1. Introduction and background

1.1
The Joint Select Committee on Road Safety (the committee) was established by a resolution of appointment that was passed by the House of Representatives on 25 February 2021 and the Senate on 15 March 2021.1
1.2
The committee’s inquiry builds on the work of the previous Joint Select Committee on Road Safety (previous committee), which tabled its final report on 30 October 2020.
1.3
The committee’s resolution of appointment requires the committee to inquire into and report on:
(a)
measures to support the Australian Parliament’s ongoing resolve to eliminate road crash fatal and serious injuries with a focus on ways to achieving Vision Zero by 2050;
(b)
the effectiveness of existing road safety programs across Australia; opportunities to improve them and encourage broader take-up of effective approaches;
(c)
opportunities for government policy in health, education, industry, transport, and other areas to contribute to road trauma elimination, integrating Safe System principles;
(d)
opportunities to embed road trauma prevention across Australian Government portfolios and agencies; and
(e)
opportunities to reduce road trauma in the workplace, working with Work Health and Safety agencies and employers across Australia; including a focus on heavy vehicles and the gig economy.
1.4
The committee’s resolution of appointment requires the committee to present a report to the Parliament on or before 1 July 2022.

Conduct of the inquiry

1.5
Information about the inquiry was made available on the committee’s website. In accordance with standard practice, the committee wrote to Commonwealth, state, territory, and local government agencies, industry groups, research organisations, peak bodies, insurance agencies, and community stakeholders to invite submissions. Submissions were also welcomed from members of the public.
1.6
The committee received 79 submissions. These are listed in Appendix A and are available on the committee’s website.
1.7
The committee also conducted eight public hearings on the following dates:
13, 29, and 30 September 2021.
6, 7, 12, and 14 October 2021.
14 December 2021.
1.8
Due to restrictions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, the committee’s public hearings were based in Canberra and conducted remotely by videoconference and teleconference.
1.9
Transcripts for the hearings, along with answers to questions on notice and additional information, are available on the committee’s website. Witnesses who provided evidence at the hearings are listed in Appendix B.

Report structure

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This report is divided into 10 chapters, as follows:
Chapter 1 (this chapter) outlines the referral and conduct of the inquiry and provides information on road trauma in Australia. It also provides an overview of the Safe System approach, introduces the Office of Road Safety (ORS) and the National Road Safety Strategy 2021–2030 (NRSS 2021-30), and provides an overview of recent inquiries into road safety.
Chapter 2 examines the importance of leadership, data, and research to road safety outcomes. This foregrounds consideration in subsequent chapters of areas where road safety can be enhanced—for example via safer vehicles, training and education, and safer road infrastructure.
Chapter 3 examines infrastructure and its connection with road safety, with a focus on infrastructure design. It also covers specific road safety treatments, infrastructure in regional and remote areas, safety measures for vulnerable road users, and measures to encourage active travel.
Chapter 4 examines funding for road safety initiatives and infrastructure projects. It covers federal road safety investment programs, distribution of funding between metropolitan and regional areas, funding for local government, and infrastructure funding linked to safety improvements and the provision of data.
Chapter 5 examines vehicle safety features and measures to encourage their uptake. It also considers associated matters such as education on the function of and risks of certain safety features, electric vehicles, connected and autonomous vehicles, and motor vehicle insurance.
Chapter 6 examines the contribution of speed, distraction, and drug and alcohol use to road trauma, as well as measures to reduce the incidence and impact of dangerous behaviours.
Chapter 7 examines driver training, licensing restrictions, ongoing fitness to drive, and public awareness of road safety issues.
Chapter 8 examines measures to improve road safety in the workplace, with a focus on embedding road safety as part of workplace culture. It also considers measures to improve safety for road workers and for gig economy workers—with a focus on delivery riders.
Chapter 9 examines road safety in the heavy vehicle sector. It covers vehicle safety features, data, safety management processes, fatigue, commercial incentives to unsafe behaviour, and driver health.
Chapter 10 examines measures to improve post-crash response and trauma care, with a focus on enhancing trauma services and response times (particularly for regional and remote areas) and improving the support available to first responders.
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The report makes 61 recommendations that aim to improve road safety in Australia. These are listed at the start of the report and are included throughout with discussion of the committee’s views on relevant matters.

Road trauma in Australia

1.12
Between 2011 and 2021, 1,100 to 1,300 people were fatally injured each year on Australian roads.2 A far greater number were seriously injured, with the Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics (BITRE) reporting that between 2017–18 and 2019–20, there were an average of 40,472 hospitalisations each year due to road crashes. In 2018–19, over 10,000 of these cases were categorised as having life-threatening injuries.3
1.13
As outlined in Figure 1.1, the decade to 2020 saw a progressive decline in road fatalities per year, from 1,277 in 2011 to 1,106 in 2020. This trend was not uniform, but the total reduction was 13.4 per cent. By contrast, injuries increased over the five years to 2018. Injury rates per 100,000 population are approximately 35 times higher than fatality rates.4

Figure 1.1:  Trends in road fatalities 2011–2020

Source: BITRE, Road Trauma Australia: 2020 statistical summary, 31 August 2021, p. 2
1.14
Evidence suggests that reductions in fatal injuries have stalled. For example, in a recent report by the Australian Automobile Association (AAA), it was noted that the four years ending June 2019 saw higher rates of fatal injuries than the year ending June 2015.5 AAA also stated that current approaches to reducing road trauma are not working effectively.6
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BITRE predicted that under 2018 conditions, fatalities would trend slightly upwards to 2030, while injuries would remain static. BITRE indicated that the trends may be explained by an overall increase in road use and increases in the incidence of drivers interacting with phones and other devices—offset by uptake of safety features, infrastructure improvements, and reductions in driving while intoxicated.7 Actual and predicted death and injury rates to 2030 are set out in Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3 below.

