Joint Standing Committee on Treaties
CHAPTER 3
PROTOCOL IV
3.1 The additional or amended Protocol II, prohibiting
and restricting the use of mines, booby traps and other devices, to the
Inhumane Weapons Convention (IWC) was adopted by a conference of States'
Parties including Australia on 3 May 1996.
3.2 The amended Protocol will come into force when
it has been ratified by at least 20 countries, and Australia wishes to
be in that group. [1]
3.3 There has been considerable and growing interest
in the issue of banning landmines since the signing of this Protocol.
For example, in his speech to the Australian Parliament on 20 November
1996, President Clinton of the United States of America referred to the
need to pursue the remaining arms control agenda. This included a world
wide ban on landmines, 'so that all our children can walk with confidence
on the earth beneath them'. [2]
3.4 At the United Nations' (UN) General Assembly,
Australia co-sponsored an historic resolution which 'urges States to pursue
vigorously an effective, legally binding international agreement to ban
the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines
with a view to completing the negotiations as soon as possible'. This
was the first time the General Assembly had called for a total ban on
landmines.
3.5 In January 1997, nations in favour of a global
ban on landmines were reported to have expressed pleasure at a United
States' decision to push for the ban at the UN-sponsored Geneva Conference
on Disarmament. The report suggested that the determination among developing
nations to move for total nuclear disarmament might work against the US'
desire to accept negotiations on the subject at the Geneva Conference.
[4]
Provisions of the amended Protocol in brief
3.6 Article 1 of the amended Protocol II restricts
its scope to landmines, extends it to cover internal conflicts, preserves
the sovereignty of States and guards against uninvited intervention in
the internal or external affairs of a Party in the territory where there
is a conflict.
3.7 Article 2 defines the key terms used in this Protocol.
3.8 Article 3 sets out general restrictions on the
use of mines, booby-traps and other devices: assigns responsibility to
those who laid them; prohibits the use of devices which cause superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering; sets technical standards; prohibits anti-detection
features; prohibits targeting the civilian population and indiscriminate
use; prohibits the grouping of a number of targets as one target where
they are interspersed in civilian areas; requires the taking of 'all feasible
precautions' to protect civilians, and requires effective advance warning
of emplacement to civilians 'unless circumstances do not permit'.
3.9 Article 4 prohibits the use of non-detectable
anti-personnel mines.
3.10 Article 5 restricts the use of anti-personnel
mines, other than remotely delivered mines, which do not self-destruct
and self-deactivate outside marked areas. Where used inside perimeter
marked areas, protection requirements for protection of civilians and
clearance are specified. It also imposes constraints on the use of trip-wire
operated Claymore mines.
3.11 Article 6 restricts the use of remotely-delivered
mines, requiring them to be recorded, self-destructing and self-deactivating,
and encourages advance warning of delivery.
3.12 Article 7 prohibits the use of booby-trapping
of a wide range of items; prohibits the use of booby-traps on apparently
harmless portable objects, and imposes constraints on their use against
civilians.
3.13 Article 8 prohibits the transfer of banned mines;
prohibits transfers of anti-personnel mines to States not bound, or not
agreeing to be bound, by the Protocol; requires compliance during any
period of deferral, and requires compliance pending entry of the Protocol
into force.
3.14 Article 9 requires detailed recording of mined
areas, retention of records and use to safeguard civilians; covers the
sharing of information with the Secretary-General of the UN and with others
who may be in possession of mined areas.
3.15 Article 10 requires removal of minefields and
other devices without delay after the cessation of hostilities; covers
provision of assistance from the State which laid mines and other devices
to the State which controls an area after hostilities, and seeks the sharing
of information which will help with clearance of an area.
3.16 Article 11 encourages the sharing of technology
and information which will help humanitarian mine clearing and compliance
with the Protocol, or reduce any period of deferral; seeks resources for
such work, and outlines procedures for requesting assistance.
3.17 Article 12 requires provision of safeguards for
peace-keeping missions, UN forces, UN humanitarian and fact-finding missions,
missions of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other
humanitarian missions.
3.18 Article 13 calls for the Parties to consult on
issues related to the operation of the Protocol, and requires annual conferences
to discuss the document and annual reporting to the depositary.
3.19 Article 14 requires that 'all appropriate steps,
including legislative' shall be taken to prevent and suppress violations
of this Protocol. This includes penal sanctions against those who harm
civilians by breaching it, and includes requiring armed forces to issue
instructions and give training, and consultations with other Parties.
3.20 The Technical Annex sets out detailed standards
on recording, detectability, self-destruction and self-deactivation and
international signs for minefields and mined areas. At paragraph 2 (c),
it includes the provision that allows a Party to defer compliance, for
nine years, with the requirement that APLs produced after 1 January 1997
include material which can be detected with a response equivalent to a
signal from eight grams of iron. [5]
Consultation
3.21 The National Interest Analysis (NIA) prepared
for this Protocol stated that community groups had been consulted and
informed of negotiations about the amended Protocol through a Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) body, the National Consultative Committee
on Peace and Disarmament. There was also close liaison with the Australian
Network of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), an umbrella
organisation which represents and coordinates the activities of a number
of non-government organisations (NGOs) with an interest in banning mines.
Sister Patricia Pak Poy, the coordinator of the Australian campaign, was
an NGO representative on the Australian delegation to the conference which
produced the amended Protocol.
3.22 NGOs were briefed regularly on preparations for,
and developments in, the negotiating process at meetings and through a
DFAT newsletter. As was clear during the public hearings on the subject,
although NGOs and interested individuals were disappointed a total ban
on landmines was not achieved, the amended Protocol has their critical
support for ratification. The views of some of these organisations and
individuals are set out below.
3.23 The obligations of the amended Protocol do not
have implications for the States and Territories. They have been kept
informed of the negotiations through the Standing Committee on Treaties
(SCOT) process.
Withdrawal
3.24 Denunciation of the Protocols to the IWC is dealt
with in Article 9 of that document. It takes effect one year after the
Depositary, the Secretary-General to the UN, receives notification of
the intention to withdraw from a Protocol.
Dimensions of the problem
3.25 As defined in Article 2 of this Protocol, mines
or anti-personnel landmines (APL) are munitions placed on or near the
ground and designed to be exploded by the presence or contact of a person.
They can include blast mines, standard and directional fragmentation mines
and bounding fragmentation mines, all of which can be activated by the
victim. They were originally developed as a counter-measure against tanks
and APLs were developed to keep enemy mine-clearers away from the larger,
more easily found anti-tank devices. They can remain in the ground, to
kill and maim indiscriminately, long after the conflict during which they
were sown has ended. [6]
3.26 In addition to the different types mentioned
above, mine technology has advanced so that there are now so-called 'dumb'
and 'smart' mines. The latter are self-destructing or self-deactivating
or self-neutralising. 'Dumb' mines do not have attached a self-deactivating
or other device of the type specified in the Technical Annex to the amended
Protocol and remain lethal indefinitely. [7]
3.27 APLs are cheap, easily available, low-technology
items, made up of a casing, a detonator and material discharged by the
detonation, which are cheap to make, buy and lay. In their simplest forms
they can be made in kitchens, garages or fields. As was demonstrated convincingly
at a briefing for Committee members on 6 December 1996, many of the simplest
types would not be covered by the definition in the amended Protocol.
