5. Strengthening Australia's electoral system
   1. The Committee’s interim report noted that it would further explore themes in evidence received in this final report. The Committee has given consideration to several additional reform proposals, which are examined in this chapter.

Donation and expenditure reforms applying to third parties

5.2The Committee’s interim report examined reforms to political donation laws and the implementation of expenditure/spending caps. Submitters were by and large supportive of political donation reform at the federal level and advocated for the introduction of real time disclosure of political donations and lowering the donation disclosure threshold. In its interim report the Committee noted concerns raised by submitters about how political donation reforms might apply to third parties and noted that it would further explore this question. The Committee remains committed to improving transparency in Australia’s political and electoral systems, while recognising the unique position of some third party groups within those systems.

5.3Third parties raised concerns that amending the electoral laws to improve transparency around money – including donation caps and disclosure thresholds – could have unintended consequences, particularly for charities and not-for-profits, on the basis that applying them to their sector would considerably inhibit their work.

5.4Organisations such as the Centre for Public Integrity (the Centre); Hands Off Our Charities Alliance; Human Rights Law Centre (HRLC); Australian Democracy Network (ADN); Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF); and Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) provided evidence on the potential for third parties, civil society organisations, small community groups and donors to be inhibited by increased compliance and regulatory burdens.

5.5The Centre emphasised the importance of political participation of smaller organisations and civil society groups, arguing that the health of democracy depends on donations and electoral expenditure of these groups.[1]

Donation disclosure threshold

5.6The ACTU emphasised the impact that a lower disclosure threshold could have on smaller organisations in terms of increased compliance and reporting burdens.[2]

5.7The Hands Off Our Charities Alliance highlighted the compliance burden that increased disclosure requirements would have for charities, as well as the potential for some people being discouraged from donating to charities if their details would be made public. The Alliance suggested that a threshold of around $2,500 for donation disclosure would alleviate the administrative burden on charities and not-for-profits.[3]

5.8Some submitters argued that these points also applied more broadly than only to charities and not-for-profit third parties. For instance, the NSW Nationals agreed that a lower threshold could potentially increase the administrative burden on political participants such as political parties and deter possible donors from participating in elections and democracy.[4]

5.9Mr Travis Jordan argued that the administrative burden of greater disclosure would be felt by smaller organisations more than larger ones, and suggested that:

Investment in information management systems and providing a single point-of-service for disclosure across Commonwealth, state and territory regimes will not only create a more transparent disclosure regime, but reduce the overall administrative burden of managing multiple contradictory compliance systems.[5]

5.10However, the experience of independent candidates has demonstrated that transparent reporting of donations is not necessarily a significant burden. Curtin Independent Pty Ltd, the campaign entity for Kate Chaney for the 2022 Federal Election, commented on the ease with which they implemented and maintained real-time voluntary donation disclosure on their website:

This was set up in approximately one week despite the lack of experience in the campaign.

Throughout the campaign, Kate Chaney ensured that real-time disclosure of each and every financial donation was made with the only variable being that a donor could elect to appear as "anonymous" rather than being named. Approximately 90% of people elected to be named. More than $900,000 was raised and disclosed on the donor wall in real-time and prior to the opening of voting. It was neither difficult nor expensive. It used off-the-shelf software and required no expertise to implement or maintain.[6]

5.11Other independents have stated publicly that they disclose donations well before the required legislated timeframe requires. Dr Helen Haines MP discloses anything above the threshold within five days and anything above $1,000 every financial quarter on her website.[7] Ms Zoe Daniel MP also discloses any donation above the threshold on her website weekly.[8]

5.12Several other members of parliament voluntarily disclosed the aggregated amount of donations that they received during the 2022 federal election campaign, or have committed to introducing a donor list of every monetary donation during their term in Parliament soon.[9]

Donations and expenditure caps

5.13The HRLC argued that the recommendation to cap donations to third parties and associated entities would effectively stifle ‘a lot of community groups and charities that rely on large donations to do their advocacy in the lead-up to an election’, and added:

We believe that this recommendation is discriminatory. It is, in fact, anti charity and it is anti community groups. The reason is that, if you only cap donations to third parties, you only impact third parties that receive donations. Most or many third parties don't rely on donations.[10]

5.14The ADN agreed that while ‘caps are very important for political parties and candidates... they should not apply to third parties.’[11]

5.15The ACF and the HRLC suggested that a cap on electoral expenditure, rather than donations, could potentially make a ‘fair playing field and make elections a contest of ideas, not a contest of money.’[12] The HRLC elaborated:

I think our starting position is that the only non-discriminatory way of regulating third parties is to regulate their expenditure. Spending caps is the preferable reform. If donation caps are to be applied to third parties then caps also need to be applied to membership fees, levies, subscriptions and investment income. It needs to be capped across the board, otherwise you're effectively just singling out one type of third party for pretty significant limitations on their ability to engage in advocacy.[13]

5.16The HRLC added that they ‘support lower spending caps for third parties than for political parties and candidates.’[14]

5.17The Grattan Institute was of the view that donation caps would unduly impact donors while expenditure caps would affect political parties:

Donations caps would also impose a regulatory burden on donors. Donors would need to keep track of their payments to political parties, know whether they are a donation or receipt, and be aware of when they have reached the cap. In contrast, an expenditure cap puts the regulatory burden on the parties. Recent challenges associated with regulating foreign donors show how restricting the supply of donations can easily result in unintended consequences.[15]

5.18Charities are regulated in Australia by the Australian Charities and Not-for Profits Commission (ACNC), who noted that ‘the purpose of promoting or opposing a political party or candidate for office’ is a disqualifying purpose for a charity.[16]Charities registered with the ACNC are required to publish details about their activities, including a link to the AEC’s Transparency Register if they have incurred electoral expenditure.[17]

Expenditure disclosure thresholds and the definition of third party and significant third party

5.19Relevant groups highlighted the challenges they face in complying with the provisions introduced in the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Funding and Disclosure Reform) Act 2018 (EFDR Act), which was subsequently further amended in 2021 (2021 EFDR Act).

5.20The EFDR Act introduced new or amended definitions for the categories of associated entities, political campaigners (subsequently renamed significant third parties in the 2021 EFDR Act), third parties, electoral matter and electoral expenditure:

• associated entity (expanded definition) – entities that have some kind of connection with registered political parties (such as being controlled by or operating for the benefit of a registered political party).
• political campaigner/significant third party – a person or entity that incurs political expenditure of $250,000 or more in a financial year. (In the 2018 EFDR Act, this figure was $500,000 in a year, or $100,000 in the current year and more than two-thirds of their revenue on electoral expenditure in the previous year; the 2021 EFDR Act renamed ‘political campaigners’ to ‘significant third parties’ and, following amendments in the Parliament, lowered the threshold to $250,000.)
• third party – a person or entity that incurs electoral expenditure of more than the disclosure threshold ($13,800 indexed) in a financial year and the person or entity is not required to be, and is not, registered as a political campaigner under section 287F for the year.
• electoral matter – matter communicated or intended to be communicated for the dominant purpose of influencing the way electors vote in a federal election of a member of the House of Representatives or of Senators for a State or Territory, including by promoting or opposing a political entity, to the extent that the matter relates to a federal election; or a member of the House of Representatives or a Senator.
• electoral expenditure – expenditure incurred for the dominant purpose of creating or communicating electoral matter.[18]
  21. Not-for-profits and civil society organisations have expressed concern over the amended definition since the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Funding and Disclosure Reform) Bill 2018 (the Bill) was introduced in the 45th Parliament. The Committee conducted two inquiries into the Bill in 2018 and a review of the EFDR Act on the second anniversary of Royal Assent, where submitters commented on the additional administrative burden placed on charities and not-for-profits in complying with the EFDR Act’s requirements.[19]
  22. During the course of this inquiry charities and not-for-profits continued to caution against enacting legislation that would impose what they perceived would be excessive administrative burdens which could potentially disadvantage charities. The ACF argued that changes to the significant third party provisions under the Electoral Act had negatively impacted charitable organisations and added to red tape.[20]
  23. The ACF, ADN and HRLC were all of the view that the changes should be wound back so that the definition of a significant third party reverts to the pre-2021 threshold of an entity that spent over $500,000 in a year on election-related expenditure, and that the definitions of ‘electoral matter’ and ‘electoral expenditure’ should not be overly broad.[21]
  24. The definition of ‘electoral expenditure’ is crucial because it determines if an entity is a significant third party: under the current threshold, an entity spending over $250,000 in a financial year on ‘electoral expenditure’ is a significant third party.[22]
  25. HRLC described the definition of ‘electoral expenditure’, as amended in 2021, as ‘so broad that it is virtually impossible to comply with’.[23] This amendment broadened the definition of ‘electoral expenditure’ to include any expenditure by a relevant entity ‘in relation to an election’.[24]
  26. The Electoral Act defines third party as ‘a person or entity (except a political entity or a member of the House of Representatives or the Senate) is a third party during a financial year if the amount of electoral expenditure incurred by or with the authority of the person or entity during the financial year is more than the disclosure threshold’ ($15,200 till 30 June 2023; $16,300 till 30 June 2024).[25]
  27. The ADN cautioned that the definition of ‘third party’ needs to be decoupled from proposals to lower the disclosure threshold, to avoid capturing too many organisations with limited involvement in elections:

At the moment, the definition of 'third party' is linked to the disclosure threshold. If we lower the disclosure threshold significantly to $1,000, as is proposed—we actually support a lower disclosure threshold—it must be decoupled from the definition of 'third party'; otherwise you wind up with entities that are barely participating in elections becoming categorised as third parties, and we don't think that's a good outcome.[26]

5.28The HRLC agreed with the ADN’s views to decouple the definition of 'third party' and suggested introducing a new threshold ‘for becoming a third party if the disclosure threshold is lowered across the board.’[27]

Definition of associated entity

5.29Some submitters believed it was also important to ensure that that associated entities are included in reforms to the electoral finance system, and recommended that the definition also be amended to include these entities.

5.30The HRLC were of the view that an ‘associated entity’s expenditure should be counted toward the candidate or political party’s electoral expenditure, as is done in Queensland, to prevent the proliferation of associated entities and circumvention of the spending cap.’[28] They suggested amending the definition:

…the definition of “associated entity” in s. 287H of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) (the Electoral Act) needs to be amended to capture only those entities that genuinely operate for the benefit of a political party — not those that simply have voting rights as members. Having voting rights within a political party is too tenuous a link to suggest their election spending should be treated the same.[29]

5.31The HRLC added that ‘the cap should be extended to donations to entities that coordinate with, or operate to a significant extent to support or oppose, a political party or candidate.’[30]

5.32The Centre suggested using the definition of associated entities in the Electoral Funding Act 2018 (NSW) as a potential model so as not to circumvent any expenditure cap:

…to account for entities which operate ‘solely for the benefit of one or more registered parties or elected members or is controlled by one or more registered political parties’. Expenditure by associated entities so-defined should be captured for the associated party’s expenditure cap. Associated entities previously captured by the Commonwealth’s broad definition should now be subject to the third party expenditure cap and closely monitored for violations of the anti-circumvention offence.[31]

5.33They suggest that anti-circumvention offence should be inserted into the Act and apply to all parties involved in the electoral process:

Such an offence would penalise any attempt by a regulated entity to exceed their cap in concert with another entity. This provision would be particularly important with a narrower definition of associated entity than is currently maintained at the Commonwealth level. As considered by Edelman J in Unions NSW v New South Wales, such an offence, if it is to be constitutional, must extend to all actors attempting to circumvent their applicable cap – not only third parties.[32]

5.34Ms Nicolette Boele, an independent candidate in the 2022 election, agreed that any campaign expenditure caps should be accompanied by ‘anti-circumvention measures, so that entities cannot just create new organisations and spend through them.’[33]

5.35As noted above, submitters were of the view that the Queensland and New South Wales legislations provided more comprehensive definitions of what constituted an associated entity, particularly as it relates to their electoral expenditure. Electoral Acts in other jurisdictions such as South Australia and Victoria also have expanded definitions compared to the federal Electoral Act which include associated entities’ and third parties’ electoral expenditure.

5.36Under the Electoral Act 1992 (Qld) associated entities are treated as part of a registered political party or a candidate in an election. The Queensland Electoral Act defines associated entity as one that is controlled by either a party, group of endorsed candidates of the party, or candidate; or operates wholly, or to a significant extent, for the benefit of the party or a group of endorsed candidates of the party, or candidate in the election, or operates for the dominant purpose of promoting the party in elections, or promoting a group of endorsed candidates of the party, or candidate in an election.[34] Electoral expenditure incurred by a third party is electoral expenditure if the dominant purpose for which the expenditure is incurred is a campaign purpose.[35]

5.37The Electoral Funding Act 2018 (NSW) defines associated entity as a corporation or another entity that operates solely for the benefit of one or more registered parties or elected members.[36] Electoral expenditure includes expenditure that is incurred for the dominant purpose of promoting or opposing a party or the election of a candidate or candidates or influencing the voting at an election.[37]

5.38The definition in the Electoral Act 1985 (SA) includes associated entities that have a financial interest in a registered political party:

• an entity that is controlled by 1 or more registered political parties; or
• an entity that operates wholly, or to a significant extent, for the benefit of 1 or more registered political parties; or
• an entity that is a financial member of a registered political party; or
• an entity on whose behalf another person is a financial member of a registered political party; or
• an entity that has voting rights in a registered political party; or
• an entity on whose behalf another person has voting rights in a registered political party.
  39. Political expenditure also has a broader definition in the South Australian Electoral Act including:
• for the purposes of the public expression of views on a political party, a candidate in an election or a member of the House of Assembly or the Legislative Council by any means; or
• for the purposes of the public expression of views on an issue in an election by any means; or
• for the purposes of the production of any political material (not being material referred to in paragraph (a) or (b)) that is required under section 112, 115A or 116 to include the name and address of the author of the material or of the person who takes responsibility for the publication or authorisation of the material (as the case requires); or
• for the purposes of the carrying out of an opinion poll, or other research, relating to an election or the voting intentions of electors; or
• for any other prescribed purpose.[38]
  40. An associated entity is deemed to be a third party under South Australian legislation once it has incurred political expenditure of more than $10,000 (indexed) during the designated period of the election.[39]
  41. The Electoral Act 2002 (VIC) contains the same definition of associated entity as the South Australian Electoral Act.[40] Political expenditure under the Victorian Electoral Act ‘means any expenditure for the dominant purpose of directing how a person should vote at an election, by promoting or opposing the election of any candidate at the election; or a registered political party; or an elected member.’[41]
  42. Political expenditure for associated entities and third-party campaigners ‘occurs during the election campaigning period outside the election campaign when information refers to a candidate or registered political party and how a person should vote.’[42]
  43. Third parties also highlighted several other areas in which they believed reform was required, including:

• not supporting real-time disclosure for third parties or significant third parties[43]
• capping membership fees, levies and subscription fees to political parties[44]
• encouraging lobbying reform and limiting the influence of ‘big money’ – particularly on the tobacco, fossil fuels and gambling industries[45]
• addressing ‘dark money’ in the political system.[46]

Committee comment

5.44Electoral finance is one of the most complicated components of Australia’s electoral system. The Committee, in its recommendations in both its interim report and this final report on the 2022 election, has prioritised the key principles of increasing transparency around donations, and curbing the potentially corrupting influence of big money on elections.