Figure 1.2:  Actual and predicted fatality rates 1965-2030

Source: BITRE, Information sheet: modelling road safety in Australian states and territories, p. 4

Figure 1.3:  Actual and predicted injury rates 1965–2030

Source: BITRE, Information sheet: modelling road safety in Australian states and territories, p. 6.
1.16
There was some disagreement as to whether predictions of trends in road fatalities and injuries will remain accurate when compared with data on actual road fatalities and injuries in the future. One stakeholder noted that there has been an ‘explosion’ of vehicle ownership since the 1920s, with increasing variation in the type of journeys for which vehicles are used. The stakeholder noted that if road fatalities are measured against the number of vehicles on the road, there is an ‘almost unbroken record of improvement’.8
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By contrast, the Australasian College of Road Safety (ACRS) observed that a key flaw in existing data is that serious injuries may be substantially under-reported, meaning true injury numbers may be worse than envisioned.9
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Some stakeholders also indicated that while there are still a substantial number of deaths and serious injuries on Australian roads each year, there appears to be a level of public ‘tolerance’ of road trauma.
1.19
For example, Roads Australia (RA) noted that Australians ‘seem to accept a high number of road crashes yet seem focused on…a much lower level of deaths associated with a range of other activities’.10 RA indicated that this is not a recent phenomenon, and may be due (at least in part) to the public becoming desensitised to the issue:
I don't think in my lifetime there has ever been a time where I guess people were less tolerant of it. If you go back in time and think about campaigns around seat belts and the campaign around driving under the influence, just those two examples had quite considerable impacts in terms of road deaths. But, since then, I think there has just been a general community tolerance of deaths on roads.11

Costs of road trauma

1.20
According to the NRSS 2021–30, the annual cost of road trauma to the national economy is $30 billion.12 This is consistent with findings of the 2018 Inquiry into the National Road Safety Strategy 2011–2020 (the NRSS Inquiry) conducted by independent experts:
Failing to improve our current situation will result in 12,000 people killed and 360,000 admitted to hospital at a cost of $300 billion…over the next decade. 13
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As noted elsewhere in this report, limitations in available road safety data—particularly for serious injuries—may mean that $30 billion per year is a conservative estimate.
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The costs of road trauma vary by jurisdiction. For example, the annual cost to Western Australia (WA) was estimated in 2020 at $2.4 billion, while the cost to New South Wales (NSW) was estimated in 2012 at $5.37 billion.14
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At the individual level, it was estimated that a road fatality costs $3 million, while each serious injury costs $800,000.15
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The costs of road trauma extend beyond financial costs to significant emotional and social impacts on the people involved in a road crash and the wider community. Costs are especially pronounced in regional and remote areas, as victims of road trauma are often local residents.16
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Moreover, the psychological impacts of road trauma may not manifest immediately. This means that long-term support is vital. For example, Injury Matters observed:
There is no ‘timeline’ for when people experience psychological conditions after a road traffic incident. People impacted by road trauma report improvements in their mental health three months after the incident and others can experience late onset psychiatric outcomes. Therefore, it is vital that individuals experiencing road trauma are supported no matter what time period has passed since the road traffic incident occurred.17
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Road trauma also has significant psychological and physical impacts on first responders, emergency services personnel and medical practitioners. This was highlighted in a 2018 survey of police officers and emergency services personnel. Almost half the survey respondents reported experiencing a traumatic event during their work. Moreover, survey respondents were almost twice as likely to be diagnosed with a mental health condition compared to other Australians and were over twice as likely to report suicidal ideation.18

Road trauma by jurisdiction

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Road trauma rates vary significantly by jurisdiction. For example, in 2018 the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) reported 2.14 deaths per 100,000 population, compared with 4.54 per 100,000 across Australia and 4.97 per 100,0000 (the average for Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries). In the same year, the Northern Territory (NT) reported 20.24 deaths per 100,000 population.19 Figure 1.4 below sets out fatality rates by jurisdiction and remoteness area.

Figure 1.4:  Fatality rates by jurisdiction and remoteness area

Source: Office of Road Safety, Remote road safety fact sheet
1.28
Differences in jurisdictions are linked to a variety of factors. For example, the NT’s higher fatality rates may be explained by a small, highly dispersed population, with many living in remote and very remote areas. Much of the road network in that jurisdiction is also unsealed. In addition, a very high proportion of the NT population identify as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander.20 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples often face additional and unique road safety challenges, as outlined below.

Road trauma in regional and remote areas

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Regional and remote areas are over-represented in road trauma statistics. As set out in Figure 1.4 above, in 2018 the road fatality rate was 2.2 per 100,000 in major cities, compared with 9.6 per 100,000 in regional areas. This rises to 20.3 and 28.5 per 100,000, respectively, for remote and very remote areas.21
1.30
Injury rates also rise with remoteness. The consultation draft of the
NRSS 2021–30 notes that in 2017, there were 148.7 hospitalised injuries due to road trauma per 100,000 people in major cities. This rose to 171.4 per 100,000 in regional areas, and 213.8 per 100,000 in remote locations.22
1.31
According to ORS, higher fatality rates in regional and remote areas can be explained by higher speeds, combined with poorly maintained roads and a lack of roadside safety infrastructure. This is reflected in the fact that more than 75 per cent of crashes on regional and remote roads are associated with lane departure (run-off road and head-on crashes). Accordingly, strategies to reduce road trauma in regional and remote areas focus on speed management and on implementing low-cost, high-return safety treatments across as much of the network as possible.23

