Additional comments from Government Senators

1.1We thank the committee Chair, Senator Paterson, and committee members for conducting a comprehensive inquiry on a matter of national significance in a collegiate spirit.

1.2The risk of foreign interference is real across all social media platforms.

1.3Misinformation and disinformation, coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) and foreign interference through social media pose a threat to Australia's social cohesion, national security and to the ability of diaspora communities to participate fully and without fear in our democracy.

1.4Platforms must take greater responsibility for combating these harmful practices.

1.5While evidence from platforms indicated they have some measures in place, there are significant differences and gaps in platform practices and reporting. Overall, platform transparency measures are insufficient and inconsistent, particularly when it comes to specific reporting on the Australian context.

1.6The committee has recommended a minimum set of transparency requirements, enforceable with fines. Government Senators welcome the committee's core focus on transparency measures.

1.7In January 2023, the Minister for Communications announced that the Australian Government would introduce new laws to provide the independent regulator, the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), with new powers to combat online misinformation and disinformation.

1.8The new powers will enable the ACMA to require platforms to address misinformation and disinformation, while balancing freedom of speech.

1.9The proposed powers mirror those proposed by the committee, and will enable the ACMA to gather information from platforms and require them to keep records about misinformation and disinformation.

1.10Evidence to this inquiry has further highlighted the urgent need for powers like these, to ensure consistent, transparent, Australia-focussed information is available from platforms to inform users.

1.11The proposed legislation also gives the ACMA the power to enforce an industry‑led code of practice covering measures to combat misinformation and disinformation, and to create and enforce a new industry standard, if required.

1.12The committee has proposed a list of specific requirements that could be considered as part of such a new code, including requiring social media platforms to have an Australian presence to ensure accountability to the Parliament and people, labelling state-affiliated media, disclosing instances of transnational repression, and greater transparency about levels of CIB and takedowns of networks and materials. We commend the list of measures in Recommendation One for further consideration by the Australian Government.

1.13Blunt, national bans of specific platforms as a policy approach were not supported by evidence to the committee.

1.14One submitter described single platform bans as a 'whack-a-mole approach', given the relative ease with which platforms could take data and reestablish, and the frequency with which new platforms emerge in the global market. Others raised concerns about whether bans can be practically implemented, and the implications for users on these platforms.

1.15For these reasons, the committee's central focus is on strong regulation for transparency, rather than nation-wide bans of specific platforms.

1.16In relation to bans on government devices, the Australian Government has taken an appropriate and targeted approach, by seeking advice from intelligence and security agencies and issuing a mandatory direction under the Protective Security Policy Framework to prohibit TikTok on devices issued by Australian Government departments and agencies.

1.17We note that any further approaches to bans or policies for government or government-related devices should similarly be informed by advice from agencies.

1.18The committee notes that a whole-of-government approach is required to combat foreign interference through social media. Departments and agencies including Home Affairs, the Australian Federal Police, Australian Electoral Commission, the eSafety Commissioner and intelligence agencies gave evidence of their collaboration today to protect Australians. Home Affairs, as the lead department in countering foreign interference, outlined the central role of the Counter Foreign Interference Coordination Centre (CFICC) within HomeAffairs in leading multi-department and agency collaboration.

1.19One of the most concerning themes in evidence was instances of harassment of Australian citizens within diaspora communities as they exercise their democratic rights to speak out on matters pertaining to their country of origin. This whole-of-government approach is needed to protect at-risk communities. Work to continually improve the resources of, and responses to, diaspora communities is critical. The committee recommends supporting diverse, independent foreign-language journalism in Australia, as part of this approach.

1.20We note that the committee has provided a range of further thoughtful recommendations for the consideration of the Australian Government, including in the areas of the security implications of artificial intelligence (AI), supporting independent research, and further assisting our Pacific neighbours to combat foreign interference in the region.

1.21Once more, we thank the Chair, committee members, submitters and witnesses and the Secretariat for their considered work on a topic of critical importance to our nation.

Senator Jess WalshSenator Raff Ciccone

Deputy ChairMember

Labor Senator for VictoriaLabor Senator for Victoria