[8]
3.28 Mines are not designed to kill people but to
injure them. As Dr William Maley pointed out, a military force can be
disabled much more effectively if it has a significant number of injured
rather than dead. The latter are buried where they fall, whereas the injured
are assisted by their comrades, and that can significantly hamper a force
either by delaying it or by forcing it to abandon an objective. After
conflicts are over, many of the victims are children. [9]
3.29 As the NIA pointed out, the past decade has seen
growing numbers of instances where APLs have been used indiscriminately
against civilians, despite restrictions placed on their use by the IWC
in 198
3. Since the Second World War, an estimated 400 million APLs have been
laid in various parts of the world. The US State Department estimated
that there were more than 85 million uncleared mines scattered in 62 countries
around the world. As many as another five million new mines may be laid
each year. Based on UN programs in Cambodia and Afghanistan, it can cost
between $US200 and $US1000 to clear each mine. [10]
3.30 The ICRC stated that for every mine cleared,
20 are laid. According to UN estimates, it would take 1100 years to clear
the active landmines already in place and would cost about $US33 billion
to rid the world of this scourge. [11]
3.31 While many states have fenced and signposted
mine-affected areas, the problem remains acute in Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique,
Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, Iraq and the states of the former Yugoslavia. The
problem is less acute in El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala and Rwanda. During
the Vietnam War, huge numbers of mines were scattered over Laos, Cambodia
and Vietnam and are still there. [12]
3.32 In such countries, APLs continue to maim and
kill civilians indiscriminately long after hostilities have ceased: about
30 people per day are killed and up to 60 a day are maimed. For example,
Libyans still die from mines laid during the Second World War. Between
1945 and the mid-1970s in Poland, some 4000 civilian deaths and 9000 injuries
were attributed to mines although some 15 million had already been cleared
at great expense. [13]
3.33 From time to time, DFAT issues Consular Travel
Advices through travel agents to travellers to specific countries, warning
of the need to 'exercise due care and personal security awareness'. Information
should be included in Advices for particular countries, suggesting that
travellers stay on roads and clearly marked paths because of the prevalence
of mines.
Humanitarian consequences
3.34 APLs inflict horrendous injuries on the innocent,
such as children playing games or searching for firewood, or farmers ploughing
fields for crops needed to avoid starvation. The presence of mines, marked
or otherwise, often prevented the use of land needed for crops. Photographs
taken in Afghanistan by Dr Khaled Dik of the World Health Organisation
(WHO), provided by Dr Maley and reproduced here, are two examples among
countless others which could be used to demonstrate the terrible injuries
which can be inflicted. At the hearing on 2 December 1996, a short and
moving video was shown on the plight of some young victims. [14]
3.35 Quite apart from the devastating impacts on victims,
their families and their immediate communities, there are national consequences
for the countries involved because of the effects of mines on general
development. Significant resources, often needed for other purposes, have
to be diverted to identifying and surveying minefields, clearing APLs,
treating and rehabilitating victims. [15]
3.36 He told of the deliberate laying of mines in
a zigzag pattern outside the main entrance to the Aliabad Hospital in
Kabul in Afghanistan. He also pointed out that the existence of a minefield
denied locals the use of land for economic purposes or for travel. It
did not matter whether there were 500 mines in a field or only one mine,
as they all had to be surveyed and cleared. [16]
3.37 Dr Maley stated that mines tended to blow non-sterile
material up a limb much further than the immediate point of the blast.
Earth and other material was embedded into wounds and tended to create
massive secondary infections. Amputations needed to be high above the
knee, creating problems for fitting prostheses. Because children's bone
and flesh grows at different rates, this is a particular problem and it
can take successive operations to stabilise a stump for the fitting of
a prosthesis. All this increased the pain and general suffering of the
victims and, although of no importance to victims and their families,
also added significantly to the long-term and indirect costs of APLs to
nations.[17]
Australia's position
3.38 On 15 April 1996, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs
and Defence jointly announced support for a global ban on production,
stockpiles, use and transfer of APLs. The Government also decided to suspend
immediately the operational use of APLs by the ADF, to be reviewed only
in the case of 'a substantial deterioration' in our strategic circumstances.
[18]
3.39 Australia participated in the first review of
the IWC which led to the signing of the amended Protocol on 3 May 1996.
These negotiations were difficult because of the positions of some Parties
which continue to produce and export APLs. To gain the agreement of these
Parties, the nine year deferral was included in the Technical Annex. The
NIA states that this was 'an unfortunate decision', but necessary to gain
the adoption by consensus of the amended Protocol. [19]
3.40 During his tabling speech in October 1996, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs observed that Australia was disappointed
that the review process had not produced a stronger Protocol, taking greater
steps towards a total ban on APLs. He also believed that arguments in
favour of early ratification of the amended Protocol were overwhelming.
[20]
3.41 As mentioned above, Australia co-sponsored with
the US a resolution in the UN General Assembly which called for 'an effective,
legally binding agreement' to ban APLs. The resolution also called for
completion of negotiations on the treaty to be completed 'as soon as possible'.
[21]
3.42 In January 1997, the Minister told the Conference
on Disarmament at Geneva of Australia's suspension of the ADF's operational
use of landmines This had been done not because the ADF was responsible
for the APL crisis but as 'a moral gesture intended to hasten the end
of the carnage'. He outlined recent and continuing contributions to mine
clearance and rehabilitation work in Afghanistan, Mozambique, Angola,
Laos and Cambodia. [22]
3.43 He also pointed out that Australia's decision
to suspend the use of APLs and support the negotiation of a global ban
was not taken without 'considerable soul-searching' about our strategic
situation. He asked members of the Conference to consider how particular
national security interests may be accommodated within the framework of
the international instrument the world needs to meet this urgent humanitarian
crisis. [23]
3.44 Landmines are dealt with in both the prohibited
imports regulations and the prohibited export regulations. Details of
Australia's controls on the export, import or transfer of defence-relevant
and strategic goods, and of a review of these controls, are set out in
Chapter 2 above. [24]
Use of landmines by the ADF
3.45 The last time the ADF used APLs in operations
was during the Vietnam War. Currently, there are only three mine types
in the inventory: the small M14 blast anti-personnel mine, the M16 jumping
fragmentation mine and the Second World War vintage British Mark 5 anti-tank
mine. [25]
3.46 Australia also has stocks of the M18A1 Claymore
mine: a munition which is normally fired electrically by the user. If
used with a trip wire, however, it conforms to the definition of a landmine
in the amended Protocol, as it would be detonated by the victim.