Road trauma in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities

1.32
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples bear a higher burden of road trauma and are nearly three times more likely to sustain a fatal injury in a crash. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples are disproportionately represented in both passenger and pedestrian fatalities.24
1.33
In addition, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples are 30 per cent more likely to be hospitalised due to a road crash than other Australians. Serious injuries requiring hospitalisation may lead to lifelong impairment, particularly if the injury is to the brain or spinal cord.25
1.34
Various interrelated factors contribute to higher rates of road trauma for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities. A key issue is that many communities are geographically remote, and accordingly may drive on poorly maintained roads and have limited access to health services.26 Other contributing factors include the ongoing impacts of colonisation; social disadvantage; drug and alcohol misuse; family and domestic violence; housing issues; low safety standards; and unsafe living environments.27
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Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities also face challenges in obtaining licenses, including a lack of access to safe vehicles and the limited availability of culturally competent licensing programs. This is compounded by issues such as difficulties in obtaining identity documents and lower levels of literacy in some communities.28
1.36
It is understood that effective measures to address the overrepresentation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in road trauma statistics should be holistic (covering education for community members; the safety of roads; and the safety of vehicles, among other matters), and should be led and co-designed by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.29 The Commonwealth has also noted that challenges faced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples will be addressed by reference to the National Agreement on Closing the Gap.30

Vulnerable road users

1.37
Vulnerable road users are generally considered to be road users who are not in a heavy or light vehicle, and include pedestrians, motorcyclists, cyclists, and users of personal mobility devices. These road users are considered to be ‘vulnerable’ because they have little to no protection from crash forces in the event of a road traffic incident. 31
1.38
Vulnerable road users are disproportionately represented in road trauma statistics. For example:
Despite comprising just 5.7 per cent of registered vehicles, motorcyclists made up approximately 18 per cent of road fatalities in 2019.32
Of the 1,142 deaths on Australian roads in the period ending June 2021, 32 were cyclists. Cyclist road fatalities have increased by 45 per cent over the past decade, and injuries have increased by 36 per cent.33
Pedestrians generally travel shorter distances than other road users yet comprise 13 per cent of all fatalities due to road trauma. Children and elderly people are also particularly vulnerable to road trauma.34
1.39
Groups of vulnerable road users will have different safety needs, based on factors such as location and mode of travel. Accordingly, while measures can be designed to improve safety for all road users (for example, lower speeds), the unique needs of each group must also be considered. Stakeholders indicated that this is not always done, with strategies often treating all vulnerable road users as a homogenous group.35

Road safety in the workplace

1.40
Vehicle use is the most significant contributor to work-related death and traumatic injury. For example, in 2018 around 62 per cent of all reported work-related fatalities related to vehicles. Contributing factors include inadequate journey planning; poor road quality and safety; unsafe vehicles; unauthorised and unsafe drivers; the absence or incorrect use of personal protective equipment; and inadequate post-crash response.36
1.41
Under applicable work health and safety (WHS) laws, persons conducting a business or undertaking are required to ensure the health and safety of workers and third parties so far as reasonably practicable. This extends to use of vehicles for work purposes. However, measures are needed to ensure that employers, workers, and others understand their WHS obligations and embed road safety in all operations as ‘business as usual’.37
1.42
Many jobs also require workers to be on or near the road, and accordingly involve a higher level of exposure to road trauma. These include roles in policing, traffic management, and landscaping and gardening. Workers in road construction, repair, and maintenance are at particular risk.38
1.43
An important element of road workplace safety is heavy vehicle safety, noting that road use is core business for the heavy vehicle sector. Heavy vehicle drivers are disproportionately involved in fatal and serious injury crashes. In 2016, heavy vehicles made up only 2.4 per cent of registrations and 7 per cent of kilometres travelled but were involved in 16 per cent of fatal crashes and 4 per cent of crashes resulting in injuries.39 Around 500 heavy truck occupants are hospitalised each year, with around 30 per cent categorised as having life-threatening injuries.40
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Creation of the Heavy Vehicle National Law (HVNL) and establishment of the National Heavy Vehicle Regulator (NHVR) has seen an increased focus on heavy vehicle safety.41 However, while these measures have improved safety outcomes for the sector, more work is needed to deliver meaningful reductions in road trauma.
1.45
In May 2021, infrastructure and transport ministers agreed to a forward program of work resulting from a comprehensive review of the HVNL. This program will lead to an updated law based on a risk management-focussed operator assurance framework, which offers simplicity and flexibility to the sector. The program comprises six reform areas: operator assurance scheme; technology and data; duties and driver health; fatigue management; vehicles and access; and legislative approach. It is anticipated that final legislation will be presented to ministers in mid-2023.42
1.46
Road safety in the expanding ‘gig’ economy is also an area of concern. Generally, gig economy workers are engaged as contractors on a flexible basis and paid according to the completion of tasks (such as delivering an order or providing travel to a destination). Often, workers connect with customers via an online platform, and use mobile phone applications to receive orders and requests.
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Elements of the gig economy model have been found to contribute to higher levels of work-related road risk. Studies show that workers feel pressured to exceed speed limits or drive while fatigued to maximise their income, and that riders and drivers often interact with phones and devices—leading to distraction.43
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Food delivery riders are at particular risk given that they often ride in heavy traffic and in conditions of reduced visibility. These risks were brought into sharp focus in 2020, when multiple food delivery riders were fatally injured in road traffic incidents over a three-month period.44

The Safe System approach to road safety

1.49
The Safe System is a holistic approach to road safety. The core ethical principle of the Safe System is that road trauma is never ethically acceptable. Key principles of the Safe System approach are human fallibility (people make mistakes); human vulnerability (humans have physical limits and limited ability to tolerate crash forces); and a forgiving road transport system (a system must be forgiving of mistakes within those limitations).45

