Key points

• The security situation in the Indo–Pacific region is challenging and deteriorating. Australian defence spending and activity is increasing in response. Due to security risks, an increasing number of defence matters cannot be properly scrutinised in public hearings of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JSCFADT).
• The Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2025 (the Bill) proposes a Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence (the Committee), to take on JSCFADT’s Defence-related functions. The Committee is modelled on the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS).
• A Bill in very similar terms, the Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2024 (the 2024 Bill), was introduced to the 47th Parliament but negatived at third reading in the Senate. Despite proposal of a number of amendments, consensus could not be reached on Committee membership.
• There are very few changes from the 2024 Bill and those changes are technical rather than substantive. In particular, the membership provisions are unchanged.
• At the time of writing, the Bill had not been referred to or reported on by any parliamentary committees. However, the 2024 Bill was considered by the Senate Scrutiny of Bills Committee and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights. Those committees raised concerns relating to:
  • whether it is appropriate for the executive to be able to limit a parliamentary committee’s powers to conduct itself
  • the absence of an adequate rationale for certain serious penalties
  • freedom of expression and privacy.

Introductory Info

Date of introduction: 8 October 2025
House introduced in: House of Representatives
Portfolio: Defence
Commencement: Commences on the day after Royal Assent.

Purpose and history of the Bill

The purpose of the Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2025 (the Bill) is to amend the Defence Act 1903 (the Act) to implement a recommendation of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JSCFADT) to create a Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence (the Committee).

The Bill is almost identical to the Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2024 (the 2024 Bill), which was introduced into the 47th Parliament. The 2024 Bill passed the House of Representatives but was negatived at third reading stage in the Senate. The 2024 Bill was considered by the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills (p. 55) and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (p. 55). A Bills Digest was published for the 2024 Bill. This Bills Digest is based on the previous Digest.

Structure of the Bill

There is one Schedule to the Bill, which amends the Act.

• Item 1 inserts a series of new definitions into subsection 4(1) of the Act.
• Item 2 inserts new Part VIIIAB – Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence, which contains proposed sections 110AAA to 110AFD.
• Item 3 provides for the appointment of the first Committee.

Background

Defence policy is increasingly complex in a challenging security situation

The acquisition of longer range and more sophisticated weapons by multiple countries in the Indo-Pacific has overturned Australia’s long-standing advantage of geography; this means denying access to the sea-air gap north of Australia no longer provides protection against a military strike (p. 15).

The Government has responded with an updated defence strategy and force structure supporting the concept of ‘national defence’. It has also accelerated defence spending and expanded local defence industry. These responses are addressed in more detail in the 2025 Library publication, Issues & Insights: Australia’s defence strategy adjusts to an increasingly volatile regional environment.

During 2025, Australia has expressed concern about confrontations such as unannounced live-fire exercises (pp. 8–9), cyber-attacks and sabotage of undersea cables and unsafe interactions with aircraft (pp. 40–41) as recently as 21 October 2025.

These grey zone confrontations, as well as foreign interference within Australia (pp. 4; 5–6), are likely to continue. During the most recent Senate Estimates hearings, Defence Secretary Greg Moriarty told the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JSCFADT):

The National Defence Strategy sets out that the government's view is that the strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific is becoming more contested. Our strategic circumstances are deteriorating, and the government's response to that was set out as well in the National Defence Strategy … The risk of an incident has heightened over recent years, and the trends continue to be very worrying for us.  (p. 10).

Need for more consensus, greater scrutiny and information security

JSCFADT has argued that a dedicated statutory Defence Committee would address concerns about a lack of transparency around Defence activities and expenditure, noting:

Parliament has both an obligation and a right to access information necessary to oversight how the Executive expends public funds. Cross-party parliamentary engagement with Defence (via a Government-majority committee with improved powers of scrutiny and access to classified information) could better support strategic policy and objectives in the long term by:

• building greater parliamentary and public consensus regarding principles, strategy, and goals
• improving Defence performance and accountability through enhanced parliamentary scrutiny [3.88]

Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) commentators argued in The Strategist:

As the DSR  [Defence strategic review] makes clear, national defence requires all-of-nation delivery. That means bringing along industry, the media and the public at large. It also means a crucial role for parliamentary debate and scrutiny …

But some aspects of national defence are not suited to open formats that may be monitored by potential adversaries. This has long been recognised in the intelligence world, and is why the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security has a statutory responsibility to consider classified evidence behind closed doors. This is an increasingly stark problem in defence given our deteriorating strategic environment and the discretion our partners expect around initiatives like AUKUS.

