Criminal Code Amendment (Slavery and Sexual Servitude) Bill 1999

Introduction

The Committee dealt with this bill in Alert Digest No. 5 of 1999, in which it made various comments. The Minister for Justice and Customs has responded to those comments in a letter dated 27 April 1999. A copy of the letter is attached to this report. An extract from the Alert Digest and relevant parts of the Minister's response are discussed below.

Extract from Alert Digest No. 5 of 1999

This bill was introduced into the Senate on 24 March 1999 by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts. [Portfolio responsibility: Justice and Customs]

The bill proposes to:

• amend the Criminal Code Act 1995 to create offences relating to slavery, sexual servitude and deceptive recruiting for sexual services; and
• repeal 6 Imperial Acts relating to slavery that still apply in Australia.

Penalties, definitions and the reversal of the onus of proof

Proposed new sections 270.1 and 270.3

Item 1 of Schedule 1 to this bill proposes to insert a new Division 270 in the Criminal Code. This new Division includes proposed section 270.3, which deals with slavery offences.

Proposed subsection 270.1 defines slavery as “the condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised, including where such a condition results from a debt or contract made by the person”. Proposed subsection 270.3(1) makes it an offence to possess a slave or exercise over a slave any of the other powers attaching to the right of ownership, or to engage in slave trading. The maximum penalty for this offence is imprisonment for 25 years.

Proposed subsection 270.3(3) states that a person who enters into a transaction with the intention of securing the release of a person from slavery is not guilty of an offence against the section. Proposed subsection 270.4(4) states that the defendant bears the legal burden of proving this matter. The Explanatory Memorandum notes that the effect of this provision is that, to establish the defence, the defendant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, that his or her intention was to release the person.

These provisions raise a number of issues. First, it is clear that the penalties to be imposed for slavery offences are significant, as, indeed, are the penalties for all the offences created by this bill. The Committee would appreciate some further advice about where these penalties stand in relation to the general range of penalties for similarly serious offences.

Secondly, the Committee would appreciate some further advice regarding the statutory definition of `slavery' – in particular, some indication of the range of situations to which it is intended to apply. The Committee notes that the Explanatory Memorandum states that whether a person is a slave “is a matter to be determined by the courts on a case by case basis” and that “slavery is more than merely the exploitation of another… it is where the power a person exercises over another effectively amounts to the power a person would exercise over property he or she owns”. For example, given that slavery may arise “from a debt owed or contract entered into by the enslaved person”, is the bill intended to apply to situations of forced labour in `sweatshops'?

Thirdly, the Committee notes that subclause 270.3 provides a defence of entering into a transaction “with the intention of releasing [a] person from slavery”. The defendant bears the legal burden of proving this defence. The Committee usually queries such reversals of the onus of proof, and would appreciate some further advice on the reason for its reversal in this instance. In particular, the Committee would appreciate advice on the reason for including this as a specific defence, and for imposing a “legal burden” on the defendant – in these circumstances, is a “legal burden” different from an evidential burden?

The Committee would also appreciate advice on the relationship between the intention to be proved by the prosecution in proving all the elements of the offence, and the intention to be proved by the defendant in proving this defence. For example, the Committee observes that a person charged with murder, where the issue of self-defence arises, cannot be convicted unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that he or she did not act in self defence. Similarly, a person charged with rape cannot be convicted unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that that person believed that the alleged victim was not consenting. This bill seems to impose a different burden on the prosecution in proving intent.

Therefore, the Committee seeks the Minister's advice about these matters.

Pending the Minister's advice, the Committee draws Senators' attention to this provision, as it may be considered to trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties in breach of principle (1)(a)(i) of the Committee's terms of reference.

Relevant extract from the response from the Minister

The offences in the Bill and the penalties that apply are based on the offences and penalties recommended by the Model Criminal Code Officers Committee ('MCCOC'), of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, in its final report on "Offences Against Humanity - Slavery". The report was prepared after nationwide consultation and forms part of the Model Criminal Code Project, which aims to ensure greater uniformity in criminal law across Australia.

