Purpose of the Bills

The purpose of the Aviation Consumer Protection Bill 2026 (the ACP Bill) is to establish a regulatory framework to protect aviation consumers by imposing requirements on regulated entities (including airlines and airport operators) including an external dispute resolution scheme handling eligible complaints overseen by an Aviation Consumer Ombudsperson (ACO) and an Aviation Consumer Protection Authority (ACPA). It will also provide an Aviation Noise Ombudsperson to review the management of aircraft noise.

The Aviation Consumer Protection (Consequential Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2026 (Consequential Amendments Bill) makes a consequential amendment to the AirNavigation Act 1920. It also provides transitional provisions relating to the movement of the functions of the existing Aircraft Noise Ombudsman (ANO) from Airservices Australia to the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts (the Department or DITRDCSA).

The Aviation Consumer Protection Levy Bill 2026 (the Levy Bill) together with the Aviation Consumer Protection Levy (Collection) Bill 2026 (the Collection Bill) will provide for the imposition and collection of levies to cost recover the administration costs associated with the framework established under the ACP Bill. In particular, the Levy Bill will allow for the regulations to set annual general levies payable by regulated entities.

Outline of the Bills

Aviation Consumer Protection Bill 2026

The ACP Bill establishes the Aviation Consumer Protection Framework (ACPF) that addresses gaps and limitations in existing consumer protection arrangements under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA), including the Australian Consumer Law and the Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1959.

The Bill is structured into parts dealing with the establishment of the framework, the development of the Aviation Consumer Protections Charter, the monitoring of regulated entities, the operation of the Aviation Consumer Ombuds Scheme (the scheme), compliance and enforcement powers of the Aviation Consumer Protection Authority (ACPA), information management and administrative matters.

Part 1—Preliminary

This part sets out the objectives of the regulatory framework and defines the entities which are regulated entities under the ACP Bill (for example, an airline, an airport operator or an airport accessibility service) (clause 14). It also defines key terms such as eligible complaint (clause 17) as well as airline service, airport service and airport accessibility service (clauses 11–13).

Part 2— Aviation Consumer Protections Charter and other protections

Part 2 would allow the Minister to specify the minimum requirements that must be met in relation to the offering or supply of regulated services. These requirements will be set out in a forthcoming legislative instrument known as the Aviation Consumer Protections Charter (and related Standards) (clause 20). These will be finalised after the Bill package is passed.

In the consultation process in December 2024 the proposed aviation consumer rights included ‘the right to prompt and fair remedies and support during and after cancellations, delays and disruptions’ and ‘the right to safe and timely baggage handling and fair remedies for damage and delays’ (pp. 10-11).

A regulated entity may be subject to a civil penalty if it does not comply with the Charter and Standards (clause 19). The maximum penalty for a body corporate will be ‘not more than the greatest of’ 30,300 penalty units (currently $9,999,000, to be indexed on 1 July 2026), 3 times the benefit obtained by the contravention (where the court can determine this value) or 30% of the body corporate’s adjusted turnover (where the court cannot determine the value of the benefit obtained).

Part 3—Aviation Consumer Ombudsperson

This part allows the Minister to authorise a scheme for the external dispute handling of eligible complaints to be known as the Aviation Consumer Ombuds Scheme (the scheme) where satisfied that it meets certain mandatory organisational, operator, compliance and operational requirements (Division 2).

The scheme will be operated by a company, limited by guarantee which will be known as the Aviation Consumer Ombudsperson (ACO). Subject to certain exceptions, all regulated entities must join the scheme by becoming members (Division 4). Key organisational requirements include that the operations of the scheme are financed through contributions of scheme members and that complainants are exempt from any fee or charge in relation to a complaint.

The ACO will have a range of powers to join parties to complaints, require attendance at conciliation conferences and issue notices to require information or documents (Division 5). In determining a complaint, the ACO may affirm a scheme member’s decision or conduct if satisfied it ‘was fair and reasonable in all the circumstances’. If not satisfied, the ACO may vary the decision, set aside the decision or specify an action for a scheme member to take or refrain from taking. If the scheme member does not comply with an ACO determination the Minister can seek an injunction from the Federal Court to enforce it (Division 6). Parties to a complaint may also appeal determinations to the Federal Court on questions of law (Division 7).