Figure 1.5:  The Safe System approach to road safety

Source: Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications, Submission 38 to previous Joint Select Committee on Road Safety, Attachment 1, pp. 300-301.
1.50
As outlined in Figure 1.5 above, the Safe System has five key pillars that are designed to work together in an integrated fashion to reduce and ideally eliminate road trauma.
Safe vehicles that lessen the likelihood of a crash, protect occupants, simplify driving, and protect vulnerable users.
Safe speeds that complement the road environment and manage impact forces within human tolerance. Road users must be encouraged to obey speed limits via the provision of information and robust enforcement.
Safe people and behaviours, encouraged via licensing, education, road rules, enforcement, and sanctions.
Safe roads and roadsides to reduce the risk of crashes occurring and to lessen the severity of a crash which does occur. Safe roads prevent unintended use through design and encourage safe behaviour by users.
Post-crash care involving incident response, emergency treatment and trauma care and rehabilitation, to lower risks of death, serious injury and lifelong impairment.46
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The NRSS 2021–30 is based on the Safe System and framed by the vision that no person should be killed or seriously injured on Australian roads.47
1.52
Linked to the Safe System approach is the idea that system designers and operators—rather than road users—should be held responsible for road trauma. Accordingly, some stakeholders raised concern that Australia continues to entrench a message of ‘victim blaming’ in road safety narratives and called for this to be addressed.48 For example, in relation to road safety for vulnerable road users, WalkSydney stated:
Once [a] pedestrian is seen as mostly at fault, there is a tendency to jump to fix the pedestrian as a solution, which drives advocacy for what pedestrians should do as the primary solution. We know, for instance, that almost no pedestrian fatalities are due to pedestrians looking at their smartphones, yet that attracts significant media attention, in contrast with distracted drivers, who do kill. Policies often focus on what pedestrians can do but do not address how to advocate for systemic change.49

The Office of Road Safety

1.53
The NRSS Inquiry highlighted the need for better national leadership and coordination on road safety, and the need for a strategic approach to the development and implementation of the NRSS 2021–30.50
1.54
In response, the ORS was established in July 2019 to coordinate and facilitate national efforts to eliminate road trauma in Australia. The ORS is a branch of the Commonwealth Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications (DITRDC). It works with state, territory and local governments, police agencies, road safety organisations and other stakeholders on measures which aim to ensure that no one is killed or seriously injured on Australia's roads. Functions of ORS include:
Collecting, verifying, and disseminating data on the effectiveness of road safety interventions via the National Road Safety Data Hub.
Analysing research and data to inform road safety policy and program development.
Implementing the NRSS 2021–30, working with state, territory, and local governments to achieve road trauma reduction targets by 2030
Administering the $3 billion Road Safety Program.
Partnering with state, territory, and local governments to pilot new and innovative road safety solutions
Engaging with national road safety stakeholders and the Australian public to improve road safety for all Australians.51
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ORS oversees various programs (including funding initiatives) that aim to enhance safety across the Australian road network. Some examples are outlined below.

Road Safety Program

1.56
In the 2020–21 Budget, the Commonwealth committed to a $2 billion Road Safety Program to reduce regional road crashes and protect vulnerable road users. An additional $1 billion was announced in the 2021-2022 Budget to continue the program into 2022-2023. The Road Safety Program provides up to 80 per cent of the cost of projects which aim to reduce risk across the road network, including to progressively address high-speed roads that lack safety features.52
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The Road Safety Program is being rolled out over 30 months in six-month tranches, with funding recipients required to use their funding within six months to receive the full allocation of funding in the next tranche.53
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A total of 6,176 km of road safety improvement works have been funded under the initial tranches of the Road Safety Program. These works aim to lift regional roads to a minimum safety standard and protect vulnerable road users in urban areas. Road treatments funded through the program include median treatments; protection from hazards; upgrading signals; installation of kerb blisters and refuges; shoulder sealing; audio tactile line markings; separated cycle paths; and heavy vehicle rest stops.54

National Road Safety Data Hub

1.59
The NRSS Inquiry found that a lack of detailed, reliable, and consistent road safety data meant that efforts by all levels of government could not be assessed for their effectiveness in improving road safety outcomes.55
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To address this concern, the Commonwealth committed $5.5 million over four years for a National Road Safety Data Hub to bring together road safety data to inform and evaluate road safety strategies, associated Action Plans and the effectiveness of road safety treatments. The Data Hub is the first nationally available collection of road safety data.56

Other programs

1.61
DITRDC funds several additional programs related to road safety. Many of these are administered by ORS. Examples include:
Keys2drive: This program provides free safety lessons to novice drivers and supervisors, recognising that provisional drivers have significantly elevated risks of serious crashes. Learner drivers receive training in the best ways to practice, helping them gain confidence to prepare for safe driving under their provisional and open licences.
Road Safety Awareness and Enablers Fund. This program provides
$4 million in grants to fund road safety awareness, education, and collaboration. It was announced in the 2019–20 Budget. Funding under the program has been fully committed, with key projects including rural and regional road safety, promoting, and raising awareness on the impacts of speeding, driveway safety, sharing roads safely, and combating fatigue—via the expansion of the ‘Driver Reviver’ program.
Road Safety Innovation Fund. This program provides $12 million in grants over four years until 2022-23 to support road safety research and development of new technologies. The program supports 53 projects designed to reduce the number of deaths and serious injuries on Australian roads and create a safe, sustainable road transport system. Priority areas include safety in regional and remote areas, reducing distraction and drug driving, and safety for vulnerable road users.57

National Road Safety Strategies

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There have been four national strategies for road safety in Australia. Each aimed to enhance road safety via measures such as training and education; infrastructure upgrades and urban planning; improved vehicle safety; and changes to road rules.58
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The first strategy was released in 1992. It provided a framework for national collaboration on road safety that has evolved over the last two decades. The second, for the period 2001–2010, aimed to achieve a 40 per cent reduction in the per capita rate of road deaths. Australia fell short of this target, recording an actual reduction of 34 per cent. It was also via this strategy that Australia became one of the first countries to adopt the Safe System approach.59
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The next strategy, for the period 2011–2020, aimed to ‘elevate Australia’s road safety ambitions through the…decade [from 2011-2020] and beyond’. The strategy was based on Safe System principles and on a vision of eliminating death and serious injury due to road crashes. It aimed to reduce annual fatalities and serious injuries by at least 30 per cent relative to the average number of fatal and serious injuries in the period 2008–2010.60