5.45In its interim report the Committee recommended that ‘the Australian Government lower the donation disclosure threshold to $1,000.’[47] Many charitable organisations that provided evidence to the inquiry were supportive of lowering the donation disclosure threshold.

5.46The Committee notes that independent MPs have publicly stated that they found it relatively simple to set up a website to disclose their donations in real time with very little administrative burden.

5.47The Committee has given careful consideration to the additional evidence provided by charities on the financial and resource implications lowering the donation disclosure threshold could potentially have on their work, in particular to the concern that a lower threshold could place an additional administrative burden on their advocacy work. In this context, the Committee reiterates its recommendation from this inquiry’s interim report that the Government should ensure that the AEC is appropriately resourced to support, implement and enforce these reforms.

5.48The Committee also recommended that ‘the Australian Government introduce expenditure (also known as spending) caps for federal elections.’[48] The Committee continues to support the introduction of expenditure caps for federal elections and is of the view that they should apply to associated entities and third parties in a proportionate way.

5.49The Committee also recommended the introduction of donation caps. The Committee acknowledges that donation caps have the potential to add further complexity to the operating environment of participants in the electoral system. It is not the Committee’s intention to stifle civil society voices.

5.50As much as possible, there should be clarity and consistency in how political donations and electoral expenditure are regulated, with all involved in the electoral process being treated as fairly as possible. Creating multiple sets of rules for separate groups will inevitably lead to a more complex regulatory environment and raise the real possibility of different rules being used to circumvent a regulatory regime.

5.51However, the existing regulatory environment for charities registered with the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC) provides adequate safeguards. For this reason, the Committee recommends that charities regulated under the ACNC should be included in the proposed caps on electoral expenditure, but not proposed donation caps.

5.52For third parties and significant third parties, a large component of the confusion in electoral donations and expenditure is because the definitions of ‘electoral matter’ and ‘electoral expenditure’ are not as clear as they should be, and were broadened considerably in the 2021 amendments to the Electoral Act. There is also variation around how terms are defined and included in electoral systems at the federal and state/territory levels. As noted in the Committee’s interim report, this has relevance in practical terms to regulations around spending and communication and the applications of these terms is not always clearly explained or well understood.

5.53The Committee is therefore recommending that the Government revise the definitions of those terms, with a view to ensuring that they capture electoral matter and expenditure specifically related to influencing how people vote and supporting or opposing specific political parties or candidates. The establishment of a Commonwealth Campaign Account for electoral spending, as recommended in the Committee’s interim report, would provide clarity in this way: expenditure from this account is, by definition, electoral expenditure and therefore subject to the recommended expenditure caps.

5.54The Committee is cognisant that currently the legislation captures some third parties who have very little involvement in the electoral process. There is a disproportionate administrative burden placed on small third parties who play a minor role in the electoral process in complying with the Electoral Act’s requirements and therefore third parties should be defined as people or entities that have incurred over $20,000 in electoral expenditure in a financial year.

5.55Associated entities should not be used as a way of circumventing electoral finance laws, and must be included in any reforms to the electoral finance system, to ensure that there is broadly a consistent approach taken across various forms of entities.

5.56The Committee appreciates the evidence from not-for-profit organisations and charities that the significant third party provisions set out in the EFDR Act and the current definition of 'third party' have negatively impacted charitable organisations.

5.57The Committee reiterates its comment from the interim report that, ‘Given the need for legislation, and the time involved in ensuring that any changes can be clearly understood in the community, action should be taken now, including any necessary further consultation, and that any actions be reviewed following the next federal election.’[49]

5.58The Committee recommends that charities registered under the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission be exempt from the donation caps recommended in the Committee’s interim report into the 2022 federal election, but that these caps be applied to political parties and candidates, along with associated entities, other third parties and significant third parties.

5.59The Committee recommends that the Australian Government amend the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 to provide clarity around the following terms:

• ‘electoral matter’, which relates to material specifically supporting or opposing one or more parties or candidates in a federal election, and which carries the appropriate authorisation;
• ‘electoral expenditure’, to ensure that only expenditure for authorised electoral matter, funded out of a Commonwealth Campaign Account, is captured;
• ‘third party’, to clarify that an organisation qualifies as a third party if ‘the amount of electoral expenditure incurred by or with the authority of the person or entity during the financial year is more than $20,000’, noting the definition of ‘electoral expenditure’ above.

Media blackout laws

5.60The Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Broadcasting Services Act) sets out mandatory election blackout rules for licenced commercial, community, subscription and narrowcast television and radio broadcasters.[50] Under these laws no election ads are to be broadcast from the Wednesday before polling day until the close of the poll on the polling day.

5.61The blackout rules only apply to a broadcaster’s television and radio services licensed under the Broadcasting Services Act, and do not apply to any election advertising in print, on a broadcaster’s streaming or catch-up service, on social media, or any other website or online platform.[51]

5.62ACMA noted that, because these rules only apply to broadcasters’ television and radio services, Australians continued to receive election advertising during media blackout periods, and highlighted that:

This caused some confusion for viewers during the 2022 federal election, with audiences either assuming the material they had seen breached the rules or expecting the blackout rules to cover a broader range of services than they currently do.[52]

5.63The Broadcasting Services Act passed prior to widespread internet access and the subsequent rise of new technology with communication platforms including websites, social media, streaming services, robocalls and SMS/MMS notifications. There are now many more options for consuming information and entertainment, and political advertising no longer exists only in print, on television and radio.[53]

5.64The scale of the shift can be seen in research from The Australia Institute, cited by Free TV, which found that, ‘[a] total of $12.5 million was spent to run 26,945 political ads on Facebook and Instagram by parties and candidates over the two months leading up to May 21 [2022]’.[54]

5.65For the 2022 Federal Election, ACMA received 34 complaints alleging election ads were shown during the blackout period. The majority of these complaints were the result of complainants seeing an election ad while streaming content online, such as via catch-up services or on-demand apps. Ultimately, none of the relevant broadcasters were found to have broadcast the material which was the subject of complaint.[55]

5.66Free TV, who represent Australia’s commercial TV networks, highlighted that the prevalence of streaming and catch-up services means that existing blackout laws are irrelevant and create confusion, and argued for ‘regulatory consistency, in order to maintain transparency and trust with audiences.’[56]

5.67Free TV, like ACMA, expressed their concern that different regulation for different forms of advertising during the 2022 federal election resulted in confusion for viewers.[57] Another concern was that applying these laws to linear broadcasting were no longer ‘relevant or effective, and unfairly disadvantaged commercial broadcasters’ and that ‘this regulatory imbalance has a commercial and competitive impact on commercial broadcasters’.[58]

Bringing consistency to the blackout laws

5.68Given this lack of consistency, two main solutions have been suggested: to extend the blackout laws to all media platforms or to remove the blackout period for all media platforms. Either of these approaches would see the same rules apply to broadcast TV and catchup services, and to social media platforms and traditional media outlets.