Part 4— Aircraft Noise Ombudsperson

This establishes an Aircraft Noise Ombudsperson (ANO) within the Department to review Airservices Australia’s or the Department of Defence’s management of aircraft noise. Part 4 sets out the ANO’s complaint handling functions, allows for self-initiated reviews, provides for ministerial directions to the ANO and that the ANO may refer matters raised in a complaint to a Commonwealth body with responsibility for the matter.

Part 5—Regulatory powers of the Minister and the Secretary

Part 5 provides the Minister and Secretary with regulatory powers to ensure compliance with, and enforcement of, the Aviation Consumer Protection Framework. While Part 5 of the Bill refers to powers held by the Minister and Secretary, the effect of this part is to provide for the regulatory powers of the proposed regulator, the Aviation Consumer Protection Authority (ACPA) which will be established as a regulatory function within the Department (Explanatory Memoranda (EM), p. 50).

The EM notes that, while the ACO will work to resolve individual eligible complaints, the ACPA will be responsible for ‘systemic oversight, compliance activities and enforcement action in relation to regulated entities’ (EM, p. 6). It will have a range of investigation and compliance powers that may be used to ensure that regulated entities are complying with the legislation including the Charter and Standards. These include empowering the Minister to require persons to provide information or documents (Division 2) and the Secretary to require a person to answer questions or give evidence (Division 3) in relation to:

• the operation of, or compliance with, the legislation
• the performance of function or duties or exercise of powers under the legislation
• an offence provision of the Criminal Code relating to the legislation
• eligible complaints, including the handling of complaints by regulated entities
• complaints, and the handling of complaints, about aircraft noise
• membership of the ACO
• the reasons for disruptions, cancellations or delays of airline services.

Persons who fail to comply with notices may be subject to civil penalties.

The Secretary may also give a regulated entity an improvement notice where the Secretary reasonably believes a regulated entity is, or is likely to, contravene a provision of the legislation (or has contravened and is likely to contravene again). An improvement notice may specify the entity take actions to prevent any actual or likely contravention of the legislation. A person who fails to comply with an improvement notice may be subject to a civil penalty (Division 5).

Parts 6, 7 and 8—information management, review of decisions and other matters

Part 6 sets out requirements for making and retaining records, sharing of information between entities and publication of information. Part 7 provides for the internal reconsideration of reviewable decisions made under the legislation and review by the Administrative Review Tribunal of a decision by the Secretary to give an improvement notice. Part 8 provides for the delegation of the Minister’s and Secretary’s functions and powers and for the Minister to make rules by legislative instrument.

Aviation Consumer Protection (Consequential Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2026

The Consequential Amendments Bill contains 2 schedules of amendments. The first schedule make a consequential amendment replacing subsection 16(2) of the Air Navigation Act1920 to exclude compliance with the ACPF as a condition of a licence, permission or approval granted regarding an airline making international flights. The second schedule contains transitional provisions for complaints, documents and records relating to the movement of the ANO from Airservices Australia to the Department.

Aviation Consumer Protection Levy Bill 2026

The Levy Bill imposes an annual general levy on regulated entities (clauses 9 and 12). The amount of the annual general levy payable by a regulated entity will be set in regulations.

Before the regulations are made by the Governor-General, the Minister must consider 2 objectives (clause 10). The first is that the total amount of the annual general levy payable ‘reflect the amount of administration costs’. Clause 11 provides that the Secretary must determine the administration costs for each financial year. The Secretary must, by legislative instrument, determine ‘the costs expected to be incurred’ in administering the ACP Bill and the Collection Bill (when passed). This amount must ‘reflect an effective and efficient use of public resources’.

The second objective the Minister must consider is whether the amount of annual general levy payable by a regulated entity is a ‘fair proportion of the total amount of annual general levy payable by all regulated entities for the financial year’.

