change and reform, especially in Burma. Australia has been very
interested to be involved in ASEAN's multilateral dialogues and has
consistently been an active participant in the ASEAN Regional
Forum. However, Australia has not yet succeeded in gaining access
as a member in ASEAN's newest focus for dialogue, the Asia-Europe
Meetings (ASEM) process.
The paper concludes by suggesting that ASEAN's enlargement
should bring benefits both to the new and pre-existing members and
should add to ASEAN's 'weight' as a regional grouping. However,
ASEAN may face some problems in absorbing its new members:
effective decision-making may be more difficult, cohesion may be
harder to maintain and continuing internal problems in some newer
members could see discord emerging between ASEAN's older and newer
members. The manner in which enlargement evolves will play a play a
large role in determining whether ASEAN retains the profile and
prestige which it has gained in its first three decades.
On 8 August 1997, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) celebrated its 30th anniversary. Since its cautious
beginning in 1967, during the height of the Vietnam war, ASEAN has
come to be regarded as an important factor for stability in
Southeast Asia and the most successful regional organisation in the
Third World. Developments in 1997 have emphasised ASEAN's
continuing vitality. On 23 July, ASEAN accepted two new members,
Laos and Burma (Myanmar). Once again, ASEAN's annual meetings (in
late July in Kuala Lumpur) were attended by the foreign ministers
of the major Asia Pacific powers as well as the European Union, for
bilateral dialogues and for the ASEAN Regional Forum-not to mention
the annual dinner and musical evening (during which US Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright stole the show with her revised version of
an Andrew Lloyd Webber song, retitled for the occasion 'Don't Cry
for Me ASEANies').
But ASEAN's anniversary has also highlighted its ongoing
challenges. ASEAN's move to enlarge its membership was a historic
step. However, enlargement does not automatically mean a stronger
ASEAN. Moreover, ASEAN's bold plans to include all ten Southeast
Asian countries were disrupted by the violent conflict in Phnom
Penh on 5-6 July in which First Prime Minister Ranariddh was
ousted-a development which has forced ASEAN to postpone acceptance
of Cambodia into the association. ASEAN now faces a major challenge
in trying to ameliorate conditions in Cambodia, and particularly to
encourage Cambodia's government to adhere to constitutional
provisions for the conduct of open elections in 1998.
This paper provides a concise overview of ASEAN's origins,
character and rise to significance in the 1970s and 1980s, ASEAN's
efforts to adapt to the impact of the end of the Cold War in East
Asia, and its major current challenges, including those posed by
the situation in Cambodia. The paper concludes by discussing
ASEAN's significance for Australia.
ASEAN was established by a meeting in Bangkok in August 1967 of
the foreign ministers of Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand and the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia.(1) The founding
members of ASEAN had several major motivations when they first met.
In 1967 the Cold War was at its height-as was the war in Vietnam.
Each of the founding members was highly concerned about domestic
Communist-led revolutionary movements and felt acutely vulnerable
in relation to the major powers-especially the Soviet Union and
China. The capacity of the major powers for involvement in internal
and inter-state conflicts was seen as one of the major security
threats to the region-as was being illustrated so clearly in
Indochina.
In addition, the five founding members had only very recently
experienced serious tensions between each other-particularly during
Indonesia's 'Confrontation' of the new state of Malaysia (between
1963 and 1966). In its first year of existence ASEAN was virtually
immobilised by the tensions arising over the Philippines' claim to
the Malaysian state of Sabah. There was very little trust or
confidence among Southeast Asian countries in the late 1960s.
Economic development was also a severe worry for all ASEAN
members. In 1967 there was as yet no 'East Asian miracle'-but
rather a group comprising one city state and four poor, primarily
agriculture-based economies highly dependent on their primary
product trade, with what they saw as unsympathetic First World
trading partners. In the late 1960s, Singapore was just beginning
to plan the export-oriented process of industrial development which
has since been followed by many other countries in Southeast
Asia.
ASEAN was not initially in a position to exercise any
significant influence on these conditions. What its members did do
was to set up a model of regional cooperation that its very diverse
members could live with and which maximised the members' diplomatic
and political strengths. ASEAN's model of cooperation was developed
in two main phases. From 1967 until 1975, the pace of activity was
very low key and the members concentrated on discussion and
confidence building. The end of the wars in Indochina in 1975 was
accompanied by a sense of uncertainty in the region which
stimulated a second phase of development: ASEAN at its first heads
of government summit meeting in Bali (February 1976) upgraded both
regional dialogues and efforts at economic cooperation.
The key features of the 'ASEAN style' of regional cooperation
which has been developed steadily after 1967 have included:
- A steady process of contact and confidence building has been
developed to dampen down the considerable bases for conflict among
the members. ASEAN has avoided developing a top heavy organisation
and has kept the style of discussions informal;
- Strong emphasis has been given to the principle of
non-interference in the internal affairs of member countries:
ASEAN's founding declaration in Bangkok in 1967 called upon member
states to '...ensure their stability and security from external
interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve
their national identities in accordance with the ideals and
aspirations of their peoples'.(2)
- Emphasising economic cooperation as a major focus for the
group-but without pursuing programs which would have produced
serious disharmony among its very diverse members. ASEAN also
contributed to building an image for Southeast Asia as a stable and
benign destination for foreign investment;
- Utilising ASEAN's collective drawing power to gradually include
the major external powers in dialogue-a process begun seriously in
1976 at the Bali summit and now a central feature of ASEAN;
- Using the association to take a stand on key regional security
issues-especially the Indochina refugee crisis in 1978-1979, which
was a very serious threat to most members, and over the conflict in
Cambodia after Vietnam's invasion in December 1978.
ASEAN was a product of the period of the Cold War in Southeast
Asia and it gained its greatest influence through its role in the
most serious conflict of the Cold War era in the region in the last
two decades-Cambodia. The ASEAN members viewed Vietnam's invasion
as a violation of the principle of territorial sovereignty, and
were also committed to support Thailand, which was concerned at the
presence of over 150,000 Vietnamese forces in Cambodia after 1979.
ASEAN encouraged international action to deny legitimacy to
Vietnam's actions and cooperated with the major powers-particularly
China and the United States-to oppose Vietnam's policies. While the
conflict over Cambodia continued, ASEAN had a very high profile
diplomatically-for example, through the resolutions which it
sponsored each year in the United Nations General Assembly.
The decline of Cold War confrontation internationally was
reflected directly in Southeast Asia by Vietnam's move to withdraw
its forces from Cambodia (in September 1989) and by resolution of
the Cambodia conflict as a regional and international problem
(through the Paris Agreements of October 1991). After the agreement
on Cambodia, the ASEAN members faced an improved regional security
situation with new prospects for detente between former
adversaries, particularly China and Vietnam, and Vietnam and the
ASEAN states. ASEAN members, however, also faced an international
climate where many problems competed for the attention of the major
powers and where, with the Cambodia issue apparently on the way to
resolution, ASEAN might not be able to hold the international
interest which its members had got used to during the 1980s.
Accordingly, since the early 1990s the ASEAN members, in the third
major phase of the association's development, have moved actively
to 're-engineer' the Association-to keep it at the centre of
regional cooperation in the 1990s and beyond.(3) This has taken
several important forms: enhanced cooperation on security and
economic issues, organisational change, and enlarging the
membership.