Penalties

In recommending the level of penalties that should apply to the offences in the Bill MCCOC sought to achieve consistency with penalties for offences of comparable seriousness. In the case of the slavery offences, the recommended maximum penalty of 25 years imprisonment is the same as the penalty recommended by MCCOC for manslaughter and aggravated causing of serious harm. It is also appropriately higher than its recommended penalty for aggravated kidnapping (that is, 19 years). I note also that the penalty recommended by the Australian Law Reform Commission for the modern slavery offences was life imprisonment.

With regard to the sexual servitude offences, MCCOC considered the maximum penalty it recommended (in its report on "Sexual Offences Against the Person") for the basic sexual offence of penetration without consent (ie 15 years imprisonment) and concluded that the same maximum penalty is appropriate for those offences.

The deceptive recruiting offence is significantly less serious than slavery and sexual servitude. It relates to the method of recruiting sex workers and does not involve actually forcing or threatening a person to provide sexual services. MCCOC considered that the consequences of this offence has similarities with the level of harm a person may suffer as a result of fraud or deception, for which it has recommended a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. However, because in its worst form fraud can involve much more serious consequences and multiple victims, the lesser maximum penalty of 7 years imprisonment was considered more appropriate for the deceptive recruiting offence.

The Bill includes an aggravated offence provision which allows the court to impose higher penalties for the sexual servitude and deceptive recruiting offences, where the victim is under the age of 18 years. This approach is consistent with the approach MCCOC has taken in relation to other Chapters of the Code including, the Chapters relating "Non Fatal Offences Against the Person" and "Serious Drug Offences".

The definition of slavery and forced labour

The slavery offences in the Bill are intended to apply in all cases where a person exercises any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over another. Therefore, if the circumstances of a person's forced labour (or sexual servitude) are such that she or he is dealt with as though she or he is the property of another, the slavery offences will apply.

As far as I am aware there is no settled exhaustive list of all of the rights of ownership. However, some of the more "standard" rights are identified by A.M. Honore, in an article in the Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence. They include the right to possess, the right to manage (ie the right to decide how and by whom a thing owned shall be used), the right to the income and capital derived from the thing owned, the right to security (ie to retain the thing whilst ever the owner is solvent) and the right to transmit your interest to successors. Therefore if, for example, a person is forced to work for another without receiving any reward for her or his labour, it is likely that the court would find that the person is a slave.

Reversal of the Onus of Proof

In my view the reversal of the onus of proof in relation to the defence of releasing a slave is consistent with the Committee's policy on this issue. Although it is not generally appropriate to place the legal burden on the accused to prove a defence, in some cases it may be appropriate if the matter to be proved is peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, and it would be extremely difficult and costly for the prosecution to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, the matter in issue is the motive of the accused in entering into the relevant transaction. This is something that will be peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused and very difficult (and in some cases very costly) for the prosecution to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt.

The difference between the legal and evidential burden of proof is set out in Part 2.6 of the Criminal Code. In this case the legal burden on the accused is to prove on the balance of probabilities that she or he entered into the transaction to release the slave (ss13.1(3), 13.4 and 13.5). If only the evidential burden applied the accused would simply have to adduce or point to evidence that suggested a reasonable possibility that she or he had that motive (s13.6), and the prosecution would have to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. In many cases it will be relatively easy for an accused to fabricate a story that she or he (say) purchased the slave to release her or him and, extremely difficult (and in some cases almost impossible) to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly I believe that reversing the legal burden of proof in this case is justified.

With regard to Committee's final comments, the reference to 'intention' in the defence provision (subsection 270.3(3)) is not to intention as a fault element but rather to the person's motive in acting. Accordingly, to establish the slavery offences the prosecution will need to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally engaged in the conduct specified in paragraphs 270.3 (1)(a) or (b) (eg that the defendant meant to possess a person that he or she knew to be a slave). However, if the prosecution succeeds in demonstrating this, the accused will still escape liability if she or he proves on the balance of probabilities that her or his motive was to release the slave.

I should say finally that I do not consider the parallels the Committee draws between the proposed defence and the requirement that the prosecution prove absence of consent on a charge of rape is particularly apt. The actual conduct involved in the offence of rape is not, per se, criminal. It is only made criminal where the act of sexual intercourse is committed in the circumstances where the defendant is aware that the victim is not consenting or is reckless as to that matter. In contrast, the conduct involved in an offence under proposed section 270.3(1) is intrinsically criminal ie proposed section 270.3.(3) constitutes an exception to what would otherwise be criminal conduct.