The Minister may also determine, by legislative instrument, that a specified regulated entity or class of regulated entities is exempt from paying the annual general levy for a financial year (subclause10(2)).

Aviation Consumer Protection Levy (Collection) Bill 2026

The Collection Bill provides for the collection of levies imposed by the Levy Bill including late payment penalties, waivers, recovery of debts and the review of decisions. The regulations made under Collection Bill may prescribe pecuniary penalties, not exceeding 50 penalty units (currently $16,500), for contravening civil penalty provisions.

Background

Concerns about the effectiveness of aviation consumer protections in Australia have existed for many years. The issue was raised in the 2009 National Aviation White Paper: Flight Path to the Future (p. 87). This led to the establishment of an Airline Customer Advocate (ACA) in 2012, funded and managed by the participating airlines (Jetstar, Qantas, Virgin Australia) to assist consumers with unresolved complaints.

During the 2024 National Aviation White Paper: Towards 2050 consultation process, many submissions were made that were critical of the ACA. Specific criticisms included:

• excessive complaint ineligibility
• perceived lack of independence
• limited powers
• incomplete coverage. (p. 54)

The Australian Government concluded in the 2024 aviation white paper that ‘ … the ACA has not delivered an effective complaint resolution service in the way it was intended and that it is appropriate for the Australian Government to now establish a more effective body.’ (p. 54)

The proposed ACPF implements key commitments from the 2024 aviation white paper that aim to strengthen consumer protection and set clearer expectations for industry that will be subject to stricter oversight arrangements. It aims to achieve meaningful protections for passengers while maintaining a competitive aviation sector.

Recent research published by the Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics (BITRE) confirms domestic on time performance data for both arrivals and departures are still below the long-term average and cancellation rates are still above the long-term average (p. 1).

Related proposed legislation and previous inquiry

On the 27 February 2024 Coalition Senators Bridget McKenzie and Dean Smith introduced a private senators Bill, the Airline Passenger Protections (Pay on Delay) Bill 2024 (the Pay on Delay Bill), which lapsed at the end of the 47th Parliament. The Pay on Delay Bill’s centrepiece was a mandatory compensation scheme for passengers affected by delays and cancellations. The Bill was referred to the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee for inquiry and report on 16 May 2024. The Coalition Senators’ dissenting report described the Bill in the following manner:

The Bill directs the Minister to establish a legislated and enforceable framework that guarantees automatic compensation for airline passengers affected by significant flight delays, cancellations where those issues have been within the control of the airline, lost or delayed baggage, and instances of being denied boarding. It also sets out a requirement to create a set of mandatory standards for customer care during disruptions, including provisions for food, accommodation, and communication during long delays, and requires airlines to offer timely refunds or rebooking options.

… It responds to widespread, documented consumer dissatisfaction, systemic market failure in Australia’s domestic aviation sector, and a lack of enforceable remedies under existing consumer law. (p. 26)

International jurisdictions—including the European Union (EU), United Kingdom and Canada—have introduced similar laws to better protect consumers in the event of flight delays or cancellations, and Australian airlines may be subject to these requirements when operating in those jurisdictions. Evidence received by the Senate Committee from the Department indicated that airfares in the EU had risen by $4 to $16 per ticket because of the EU compensation scheme (p. 14). In a more recent submission on the package of Bills the Department provided further arguments against a compensation scheme including high administrative overheads and long processing delays (p. 4).