Recommendations for more effective scrutiny of Defence matters

The 2023 Library publication Proposals to increase parliamentary scrutiny of Defence: a quick guide reviews recommendations from several parliamentary committees since 2018 for removing Defence matters from JSCFADT and empowering a Defence committee to provide more effective Parliamentary scrutiny of Defence matters.

Framework for achieving consensus

The November 2018 bipartisan report of the Defence Sub-Committee of JSCFADT, Contestability and Consensus: A bipartisan approach to more effective parliamentary engagement with Defence, noted:

This inquiry commenced as an attempt to establish bipartisanship in defence policy and concluded that under Australia’s system of government, the only feasible way to foster bipartisanship was to establish a new and effective committee that had real powers of oversight along the lines of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS). (p. vii)

In 2023 the JSCFADT recommended, in its report Inquiry into international armed conflict decision making (war powers inquiry report), establishing an 11-member (6 government and 5 non-government) Joint Statutory Committee on Defence modelled on the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) that could be authorised to receive classified information (pp. xv–xvi). (The PJCIS is constituted under section 28 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 and its functions are set out in section 29.)

The Australian Greens appended a Dissenting report to the war powers inquiry report. While they agreed with the recommendation to establish a Joint Statutory Committee on Defence, their agreement was subject to 2 conditions:

• there be a ‘legislated requirement for crossbench members from both houses of Parliament to be members of the committee’
• the oversight role of the Senate Estimates process and relevant Senate committees not be infringed (p. 109).

Previous Bill

The Government response to the war powers inquiry report noted in particular the recommendation to establish a Joint Statutory Committee on Defence and, while agreeing with the recommendation:

The Government notes that this would be a significant change to the existing arrangements and, therefore, that further work will be required to determine the precise scope, powers and functions of the proposed committee, particularly to avoid the potential for duplication and/or overlapping responsibilities with existing committees. (pp. 8–9)

In March 2024, the Government introduced the Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2024 (the 2024 Bill). In his second reading speech for the 2024 Bill, Assistant Minister for Defence Matt Thistlethwaite, stated that the Committee was expected to ‘supersede and enhance the Defence-related functions currently undertaken’ by the JSCFADT.

A number of proposed amendments were introduced in the House and in the Senate and, while the Bill passed the House unamended, agreement in relation to the membership of the Committee could not be reached in the Senate and it was negatived at third reading on 4 July 2024.

Provisions that in the 2024 Bill were contingent on the passing of the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2024 have been woven into the main amendments since that Bill has now been enacted. The definition of Department of Veterans’ Affairs has also been updated. The Committee membership provisions in the Bill are unchanged from the 2024 Bill.

Decisions to deploy the ADF into armed conflict

There have been suggestions in the past that a parliamentary defence committee, or the parliament more broadly, participate in decisions to deploy the ADF into armed conflict. The Government response to the war powers inquiry report asserted the conventional position that these decisions are an exercise of prerogative power under section 61 of the Constitution and exclusively the domain of the Government. The Government agreed in principle that there was:

… a need for greater clarity and transparency about the way the Executive makes decisions in relation to Australia becoming a party to armed conflict (p. 5).

The Government supported codifying and publishing its practice. On 27 November 2024, after the 2024 Bill was negatived in Parliament, the Government published a Memorandum on Government conventions relating to overseas armed conflict decision making.

While it is possible that the Committee could be given an additional role if the Bill is passed, the Government has not given any indication that it intends to change its practice if the Committee is established.

The war powers inquiry report noted that:

The current parliamentary committee system does not specifically address how major armed conflict including war or warlike operations can or should be subject to appropriate parliamentary oversight (para 3.62).

The Committee’s functions do include being apprised of and examining war or warlike operations, including ongoing conflicts (proposed paragraph 110ABB(1)(e)). The war powers inquiry report argued that, since the Government of the day would retain a majority on the committee and hold the Chair’s position, the proposed Committee would not diminish the Executive’s powers and prerogatives (para. 3.89). 

Policy position of non-government parties/independents

Opposition

The Shadow Minister for Defence in 2024, Andrew Hastie, expressed broad support for the 2024 Bill but moved an amendment to restrict Committee membership to Government and Opposition members only. Mr Hastie advised that if the amendment was unsuccessful, the Opposition would not support the Bill.

