Key points

• The Commonwealth Entities Legislation Amendment Bill 2026 (the Bill) proposes to amend appointment, suspension and termination arrangements for the statutory officer holder (SOH) positions that lead four Commonwealth entities: Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR); Australian Trade and Investment Commission (Austrade); Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO); Office of Parliamentary Counsel (OPC).
• Most of the Bill’s proposed governance changes will more closely align arrangements with the majority of SOH positions created in other legislation. Such measures include: reducing the maximum term of appointment from 7 years to 5 years; and inserting grounds for suspension or termination that are already found in other legislation.
• On the other hand, provisions to enable ministers to set performance standards for SOH positions would appear to be novel, and performance standards would not be legislative instruments.
• In that context, it is not clear why the circumstances of these particular SOH positions are being changed, or why the changes are necessary at this particular time. In recent months, 3 of the 4 entities affected by the Bill have faced adverse audit findings or other public criticism. However, it is not clear that these issues have led to the current Bill nor whether governance changes proposed in the Bill would necessarily have prevented the reported shortcomings.
• The Senate Selection of Bills Committee reported it could not reach agreement on referral of the Bill to committee. A Government amendment to not refer the Bill to committee was passed in the Senate. The Senate Scrutiny of Bills Committee and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights had no comment on the Bill.

Introductory Info

Date of introduction: 11 February 2026
House introduced in: House of Representatives
Portfolio: Attorney-General
Commencement: Schedule 1 commences on the day after Royal Assent. Schedule 2, Parts 1 to 3 commence 14 days after Royal Assent. Schedule 2, Parts 4 to 6 commence immediately after Parts 1 to 3.

Purpose of the Bill

The purpose of the Commonwealth Entities Legislation Amendment Bill 2026 (the Bill) is to amend appointment, suspension and termination arrangements for statutory office holders in 4 Commonwealth Entities: the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR); the Australian Trade and Investment Commission (Austrade); the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO); and the Office of Parliamentary Counsel (OPC).

In her second reading speech, the Attorney-General, Michelle Rowland stated that the existing arrangements for these statutory office holders ‘have limited provisions for accountability where conduct or performance are unacceptable’:

The amendments would expand and clarify the grounds for termination of the statutory office holders and introduce a power to suspend relevant office holders from their duties …

These amendments will ensure statutory office holders with direct management responsibilities for staff can be removed from office where their behaviour is considered serious misconduct.

Statutory office holders should also be held accountable for their performance. If their performance is unsatisfactory, then the government should have options to terminate them from their position.

Structure of the Bill

Schedule 1 of the Bill would amend the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Act 1982 (ACIAR Act), the Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act 1985 (Austrade Act) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 (Safeguards Act).

Schedule 2 of the Bill would amend the Parliamentary Counsel Act 1970 (OPC Act).

Background

Statutory office holders

A statutory office holder (SOH) is a person appointed to a specific position established by legislation.

The relevant legislation sets out distinct functions to be performed and specific powers to be exercised by the SOH with a degree of independence from the direct control of the Government. Typically, functions and powers may include investigation, regulation, or other specialist roles, particularly of a technical nature. Provisions in legislation will also include arrangements for appointment (including tenure) and termination.

Subject to specific regulations or express exclusions, SOH are bound by the Code of Conduct in the Public Service Act 1999 (section 14) and the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act), which contains governance and accountability rules for the use of public resources.

This Bill would amend four Acts that establish SOH positions that perform CEO-type roles. This is in contrast to other types of SOH positions that may include, for example, appointees to statutory committees.

Tenure of office and reappointments

Appointment to an SOH position is by a minister or the Governor-General. For most SOH positions, legislation generally permits an appointment period of up to 5 years, usually with the possibility of reappointment. In some cases, the second appointment must be less than 5 years.