The regional security environment was affected substantially by
the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The decline of Soviet power
placed renewed focus on security relations in the East Asian region
where optimism was accompanied by a sense of uncertainty,
especially over the post-Cold War role of China. The new security
environment encouraged continuation of a process of armed forces
modernisation in Southeast Asia, and the end of the Cold War made
available many weapons systems at reduced prices. In this new
environment ASEAN took the opportunity to inaugurate the ASEAN
Regional Forum in 1993 to provide the first regional basis for
discussion of security issues in East Asia: the Forum now brings
together 21 countries for annual ministerial meetings and a series
of 'inter-sessional' working groups.(4) ASEAN has also developed
other new bases for international and regional dialogue, including
inaugurating the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) process, which has
brought together the ASEAN members, China, Japan, and South Korea
with the 15 members of the European Union in what is planned to be
a series of regular meetings, and moving to hold a summit of East
Asian states (ASEAN plus the three Northeast Asian members of the
ASEM dialogue), which will be held in December 1997.
Secondly, the post-Cold War environment has also involved
economic challenges for ASEAN. Competition for access to
international investment has been intense, not least because
China's economy has drawn so much foreign investment. ASEAN has
therefore sought to bolster the attractiveness of its region as a
favourable focus for investment by taking more concerted steps to
reduce economic barriers among the members and thus create a larger
ASEAN market. To pursue this goal, ASEAN initiated the ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA) proposal in 1992. AFTA seeks to reduce trade
barriers to create a market of up to 500 million people with low
external tariff barriers and common internal standards.
Thirdly, ASEAN has moved to improve its own administrative
capacities. Since 1992 the office of Secretary-General has been
upgraded and has played a more significant role (for example in
coordinating the preparations for the acceptance of new members).
The size of the Secretariat has also been increased and its members
have been recruited from across the ASEAN region.
Fourthly, and perhaps most ambitiously, ASEAN has seized the
chance provided by the more flexible post-Cold War environment to
expand its own membership. ASEAN had admitted Brunei as its sixth
member in January 1984. Less than four years after the Paris
Agreements on Cambodia, ASEAN welcomed Vietnam as its seventh
member in July 1995. ASEAN has now just accepted Laos and Burma-see
below.
All of these steps have been designed to keep ASEAN at the
centre of cooperation in East Asia. And the continuing success of
ASEAN in attracting the active participation of the major powers
shows that the strategy has been succeeding. Nonetheless, ASEAN
faces some major challenges as it enters its fourth
decade-especially, whether it can at the same time pursue both
'widening' of its membership and also 'deepening' of its
cooperation, while retaining the confidence and relative cohesion
among its members which has been built carefully since the
1960s.
The 30th ASEAN Ministerial Meetings in Kuala Lumpur in 1997
reaffirmed the activism and profile of the association. The ASEAN
meetings accepted formally Burma and Laos as full members. The
dialogue sessions with major Asia Pacific countries and the
European Union, emphasised ASEAN's continuing capacity to engage
the interest of states outside the Southeast Asian region. The
fourth meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) provided a venue
for another round of discussions on regional security issues. ASEAN
leaders were able to engage with and debate key issues of concern
with the major powers, both in the meetings' formal sessions and at
the media conferences which followed them, as did Malaysia's Prime
Minister Mahathir with the US over the issue of human rights.
However, as it enters its fourth decade, ASEAN and its members
face some substantial challenges including the process of
enlargement of ASEAN itself, the regional security situation and
the roles of the major powers, economic issues (including the
instabilities in some ASEAN states' currencies in mid 1997) and
regional economic cooperation, internal leadership transitions, and
the special problems posed by Cambodia. It is useful to consider
these challenges separately in turn, although they are in many ways
inter-related-the issue of enlargement, for example, will clearly
affect all major areas of ASEAN's activities and prospects.
ASEAN's Enlargement
ASEAN's expansion of membership is a key part of its strategy to
remain a vital focus for regional cooperation but it has also been
one of the biggest recent sources of controversy, both within the
association and externally.
Vietnam and Laos
Vietnam was ASEAN's first new member in the post-Cold War period
(on 28 July 1995). Vietnam's move towards ASEAN was a logical
outcome of the end of the Cold War era in East Asia and it was
effected more rapidly than many observers expected. The decline of
the Soviet Union and the pursuit of internal economic reform gave
Vietnam a new basis for common interests with the rest of Southeast
Asia, from which it had been separated by over three decades of
conflict. Vietnam's withdrawal of its forces from Cambodia in
September 1989 followed by the achievement of the Paris Agreements
in October 1991 removed the major basis for differences between
Vietnam and ASEAN. For Vietnam, ASEAN membership offered a new
basis for international acceptance, held out the prospect for
access to added investment both from the ASEAN region and
externally, and provided Vietnam the chance to join a prestigious
diplomatic group which could balance the influence of China.(5)
Vietnam's role in ASEAN is still being developed but appears to
have gone well so far. Vietnam has been cautious in pursuing its
role in its first two years of membership, but has been willing to
advance its views on key issues of major concern, such as the early
incorporation of Burma and Cambodia, both of which it has
supported.
For Laos, entry into ASEAN is also a logical development in its
post Cold War foreign policy evolution. As Southeast Asia's third
smallest state in population terms (after Brunei and Singapore) and
one of its poorest, ASEAN membership involves substantial financial
costs and will impose major demands on its limited supplies of
trained and English-language proficient personnel. The Lao
government has also been concerned that full adherence to AFTA
would see the Lao economy, and its fledgling industries, swamped by
an influx of goods from Thailand. Nonetheless, Laos probably felt
that full membership of ASEAN was both necessary and unavoidable.
As Professor Carlyle Thayer (Australian Defence Force Academy) has
observed:
Laotian leaders fear moving too fast
and losing control. They are also apprehensive about being left
isolated. They have opted for membership to balance Thailand's
economic, cultural and political influence. Another motivation for
joining is to gain a sense of regional identity and not to be left
isolated.(6)
Burma
The entry of Burma has been much more contentious. The pattern
of political conflict in Burma, culminating in the 1990 elections,
and the overturning of the results of the elections (which were won
decisively by the opposition National League for Democracy) by the
military-dominated State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC),
attracted international and regional attention and concern. ASEAN
from the 1991 began to pursue a policy widely termed as
'constructive engagement' towards Burma (Myanmar). The rationale
for this was summed up in a regional journal in 1996:
Geostrategic realities ...ensure that
ASEAN can never ostracise Myanmar. Unlike outsiders, neighbours
have to live with one another-forever. Patient, sensitive diplomacy
is usually the only practicable approach to difficult
relationships. For ASEAN, ganging up on Yangon (Rangoon) would
produce another undesirable outcome by pushing the Burmese further
into China's orbit.(7)
However, the issue of acceptance of Burma into ASEAN has been
contentious both within and outside the ASEAN region. Within ASEAN,
concern over Burma's acceptability was expressed in both Thailand
and the Philippines.(8) Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) were
vocal in criticising the level of political repression of the SLORC
regime, and this criticism was also advanced in Malaysia, for
example by the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM).(9) The
potential acceptance of Burma by ASEAN was criticised by some
Western governments-especially the US. At the 1997 ARF meeting, US
Secretary of State Albright stated that:
Burma is the only nation in ASEAN
where it is illegal to own a fax machine, where the police arrest
legitimate business people to stop currency fluctuations, where
public schools are routinely closed to prevent political unrest.
Burma is also the only member of ASEAN where the government
protects and profits from the drug trade... . The admission of
Burma presents a challenge: to avoid the possibility of a chasm
within ASEAN, between one part that is open, integrated and
prospering, and another that is closed, isolated and
poor.(10)
ASEAN's leaders, however, appear to have taken the view that
Burma's isolation from ASEAN would not serve the association's long
term interests. Prime Minister Mahathir in his address to the ASEAN
Ministerial Meetings said, in an evident reference to the US
attitude towards Burma, that:
It is regrettable that there are
those who would not see the obvious. Instead of encouraging ASEAN
to accept all South East-Asian countries as soon as possible, ASEAN
has been urged to pass judgement, deny membership and apply
pressure on a potential candidate... so as to force that country to
remain poor and therefore unstable. ASEAN must resist and reject
such attempts at coercion-they are not the ASEAN way.(11)
Concern about the potential for China to increase its influence
in Burma has clearly been one factor in ASEAN calculations: for
example, President Suharto was recently reported as having said
that if Burma was not incorporated into ASEAN it would be open to
China's influence, with the risk of 'ASEAN's encirclement by
China'.(12) It is also likely that ASEAN's most influential senior
leaders (including President Suharto, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew
and Prime Minister Mahathir) have held the view that the 30th
anniversary of ASEAN was a good opportunity to realise the
aspirations of ASEAN to include all ten Southeast Asian states.
