Key points
- The Australian Centre for Disease Control Bill 2025 (the Bill) establishes the Australian Centre for Disease Control (Australian CDC) as an independent, non-corporate Commonwealth entity and establishes the role, powers, functions and duties of the agency and its Director-General.
- The establishment of an Australian CDC was a commitment made by the Australian Labor Party prior to the 2022 election. An interim Australian CDC was established on 1 January 2024 within the Department of Health, Disability and Ageing.
- The Australian CDC is intended to be an ‘authoritative source of public health advice and information’ for Governments, health professionals, the Australian public, international agencies and non-government organisations. The initial focus of the CDC includes communicable diseases, pandemic preparedness, emergency health management (including management of the National Medical Stockpile), disease surveillance and existing capabilities in environmental health and occupational respiratory diseases. The functions of the Australian CDC are subject to review and intended to grow over time.
- The Australian Centre for Disease Control (Consequential Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2025 (the C&T Bill) makes consequential amendments to existing Commonwealth legislation to transfer relevant public health responsibilities to the Director-General of the Australian CDC.
- The Bill and the C&T Bill have been referred to the Community Affairs Legislation Committee for inquiry and report by 24 October 2025.
- Stakeholders have argued that bipartisan support and surety of funding are essential for the Australian CDC to achieve success over the medium to longer term. (CDC Stakeholder Engagement, p. 6)
Introductory Info
Date of introduction: 3 September 2025
House introduced in: House of Representatives
Portfolio: Health, Disability and Ageing
Commencement: The Australian Centre for Disease Control Bill 2025 (the Bill) commences on 1 January 2026.
The Australian Centre for Disease Control (Consequential Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2025 (the C&T Bill) commences on the same day as the Bill. However, the provisions do not commence at all if the Bill does not commence.
Purpose of the Bill
The purpose of the Australian Centre for Disease Control Bill 2025 (the Bill) is to establish the Australian Centre for Disease Control (Australian CDC) as an independent, non-corporate Commonwealth entity and establish the role, powers, functions and duties of both the Australian CDC and its Director-General.
The purpose of the Australian Centre for Disease Control (Consequential Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2025 (the C&T Bill) is to make consequential amendments to the following Commonwealth legislation to transfer relevant public health responsibilities to the Director-General of the Australian CDC:
The C&T Bill will also repeal the Australian National Preventive Health Agency Act 2010 (ANPHA Act). The repeal of the ANPHA Act is to allow the CDC to take up a role in the prevention of chronic disease in the future.
Background
Responsibility for public health in Australia
Australia’s federated system of government means that responsibility for public health is shared between the Commonwealth and the states/territories.
The Commonwealth is primarily responsible for national coordination and manages Australia’s exposure to imported infectious diseases and pandemic risks under the Biosecurity Act, the NHS Act and other legislative frameworks.
State and territory governments are responsible for managing emergencies and operational responses in their respective jurisdictions and all jurisdictions have enacted public health legislation.
There are several mechanisms through which national public health leadership and coordination have traditionally occurred in Australia. These include the Australian Health Protection Committee (AHPC) and the National Cabinet which was established during the pandemic and replaced the Council of Australian Governments.
Establishment of an Australian CDC
There have been calls to establish an Australian CDC for nearly 40 years. In 1987, the Australasian Epidemiological Association noted (p. 493) that disease control activities in Australia were ‘fragmented, inadequate and poorly coordinated’ and suggested that ‘now is the time to begin to plan for a national system of disease control’. In the decades since, several public health experts and stakeholders have made similar observations and made their case for the establishment of an Australian CDC. For example:
- In 2011, the Public Health Association of Australia (PHAA) and the Australasian Faculty of Public Health Medicine of the Royal Australasian College of Physicians (RACP) released a discussion paper, Does Australia Need a National Centre for Disease Control? The paper, which did not represent a formal policy, stated that ‘the aim of establishing an ACDC would be to provide strong central, expert driven leadership and coordination of national communicable disease control’.
- In 2017, the Australian Medical Association (AMA) released a position paper calling for the ‘immediate establishment of an Australian National Centre for Disease Control (CDC), with a national focus on current and emerging communicable disease threats, engaging in global health surveillance, health security, epidemiology and research’.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, establishment of an Australian CDC entered public debate following renewed calls from public health stakeholders, and a commitment by the Australian Labor Party (ALP, then in opposition) to create an Australian CDC. While the COVID-19 pandemic brought the idea of an Australian CDC back to the fore, the development of a CDC has also been considered essential for addressing other public health threats, such as antimicrobial resistance, bird flu outbreaks overseas, external threats to health such as climate change and air pollution, and natural disasters.