3.47 The only mine currently held by the ADF which
does not comply with the detectability standard in the amended Protocol
is the M14. It is detectable with modern mine detectors, but does not
meet the new signal requirement of eight grams of iron. Thus, provided
these mines are not used, they meet the new standard. Should there be
the type of change in our strategic situation referred to in the joint
Ministerial Statement, evidence was given that it would be simple and
cheap to make M14 mines detectable and use them in accordance with the
provisions of the amended Protocol. [26]
3.48 It was stated that disposing of the current stockpile
of APLs would be a 'relatively simple' but major task: they would have
to be removed from boxes in storage and blown up or burnt in controlled
situations. It would be vital to ensure that all were detonated. [27]
3.49 During this inquiry, there were no suggestions
that the ADF had ever behaved irresponsibly in the past about the usage
and mapping of mines. Tributes were also paid to the skills and training
shown by ADF personnel in the dangerous work of mine clearance. [28]
3.50 The ADF's existing training abides by the revised
Protocol and exceeds it in protecting the civilian community from the
effects of APLs. In all areas it either complies with or exceeds the Protocol's
requirements. With the exception of the detectability of the M14 mine,
a small change in the design of minefield marking signs and new requirements
for Claymores operated by trip wires, Australian Army doctrine meets or
exceeds these requirements. The actual changes affecting training are
limited. Some other aspects, resulting from changes to Government policy,
will be evaluated and will be incorporated in doctrine over the next two
to three years. [29]
3.51 Although there were some difficulties in making
live mines available for mine awareness training this matter appears to
have been resolved, and evidence was given that the constraints imposed
by the amended Protocol would have little impact on the ADF. If there
were to be an impact, it would be in ensuring the provisions of this Protocol
were passed down to all levels. [30]
3.52 The Government's announcement did not mention
the disposal of the existing stockpile of APLs. Nor did it ban the use
of live mines for training, but the ADF believed that it was consistent
with that policy to reduce use during training. There will be no difference
in the training provided, other than the inability to buy stocks of mines
the ADF does not have and which it might otherwise have used in training.
[31]
3.53 The ADF has to have a stockpile sufficient to
maintain an operational APL capability and remain current in use and clearance
training. To fulfil only the training commitment, stocks would need to
be 'fairly modest'. To maintain a clearance capability, rather than an
ability to use mines, that stockpile would need to be greater but still
'reasonably modest'. To remain current, larger numbers of some mines already
held would need to be carried. If the ADF were to maintain expertise to
clear mines internationally, only 'very modest' stocks would be required.
[32]
3.54 It was also pointed out that a capability to
use mines cannot be developed quickly if it is required urgently. For
one thing, while it has no replenishment plans, the ADF's ability to buy
APLs in the current environment would be 'almost zero'. [33]
Australia's contributions to de-mining activities
3.55 Evidence was given of Australian support for
demining, mine awareness and rehabilitation programs. In 1995/96, $A7.4
million was given, if work on unexploded ordnance was included, to five
countries through the Australian International Agency for International
Development (AusAID):
- Afghanistan, $A0.4 million;
- Angola, $A0.55 million;
- Cambodia, $A4.88 million;
- Laos, $A0.367 million, and
- Mozambique, $A0.695 million. [34]
3.56 Since 1991, the total contribution has been $A24.5
million which includes two other substantial programs. In his tabling
statement on 15 October 1996, the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred
to a $A12 million, three year de-mining program for Laos and Cambodia,
announced in May 1996. A further three year, $4 million program for Cambodia
and Mozambique has also been announced for 1996/97 by the Minister. This
would make Australia one of the major donors to the UN-sponsored de-mining
and ordnance clearance efforts in the region. [35]
3.57 As well as de-mining activities, Australia supports
mine awareness training, particularly in local communities and schools
in rural areas. Assistance is also provided to the victims of landmines,
especially in Cambodia. [36]
3.58 Details of expenditure in this area by a number
of nations showed that Australia's contributions were comparable. There
appears to be a growing awareness among other donor nations of the need
to include mine programs in aid and humanitarian defence programs. [37]
3.59 While assistance with demining in Cambodia is
carried out under the Defence Cooperation Program (DCP), the Department
of Defence confirmed that the DCP does not fund the purchase of landmines
for Papua New Guinea, or any other recipient country. [38]
Developments in mine clearance technology
3.60 As the Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out
in his speech tabling the text of the amended Protocol, Australia is interested
in working with other countries to improve technology to increase the
rate and scale of de-mining. During his speech to the Conference on Disarmament
in January 1997, the Minister referred to the development of technology
which has the potential to make mine detection faster and more reliable
in countries like Cambodia which have highly mineralised soils. [39]
3.61 A submission from the Defence Science and Technology
Organisation (DSTO) gave details of a research program into the detection,
neutralisation, vehicle protection, simulation and database development
related to APLs. DSTO has investigated a wide range of technologies, and
for three years has collaborated with the Commonwealth Scientific and
Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) in a program to detect and identify
small plastic landmines which only have small amounts of metal. CSIRO
contributed a high resolution ground penetrating radar, and DSTO enhanced
the performance of this radar to distinguish targets from other metallic
objects nearby. DSTO believes there has been a break-through in the detection
of plastic mines in its program with CSIRO, and with private industry.
[40]
3.62 A witness from DSTO explained that Minelab Electronics
Pty Ltd, a manufacturer of metal detectors for gold prospecting, has developed
an enhanced metal detector capable of overcoming the interference caused
by mineralised soils. Its F1A4 model detects plastic mines with low metal
content, and cancels the effect of these soils. It has exceptional sensitivity:
tests by mine clearance teams in Cambodia and Laos have assessed it as
superior to detectors in service. [41]
3.63 DSTO is putting together CSIRO's ground penetrating
radar and Minelab's electro-magnetic detection hardware to combine their
data in an enhanced visual display. The combined device detects and identifies
mines which could not previously be detected, but it can not detect mines
with no metal content. The US Army, it was stated, had invested heavily
in similar technology, but the resulting equipment was not as sensitive
as the Australian device. [42]
3.64 The ADF has used the Minelab equipment in trials
and has found it detects the Chinese M72A mine 'reasonably well'. Considerable
stocks of this mine are held around the world and existing Western equipments
in service are not able to detect it. While detecting mines is one problem,
the other is determining what has been detected, and advances in the synthesis
of metal detection, ground probing radar and other capabilities to discern
what has been detected are the areas of the break-throughs. [43]
3.65 The question which needs to be addressed is not,
however, the equipment which might be developed or used, but whether an
APL meets the standard of detectability in the amended Protocol. [44]
3.66 DSTO believed that government assistance would
assist the development of the devices from CSIRO and Minelab into a piece
of equipment which could be deployed. It stated that the Australian Army
and other armies were 'very interested' in acquiring this type of equipment.
Humanitarian organisations working in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Mozambique
and Angola would also be potential users. [45]
The need for additional legislation
3.67 Australia's policy is only to enact legislation
needed for the ratification of international instruments where existing
legislation, State or Commonwealth, is found to fall short of the international
obligations concerned. The NIA stated, and a witness from the Attorney-General's
Department (AGs) confirmed, that Australia would not be required to introduce
any new legislation to implement the amended Protocol II. [46]
3.68 Evidence was given by AGs that the compliance
requirements are set out in Article 14 of the Convention itself, and these
are divided into requirements for legislation and for other types of implementation
measures. Each contracting Party 'shall take all appropriate steps' to
implement parts of the Protocol and it has been decided, for example,
that legislation is not needed for the ADF to stop using APLs in operations.
[47]
3.69 Paragraph (2) of Article 14 refers to penal sanctions
against those who wilfully kill or cause serious injury in an armed conflict,
contrary to the provisions of the amended Protocol. AGs believed that
State and Territory criminal law would adequately cover such actions taken
within Australia. Such legislation is not specific about the type of weapon
used and would be relevant if a landmine was used in a murder, an assault
or causing grievous bodily harm.
3.70 Not all Australian citizens abroad would be subject
to Australian Government jurisdiction and control. Under existing legislation,
such as the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982, members of
the ADF could be dealt with for breaches of this Protocol whether or not
they are in Australia.
