| 3.1  | 
    The telecommunications sector is one of the most  vibrant and growing areas of business in the world today. The relationship  between countries as close as Australia  and New Zealand  necessarily involves close cooperation in this area. The Committee took much  evidence as to the ‘state of play’ between the two countries in the area of  telecommunications.  | 
  
  
    | 3.2 | 
    Senior officials from the Australian Department  of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA) meet regularly  with their counterparts in the New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development  (NZMED) to discuss key issues of interest to both countries.1   | 
  
  
    | 3.3 | 
    In the past year there have been two meetings  between DCITA and NZMED officials. Officials will meet again later this year in  Wellington to  discuss a wide range of issues relating to telecommunications policy and  regulation.2   | 
  
  
     | 
      | 
  
  
    The New Zealand  telecommunications market | 
    
  
    | 3.4  | 
    The provision of telecommunications services in New Zealand was  deregulated in 1989. The total telecommunications market in New Zealand was  estimated at NZ$ 7.3 billion in 2005. It is estimated that the market will grow  by 5 to 6 % in the next two years. Data, Internet and Value Added Services grew  by 8% and the mobile market grew by 13% during 2005. However, the fixed network  voice market has been declining at levels consistent with global trends for  fixed lines.3   | 
  
  
    | 3.5  | 
    There are two major fixed-line public  telecommunications operators in New    Zealand – Telecom New Zealand  and TelstraClear. Telecom New    Zealand has close to 80% of the local access  market in fixed line voice and broadband.4   | 
  
  
    | 3.6  | 
    In 2005 there were 3.53 million mobile  subscribers in New Zealand  and the mobile penetration rate was 86%. The major mobile operators are Telecom  Mobile (owned by Telecom New Zealand) and  Vodafone New Zealand. The mobile market is  highly concentrated and mobile phone charges are high by international  standards. According to the OECD, in terms of mobile calls price, New Zealand  ranks 29th  out of 30 countries for high volume users and 23rd for  low volume users.5   | 
  
  
     | 
     | 
  
  
    Telecommunications access arrangements | 
    
  
    | 3.7 | 
    In developing access to telecommunications  regimes Australia has relied on the telecommunications specific access regime  in Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act  1974 (TPA) whilst New Zealand, after previous provisions in their Commerce Act 1986 proved unworkable, enacted  the Telecommunications Act 2001.6   | 
  
  
    | 3.8  | 
    Services  that must be supplied to access seekers on demand under the access regimes  are known as ‘regulated telecommunications services’. Once a service is  designated (NZ) or declared (Aus), each country has a different procedural regime  to deal with access issues. In Australia  the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), independent of the  Australian Government, has the power to declare services. In NZ the New Zealand  Commerce Commission (NZCC) can only recommend to Government that a service be  designated with the final decision being left to the Government.7   | 
  
  
    | 3.9  | 
    Anti-competitive conduct is policed in Australia by  the ACCC under Part XIB of the TPA. Under this legislation the ACC are able to  issue ‘competition notices’ which are designed to stop anti-competitive conduct  and allow the ACC and other parties to seek penalties and damages in the  Federal Court.8 TPA parts XIB and XIC are the responsibility of the Minister for  Communications.9        | 
  
  
    | 3.10 | 
    New    Zealand relies on section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 which is a general  restrictive trade provision. There is no provision in the legislation for a  regulatory tool such as a competition notice.10        | 
  
  
    | 3.11 | 
    Two other issues where Australia is  ahead of New Zealand  on regulatory control and increased competition are: 
      Number portability (see explanatory box below);  and, 
      Operational separation (see explanatory box  below). 
       
           | 
  
  
    
      
        NUMBER PORTABILITY11 
            New Zealand is one of the few countries in the  OECD that does not have fully extended number portability. Number portability  allows a customer to retain a phone number when changing operators, services or  geographical locations. The concept is important for promoting competition and  ensuring the availability of choice in a market. This issue has been on the  agenda in New Zealand  since 1992. 
          Number portability reduces the cost of customers  changing suppliers and moving locations. For businesses and personal users, the  cost and inconvenience of changing numbers is a major deterrent to changing  carriers and service providers who are competing in the market place. Presently  number portability is not mandated and limited to a small number of locations  for fixed line. There is no number portability for mobile telephony and in some  respects this is preventing the entry of a third mobile provider into the  market. We understand that number portability will be available in New Zealand by  2007.  
           | 
       
     
       
      
        