Inquiries and reports on establishing an Australian CDC
In addition to calls from public health experts and stakeholders, several inquiries have recommended the establishment of an Australian CDC, or equivalent.
In 2012–13, during an Inquiry into health issues across international borders, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Health and Ageing considered whether Australia should have a national centre for communicable disease control. The Final report discussed the issue in detail, with the committee considering that a CDC could ‘assist in encouraging more uniformity, improved efficiency and better coordination between public health departments in each state and territory and the Commonwealth, and across a range of portfolio agencies’ (p. 134). While the report recommended that the government commission an independent review to assess the case for a CDC (p. 136), this recommendation was rejected by the then government in August 2018, who considered that the already established National Framework for Communicable Disease Control was the best option for managing existing and emerging health issues (pp. 28–29).
The First interim report from the Senate Select Committee on COVID-19, published in December 2020, recommended that the Australian Government ‘establish an Australian Centre for Disease Control to improve Australia's pandemic preparedness, operational response capacity and communication across different levels of government’ (p. xv). The report noted that Australia is the only member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to not have a CDC or equivalent body, and that stakeholders and experts made a strong case for its establishment. The recommendation was re-iterated in the Final report from the Select Committee on COVID-19, published in April 2022 (p. ix).
The COVID-19 Response Inquiry Report, released in October 2024 (following the establishment of the Interim CDC), recommended that the government finalise establishment of the Australian CDC within the next 12–18 months. The report also highlighted roles it believes the CDC should undertake, including building foundations for a national communicable disease data integration system; developing a world-leading public health surveillance system; pandemic preparedness and working with the Department of Health and Aged Care and jurisdictions on updated communicable disease plans (p. 9).
Consultation on the role and functions on the Australian CDC and establishment of the Interim Australian Centre for Disease Control
Initial stakeholder consultation in lead up to the Bill
In the lead up to the 2022 election, the ALP reiterated its commitment to the establishment of an Australian CDC. At the time, it was reported that the then Coalition government did not support the establishment of a CDC. Following its election, the Labor Government provided $3.2 million in the 2022–23 Budget (October) to undertake the initial design for the establishment of an Australian CDC (p. 117).
In November 2022, the Department of Health, Disability and Ageing (the Department, previously the Department of Health and Aged Care) released a consultation paper on the Role and Functions of an Australian Centre for Disease Control, which provided an opportunity for stakeholder consultation. As noted by the Minister for Health and Aged Care in the consultation paper, the Government had ‘not made any firm decisions about the model for Australia’s CDC’ and one of the main aims of the consultation was to help inform ‘the Government’s decision-making in this regard’ (p. ii).
As part of the consultation, 12 facilitated workshops were undertaken, and 144 written submissions were received from a wide range of diverse stakeholders including industry representatives, advocacy groups, medical colleges, NGOs, peak bodies and research institutions.
The consultation report, published in December 2022, contains a summary of the ‘high-level themes captured across stakeholder written submissions’. Key findings from the consultation include:
- Nearly all written submissions indicated strong support for the establishment of an Australian CDC. There was ‘a strong expectation that the establishment of a CDC will drive much greater linkage and collaboration across the Australian health system and offer a genuine ‘one source of truth’ on how Australia responds to both communicable and non‑communicable disease challenges into the future’ (p. 3).
- Broad support for the ‘One Health’ approach, which takes ‘an integrated, unifying approach to tackling health challenges that aims to sustainably balance and optimize the health of people, animals and ecosystems’. However, it was noted that there would need to be an increased focus on animal and environmental health stakeholders and data sources to achieve genuine outcomes (p. 4).
- Stakeholders indicated that the scope of the CDC’s functions should vary based on prevailing circumstances, with a more significant ‘command and control role’ during pandemics and a ‘data collation, analysis and advice’ role in non-pandemic times (p. 3).
- Several submissions favoured a ‘hub and spoke’ model, with a Canberra based policy making hub linked to centres of expertise within all states and territories, especially given the diversity that exists in local communities across Australia (p. 5).