5.69Some witnesses argued that the blackout rules should be extended to capture all media platforms.[59] This would create consistency[60] and level the playing field.[61]

5.70Commercial Radio & Audio noted that the blackout rules were originally introduced to prevent broadcasters from influencing voters immediately prior to an election and that there was little value in limiting it to just television and radio:

In a world where so much information is provided from other sources there is no logic for maintaining a blackout in relation to broadcasters while online platforms are free to advertise as they like.[62]

5.71Similarly, the University of Canberra’s News and Media Research Centre (NMRC) stated that:

…politics needs to get into step with the changing media environment and having rules just for a newspaper or a television station is not the full picture.[63]

5.72The NMRC therefore argued that all platforms should be captured by the blackout rules and that it is ‘crazy’ that it only applies to broadcast media.[64]

5.73The Australian Labor Party and the NSW Nationals were both supportive of expanding the blackout to capture all paid advertising.[65]

5.74Alternatively, other witnesses argued that the blackout period should be removed altogether. Free TV noted that, not only are the blackout rules ‘no longer serving a purpose’, but that there has been a rise in prepoll voting, with over 30 per cent of voters in the 2022 election casting their vote prior to the election blackout period commencing. For this reason, they recommended that the blackout rules be removed.[66] This could be achieved by the repeal of the definition ‘relevant period’ from clause 1 of Schedule 2 to the Broadcasting Services Act.[67]

5.75Free TV expressed a number of concerns relating to the blackout laws, one being that because these rules do not extend across all platforms, political parties and candidates transfer their advertising (once the blackout period takes effect) from television to other digital media platforms that are not regulated.[68]

5.76However, the NMRC commented that if blackout rules were to be discarded because they were no longer relevant it would become ‘open slather’ and this would be ‘really dangerous’:

If the blackout rule was discarded, then there should be some kind of guard rails around how much advertising is permitted in those last days instead of this bombardment, micro targeting and splintering of information to different people.[69]

5.77Free TV were sceptical about the effectiveness of broadening the legislation to include digital services:

…the alternative suggestion of introducing election blackout regulation to digital services would not significantly contribute to meeting the objectives of the election blackout period.[70]

Committee comment

5.78Australia’s political blackout laws were legislated at a time where the media landscape was significantly smaller. With the increase in and advancement of technology there is a clear need for reform of political blackout laws. Australians are exposed to political communication through websites, social media, streaming services, robocalls and SMS/MMS notifications. There must be consistency in treatment of the various platforms and media outlets. The blackout period is clearly ineffectual if it doesn’t apply to all communication channels.

5.79Australians are also increasingly voting early with ‘more than 7.9 million of the 15.5 million votes cast’[71] prior to election day in the 2022 election, meaning many have already cast their vote before the three day blackout comes into effect.

5.80The Committee notes that the application of the blackout to online media has been an ongoing issue since its report into the 2016 federal election, and that this Committee has consistently found that the rules lack consistency.[72]

5.81The intent of a blackout period is to support voters being able to make a choice that is not unduly influenced by the biggest or most persuasive advertising spend. However, for all the reasons listed above, this is not what the current blackout period is providing for.

5.82The Committee notes work is underway from numerous bodies, including the Australian Communications and Media Authority, the Senate Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media and the Australian Electoral Commission to address misinformation and disinformation across broadcasting, radio communications and online content.

5.83In its interim report the Committee also addressed the challenge of ensuring voters can trust the information they receive in elections and recommended the Government introduce truth in political advertising legislation at the federal level. It also recommended spending caps, which would play a role in limiting the ability of parties or candidates to spend on campaign advertising.

5.84Given the blackout period does not apply to all communication channels and action is being taken to address misinformation and disinformation, the advertising blackout period is consequently no longer relevant.

5.85The Committee recommends that contingent on the Australian Government introducing truth in political advertising laws, that the media blackout, known as the relevant period in the Broadcasting Services Act 1992, be removed.

Fixed terms for federal elections

5.86In its review of the 2019 federal election the Committee recommended the need to consider four-year terms for the House of Representatives, to align the Commonwealth Parliament with the State Parliaments, and eight-year terms for the Senate.[73]

5.87The Committee heard from some submitters who were broadly in favour of fixed terms, and others who were clearly not supportive of any change to current arrangements. The Committee considers that a more detailed inquiry would be needed to fully assess the views in the community and seek expert advice. To assist in any future consideration of this issue, the Committee has agreed to present the evidence received, but making no specific conclusions about the extent of support, or likelihood of success.

5.88Any future investigation would need to include consideration of how any change might be achieved, and to what extent there would need to be constitutional reform, and whether a referendum would be appropriate. Submitters had a range of views as to the extent of change needed, and how it might be accomplished.

5.89Consideration might also include views on the impact of fixed terms to length and cost of campaigns, as well as on reducing the advantages currently experienced by incumbent governments. The Australian Greens noted that:

The absence of fixed terms puts the timing of elections in the control of the government, providing significant strategic advantages to those who know when it will be called, including pre-planning, booking advertising space and venues…[74]

5.90The Australian Greens also noted that fixed terms might enable the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) to plan more efficiently for polling places which would include securing accessible venues, ensure printed materials are completed in time, as well as recruiting for the intake of temporary employees to assist with elections. The Greens noted their continued support for the adoption of fixed three-year terms for the House of Representatives, with aligned six-year terms for Senators.[75]

5.91The NSW Nationals concurred that fixed terms could provide greater certainty, particularly around campaign finance and expenditure:

If the Committee consider reforms to campaign finance to be important, it must also consider recommending fixed terms for the Commonwealth Parliament. Apart from providing certainty to the electorate, this would allow explicit time periods for matters considered above and provide political participants the opportunity to plan to accommodate reforms.[76]

5.92The Labor Party stated it was also in ‘favour of fixed four-year terms in the federal arena.’[77]

5.93The Real Republic agreed that establishing ‘fixed four-year and synchronised terms for both the House of Representatives and Senate’ would help provide certainty around campaign costs. They elaborated on what they believed were several benefits for proposing fixed terms:

• longer terms for governments would deliver cost savings to taxpayers by having fewer elections as well as better decision-making by governments and more certainty for the community, especially business and investors
• no excuse for lengthy election campaigns as all participants, especially the AEC, would be aware of the election date and could plan accordingly
• a formal campaign period of a specific and appropriate number of weeks – even as short as a fortnight – could be legislated with designated activities prohibited outside the formal period
• fewer elections and shorter campaigns would also mean less call on political parties and related entities to undertake fundraising.[78]
  94. Dr Monique Ryan MP stated that she had received anecdotal evidence from constituents who were in favour of ‘fixed terms with set election dates and a finite election period.’[79]
  95. The Australia Institute recommended three-year fixed terms, and drew on analysis of the fixed terms in Victoria and South Australia which highlighted that these provisions made blocking supply a ‘much less attractive option’.[80]
  96. While not providing any views on a specific length of term, Mr Ben Raue and DrBrendan Long were both supportive of having fixed terms.[81]
  97. The Northern Territory Electoral Commission commented on the benefits of a fixed-term election timetable, highlighting that it provided:

… surety in terms of when we need resources on the ground and in terms of dealing with the Aboriginal Interpreter Services and other local assistance. We can make arrangements way before the election in that regard, and there's more surety in terms of letting people know, 'Well, this is the period that we will need you'…[82]

AEC workforce for elections

5.98The AEC’s regular workforce is engaged under the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth). For the purposes of conducting an election the AEC augments its existing workforce with temporary staff in accordance with section 35 of the Electoral Act. The AEC attracted and selected almost 105,000 temporary staff to deliver the 2022 federal election; the terms and conditions of their employment are outlined in a Collective Determination.[83]

5.99The Community and Public Sector Union (CPSU) undertook a survey of its members after the election and provided a brief summary of its results in their submission. The CPSU stated that its members commented on a number of issues about AEC’s resources during the election including:

• unsustainable workloads
• under-resourced staffing at electorate booths, especially in regional and remote electorates
• inadequate staffing levels before and after elections causing ongoing problems by reducing the corporate knowledge and capability of the AEC to run future elections
• unsafe workloads, chaotic processes, inexperienced temporary staff, and inadequate training
• inadequate pay and conditions.[84]
  100. The CPSU argued that the AEC should be well-resourced and properly staffed before, during and after federal elections in order to ‘retain an experienced workforce with the corporate knowledge needed to continue to deliver elections to a world-class standard into the future.’[85]
  101. Dr Brett Biddington AM, employed as a subject matter expert during the 2022 federal election, provided some feedback on his experience working as a temporary staff member for the AEC. Dr Biddington believed that the online training provided by the AEC required for the role was ‘informative, clear and well-produced’[86] but suggested that the face-to-face training could have benefitted from improvement:

The face-to-face training that I helped to deliver was seriously compromised, in part for reasons beyond the AEC’s control – especially with training staff and polling place staff reporting sick, mainly with COVID or flu, at short notice. This created enormous daily, sometimes hourly, challenges for the training operations staff.[87]

5.102Dr Biddington suggested that a greater explanation and practical experience with the more technical areas of the electoral process and an update to the training area would be beneficial.[88] He made three recommendations:

• recast the script for training courses by adding context and rationale and using the active voice and, where possible, the pronouns of inclusion and commitment
• invest in training areas that are fit for purpose – such as rooms at a university or TAFE – specifically set up for adult education with relevant facilities on tap
• revisit the selection criteria for trainers – to add a criterion about election experience/exposure and teaching/training experience as well.[89]
  103. Another submitter, who also worked as a casual employee of the AEC, suggested ‘employing a single polling place manager at multi-division premises’ believing it would simplify ‘staffing, administration and many logistical aspects of managing the venue.’[90] They also proposed the ‘establishment of a national permanent part-time/contingent workforce of expert and experienced election officials.’[91]
  104. The AEC outlined several challenges they faced in attracting and maintaining a workforce for the 2022 election: low pay rates, mobility, training, short term employment, and a challenging working environment.
  105. In comparison with State and Territory electoral commissions, the pay rates for election staff at the federal level are ‘at the very bottom.’[92] Technical staff, such as interpreters, were employed as temporary workers and not specifically recruited as interpreters, which added to the challenge.[93]
  106. The AEC noted that it's difficult for them to attract the size of workforce required in a four-week period – ‘105,000 people, at the last election, to fill 121,000 positions’ – and the complexities in moving people to the right places.[94]
  107. The AEC also noted that their electoral staff worked in a multifaceted environment which has become more polarised:

The other thing is that we are asking the staff in the modern era to go into a very complex area of service delivery that's becoming highly litigious. We saw at the last election, for the first time, people coming into the polling place and recording interactions with our staff, shouting at our staff—some fairly bizarre behaviour that we haven't seen previously. The work is also complex, and, quite frankly, in places it can be quite hard too. We're putting people in, effectively, disused factories and asking them to do hard work for a period of time.[95]

5.108The AEC suggested addressing the pay issue through seeking ‘tax-free status for those workers, just like the Army Reserve.’[96] They also suggested employing Officers in Charge (OIC) of polling places and polling place liaison officers on a more permanent basis:

The second thing, though, and probably this is even more important, is that for members of the temporary workforce who are holding positions of responsibility—OICs of polling places, polling place liaison officers and others—we would like to have them attached to us on a more regular basis so we can give them better training, more assessment, more tools to assist them in doing the job. What that would look like I don't know, but a few days training maximum in each electoral cycle, where we could run assessment centres and give them some information, would make the process better. I think it would even speed up the count. It would lead to a whole range of issues where it's a better election.[97]

Committee comment

5.109There is no doubt that employing, training, and deploying a large (and mostly temporary) workforce in a relatively short period of time is extremely complex. The environment in which AEC employees work is becoming more challenging and staff are being exposed to environments which are becoming more polarised. The AEC does an outstanding job with the resources that is has available to them and the Committee recognises the extremely hard work that the AEC’s staff, permanent and temporary, do before, during and after each election.

5.110It is important that we continue to look at opportunities to strengthen the electoral workforce to make sure that they are suitably trained to make the process better. The Committee therefore agrees with the suggestion of establishing senior AEC staff on a more permanent basis. The Committee agrees that this would assist with maintaining an experienced electoral management workforce with the corporate knowledge required to continue to deliver high quality electoral services to the Australian population.

5.111The Committee recommends that the Australian Government ensure that the Australian Electoral Commission is resourced to employ staff at the appropriate level to facilitate elections to the high standard expected by the Australian community.

5.112The Committee recommends that the Australian Government amend section 35 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 to enable the Australian Electoral Commission to employ senior electoral officers on a more permanent basis.

5.113Australia has one of the most multicultural communities in the world. Over 30 percent of Australians were born overseas. According to the 2021 census, 22 percent of Australians reported using a language other than English at home. It is vitally important to ensure that all Australians are engaged in the electoral process, particularly during elections.

5.114The Electoral Commission needs to be able to assign teams of qualified interpreters for electorates based on the target communities with the necessary linguistic skills, subject-matter expertise, and cultural competency. Census and ABS data is key to informing this service, including by considering the size of language communities.

5.115The Committee recommends that the Australian Electoral Commission expand its recruitment drive to employ staff for selected polling places who can speak the targeted language(s) for those communities.

Section 44 of the Australian Constitution

5.116Australia’s Constitution provides both qualifications and disqualifications for citizens to nominate for election (sections 34 and 44 respectively). Submitters to the inquiry advocated for reforming section 44 of the Australian Constitution[98] believing that it no longer reflects Australian community standards.

5.117Professor George Williams provided several reasons as to why navigating section 44 is difficult:

• it affects a large percentage of the Australian population due to its open-ended language
• drafted in the 1890s the section is technical, written in arcane language, and especially problematic when it comes to whether a person is a citizen of a foreign power
• tracking down every possible ground of citizenship can prove an impossible task. It places a formidable barrier in the way of anyone standing for Parliament with foreign ancestry
• the High Court has held that a person is struck out if they are completely unaware that another country has conferred them with citizenship
• the High Court has also set the point of nomination as the cut-off for compliance.[99]
  118. Professor Williams and Mr Robert Irvine recommended amending the clause:

…by inserting the words ‘until the Parliament otherwise provides’ at the start of s 44. This would provide a means for Parliament to modernise the grounds of disqualification, and to continue to update them is required in line with community standards.[100]

5.119Dr Apostolos Mavroudis and Dr Ryan MP also agreed with the view that the section no longer reflected Australia’s multicultural society. Noting the concerns raised by Professor Williams, Dr Ryan MP added that this would continue to be an issue ‘given the number of Australians born overseas or from immigrant families’ and suggested removing section 44(1) from the Constitution.[101]

5.120The Australia Institute held the view that most clauses in section 44 were problematic and recommended that it ‘should be revised by a non-partisan commission and a more limited, modern and clearly-drafted amendment should be put to voters at a referendum.’[102]

5.121Mr Martin Gordon also believed that the language of section 44 was archaic and suggested that clause 44(v) in particular (any person who has direct or indirect pecuniary interest in any agreement with the Public Service of the Commonwealth) should be addressed.[103]

5.122Professor Williams noted that subsection 44(v) has the potential to preclude small-business people, as beneficiaries of Commonwealth programs such as for apprenticeships, and public servants from running for parliament.[104]

5.123While not holding a particular view on amending or removing the clause, the Liberal Party believed that the section 44 qualification checklists could be ‘clearer, better structured, more thorough, and more user-friendly’ and suggested adopting the revised draft qualification checklist which was considered by the Committee in the 46th Parliament.[105]

Committee comment

5.124The Committee undertook an extensive inquiry into the impact of section 44 on Australian democracy during the 45th Parliament.[106] That report highlighted that potentially ‘over half of all Australians today would have barriers to nomination under section 44.’

