List of recommendations
Recommendation 1
2.47 The
committee recommends that the Government create a single, independent,
statutory authority – separate from the Department of Agriculture – with
responsibility for quarantine and biosecurity policy and operations.
Recommendation 2
2.48 The
recommends that the Government ensure that Australia's import risk analysis
process is consultative, scientifically based, politically independent,
transparent, consistent, harmonised and subject to appeal on process.
Recommendation 3
3.83 The
committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture give thorough
consideration to the Peace report, as well as the underlying themes of all
other recommendations contained in this report, in developing the new
biosecurity regulations and guidelines.
Recommendation 4
3.85 The
committee recommends that the IRA Handbook should be amended to include full
details of techniques available to Department of Agriculture risk analysts and
any underlying data or research validating those techniques.
Recommendation 5
3.87 The
committee recommends that the IRA Handbook should include an IRA effectiveness
checklist similar to that recommended by Mr Peace.
Recommendation 6
3.91 The
committee recommends that stakeholders' risk perceptions should be incorporated
into risk criteria used to analyse the consequences of a given import risk.
Recommendation 7
3.92 The
committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture consider ways to
improve the way it communicates risk (and the risk assessment process) to
stakeholders.
Recommendation 8
3.95 The
committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture reconsiders the
operation of geographic impacts in the IRA process, and give consideration to
developing consequence scales based on, for example, national GDP, percentage
of national crop at risk, or viable planting area at risk.
Recommendation 9
4.61 The
committee recommends that before commencing the importation of fresh pineapples
from Malaysia, the Department of Agriculture should establish to a much greater
degree of certainty the degree of post-harvest latency of pineapple fruit
collapse and heart rot.
Recommendation 10
4.89 The
committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture review its assessment
of the probability of importation and the probability of distribution of the Dickeya
sp. pathogen. If a risk above Australia's ALOP were to emerge from the review,
then the committee expects stronger risk management measures would be required.
If such risk management measures were not sufficient to reduce the risk to
Australia's ALOP, then imports of Malaysian pineapples to Australia should not
be permitted.
Recommendation 11
4.100 The
committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture review its assessment
of the consequences of the establishment of the pineapple heart rot and fruit
collapse pathogen Erwinia chrysanthemi (pineapple strain, Dickeya
sp.) in Australia. If a risk above Australia's ALOP were to emerge from the
review, then the committee expects stronger risk management measures would be
required. If such risk management measures were not sufficient to reduce the
risk to Australia's ALOP then imports of Malaysian pineapples to Australia
should not be permitted.
Recommendation 12
5.23 The
committee recommends that the full reasons and relevant supporting
documentation of the Import Market Access Advisory Group should be made
publicly available within 30 days of a decision being taken.
Recommendation 13
5.36 The
committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture review its assessment
of the likelihood of entry, establishment and spread of yam scale. If a risk
above Australia's ALOP were to emerge from the review, then the committee
expects stronger risk management measures would be required. If such risk
management measures were not sufficient to reduce the risk to Australia's ALOP,
then imports of Fijian ginger to Australia should not be permitted.
Recommendation 14
5.61 The
committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture review its assessment
of the likelihood of entry, establishment and spread of the Fijian burrowing
nematode variant. If a risk above Australia's ALOP were to emerge from the
review, then the committee expects stronger risk management measures would be
required. If such risk management measures were not sufficient to reduce the
risk to Australia's ALOP, then imports of Fijian ginger to Australia should not
be permitted.
Recommendation 15
5.93 The
committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture review its assessment
of the consequences of the establishment of the Fijian burrowing nematode
variant in Australia. If a risk above Australia's ALOP were to emerge from the
review, then the committee expects stronger risk management measures would be
required. If such risk management measures were not sufficient to reduce the
risk to Australia's ALOP, then imports of Fijian ginger to Australia should not
be permitted.
Recommendation 16
5.123 The
committee recommends that before an import license is granted, the Department
of Agriculture make available to stakeholders the scientific evidence used as
the basis for the effectiveness of the proposed mitigation measures for yam
scale.
Recommendation 17
5.124 The
committee recommends that if the Department of Agriculture cannot produce such
scientific evidence, the mitigation measures for yam scale must be reassessed.
Recommendation 18
5.130 The
committee recommends that the draft work plan for importing ginger from Fiji be
made available to the Parliament and industry for appropriate scrutiny over a
suitable period of time, prior to it being finalised.
Recommendation 19
5.133 The committee recommends that the Import Risk
Analysis for fresh ginger from Fiji be recommenced. In recommencing the IRA, DA
Biosecurity should ensure that particular attention is paid to:
- the likelihood of the Fijian burrowing nematode variant being
imported given:
-
the potential for the Fijian burrowing nematode variant to be
imported via other host crops; and
-
the potential for the Fijian burrowing nematode variant to be
imported via other non-host crops grown in the same fields as ginger.
-
the consequences of importing the Fijian burrowing nematode
variant when the following are taken into account:
-
the suggestions made in the Peace Report regarding geographic
scale for crops that are limited to particular districts or regions due to
climatic conditions;
-
the greater geographic scale for other host crops grown in
Australia that could be susceptible to the Fijian burrowing nematode variant;
-
proper consultation with stakeholders for other host crops, who
should be fully informed of the Fijian burrowing nematode variant and its
unknown pathogenicity to those other host crops; and
-
whether there are any effective management measures for the
Fijian burrowing nematode variant in other host crops that are grown in
Australia.
-
the effectiveness of the proposed mitigation measures, taking
into account:
-
the scientific evidence for the limited effectiveness of methyl
bromide treatment when the Fijian burrowing nematode variant is resident inside
ginger rhizomes;
-
the assessment of the import likelihood, given that the
mitigation measures do not guarantee elimination of the Fijian burrowing
nematode variant and that inspections will not detect nematodes resident inside
the ginger;
-
the relative effectiveness of the mitigation measure for the
Fijian burrowing nematode variant compared to the more common variant; and
-
a comprehensive examination of overseas practices.
Recommendation 20
5.140 The
committee recommends that when the IRA is recommenced for fresh ginger from
Fiji, all relevant pests and diseases should be reassessed.
Recommendation 21
6.32 The
committee recommends that, before any fresh ginger is imported from Fiji, the
Department of Agriculture use its powers under Regulation 69 of the Quarantine
Regulations 2000 to resolve the scientific uncertainty surrounding the
burrowing nematode and other possible pathogens.
Recommendation 22
6.33 The
committee recommends that the proposed merits review process for IRAs also
include decisions by the Department of Agriculture on the exercise of
information-gathering and other powers under Regulation 69 of the Quarantine
Regulations 2000.
Recommendation 23
6.42 The
committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture provide industry
stakeholders and/or peak bodies with information relevant to IRA processes
directly and without delay (and with sufficient time to respond to IRA
timelines).
Recommendation 24
7.118 The
committee recommends that, before commencing the importation of fresh potatoes
from New Zealand, a formal Import Risk Analysis be conducted for fresh potatoes
for processing from New Zealand. In conducting the IRA, DA Biosecurity should
ensure that particular attention is paid to:
- the conduct, or
commissioning, of scientific research in relation to possible disease pathways
for the Candidatus Liberibacter solanacearum pathogen;
- the lack of reliable
diagnostic testing for the zebra chip bacteria;
- the large number of
bacteria, fungi, nematodes, arthropods and viruses which are known to occur in
New Zealand, and which are of concern to Australian potato producers.
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