I trust this meets the concerns of the Committee.

The Committee thanks the Minister for this considered response.

Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Bill 1998

Introduction

The Committee dealt with this bill in Alert Digest No. 10 of 1998, in which it made various comments. The Minister for the Environment and Heritage has responded to those comments in a letter dated 28 April 1999. A copy of the letter is attached to this report. An extract from the Alert Digest and relevant parts of the Minister's response are discussed below.

Extract from Alert Digest No. 10 of 1998

This bill was introduced into the Senate on 12 November 1998 by the Assistant Treasurer. [Portfolio responsibility: Environment and Heritage]

The bill proposes to implement the 1997 Council of Australian Governments Agreement relating to the Commonwealth's role by reference to certain matters of national environmental significance. Primarily, the bill:

• introduces assessment and approval processes that apply to actions which will or are likely to have a significant impact on world heritage properties, certain Ramsar wetlands, nationally threatened species and communities, certain migratory species, nuclear actions, the Commonwealth marine environment, any additional matter specified by regulation, including actions on Commonwealth lands and actions by the Commonwealth and Commonwealth agencies;
• empower the Minister to enter into bilateral agreements with States or Territories in relation to actions impacting upon matters of national environmental significance;
• provides for the establishment of lists of nationally threatened native species and ecological communities, key threatening processes, internationally protected migratory species, and marine species;
• establishes the Australian Whale Sanctuary;
• regulates certain activities in Commonwealth areas which affect whales and dolphins, listed species and listed ecological communities;
• requires the Minister to prepare recovery plans for listed threatened species and communities and to prepare threat abatement plans for listed key threatening processes;
• specifies steps to be followed before a property can be nominated as a world heritage property or designated as a Ramsar wetland;
• empower the Minister to enter into conservation agreements with private landholders;
• enables regulations to be made about access to biological resources on Commonwealth land and waters; and
• replaces the Endangered Species Protection Act 1992, Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974, National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1975, Whale Protection Act 1980 and World Heritage (Properties Conservation) Act 1983.

Non-disallowable declarations

Clause 33

Clause 33 of this bill gives the Minister power to make various declarations. The Committee believes that some of these declarations are legislative in character. However, the bill does not provide for their scrutiny by the Parliament.

Accordingly, the Committee seeks the advice of the Minister on the reasons why the declarations which may be made under clause 33 are not disallowable instruments.

Pending the Minister's advice, the Committee draws Senators' attention to the provision, as it may be considered to insufficiently subject the exercise of legislative power to Parliamentary scrutiny, in breach of principle 1(a)(v) of the Committee's terms of reference.

Relevant extract from the response from the Minister

The Bill is intended to establish an efficient and timely Commonwealth environmental assessment and approval process that will ensure activities that are likely to have significant impacts on the environment are properly assessed. A key aspect of the Bill is that it provides for formal mechanisms to accredit Commonwealth and State environmental assessment and approval processes which meet prescribed standards or criteria. Accreditation will significantly streamline Commonwealth processes and reduce duplication between the Commonwealth and the States and between Commonwealth agencies. Declarations made under clause 33 provide the mechanism for accrediting specified processes of the Commonwealth or of specified Commonwealth agencies.

I do not consider that declarations under clause 33 are sufficiently legislative in character to be considered disallowable instruments. The declarations will neither determine the content of the law nor have general application, as they merely provide the means for applying a general mechanism for accreditation.

Clause 33 includes safeguards to ensure that accredited processes are consistent with the intent of the Bill. Under subclause 33(2) the Minister may make a declaration only if he or she is satisfied that the impacts of an action on relevant aspects of the environment protected by Part 3 of the Bill will be considered in deciding whether to approve that action. Under clause 33(3) Commonwealth laws and instruments which are, in effect, accredited under a declaration must meet any prescribed standards. As regulations these standards will be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny and be disallowable.

The Committee thanks the Minister for this response.

Strict liability offences

Subclauses 196(3), 211(3), 229(3), 236(1) and 254(3)

A number of provisions in the bill create criminal offences of strict liability. In each case, the Explanatory Memorandum does not provide a reason for imposing strict liability.

Accordingly, the Committee seeks the advice of the Minister on the reasons why the offences in subclauses 196(3), 211(3), 229(3), 236(1) and 254(3) are declared to be offences of strict liability, particularly given the levels of penalty imposed.