They may well feel that while Burma has a repressive regime and is
economically well below the level of development of the founders,
some of ASEAN's present members were also very underdeveloped in
1967. Finally, they may have thought that the ASEAN members are
better qualified to advise the Burmese regime on how to develop and
open up than anyone else.
At the Fourth ASEAN Regional Forum on 27 July, the Ministers in
their communique commended '...ASEAN's efforts at constructive
engagement with Myanmar'. The immediate prospects for this policy,
nonetheless, remain uncertain. It seems unlikely that the entry of
Burma to ASEAN will have any major immediate positive impact on the
internal political situation or on the pace of reform. ASEAN
membership, it may be argued, will widen Burma's contacts, expose
its regime to a wider range of discussions and provide added
opportunities for ASEAN neighbours to quietly advocate a process of
internal dialogue and liberalisation-in a situation where the
regime seems quite unwilling to accept more active pressure from
Western countries. A key question for ASEAN in the next several
years, however, will clearly be whether Burma's acceptance within
the association is accompanied by some discernible movement towards
political liberalisation and dialogue. If this does not take place,
then ASEAN is likely to face continuing criticism over internal
conditions within Burma.
Enlargement: Costs and Benefits
A key issue for ASEAN is how enlargement will affect its
character and cohesion. As Singapore's Foreign Minister Jayakumar
noted on 23 July 1997 at the ceremony in which Burma and Laos were
admitted, 'The challenge for ASEAN is how to remain robust and
united. ASEAN will be able to build on its strength if all the
member countries continue to work closely together and if we remain
cohesive'.(13)
ASEAN must now pursue cohesion and unity with a substantially
more diverse array of members. In economic terms, ASEAN now
contains members whose per capita GNP (in 1994) ranged from
Singapore's $US23,260 and Brunei's $14,240, to Malaysia's $3,520,
Thailand's $2,210, the Philippines' $960 and Indonesia's $880, and
to Burma's $200, Vietnam's $190 and Laos' $320 (with Cambodia's at
an estimated $210):(14) (for further data on the comparative size
and national incomes of the ASEAN economies see Appendix A).
Politically, ASEAN now includes widely varying types of
governments, including comparatively liberal representative
democratic systems (the Philippines and Thailand), well-established
representative systems with strongly entrenched ruling parties or
coalitions (Singapore and Malaysia), a sultanate without elected
representative institutions (Brunei), a military-dominated
government but with substantial civilian participation (Indonesia),
an illiberal and repressive military regime (Burma), and two
Communist, single party-dominated states (Vietnam and Laos). As was
noted above, much of ASEAN's strength has derived from its members'
capacity to build up trust, consensus and a sense of common
identity. Maintaining cohesion with its enlarged membership will
clearly be a substantial additional challenge.
Enlargement involves both potential costs and benefits-which
have been aptly summed up in a recent Parliamentary submission by
Professor Carlyle Thayer.(15) The major potential costs
include:
- the danger that the inclusion of new members will erode the
traditional ASEAN spirit of solidarity, accommodation and consensus
building;
- the danger that a larger ASEAN may not be able to move
effectively to make decisions on regional issues and areas of
cooperation;
- the potential for longstanding suspicions between some members
(for example, Vietnam and Thailand) to carry over into ASEAN;
- the danger of impeding the development of the ASEAN Free Trade
Area;
- the danger that ASEAN may come to be divided on key issues, for
example that a 'two tier' ASEAN may develop with the older and
richer members coming into conflict with the newer and much poorer
members; and
- the danger that expansion may lead to difficulties in ASEAN's
relations with major external partners such as the US and the EU
over the policies of certain members, for example Burma.
The major potential benefits include that:
- an expanded ASEAN will be able to increase its geo-political
weight and enhance its leverage with major powers including the US,
China, Japan and India (as well as Australia);
- an expanded ASEAN with an internal market of about 500 million
people will be attractive to investors and enhance ASEAN's overall
international economic weight;
- an expanded ASEAN will be able to reduce the danger of
inter-state conflict by increasing confidence and
communications;
- an expanded ASEAN will encourage the newer members to continue
and increase progress towards economic reform and towards
strategies that can achieve both growth and equity;
- an expanded ASEAN will enhance prospects for bilateral and
subregional cooperation, and contribute to stability both in
Southeast Asia and in East Asia overall; and
- an expanded ASEAN should be able to contribute to an increased
sense of regional confidence and identity and thus bolster ASEAN's
'spirit' and positive image.
The balance of benefits and costs from enlargement will play a
large part in determining ASEAN's future in the next decade and
beyond.
Regional Security and the ASEAN Regional Forum
As they work to draw strength from their expanded membership,
the ASEAN members continue to face the challenge of contributing to
the maintenance of a secure regional environment. ASEAN as a group
has two major strategies to help achieve this: through avoiding
conflict among themselves, and through the engagement of the major
powers.
One of ASEAN's most valuable contributions to security in
Southeast Asia has been its role in helping to dampen the potential
for disputes among its own members-disputes which could otherwise
attract external interference. Even though ASEAN has been actively
fostering communication and cooperation for three decades,
sensitivities between members can easily surface. A notable recent
example was the ill-feeling between Singapore and Malaysia after
Senior Minister Lee made comments about the allegedly poor state of
law and order in the Malaysian state of Johore which produced
hostile reactions from Malaysian media and officials.(16) Despite
such problems, ASEAN has continued to serve as an umbrella under
which bilateral disputes can be alleviated. There has been a trend
for some members to seek arbitration from the International Court
of Justice as a way of resolution; for example, in relation to the
dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia over islands off Sabah and
Kalimantan. While ASEAN as a regional group has not played a direct
role in these negotiations, the efforts at conflict reduction are
very much in line with ASEAN's interests.
The roles of the major powers in East Asia pose a further
challenge for the ASEAN members' efforts to maintain national and
regional security. One of the striking characteristics of East Asia
is that while there has been a growing pattern of economic
interactions, the level of political and institutional cooperation
has remained modest. The sharp differences in level of wealth and
historical and cultural background among the region's major
powers-combined with the impact of four decades of Cold War
conflict-have meant that the East Asia region overall has never
fostered the kind of cooperative activities pursued by
organisations like the European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation. The end of the Cold War has opened up new
opportunities for regional association and cooperation. However, as
Richard Baker (East West Center, Hawaii) has argued, the security
order in the region is in a state of transition, 'in suspension
between a Cold War framework that no longer applies and new
approaches that are just being developed and cannot yet cope with
major challenges'.(17)
China's gradually rising profile and national power has been a
focus of concern and a stimulus for continuing cooperation in the
ASEAN region during the last decade. In 1996 concerns about China's
polices were reinforced by the tensions generated in the Taiwan
Straits at the time of the 1996 elections. As one observer has
noted, 'The decision by China's leadership, announced by China's
Premier Li Peng on 5 March, to conduct missile test firings to
within 32 kilometres of Taiwan's coast shook Southeast Asian
complacency'.(18) The Taiwan straits incidents, which drew a firm
US response in the form of the dispatch of two carrier battle
groups into the area, aroused considerable concern in the ASEAN
region because of the potential dangers posed for security in East
Asia, although these concerns were not given public official
expression.