Suspension of appointment

The Acts Interpretation Act 1901 provides an authority to suspend or remove a SOH. Subsection 33(4) provides that ‘where an Act confers upon any person or authority a power to make appointments to any office or place, the power shall be construed as including … a power to remove or suspend any person appointed, and to appoint another person temporarily in the place of any person so suspended …’. Subsection 33(4) further provides that:

… where the power of such person or authority to make any such appointment is only exercisable upon the recommendation or subject to the approval or consent of some other person or authority, such power to make an appointment to act in an office or place or such power of removal shall only be exercisable upon the recommendation or subject to the approval or consent of such other person or authority.

Section 28 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 provides an example of a circumstance in which the appointing authority (in this case, the Governor-General) must follow a process that includes the concurrence of another authority (the Parliament).

Termination, and grounds for termination

The legislation under which a SOH is appointed or holds office will usually contain provisions relating to the circumstances in which a SOH may be removed from office. Typically, grounds for termination include misbehaviour, physical/mental incapacity, bankruptcy, outside employment and failure to disclose interests.

Legislation that includes ‘unsatisfactory performance’ or similar as a ground for termination for a SOH includes Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 subsection 44(3), Australian Research Council Act 2001 subsection 40A(3), Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority Act 2008 subsection 32(2), Creative Australia Act 2023 paragraph 72(1)(c), Housing Australia Act 2018 paragraph 25(e), Safe Work Australia Act 2008 subsection 57(3) and Australian Trade and Investment Commission Act 1985 subsection 59(3).

Ministerial directions

Commonwealth legislation often includes provision for a minister to give general directions about the performance of functions to SOHs. Such provisions are often qualified to clarify that directions must be general in nature and must not relate to individual people or cases.

The capacity to make ministerial directions can reflect the relative independence of a SOH from government control. For example, the Attorney-General may give directions and guidelines to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (subject to certain transparency provisions) (section 8 of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983) but there is no provision in the National Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2022 for the Attorney-General to give directions to the National Anti-Corruption Commissioner.

Recent developments involving entities affected by the Bill

In recent months there have been adverse audit findings or other criticisms of 3 of the 4 entities affected by the Bill, as outlined below. However, it is not clear that these issues have led to the current Bill nor whether governance changes proposed in the Bill would necessarily have prevented the reported shortcomings.

ACIAR

The Australian Government Organisations Register (AGOR) describes ACIAR as the Australian Government’s specialist agricultural research-for-development agency within the Australian aid program. In Audits of the Financial Statements of Australian Government Entities for the Period Ended 30 June 2025, the Auditor-General noted in relation to ACIAR:

Section 83 of the Australian Constitution states that money cannot be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF) except under an appropriation made by law. During 2024–25 potential breaches of section 83 of the Constitution were identified. These potential breaches related to departmental and administered employee entitlements being misclassified and the incorrect funding being used for associated payments. [p. 139] [emphasis added]

ACIAR was not the only agency identified in the report as breaching section 83.

OPC

AGOR describes OPC as the Commonwealth's principal provider of professional legislative drafting and publishing services. In Procurement and Contract Management of the New Federal Register of Legislation Project the Auditor-General reported in December 2025 on OPC’s development of a new Federal Register of Legislation, the authorised whole-of-government website for Commonwealth legislation and related documents. The report found:

The new Federal Register of Legislation was launched on 1 January 2024, four years later than planned and at an estimated cost more than double the original budget. … OPC did not fully comply with the CPRs [Commonwealth Procurement Rules] and did not demonstrate the achievement of value for money. … AusTender reporting requirements specified in the CPRs were not met for nine of the 13 procurements. [T]here was no written contract for three of the procurements (23 per cent) and the contract for a further nine procurements (69 per cent) did not include performance requirements. [pp. 8, 9]

The report also observed that ‘OPC’s approach to managing probity risks and procurement record keeping was not to an appropriate standard’:

The ANAO identified that there was at least one instance where a conflict of interest existed but had not been declared. Specifically, a member of the evaluation panel was related to, and engaged socially with, one of the candidates. The decision-maker was not advised of this probity issue and there were no records documenting how this conflict had been managed. This procurement process resulted in the award of two contracts for back end developers valued at $253,440 and $284,449. … A probity plan was documented, as a schedule to the procurement evaluation plan, for one of the procurements. There was no probity plan documented for the remaining 12 contracts examined. [p. 31] [emphasis added]

Austrade

AGOR notes that Austrade assists Australian businesses, education institutions, tourism operators, governments and citizens to develop international markets, promote international education, and strengthen Australia's tourism industry.