- Regarding governance, stakeholders highlighted the importance of an independent board, and it was indicated that ‘it was critical that the CDC have a degree of independence from – but still be ultimately answerable to – federal, state and territory governments’ (p. 5).
- Of note, the report stated that ‘perhaps the most consistent feedback across all written submissions was the critical importance of the CDC needing to drive a breakthrough on data linkage and usage at the national level’ (p. 3). Stakeholders raised several barriers that exist in relation to collecting ‘timely, consistent and accurate national data’(p. 9). Further, it was considered that ‘the ability to make headway on data linkage to ensure public health decisions are made on the analysis of accurate and timely data is perhaps the most critical goal that stakeholders anticipate a CDC being challenged with achieving’, with the ‘positive connection between high quality data and better health outcomes…clear to all stakeholders’ (p. 9).
The proposed role and functions of the Australian CDC as outlined in the Bill appear to broadly align with what has been discussed with, and recommended by, stakeholders through the consultation process. Particularly with relation to powers and functions of the CDC and the Director-General, data collection and reporting, transparency and publication of information.
Interim CDC
The 2023-24 Budget provided $91.1 million over 2 years (from 2023–24) to progress establishment of an Australian CDC (p. 131). An interim Australian CDC was established on 1 January 2024 within the Department. Its functions include health alerts, emergency health management (including management of the National Medical Stockpile), communicable disease, national and international disease surveillance and environmental health.
Proposed role of the CDC
The CDC will preliminarily focus on select health-related issues when it commences. As outlined in the Explanatory Memorandum, the ‘Australian CDC’s initial priorities will focus on communicable diseases, pandemic preparedness and existing capabilities in environmental health and occupational respiratory diseases’ (p. 3). The central roles of the CDC are to:
- provide evidence-based public health advice to the Commonwealth Health Minister and other Commonwealth Ministers;
- advise and consult with other Commonwealth entities, state and territory government bodies, international organisations and non-government organisations on matters relevant to the Australian CDC;
- deliver a contemporary, nationally coordinated approach to public health data;
- build awareness and educate Australians on public health threats as a trusted source of public health advice and information for the Australian public and for health professionals;
- develop health guidelines, statements and standards, which the Commonwealth and states and territories could consider adopting for their responsible sectors; and
- publish reports, information and papers on public health matters, including for transparency purposes and further publication at the Director-General’s discretion.
Of note, the CDC will not duplicate functions already undertaken by the Commonwealth Government, states and territories (p. 3). It is intended to support existing work and prepare for future health threats and emergencies.
The role and functions of the Australian CDC are intended to be expanded over time, into areas such as chronic disease; however, this expansion will not occur until the completion of an independent review planned for 2028. The Bill includes a review provision to review the CDC every 5 years to ensure that the Act is ‘working as intended to support the CDC’s operations, particularly in improving the availability and use of data for public health benefit’.
Policy position of non-government parties/independents
Coalition
At the time of writing, the Coalition have not commented directly on the Bill; however, they have previously stated that they do not support the establishment of an Australian CDC. In February 2021, in response to a petition requesting the establishment of a CDC, the then Health Minister, Greg Hunt stated:
A national CDC would not add to Australia's proven expertise and capacity to effectively respond to national communicable disease outbreaks. Additional structures could risk overlap and duplication with existing communicable disease control functions.
In the lead up to the 2022 election, it was reported that the then Coalition government did not support the establishment of a CDC. A similar report published prior to the 2025 election quoted the Coalition as saying that it ‘does not believe the case has been made for the establishment of a dedicated Centre for Disease Control in an Australian context’ (p. 1). This view was reiterated by Opposition health spokesperson Senator Anne Ruston during a debate at the National Press Club:
…you [the Minister for Health] made a promise to the Australian public about the formation of a CDC. So far, you have failed to make the case for what that CDC might look like. I have not seen any legislation about the establishment of the CDC. And I find it quite interesting that you're suggesting that we import, by the sounds of things, the American style CDC into Australia, when by all accounts, Australia's response to the COVID pandemic was one of the best in the world, certainly better than cases that currently have a CDC. So my argument is that you haven't made the case for a CDC (p. 18).
In an article published following the introduction of the Bill, Senator Ruston was reported as saying that ‘the Coalition was yet to examine the bill, flagging it would move to establish a Senate inquiry’. Senator Ruston further stated that ‘[d]espite being in Government for three years, Labor has failed to release any of the substantive details about this key Labor election promise until this week’.