The ASEAN members are most immediately concerned at China's
policies in the South China Sea. A complex set of overlapping
claims are in effect to areas of the Sea including the Spratly
islands, in what is considered to be a potentially petroleum rich
area. A series of discussions over the issue have failed to see any
progress towards resolving these claims. Meanwhile, the ASEAN
members continue to see the potential for what has been described
as a pattern of 'creeping assertiveness' by China in the area. The
Philippines criticised China's occupation of areas on Mischief Reef
in early 1995. In early 1997 some tensions were evident again
between China and Vietnam when a Chinese vessel conducted petroleum
explorations in an area claimed by Vietnam. The potential for
dispute in the South China Sea also highlights the difficulty for
the ASEAN members in developing and maintaining a concerted
response.(19) There have been longstanding differences in emphases
among ASEAN members towards China, with some members (including
Thailand and Singapore) relatively more sanguine about China's
regional role than others (particularly Indonesia and Vietnam). The
issue of such tensions was raised by Vietnam's concerns in early
1997, but the tensions abated after the withdrawal of the Chinese
exploration vessel involved.
The problem of overlapping and unresolved claims in the South
China Sea seems set to continue: Premier Li Peng during discussions
with Malaysian leaders in August 1997 said that the Spratly islands
dispute would carry on for a long time and reaffirmed Beijing's
call for a concentration on economic development.(20) The ASEAN
members are thus likely to remain in a state of uncertainty about
prospects for further disputes in the area.
Japan has played a leading role as a stimulus for economic
development in the ASEAN region, both through investment and as the
world's largest aid donor, and since the mid 1980s has directed
another wave of investment into the ASEAN members' economies. Japan
has also played an important role in encouraging regional
cooperation on both economic and security issues and has had an
extensive dialogue relationship with ASEAN since the late 1970s.
However, Japan's existing and potential regional roles are also
viewed with some reserve and concern. Japanese political figures
have alienated neighbouring states with their capacity for
insensitive comments about Japan's history in the region.: The
issue of the historical legacy continues to undercut Japan's
regional legitimacy. As Kua Chong Guan (a Singaporean defence
analyst) has noted:
For some of us in ASEAN, a younger
generation of Japanese ignorant of their past, combined with a
leadership unrepentant over their conduct in the war, is a source
of concern, especially when that leadership is in command of a self
defence force that now has the second largest military budget in
the world.(21)
In the context of China's rising profile, the role of the United
States in East Asia remains of central importance to the ASEAN
region. The United States remained the dominant single power in the
region, with its set of bilateral alliances (which include those
with two ASEAN members, Thailand and the Philippines), its forward
deployment of over 100,000 military personnel (especially in Japan
and South Korea) and its powerful naval forces which together
provide a major part of the region's balance of power. In the
post-Cold War environment however, the US has wished to pursue a
range of foreign policy interests with the ASEAN region including
bilateral economic issues of market access, and human rights
concerns. US policies, moreover, have sometimes appeared to some
observers to have lacked a strong sense of strategic direction in
the setting of priorities in policy areas including trade, human
rights and security relations.(22)
In the 1990s, the ASEAN members have faced areas of dispute with
the US. At the recent meetings in Kuala Lumpur, for example, the US
and ASEAN clashed over human rights issues (including the
controversy over the proposal by Prime Minister Mahathir that the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights should be recast to reflect
non-Western concepts of rights), Burma, Cambodia and the question
of currency speculation and the alleged responsibility of
particular individual financiers. Despite these areas of
contention, ASEAN's members see a continued active involvement by
the US as a central factor in the maintenance of regional
security.(23) However, ASEAN's enlargement may be accompanied by
continuing diplomatic tensions in the US relationship, particularly
over Burma and Cambodia.
ASEAN members have responded to the uncertain security
environment with individual and bilateral defence cooperation
strategies. A number of intersecting bilateral arrangements have
developed into what is referred to in ASEAN defence circles as an
extensive 'defence spider's web', but these have been pursued
strictly on a 'non ASEAN' basis(24). ASEAN's major formal
multilateral response to the post-Cold War security environment has
been the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).(25) The ARF has been
significant because it has been able to draw in all the major
powers in the region. It has been helping to develop a sense of
shared strategic and security interest among regional states: it
has helped to draw China into cooperative dialogue in the region,
enables Japan to engage in regional security in a way comfortable
to other states, and reinforces US engagement in East Asia. The ARF
is intended to gradually move through a three stage evolution from
confidence building, to preventative diplomacy, to being a body
capable, in the longer term, of developing approaches to conflict
resolution.
ASEAN has played a high profile role in the Forum by co-chairing
all its working groups and the Fourth ARF meeting on 27 July 1997
reaffirmed that '... ASEAN continues to undertake the obligation to
be the primary driving force'.(26) The Forum has so far sponsored a
relatively modest but expanding program of discussions among senior
ministers and officials on cooperative and confidence building
measures. The Fourth ARF drew attention to the work of the
'inter-sessional' specialist working groups, which have discussed
issues including confidence building measures, disaster relief,
search and rescue coordination, conduct of peacekeeping operations,
and de-mining. The 1997 meeting extended the mandates for the
groups and also welcomed the 'track 2' activities conducted
primarily by non-governmental organisations The Ministers also
agreed that '...the evolutionary approach to the development of the
ARF process and the practice of taking decisions by consensus shall
be maintained' to help ensure that the process is
consolidated.(27)
The ARF has made a cautious start to its efforts at regional
consensus building. Since the ARF does not include among its
members either Taiwan or North Korea, it is not in a position to
discuss or try to ameliorate the two most serious threats to
security in the East Asian region. Nonetheless, the ARF is regarded
as a valuable initiative and one which only ASEAN was able to
achieve. An important task for ASEAN is therefore to maintain
ASEAN's own cohesion so that it can continue to claim an equal role
in determining the activities of the Forum alongside the much more
powerful major powers whom it seeks to keep engaged in the ARF
process.
Economic Issues and AFTA
One of ASEAN's central goals has been to help create a stable
environment to encourage economic growth for its members. High
growth has been seen as a prerequisite for the maintenance of
internal stability and of 'national resilience'. ASEAN has in turn
benefited from economic growth: a considerable part of ASEAN's
prestige as a grouping has been derived from the members'
international image of being part of the 'East Asian miracle' of
growth and long-term alleviation of poverty.
The ASEAN members have therefore been disturbed by the currency
problems in mid 1997 which affected first Thailand and which then
spread to affect the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. The
causes of the recent round of currency instability in the region
are still being assessed but it has been argued that some aspects
of domestic policies in several states have increased their
vulnerability to the kind of pressure which resulted in downward
currency movements. In Thailand, for example, problems were
associated with large inflows of foreign investment which were
often used for relatively unproductive purposes, such as resort and
real estate development and short term portfolio investments. This
was taking place in the context of a fixed exchange rate between
the baht and the US dollar. Increasingly the value of the baht
seemed to be above the level warranted by the fundamentals of the
Thai economy. Ultimately, the confidence of investors faltered and
the position of the currency came under pressure. The Thai Minister
for Commerce Dr Narongchai Akrasanee (a well-known specialist on
the ASEAN economies) commented in mid-August 1997 that 'We made a
major mistake in keeping the exchange rate fixed for so long'.(28)
The pressure on the Thai currency forced a devaluation on 2 July
and in mid August a large rescue package was organised by the
International Monetary Fund totalling $US 16 billion, which will
necessitate stringent austerity measures. Other regional economies
have also been placed under pressure, particularly the Philippines
which has also received IMF assistance and Indonesia which in mid
August was forced to float the rupiah.(29)
The pressure on Thailand and on several other ASEAN members
inevitably affected the climate for the Ministerial Meetings in
late July and attention was focused on the alleged role of currency
speculators. In their communique, the Ministers declared that they
were seriously concerned at 'well-coordinated efforts to
destabilise ASEAN currencies for self-serving purposes, thus
threatening the stability of all ASEAN economies'. Malaysia's Prime
Minister Mahathir made highly publicised attacks on one well known
speculator, George Soros, and he continued the criticism in August.