An activity administered by Austrade is the Export Market Development Grant (EMDG) program. Previously a reimbursement scheme, since 2020 the EMDG has been providing grants to Australian Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and their representative bodies to market and promote their goods and services globally and undertake export training. In September 2025, ABC News reported:

Austrade is facing criticism of its grants scheme for exporters, which last year changed to a "first-come, first-served" application process.

Tens of millions of dollars in funding to help Australian businesses access overseas markets was exhausted within hours under the new tiered system, industry consultants tell ABC News.

Policy position of non-government parties/independents

The Bill was debated in the House of Representatives on 3 March 2026 (Hansard - House of Representatives 3 March 2026, pp. 6–8 and 98–105) and passed on the voices on 4 March 2026 (p. 5).

Speaking for the Opposition, Julian Leeser stated that the Coalition would not oppose the Bill’s second reading in the House but will seek a Senate committee referral to scrutinise the Bill ‘before finalising our position’.

This bill is presented as a governance modernisation measure, aligning certain statutory office holders with contemporary accountability standards. … Individually, many of these elements are not unprecedented. The concern is the combined effect and what it does to the balance of power. Taken together, this bill creates a clearer executive pathway: the minister can set the standards, assess performance, suspend and ultimately terminate. In other words, the powers are transferred from being clearly set out by the parliament to being set by the relevant minister, all without strong parliamentary oversight. A critical point is that several of these levers were deliberately placed outside strong parliamentary oversight. For example, the performance standards are not legislative instruments, they're not disallowable and they're not required to be published or tabled, and suspension decisions for most entities are not required to be tabled. So, while parliament passes the framework, the executive gains greater practical control over how key accountability thresholds are set and applied. …

We're not opposing accountability, but the questions we need to ask are: What problem is this bill actually solving? Why only these four agencies—why them, and why now? Why are the new performance standards not subject to tabling, publication or disallowance? Are the suspension and termination safeguards strong enough to protect procedural fairness and independence? Does this architecture preserve the right balance between executive control and parliamentary oversight? That's why we're not opposing the bill's second reading but we are seeking committee scrutiny before finalising our position. [emphasis added]

Independent MP, Allegra Spender stated:

This legislation, I believe, is perfectly unobjectionable. … The question I have for the government is: at a time when inflation is high, when productivity is in the doldrums, when house prices mean young people are struggling to get into the housing market and achieve the same outcomes as their parents, when social cohesion is under pressure, when trust in government is at a low ebb and when Australia's clean energy transition is happening more slowly than we would like, is this legislation really the best use of our parliamentary time? Is tweaking the employment contracts of four government appointed officials really an issue at the top of the government's precious parliamentary agenda? I would genuinely hope that this sort of bill would come in a big omnibus bill of uncontentious pieces of legislation that we could push through parliament, so we can focus on more important things, but in this case it hasn't. [emphasis added]

On 5 March 2025, the Senate Selection of Bills Committee reported it was unable to reach agreement on the referral of the Bill to a committee. A Government amendment to not refer the Bill to committee was passed in the Senate. In the response, the Opposition unsuccessfully moved an amendment to refer the Bill to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee. In arguing for the Opposition amendment, Senator Anne Ruston stated:

A committee inquiry would allow the parliament to test whether these changes are appropriate and consistent with governance arrangements that apply to other Commonwealth statutory office holders. A Senate inquiry will provide an opportunity to clarify whether specific operational and management issues prompted these reforms and whether the government intends to extend similar measures to other statutory bodies into the future …

Finally, a Senate inquiry would allow affected agencies to provide submissions and evidence to ensure the parliament has a full understanding of the policy, rationale and implications of this bill.