          OPERATIONAL SEPARATION12 
              Operational separation involves a clear internal  separation between a ‘retail business’ supplying services to end users, and a  ‘network business’ supplying wholesale services to both the incumbent’s retail  business and its competitors. Operational separation puts up “Chinese walls”  between the retail and wholesale divisions of the incumbent without actually  breaking up the company into two separate entities. The intention of  operational separation is not to stymie the commercial operation of the  incumbent but to bring it onto a level playing field with its retail  competitors.    | 
         
       
      
  | 
    
  
     | 
      | 
  
  
    Telstra Corporation/TelstraClear’s position | 
    
  
    | 3.12 | 
    Telstra Corporation and their New Zealand  subsidiary TelstraClear (hereafter Telstra) made a detailed and comprehensive  submission to the Committee. The main issues they address are: 
      - A common market for telecommunications services  on both sides of the Tasman;
 
       - How telecommunications got left behind by CER;
 
       - Benefits of a common market for telecoms;
 
       - CER needs to keep evolving;
 
       - Importance of the telecommunications sector
 
       - Historical barriers to a trans  – Tasman telecoms market;
 
       - Need for greater harmonisation of sectoral  regulation; and
 
       - Greater coordination of telecoms regulation in  the interim.
   | 
  
  
     | 
      | 
  
  
    A common market for telecommunications on both sides of the Tasman | 
    
  
    | 3.13  | 
    Telstra have difficulties encountered in the  supply of seamless services between Australia and New Zealand and  point to the lack of regulatory harmonisation, which they argue has been  hampered by the Australian and New Zealand Governments.13 Specifically Telstra states that telecoms regulation “is a form of sectoral  competition regulation, which to date has differed greatly between Australia and New Zealand.”14        | 
  
  
    | 3.14 | 
    Telstra’s submission refers to the proposed  Single Economic Market (SEM) and states that “it is time to work towards a  common market for telecoms services.”15   | 
  
  
     | 
      | 
  
  
    How telecommunications got left behind by CER | 
    
  
    | 3.15 | 
    Telstra contends that agreements such as WTO  Basic Telecoms Agreement and regulatory Reference Paper as well as Australia’s  bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) deal more comprehensively with telecoms.  Their submissions states: 
      Telstra submits that immediate steps should be taken to  incorporate more detailed treatment of telecommunications into CER, at least  consistent with the WTO Reference Paper, but preferably duplicating the more  detailed approach of the existing telecommunications chapters in the FTAs that  Australia has concluded with the US and Singapore.16   | 
  
  
    | 3.16 | 
    Telstra informed the Committee that, in their  view, the excuse provided by the Australian and New Zealand governments for not  including telecoms in CER Business MoU work program—that telecoms regulation  has not yet ‘bedded in’—is implausible given that the Australian regime has  been in place for almost a decade and New Zealand is doing a ‘regulatory  stocktake’.17   | 
  
  
    | 3.17  | 
    Mr   Danny Kotlowitz,  a solicitor for Telstra’s Regulatory Legal Group, gives the example of number  portability as one area in which CER has not kept pace with a current FTA: 
      In the free trade agreement with Singapore, there is a list of  behind-the border, domestic regulatory obligations. For example, there is an  obligation to provide number portability. That means that when you go to a  competing provider for your mobile, you get to take your number with you. In New Zealand,  that is currently not available; it is not mandated.18   | 
  
  
    | 3.18 | 
    In Telstra’s opinion: 
      If CER had the same commitments as made under the  Australia-US FTA, New    Zealand consumers would have been enjoying  the benefits of number portability in 2004, instead of still waiting for implementation  of this critical pro-competitive measure.19   | 
  
  
    | 3.19 | 
    The submission by Australia’s Department of  Communications, Information, Technology and the Arts echo these comments when  it states in relation to new entrants to the New Zealand market that; 
   . . . a number of  significant barriers exist in the mobile market. Entrants are obliged to have  demonstrated plans to build a national network that would give them access to  regulated national roaming. Consequently, there are high fixed costs to entry  into the mobile market. The absence of number portability is another key  problem. New Zealand  has some of the highest mobile termination rates amongst OECD countries and  there is a lack of both wholesale and resale competition in the mobile services  market. Australia  has extended regulation to mobile termination charges. In New Zealand  regulation is being proposed for non-3G networks only.20   | 
  