These arguments have been contested by some financial analysts who
have suggested that the criticism of financial speculators
distracts attention from the internal policy problems of individual
ASEAN members. For example, Jim Walker (Chief Economist for Credit
Lyonnais Securities Asia) has commented that 'All the talk about
foreign speculators is a diversion from the real issue. The main
cause is locals selling'.(30)
At the time of writing (2 September) the IMF package for
Thailand (supported by Australia) appears to have been received
well. The issues about the precise causes of the round of currency
problems in regional economies are continuing to be analysed. A
number of analysts have argued that while growth rates in the ASEAN
economies may slow in the short run, the medium term prospects for
growth continue to be favourable. The currency problems, however,
have highlighted the fact that the successful economic performance
of the ASEAN economies cannot be taken for granted inside or
outside the region. Some revised domestic strategies-including
reforms to the banking sector and greater efforts to upgrade the
skill levels of the work forces of ASEAN economies so that they are
equipped to support the demands of rapid economic development-will
be needed to bolster the prospects for continued growth.(31)
The tension aroused by the currency problem in mid 1997 also
directed attention to the value of boosting trade and investment in
the ASEAN region and to the contribution which ASEAN as a group is
seeking to make to this. The ASEAN economies have traditionally
been highly outward looking, with their major trading partners
generally being in Northeast Asia, North America and Europe. In
1995 trade among the ASEAN members amounted to 23 percent of their
total trade and it has been estimated that if goods transhipped
through Singapore were to be discounted, the level of intra-ASEAN
trade would fall to just 12 percent. Nonetheless, intra-ASEAN trade
has been growing at a faster rate than the countries' trade with
the rest of the world (the trend annual rate for growth of
intra-ASEAN trade between 1991 and 1995 was 21.6 percent versus 15
percent for the world overall).(32) ASEAN members therefore see
economic cooperation as encouraging an already strong and
beneficial trend.
The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) agreement is seeking to reduce
intra-ASEAN tariffs over a ten year period, with most cuts expected
to be achieved among the largest economies by 2003 (Vietnam has
been asked to comply by 2006 and Laos and Burma by 2008). ASEAN
members are aiming to maximise the number of tariffs in the 0-5
percent category by 2000 and zero percent by 2003. The mechanism
for implementation of AFTA is the Common Effective Preferential
Tariff (CEPT). The AFTA agreement also requires the removal of all
quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff barriers on goods
brought within the scheme within five years. ASEAN has also been
working on a prioritised list of items on which non-tariff barriers
are to be lifted. A 'Green Lane' system for express customs
clearance of AFTA items has also been introduced. Overall progress
on harmonising customs procedures however has been slow.
ASEAN is also pursuing other areas of economic cooperation.
Extensive discussions have taken place on development of an ASEAN
Investment Area to further stimulate intra-ASEAN and foreign
investment into the ASEAN region. Work is also being conducted to
follow through the Framework Agreement on Services and the
Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property, both signed in
December 1995.
ASEAN's pursuit of AFTA is taking place in the context of the
commitments made by the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
group at Bogor in 1994 in which APEC members pledged to remove
trade barriers among developed economies by 2010 and less developed
economies by 2020.(33) AFTA is pursuing effectively a similar goal,
but at a pace which is intended to be faster. It is thus another
way in which ASEAN is seeking to be at the forefront of regional
cooperation activities. While ASEAN has reaffirmed its commitments
to AFTA, the actions of individual members have not always been in
full accord with its spirit or provisions. For example, Indonesia's
pursuit of a 'national' car industry (through a joint venture
between an Indonesian company and South Korea's KIA Corporation)
has involved the imposition of barriers which are not compatible
with AFTA's goals.(34)
The addition of new ASEAN members need not slow the pace of
tariff reductions already agreed to, since the 2003 target is
legally binding. If the new members do not adhere to their
timetables, the six 'older' members do appear to be likely to
adhere to their agreed target of 2003, although sensitive sectors
such as rice and cars are proving difficult. It is possible that
some new members may wish to seek exclusion from AFTA for some
sectors or industries: Vietnam, for example, might wish to seek
exemption for some of its state-owned industries or conglomerates.
This kind of issue could slow the pace of cooperation. However, a
recent Australian government report has argued that if the newer
members seek to 'drop out' of key areas of ASEAN's economic
cooperative activities, they run the risk of becoming marginalised
in the wider regional context of liberalisation and growth.(35)
Political Transition and 'National Resilience'
Another important issue for ASEAN as it enters its fourth decade
is the interplay between internal stability and regional
'resilience'. A number of ASEAN members face impending transitions
in their leaderships and political systems. In Indonesia, President
Suharto's continued dominance is accompanied by discussion about
the succession issue, in Vietnam the generation of revolutionary
leaders who led the anti-colonial struggle will be replaced by a
younger generation, Thailand will in the medium future face the
issue of a successor to the revered King Bhumibol, the Philippines
will see a successor elected to replace the Presidency of Fidel
Ramos which has seen great progress towards economic reform and
growth, and in Malaysia Prime Minister Mahathir will presumably be
in time replaced by Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. In the
case of Malaysia, a smooth process of leadership change may be
expected on the basis of past experiences of orderly transitions.
In other cases the outlook is much more uncertain. The focus which
ASEAN will be able to retain as a group will clearly depend partly
on effective processes of leadership and political change in the
individual member countries.
An accompanying important issue is that several of the region's
senior leaders who are likely to depart from the political scene
within the next decade have played vitally important roles in
establishing and developing ASEAN-in several cases through its
entire history. A considerable part of the cohesion among the
members has been contributed by the long-standing efforts of
leaders such as President Suharto, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew,
President Ramos and Prime Minister Mahathir. As Professor James
Clad has observed:
The question which hangs over the
inevitable process of generational displacement is whether the
incoming leaderships will have the time, or the inclination, to
enter into the type of sedulous cultivation of ASEAN country
leaders indulged in by Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew for over three
decades.(36)
ASEAN's progress towards enlargement to include all ten
Southeast Asian countries was severely disrupted by the upsurge of
political tensions in Cambodia which led to the violent conflict in
Phnom Penh on 5-6 July, the ousting of First Prime Minister Prince
Ranariddh and the assumption of a clearly dominant position by
Second Prime Minister Hun Sen. The developments since early July
have created major problems for Cambodia, raised a new set of
problems for ASEAN as it seeks to pursue dialogue and to redevelop
a basis for Cambodia's entry, and added to debate on the extent to
which ASEAN may be able to exercise a positive influence on
internal developments in Southeast Asian countries.
The 5-6 July 1997 Conflict and ASEAN's Response
The precise causes of the outbreak of conflict within the
Cambodian government in early July are still emerging. It appears
that the conflict stemmed primarily from the exacerbation of
tension between the two main coalition parties, the Cambodian
People's Party (CPP) led by Hun Sen and the royalist National
United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative
Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) led by Prince Norodom Ranariddh.(37) The
delicate coalition between the CPP and FUNCINPEC, established after
the UN-sponsored 1993 elections, came under great strain in 1996,
exacerbated by the competition between those parties for the
allegiance of breakaway elements of the Khmer Rouge. Both parties
actively sought the allegiance of defecting Khmer Rouge elements.
When FUNCINPEC appeared to be gaining particular success in this
effort, antipathy in the CPP increased.
The deterioration of relations into outright violence appears to
have been precipitated by efforts by FUNCINPEC elements to gain a
negotiated end to the residual resistance by the Khmer Rouge.