3.71 Section 7 of the Geneva Conventions Act 1957
deals with a person who commits or aids the commission of a grave breach
of the Geneva Conventions, including wilful killing and injury, whether
inside Australia or not. The Geneva Conventions allow for the defence
of military necessity while the amended Protocol II does not and, thus,
some situations would not be covered.
3.72 Other Acts cover specific activities abroad.
The Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978,
for example, proscribes and makes a criminal offence of engaging in hostile
activity in a foreign state.
3.73 If gaps in legislation are discovered, they will
become apparent with operational use of the Protocol. Amendments to an
existing Act, or a new Act as appropriate, could be introduced to deal
with any deficiencies. [48]
Previous Parliamentary involvement
3.74 The use, effects and export of APLs has been
dealt with, generally and specifically, in a number of reports by Parliamentary
committees and delegations. Several of these reports were by the Joint
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JCFADT), from 1993 the
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JSCFADT).
Committees have also received briefings, at private meetings, from a range
of experts on the world wide problem of APLs, and individual Parliamentarians
have also raised the matter in their respective House.
3.75 In a 1991 report, the Senate Standing Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade referred to Australian Army engineers
seconded to the United Nations Mine Clearance Training Team in Pakistan
(UNMCTT). It also noted the need to provide adequate training to ensure
an awareness of high risk environments, including awareness of mines and
booby traps. In the context of the experience of participation in the
UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia in 1989-90, the Senate
Committee pointed out that this was the first time since the Vietnam War
that Australian soldiers had had to breach live minefields. [49]
3.76 In its 1992 report, A Review of Australia's
Efforts to Promote and Protect Human Rights, the JCFADT considered
review procedures for defence exports. It recommended that a direct link
be established between military exports and human rights violations so
that:
- guarantees are sought from recipients that military equipment they
receive will not be used against their own populations, and
- it is made clear that military exports will be cut where persistent
and flagrant abuses of human rights occur. [50]
3.77 In its September 1994 report The Implications
of Australian Defence Exports, the JSCFADT referred to the large number
of civilian casualties caused by landmines, and to Australia's attempts
to strengthen the IWC. It noted that APL counter measures and expertise
in de-mining were defence exports and could be expanded. [51]
3.78 The JSCFADT's 1994 review of human rights endorsed
the recommendations in the report on Australia's defence exports, mentioned
above, and referred to Australian participation in UNTAG and the UN's
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992-1993 which included
mine clearing operations. Referring specifically to the world wide problem
of landmines, it recommended the Australian Government consider ways in
which a number of propositions could be put forward internationally for
the better control of APLs:
- inclusion of APLs on the list of weapons monitored under the UN arms
register;
- strengthening of the IWC and the existing version of Protocol II;
- making mine clearance a major aid issue for governments and humanitarian
agencies, and including it in then Australian aid program;
- mounting campaigns to have more countries sign and ratify the Protocol;
- instituting a total ban on the manufacture and export of landmines,
using the model of the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- the couching of international conventions on landmines in terms of
rights and obligations, making international criminal law applicable
and breaches subject to international criminal tribunals or war crimes
tribunals, and
- campaigns against companies which export landmines. [52]
3.79 The JSCFADT's December 1994 report Australia's
Participation in Peacekeeping also referred to the Army engineers
deployed on rotation with UNMCTT in Pakistan and Afghanistan from July
1989 to December 1993 and the Australian contributions to UNTAG, as well
as to UNTAC. [53]
3.80 The JSCFADT report briefly examined the decision
to withdraw the Army engineers from UNMCTT because of a perceived threat
to their security and a supposed lack of support at the time from the
people of Afghanistan. Having reviewed the matter and the various claims,
the JSCFADT was 'surprised' at the decision to withdraw the team. Dr Maley
also commented on this decision. [54]
3.81 This report also mentioned that training for
peacekeeping operations should include information on such things as the
threats from mines, how to identify likely mine sites, how to deal with
mines and how to treat their victims. [55]
3.82 The report of a Parliamentary delegation which
visited Cambodia in January 1996 described the work of the Cambodian Mine
Action Centre. Australia has contributed substantially to the Centre,
but it has been estimated that more than 10 million mines were laid in
Cambodia in the past two decades, and that it will take up to ten years
to clear existing minefields. It has also been estimated that up to 300
people are killed or injured by mines in the country every month. [56]
3.83 The delegation recommended that technical and
financial support continue at present levels, and that the Australian
Government seek wider international action to overcome this continuing
human tragedy. [57]
3.84 In a chapter titled 'Special Issues', the JSCFADT
dealt with the humanitarian issues of landmines in a recent report on
Australia's relations with Southern Africa. It surveyed the problem in
the Southern African Development Countries (SADC) which were the subject
of the report, and also dealt with Australian aid to Southern Africa for
demining. It recommended that Australia continue:
- to work for a total ban on landmines, and
- to provide assistance to SADC countries for demining activities, encompassing
medical and rehabilitation assistance to victims, community education
on the dangers of APLs and training for local people in demining. [58]
Views of interested organisations and individuals
3.85 A number of NGOs and individuals were invited
to give evidence at public hearings and some also provided submissions
and other written material, listed in Appendices 2 and
3. Many similar views were expressed and not all will be set out below.
3.86 For the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA),
Ms Janet Hunt acknowledged the change in Government policy on APLs which
had led to the suspension of their operational use by the ADF. She argued,
however, that unless Australia abandoned the use of APLs it would not
be able to develop the moral force required internationally to prevent
other countries from using these weapons. She also mentioned that many
people in the ICBL were reluctant in their support for the amended Protocol.
While it was the only international legal instrument available to control
APLs, and recognised as stronger than the previous version, it was seen
to be 'far from adequate'. [59]
3.87 ACFOA would like to see the adoption of a ban
on any use of APLs by Australia, except for their use in mine clearance
training. It also suggested that only mines using new, detectable technologies
should be used and that, apart from training stocks, the existing Australian
stockpile should be destroyed. Failure to destroy this stockpile, she
argued, could indicate a willingness to use APLs. Ms Hunt drew attention
to the fact that the mines in this stockpile did not have the detectable
metal content required by the amended Protocol, a point acknowledged by
the ADF, nor did they have the necessary self-destruct mechanisms. [60]
3.88 This umbrella NGO supported the Ottawa Declaration,
a Canadian initiative and challenge, which seeks to have the amended Protocol
II signed by December 1997 and implemented by 2000 as an agreed international
treaty. To this end, Canada would host a conference in December 1997.
It has also announced it will destroy two-thirds of its stockpile of APLs.
[61]
3.89 Ms Hunt also noted that some members of the Association
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) had not signed this Protocol, and
suggested that Australia could profitably discuss the matter with those
nations. China, India and Pakistan were strong in their opposition to
a total ban, and bilateral discussions with these nations would be important.
[62]
3.90 The ICRC's enthusiasm for the Protocol was 'muted',
according to Ms Shaun Hoyt. She welcomed the increased restrictions, but
considered the document to be 'woefully inadequate' because the limitations
were 'very modest'. Regulations covering detectability and self-destruction
were seen to be weak and overly complex, and it included the nine year
deferral for complying with the detectability provisions. [63]
3.91 Positive features included extension of the Protocol
to non-international conflicts, clear assignment of responsibility for
clearance to those who laid them, improved recording requirements and
improved protection for humanitarian workers.