5.125According to Australian Bureau of Statistics’ (ABS) 2021 census data ‘the proportion of Australian residents that are born overseas (first generation) or have a parent born overseas (second generation) has moved above 50 per cent (51.5 per cent).’[107]

5.126The ABS data also shows that as at June 2022, there is an aggregate of 2,160,000 employees in the Commonwealth, state/territory, and local government sectors.[108]

5.127The Committee confirms the conclusion it recommended as part of its previous inquiry into section 44; that it ‘remains a potential deterrent for many Australians who are considering actively participating in politics.’[109]

5.128The Committee urges the Government to undertake a further examination of section 44 with a view to prepare a proposed referendum question.

5.129The Committee recommends that the Australian Government engages with the Australian community to determine contemporary expectations of standards in order to address all matters of qualification and disqualification for Parliament through legislation under sections 34 and 44 of the Constitution.

Postal vote campaigns

5.130Another matter raised during this inquiry was the use of postal vote campaigns by candidates and parties.

5.131The AEC’s website states that, ‘third parties, political parties and candidates are allowed to distribute their own materials with AEC postal vote application (PVA) artwork; however, it must be produced in-line with legislative requirements in the format specified by AEC guidelines.’[110] They ‘must also email the AEC to obtain a copy of the approved PVA artwork.’[111]

5.132The AEC noted that, while legal, the ‘distribution and collection of PVAs by candidates and parties creates eligibility confusion and privacy concerns amongst voters’.[112]

5.133The scale of this confusion and concern can be seen, the Electoral Commissioner explained, in that:

It is probably the No. 1 complaint we get at election-time from citizens, about that mail arriving from political parties with postal vote information. It's confusing for citizens, and I'd prefer it didn't occur.[113]

5.134Submitters voiced concerns around the distribution and collection of PVAs by candidates and parties. One provided anecdotal evidence that voters frequently spoke about their frustrations with the PVAs:

I’ve managed multiple large election day and early voting centres. Every single election, there are issues of frustration raised by electors regarding postal voting and very frequently it’s related to the application and receiving (or not) stage of the process with conversations starting, “I received a postal vote application form in the mail…”.

Both firsthand and anecdotally, very few voters know that the Commission is not the direct recipient of their ballot paper application when they use a PVA from a party / candidate. This presents scenarios related to the independence and the perception of independence of the postal voting process and in turn, the Commission.[114]

5.135The AEC confirmed that delays caused by the indirect return of PVAs to them created concern and even difficulty voting amongst voters:

Many complaints were received from voters who experienced lengthy waits between applying via party PVA and receiving their postal vote. In some cases, the timing meant that voters were then unable to vote.[115]

5.136Another submitter advocated for the AEC to be ‘given the complete and sole authority, responsibility of and resourcing allowance for the management of the entire [postal voting] process’.[116]

5.137Climate 200 were also critical of PVA programs, stating that they were ‘opaque, unfair, and confusing’:

In its engagement with the 2022 federal election, Climate 200 observed that

some electors, particularly those with low information or education about the

electoral process, or those for whom English is not a primary language, are

genuinely confused by this process. Many believe that they are returning their

application to a government body rather than to a political candidate or party.

Some even believe that the enclosed HTV is an official instruction about the

correct way to vote. Most electors likely don’t realise that their registration is being processed and recorded by a party or candidate. It is concerning that a mistake in such a process could lead to electors’ applications being misplaced.[117]

5.138Climate 200 recommended ‘that the Committee consider a thorough review of the postal vote application process; and that the AEC be properly funded to run a postal vote application process that is independent of political parties and candidates.’[118]

5.139The Australian Greens believed that the PVA process posed a potential risk:

The Greens have raised concerns in previous election reviews regarding the practice of political parties sending postal vote applications to voters, often accompanied by promotional material and a reply-paid envelope that sends the completed application to the candidate, rather than the AEC. While legal, this is an unjustified politicisation of applications, risks applications not being processed, and is clearly used by political parties for data collection.[119]

5.140They recommended amending the Electoral Act to explicitly require PVAs to be sent directly to the AEC and to ‘prohibit any written material being included with postal voting application forms.’[120]

5.141At the 2022 election, 56 per cent of PVAs were sent directly to the AEC, with the remained coming through another source.[121]

5.142Another submitter argued that political parties who received PVAs prior to forwarding them to the AEC were in breach of section 184 of the Electoral Act, which states that the application for a postal vote ‘made in Australia shall be made to the Electoral Commissioner.’[122] They elaborated:

The Act quite sensibly allows for a person (my legal advice is that by stating a person the Act means a person not an organisation) to act as an intermediary to take the postal vote application on behalf of the voter and post it or deliver it to the electoral commissioner directly. This seems to be a sensible inclusion in the Act as the voter could be impaired and unable to get the application into the post, hence the persons real need for a postal vote. What a political party has done is seen this as a loophole and attempted, I say, improperly, to inject itself into the process. I say this is not what the Act says or what was envisaged. The party would undoubtedly say that it is just assisting the democratic process.[123]

5.143The NSW Nationals however were generally supportive of the PVA process. They noted challenges for local campaign teams and offices submitting PVA forms in person and suggested that the AEC ‘be provided adequate funding to receive scanned postal vote applications in bulk from political participants electronically.’[124]

5.144The AEC took steps to mitigate the concerns of voters about the PVA process during the 2022 federal election, including:

• published and promoted a YouTube video explaining party PVAs to voters
• published PVA Management Guidelines for candidates and parties
• engaged with third parties regarding processes and design
• the Electoral Commissioner sent a letter to all registered parties expressing concerns that some approaches taken by candidates and parties were causing voter confusion.[125]
  145. The AEC noted that the ‘Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) in its submission to the Privacy Act Review Discussion Paper in December 2021, supported the removal of the political exemption.’[126]
  146. The AEC recommended legislative reform ‘to mitigate the risk of data and privacy breach, to better align with community expectations’[127]:

This includes considering whether the exemption for political parties enshrined in the Privacy Act still meets community expectations in relation to privacy and data security, as well as considering reform to section 184AA – which since 1998 has enabled parties and candidates to adapt, distribute and collect PVAs.[128]

5.147The AEC added that ‘access to elector information should be episodically re‑evaluated to ensure compatibility with community expectations and the general privacy environment’ and queried whether parties, members and candidates should receive ‘Commonwealth support and resourcing to protect the important data entrusted to them.’[129]

5.148Climate 200 also noted the exemption for registered political parties in the Privacy Act and suggested it was problematic:

The first is that registered parties have been able to spam Australians with unsolicited contact without the restraints provided for in the Privacy Act including accountability and unsubscribe options. The second is that political communications from registered political parties are treated differently at law than those from independent candidates, creating another benefit of incumbency.[130]

5.149Climate 200 agreed with the recommendation to amend ‘the Privacy Act to remove the exemption for registered political parties.’[131]

5.150Digital Rights Watch suggested removing political exemptions from several Acts including the Privacy Act 1998, Spam Act 2003 and Do Not Call Register Act 2006, noting two core concerns:

• The increasing availability and ubiquity of data-extractive technologies have increased the scale and scope by which harm can be caused to everyday Australians through inappropriate or invasive collection, use and disclosure of their personal information. These harms include invasions of privacy, voter manipulation, and misinformation and disinformation. This stands to weaken our democratic processes and undermine public trust. Political parties have a responsibility to exhibit best practices when it comes to handling data ethically, lawfully, and minimising digital technology facilitated harms to Australians.
• Without appropriate safeguards in place, unregulated access and use of Australians’ personal information creates a concerning gap in Australia’s approach to cyber security, putting not just individuals at risk, but also our digital security more broadly.[132]
  151. Mr Travis Jordan agreed with the view that the exemption should be removed, adding that voters should be able to opt out of mass communications.[133]
  152. The AEC also questioned the suitability of the PVA deadline (Wednesday 6pm prior to polling day), ‘as some voters who apply in the final days do not receive their postal voting materials before election day’ and suggested an ‘earlier application deadline would better ensure voters receive materials in time to vote before close of polls.’[134]

Committee comment

5.153The Committee acknowledges the concerns raised by submitters and the AEC that the PVA process can be confusing for some voters and the challenges with ensuring that voters not only receive materials in time but that they are also afforded adequate time for their vote to be sent through the postal system by the deadline.