The Senate Committee noted the arguments that ‘international schemes do not achieve their desired outcome and, in some cases, can even make conditions worse for passengers’. The Airlines for Australia and New Zealand (A4ANZ) told the committee that since the introduction of the EU compensation regime ‘customer complaints have increased, and fares have risen to account for possible penalties’ (p. 19):

A4ANZ expressed its belief that it is ‘highly likely’ that the costs of a compensation scheme would place upward pressure on airfares and impact scheduling, thereby reducing access and choice for consumers. It stated that where it is not possible to pass on the costs to passengers through higher ticket prices—generally due to competitive factors—regulation costs are internalised by airlines and manifest in reduced service. The impact is greater on less-utilised regional routes—a particular concern in the context of the Australian aviation industry. (p. 20)

The Senate Committee recommended that the Senate not pass the Bill:

While the committee acknowledges that this bill seeks to improve customer protections, the committee believes that its provisions duplicate work that the government already has well underway. The obligations provided for in this bill ignore wider issues and factors that affect flights in Australia and could result in negative unintended consequences, particularly for rural and regional Australia. As such, this bill is not the appropriate means for improving Australian aviation. (p. 23)

Key issues

Coverage of regulated services

According to the Government’s consumer fact sheet, the ACPF coverage is intended to be broad, covering:

• airlines operating domestic flights in Australia
• airlines flying internationally to and from Australia
• major Australian airports. (p. 1)

The Government’s industry fact sheet indicates the ACPF coverage will also be deep — applying to a range of services offered or supplied to consumers by an airline or airport in relation to their flight, including services contracted out to third parties:

An airline service will include, but will not be limited to, booking requirements, check-in and boarding, baggage, treatment during disruptions, delays and cancellations, complaints handling, availability of refunds and passenger assistance.

An airport service is a service provided at an Australian airport to a traveller as a consumer in connection with their flight, which arrives or departs from that airport. This would include directly paid services like parking but exclude retail and food service inside the airport.

An airport accessibility service is a service that is offered or provided by an airport or airline to a person who requires assistance in connection with their flight to or from an Australian airport. (p. 2)

A4ANZ suggested during consultation on the design of the primary legislation in October 2025, that the ACPF coverage should be even broader, with the recommended inclusion of travel agents, given ‘90% of all corporate travel and 70% of all international travel is booked via travel agents’ (p. 2).

In its submission to the Senate inquiry, Australian Airports Association (AAA) argued that accountability under the framework should align with operational control:

While the legislation appropriately recognises the primary responsibility of airlines for core elements of the passenger journey … there remains a risk that accountability becomes less clearly defined, particularly where responsibilities are shared or arise through commercial arrangements … This is particularly relevant in multi-party or flow-on scenarios. Airports should not be held accountable for outcomes that sit outside their operational control, nor should they be required to fund or administer complaints arising from airline performance. (p. 2)

Several submissions to the consultation process and Senate inquiry contained arguments concerning the coverage of the framework. For example, the Australian Federation of Disability Organisations highlighted that security screening services appear to be excluded from the definition of ‘airport service’ which require the services to be ‘paid for directly’ by a consumer (pp. 15–17). Sydney Airport highlighted the interaction of airline passengers with services of government entities (such as air traffic control, immigration and customs):

In order to achieve the regime’s objective of ensuring accountability for positive passenger outcomes, it should apply equally to services provided by government entities as well as non‑government entities. Should the regime not apply to government-provided services, the effect of these services on non-government entities subject to the regime – such as airports and airlines – should be considered if a complaint is raised. (p. 1)

In a media release issued on 1 April 2026 the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government stated ‘the Government intends to exempt airports with less than 1 million passengers per year from the framework, airports that are commonly council-owned in regional Australia’. The September 2025 consultation paper indicates this would leave 14 airports which ‘would capture nearly 90% of all passenger movements in Australia.’ (p. 41)

The exemption of the smaller airports has been welcomed by industry. For example, the AAA stated ‘[s]etting a one million passenger threshold ensures the framework targets where complaints are most likely to arise, while protecting smaller community assets from disproportionate regulatory costs’. However, the Regional Aviation Association of Australia submitted that airline operators ‘… on regional routes using aircraft with less than 100 seats’ should also be excluded. It argued the framework would result in ‘unfair operational burden on regional airlines, particularly as their ability to mitigate the effects of unexpected events that lead to flight delays is limited.’ (pp. 1–3).

