Chapter III - Concluding Observations
“There is no a priori reason to believe that the
truth,
when discovered, will
prove to be interesting.”
Sir Isaiah Berlin[1518]
1.
Conspiracy theories will always hold a morbid fascination for
some. The truth is almost invariably
more prosaic. The only reasonable
conclusion which emerges from a dispassionate analysis of the SIEV 4 episode is
that there was a communications failure within the military chain of command. The critical date was 11 October. By 10 October, Cmdr. Banks, having reviewed all of the
available evidence and spoken to other members of the Adelaide crew, had arrived at the
view that in all probability, no child had been thrown overboard from SIEV
4. We think that that conclusion was
probably correct. He communicated that
view through the chain of command.
However, by the time his ultimate assessment of events reached those
above him in the chain of command on the afternoon of 11 October, Rear Admiral Ritchie had already had the
critical conversation with Admiral Barrie, from which both officers
came away with somewhat different perceptions.
From Barrie’s point of view, Ritchie
was always welcome to come back to him with new information – to “fight a
repechage”, as he put it – but, until new information was placed before him, he
was not persuaded to depart from reliance upon the initial report. For reasons we have explained in Chapter II,
in taking that position, we consider that Admiral Barrie acted entirely reasonably
and appropriately. It is not to the
point that, by this time, Commander Banks had changed his assessment
– Barrie did not know that and, at the time of the
critical conversation, neither, it seems, did Ritchie. Put simply, Barrie kept an open mind but was,
at that point, unpersuaded.
2.
Ritchie’s perception, however, was different: for him, after 11 October, the matter was a
dead issue. He did not put further
information before Admiral Barrie, and apparently did not
consider the matter further. So it was
with that state of mind that Barrie briefed Mr. Reith on 17 October; what he told
Mr. Reith then was an accurate
assessment of the position as he understood it to be. For reasons we have outlined, he was not
only entitled to that assessment; it was (given the facts as he then knew them)
the correct assessment. Mr. Reith was right to take his
advice.
3.
Equally, Mr. Reith was, in our view, also
right not to change his position on the basis of the representations by Air Marshal Houston on 7 November – he was
entitled to continue to rely upon the assessment of the CDF in view of the
limited information available to Houston. At the very least, he should have waited – as
he decided to wait – for Barrie’s return from overseas
three days later before abandoning reliance upon his earlier advice.
4. In
regard to the misattribution of the photographs, there is no doubt that an
error was made. But it was not Mr. Reith’s error: on the afternoon the photographs were
released, Admiral Barrie and Mr. Reith shared a belief that they
referred to the “children overboard” incident. For the reasons we have
explained, that belief was, in the circumstances as they understood them at the
time, not only reasonable but natural.
However, it is the case that Mr. Reith failed to correct the
public record when, after the 7.30 Report
broadcast that evening, the error had been pointed out to him. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe
that Mr. Reith doubted the accuracy of the
original report; on the contrary, all of the evidentiary indications are that he
had no reason to doubt it – a view in which he was confirmed by Admiral Barrie 6 days later and which he
continued to hold in good faith.
5. Mr. Reith’s good faith in the matter
is most obviously demonstrated by his reaction to Air Marshal Houston’s advice to him that the
video did not show children being thrown overboard (as Mr. Reith had believed). His immediate response was to order the
release of the video – not the act of a man who was attempting to conceal
inconvenient facts, but an act only explicable by a readiness to have the facts
on the public record. Nor did the
Committee hear any compelling evidence that Mr. Reith’s staff acted in any way
other than honestly and in good faith.
Finally, we heard not a syllable of evidence to suggest that the Prime
Minister acted other than honestly and in good faith.
6. In
relation to the senior public servants concerned, the position is best
articulated by Ms. Jane Halton, her position was simple
and credible. She never received any
sufficient evidence from Defence to persuade her that the initial report that a
child or children had been thrown overboard was wrong. She cannot be criticized for holding that
view, nor can other senior public servants, including Dr. Hammer, who chose to disregard
conjecture which barely rose above the level of gossip.