Australian Greens

In their March 2023 Dissenting report to the JSCFADT report Inquiry into international armed conflict decision making, the Australian Greens agreed with a recommendation to establish a Joint Statutory Committee on Defence, subject to the condition that there be a legislated requirement for crossbench members of both houses to be members (p. 109).

While the Bill allows the appointment of non-Government members, the Bill does not require appointment of crossbench members.

Independents

The potential for independent members to sit on the PJCIS has previously been raised and is likely to be raised again in relation to the Bill.  In debate on the 2024 Bill, both Allegra Spender and Zoe Daniel noted that they were members of other parliamentary committees and argued for allowing Independents to be members of the Committee. Ms Daniel asserted:

More than 30 per cent of voters in this country no longer support a major party, and there is no sign of that trend ending—as much as the major parties would like to wish it away. Even polling today further indicates the entrenchment of this trend. That makes it even more important that this committee, which I regard as an excellent idea, reflects the way the nation votes and the composition of this parliament. Therefore, I would argue that the government has done a good thing by leaving the way open for a crossbencher to be a member of the committee …

Defence is a common theme among my constituents. Many of them raise the issue of AUKUS with me and they would like a full public airing about the way our defence budget is spent. From that point of view, my strong view is that this committee should accurately reflect the make-up of this parliament. It is also important to note that the legislation does not specifically allocate a position on this committee to a member of the crossbench. All it does is not prevent the Prime Minister from choosing to allocate a position on the committee to a member of the crossbench. Again, my strong view is that to allow that is to strengthen, not weaken, the committee. [emphasis added]

Position of major interest groups

Submitters to the JSCFADT war powers inquiry proposed a range of different ideas for effective Parliamentary oversight of decisions taken by and for Defence in relation to armed conflict. A significant majority of stakeholders supported increased parliamentary engagement, though they supported a variety of forms of additional engagement.

The war powers inquiry report noted that the creation of a new parliamentary committee on Defence had support from multiple stakeholders (para 3.64).

During the JSCFADT inquiry into international armed conflict decision making, Defence was asked if the JSCFADT made a recommendation to establish a Defence committee similar to the PJCIS, what and how would Defence best interact with such a committee (p. 48). Defence’s written response noted:

The establishment of an additional parliamentary committee to inform, and provide parliamentary oversight of, decisions to deploy the ADF beyond existing arrangements is a matter for the Government and Parliament. As stated in Defence’s submission, Defence assesses that current Executive-led decision-making arrangements, as they relate to ADF deployments into international armed conflicts, remain appropriate.

Relevant security factors in considering any proposal to establish a PJCIS-like body would include the critical importance of maintaining timely and flexible decision-making for ADF deployments, and ensuring the ongoing confidentiality of highly classified information. Any such proposal would also need to consider the potential impacts on the ADF’s operational security; the ADF’s relative strategic and tactical advantages over adversaries; and Australia’s international credibility as a security and intelligence partner.

Defence commentators at ASPI have argued that the patient work of cross-party parliamentary committees is essential to develop the consensus required to ensure robust government policy and retain the confidence of the Australian public. They have pointed out:

• There is currently no mechanism that allows for full and frank dialogue between the parliament and the broad community of institutions engaged in national defence. ‘The case for creating a new parliamentary committee that could hold sessions in camera is strong but must be weighed against the public interest and communication benefits of open hearings.’
• The appropriate degree of secrecy provided by a committee modelled on the PJCIS is necessary to protect our democracy and ensure accountability. 
• Done right, the scrutiny and consensus-building that such a parliamentary committee would provide could help build public understanding and consent for the adjustments to everyday life that national defence will require across peacetime and wartime.
• The Committee may need to draw on expertise from defence industry and a range of agencies involved in national preparedness and resilience, including the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Department of Home Affairs. It should have the remit to hear evidence from across government.

The Department of Industry, Science and Resources also has responsibilities relevant to ‘national defence’, particularly in terms of infrastructure and workforce.

Key issues and provisions

Establishment of the Committee

The first committee would be established under a transitional provision (Schedule 1, Item 3). After that, the Committee would be established at the commencement of the first session of each new Parliament (proposed subsection 110ABA(1)).