  
     | 
      | 
  
  
    Benefits of a common market for telecoms | 
    
  
    | 3.20 | 
    Telstra lists benefits of a common market for  telecoms such as: 
      Reduced charges by the elimination of  international roaming charges;21 
      The continuing ability to safeguard key  differences in each countries’ approach to telecommunications regulation in  such areas as universal services and content regulation.22        | 
  
  
    | 3.21  | 
    At this point Telstra see the mechanics of a  single economic market for telecommunications as something that can be  discussed in due course. What is important now is to identify a  telecommunications SEM as a goal that can be achieved and worked towards: 
      . . .there are many possible paths to achieving a  trans-Tasman single economic market for telecommunications – debate over  institutional/structural issues such as whether to harmonise laws or amalgamate  regulators, should be left aside for now. What is necessary now is to identify  a common market as the goal and begin working towards that goal.23        | 
  
  
     | 
      | 
  
  
    CER needs to keep evolving | 
    
  
    | 3.22  | 
    It is Telstra’s belief that that: 
      CER’s general development, and the achievement of a common  economic market across all industry sectors, will be held back for so long as  telecoms regulatory harmonisation is ignored by CER24   | 
  
  
     | 
      | 
  
  
    Importance of the telecommunications sector | 
    
  
    | 3.23 | 
    Telstra believes that telecoms are in danger of  being put in the CER’s ‘too-hard basket’25 and, given the importance of telecommunications to all aspect of business,  suggests this would have a negative impact on the economic development of both  countries.   | 
  
  
     | 
      | 
  
  
    Historical barriers to a trans – Tasman  telecoms market | 
    
  
    | 3.24 | 
    Until recently New Zealand had ‘light touch’  regulation of telecoms and Australia’s  regulatory regime was more mainstream in international terms.   | 
  
  
    | 3.25 | 
    It is Telstra’s view that Australia is  now tending towards over-regulation in international terms whilst New Zealand,  with the introduction of the Telecommunications  Act (2001), has abandoned the ‘light touch’ regulatory approach. As a  result regulatory approaches in the two countries are now converging.26   | 
  
  
    | 3.26 | 
    With New Zealand currently undergoing a  ‘regulatory stocktake’ in relation to telecommunications in which many issues  of divergence between Australia and New Zealand, such as unbundling of the  local loop, will be addressed it is Telstra’s view that CER “drive greater  convergence, by setting a goal of achieving a common market in telecoms  services to the benefit of both economies.”27   | 
  
  
     | 
      | 
  
  
    Need for greater harmonisation of sectoral regulation | 
    
  
    | 3.27 | 
    Telstra believes that “claims that competition  law has been harmonised under CER ring hollow for so long as that harmonisation  has only occurred at the level of generic competition law.”28 
       | 
  
  
     | 
      | 
  
  
    Greater coordination of telecoms regulation in the interim | 
    
  
    | 3.28 | 
    Telstra envisages interim steps that can be  taken along the way to realisation of a common market such as: 
   greater  institutional co-ordination; 
      greater pooling of expertise; and 
   formal consultative  obligations.29 
       | 
  
  
    | 3.29 | 
    Telstra is critical of the fact that, although the  revised CER Business Law MoU adopts the above measures they are not being  applied to telecoms because telecoms are not on the formal work program. This  is despite the fact that a great deal of the time of the ACCC and the NZCC is  devoted to telecoms Telstra believes that regulators are being asked to consult  with each other but what they may discuss is being limited.30 
       | 
  
  
     | 
      | 
  
  
    AAPT’s position | 
    
  
    | 3.30 | 
    AAP Telecommunications (AAPT) grew out of  Australian Associated Press (AAP) in 1991 after the Australian telecommunications  market commenced de-regulation. After various owners AAPT was fully acquired by  Telecom New Zealand in 2000.  | 
  
  
    | 3.31 | 
    AAPT’s submission is concerned expressly with “why  the proposals in the Telstra submission are not in Australia’s interest.”31 Specifically AAPT disagrees with following points made by Telstra: 
      Non inclusion of telecommunications in CER 
      End user benefits of regulatory harmonisation 
      International mobile roaming savings 
      One  contract one bill
       | 
  
  
    | 3.32 | 
    AAPT’s submission also offers ways to include  telecommunications in CER on a sustainable basis.  | 
  
  
     | 
      | 
  
  
    Non inclusion of telecommunications in CER | 
    
  
    | 3.33 | 
    AAPT argues that, if telecommunications  requirements under the WTO are looked at Australia and New Zealand are  at “similar stages of WTO compliance.32”  
       | 
  