3.92 The ICRC, with Dr Maley and the Medical Association
for the Prevention of War (MAPW), was also concerned that the new measures
were the first international instrument which implicitly promoted the
use of smart mines. Ms Hoyt believed that the amended Protocol was only
a step along the way to the goal which must be the total stigmatisation
and elimination of APLs. [64]
3.93 She referred to ICRC plans for various regional
conferences to consider the amended Protocol, and to planning for such
a conference in Manila, tentatively scheduled for August to October 1997.
DFAT advised that, while the Philippines would not actually co-host this
gathering, it may provide some resources. The conference's focus would
be the military usefulness of APLs, as well as humanitarian consequences
of their use and legal issues. The agenda had not been finalised but could
include:
- landmines in Asia, humanitarian and medical aspects;
- international humanitarian law applicable to the use and choice of
weapons;
- the military effectiveness of APLs and alternative weapons, and
- Asia's role in global political efforts to prohibit or control APLs.
[65]
3.94 Ms Hoyt also mentioned talks with the Australian
Government about such a conference, which should include the South East
Asian region. [66]
3.95 Mr Gideon Boas of the Australian Red Cross (ARC)
did not want to see Australia use the nine year period to move towards
the new, self-destructive, self-deactivating technology required by the
Protocol. He said Australia should encourage its regional neighbours to
adhere to the Convention, and to the amended Protocol [67]
3.96 Mr Boas also referred to an ICRC study on the
military usefulness of APLs, stating that it concluded there was no circumstance
where landmines had stopped an advance and that there were other means
to achieve the purposes for which APLs were employed. In particular, it
showed that the humanitarian devastation they caused outweighed their
military usefulness. [68]
3.97 Discussing the likelihood of a total ban, Ms
Hoyt noted that very few countries used to be in favour, whereas over
40 now supported the idea, and 50 had supported the Ottawa Declaration
on banning and eliminating APLs. The ICRC was very optimistic about this
momentum, with other nations, including Australia, changing their positions.
The more countries which support a total ban, the more difficult it would
be to import mines. International pressure on this issue should not be
ignored. [69]
3.98 For Austcare, Mr Eric Ellem referred to the burden
that the slow clearance of mines placed on the development of nations
which have problems with large numbers of APLs from previous conflicts.
Austcare also supported a total ban and, as did other organisations and
individuals, saw the amended Protocol only as the first step towards that
goal. [70]
3.99 He reported that Austcare was holding discussions
with a group of engineers who are trying to develop a mine detection unit.
If this work were to be successful, Austcare would be seeking government
support for the development of these units. He also believed that greater
pressure should be placed on manufacturing countries than on those who
used APLs: if they were not available, they would not be used. [71]
3.100 Caritas Australia's Mr Laurie Halloran referred
to the impact on development caused by landmines, and supported a total
ban on APLs and ratification of this Protocol as a first step. He was
aware of a number of shortcomings in the document, but expressed support
for the demining work undertaken by the ADF. Reference was also made to
what was seen as an inconsistency in Australia's approach: setting aside
funds for demining, at the same time as mines were allowed to be made
and laid around the globe. [72]
3.101 Dr Ian Buckley of the MAPW stated that the world
wide trade in and deployment of APLs was an abhorrent situation which
any civilised nation would do its utmost to stop. He said that it was
vital that APLs be stigmatised as totally unacceptable items of commerce
and that there was already in international law a firm foundation for
this position: as indiscriminate weapons, they were prohibited under existing
customary international law irrespective of the treaty commitments of
the States involved. [73]
3.102 Dr Sue Wareham of the MAPW, referring to statement
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, tabling the text of the amended Protocol,
found the position taken was 'quite weak'. She believed that quite forceful,
ethical statements in favour of a total ban were followed by the re-statement
of the intention to retain the stockpile, thus demolishing the earlier
argument. [74]
3.103 The MAPW believed that through promotion of
appropriate international treaties, countries such as Australia which
sincerely wished to solve the problem must redefine their military practices
and, through promotion of treaties, support and strengthen existing humanitarian
law. The Association drew attention to the 'gross inadequacies' in the
amended Protocol, noted by a number of UN bodies and other NGOs. [75]
3.104 The 'most objectionable and totally inappropriate'
feature of the amended Protocol was, according to the MAPW, that it promoted
the continued use of APLs. It encouraged the use of smart mines, providing
that these may be delivered aerially, and permitted nations to continue
to produce, sell, export and deploy as many mines as they pleased providing
some rules were followed. These features, together with the nine year
deferral and military exigency provisions, the MAPW believed, did not
hold out any hope for the current and future victims of landmines. [76]
3.105 This organisation was encouraged by the Canadian
initiative which it saw as having a humanitarian rather than a trade orientation
and therefore having exciting prospects for success. It supported Australian
participation in follow-up conferences, especially that to be hosted by
Canada in December 1997. The MAPW pleaded that, to ensure full effectiveness,
the Protocol should prohibit production, stockpiling, sale, transfer,
and deployment of APLs. The document should provide for registers of production
plants, offshore and domestic, and of stockpiles to allow for inspections
and sanctions. The MAPW hoped that manufacturers and governments responsible
for the mines presently deployed would be obliged under the Protocol to
assist with and bear the cost of mine clearance. [77]
3.106 Finally, the MAPW asked that an increased proportion
of Australia's defence budget be given to landmine clearance in the Third
World. ACFOA and Dr Maley supported this view because it would commit
more Defence resources, human and material, to humanitarian causes, as
well as providing the ADF with significant training benefits. [78]
3.107 Sister Patricia Pak Poy said the Australian
Network of the ICBL comprised a wide range of humanitarian aid agencies,
refugee groups, ethnic communities, churches, church groups, service groups,
students, workers, the young and the old. It called for a total ban on
the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of APLs. It also called
on Australia to give generously to mine clearance and to programs for
the assistance of victims, and wanted Australia's suspension of the operational
use of APLs to be permanent. [79]
3.108 The Network recognised the gains made in the
amended Protocol: tighter restrictions and better standards of detection.
There were, however, 'gross loopholes' which made it unsatisfactory:
- the nine year deferral period;
- the ambiguous definition of mines;
- exceptions for remotely delivered mines, and
- conditions for marking fields and for the protection of humanitarian
organisations.
While the verification mechanism was seen as weak, the Protocol did call
for consultations and an annual review process. [80]
3.109 Commenting on Australia's position, Sister Pak
Poy noted the development from a position stressing the legitimacy, efficiency
and military usefulness of APLs to one of strong support for a total and
global ban, albeit with a condition. This made the nation's position a
compromise and revealed an ambivalence: the reservation of the right to
use APLs seemed to the Network to be based on the premise that these are
legitimate weapons. This could lead to accusations of hypocrisy, and the
Network wanted to see Government rhetoric matched by actions such as the
renunciation of the use of these weapons and a reduction in the stockpile
not needed for training. [81]
3.110 Sister Pak Poy referred to 'a strong body of
military opinion' which held that these weapons were not as strategically
and tactically useful as claimed, a point also made by the ARC, the MAPW
and Dr Maley. She said the NGO community applauded the Canadian initiative,
believing that it promised to hasten a total ban. She also expressed some
concern at the prospect of placing landmines on the agenda of the Conference
on Disarmament because of its slow processes and the restriction of discussions
to member parties. [82]
3.111 Sister Pak Poy expressed the view that Australia
has the potential and capacity to be a catalyst for progress on this issue
in its region, and looked for the policy commitment to further the cause
of a total regional ban to be honoured. She sought a reduction in Australia's
stockpile, active participation in the initiative proposed by Canada and
continued support for mine clearance and assistance to victims of landmines.