Pending the Minister's advice, the Committee draws Senators' attention to the provisions, as they may be considered to trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties, in breach of principle 1(a)(i) of the Committee's terms of reference.

Relevant extract from the response from the Minister

The Committee also sought advice on how appropriate penalties were determined for offences under the Bill, particularly for the strict liability offences.

The penalties for many of the offences in the Bill were based on those in existing Acts which are to be replaced by the Bill. In some cases, these penalties were increased to ensure consistency with more recent environment legislation or to strengthen the deterrence provided by the penalties where necessary. Relevant offences from existing Acts and proposed new offences were analysed according to a number of categories, with a view to ensuring that penalties in the Bill: are fair and appropriate; reflect the seriousness of the offences, particularly their impact on achieving the objects of the Act and their impact on the environment; reflect community attitudes; reflect the level of criminal responsibility involved; are consistent within the Bill; and where appropriate, are consistent with penalties for offences in other Commonwealth legislation or, in some cases, State legislation. The Bill also contains a balance of civil penalties and custodial and non-custodial sanctions for criminal offences. Advice on the construction of offence provisions and penalty levels was sought from Attorney-General's Department.

Penalties for the strict liability offences mentioned in the Alert Digest were determined in this context. Subclause 236(1) contains a penalty of 500 penalty units, which is equivalent to the penalty applying to the corresponding offence in the Whale Protection Act 1980 (($50,000) and a similar offence in section 102 of the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (500 penalty units). A higher penalty level of 1000 penalty units applies to subclauses 196(3), 211(3) 229(3) and 254(3), as these offences result in more direct and serious impacts on the environment and involve higher levels of criminal intent.

I will write to you again shortly to address the comments made by the Committee in relation to the strict liability offences contained in subclauses 196(3), 211(3), 229(3), 236(1) and 254(3) of the Bill.

The Committee thanks the Minister for this response, noting that further correspondence will be forthcoming.

Reversal of the onus of proof

Clauses 235, 255, and 492

A number of provisions in the bill expressly impose an evidential burden on a defendant to criminal charges. These provisions require a defendant wishing to escape liability to show the existence of certain circumstances. These circumstances include some matters which may be within the specific knowledge of the defendant (eg. the taking of actions that are reasonably necessary to deal with an emergency, or that occur as a result of an unavoidable accident). Other circumstances seem less likely to be within the defendant's specific knowledge (eg. the taking of actions which are covered by a relevant Ministerial declaration). The Explanatory Memorandum does not provide a reason for imposing an evidential burden on the defendant in these circumstances.

Accordingly, the Committee seeks the advice of the Minister on the reasons why clauses 235, 255 and 492 impose an evidential burden on a defendant in the circumstances set out.

Pending the Minister's advice, the Committee draws Senators' attention to the provisions, as they may be considered to trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties, in breach of principle 1(a)(i) of the Committee's terms of reference.

Relevant extract from the response of the Minister

The intention of these provisions is to qualify offence provisions relating to possessing or treating unlawfully imported cetaceans, taking listed marine species, and providing false or misleading information. The provisions establish specific statutory defences, with the defendant bearing the evidential burden.

The Committee has suggested that the circumstances covered by these provisions may not be within the specific knowledge of the defendant, such as whether the taking of an action is covered by a Ministerial declaration. In all cases, the defences involve matters which should be within the specific knowledge of the defendant. For example subclause 33(1) provides an exception for classes of actions covered by declarations identified wholly or partly by reference to the fact that their taking has been approved by the Commonwealth or a specified Commonwealth agency in a specified manner. A defendant would require some form of approval by the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth agency to carry out an action identified in a declaration and would necessarily be aware of that fact. A similar argument applies to actions which are authorised under a permit, a recovery plan, a wildlife conservation plan, or an approval under Part 9 of the Bill.

Clause 492 qualifies the offences of providing false and misleading information created in clauses 489, 490 and 491. The offences apply only where a person provides information or a document and knows that, or is reckless as to whether, the information or document is false or misleading. Clause 492 provides a defence where the defendant has explained to the recipient that the information or document was false or misleading and has indicated how it was false and misleading. Knowledge of whether a document provided by the defendant is false or misleading will be within the defendant's specific knowledge.