5.154Third parties, political parties and candidates need to be vigilant in ensuring that all their communications are accurate and they are in compliance with the requirements of the Electoral Act. Third parties, political parties and candidates also need to ensure that individuals data and privacy is protected at all times and guided by the principles set out in the Privacy Act 1998.

5.155The Committee agrees with the views of many submitters, including the AEC, that enabling political parties and candidates to distribute and collect Postal Vote Applications creates confusion, privacy concerns, no longer aligns with community expectations, and that legislative reform is required. The Australian Electoral Commission should be the only authorised body that can issue or receive a postal vote application.

5.156The Committee notes that this change will place a requirement on the AEC to ensure voters who have been used to receiving a postal vote application from political parties understand how they can apply for one, and to ensure postal votes are available in an accessible and timely manner.

5.157The Committee recommends that section 184AA of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, application forms for postal votes, be amended or removed, so that postal vote applications can no longer be included with other material.

5.158The Committee recommends that section 184 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 be amended to clarify that postal vote applications must be sent directly to the Australian Electoral Commission’s nominated addresses.

Ms Kate ThwaitesMP

Chair

15 November 2023

Footnotes

[1]Centre for Public Integrity, Submission 351, p. 16.

[2]Australian Council of Trade Unions, Submission 357, p. 1.

[3]Hands Off Our Charities alliance, Submission 341, p. 3

[4]The National Party of Australia - NSW, Submission 399, p. 2.

[5]Mr Travis Jordan, Submission 245, p. 22.

[6]Curtin Independent Pty Ltd, Submission 403, pp. 2-3.

[7]Dr Helen Haines MP, ‘Donations’, viewed 14 September 2023, <https://www.helenhaines.org/donate/>

[8]The Age, ‘Millions flow into Goldstein campaign but the source is not all clear’, viewed 12 September 2023, <https://www.theage.com.au/politics/federal/millions-flow-into-goldstein-campaign-but-the-source-is-not-all-clear-20220419-p5aekf.html>

[9]Dr Sophie Scamps MP, ‘Dr Sophie Scamps: Donations status 3rd May 2022’, viewed 14 September 2023, <https://www.sophiescamps.com.au/sophie-scamps-donations-update-2022-05-03>; Ms Zali Steggall OAM, MP, ‘Donation Disclosure Statement 2022’, viewed 14 September 2023, <https://www.zalisteggall.com.au/https_www_zalisteggall_com_au_donation_disclosure_statement_2022_2>; Dr Monique Ryan MP, ‘Let 1000 Campaign Signs Bloom!’, viewed 14 September 2023, <https://www.moniqueryan.com.au/let_1000_campaign_signs_bloom>; Ms Kylea Tink MP, Transparency Donations, viewed 14 September 2023, <https://www.kyleatink.com.au/transparency>

[10]Human Rights Law Centre, Committee Hansard, 23 June 2023, p. 1.

[11]Australian Democracy Network, Committee Hansard, 23 June 2023, p. 2.

[12]Australian Conservation Foundation, Committee Hansard, 23 June 2023, p. 2; Human Rights Law Centre, Committee Hansard, 23 June 2023, p. 3.

[13]Human Rights Law Centre, Committee Hansard, 23 June 2023, p. 4.

[14]Human Rights Law Centre, Committee Hansard, 23 June 2023, p. 5.

[15]Grattan Institute, Supplementary Submission367.1, p. 66.

[16]Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission, Submission 278, p. 2.

[17]Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission, Submission 278, p. 1.

[18]Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Funding and Disclosure Reform) Act 2018 (Cth).

[19]Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Advisory report on the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Funding and Disclosure Reform) Bill 2017, April 2018; Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Advisory report on the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Funding and Disclosure Reform) Bill 2017, October 2018; Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Review of the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Funding and Disclosure Reform) Act 2018, May 2021.

[20]Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission 411, p. 3; Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission 411, p. 7.

[21]Australian Democracy Network, Committee Hansard, 23 June 2023, p. 2; Human Rights Law Centre, Committee Hansard, 23 June 2023, p. 3.

[22]Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, section 287F.

[23]Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 418, p. 13.

[24]Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, section 287AB (3).

[25]Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, section 287; Australian Electoral Commission, Disclosure threshold, viewed 1 September 2023, <https://www.aec.gov.au/parties_and_representatives/public_funding/threshold.htm>

[26]Australian Democracy Network, Committee Hansard, 23 June 2023, p. 2.

[27]Human Rights Law Centre, Committee Hansard, 23 June 2023, p. 3.

[28]Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 418, p. 8.

[29]Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 418, p. 8.

[30]Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 418, p. 8.

[31]Centre for Public Integrity, Submission 351, p. 14.

[32]Centre for Public Integrity, Submission 351, p. 17.

[33]Ms Nicolette Boele, Private capacity, Submission 364, p. 12.

[34]Electoral Act 1992 (Qld), s. 204-204(A).

[35]Electoral Act 1992 (Qld), s. 199.

[36]Electoral Funding Act 2018 (NSW), s. 4.

[37]Electoral Funding Act 2018 (NSW), s. 7.

[38]Electoral Act 1985 (SA), s. 130A.

[39]Electoral Commission South Australia, Part 13A Electoral Act 1985 (SA), Funding, Disclosure & Registration, Associated Entities, p. 13.

[40]Electoral Act 2002 (VIC), s. 206.

[41]Electoral Act 2002 (VIC), s. 206.

[42]Victorian Electoral Commission, ‘Funding glossary’, viewed 14 September 2023, <https://www.vec.vic.gov.au/candidates-and-parties/funding/funding-glossary#political-expenditure>

[43]Human Rights Law Centre, Committee Hansard, 23 June 2023, p. 3.

[44]Human Rights Law Centre, Committee Hansard, 23 June 2023, p. 1.

[45]Australian Democracy Network, Committee Hansard, 23 June 2023, p. 7; Human Rights Law Centre, Committee Hansard, 23 June 2023, p. 7.

[46]Australian Democracy Network, Committee Hansard, 23 June 2023, p. 2.

[47]Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Conduct of the 2022 Federal election and other matters, Interim Report, June 2023, p. 65.

[48]Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Conduct of the 2022 Federal election and other matters, Interim Report, June 2023, p. 67.

[49]Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Conduct of the 2022 Federal election and other matters, Interim Report, June 2023, p. 65.

[50]Australian Communications and Media Authority, Submission 325, p. 1.

[51]Australian Communications and Media Authority, Submission 325, p. 2.

[52]Australian Communications and Media Authority, Submission 325, p. 2.