According to recent reports, negotiations took place in May and
June between senior FUNCINPEC and Khmer Rouge leaders including a
meeting on 1 June 1997 between Prince Ranariddh and senior Khmer
Rouge leader Khieu Samphan. These negotiations helped fuel an
intense internal struggle in the Khmer Rouge in which those
supporting negotiations were opposed by the movement's longstanding
senior figure, Pol Pot. After a fierce conflict within the Khmer
Rouge, Pol Pot was captured on 19 June and placed under arrest (he
was later presented to foreign media representatives during a show
'trial' in late July). On 4 July Prince Ranariddh and senior Khmer
Rouge leader Khieu Samphan reached a provisional agreement by which
the Khmer Rouge would end their armed struggle, disband their
provisional government, recognise the Constitution, recast
themselves as the 'National Unity Party' and be allowed to rejoin
the political system.(38)
The prospect of FUNCINPEC announcing an agreement to end the
Khmer Rouge's resistance evidently prompted Hun Sen to seize the
opportunity to confront Ranariddh and his chief allies, including
General Nhek Bun Chhay. On 5 July, fighting broke out between CPP
party and militia forces and FUNCINPEC elements in Phnom Penh; a
number of people were arrested and up to 60 people were killed in
fighting, with a number of others allegedly killed after their
capture by CPP forces. Prince Ranariddh, who had left Cambodia just
before the outbreak of fighting was accused by Hun Sen of the
illegal importation of arms and of planning to infiltrate Khmer
Rouge forces into Phnom Penh. In Phnom Penh, as one observer (Jason
Barber in The Phnom Penh Post) has commented, 'Funcinpec
officials and MPs were effectively left with two choices: give up
their positions and livelihoods or agree to Hun Sen's demands'.(39)
A number of FUNCINPEC figures, including several Ministers, chose
to remain in Cambodia and were prepared to cooperate with Hun Sen
and the CPP. Many other individuals and groups of FUNCINPEC forces
fled to border areas. Hun Sen and the CPP were rapidly able to
dominate the situation in the capital and in most of the
country.(40)
With Ranariddh outside the country and the residual FUNCINPEC
armed forces on the northern and western borders, Hun Sen moved to
consolidate his position. In late July, the CPP sought to reaffirm
the ruling coalition by appointing Foreign Minister Ung Huot as
Ranariddh's replacement as First Prime Minister. On 6 August, the
National Assembly elected Ung Huot to this office, with the support
of the CPP members and a majority of the 58 elected FUNCINPEC
members: about twenty FUNCINPEC members were outside Cambodia and
unable to participate in the vote. This move went some way to
legitimise the CPP's position, but left Hun Sen as the dominant
figure in Cambodia.
ASEAN leaders reacted with consternation and anger at Hun Sen's
actions, since he, along with Prince Ranariddh, had promised on
several occasions (including to Indonesia's President Suharto and
Thai Prime Minister Chavalit) that the FUNCINPEC-CPP coalition
would be maintained until the 1998 elections. The reactions of
individual ASEAN members, however, appeared to differ: Malaysia
apparently remained in support of going ahead with the plan to
accept Cambodia as a member, perhaps partly because of its concern
for the image of the ASEAN meetings which it was hosting. Vietnam
also supported Cambodia's early admission. Thailand opposed
Cambodia's immediate entry, supported by Singapore and Indonesia.
At a meeting on 10 July, the ASEAN foreign ministers decided to
delay Cambodia's entry and the foreign ministers of Thailand,
Indonesia and the Philippines were appointed to try to mediate a
solution.
ASEAN's move came at a time of substantial international
criticism of Hun Sen's actions, although no concerted international
approach developed: for example, while two major aid donors
suspended aid (the US and Germany), others did not (Japan and
France), while Australia suspended military assistance but
continued its civilian and humanitarian programs.(41) In the
immediate aftermath of the coup there was some support for the
restoration of Prince Ranariddh, particularly from the US, but this
emphasis has not been sustained. At the ASEAN Regional Forum on 27
July, ASEAN was given the responsibility of attempting to restore
political stability in Cambodia. However, ASEAN has had
difficulties in trying to exercise a moderating influence in
Cambodia in the face of resistance from Hun Sen.
One tactic by Hun Sen has appeared to be an effort to exercise
leverage in relation to ASEAN by playing on concerns about a
possible rise in Chinese influence in Cambodia. In late July, Hun
Sen ordered the closure of Taiwan's representative office in
Cambodia, the Taipei Economic and Representative Office, which he
claimed had assisted Prince Ranariddh. The Phnom Penh Post
in late July argued that:
Political observers suggested that
Hun Sen was courting China, which has not issued any condemnation
of his power grab, in an effort to force Asean into accepting his
new government. Alternatively, they suggested that Hun Sen may
regard China-which has uneasy relations with several key Asean
states-as a potential major source of financial aid if other
countries cut their funds for Cambodia.(42)
In August, with the CPP-FUNCINPEC coalition government now
reaffirmed with the elections of Ung Huot as First Prime Minister,
Hun Sen made clear his continuing desire to resist efforts at
mediation. On 20 August, for example, Hun Sen challenged ASEAN to
grant early entry to Cambodia and criticised the idea that Cambodia
should have to wait until the conduct of the scheduled 1998
elections before it was granted membership. He said in a radio
broadcast that:
I warn you in advance that if I win
the election... and you do not allow me to enter ASEAN until then,
I will not enter. Let ASEAN defeat the formula of the ASEAN 10, let
them defeat it, we don't have to enter. If we don't enter ASEAN, we
won't die.(43)
In Cambodia, government forces have continued to confront the
residual FUNCINPEC forces, which have been operating in alliance
with Khmer Rouge elements near the northern border with Thailand.
While the Cambodian government appears to be clearly predominant in
the military conflict, it still faces substantial problems. The
economy has been affected badly by the fighting in early July in
which many businesses were damaged by fighting or looting. The
confidence of investors is likely to take a long time to revive.
While aid programs remain in effect, actual aid deliveries have
been severely hampered by the withdrawal of most foreign aid
personnel in the aftermath of the fighting. The internal political
situation also cannot be regarded as fully stable. There has been
some indication of internal disagreement within the CPP at the
violent tactics pursued by Hun Sen (who issued a warning against
internal party divisions in mid August).(44) King Sihanouk returned
to Cambodia on 29 August: he went to Siem Reap, rather than Phnom
Penh; at the time of writing it was not yet clear whether he might
be able to pursue negotiations or mediation in relation to the
recent political confrontation.(45)
The ASEAN foreign ministers at a meeting on 11 August decided to
keep in place an indefinite postponement of Cambodia's entry into
the association, and to continue to attempt a mediating role. In a
joint statement, the ASEAN ministers 'stressed the importance of
holding free and fair elections in Cambodia as scheduled in May
1998'. They also 'reaffirmed the necessity for all political
parties in Cambodia to participate fully in the elections and
reiterated ASEAN's readiness to help Cambodia with technical
cooperation in facilitating these elections'.(46)
The outcome of ASEAN's efforts at mediation continue to be
uncertain. Much is likely to depend on what kind of electoral
contest will take place in Cambodia, on the level of participation
allowed and on the conduct of the polls. In the meantime, ASEAN's
goal of representing all ten Southeast Asian countries remains in
abeyance.
'Constructive Engagement' and 'Constructive Intervention'
The conflict in Cambodia in early July and ASEAN's efforts to
exercise influence have added to a debate in ASEAN circles about
the potential for the association to assume a more active role in
exercising a moderating influence in relation to certain countries'
internal affairs. This area of debate has been increasing since the
mid 1990s and has partly reflected the development of academic and
other non-government organisations in some of the older and more
wealthy ASEAN members, including the Philippines, Thailand and
Malaysia. In an article in 1995, for example, the leading
Indonesian analyst, Jusuf Wanandi (Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, Jakarta) argued that:
In the case of ASEAN relations, it is
clear that in the longer term, economic integration, social
interaction and political cooperation will increase the stake of
each member country in the development of other member countries.