  
    | 3.34 | 
    It is AAPT’s position that the elements required  in a Free Trade Agreement are fully provided for by current Australian and New  Zealand Regulatory regimes; 
      But the extent to which there is perhaps an impediment to the  ‘one market’ is that we have not yet even formally harmonised the trade  practices requirements—the actual underpinning competition law. Talking about  harmonising the specific regimes prior to that is a bit strange when we have  not worked out issues about trans-Tasman enforcement for generic competition  law. So it is hard to understand how you could actually build a trans-Tasman  harmonisation for the specific before you have done the generic.33 
       | 
  
  
     | 
      | 
  
  
    End user benefits of regulatory harmonisation | 
    
  
    | 3.35 | 
    AAPT rejects the idea that regulatory  harmonisation will provide any benefits to end-users. In relation to mobile  roaming charges their view is that: 
   . . . there is nothing  about harmonising the regime that would magically make that inbound roaming  more competitive and there is actually nothing that would make it immediately  covered by the regulatory regime because you would have to cover domestic  mobile roaming, which neither regime has done . . .34 
       | 
  
  
    | 3.36 | 
    AAPT expressed bemusement as to Telstra’s  submission that regulatory harmonisation will promote the ability to have “one contract  and one bill.” In AAPT’s view there “is nothing in the existing regime to stop  a person who is a service provider writing one contract and offering one bill.”35 
       | 
  
  
    | 3.37 | 
    AAPT’s believes that regulatory harmonisation is  unnecessary as the end result of current regulatory regimes will be the same: 
      So we both have the same starting point and the same end  point. It is a bit like we are both travelling from Sydney to Brisbane but one  of us has chosen to do that journey via the New England Highway and the other has  gone via the Pacific Highway. . . The call for harmonisation is bit like making  a new road when we are already on pretty well laid out roads.36 
       | 
  
  
     | 
      | 
  
  
    Including telecommunications in CER | 
    
  
    | 3.38 | 
    The Committee was impressed with the effort put  in by AAPT, in commissioning their own research into trans-Tasman business, to  look at the “inclusion of telecommunications in CER on a sustainable basis.”  The Committee notes that AAPT sees closer regulatory ties (but not necessarily  harmonisation) as one way forward: 
      AAPT would further support regular meetings that include both  policy departments and regulators to undertake “stocktakes ” of the current  institutional settings in both markets. However, we would note that these  meetings are more likely to be productive if conducted on the “economy to  economy” model of APECTEL than the “government to government” model more  traditionally associated with international relations.37 
       | 
  
  
     | 
      | 
  
  
    The committee’s view | 
    
  
    | 3.39 | 
    The Committee  notes the evidence from DCITA on the close ties between officials in Australia and New Zealand on  telecommunications. In addition the Committee  notes the lack of formal ministerial contact. Ministerial ties are already  provided for in many other areas by Ministerial Councils and it is the Committee’s recommendation that a Telecommunications  Ministerial Council is established.             | 
  
  
    Recommendation 3      The Committee recommends that a Telecommunications  Ministerial Council be established.  | 
    
  
    | 3.40 | 
    The Committee notes some quite divergent views  on regulatory harmonisation and other issues relating to telecommunications in Australia and New Zealand. It  is not the province of this Committee to adjudicate complex regulatory and  technical issues. These are things best left to legal and technical experts.  The Committee, however, is able to see, from the evidence gathered, that there  is much room for more discussion on these issues.  | 
  
  
    | 3.41 | 
    The establishment of a Telecommunications  Ministerial Council will be useful to address issues that are raised for time  to come in the future. However, the Committee is of the view that  telecommunications be placed on the CER Work program at the earliest  opportunity to facilitate discussion of the complex technical and regulatory  issues mentioned above.  | 
  