The Committee thanks the Minister for this response.

Youth Allowance Consolidation Bill 1999

Introduction

The Committee dealt with this bill in Alert Digest No. 2 of 1999, in which it made various comments. The Minister for Family and Community Services has responded to those comments in a letter dated 5 March 1999. A copy of the letter is attached to this report. An extract from the Alert Digest and relevant parts of the Minister's response are discussed below.

Extract from Alert Digest No. 2 of 1999

This bill was introduced into the House of Representatives on 11 February 1999 by the Minister for Community Services. [Portfolio responsibility: Family and Community Services]

The bill proposes to amend the:

• Social Security Act 1991 to incorporate provisions contained in the Social Security (Fares Allowance) Rules 1998, Social Security Student Financial Supplement Scheme 1998, the Social Security (Family Actual Means Test) Regulations 1998; and
• Social Security Act 1991 and five other Acts to make consequential and technical amendments related to the implementation of the youth allowance package.

Retrospective effect

Subclauses 2(3) to (13)

Schedule 4 to this bill proposes to amend the Social Security Act 1991 “to address certain technical issues identified during the implementation of the youth allowance package”. The Explanatory Memorandum notes that these amendments make “minor drafting clarifications and technical refinements to ensure that the youth allowance package operates in line with the original policy intentions, including the alignment where appropriate with the pre-existing AUSTUDY provisions”. By virtue of subclauses 2(3) to (13), the items in Part 2 of Schedule 4 are to be taken to have commenced at various times on 1 July 1998.

Schedule 5 to the bill amends legislation other than the Social Security Act to reflect the new placement and structure of the student financial supplement scheme provisions. By virtue of subclause 2(3), Part 2 of Schedule 5 is also to be taken to have commenced on 1 July 1998.

By virtue of subclause 2(14), Part 3 of Schedule 4 is to be taken to have commenced on 20 September 1998, and by virtue of subclause 2(15), Part 4 of Schedule 4 is to be taken to have commenced on 1 January 1999.

While it is likely that the various amendments proposed in these Schedules are technical or consequential, and make no substantive change to the law, the Explanatory Memorandum does not clarify the need for retrospectivity. The Committee, therefore, seeks the Minister's advice on the need for retrospectivity in the application of Schedules 4 and 5 of the bill.

Pending the Minister's advice, the Committee draws Senators' attention to the provisions, as they may be considered to trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties in breach of principle 1(a)(i) of the Committee's terms of reference.

Relevant extract from the response from the Minister

These amendments are essentially to fine-tune the large and complex youth allowance package. They make minor drafting clarifications and technical refinements to ensure that the youth allowance package operates in line with the original policy intentions, including the alignment where appropriate with the pre-existing AUSTUDY provisions. That is, the amendments are either:

• to refine provisions in line with the original policy intent;
• for necessary alignment with other programs and provisions;
  • to close technical loopholes or clarify the operation of the existing provisions; or
• to make minor technical corrections and drafting refinements.

The amendments that carry retrospective effect in this way do not adversely affect customers. Their effect is technically either beneficial or neutral. Accordingly, the retrospectivity is to give customers the full benefit of the intended operation of the substantive provisions. A full description of what each amendment achieves is contained in the Explanatory Memorandum for the Bill.

The Committee thanks the Minister for this response.

Use of tax file numbers

Proposed new sections 1061ZZBP and 1061ZZBQ

Schedule 2 to this bill proposes to amend the Social Security Act 1991 (the Act) to incorporate the student financial supplement provisions currently contained in separate legislation. The Explanatory Memorandum notes that, for the most part, “there is no change in effect between the provisions of the Financial Supplement Scheme and those of the new Chapter 2B [of the Social Security Act]”.

Among the provisions to be incorporated in Chapter 2B of the Act are proposed new sections 1061ZZBP and 1061ZZBQ. These sections, if enacted, would make the payment of financial assistance to category 2 students conditional upon the recipient providing either his or her tax file number, or that of his or her parent or parents.

With regard to these provisions, the Explanatory Memorandum states that “the tax file number provisions have been put into the standard Social Security Act form”. It further states that “these provisions are applicable only to category 2 students because category 1 students are already subject to such rules under their substantive payments”.