[83]
3.112 Major General A Clunies-Ross (RL) of the Returned
and Services League (RSL) mentioned that it was one of the few organisations
in the country whose members had had personal experience of APLs. It was
therefore more aware than most of the horrific nature of the injuries
they caused. It also appreciated the difficulties involved in the formulation
of a document with world wide, practical application. It supported the
Protocol, noting it was the only international agreement which defined
limitations on the use of APLs.
3.113 The RSL condemned the careless and indiscriminate
use of APLs and, were it at all practical, would support a total ban on
their use. It supported the suspension of the operational use of APLs,
taking into account the requirement to protect the ADF, and also the right
to review that policy. It believed there was a possibility APLs would
need to be used in the future and therefore stocks must be maintained
for training and initial use. Australia also needed to remain abreast
of technological developments in the field. [84]
3.114 The amended Protocol was seen as a necessary,
interim measure pending more substantial developments. The RSL believed
there was loose wording in some articles which created significant weaknesses,
and it shared the view of some NGOs, referred to above, that this document
was only a step in the right direction. The major flaw, according to the
RSL, was deferral of compliance for nine years which it believed rendered
the amended Protocol largely ineffective for a substantial period. [85]
3.115 Major General Clunies-Ross stated that APLs
provided an additional capability for military personnel which was only
feasible in defensive situations. Alternative means of protection could
be available but would depend on the range of other, available resources.
There were situations in which commanders would not lay APLs because,
once laid, mine fields become problems to secure properly. [86]
3.116 Dr William Maley also believed that the amended
Protocol was a step forward towards the ultimate goal of getting rid of
these weapons altogether, but saw a number of problems in the international
management of landmines which still needed to be addressed. He thought
that anathematisation as an utterly uncivilised weapon of war would ultimately
be the path by which APLs would disappear. He suggested that a combination
of unilateral steps by countries around the world would put so much pressure
on those continuing to produce these weapons that it would not be in their
political interests to continue. He saw scope for moral suasion to be
applied to some countries importing APLs, although he recognised that
there were some which would simply not be susceptible to such pressures.
[87]
3.117 One of the problems of which he was aware was
the danger of secondary markets. Only about one third of States have adhered
to the IWC, and the amended Protocol did not place any moral pressure
on those who might move away from it and begin producing dumb mines for
use in Third World conflicts. Dr Maley pointed to a situation which could
arise where wealthy countries used smart mines, and there was also an
expanded market in dumb mines for both producers and consumers who could
not afford smart mines. [88]
3.118 Sub-paragraphs 2 (a) and (b) of Article 5 contain
provisions for using dumb mines in some circumstances, but serious problems
can arise when a regular armed force using dumb mines in marked fields
is overrun by an irregular force. The local civilians then returned to
the area of the conflict, where their houses are, and tended to take the
marking fences for other purposes. This caused a major problem in humanitarian
mine clearance: the entanglement of locals in minefields full of non-self
destructing mines. [89]
3.119 Dr Maley did not believe much could be done
about the nine year deferral of compliance with the detectability provision
in the Technical Annex, as this was the shortest period some States were
prepared to accept. He thought it was appropriate to continue to put pressure
on States to adopt a shorter timetable. He did not believe that problems
in the text, such as that with dumb mines, would be best dealt with, and
advantageous for Australia, by ratifying the amended Protocol with reservations.
[90]
3.120 While Dr Maley thought that there was a prospect
for a total ban in 20 to 25 years, he also believed there was a case for
keeping part of Australia's stockpile for training purposes. He said that
this country had an excellent record of contributing to humanitarian mine
clearance operations in countries with significant mine problems. First-rate
work was done in Cambodia and Afghanistan and, referring to the 1993 withdrawal
of ADF personnel from UNMCTT in the latter country, Dr Maley stated that
this was 'an extremely ill-considered decision'. He expressed the view
that it was important that this skill be maintained within the ADF, so
that its personnel received field experience in clearance operations,
and could also give to other nations the benefits of that expertise. [91]
3.121 He was uneasy about retaining the stockpile
specifically to deal with 'a substantial deterioration in our strategic
circumstances', referred to in the joint Ministerial statement. Because
of Australia's geographical position and natural defences, he was not
able to draw up a credible scenario in which mines would be useful. Dr
Maley believed that it was in our interests to relinquish the use of these
weapons and press for a total ban, and he would rather see Australia take
a moral lead than retain these weapons for extremely unlikely strategic
circumstances. [92]
The Committee's views
3.122 While the Australian Parliament has been concerned
about the long term consequences of the use of APLs for some years, revised
treaty-making processes have made it possible for Government departments,
NGOs, other organisations and individuals to place their views before
this Committee.
3.123 In our consideration of this issue, we have
been conscious of the high standing of the ADF, both in its professional
usage of landmines in the past and its more recent humanitarian work in
clearing these weapons in various parts of the world and looking after
the victims.[93]
3.124 APLs should be totally and globally banned because
of their effects on innocent people long after the end of conflict. Evidence
presented to this inquiry showed that fields which are not properly mapped,
marked and fenced aggravate this situation. Changed international attitudes
which led to the signing of the amended Protocol can only be welcomed.
It is also clear that many Australian organisations and individuals see
the document as deeply flawed. In the course of this inquiry, the information
provided by all witnesses was very useful. NGO witnesses, in particular,
were able to bring some of the deficiencies of the document to our attention
in an objective manner, backed by detailed knowledge of the IWC and its
Protocols.
3.125 DFAT and other witnesses used phrases such as
'a step along the way' to describe the amended Protocol II. We believe
that it does make some worthwhile changes to the previous document: it
remains the only international instrument which puts any controls on the
use of APLs, and this version includes tighter restrictions and better
detectability standards. Among other weaknesses, it also includes a deferral
period for compliance with these detectability provisions. While this
was the minimum period some nations would accept, this Protocol should
be seen as only a step in the process leading to a total, world wide ban
on the use of APLs.[94]
3.126 Dr Maley raised the possibility of Australia
expressing a reservation about the operation of Article 5, but noted that
this could be disadvantageous to the Protocol. While not making a recommendation
on the matter, we believe the use of dumb mines in the circumstances cited
by Dr Maley warrants some further investigation and consideration could
be given to a reservation to this Article. If this is not appropriate,
a statement on the subject could be made by Australia at the time of ratification.[95]
3.127 It is clear that the Australian position has
changed greatly and we support continued involvement in such initiatives
as that taken by Canada. The issue of a total ban should continue to be
raised at all appropriate international forums, particularly at the annual
conferences of States' Parties to the IWC and placed on the agenda for
the review conference in 2001.
3.128 We were advised that Australia enacts legislation
only when it falls short of the needs imposed by international obligations,
and that there is no call for additional domestic legislation to implement
this Protocol. We do not accept the argument that it is realistic, or
even possible, to legislate domestically to seek to impose a moral argument
or position on other countries about any international instrument.[96]
3.129 As ACFOA and the ARC observed, a number of nations
in Australia's region have not signed the amended Protocol and opportunities
should be taken during bilateral discussions to further this important
cause. Australia should participate in any regional conferences and give
consideration to organising one if the opportunity arose.[97]
3.130 The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties
recommends that:
The Australian Government take advantage of every opportunity, especially
in the South East Asian and Pacific regions, to encourage other nations
to sign the Inhumane Weapons Convention and all of its Protocols.