Key issues and provisions

The SOH positions affected by the Bill are: ACIAR CEO, ASNO Director-General (ASNO DG), Austrade CEO, and OPC’s First Parliamentary Counsel (1PC) and Second Parliamentary Counsel (2PC).

Tenure of office

The ASNO DG and Austrade CEO are currently appointed for periods not exceeding 5 years.

For the ACIAR CEO and OPC’s 1PC and 2PC, the Bill would reduce the maximum term of appointment from 7 years to 5 years (item 17 of Schedule 1 and item 3 of Schedule 2). This approach would align these 3 SOH positions with the majority of SOH positions. The Explanatory Memorandum notes that the 5-year maximum terms would apply to appointments and reappointments made on or after the provisions commence (pp. 15, 29).

Suspension

As discussed above, subsection 33(4) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 provides authority for a Minister to suspend or remove a SOH. The Bill would add additional requirements in relation to several SOH positions.

The Bill would enable the Minister to suspend the appointments of the ACIAR CEO, Austrade CEO and ASNO DG for 3 months ‘if the Minister believes that the suspension would be in the interests of’ ACIAR, Austrade or ASNO, respectively (items 4, 22 and 33 of Schedule 1). This period may be extended by up to 3 months, or by up to 12 months if an inquiry is being undertaken into the conduct of the relevant SOH, which may include whether the SOH has breached the APS Code of Conduct, or a corruption investigation (within the meaning of the National Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2022) involving the conduct of the SOH. If the Minister suspends the appointment of the ASNO DG or extends a period of suspension applying to the ASNO DG, the Minister must publish notice of the suspension or extension.

The provisions would apply regardless of whether the SOH was appointed before, on or after commencement of the amendments (items 5, 23 and 35 of Schedule 1).

The Explanatory Memorandum states that the office holders would be paid remuneration and allowances while suspended (pp. 8, 17, 23) and that the new powers for suspension of duties ‘are consistent with suspension clauses in other Commonwealth statutes for statutory office holders’ (p. 4).

Termination and performance standards

Additional grounds for termination

The Bill would add additional grounds for termination for the SOH positions although, as explained below, it would not add the same provisions to every Act. However, the Explanatory Memorandum notes that for all affected SOH positions ‘procedural fairness requirements would apply in relation to any proposed termination decision’ (pp. 10, 19, 25, 32).

The Bill would expand and clarify the grounds on which the appointments of OPC SOHs may be terminated. As noted by the Explanatory Memorandum:

Termination would remain mandatory in respect of bankruptcy-related grounds. The new list of discretionary grounds for termination would comprise conviction of an indictable offence, physical or mental incapacity, serious misconduct, unsatisfactory performance, absence from duty in certain circumstances, engaging in paid work outside official duties without the consent of the Minister and failing to disclose interests under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act). [p. 2] [emphasis added]

These provisions would bring the OPC positions into alignment with usual grounds for termination of other SOH positions, although some Acts refer to ‘paid employment’ and some refer to ‘paid work’.

Of the Acts affected by the Bill, only the Austrade Act currently includes reference to the Minister terminating the appointment of the SOH on the grounds of unsatisfactory performance, with current subsection 59(3) providing the Minister must terminate the Austrade CEO’s appointment if, in the Minister’s opinion, their performance ‘has been unsatisfactory for a significant period of time’. The Bill would amend this provision to provide the Minister with discretion as to whether to terminate the CEO’s appointment for unsatisfactory performance (item 9 of Schedule 1).

The Bill would also add ‘unsatisfactory performance’ as a ground where the Governor-General may terminate the appointments of the ACIAR CEO, and OPC’s 1PC and 2PC (item 25 of Schedule 1 and item 12 of Schedule 2). This would be where, in the Minister’s opinion, having regard to any performance standard (discussed below), the performance of the SOH had been unsatisfactory.