The Committee recognises that these clauses are not new, and have been included to minimise the opportunity for fraud against the Commonwealth. The provision of a tax file number is now a common requirement throughout social security (and other related) legislation. However, the Committee notes the words of the then Treasurer in the Parliament on 25 May 1988 when referring to the proposed introduction of the tax file number scheme:

The only purpose of the file number will be to make it easier for the Tax Office to match information it receives about money earned and interest payments.

The system is for the exclusive and limited use of the Tax Office - it will simple allow the better use of information the Tax Office already receives.

The Committee also notes the words of the then member for Kooyong in the Parliament on 21 December 1990, that “since the inception of the tax file number in 1988 as an identifying system, we have seen the gradual extension of that system to other areas by way of a process sometimes referred to as function creep”.

This process has continued and grown over a number of years, irrespective of the governing party of the day, and in spite of assurances that it would not occur. The provisions of this bill represent yet another example of this process.

In these circumstances, the Committee draws Senators' attention to the provisions, as they may be considered to trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties in breach of principle 1(a)(i) of the Committee's terms of reference.

Relevant extract from the response from the Minister

The second group of comments made by your Committee concerns a requirement for a person to provide tax file numbers (TFNs). This requirement is part of the provisions, relocated from a disallowable instrument in the Social Security Act 1991 (the Social Security Act) by this Bill, relating to the student financial supplement scheme as it applies to category 2 students. Your Committee has expressed concern that this requirement, while included to minimise the opportunity for fraud against the Commonwealth, may be considered to trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties in breach of principle 1(a)(i) of the Committee's terms of reference.

Whether a person is eligible for financial supplement as a category 2 student depends, among other things, on the person being excluded from receiving youth allowance only because of either the parental income test or the family actual means test. Furthermore, during the period of that exclusion, the person's combined parental income or family actual means must remain below a certain threshold level (currently $55,350). Beyond this, a category 2 student must satisfy all of the usual youth allowance eligibility criteria, including the personal income test. For these reasons, details of the student's and his or her parents' income and actual means are vital in assessing eligibility for financial supplement.

Under a data-matching program provided by the Data-matching Program (Assistance and Tax) Act 1990, certain income details disclosed by people to Centrelink for social security purposes are checked automatically against income disclosed to the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) and other paying agencies. The income details checked include, for youth allowance family actual means test purposes, involvement in a business, partnership or trust.

People who are eligible for the student financial supplement scheme as category 1 students must be receiving one of the existing Social Security Act student payments (youth allowance, austudy payment or pensioner education supplement). Therefore, such people are already subject to TFN provisions through their substantive student payment. Category 2 students are not so subject because they are not actually receiving a current payment.

Some customers will be exempted (temporarily or indefinitely) from being requested to provide a TFN (for example, a person with no income, where a person is in a natural disaster zone or a remote area, or when the parent is not contactable or is violent).

Some customers who do not have a TFN can be assisted by Centrelink, as the TFN provisions enable Centrelink to accept TFN applications on behalf of the ATO and conduct necessary proof of identity checks. This approach provides an opportunity for Centrelink to assist those customers who may have problems with obtaining a TFN because of proof of identity requirements. As Centrelink conducts its own proof of identity checks, this practice would not constitute any increased intrusiveness from the customer's point of view. Centrelink's involvement in the TFN application process should be beneficial to disabled people, people with language difficulties or new entrants to the workforce.

The use of TFNs actually decreases the chance that a person will be identified during the process of data-matching. If Centrelink were unable to use TFNs, data-matching would require Centrelink to obtain a list of all taxpayers from the ATO and then conduct a data-matching exercise against the list of all taxpayers. By using TFNs, Centrelink compares ATO income and actual means details only in respect of social security customers rather than all taxpayers.

The requests to provide TFNs as a condition of payment of student financial supplement to category 2 students are consistent with the requirements that apply to existing programs administered by Centrelink on behalf of the Department. It should also be noted that the TFN provisions included in the Bill merely replicate arrangements already in place for category 2 students under the current disallowable instrument (the Social Security Student Financial Supplement Scheme 1998) and the current version of Chapter 2B of the Social Security Act. The Bill aims merely to house all relevant provisions in the Social Security Act itself and to put the provisions into a standard form.

The Committee thanks the Minister for this response.

Barney Cooney

Chairman