List of recommendations

2.52The Committee recommends the Government use the forthcoming National Defence Strategy to set out how ongoing recruiting and retention efforts will interact with the design and implementation of the Defence Strategic Review’s force posture recommendations.

2.53The Committee recommends the Department of Defence report back to the Defence Subcommittee of this Committee on a six-monthly basis, for the next two years from the tabling of this report, with updates in relation to specific recruiting and retention initiatives including:

Defence’s partnership with Adecco and associated performance metrics

trend analysis of workforce categories identified as ‘critical’ and any impact to Defence Strategic Review implementation requirements

data analytics from exit interviews/surveys that references serving personnel’s lived experience and how that is informing future retention strategies.

3.48In transitioning Space Command to Joint Capabilities Group, the Committee recommends the Department of Defence consider evidence referenced through this inquiry to clearly articulate the role of Space Command within Defence and its contribution to the National Defence Strategy.

3.49To maximise efficiencies, promote complementary effects, and ensure clear accountabilities, the Committee recommends the Department of Defence examine the relationships and demarcations amongst all relevant inter and intra-departmental stakeholders as it pertains to the conduct of space-based operations and clarify the roles of key units/entities.

3.50The Committee recommends the Government review and clearly articulate the role and contributions of all relevant stakeholders regarding Space Traffic Management, including which agency is the lead for strategic thinking and implementation of any international governance framework initiatives/requirements.

3.51The Committee recommends:

the Department of Defence develop a more structured and strategic approach to communicating its future capability and operational requirements to trusted industry partners

the Government refines its expectations of a sovereign space capability by identifying those military response options it assesses can only be achieved by Australian industry in scenarios whereby services provided by other nations are disabled or re-tasked in times of conflict

the Government makes a strong commitment to sovereign industry and capability development noting the practical realities that some systems may be difficult for Australia to deliver in the short term. Additionally, there needs to be a concerted national effort towards long-term investment in sovereign capability with the purpose of delivering assets and effects that may be vulnerable in future conflict. This will ensure less reliance upon our allies for continued access to critical space-based infrastructure

This will better leverage industry investment and technologies, and foster growth in sovereign capability in areas where that is required and realistic to do so.

4.32The Committee recommends the Government notes the Committee’s:

acceptance of the evidence provided by the Department of Defence regarding the impact of domestic operations to its warfighting preparedness

view that the current disaster response model between the Commonwealth and the relevant States and Territories is not sustainable noting the near-persistent expectation of ADF support and concerning impacts that risk ADF readiness and warfighting capabilities

conclusion that States and Territories should continue to take the lead in their response to natural disasters and need to adequately resource their responsibilities to limit reliance on the ADF to genuinely unique capabilities or truly exceptional circumstances.

4.33The Committee recommends the Government use the National Defence Strategy to clearly articulate:

the expectations of all Australians as part of a whole of nation crisis response

distinguishing between disaster relief and national crisis involving malign actors and states, and national and international crisis response

concurrency pressures and the real-time risk to a response to national crises as well as the commitment of the ADF abroad

the ongoing risks arising from climate change and how that is informing Government-led initiatives.

5.10The Committee recommends the Department of Defence continues to ensure that information publicly available on the Defence Afghanistan Inquiry website is regularly updated and specifically addresses the following criteria:

details of redress pathways for Afghan victims and their families

clear articulation as to how survivors, victims’ families, and affected communities should be informed about their rights and available remedies

detailed information on planned and completed reforms within the ADF and how the reforms will address the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Report’s recommendations.

5.24The Committee recommends the Government consider how the estate works program accommodates minor works that may not carry immediate/urgent risk, but which local commanders identify as priorities which would enhance critical capacity in advance of major planned works. For example, at RAAF Base Learmonth, areas like air conditioning in the maintenance sheds to enable work to continue in hot weather or sewerage system upgrades to remove a practical capacity limitation.

5.25The Committee recommends the Department of Defence report back to the Committee in 3 months and then 6 months, from the tabling of this report regarding the:

progress of urgent works required to enable diesel refuelling to occur from the jetty at Harold E Holt Naval Communications Station and other short-medium termed planned remediation works

specific circumstances which led to the deterioration of this mission critical asset over the last five or more years and an explanation of failures in the capability assurance mechanism.

5.26The Committee recommends that in the context of the continuing implementation of the 2020 Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan inquiry report and any legal proceedings that may arise, the Government and Parliamentarians strive hard to publicly articulate the:

critical and unique role capabilities of Australia’s Special Forces

overwhelming professionalism of those elite forces who served in Afghanistan and serve Australia today

significant transformations that have occurred over the last decade

understanding that individual and institutional failures over a decade ago do not define all those who serve or served, and that security classifications mean the majority of their good work to keep our country safe may never be known, hence the Government and Parliament bears the responsibility to highlight the importance of their service.