National Road Safety Strategy 2021-2030

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In November 2019, the (then) Transport Infrastructure Council (TIC) advised that it had committed to the framework for the NRSS 2021–30. The TIC agreed that the strategy would be underpinned by Safe System principles and would include a 2030 national target for reduced road deaths and serious injuries. The TIC recognised that ORS would lead development and implementation of the NRSS 2021–30, working closely with states, territories, local governments, Austroads, and other key bodies.61
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A draft of the NRSS 2021–30 was released for consultation in February 2021, eliciting 110 written submissions. ORS also held ten consultation meetings of 60 minutes each to allow stakeholders to ask clarifying questions to senior ORS staff.62 A consultation outcomes report was released on 26 April 2021. Key matters outlined in the report included:
General support for the Safe System approach and for adoption of the Movement and Place framework,63 with additional clarity requested on these concepts and their impact. Speed management compliance and enforcement were also noted as ‘polarising issues’ in the community.
Support for the nine priority areas in the strategy, with infrastructure planning and investment seen as key to safer roads. Stakeholders called for improved design standards and for increased funding to be made available to improve the network, with shared responsibility across all levels of government, industry, and the community.
A desire to see a strong and transparent implementation approach with a strengthened governance and accountability framework. Stakeholders asked for additional information on performance indicators, resources, and measuring of results through key performance indicators and continuous improvement. There was also a strong desire for the identification of responsibilities across the multiple agencies responsible for road safety and for strong national leadership.64
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Feedback received through the consultation process was used to refine the NRSS 2021–30, including through the addition of fatality and serious injury reduction targets and better accountability and governance mechanisms.
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The final NRSS 2021–30 was released in December 2021. According to ORS, the strategy formally recognises the need to build institutional capacity and establish better governance, transparency, and accountability at all levels of government. Key targets in the strategy are the reduction of fatal injuries by 50 per cent and the reduction of serious injuries by 30 per cent by 2030.65
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Sitting under those targets are more specific performance indicators linked to the strategy’s focus on speed management, safe vehicles, and safe road use. Examples of performance indicators include the following:
Share of state and local government roads with a fit-for-purpose safety risk assessment as an investment plan for its infrastructure.
Share of travel on national highways and high-speed networks with a three star or better safety rating.
Share of high pedestrian traffic areas under Movement and Place or equivalent approaches with posted speed limits under 40km/h.
Share of the vehicle fleet that has an Australasian New Car Assessment Program (ANCAP) rating of five stars, with a data stamp of no more than six years.
Share of vehicles at or below the speed limit.
Share of drivers and riders tested who are not over the applicable blood alcohol content (BAC) limit or under the influence of drugs.66
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The NRSS 2021–30 also sets out nine priority areas for action. These were identified through a process which included analysis of available data on road crash deaths and serious injuries, and consideration of expert views on how best to respond to the greatest road safety challenges over the next decade. The priority areas are as follows:
Infrastructure planning and investment: Designing a Safe System that is future focused.
Regional road safety: Planning and implementing network-wide safety improvements.
Remote road safety: Better transport options and assistance.
Vehicle safety: Technological improvements and uptake of safer vehicles.
Heavy vehicle safety: Supporting safe freight transport and reducing harm to all road users.
Workplace road safety: Enabling safety culture in organisations to take responsibility for vehicles and roads as a workplace.
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples: Addressing the disproportionate impacts of road trauma on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities.
Vulnerable road users: Providing safe access for all road users.
Risky road use: Increasing community understanding of risky road use and addressing it through education and enforcement.67
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Each priority is accompanied by action items, designed to ensure that the targets set by the NRSS 2021–30 can be achieved as effectively as possible.
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The NRSS 2021–30 will be supported by five-year Action Plans. The first has been drafted for consideration by infrastructure and transport ministers.68

Previous inquiries

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There have been several recent inquiries into road safety-related matters in Australia, including the NRSS Inquiry; the Review of National Road Safety Governance (Governance Review), and the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Reference Committee’s (Senate RRAT Committee) Inquiry into the importance of a viable, safe, sustainable, and efficient road transport industry. Those three inquiries and reviews are outlined below.
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The current inquiry also continues the work of the previous Joint Select Committee on Road Safety (previous committee) which tabled its final report in October 2021.
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Stakeholders were supportive of the current inquiry, though impatient at the slow pace of reform in road safety across different levels of government, given the number of recent inquiries and reviews on this issue.69
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For example, the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons (RACS), stated that many solutions to reducing death and serious injury due to road crashes have been identified, and there is a ‘growing sense of frustration’ at the time taken to enact life-saving initiatives. According to RACS:
[What is needed] …is accountability, assessment, and measurability of targets. All agencies and all levels of government need to take responsibility for road trauma and strive for zero deaths and major injuries on Australian roads. 70

Inquiry into the National Road Safety Strategy 2011–2020

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On 8 September 2017 the (then) Minister for Transport (and current Chair of this committee), the Hon Darren Chester MP, announced an independent inquiry into the NRSS 2011–2020 (that is, the NRSS Inquiry). The inquiry was co-chaired by Dr John Crozier, Chair of the RACS Trauma Committee, and Associate Professor Jeremy Woolley, Director, Centre for Automotive Safety Research, University of Adelaide.
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The NRSS Inquiry was tasked with examining key factors behind increases in death and injury rates in 2015 and 2016 and reviewing the effectiveness of the NRSS 2011–2020 and associated Action Plans. It was also tasked with identifying issues and priorities for consideration in a post-2020 road safety strategy and in the 2018–2020 Action Plan, and on advising on arrangements for the management of road safety and the NRSS.71
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The final report for the NRSS Inquiry was presented to the Government on 12 September 2018. The report contained 12 recommendations:
Create strong national leadership by appointing a cabinet minister with specific multi-agency responsibility to address the hidden epidemic of road trauma including its impact on the health system.
Establish a national road safety entity reporting to the cabinet minister with responsibility for road safety.
Commit to a minimum $3 billion a year road safety fund.
Set a vision zero target for 2050 with an interim target of vision zero for all major capital city CBD areas, and high-volume highways by 2030.
Establish and commit to key performance indicators in time for the next strategy that measure and report how harm can be eliminated in the system, and that are published annually.
Undertake a National Road Safety Governance Review by March 2019.
Implement rapid deployment and accelerated uptake of proven vehicle safety technologies and innovation.
Accelerate the adoption of speed management initiatives that support harm elimination.
Invest in road safety focused infrastructure, safe system and mobility partnerships with state, territory and local governments that accelerate the elimination of high-risk roads.
Make road safety part of ‘business as usual’ in Commonwealth, state, territory and local government.
Resource road safety enablers and road safety innovation initiatives.
Implement life-saving partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific and globally as appropriate to reduce road trauma.72
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The Transport and Infrastructure Council agreed on 22 November 2019 to a response to the NRSS inquiry—including implementation arrangements. Of the 12 recommendations, the Council agreed with 10, and agreed in principle with two.73