The Australian Greens
At the time of writing, the Australian Greens have not commented on the Bill; however, they support the establishment of a ‘well-funded National Centre for Disease Control’.
Independents
According to a report published in the Canberra Times, Independent Senator for the ACT, David Pocock, ‘welcomed the move "to finally introduce legislation giving effect to [the Government’s] commitment" to establish a standalone Australian CDC based in Canberra’. The Senator further stated:
There are huge opportunities to maximise the multiplier benefits of the ACDC to the ACT economy and especially to grow and support our health ecosystem, if done right…
The ACDC will also be crucial to our preparedness to combat the inevitable future pandemics and I look forward to examining the details over the coming month.
In an article published in The Saturday Paper, Independent Member for Kooyong, Dr Monique Ryan stated that the establishment of an Australian CDC was ‘a milestone for public health in this country’, but also that the ‘draft bill for the centre… hives off key responsibilities, is silent on priorities and is constrained by an insufficient budget and limited vision’. The Member for Kooyong argued that the legislation should highlight which public health matters the CDC will prioritise; that non-communicable disease should be a priority from the outset; the CDC should ‘train the public health workforce of the future’, and that adequate funding is essential (higher than that currently provided).
In a speech in response to the 2022–23 Budget, Dr Sophie Scamps welcomed the establishment of a CDC:
It firmly demonstrates that this government recognises the benefits of planning for major public health emergencies in Australia, such as the increased incidence of diseases associated with climate change. It will allow Australia to catch up with the other OECD countries, after years of experts calling for it to be established. The $3.2 million in this budget is small but it will get the ball rolling.
Position of major interest groups
As discussed in the background, several public health experts and stakeholders have supported the establishment of an Australian CDC for many years. Following the introduction of the legislation, many stakeholders expressed their support.
The Public Health Association of Australia (PHAA) called the legislation a ‘momentous and welcome step forward for health’. Further stating that ‘the Australian CDC will provide a central, credible source of information. We hope it will grow and evolve to a key leadership role in public health in Australia, and be resourced accordingly’.
The Australian Medical Association (AMA) welcomed the introduction of legislation, noting that the ‘AMA has been the flag bearer in calling for an Australian CDC, which will help ensure we are better prepared for the next pandemic and future health challenges’. The AMA encouraged parliamentarians to support the legislation.
“It’s very reassuring to see the legislation that will create this independent body being introduced into parliament and I encourage all parliamentarians to get behind it.”
The Bill has been referred to the Community Affairs Legislation Committee for inquiry and report by 24 October 2025. At the time of writing, 37 submissions had been published on the inquiry website. A summary of some of the issues raised in the submissions is provided below. As there may be additional submissions published, and not all submissions could be considered prior to writing this digest, this should not be considered comprehensive or exhaustive.
Most submissions were supportive of the establishment of an Australian CDC. A small number of submissions (two from individuals)[1] expressed concerns about the proposed roles and functions of the CDC, particularly in relation to agreements with international organisations.
Several submissions called for additions to the initial remit of the CDC, for example:
The PHAA and Deakin University’s Faculty of Health considered that the Advisory Council should not be chaired by the Director-General. The submission from Deakin University noted that ‘…such an arrangement still has the potential to create a conflict of interest and compromise CDC independence’ (pp. 2–3).
Financial implications
The Government committed in the 2024–25 MYEFO process $251.7 million over a period of four years, commencing from 2024–25, for the establishment of the Australian CDC (p. 258). The Government has also committed $73.3 million in ongoing funding from 2028–29 (p. 6).
The Public Health Association of Australia has questioned whether this funding is new money or money which has been reallocated to the Australian CDC through the transfer of functions from the Department and other agencies (p. 6). It has argued that ‘[i]f the CDC is to genuinely fulfil its potential, the budget allocations for 2024–25 and onwards will need to be in the hundreds, not tens, of millions of dollars.’ (p. 6)
The AMA has suggested that ‘a proportion of CDC operational funding could be sourced from state and territory governments to help ensure all jurisdictions are invested in the CDC’s success and ongoing relevance’ and noted that the ‘CDC will require flexible and additional funding in case of acute pandemic/epidemic episodes that require immediate attention (p. 5).