[53]Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into and Report on the conduct of the 2019 federal election and matters related thereto.

[54]Free TV, Submission 362, p. 4.

[55]Australian Communications and Media Authority, Submission 325, p. 2.

[56]Free TV, Submission 362. p. 4.

[57]Free TV, Submission 362, p. 4., Ms Bridget Fair, Chief Executive Officer, Free TV Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 18 October 2022, p. 25.

[58]Free TV, Submission 362, p. 2.

[59]Dr Caroline Fisher, Associate Professor of Communication, News and Media Research Centre, University of Canberra, Committee Hansard 18 October 2022, p. 24., Dr Kerry McCallum, Director, News and Media Research Centre, University of Canberra, Committee Hansard 18 October 2022, p. 24

[60]Ms Creina Chapman, Deputy Chair and Chief Executive Officer, Australian Communications and Media

Authority, Committee Hansard 18 October 2022, p. 14.

[61]Digital Industry Group Inc., Submission 378, p. 4.

[62]Commercial Radio & Audio, Submission 358, p. 3.

[63]Dr Kerry McCallum, Director, News and Media Research Centre, University of Canberra, Committee Hansard 18 October 2022, p. 24.

[64]Dr Caroline Fisher, Associate Professor of Communication, News and Media Research Centre, University of Canberra, Committee Hansard 18 October 2022, p. 24.

[65]Mr Paul Erickson, National Secretary, Australian Labor Party, Mr Joe Lundy, State Director, NSW Nationals, Committee Hansard 3 November 2022, p. 27.

[66]Ms Bridget Fair, Chief Executive Officer, Free TV Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 18 October 2022, p. 25.

[67]Free TV, Submission 362, p. 2.

[68]Free TV, Submission 362, p. 4.

[69]Dr Caroline Fisher, Associate Professor of Communication, News and Media Research Centre, University of Canberra, Committee Hansard 18 October 2022, p. 24.

[70]Free TV, Submission 362, p. 4.

[71]Australian Electoral Commission, Submission 330, p. 27.

[72]Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into and Report on the conduct of the 2019 federal election and matters related thereto.

[73]Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into and Report on the conduct of the 2019 federal election and matters related thereto.

[74]The Australian Greens, Submission 432, p. 8.

[75]The Australian Greens, Submission 432, p. 12.

[76]The National Party of Australia - NSW, Submission 399, p. 4.

[77]Labor Party, Committee Hansard, 3 November 2022, p. 29.

[78]The Real Republic, Submission 401, p. 13.

[79]Dr Monique Ryan MP, Submission 414, p. 7.

[80]The Australia Institute, Submission 412, p. 54.

[81]Mr Ben Raue, Committee Hansard, 23 June 2023, p. 24. Dr Brendan Long, Committee Hansard, 23 June 2023, p. 24.

[82]Northern Territory Electoral Commission, Committee Hansard, 23 November 2022, p. 7.

[83]Australian Electoral Commission, Annual Report 2021-22, p. 70, Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, Collective Determination 2023/3, 25 August 2023.

[84]Community and Public Sector Union, Submission 389, pp. 1-3.

[85]Community and Public Sector Union, Submission 389, p. 3.

[86]Dr Brett Biddington AM, Private capacity, Submission 14, p. 1.

[87]Dr Brett Biddington AM, Private capacity, Submission 14, p. 2.

[88]Dr Brett Biddington AM, Private capacity, Submission 14, pp. 3-5.

[89]Dr Brett Biddington AM, Private capacity, Submission 14, p. 6.

[90]Name Withheld, Submission 355, p. 4.

[91]Name Withheld,

Submission 355, p. 5.

[92]Australian Electoral Commission, Committee Hansard, 3 November 2022, p. 2.

[93]Australian Electoral Commission, Committee Hansard, 3 November 2022, p. 10.

[94]Australian Electoral Commission, Committee Hansard, 3 November 2022, p. 2.

[95]Australian Electoral Commission, Committee Hansard, 3 November 2022, p. 2.

[96]Australian Electoral Commission, Committee Hansard, 3 November 2022, p. 2.

[97]Australian Electoral Commission, Committee Hansard, 3 November 2022, p. 2.

[98]Section 44(i) of the Australian Constitution sets out that any person who ‘Is under any acknowledgement of allegiance, obedience, or adherence to a foreign power, or is a subject or a citizen or entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject or citizen of a foreign power…shall be incapable of being chosen or of sitting as a senator or a member of the House of Representatives.’

[99]Professor George Williams AO, Submission 7, pp. 4-5.

[100]Professor George Williams AO, Submission 7, p. 5; Mr Robert Irvine, Private capacity, Submission 285, p. 1.

[101]Dr Apostolos Mavroudis, Private capacity, Submission 275, p. 1; Dr Monique Ryan MP, Submission 414, p.5.

[102]The Australia Institute, Submission 412, p. 4; The Australia Institute, Discussion paper, Democracy Agenda for the 47th Parliament, Options for reform, April 2022, pp. 34-35.

[103]Mr Martin Gordon, Private capacity, Submission 293, p. 2.

[104]Professor George Williams AO, Committee Hansard, 17 October 2022, p. 18.

[105]Liberal Party, Submission 382, p. 10.

[106]Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Excluded. The impact of section 44 on Australian democracy, May 2018.

[107]Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Snapshot of Australia, A picture of the economic, social and cultural make-up of Australia on Census Night, 10 August 2021’, viewed 3 August 2023, <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/employment-and-earnings-public-sector-australia/latest-release>

[108]Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Employment and Earnings, Public Sector, Australia, 2021-22’, viewed 3 August 2023, <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/people-and-communities/snapshot-australia/2021>

[109]Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Excluded. The impact of section 44 on Australian democracy, May 2018, p. 102.

[110]Australian Electoral Commission, Postal voting, Guidance for third parties, political parties and candidates, viewed 8 August 2023, <https://www.aec.gov.au/elections/candidates/third-party-pva.htm>

[111]Australian Electoral Commission, Postal voting, Guidance for third parties, political parties and candidates, viewed 8 August 2023, <https://www.aec.gov.au/elections/candidates/third-party-pva.htm>

[112]Australian Electoral Commission, Submission 330, p. 8.

[113]Australian Electoral Commission, Committee Hansard, 6 September 2023, p. 2.

[114]Name Withheld, Private capacity, Submission 355, p. 3.

[115]Australian Electoral Commission, Submission 330, p. 8.

[116]Name Withheld, Private capacity, Submission 355, p. 3.

[117]Climate 200, Submission 419, pp. 11-12.

[118]Climate 200, Submission 419, p. 12.

[119]Australian Greens, Submission 432, p. 12.

[120]Australian Greens, Submission 432, p. 12.

[121]Australian Electoral Commission, Committee Hansard, 6 September 2023, p. 9.

[122]Name withheld, Submission 286, p. 4; Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, s. 184.

[123]Name withheld, Submission 286, p. 4.

[124]The National Party of Australia - NSW, Submission 399, p. 2.

[125]Australian Electoral Commission, Submission 330, p. 8.

[126]Australian Electoral Commission, Supplementary submission 330.7, p. 4.

[127]Australian Electoral Commission, Supplementary submission 330.7, p. 3.

[128]Australian Electoral Commission, Supplementary submission 330.7, p. 3.

[129]Australian Electoral Commission, Supplementary submission 330.7, p. 3.

[130]Climate 200, Submission 419, p. 10.

[131]Climate 200, Submission 419, p. 10.

[132]Digital Rights Watch, Submission 246, p. 3.

[133]Mr Travis Jordan, Private capacity, Submission 245, p. 43.

[134]Australian Electoral Commission, Submission 330, p. 29.