Review of National Road Safety Governance Arrangements

1.81
In October 2018, the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Development announced a Review of National Road Safety Governance, to examine whether Australia has appropriate governance arrangements to deliver the commitments made by governments to road safety in line with the Safe System approach. The review also considered ways for the Australian Government to work in partnership with state, territory, and local governments to bring down road deaths and serious injuries.74
1.82
The review was conducted by the (then) Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Cities, and Regional Development, with support from state and territory government agencies and the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA). A final report was endorsed for publication by the Transport and Infrastructure Council on 2 August 2019. The report did not make specific recommendations, but instead set out key findings on the state of road safety governance arrangements in Australia. The key findings of the review were as follows:
The Australian Government had not provided sufficient leadership, coordination, or advocacy on road safety. Further, the Transport and Infrastructure Council had not been used to enable cross-jurisdictional decision-making to drive the national harm elimination agenda.
The Safe System approach was adopted but had not been ingrained or mainstreamed in business as usual at all levels of governments.
Road safety teams at all levels of government lacked influence across Safe System pillars and within their own organisation. More integration of road safety teams into government decision-making processes will be essential if Safety System principles are to be embedded.
Road infrastructure funding is not conditional on the inclusion of Safe System treatments in every project.
Local government, despite owning most Australian roads, was not sufficiently resourced or engaged to deliver road safety.
The Australian Government needed to lift its efforts to improve the uptake of new safety technology in the Australian new vehicle fleet.
A national framework was needed to better measure, target, monitor and evaluate road trauma and evaluate the success of safety initiatives.
Work was needed to explore a national ‘no-blame’ investigation process for heavy vehicle crashes. 75

Inquiry into the Importance of a Viable, Safe, Sustainable, and Efficient Road Transport Industry

1.83
On 11 September 2019, the Senate referred the matter of the importance of a viable, safe, sustainable, and efficient road transport industry to the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee (Senate RRAT Committee) for inquiry and report by April 2020.76
1.84
The Senate RRAT Committee was tasked with examining issues such as pay and conditions; road transport infrastructure; laws and regulations applicable to the road transport industry; training and career paths for the road transport industry; the social and economic impact of road trauma; the impact of new and emerging technologies; and the importance of a formal consultative relationship between industry and government. 77
1.85
The Senate RRAT Committee presented its final report to Parliament in August 2021. The report made 10 recommendations to improve conditions in the road transport sector, and to enhance the sector’s value to Australia:
Establishment of an independent body which will set universal, binding standards for safe work performance in the road transport industry, and act as a dispute resolution body. Initial priorities of the body would be ensuring that all workers are paid for all work time, establishing a system of demurrage rates to help drivers and operators recoup costs, and establishing binding industry payment terms.
Implementing an enforcement framework to ensure compliance with standards in the sector, including those set by the independent body.
Improvements to training, accreditation, and licensing arrangements for the sector, including expediting consideration of the Review of the Heavy Vehicle Driver Competency Framework and implementation of its outcomes, and developing a national apprenticeship scheme.
Enhancing investigations and data collection, including expanding the powers of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau to conduct no-blame investigations of road crashes involving commercial heavy vehicles.
Improving road infrastructure and driver facilities, with a focus on rest areas and infrastructure in regional, rural, and remote areas.
Encouraging uptake of proven safety technologies, ensuring technology complies with guidelines and standards, and educating the sector on the benefits of technologies such as telematics devices.
Reviewing the Reserve Bank’s Banknote Distribution Agreement and the operation of the wholesale cash system, and investigating the creation of standards, accreditation, and licensing for the cash-in-transit industry.
Improving heavy vehicle safety, including via an industry-wide ratings system to incentivise best practice, ensuring government procurement gives priority to safety, improving fatigue management arrangements and appointing a dedicated Minister for Transport.
Establishing a Transport Advisory Group, consisting of members of the transport industry and unions, which will function as a consultative and advisory body for ministers responsible for the infrastructure, transport, and road freight portfolios.78

Joint Select Committee on Road Safety (2019-20)

1.86
A previous Joint Select Committee on Road Safety was established on 1 August 2019 to inquire into and report on steps that can be taken to reduce Australia’s road accident rates and investigate the impact of trauma and death on Australia’s roads. The previous committee’s Terms of Reference included recommending strategies, performance measures and targets for the NRSS 2021–30; recommendations for the role of the ORS; and other measures to support Parliament’s ongoing resolve to reduce road trauma, with a focus on recommendations from the NRSS Inquiry.79
1.87
The previous committee presented an interim report in July 2020 and a final report in October 2020. The final report made 22 recommendations to improve road safety in Australia.80
1.88
The government response to the final report was tabled in the House of Representatives on 30 August 2021 and the Senate on 31 August 2021. Of the 22 recommendations in the report, government supported 15, supported three in principle, noted three, and did not support one.
1.89
Recommendations made by the previous committee and the government’s response to each are outlined in Appendix C.