Key issues and provisions
Role of the Director-General and the Advisory Council
A key focus for stakeholders was that the Australian CDC be independent from, but reportable to, government. The Bill establishes the Australian CDC as a statutory non‑corporate Commonwealth entity, with the Director-General as the accountable authority (clause 7).
The Director-General will be appointed by the Minister and may be re-appointed (clause 10). The Minister must not appoint a person unless they are satisfied the prospective Director‑General has the appropriate expertise, qualifications, or experience in public health matters. Stakeholders such as the AMA have emphasised the need for this to be an independent appointment based on clinical merit rather than political appointments (p. 5).
The Director-General will be supported by an Advisory Council which will be responsible for advising the Director-General on a range of matters (clauses 26 and 27). The Director‑General will be the Chair of the Advisory Council, and the Commonwealth Medical Officer will also be a member (clauses 28 and 29). Other members will be appointed by the Minister based on their expertise in a range of sectors, including public health matters, economics, human rights, and communications (clause 30). While the Advisory Council will have the ability to advise the Director-General it does not have the power to give directions. Some stakeholders, such as the Public Health Association of Australia, have argued that the Australian CDC should be governed by a Board as opposed to an Advisory Council (p. 5).
Beyond the Advisory Council, the Director-General will also be able to create temporary expert advisory groups in accordance with section 24 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013. According to the Explanatory Memorandum for the Bill, ‘[t]hese groups would provide technical and specialist advice on key issues—including community expertise and highly specialised advice on specific diseases and responses, where needed.’ (p. 5)
Use of consultants
Clause 18 provides that staff of the Australian CDC must be engaged under the Public Service Act 1999. Clause 19 provides that the Director-General, on behalf of the Commonwealth, may engage consultants to assist in the performance of the functions, powers and duties of one or more of the Australian CDC, the Director-General and/or the Advisory Council. Stakeholders have noted the importance of conflicts of interest being managed appropriately, particularly in engaging with the private sector (for example, see submissions to the Department by The George Institute and the AMA).
Provision of public health advice and transparency around decision-making
One of the key functions of the Director-General is the provision of public health advice to Commonwealth Ministers, Commonwealth entities, state/territories entities, international organisations, and a range of other public health bodies (clause 11). This advice must relate to ‘public health matters’ which is defined broadly at clause 5 of the Bill to include preventative health; environmental health; and the health effects of climate change.
As acknowledged by the Government in the Explanatory Memorandum (p. 12), the COVID-19 Response Inquiry report ‘highlighted concerns about the lack of transparency in public health decision-making, and in the provision of trusted, evidence-based advice.’ In particular the report noted that ‘there was a view that decision-making was prioritising the immediate health impacts rather than broader health impacts and economic, social and human rights issues’ (p. 60).
According to the Explanatory Memorandum (p. 28), the Australian CDC will work closely with the Department and other stakeholders to ensure the Minister is provided with timely and consistent advice. The Director-General will also have the power to provide advice to Ministers on request or their own initiative, though there is no requirement that Ministers follow this advice.
The Bill will require the Director-General to publish certain advice that relates to public health matters which is given in writing and contains recommendations (clause 20). The Minister will have the power to make rules governing how the advice is published, including who should be consulted (clauses 23 and 80). However, this requirement to publish will only apply to advice given to Ministers, Commonwealth entities, states/territories, or state/territory entities. Further this requirement does not apply where the advice (or parts of the advice) would be exempt, including for reasons that such advice would be exempt under certain provisions in the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI Act) (clause 22; further types of exempt material are contained in clause 5). Exempt documents will also include documents or material that, if published, could present an unreasonable risk of harm to an individual, group or cohort. For example, ‘publication of epidemiological advice to the Minister discussing rates of sexually transmitted infections in a specific population group or demographic may unreasonably risk stigmatisation or harm to that population group’ (p. 19).
Given concerns regarding the Government’s recently introduced amendments to the FOI Act and how broadly these exemptions can be applied, it remains to be seen whether this will achieve the level of transparency envisaged by the COVID-19 Response Inquiry Report.