Membership of the Committee

Proposed subsection 110ABA(2) provides that the Committee is to consist of up to 13 Committee members, and must be composed of at least 8 members:

• 2 Senators who are Government members and
• 2 members of the House of Representatives who are Government members and
• 2 Senators who are non-Government members and
• 2 members of the House of Representatives who are non-Government members.

There is no requirement that any members of the Committee be from the crossbench.

The Committee will be controlled by the Government: proposed subsection 110ABA(3) requires that a majority of the Committee’s members, but no more than 7, must be Government members. The Chair of the Committee is elected by the Committee members but must be a Government member (proposed section 110AEC).

Nomination and appointment of the members is dealt with in proposed section 110AEA. Members from the House of Representatives are nominated by the Prime Minister after consulting with the leader of each political party represented in the House that does not form part of the Government. Members are appointed by resolution of the House.

Members who are Senators are nominated by the Leader of the Government in the Senate after consulting with the leader of each political party represented in the Senate that does not form part of the Government. Senators are appointed by resolution of the Senate.

The provisions state it is desirable that the Committee reflect the representation of recognised political parties in the Parliament - proposed subsection 110AEA(5). There is no requirement for the Prime Minister or the Leader of the Senate to consult with or consider appointing independent members.

Functions of the Committee

Extensive capacity to obtain information and provide advice

The functions of the Committee are considerably broader than those currently exercised by the JSCFADT; they are listed in proposed section 110ABB. Among others, the Committee has specific roles in relation to reviewing administration and expenditure, strategy and planning, capability development and examination and monitoring of war, warlike operations, and significant non-conflict operations.

While matters can be referred to the Committee by a Minister or a resolution of either House, the Committee does not need a referral to exercise the functions listed in proposed section110ABB.

Restrictions on functions

The Committee may not direct the activities of the ADF, the Inspector-General of the ADF or an Australian defence agency. It also may not do anything within the functions of the PJCIS (proposed subsection 110ABB(3)).

Agencies within scope of the Committee

The definition of Australian defence agency is important to the scope of the Committee’s functions.

The war powers inquiry report intended that legislation relating to the Defence portfolio including Veterans’ Affairs continue to be reviewed by the Senate Committee rather than the new Joint Committee (para 3.94). However, the ADF and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) are both within the proposed definition in Item 1 of Schedule 1.

The Australian Submarine Agency is explicitly defined as an Australian defence agency but note that the Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC) is not covered by the definition. ASC is a Commonwealth corporation solely owned by the Commonwealth Government and represented on the Board by the Department of Finance.

Australian Naval Infrastructure Pty Ltd (ANI) supports the Commonwealth’s continuous naval shipbuilding program by being the owner, developer and manager of infrastructure and related facilities including Osborne Naval Shipyard. ANI is a Government Business Enterprise with the Minister for Finance and the Minister for Defence as joint shareholders. It is possible that ANI is covered by para (h) of the definition of Australian defence agency.

Exclusion of oversight of AGO, ASD or DIO

The intelligence agencies of Defence: the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (AGO), the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) and the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), are already subject to the oversight of the PJCIS. Proposed subsection 110ABB(2) ensures that the Committee cannot review the expenditure or administration of AGO, ASD or DIO. The Committee can, however, request the heads of those agencies to brief the Committee about matters that are related to its functions.

Powers of the Committee

The Committee may request briefings (proposed section 110ACB) from:

• the head of an Australian defence agency
• the Inspector-General ADF
• the Director-General of National Intelligence.

Orders to appear and produce documents

There are 2 different provisions governing the Committee’s power to require a person to appear before the Committee or produce documents to the Committee. In both provisions, a person can only be required to appear if the Committee has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is capable of giving evidence or producing documents relevant to the functions of the Committee (see proposed subsections 110ACC(1) and 110ACD(1)).

Imposing statutory requirements for the exercise of power has the result that a person would be able to ask a court to set aside a notice to appear if the person believed the relevant criteria for issuing a notice did not exist.

‘Briefing agencies’

The headings of proposed sections 110ACC and 110ACD refer to ‘briefing agencies’. This term is not defined in the Bill. It appears to mean the full range of Australian defence agencies, including AGO, ASD and DIO. Neither provision appears to have any wider application to agencies which might brief the Committee.

Heads and staff members of briefing agencies (proposed section 110ACD)

The Committee may require the head of an Australian defence agency to appear before the Committee to give evidence or to produce documents to the Committee. Failure to attend or produce documents would be an offence (proposed sections 110ADB and 110ADD). The agency head can nominate a staff member of the agency to give evidence in their place (proposed subsection 110ACD(4)). Once nominated, the staff member has an obligation to appear (proposed subsection 110ADB(2)).