7. The
Government Senators consider that the military officers and senior public
servants concerned acted honestly and reasonably at all times. We regard the
attacks upon their integrity, suggested in certain parts of the Majority
Report, as contemptible.
8. Government
Senators were little impressed by counsels of perfection from academics and
armchair analysts, operating with the benefit of hindsight and free of the
pressures of decision-making in a highly mobile environment in which judgments
must be made swiftly and on the best available information (which is sometimes
imperfect and incomplete). Those
considerations particularly apply in a military operational environment, such
as the circumstances in which Adelaide was operating, where the
situation was highly unstable and unpredictable, and where lives were at stake.
9. Indeed, it is notable that the only
person with senior military experience whom the Labor Party could find to
criticize the handling of the issue was the somewhat Gilbertian figure of Sir
Richard Peek, a gentleman who, having begun his career in the Royal Australian
Navy in 1928 during the Prime Ministership of Stanley Melbourne Bruce, and
retired just on 30 years ago, could hardly be regarded as an authoritative
commentator on contemporary military systems (and whose contempt for the entire
notion of Parliamentary scrutiny of the military could not have been more
obvious).
10. The
most strident critics of the public servants concerned were the predictable
parade of professors who, as is their wont, offered the Committee counsels of
perfection which appeared to owe more to the ideals of Plato’s Republic than to familiarity with the vicissitudes of public
administration in the real world.
11. Amid
all of these criticisms, it is not to be forgotten that from an operational
point of view, the incident involving the HMAS Adelaide and SIEV 4 was an outstanding success: in extremely difficult circumstances –
generated exclusively by those attempting to illegally enter Australia and
ruthlessly using every conceivable technique of moral blackmail to do so – the
officers and crew of Adelaide performed
with superb professional competence and bravery, so that not a single life was
lost.
12. From
a policy point of view as well the outcome was successful: Australia’s maritime borders were not
breached, and Operation Relex and the Pacific Solution functioned to deter
future incursions of those borders.
13. There
is one other overwhelming consideration which must be borne in mind, but upon
which we have not yet touched. The
Committee was constantly reminded that the events with which we are concerned
took place against the background of an election environment. That circumstance was undoubtedly uppermost
in the minds of Senator Faulkner, Senator Cook and Senator Collins. But we very much doubt it was uppermost in
the minds of Admiral Barrie or Air Marshal Houston or Rear Admiral Ritchie. What, we have no doubt, was uppermost in
their minds was that these events were taking place not against the background
of an election, but within less than a month of September 11, in the early
stages of Australia’s involvement in the global war against terrorism, and at a
time when the demands upon the Australian Defence Force were higher than they
had been for a generation – indeed, arguably, than at any time since the Second
World War.
14. We
doubt that the Australian people would be troubled to know that an issue which
had a particular salience for Labor Party politicians was not regarded by those
responsible for defending our country at a uniquely dangerous time as a high
order priority. Indeed, the Government
Senators find it reassuring to know that the senior ranks of the Australian
Defence Forces were totally focussed on military matters rather than on a
political cause celebre. The same observations also apply to the
senior public service officers, including Ms. Halton and Dr. Hammer (who, it
will be remembered, at this time had principal responsibility, within the
Defence, Intelligence and Security Branch, International Division of the
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, for the war on terror).
15. Perhaps
the last word should go to Admiral Barrie – a man who impressed Government Senators
with his conscientiousness, frankness, and utter lack of cant – and whose
overview of the situation he faced in October 2001 has a chilling prescience 12
months afterwards:
In October of last year, the
Australian Defence Force was committed as never before to fulfilling its
parliamentary and government charter to “defend Australia and its national
interests”. We were barely three weeks
out from the brutal images of aircraft smashing into the World Trade Centre in
New York and we were about to join the launch of a dangerous mission to
Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom.
In short, I was focused on the imminent war in Afghanistan and the
urgent need to safeguard our homeland from a possible terrorist attack, the
risk of which I considered real and unprecedented. ... [F]rankly, I had much
bigger fish to be fried.[1519]