In their submissions, there also appears to be a consensus among some airlines/airline representatives that the framework defines ‘airport services’ too narrowly and ‘airline services’ too broadly (Virgin, p. 4, A4ANZ, p. 4, Regional Express, p. 3).

What will be the cost impact of the Aviation Consumer Protection Framework?

The Bills create the legal basis for the framework, with further details to be contained in regulations, instruments and rules. This subordinate legislation will have a significant impact on whether the benefits to consumers from the ACPF will outweigh the costs.

The partial rollout of the legislation package raised concerns for Qantas because it makes it difficult to assess how the legislation will operate in practice. According to Qantas, ‘this increases the cost of unintended consequences, inconsistent implementation and higher compliance costs.’ (p. 6). Leaving substantial elements of this framework to delegated legislation may also limit the ability of Parliament to exercise appropriate oversight.

The package of Bills did not trigger the requirements for a published Impact Analysis (IA) since there is no IA in the Government’s IA repository. Under the government’s impact analysis guidelines an IA is required for ‘[a]ny policy proposal or action of government, with an expectation of compliance, that would result in a more than minor change in behaviour or impact for people, businesses or community organisations.’ (p. 8). The lack of an IA prior to the introduction of the package of primary legislation faced criticism from Airlines for Australia and New Zealand (A4ANZ) during consultation on the design of the primary legislation in October 2025:

The proposed framework is a significant reform which will have far-reaching impacts on both the operations of, and costs for, the aviation sector – especially airlines. It is therefore essential that DITRDCSA conduct a comprehensive impact analysis to fully assess and understand the impact of the framework on the aviation industry and the expected net benefits. (p. 4)

Potential for regulatory duplication could raise costs for airlines/airports

The ACP Bill establishes the ACPA as the aviation consumer protection regulator that will be responsible for monitoring compliance with and enforcement of the Charter. It is expected that individual consumer complaints will be addressed through the ACO, while the ACPA will be responsible for systemic oversight.

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has existing powers and authority to enforce compliance with the consumer protection provisions under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) including the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) as well as state and territory ACL regulators. The September 2025 Aviation Consumer Protections Consultation Paper stated:

The framework would complement existing consumer protections provided by the ACL, by offering aviation industry-specific protections. The Charter standards would not limit or change any standards that businesses must comply with under the CCA and the ACL. (p. 23)

However, A4ANZ remained ‘concerned that there is significant potential for duplication between the ACPA, the ACO and the ACCC’ (p. 5). A4ANZ chairman Graeme Samuel reportedly commented on 2 April 2026 following the release of the draft legislation: ‘Quite simply, more bureaucracy means more cost’ (p. 17).

Minimum standards in the Charter may have a significant impact on outcomes

The Charter will set out the minimum standards applying to the regulated services discussed above. The ACPA will enforce these minimum standards. The Charter is intended to complement, not replace, consumers’ existing rights under ACL.

According to the Government’s industry fact sheet:

This will give consumers greater certainty about what to expect when things do not go as planned when flying to or from an Australian airport.

This includes the minimum requirements when selling, checking in and boarding flights as well as the base level of assistance that airlines and airports must provide to passengers in relation to:

Proposed passenger assistance during disruptions, significant delays and cancellations caused by factors within the airline’s control will focus on immediate support, such as food and overnight accommodation as well as rebooking or refunds where required. (p. 3)

Potentially, higher mandated minimum standards may result in greater cost impacts for airlines/airports (which may be passed on to consumers).

A4ANZ suggested (during consultation on the design of the subordinate legislation in October 2025) that the minimum levels of assistance standards proposed in Table 4 of the Aviation Consumer Protections Consultation Paper (pp. 50–51) should reflect a baseline of service for airlines to provide, with airlines having the option — as part of their competitive offering — to provide additional assistance. A4ANZ did not believe the proposed standards (as drafted) reflected ‘appropriate or economically sustainable minimum levels of assistance.’ (p. 7)

Qantas made the point during consultation on the design of the subordinate legislation in October 2025 that not all consumers have the same preferences and that some are willing to trade-off service standards for a lower airfare. So, a ‘one-size-fits-all’ minimum standard for full-service carriers (FSCs) and low-cost carriers (LCCs) may have unintended consequences:

The Charter as currently proposed will add complexity to an already highly complex industry and unnecessary costs. Airlines faced with these operational challenges and costs leads to either:

Requiring LCCs to adopt FSC service standards – and beyond in some cases – without FSC revenue models, risks making low-cost aviation economically unviable in Australia, resulting in reduced competition and consumer choice.

