4.1
This chapter considers evidence regarding the development and management of Defence estate in the north and north-west of Australia.
4.2
The Defence Annual Report 2019-20 states the following regarding program 2.10 of the Portfolio Budget Statements 2019–20:
Implementation of the 2016–36 Defence Estate Strategy is in its fourth year, with Defence remaining on track to deliver the 2016–21 Defence Estate Strategy Implementation Plan. Defence estate investment, divestment and acquisition programs are being delivered to align the estate to support current and future Defence capability requirements…Development of the Defence Estate Asset Management Framework and the Estate Engineering, Governance and Integrity System has progressed to the implementation stage. When mature, they will enhance Defence’s delivery and management of the estate to achieve the objective of an estate that is safe, compliant, and fit for purpose to support Defence capability.
4.3
The Estate and Infrastructure Group (E&IG) within the Department of Defence is responsible for:
the management of all Defence landholdings
construction of facilities on Defence land
maintenance of defence buildings and grounds
maintenance of on-base accommodation.
Air bases
4.4
The Department of Defence gave evidence that the Defence Force Structure Plan 2020 identifies a number of Key Defence Enterprise Program Investments, one of which is Increased Airbase Resilience which is planned from 2030 to 2040 and has indicative funding of $2.9 billion - $4.3 billion.
4.5
The Program Investment Plan is currently being considered conceptually with respect to what increased resilience means for the northern bases, including RAAF Base Learmonth, RAAF Base Curtin, RAAF base Tindal, RAAF Base Darwin and RAAF Base Scherger. Curtin, Learmonth and Scherger are ‘bare bases’ meaning they are not routinely operational, rather they can be activated by expeditionary forces for operations or exercises if and when required.
4.6
Defence is considering the current and future adequacy of those facilities as bases for the deployment of military capabilities, and expects that it will:
See a range of projects over the next few years that, from an estate perspective, will see us investing in some of those places to enhance their ability to support capability into the future. We haven’t done a lot at places like Curtin and Scherger for quite a long time.
4.7
Defence is currently in the planning phase for runway works at the Cocos (Keeling) Islands to make it suitable for P-8 Poseidon (maritime surveillance aircraft) operations. The proposal for runway works on Cocos Island is currently in detailed planning and Government is expected to approve plans in the first half of 2022 which will be followed by commencement of works.
Fuel logistics and storage
4.8
The Defence Fuel Transformation Program is a $1.16 billion program targeted at enabling ADF capability by reducing enterprise risk, increasing resilience and optimising costs across the Defence fuel network. The program is being delivered in a series of tranches which commenced in July 2018 and will conclude by 2045–46.
4.9
An overarching framework and implementation plan for governance, assurance and reporting to measure and control the health of the Defence fuel supply chain was developed in 2019–20. This is intended to provide a stronger, more integrated Fuel Services Branch structure for the effective management and governance of the fuel network.
4.10
While the management of Defence fuel facilities and logistics is the remit of E&IG, there are also broader national and strategic matters related to Defence fuel logistics, infrastructure and distribution which are addressed in further detail in Chapter 6.
Committee Comment
4.11
The Committee notes that Defence is making ongoing investments in and upgrades to its facilities in the north and north-west of Australia. As an island nation, it is a geographical necessity for Australia to be able to reliably launch its Defence capabilities from the mainland over-water to conduct peace and warlike operations in the region and beyond. To do this, Australia relies on its bases—particularly in the north—being highly capable, ready to be activated at short-notice and highly resilient to threats across all warfighting domains. Increasingly, this includes cyber and space.
4.12
The Committee is cognisant of Australia’s evolving geostrategic circumstances and the likely need to increase its ability to host forces in the north, and to be able to respond to evolving situations in our region with very little strategic warning time. This will require innovation and genuine ongoing investment in Defence estate across Australia, particularly in the north and north-west.
4.13
The Committee has been concerned about Australia’s geostrategic position with respect to fuel security, particularly in times of potentially increased competition or conflict. Detailed comment on this issue is contained in Chapter 6 where strategic fuel security, and defence fuel storage and logistics are addressed in further detail.