  
    Recommendation 4      The Committee recommends that telecommunication  be placed on the CER Work Program at the earliest opportunity.  | 
    
  
    | 1  | 
    DCITA, Submission 22, Vol 2, p. 16. Back  | 
  
  
    | 2  | 
    DCITA, Submission  22, Vol 2, p. 16 Back  | 
  
  
    | 3  | 
    DCITA, Submission  22, Vol 2, p. 16 Back  | 
  
  
    | 4  | 
    DCITA, Submission  22, Vol 2, p. 16 Back  | 
  
  
    | 5  | 
    DCITA, Submission  22, Vol 2, p. 17 Back  | 
  
  
    | 6  | 
    DCITA, Submission 22, Vol 2, p. 19 Back | 
  
  
    | 7  | 
    DCITA, Submission  22, Vol 2, p. 19-20. Back | 
  
  
    | 8  | 
    DCITA, Submission 22, Vol 2, p. 21. Back | 
  
  
    | 9  | 
    Mr J Murphy, Executive Director, Markets  Group, Department of the Treasury, Evidence, 12/05/06, p.  12. Back | 
  
  
    | 10  | 
    DCITA, Submission  22, Vol 2, p. 21. Back | 
  
  
    | 11  | 
    DCITA, Submission  22, Vol 2, p. 22. Back | 
  
  
    | 12  | 
    DCITA, Submission  22, Vol 2, p. 22. Back | 
  
  
    | 13  | 
    Telstra Corporation Limited/TelstraClear  Limited, Submission 6, Vol 1, p. 65. Back | 
  
  
    | 14  | 
    Telstra Corporation Limited/TelstraClear Limited, Submission 6, Vol 1, p. 66. Back | 
  
  
    | 15  | 
    Telstra Corporation Limited/TelstraClear  Limited, Submission 6, Vol 1, p. 66. Back | 
  
  
    | 16  | 
    Telstra Corporation Limited/TelstraClear  Limited, Submission 6, Vol 1, pp. 68  - 69. Back | 
  
  
    | 17  | 
    Telstra Corporation Limited/TelstraClear  Limited, Submission 6, Vol 1, p. 69. Back | 
  
  
    | 18  | 
    Mr D Kotlowski, Solicitor, Regulatory Legal Group, Telstra, Evidence, 12/05/06, p. 11.Back | 
  
  
    | 19  | 
    Telstra Corporation Limited/TelstraClear  Limited, Submission 6, Vol 1, p. 69. Back | 
  
  
    | 20  | 
    DCITA, Submission  22, Vol 2, p. 17. Back | 
  
  
    | 21 | 
    Telstra Corporation Limited/TelstraClear  Limited, Submission 6, Vol 1, p. 72.  Telstra estimate the savings to Australian consumers to be $31 million per  year. Back | 
  
  
    | 22 | 
    Telstra Corporation Limited/TelstraClear  Limited, Submission 6, Vol 1, p. 72. Back | 
  
  
    | 23 | 
    Telstra Corporation Limited/TelstraClear  Limited, Submission 6, Vol 1, p. 72. Back | 
  
  
    | 24 | 
     Telstra Corporation Limited/TelstraClear  Limited, Submission 6, Vol 1, p. 73. Back | 
  
  
    | 25 | 
    Telstra Corporation Limited/TelstraClear  Limited, Submission 6, Vol 1, p. 74. Back | 
  
  
    | 26 | 
     Telstra Corporation Limited/TelstraClear  Limited, Submission 6, Vol 1, p. 75. Back | 
  
  
    | 27 | 
    Telstra Corporation Limited/TelstraClear  Limited, Submission 6, Vol 1, p. 75. Back | 
  
  
    | 28 | 
    Telstra Corporation Limited/TelstraClear  Limited, Submission 6, Vol 1, p. 76. Back | 
  
  
    | 29 | 
    Telstra Corporation Limited/TelstraClear  Limited, Submission 6, Vol 1, p. 79. Back | 
  
  
    | 30 | 
    Telstra Corporation Limited/TelstraClear  Limited, Submission 6, Vol 1, p. 79. Back | 
  
  
    | 31 | 
    AAPT, Submission  28, Vol 2, p. 61. Back | 
  
  
    | 32 | 
    AAPT, Submission  28, Vol 2, p. 67. Back | 
  
  
    | 33 | 
    Mr D Havyatt, Solicitor, Head of Regulatory Affairs, AAPT Ltd, Evidence, 7/08/06, p. 6. Back | 
  
  
    | 34 | 
    Mr D Havyatt, Solicitor, Head of Regulatory  Affairs, AAPT Ltd, Evidence, 7/08/06, p. 3. Back | 
  
  
    | 35 | 
    AAPT, Submission  28, Vol 2, p. 68. Back | 
  
  
    | 36 | 
    Mr D Havyatt, Solicitor, Head of Regulatory  Affairs, AAPT Ltd, Evidence, 7/08/06, p. 3. Back | 
  
  
    | 37 | 
    AAPT, Submission  28, Vol 2, p. Back |