Therefore, it cannot be expected that there will be a completely
hands-off policy towards the domestic developments of other member
countries.(47)
In 1997 attention has been given to the concept of 'constructive
intervention', which has been mooted as a possible ASEAN response
to some internal situations in Southeast Asia, particularly by
Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim. In a recent
article on the concept, the Malaysian academic Dr Abdul Rahman
Adnan (Institute of Policy Research, Kuala Lumpur) has suggested
that ASEAN needs to revise its modes of operation and exercise an
increased degree of political maturity. In Cambodia, he has argued,
ASEAN needs to encourage reconciliation and free elections in
accordance with the constitution. More widely, ASEAN needs to
develop a concept of 'constructive intervention'.
Constructive intervention means
providing not only assistance in times of political crisis, but
also the continuous deployment of regional resources for economic
and social development in poorer parts of the region... The time
has arrived to explore this avenue more thoroughly and put in place
a guideline of just what exactly constructive intervention would
entail. ASEAN may want to review the various forms that
constructive intervention could take, such as assistance towards
legal and bureaucratic reform, measures to promote human resources
development, and the general strengthening of the rule of law [and]
of civil society.(48)
Such a concept, however, is likely to be difficult to develop
and execute. In the case of Cambodia the ASEAN countries have an
international agreement (the Paris Agreements of October 1991)
which eight of the nine current ASEAN members signed, on which to
base their pressure for free and open elections. Such a basis,
however, does not exist in the case of any other regional state.
ASEAN's nine members now comprise a number of very different
political systems; it would be difficult to gain a consensus on how
terms such as 'civil society' should be defined. It would also be
difficult to maintain agreement on how and where 'constructive
intervention' might be justified. If the concept is endorsed to
secure free and fair elections in Cambodia, might the same kind of
request be made in Brunei, which has no elected legislature, or in
Vietnam? Given that freedom of expression, a pluralistic media,
non-governmental organisations and academic debate are all
relatively much more developed in the 'older' ASEAN members, there
would seem to be some potential for discord if attention is
directed from some ASEAN members onto the political systems and
societies of some of the newer members. Such a development could
make the maintenance of solidarity and cooperation among the new,
larger ASEAN more difficult to achieve than was the case in ASEAN's
first three decades.
It is therefore difficult to see how pursuing the notion of
'constructive intervention' can easily co-exist with the
maintenance of cohesion and harmony within ASEAN.
Australia has an important stake in the success of ASEAN's
expansion and consolidation in its fourth decade and beyond.
ASEAN's development of cooperation and regional confidence has
benefited Australia's own security environment. ASEAN's rapid
economic growth has made its members a major focus for Australia's
trade. As a result, successive governments have affirmed the value
of the Australia-ASEAN relationship.
In economic terms, Australian merchandise exports to ASEAN
countries have increased by 40 percent in the last five years to
reach a level of $A11.6 billion in 1996. ASEAN as a group is now
Australia's second largest market for exports, buying over 15
percent of our merchandise exports. Australia's imports from ASEAN
countries have also risen rapidly: in 1996 merchandise imports from
ASEAN amounted to 10 percent of total merchandise imports, up from
5 percent a decade ago.
Australia was the first country to establish a multilateral
relationship with ASEAN, in 1974. Relationships both bilateral and
multilateral have since proliferated. Australia and ASEAN
cooperated closely during the refugee crisis in the region in
1978-79 and during the process which developed the Paris Agreements
on Cambodia. Interactions have sometimes involved clashes of policy
and interests, for example over trade and civil aviation issues in
the late 1970s, but there have been many areas of longstanding
cooperation.
In a review of the relationship on 26 August 1997, the Foreign
Minister, Mr Downer, referred to the unique atmosphere of ASEAN's
annual meetings and said that 'it is now the most important set of
meetings in my international calendar'.(49) Mr Downer said that the
expansion of ASEAN was a 'moment of truth for the association as it
takes on the challenge of using its prosperity and consensus-based
cohesion to assist the new members participate in the ASEAN success
story'.
The issues of Burma and Cambodia are important areas of current
Australian concern. Australia's policies on Burma differ from those
of ASEAN in that Australia has protested strongly about the
violation of human rights and it has taken a position of neither
encouraging nor discouraging trade and investment with Burma. In
relation to Cambodia, Australia was a major proponent of the peace
process and UN involvement and since 1993 has sought to support
Cambodia through both civil and some military assistance: Australia
has been the fourth largest aid donor. In his 26 August statement,
Mr Downer expressed confidence about the progress of Vietnam and
Laos as ASEAN members but noted that Burma and Cambodia were
exceptions to the general rule of prosperity and stability in the
region. Australia along with the rest of the international
community has 'deep concerns' about the situation in Burma and Mr
Downer said that 'I urge other ASEAN countries to endeavour to
ensure Burma can contribute to the political as well as economic
success of the members of ASEAN'. On Cambodia, the Minister noted
that the recent ARF meeting had agreed that ASEAN was best placed
to be a positive influence. 'This is a new direction for ASEAN, a
new challenge and a test of its political model, its flexibility
and its adaptability'. He expressed confidence that ASEAN could
help Cambodians find a peaceful, constitutional and democratic
solution to their problems.(50)
In the area of multilateral cooperation, Australia has direct
interests in the outcome of ASEAN's enlargement and is hoping to be
increasingly involved in the regional dialogues which ASEAN has
been sponsoring. Australia has been an active supporter and
participant in the ARF from its inception and Australians have been
very active in the 'second track' (primarily non-government)
security discussions in Southeast Asia. The Australian government
has been enthusiastic about the possibilities of establishing an
association between AFTA and the Australia-New Zealand Closer
Economic Relations agreement.(51) Australia's ongoing long-term
involvement in the ASEAN economies was underscored in August 1997
by the government's commitment of $US1 billion ($A1.4 billion) to
support the stabilisation program for the Thai baht coordinated by
the International Monetary Fund.(52)
Australia has also expressed great interest in the dialogue
established through the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) process, which
has its next summit in London in April 1998. Australia has been
concerned that it should be a part of any emerging forum or
dialogue that could affect Australia's trade and investment
relationships in Asia and Europe. However, although there has been
substantial support among the East Asian members of the ASEM
dialogue for Australia's participation, the issue of increasing the
number of countries participating in the ASEM dialogues has been
complicated by contention over the issue of membership in the
dialogue in relation to Burma: EU governments have refused visas to
Burmese diplomats. In addition, Malaysia has remained opposed to
Australia's participation and has maintained a veto within ASEAN on
the issue.(53) Thus, while Australia's associations with ASEAN are
very extensive, it still faces some unresolved issues about the
degree to which it will be able to participate in the major
cooperative dialogues sponsored by ASEAN.
ASEAN has been a resilient, flexible grouping which has served
its members well. The fact that as an association established at
the height of the Cold War it has been able to serve as the means
for the easing of ideological and political divisions in Southeast
Asia, while retaining the interest of the major powers, illustrates
this vividly. ASEAN's future depends on a number of variables,
including the maintenance of a peaceful accommodation of interests
among the Asia Pacific major powers, the achievement of processes
of stable political transitions within ASEAN's members and the
maintenance of a favourable pattern of growth in the region. The
kind of future ASEAN has in its fourth decade and beyond will also
depend heavily on the balance of costs and benefits which ASEAN's
enlargement brings.
ASEAN has seized the chance offered by the end of the Cold War
to expand. All the new members will clearly benefit from
membership. All the members should be able to benefit from a
continuing process of economic cooperation, closer relationships
and enhanced access to investment which should boost development
prospects. Politically ASEAN's claim to represent Southeast Asia
has been enhanced by its move to encompass all but one of the
region's states. ASEAN should as a result have relatively more
'weight' in balancing the influence of the East Asian major powers,
particularly China.