Ultimately, the impact on consumers broadly would be severe. Either Australian travellers face potentially substantially higher airfares (eliminating low-cost access to air travel for millions of price sensitive consumers), or they lose route options and frequency (reducing connectivity, particularly to regional Australia). Both outcomes reduce consumer choice and competition in the aviation market. (pp. 1–2)

Qantas called for an impact analysis to be undertaken prior to the introduction of legislation and provision to be made to review the Charter, its operations and costs 1 year after its commencement (p. 2). A4ANZ suggested that any future changes to the Charter should be ‘ … subject to consultation, transparency and regulatory impact analysis.’ (p. 4)

Similarly, the ACCC suggested the ACP Bill should include a formal statutory review mechanism ‘ … to monitor the effectiveness of the framework in improving the consumer aviation experience in accessing airport travelling with airlines in Australia, to determine whether the framework is meeting its stated objectives … ’ (p. 3). CHOICE also supported a statutory review, in particular to monitor the independent operation of the ACPA (p. 1).

Cost pass-through to consumers from the Charter

How much additional compliance cost will be ‘passed through’ to consumers is a key issue. As Qantas argued during consultation process in October 2025:

If the framework does not strike the right balance between consumer protections and the complexities and practical realities of the aviation industry, it could lead to unintended consequences for consumers. These include significant cost increases that limit airlines’ ability to invest in customer focused initiatives, such as new aircraft, or place upward pressure on airfares. (p. 1)

Who bears the cost may depend on how sensitive market participants are to price. Several general factors can affect how much cost impost is passed through to consumers. These could include:

• price sensitivity: if consumers are not very price-sensitive, more of the cost is passed on. If consumers are very price-sensitive, firms absorb more of the cost.
• competition: in highly competitive industries, firms have less ability to raise prices. In concentrated markets, firms can often pass through more.
• time: pass-through is often larger over time. Firms may initially absorb costs, then gradually increase prices as contracts renew or consumers adjust.
• scope of the cost increase: industry-wide increases are easier to pass through than increases affecting only one firm.
• supply chain structure: costs may be passed through in stages: for example, producer → wholesaler → retailer → consumer. Each stage may absorb or pass on part of the increase.

Some international research suggests that aviation markets usually have incomplete but significant pass-through (pp. 1–11). In the case of airlines, they operate in differentiated oligopoly markets—there are only a few airlines on most routes, but they still exert some competitive pressure. Airline-specific cost increases are often passed through at less than 50% while cost increases affecting the whole airline industry are often passed through at more than 50%.

The degree of pass-through in aviation-specific markets can be affected by factors such as:

• airline route competition: where several airlines compete, airlines absorb more of the cost increase; where there is limited competition, airlines can pass through more of the increase
• price sensitivity of passenger cohorts: if consumers are not very sensitive to price (for example, business travellers or passengers flying remote regional routes) airlines can pass through more of the increase
• flight capacity constraints: if flights are near or at capacity, airlines can pass through more of the increase
• specific or general cost increase: whether the cost increase affects one airline (resulting in lower pass-through) or all airlines (resulting in higher pass-through)
• fuel hedging: if an airline has locked in fuel prices in advance, consumers may see smaller or delayed fare increases.

Different airline business models also matter. US research has found that low-cost carriers tend to pass through fuel cost increases more aggressively, while legacy carriers pass through somewhat less.