Notes on terminology and references

1.90
All references to submissions and to Hansard transcripts are to evidence provided to the current inquiry unless otherwise indicated, noting that a previous inquiry into road safety has recently concluded.
1.91
The committee acknowledges that there are a variety of terms used to reflect the diversity of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultures and identities.81 In this report, the term ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ is used, with respect.

Acknowledgements

1.92
The committee would like to thank all organisations and individuals who contributed to the inquiry by providing submissions or giving evidence at public hearings. These contributions greatly assisted the committee in its deliberations.

  • 1
    See House of Representatives Votes and Proceedings, No. 105, 25 February 2021, pp. 1694-1695; Journals of the Senate, No. 93, 15 March 2021, p. 3249.
  • 2
    Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics (BITRE), Road trauma Australia: 2020 statistical summary, 31 August 2021, p.2, https://www.bitre.gov.au/publications/ongoing/road_deaths_australia_annual_summaries
    , p. 2, viewed 15 January2022. See also BITRE, Safety Statistics, https://www.bitre.gov.au/statistics/safety, viewed 15 January 2022.
  • 3
    BITRE, Safety Statistics. Injuries for 2019–20 are estimates.
  • 4
    BITRE, Safety Statistics. 2018-19 is the last year for which injury data is available.
  • 5
    Australian Automobile Association (AAA), Submission 33, Attachment 2, p. 9. The report states that this ‘end[ed] decades of continuous improvement’. See also BITRE, Road trauma Australia: 2020 statistical summary, 31 August 2021, p. 2.
  • 6
    AAA, Submission 33, p. 1.
  • 7
    BITRE, Information sheet: Modelling road safety in Australian states and territories, p. 21, https://www.bitre.gov.au/ publications/2018/is_94, viewed 5 January 2022.
  • 8
    Name Withheld, Submission 52, p. 3.
  • 9
    Dr Ingrid Johnston, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Australasian College of Road Safety (ACRS), Committee Hansard, 13 September 2021, p. 28.
  • 10
    Mr Michael Kilgariff, CEO, Roads Australia (RA), Committee Hansard, 30 September 2021, p. 14.
  • 11
    Mr Michael Kilgariff, CEO, RA, Committee Hansard, 30 September 2021, p. 14.
  • 12
    Infrastructure and Transport Ministers, National Road Safety Strategy 2021–2030, p. 6.
  • 13
    Associate Professor Jeremy Woolley and Dr John Crozier, Inquiry into the National Road Safety Strategy 2011-2020, Final Report, September 2018, p. 5.
  • 14
    Western Australian (WA) Government, Driving Change: Road Safety Strategy for Western Australia 2020–2030, p. 34, https://www.wa.gov.au/government/publications/driving-change-road-safety-strategy-2020-2030, viewed 19 December 2021; New South Wales (NSW) Government, NSW Road Safety Strategy 2012–2021, p. 4, https://roadsafety.transport.nsw.gov.au/downloads/road_safety_strategies.html
    , viewed 19 December 2021. Differences in fatality rates by jurisdiction are outlined below.
  • 15
    Ms Louise McCormick, Acting Infrastructure Commissioner, NT Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Logistics (DIPL), Committee Hansard, 14 October 2021, p. 40.
  • 16
    Australian Local Government Association, Submission 78, [p. 4].
  • 17
    Injury Matters, Submission 22, Attachment 1, [p. 3].
  • 18
    Police Federation of Australia, Submission 66, pp. 9–10.
  • 19
    Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications (DITRDC), Submission 50, p. 7. The NT fatality rate was lower in 2019 than in 2018 (14.64 per 100,000, rather than 20.24 per 100,000). However, it was still three times higher than the national average. See DIPL, Submission 23, p. 1.
  • 20
    DIPL, Submission 23, p. 7.
  • 21
    Office of Road Safety (ORS), Australian Government, Fact Sheet: Regional Road safety, https://www.roadsafety.gov.au/nrss/fact-sheets/regional-road-safety, viewed 8 February 2022. See also ORS, Fact Sheet: Remote Road safety, https://www.roadsafety.gov.au/nrss/factsheets/remote-road-safety
    , viewed 8 February 2022.
  • 22
    Infrastructure and Transport Ministers, National Road Safety Strategy 2021-2030, Consultation Draft, February 2021, p. 5.
  • 23
    ORS, Fact Sheet: Regional Road safety. See also Monash University Accident Research Centre (MUARC), Submission 47, p. 4.
  • 24
    ORS, Fact sheet: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander road safety, https://www.roadsafety.gov.au/nrss/fact-sheets/aboriginal-torres-strait-islander-road-safety
    , viewed 8 February 2022.
  • 25
    ORS, Fact sheet: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander road safety.
  • 26
    ORS, Fact sheet: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander road safety.
  • 27
    National Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Organisation (NACCHO), Submission 61, p. 3.
  • 28
    ORS, Fact sheet: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander road safety. In 20-40 per cent of crashes involving Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, the driver is unlicensed.
  • 29
    See NACCHO, Submission 52, p. 4.
  • 30
    ORS, Fact sheet: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander road safety.
  • 31
    DITRDC, Submission 50, p. 12.
  • 32
    Road trauma Australia: 2020 statistical summary, 31 August 2021, pp. 2, 46. See also DITRDC, Submission 50, p. 12.
  • 33
    Amy Gillet Foundation (AGF), Submission 27, p. 2.
  • 34
  • 35
    Pedestrian Council of Australia (PCA), Submission 76, [p. 3].
  • 36
  • 37
    ORS, Fact sheet: Workplace road safety.
  • 38
    ORS, Fact sheet: Workplace road safety.
  • 39