The COVID-19 Response Inquiry Report also concluded that there should be greater transparency on decisions made under the Biosecurity Act (p. 104). For example, currently determinations made by the Minister for Health under section 477 of the Biosecurity Act are not subject to disallowance. The lack of scrutiny afforded to the Australia Parliament over these and other determinations drew strong criticism from the Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation during the pandemic (see comments made by the Committee at pp. 4–7). The Committee also recommended that the government amend the Biosecurity Act to provide that these determinations be subject to disallowance (p. 132). The COVID-19 Response Inquiry Report noted that ‘greater transparency in the advice used to make these decisions would increase public trust in the response’ (p. 104).
Power to enter into agreements and arrangements
The Director-General will have the power to enter into agreements on behalf of the Commonwealth with the states/territories (clause 13):
Agreements may clarify roles and responsibilities at the Commonwealth and jurisdictional level, both during and outside of health emergencies, and as well as outline data access, sharing and use arrangements. Agreements include both ongoing arrangements between agencies through memoranda of understanding (e.g. articulating workforce and secondment arrangements), as well as targeted or time limited arrangements to address a current or emerging threat (e.g. the National Partnership on COVID-19 Response). (p. 32)
The Director-General will be required to publish a register of public health agreements to be published on the Australian CDC website. Subclause 24(2) defines a public health agreement as a written agreement between the Australian CDC and one or more other entities (at least one of which is not an Australian government entity) under which the Australian CDC receives information or advice in relation to public health matters. The Minister may also make rules prescribing other types of agreements as public health agreements.
The Explanatory Memorandum notes that the Register:
…is intended to capture the entities that have provided advice that has been commissioned by the Australian CDC (for financial compensation or in-kind) but not in circumstances where unsolicited advice or information is provided to the Australian CDC. The purpose of this register is to improve transparency around the entities that may inform or influence the Australian CDC’s functions. The register is not intended to be updated every time the Australian CDC engages with an entity under a public health agreement. (p. 38)
The Director-General will also have the power to enter into arrangements on behalf of the Australian CDC with a range of different international health bodies (clause 13). According to the Explanatory Memorandum (p. 32), these arrangements will be less-than-treaty status instruments and as such, will be non-binding under international law.
This suggests that there will be a range of agreements and arrangements which will not be captured by the Register.
Information gathering powers and data collection
As identified during consultations by the Department, the collection and dissemination of health data at the national level is seen by stakeholders as one of the most important functions the CDC would undertake. The focus on data is also reflected in the Minister’s second reading speech (p. 15):
At the heart of the Australian CDC is a commitment to using and enhancing the value of data and information. In a crisis, decision-makers need the best available evidence—at jurisdictional and national level—to make decisions quickly.
…
The Australian CDC will deliver a modern approach to national public health data to enable more accurate and faster detection of risks, more consistent responses across borders, and a stronger foundation for national public health planning.
But the CDC won't act alone—Australians expect all levels of government to work together when public health is on the line. That is why this bill streamlines data sharing and authorises linkage across the Commonwealth, and with state and territory governments who choose to do so, to support public health activities.
A number of barriers to data collection were identified during the consultation process, such as a lack of consistent data labels, collection practices, privacy laws and data sharing protocols across jurisdictions, poor integration of systems, and concern over data sovereignty for small incidence populations (p. 9). The complexities associated with data sharing between jurisdictions is a key issue:
For example, the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS) is owned by the Department of Health and Aged Care, which coordinates national surveillance data for more than 70 diseases on the National Notifiable Disease List. These notifiable diseases are those that present a risk to public health if there is an outbreak. Every day, the state and territory health authorities supply the NNDSS with de-identified notification data about new cases of notifiable diseases. However, the NNDSS is not interoperable with the jurisdictions and no identifiable data is stored in the NNDSS.
(p. 19)
According to an article published in September 2025, a significant part of the delay in establishing the CDC was due to ‘negotiations with state and territory health authorities and data sharing arrangements’ to ensure that states and territories would engage with the CDC.
Acknowledging that individuals may have concerns with how data is collected and used by governments, the Interim CDC engaged two independent organisations to undertake a public consultation, on the way the CDC plans to use data. At the time of writing, a consultation report does not appear to have been published.
Key provisions
The Bill provides for two different types of information gathering powers:
Request for information: the Director-General may request information from certain entities and enter into agreements with the entity governing the provision of the information (clause 43). Compliance with a request or an agreement by the entity is voluntary and there no consequences for failing to comply (clause 44).
Directions power: the Director-General may direct a person to provide information, and the person must comply with the request or be subject to a maximum civil penalty of 60 penalty units (clauses 45, 46 and 48). Importantly, such a direction is not intended to abrogate an individual’s privilege against self-incrimination (p. 50).