It is also important to note that ACO scheme membership fees may be another cost impost that airlines and airports will pass on (subclause 24(2) and clause 33 of the ACP Bill). The Regional Aviation Association of Australia suggested that if Government does introduce a compulsory membership fee on operators, ‘… they would have little choice but to pass the cost onto passengers through higher ticket prices.’ (p. 1)

The total cost impost from the different cost drivers that could be ‘passed through’ to consumers in higher airfares is unknown. This ‘pass-through’ performance metric may define the extent to which the government has effectively balanced consumer protection with competitiveness and financial sustainability in the aviation industry.

How will the Aviation Consumer Protection Levy be structured?

The Levy Bill EM states:

The Levy Bill allows the Minister to set levy amounts to impose and collect monies by enabling regulations to be made which will cost recover the administrative expenses associated with administration of the ACP Bill. The annual levy is based on the estimated costs of the ACPA’s regulatory functions (including enforcement of the Charter), investigations into non-compliance with the Charter and regulation and enforcement of the Scheme.

The cost recovery charges, as specified in the Levy Bill, will ensure that the costs of regulatory activities are appropriately distributed across the industry. (p. 1)

According to the Aviation Consumer Protections Consultation Paper:

The recovery of costs would be undertaken in accordance with the Australian Government Charging Framework. The charging framework requires that where specific demand for a government activity is created by identifiable individuals or groups, they should be charged for it unless the government has decided to fund that activity. (p. 36)

In the consultation paper the Government considered structuring the levy to have 2 components to recover the cost of administering the framework:

• an annual levy
• a variable per matter monthly levy based on the specific work associated with the regulated entity, including the number of complaints referred to the ACO, and matters referred to the ACPA and the level of escalation of those matters (p. 37).

As the consultation paper described:

A greater proportion of costs funded through the annual levy provides greater stability of funding, while a greater proportion of costs funded through the variable ‘per matter’ levy may better incentivise regulated entities to improve their behaviour. (p. 38)

Levies with a larger variable component provide a strong incentive for airlines and airports to abide by the minimum standards set out in the Charter and to settle complaints quickly. Figure 1 shows scenarios for the different weighting of funding to the 2 separate components depending on whether the objective prioritises stability of funding or incentivising good behaviour.

A4ANZ supported the 2-component levy proposal during consultation on the design of the primary legislation in October 2025:

A4ANZ, in principle, broadly supports an incentive-based funding arrangement which combines annual membership fees, and charges based on complaints volume and complaint escalation rates – similar to other industry ombuds schemes in Australia such as the Australian Financial Complaints Authority (AFCA) and the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (TIO). (p. 6)

Source: DIRTDCSA, Aviation Consumer Protections, Consultation Paper, September 2025, p. 38.

The Levy Bill establishes a general framework. It does not clearly resolve whether a variable per matter component has been retained, modified or removed since consultation on the primary legislation was undertaken in October 2025. It is unclear how the annual general levy will be structured and how different regulated entities will be charged. It is therefore difficult to assess whether the costs of regulatory activities are ‘appropriately distributed across the industry’.

It is also unclear how the Government will recover the costs for ineligible complaints, referrals and general inquiries — these matters have the potential to be a significant cost. The consultation paper said the Government was considering whether these costs should be recovered through a specific charge or integrated into the annual and/or other variable per matter levies (p. 41). It is not clear from the explanatory information provided at the time of the introduction of the Levy Bill what method has been chosen.

The ACCC suggested during consultation on the design of the primary legislation in October 2025 that these costs ‘could be factored in the annual levy amounts as the most straightforward way to fund work on such matters’ (p. 13).

A new home for the Aircraft Noise Ombudsperson

Part 4 of the ACP Bill establishes the Aircraft Noise Ombudsperson (ANO). Unlike the remainder of the Bill, the ANO is not intended to support aircraft passengers, but instead people affected by aircraft noise. Most commonly this is residents of areas under flight paths and relatively close to airports.

Continuation of the functions of the Aircraft Noise Ombudsperson

Although the Bill discusses the ‘establishment’ of the ANO, in effect it is providing statutory authority for an existing role. The existing ANO was established in September 2010 following a recommendation from the 2009 National Aviation Policy White Paper, Flight Path to the Future (p. 27). The existing ANO has indicated that it expects that the ACP Bill will not alter its core responsibilities, but may provide it with additional independence and powers.