3.131 Australia could still be seen to be in a difficult
situation internationally on APLs. While government policy changed significantly
in 1996, the caveat in the joint Ministerial Statement in April 1996 was
significant. It allows for the retention of the APL stockpile in case
our strategic situation deteriorates substantially, and does not do credit
to our overall position on these weapons. This can be set against expressions
of regret, in October 1996, that a total ban was not achieved and that
the amended Protocol did not include stronger restrictions and prohibitions.
These statements also seem to sit uncomfortably with the good work the
ADF has done in such places as Cambodia and Afghanistan, removing mines
and training locals in this dangerous work.[98]
3.132 While they have had a traditional, defensive
role, Major General Clunies-Ross made it clear that APLs were not the
answer to all tactical problems. Furthermore, in the absence of a direct
threat to the continent, and in view of the comments made by Dr Maley
about the strategic circumstances in which mines would be employed, there
seems to be some potential for accusations of a national double standard.[99]
3.133 It would be easy to say that Australia should
destroy its stockpile and have nothing further to do with APLs. The ADF
must however retain the capacity to use landmines because, once lost,
this capacity can not be regained quickly. It must also retain a capacity
to deal with landmines for humanitarian reasons, so as to be able to participate
in demining operations overseas, and because a global ban will not be
effective for some time. For the next few years at least, and depending
on progress towards such a ban, we believe that only a small training
stockpile needs to be retained and replenished as required.[100]
3.134 It was argued that Australia's current position
on retaining the stockpile damaged its international standing on APLs,
and that its position could be seen as hypocritical. If these weapons
were renounced and most of the stockpile destroyed, we believe Australia's
credibility would be enhanced and its views at the December 1997 Ottawa
Conference immeasurably strengthened, and so possibly would the move towards
a total global ban on APLs.[101]
3.135 We have also however considered the evidence
given by an ADF witness on the size of the APL stockpile required to maintain
different levels of capability within the ADF. This evidence was that
only 'modest' stocks would be required to retain capabilities in the use
of APLs. We believe that Australia could retain a small number of APLs,
to ensure it had the necessary capabilities within the ADF, and still
work towards a total global ban.[102]
3.136 We therefore believe that Australia should destroy
its APLs, except for the training stock referred to above. Australia should
formulate a proposal for an international timetable which will lead to
the destruction of the APLs of all nations. It will take time and effort
to get international agreement to the implementation of such a timetable,
but it would be appropriate for Australia to propose that this work begin
at the December 1997 meeting in Canada.
3.137 The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties
recommends that:
Australia destroy its stockpile of anti-personnel landmines, except
for a small number to be retained for training purposes to ensure
that the Australian Defence Force retains its skills, and
Australia prepare for consideration at the December 1997 meeting
in Canada a proposal for the creation of an agreed international timetable
for the destruction of anti-personnel landmines of all nations.
3.138 Australia has already contributed to a range
of demining, mine awareness and rehabilitation programs in five countries.
ACFOA, the MAPW and Dr Maley suggested that the Department of Defence
should contribute more resources to humanitarian mine clearance in countries
which have problems with mine clearance. This would represent a change
from the current situation where most funding for this activity comes
through AusAID.[103]
3.139 There is no reason why Australia should not
participate in such operations overseas, nor does it seem to matter who
pays for this work. If it is being undertaken by the ADF, it could well
be argued that, for both simplicity and function, Defence rather than
AusAID should also control funding for these projects as it does the personnel,
their conditions of service, logistics, etc.
3.140 The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties
recommends that:
The Department of Defence assume full responsibility for humanitarian
mine clearing operations in countries which need assistance and, in
order to increase its humanitarian expertise and to instil and
retain mine clearing knowledge and skills within the Australian Defence
Force, ensure appropriate countries are aware of Australia's continuing
interest in this work.
3.141 Manufacturers have improved APL technology and,
although these weapons are being cleared, the existing de-mining technology
can not deal quickly with all those APLs still potentially lethal in many
countries. Funds have been committed to programs, but the time being taken
means many innocent people will continue to be killed and maimed for many
years. Australian designers and engineers have developed equipment which
will, it appears, speed up the de-mining process while retaining safety
and efficiency and allow previously undetectable mines to be found. Government
assistance was requested to develop the equipment for use in the field.[104]
3.142 The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties
recommends that:
The Department of Defence examine ways by which it can encourage
researchers into and designers of de-mining technology with a
view to assisting financially in the development of safer, faster and
more efficient ways of reducing the number of anti-personnel landmines
throughout the world.
3.143 We believe more use should be made of the skills
of the ADF in humanitarian mine clearing operations, that it is important
for Australia to make contributions to de-mining technology and that work
should begin on an international timetable for the destruction of all
APLs. It should not be forgotten however that, as Ms Hoyt of the ICRC
and Dr Maley pointed out, the goal must be the total global ban on APLs
as soon as practicable.[105]
3.144 The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties
recommends that:
The Australian Government continue its international efforts to achieve
a total global ban on anti-personnel landmines as soon as practicable.
The Committee notes all the information it has received and supports
early ratification of the amended Protocol II to the Inhumane Weapons
Convention as proposed.
W L Taylor MP
Chairman
Footnotes
[1] Transcript, 30 October 1996, pp 5, 6.
[2] Senate, Hansard, 20 November 1996, p 5627;
House of Representatives, Hansard, 20 November 1996, p 7101.
[3] Exhibit No 52.
[4] Exhibit No 55.
[5] Exhibit No 48. See also Transcript, 2 December
1996, pp 65-66.
[6] Article 2; see also Exhibit No 9, pp 13,
12; Transcripts: 2 December 1996, pp 60, 42; 3 December 1996, p 83. The
Exhibit, prepared by the ICRC, is one of many which includes a great deal
of technical information about APLs, including their varieties, tactical
uses, consequences and clearance, which need not be set out here. In this
Report, 'APL/s', 'mines' and 'landmines' will be used interchangeably.
It should be noted that statistics used in discussing this subject vary
from source to source. Where there is no reference, the NIA has been used.
[7] Transcripts: 2 December 1996, p 39; 3 December
1996, p 74.
[8] Transcript, 30 October 1996, p 6; Exhibit
No 9, p 13.
[9] Transcript, 3 December 1996, p 84. A documentary,
Silent Sentinel, Coward's War, shown on Australia's SBS Television on
28 January 1997, included interviews with people injured by APLs, displays
of different types of mines, and showed some being laid in Cambodia, as
well as humanitarian clearance operations.
[10] Transcript, 30 October 1996, p 4; Exhibit
No 2, p i; Transcript, 2 December 1996, p 47.
[11] Exhibit No 9, p 3. See Transcript, 2 December
1996, p 62, for a comment on the time estimated to clear existing APLs.
[12] Transcripts: 30 October 1996, pp 4, 23;
2 December 1996, p 62.
[13] ibid, p 4; Transcript, 2 December 1996,
p 62; Exhibit No 9, p 7.
[14] Transcripts: 2 December 1996, p 36; 3
December 1996, pp 84, 83, 75.
[15] Transcript, 2 December 1996, pp 34, 35-36.
[16] Transcript, 3 December 1996, pp 82, 76,
82-83.