The Director-General cannot give a direction to certain persons, including Australian government entities; international organisations; or persons employed by either of these entities. The Administrative Review Tribunal will have the power to review decisions made by the Director-General to issue directions (clause 47) and the Director-General must also publish a list of directions on the Australian CDC’s website (clause 49).
The Director-General can only make a direction where:
- the Director-General is satisfied that the information or a class of information subject to a direction is reasonably necessary for performance of the Director-General's functions or duties
- the Director-General is satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances for a direction to be given and
- the Advisory Council has been consulted (subclause 45(4)).
The Explanatory Memorandum states that ‘this power should only be exercised in limited circumstances, such as to support the functions of the Director-General in responding to a current or emerging public health emergency where other avenues to obtain information necessary to inform public health advice are not viable.’ (p. 49) However, the circumstances in which the power may be exercised appear to be very broad.
According to the Commonwealth Guide for Framing Offences, a notice to produce should only be issued where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person has custody or control of the information (pp. 82-83). No such limit is imposed on the issuing of a direction though a person may rely on it as a defence (clause 48). It is also not clear what types of information this provision is intended to capture though the Explanatory Memorandum does state it is unlikely to capture requests to an individual or medical practitioner for a person’s personal health information (p. 50).
Clause 46 provides that even where other laws apply which would otherwise prevent an entity from complying with a direction to make information available to the Director-General (for example, privacy laws or laws governing health records), these are overridden by the Bill, unless they are ‘designated secrecy laws’. The Minister will have the power to prescribe any law of the Commonwealth or a state/territory as a ‘designated secrecy law’.
In exercising both types of powers, the Director-General can request that the information be provided to them directly or to a ‘designated data service provider’ as prescribed by the legislation (clause 42). The Bill prescribes both the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) as designated data service providers. The Director-General will have the power to prescribe other entities.
The Bill provides for how relevant information (including protected information such as personal information) may be used and disclosed and creates offences for unauthorised use or disclosure. Circumstances where information may be used and disclosed include:
- for the purpose of a person’s functions, duties and powers under the Australian CDC Act, National Health Security Act, National Occupational Respiratory Disease Registry Act 2023, or the Biosecurity Act (clauses 51 and 52)
- for protected information, where it is in the public interest and necessary to achieve the purpose of the disclose (clause 53)
- to facilitate the sharing of data between designated data service providers and the Australian CDC (clause 54)
- where the information is relevant to the functions of the ABS and the AIHW (clause 55)
- where it is being disclosed to an oversight or integrity agency (clause 56), court/tribunal (clause 58), or under another law (clause 59)
- where it is necessary to lessen or prevent a serious threat to the safety, health or wellbeing of the public (clause 63)
- where it is being disclosed to a ‘prescribed public health entity’ for the purpose of assisting the entity to carry out a ‘prescribed public health activity’ (clause 65). Both terms are defined broadly in the Bill (see clauses 40 and 41) and provide a framework to allow for data-sharing between the jurisdictions. This includes allowing the Director-General to establish principles governing safe handling of the information by the entity.
The Director-General will have the power to make a data sharing declaration which creates a legal basis for the collection, use, and disclosure of information in certain circumstances (clause 67). A declaration can be made where there is a severe threat to public health (either immediate or unforeseen) and the declaration is necessary to respond to the threat.
The scope of the declaration power is potentially very broad and may enable data sharing between a range of entities. While the Government has stated that it is intended that the declaration be in place ‘for the shortest time practicable’ (p. 63), the declaration can remain in force for up to 12 months (clause 68). The Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation has previously recommended that the government ensure that all delegated legislation made in response to emergencies ceases to be in force after three months (p. 132).
A data sharing declaration will also not be subject to disallowance. The Explanatory Memorandum argues this is necessary, as ‘The risk of disallowance may prevent the timely exchange of information and swift response to the threat due to the commercial and legal uncertainty caused by disallowance, which may result in exposing entities to the risk that the declaration may later be disallowed and the use of the information be unauthorised.’ (p. 62)
The Government also argues that this is analogous to National Emergency Declarations made under the National Emergency Declaration Act 2020 not being subject to disallowance (p. 62). The Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills and the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation have both previously raised concerns over legislative instruments not being subject to disallowance.