However, enlargement seems likely to make cohesion and
decision-making in ASEAN more difficult. Burma's inclusion is
likely to have some adverse impact on ASEAN's international image
and limited progress towards internal reform in Burma may
exacerbate this problem. ASEAN also faces a difficult test in
relation to the expectations that have now been developed that it
can alleviate the situation of political confrontation in Cambodia.
In the more wealthy and 'older' ASEAN members, continued economic
growth has sponsored the emergence of more pluralist societies in
which domestic progress is leading to an increasing interest in the
social and political conditions in fellow member countries and to
consideration of the concept of 'constructive intervention'.
However it will be difficult to develop a consensus on social and
political issues that could attract agreement across the highly
diverse ASEAN region. ASEAN's cohesion could be weakened by ongoing
divisions between the older, richer members and the new, poorer
members.
Over the last 30 years, ASEAN has often defied sceptical
observers and critics. It will need to continue to do so as it
meets the challenges of enlargement in the post Cold War
environment.
- On the origins and development of ASEAN see Frank Frost,
'Introduction: ASEAN Since 1967 - Origins, Evolution and Recent
Developments', in Alison Broinowski, ed, ASEAN into the
1990s, London, MacMillan, 1990, pp 1-31.
- The Bangkok Declaration, 6 August 1967, in Alison Broinowski,
ed, Understanding ASEAN, London, MacMillan, 1982, p
270.
- M. C. Abad Jnr, 'Re-engineering ASEAN, Contemporary
Southeast Asia, Vol. 18, No 3, December 1996, pp 237-253.
- The ASEAN Regional Forum's members are: Australia, Brunei,
Burma, Cambodia, Canada, China, European Union (Presidency), India,
Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, PNG, the
Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, USA
and Vietnam.
- Allen E. Goodman, 'Vietnam and ASEAN: Who Would Have Thought it
Possible', Asian Survey, Vol. XXXVI, No 6, June 1996, pp
592-601.
- Carlyle A. Thayer, 'ASEAN's Expanding Membership', Submission
to Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, Joint Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Parliament of Australia,
February 1997, p 6.
- ibid, p 8.
- Sukhumband Paribatra, 'ASEAN and the SLORC conundrum',
Bangkok Post, 22 May 1997.
- 'ASEAN split on Burma timetable', The Australian, 30
May 1997.
- 'Asia's New Test', The Australian, 28 July 1997.
- Peter Alford and Don Greenlees, 'Leave Asia to the Asians,
Mahathir warns US', The Australian, 25 July 1997.
- Paul Kelly, 'United region balances the China factor', The
Australian, 30 July 1997.
- Michael Richardson, 'Club seeks safety in larger numbers',
The Australian, 8 August 1997.
- Per capita GNP figures are from Russell Trood and Deborah
McNamara, eds, The Asia-Australia Survey, 1997-98
Melbourne, MacMillan, 1997.
- Thayer, op cit, pp 19-21.
- 'Warning to tourists fans Singapore, Malaysia rift', The
Australian, 22 May 1997.
- Richard Baker, quoted in M. C. Abad, 'Re-engineering ASEAN',
loc cit, p 241.
- James Clad, 'Regionalism in Southeast Asia: A Bridge Too far?',
in Southeast Asian Affairs 1997, Singapore, Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 1997, p 6.
- Barry Wain, 'Vietnam should get ASEAN help', Asian Wall
Street Journal, 31 March 1997.
- 'Chinese premier says that Spratlys dispute will carry on',
Kuala Lumpur, AFP, 22 August 1997.
- Kwa Chong Guan, 'Asia Pacific Security Concerns: A Singaporean
Perspective', in Ralph Cossa, ed, Asia Pacific Confidence and
Security Building Measures, Washington D C, Centre for
Strategic and International Studies, 1995, p 76.
- See for example, Greg Sheridan, 'US misguided over ASEAN',
The Australian, 26 August 1997. For a review of US recent
policies see Frank Frost, The United States and East Asia,
Research Paper No 18, 1995-96, Parliamentary Research
Service, December 1995.
- Amitav Acharya, 'ASEAN and Conditional Engagement', in James
Shinn, ed, Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with
China, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1996, pp
220-248.
- Ibid, pp 235-236.
- For a detailed assessment of the ARF see Michael Leifer,
The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN's Model of Regional
Security, Adelphi Paper No. 302, London, International
Institute of Strategic Studies, July 1996.
- 'Chairman's Statement: The Fourth Meeting of the ASEAN Regional
Forum', Subang Jaya, Malaysia, 27 July 1997.
- ibid.
- Peter Hartcher, 'Crisis will bring about change for the
better', Australian Financial Review, 18 August 1997.
- ibid, and Henny Sender, 'Drop Everything', Far
Eastern Economic Review, 24 July 1997.
- Peter Hartcher, 'Why Soros may be Mahathir's red herring',
Australian Financial Review, 26 August 1997.
- Peter Hartcher, 'The undoing of the South-East Asian miracle',
Australian Financial Review, 2 September 1997.
- The New ASEANs: Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia and Laos,
Canberra, East Asia Analytical Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade, June 1997, p 310.
- APEC's 18 members comprise Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile,
the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines,
Singapore, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), Thailand and the United
States.
- James Clad, 'Regionalism in Southeast Asia: A Bridge Too far?',
in Southeast Asian affairs 1997, Singapore, Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 1997, p 4.
- The New ASEANs: Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia and Laos,
op cit, p 324.
- James Clad, 'Regionalism in Southeast Asia: A Bridge Too far?',
loc cit, p 12.
- For a discussion of Cambodian politics from the 1993 elections
to mid-1996 see Frank Frost, Cambodia's Troubled Path to
Recovery, Research Paper No 34, Parliamentary Research
Service, June 1996.
- Nate Thayer, 'The Deal that Died', Far Eastern Economic
Review, 21 August 1997.
- Jason Barber, 'Democracy from the barrel of a gun', Phnom
Penh Post, 12-24 July 1997.
- Christiane Chaumeau, 'Two days that shook the capital',
Phnom Penh Post, 12-24 July 1997.
- Elizabeth Moorthy, 'Foreign aid-a guide for the bemused',
Phnom Penh Post, 15-28 August 1997.
- 'ASEAN backs off as Hun Sen digs in', Phnom Penh Post,
25 July-7 August 1997.
- 'Impatient Hun Sen pushes ASEAN for quick decision', Phnom
Penh, AFP, 20 August 1997.
- 'Cambodia's Hun Sen warns against split in party', Phnom Penh,
Reuters, 19 August 1997.
- 'King Sihanouk's return to Cambodia set for August 30', Phnom
Penh, Kyodo, 23 August 1997.
- Michael Richardson, 'ASEAN opts for continued mediation in
Cambodia', International Herald Tribune, 12 August
1997.
- Jusuf Wanandi, 'ASEAN's Domestic Political Developments and
Their Impact on Foreign Policy', Pacific Review, Vol 8, No
3, 1995, p 457.
- Abdul Rahman Adnan, 'ASEAN turns to "Constructive
Intervention"', Asian Wall Street Journal, 30 July
1997.
- 'Speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon Alexander
Downer M P, to the ASEAN 30th Anniversary Seminar, ASEAN and
Australia: A Future Together', Sydney, 26 August 1997.
- ibid.
- See The New ASEANs: Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia and Laos,
Canberra, East Asia Analytical Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade, June 1997, pp 345-356.
- Paul Kelly, 'Money makes us friends in the neighbourhood',
The Australian, 27 August 1997.
- Greg Earl, 'ASEAN links snag Aust's summit move',
Australian Financial Review, 30 July 1997.
(hard copy version only of these charts; not available on
Internet at present)