The ANO does not process aircraft noise complaints directly; members of the community must first make a complaint with the Airservices Noise Complaints and Information Service or (for military aircraft) the Department of Defence. If a complainant is unsatisfied with the response from the relevant agency, they may then lodge a complaint with the ANO.

This process will remain under the new ANO (clause 58). Subclause 56(2) outlines the new ANO’s review functions, which will focus on Airservices Australia’s and the Department of Defence’s activities relating to:

(a) handling of complaints or enquiries about aircraft noise.

(b) community consultation processes related to aircraft noise.

(c) presentation and distribution of aircraft noise-related information.

Additionally, subclause 59(3) gives the ANO the power, at its own initiative, to ‘conduct a review into an aircraft noise management agency’s management of aircraft noise in Australian territory’. Despite some differences in wording, the activities outlined in subclauses 56(2) and 59(3) closely resemble the 4 points used to describe the activities of the ANO in its current Charter (p. 1).

In its submission to the Aviation Consumer Protections Consultation Paper, the existing ANO advocated for greater powers to review the activities of a broader range of organisations relevant to the generation of aircraft noise and for increased information-gathering powers (pp. 7–8). The ACP Bill does not appear to respond to these suggestions, however, the Minister’s and Secretary’s new information-gathering powers (to be delegated to ACPA) in Part 5, Division 2 and 3 extend to ‘complaints about aircraft noise’.

Independence of the new Aviation Noise Ombudsperson

Currently, under the ANO Charter, the existing ANO is an ‘independent administrative office within Airservices’ and the person holding the role of the ANO is employed as a contractor rather than an employee of Airservices (pp. 1 and 3). Nevertheless, the 2024 aviation white paper noted the potential for the position of the ANO to create a perceived conflict‑of‑interest, stating:

The ombuds scheme currently exists as an office within Airservices Australia and reports to the Board of Airservices Australia. This reporting arrangement creates the potential for conflicts in the scheme’s role and can undermine public confidence in its findings and recommendations. Aviation White Paper submissions from community groups, airlines and airports raised concerns about the ombuds scheme’s perceived independence (p. 163).

In its submission to the consultation process, the Community Aviation Alliance Australia (CAAA) welcomed the move of the ANO from Airservices Australia. The CAAA also called for the ANO to be ‘genuinely independent, effective, comprehensive, fair, free and transparent’ and to be governed by a Board representing the community, public health groups, and the aviation industry (p. 4).

The consultation paper proposed locating the ANO, alongside the ACO, within the Aviation Ombuds Office (p. 8). This structure has not been maintained in the Bill. Instead, the ANO role will be filled by a Senior Executive Service (SES) staff member within the Department (ACP Bill, clause55).

Moving the position out of Airservices Australia may reduce the possibility for conflict‑of‑interest concerns. It is questionable, however, whether a Departmental official designated by the Secretary will provide the degree of independence called for by some stakeholders. In particular, the Minister may, by legislative instrument, give written directions to the ANO specifying the manner in which the functions of the ANO must be performed (although not in relation to a particular case) (clause 57).

Funding the aviation noise ombudsperson

The consultation paper proposed funding the ANO through the Levy Bill (p. 42). This proposal was criticised by the AAA and the International Air Transport Association, representing international airlines. The AAA stated (p. 12):

To ask airports to pay for it would extend the levy well beyond its intended purpose. Airports already fund extensive community engagement through Master Plans, Major Development Plans, Environmental Impact Statements and Community Aviation Consultation Groups, and should not be asked to fund the ANO in addition.

The ACP Bill does not specify the funding source for the ANO but, as noted above, under the Levy Bill, the ‘administration costs’ are determined by the Secretary incorporating the costs expected to be incurred administering the ACP Bill (which would include Part 4 containing the provisions for the ANO) (clause 11).