ASNO performs domestic regulatory functions to ensure that Australia is in compliance with international treaty commitments in relation to weapons of mass destruction and non-proliferation. The Explanatory Memorandum observes that:

There are a range of international obligations and guidance which require a high degree of regulatory independence for the Australian Safeguards Office and the Director of Safeguards. Consistent with these requirements, the Bill does not propose a ground for terminating the appointment of the Director of Safeguards on the basis of unsatisfactory performance. [p. 25] [emphasis added]

Termination of the ASNO Director is dealt with in existing section 48 of the Safeguards Act. Item 36 of Schedule 1 to the Bill would repeal and replace subsection 48(1) to retain misbehaviour, or physical or mental incapacity as grounds for termination and enable the Governor-General to terminate the appointment of the Director of Safeguards (ie the ASNO DG) for ‘serious misconduct’. The Explanatory Memorandum explains that, under new subsection 48(1A) at item 39 of Schedule 1, conduct or behaviour amounts to serious misconduct if:

-          the conduct or behaviour constitutes a breach of the APS Code of Conduct, and the Minister is satisfied that the breach is serious enough to justify termination of the Director’s appointment, or

-          an investigation report (within the meaning of the [National Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2022]) includes a finding or opinion that the Director of Safeguards has engaged, is engaging or will engage in corrupt conduct (within the meaning of that Act) or conduct that could constitute or involve corrupt conduct. [p. 26]

Performance standards

As noted above, the Bill will introduce a termination ground where ‘in the Minister’s opinion, having regard to the performance standard (if any)’ the performance of the relevant SOH ‘has been unsatisfactory’.

The Bill would enable relevant ministers, in writing, to set performance standards for the ACIAR CEO, the Austrade CEO, and OPC’s 1PC and 2PC, although the relevant ministers would not be obliged to determine such performance standards (items 2 and 20 of Schedule 1 and item 6 of Schedule 2). Provisions to enable ministers to set performance standards for SOH positions would appear to be novel.

The Explanatory Memorandum outlines how the performance standard could form the basis of a termination process for the Austrade CEO (a similar process is outlined for the ACIAR CEO (p. 19) and the OPC SOH positions (p. 36)):

Before the Minister could exercise the discretion to terminate the appointment of the CEO of Austrade [on the basis of unsatisfactory performance], the Minister must have formed the view that the CEO’s performance has been unsatisfactory, having regard to any performance standard that exists. Unsatisfactory performance is not required to endure for any particular period of time. A performance standard would support the Minister in reaching an opinion about the performance of the CEO by providing an objective measure against which to assess that performance. [p. 11] [emphasis added]

Any performance standard made would not be a legislative instrument or a disallowable instrument. The Explanatory Memorandum contends that:

Treatment of a performance standard as a legislative instrument, which would entail meeting publication, registration and tabling requirements under the Legislation Act, could hinder appointment arrangements and performance, as well as undermine the discretion of the Minister to form an opinion about termination. [p. 16, with almost identical wording at pp. 7 and 30].

The provisions contain no obligation for ministers or the relevant SOHs to publish, or make publicly available, any performance standard which is made.

Ministerial directions

Item 1 of Schedule 2 to the Bill would introduce a new power for the Minister to give written directions to OPC about the performance of its functions (proposed section 3A of the OPC Act). As discussed above, such directions ‘must be of a general nature only’.

The OPC must comply with any ministerial directions, however this will not apply to the extent that it relates to the 1PC’s performance of functions or exercise of powers under the Public Service Act or the PGPA Act.

As with the performance standards, any directions made will not be legislative instruments and accordingly will not be subject to parliamentary scrutiny or disallowance.

Notably, the Minister ‘may’ make public or give notice regarding a direction in ‘any manner the Minister considers appropriate’. This indicates that transparency concerning the content of any directions made may depend on ministerial discretion. This is not the case for some other SOHs. For example, the Agriculture Minister may give general directions to the Director of Biosecurity by legislative instrument under section 543 of the Biosecurity Act 2015. While these directions are not disallowable instruments they would be made available on the Federal Register of Legislation.