    BITRE, Heavy truck safety: crash analysis and trends, 2016, https://www.bitre.gov.au/sites/default/files/is_078.pdf
    .
  • 40
  • 41
    ORS, Fact sheet: Heavy vehicle safety.
  • 42
    ORS, Fact sheet: Heavy vehicle safety. See also National Transport Commission, Heavy Vehicle National Law review, https://hvnlreview.ntc.gov.au/, viewed 16 January 2022.
  • 43
    NSW Centre for Work Health and Safety, NSW Government, Work health and safety of food delivery workers in the gig economy, accessed November 2020 (throughout).
  • 44
    SafeWork NSW, A Guide to Managing Work Health and Safety in the Food Delivery Industry,
    August 2021, p. 4.
  • 45
    DITRDC, Submission 38 to previous Joint Select Committee on Road Safety (2019–20), Attachment 1, pp. 300-301.
  • 46
    DITRDC, Submission 38 to previous Joint Select Committee on Road Safety (2019–20), Attachment 1, pp. 300-301.
  • 47
    Infrastructure and Transport Ministers, National Road Safety Strategy 2021–2030, p. 10.
  • 48
    See, for example, Engineers Australia (EA), Submission 6, p. 9; WalkSydney, Submission 14, [p. 5];
    Mr Michael Griffiths, Submission 65, p. 6. Dr David Logan, Senior Research Fellow, MUARC, Committee Hansard, 13 September 2021, p. 35; Mr Martin Small, President, ACRS, Committee Hansard, 13 September 2021, p. 30; Dr Andry Rakotonirainy, Director, Centre for Accident Research and Road Safety Queensland, Committee Hansard, 7 October 2021, p. 40.
  • 49
    Dr David Levinson, Member, WalkSydney, Committee Hansard, 12 October 2021, p. 27.
  • 50
    ORS, About, https://www.officeofroadsafety.gov.au,viewed 20 January 2022.
  • 51
    ORS, About.
  • 52
    DITRDC, Submission 50, pp. 3–4.
  • 53
    DITRDC, Submission 50, pp. 3–4.
  • 54
    DITRDC, Submission 50, pp. 3–4.
  • 55
    DITRDC, Submission 50, p. 5.
  • 56
    DITRDC, Submission 50, p. 5.
  • 57
    DITRDC Submission 50, pp. 5–6.
  • 58
    Australian Transport Council, National Road Safety Strategy 2011–2020, p. 3.
  • 59
    Australian Transport Council, National Road Safety Strategy 2011–2020, p. 3.
  • 60
    Australian Transport Council, National Road Safety Strategy 2011–2020, p. 3.
  • 61
    DITRDC, Submission 50, pp. 2–3.
  • 62
    Elton Consulting, National Road Safety Strategy: Consultation Outcomes Report, April 2021, pp. 5–8.
  • 63
    Movement and Place is an infrastructure and city planning approach that recognises different and sometimes competing roles of roads as facilitators of transport or travel and as destinations in their own right. Using Movement and Place, roads are classified according to whether they will have, for example, higher pedestrian or commercial activity, or greater capacity to facilitate effective movement of people or goods. Once a road is classified, it can be planned, developed, and operated. Movement and Place is considered in more detail in Chapter 3.
  • 64
    Elton Consulting, National Road Safety Strategy: Consultation Outcomes Report, April 2021, p. 23.
  • 65
    Infrastructure and Transport Ministers, National Road Safety Strategy 2021–30, pp. 1–2.
  • 66
    Infrastructure and Transport Ministers, National Road Safety Strategy 2021–30, p. 5.
  • 67
    Infrastructure and Transport Ministers, National Road Safety Strategy 2021–30, p. 15–19.
  • 68
    DITRDC, Submission 50, p. 3.
  • 69
    See Royal Australasian College of Surgeons (RACS); Submission 30, p. 6; Mr Lauchlan McIntosh, Submission 53, p. 2; Dr Ingrid Johnston, CEO, ACRS, Committee Hansard, 13 September 2021, p. 28
  • 70
    RACS, Submission 30, p. 6.
  • 71
    Associate Professor Jeremy Woolley and Dr John Crozier, Inquiry into the National Road Safety Strategy 2011-2020, Final Report, September 2018, p. 4.
  • 72
    Associate Professor Jeremy Woolley and Dr John Crozier, Inquiry into the National Road Safety Strategy 2011-2020, Final Report, September 2018, p. 8.
  • 73
    Transport and Infrastructure Council, Final response and implementation arrangements for the Inquiry into the National Road Safety Strategy, November 2019, https://www.officeofroadsafety.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/final_response_nrss_inquiry.pdf
    , viewed 10 January 2022.
  • 74
    DITRDC, Review of Road Safety Governance Arrangements: Final Report, p. 33.
  • 75
    DITRDC, Review of Road Safety Governance Arrangements: Final Report, p. 4.
  • 76
    Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee (RRAT Committee), Without Trucks, Australia Stops: the development of a viable, safe, sustainable, and efficient road transport industry, August 2021, p. 1.
  • 77
    RRAT Committee, Without Trucks, Australia Stops: the development of a viable, safe, sustainable, and efficient road transport industry, August 2021, pp. 1–2.
  • 78
    RRAT Committee, Without Trucks, Australia Stops: the development of a viable, safe, sustainable, and efficient road transport industry, August 2021, pp. xi–xiv.
  • 79
    Joint Select Committee on Road Safety, Improving Road Safety in Australia, October 2020,
    pp. 1–2.
  • 80
    Joint Select Committee on Road Safety, Improving Road Safety in Australia, October 2020,
    pp. xi–xiv.
  • 81
    Reconciliation Australia, RAP good practice guide: Demonstrating inclusive and respectful language, https://www.reconciliation.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/inclusive-and-respectfullanguage.pdf, viewed 25 February 2022.

 |  Contents  | 

About this inquiry

The Joint Select Committee on Road Safety, the second of the 46th Parliament, was established by a resolution of appointment that was passed by the House of Representatives on 25 February 2021 and the Senate on 15 March 2021.

 



Past Public Hearings

14 Dec 2021: Canberra
14 Oct 2021: Canberra
12 Oct 2021: Canberra