The definition of staff member of an Australian defence agency includes employees, consultants and contractors, members of the ADF, and people seconded or loaned to a defence agency.

Other people outside briefing agencies (proposed section 110ACC)

Any person who is not within the above categories could be required to appear; that might include public servants from outside Defence, academics, Commonwealth corporations such as the ASC and ANI, and persons working for defence industry.

While Ministerial permission is not required for public servants or employees of Commonwealth entities to give evidence or produce documents, a responsible Minister may give a certificate under proposed subsection 110ACE(2) stating that a person should not give evidence or should not produce documents.

Position of companies contracted to supply services and equipment to Defence

A consultant or contractor to Defence is defined as a staff member of an Australian defence agency. The position of directors and employees of companies that supply services or equipment to Defence is not explicitly spelled out. It is possible that the meaning of staff member covers only those consultants and contractors who are personally contracted to Defence or an agency in a quasi-employment role. However, it is not entirely clear whether directors and employees of defence contractors would be covered by proposed section110ACC or proposed section 110ACD.

It is worth noting that the proposed definition of protected information in subsection 4(1) does not include any concept of sensitive commercial or intellectual property information. Presumably the requirement that evidence taken in private must not be published without the witness’s permission is considered sufficient to protect that information (proposed subsection110ACG(2)).

Constraints on Committee powers

The Committee must not require a person to disclose protected information unless disclosure is specifically authorised by a responsible Minister (see proposed section110ACA and proposed definition in subsection 4(1)). The definition of protected information includes naval nuclear propulsion information but does not extend to information about naval nuclear-powered submarines more generally (see Explanatory Memorandum p. 9).

The Committee must never disclose protected information relating to an inquiry or investigation by the Inspector-General ADF that is being conducted, in a report to a House of Parliament (see proposed section 110ACH and paragraph (d) of the definition of protected information in subsection 4(1)).

For all other categories of protected information, the Committee must not disclose protected information in a report to a House of Parliament unless disclosure is specifically authorised by a responsible Minister (see proposed section 110ACH and paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the definition of protected information in subsection 4(1)).

Offences

The Bill inserts 9 new offences into the Act. It is important to note that the offences apply to members of the Committee, staff of the Committee and staff of the members of the Committee as well as witnesses and other people. The offences protect the confidentiality and procedure of the Committee by criminalising:

• unauthorised publishing or disclosing of evidence or documents - proposed section110ADA (maximum penalty of imprisonment for 2 years or 120 penalty units ($39,660) or both)
• failure to attend the Committee when required by notice - proposed section 110ADB (maximum penalty of imprisonment for 6 months or 30 penalty units ($9,900) or both)
• failure to take an oath, make an affirmation or answer a question - proposed section110ADC (maximum penalty of imprisonment for 6 months or 30 penalty units or both)
• failure to comply with notice to produce - proposed section 110ADD (maximum penalty of imprisonment for 6 months or 30 penalty units or both)
• giving false or misleading evidence - proposed section 110ADE (maximum penalty of imprisonment for 2 years or 120 penalty units or both)
• threatening a person intending to interfere with evidence to the Committee - proposed subsection 110ADF(1) (maximum penalty of imprisonment for 5 years or 300 penalty units ($99,000) or both)
• improperly influencing a witness intending to interfere with evidence to the Committee - proposed subsection 110ADF(2) (maximum penalty of imprisonment for 5 years or 300 penalty units or both)
• threatening a person who provided evidence to the Committee - proposed subsection110ADF(3) (maximum penalty of imprisonment for 5 years or 300 penalty units or both)
• improper disclosure of Committee information by a Committee member, staff of the Committee or staff of a Committee Member - proposed section 110ADG (maximum penalty of imprisonment for 5 years or 300 penalty units or both).

The value of a penalty unit is currently $330: section 4AA(1) of the Crimes Act 1914.

The Explanatory Memorandum does not discuss the interaction of parliamentary privilege and the operation of the offences.

Proposed section 110ADH provides that these offences can only be instituted by the Attorney-General or with the Attorney-General’s consent. This provision limits to some extent the capacity of the Committee to govern its own procedure. The Government will control both the operation of the Committee and the prosecution of any person who interferes with the operation of the Committee.