[17] ibid, p 83; 2 December 1996, pp 35, 47.
[18] Exhibit No 21; Transcript, 30 October
1996, pp 4, 6. See also the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Hansard, 15 October 1996, pp 5427-5430.
[19] Transcript, 30 October 1996, p 4.
[20] House of Representatives, Hansard, 15
October 1996, pp 5428, 5429.
[21] Transcript, 3 February 1997, p 105. See
paragraph 3.4 above.
[22] Exhibit No 57, p 5; Transcript, 3 February
1997, p 106.
[23] Exhibit No 57, pp 5-6.
[24] See paragraphs 2.15 to 2.20 above.
[25] Transcript, 30 October 1996, p 28.
[26] Transcripts: 30 October 1996, p 6; 2 December
1996, p 34; 6 December 1996, pp 90-91.
[27] ibid, p 91; Transcript, 3 February 1997,
p 113.
[28] Transcripts: 2 December 1996, pp 43, 44,
53; 3 December 1996, pp 79-80, 85.
[29] Transcripts: 30 October 1996, pp 18-19;
3 February 1997, p 107.
[30] Transcript, 6 December 1996, pp 91-93.
[31] Transcripts: 30 October 1996, p 19; 6
December 1996, pp 92-93, 94.
[32] Transcript, 3 February 1997, p 108.
[33] ibid; Transcript, 30 October 1996, p 28.
[34] Transcript, 3 February 1997, p 110; Submissions,
pp 24-25. $A0.510 million was also given for such things as global funds
and for attendance at meetings by NGO representatives.
[35] Transcripts: 3 February 1997, pp 109-110;
30 October 1996, p 27; House of Representatives, Hansard, 15 October 1996,
p 5429; Submissions, pp 24-25.
[36] Transcript, 3 February 1997, p 109.
[37] Submissions, pp 16-18; Transcript, 3 February
1997, p 110.
[38] Transcript, 30 October 1996, pp 22, 28-29;
Submissions, p 3. See Exhibit No 35 for a report about the alleged use
of APLs on Bougainville in 1996.
[39] House of Representatives, Hansard, 15
October 1996, p 5429; Exhibit No 57, p 5. See also Transcripts: 2 December
1996, pp 43, 53-54; 6 December 1996, p 94, for other mentions of this
subject.
[40] Submissions, pp 22, 23; Transcript, 3
February 1997, pp 111-112.
[41] Submissions, p 23. Transcripts: 6 December
1996, p 94; 3 February 1997, pp 112, 114.
[42] ibid.
[43] Transcript, 3 February 1997, pp 114-115.
[44] ibid, p 114.
[45] Submissions, p 23; Transcript, 3 February
1997, p 115.
[46] Transcript, 30 October 1996, p 24.
[47] Unless otherwise indicated, material in
this section comes from ibid, pp 23-25.
[48] Transcript, 3 February 1997, p 109.
[49] Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade, United Nations Peacekeeping and Australia, May 1991,
pp 20, 64, 82.
[50] JCFADT, A Review of Australia's Efforts
to Promote and Protect Human Rights, December 1992, Recommendation 14,
pp 56-57.
[51] JSCFADT, The Implications of Australian
Defence Exports, September 1994, p 84.
[52] JSCFADT, A Review of Australia's Efforts
to Promote and Protect Human Rights, November 1994, pp 79-81 (Recommendation
22) 87-88, 89-94, 102-105 (Recommendation 27).
[53] JSCFADT, Australia's Participation in
Peacekeeping, December 1994, 30-31; Appendix 5, pp 153-155.
[54] ibid, pp 41-43. See Transcript, 3 December
1996, pp 79-80, 85-86, and paragraph 3.120 below.
[55] JSCFADT, 1994, op cit, pp 96, 128.
[56] Report of a Parliamentary Delegation to
the Kingdom of Cambodia, January 1996, pp 11-12.
[57] ibid, p 12.
[58] Australia's Relations with Southern Africa,
November 1996, pp 138-142 (Recommendations 38 and 39).
[59] Transcript, 2 December 1996, pp 33-34,
41, 44-45.
[60] Transcript, 2 December 1996, pp 33-34,
44, 41; see paragraph 3.47 above.
[61] Transcript, 2 December 1996, p 34; Exhibit
No 33, p 3; Transcript, 3 February 1997, p 112. See also Transcript, 30
October 1996, pp 17, 38.
[62] Transcript, 2 December 1996, pp 38, 40,
56.
[63] Transcript, 2 December 1996, p 35.
[64] Transcripts: ibid, pp 34-35, 48, 39; 3
December 1996, p 81. 'Smart' and 'dumb' mines were briefly described in
paragraph 3.26 above.
[65] Transcripts: 2 December 1996, p 38; 3
February 1997, pp 104-105.
[66] Transcript, 2 December 1996, p 38.
[67] ibid, p 37.
[68] ibid, p 41, referring to Exhibit No 19.
See also Exhibit No 53, p 60.
[69] Transcript, 2 December 1996, pp 40-41.
[70] ibid, pp 35-36, 43, 44. See also Transcripts:
30 October 1996, p 5, for DFAT's use of the phrase; 2 December 1996, pp
35, 51, 63, 67, 70, and 3 December 1996, p 75, for other uses.
[71] Transcript, 2 December 1996, pp 43, 45;
Submissions, p 1.
[72] Transcript, 2 December 1996, pp 36-37.
[73] ibid, p 47.
[74] ibid, p 59.
[75] ibid, pp 47-48.
[76] ibid, p 48.
[77] ibid.
[78] ibid, pp 53, 44; Transcript, 3 December
1996, p 85.
[79] Transcript, 2 December 1996, p 49.
[80] ibid, pp 49-50.
[81] ibid, pp 50-51.
[82] ibid, pp 41, 50-51, 55, 57, referring
to Exhibit No 19; Transcript, 3 December 1996, p 78. See Transcript, 30
October 1996, pp 16-17, for DFAT comments on the Canadian initiative and
the Conference on Disarmament mechanisms.
[83] Transcript, 2 December 1996, pp 51-52.
[84] ibid, pp 64, 68.
[85] ibid, pp 65, 70.
[86] ibid, pp 70, 68.
[87] Transcript, 3 December 1996, pp 85, 74,
75, 78. For the 'moral force' argument, see also Transcript, 2 December
1996, pp 41, 44-45, 60.
[88] Transcript, 3 December 1996, p 74.
[89] ibid, pp 74-75.
[90] ibid, pp 75-76, 77.
[91] ibid, pp 78, 79-80, 85-86. See paragraph
3.80 above.
[92] Transcript, 3 December 1996, pp 81-82.
Exhibit No 21.
[93] See paragraphs 3.49 and 3.57 above.
[94] See Footnote 70 above for references to
uses of the phrase 'a step along the way'.
[95] See paragraph 3.119 above.
[96] See paragraph 3.67 above.
[97] See paragraphs 3.89 and 3.95 above.
[98] Exhibit No 21; House of Representatives,
Hansard, 15 October 1996, p 5428.
[99] See paragraphs 3.115 and 3.121 above respectively.
[100] See paragraph 3.54 above.
[102] See paragraph 3.53 above.
[103] See paragraph 3.106 above.
[104] See paragraphs 3.60 to 3.66 and 3.99
above.
[105] See paragraphs 3.92 and 3.116 above
respectively.
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