Aviation Security Amendment
Bill 2004
Date Introduced:
11 August 2004
House: House of Representatives
Portfolio: Transport and Regional
Services
Commencement:
Sections 1 to 3 commence
on Royal Assent. The operative parts of the Bill (Schedules 1
and 2) only commence once both Royal Assent has been given
and the operative parts of the Aviation Transport Security Act
2004 have commenced.
To enable the carrying out of security checks
for persons holding prescribed licenses or authorisations issued by
the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.
Background
In March 2003, the Government introduced two
Bills into Parliament that were designed to overhaul the aviation
security legislative framework, including removing virtually all
security matters from the Air Navigation Act 1920 and the
Air Navigation Regulations 1947. The main Bill was passed as the
Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 ( the ATS Act ) in
early 2004. However, the operative parts of the ATS Act have yet to
commence, so aviation security is still regulated by the Air
Navigation Act and regulations.(1) Further background on
the legislative aspects of aviation security reform can be found in
the Bills
Digest for the ATS Act.(2)
Persons who have access to security restricted
areas at airports must hold an Aviation Security Identification
Card (ASIC). ASIC matters are currently provided for in Division 7
of Part 7 of the Air Navigation Regulations 1947. Under Regulation
90, ASICs cannot be issued to a person who, amongst other
things:
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has an adverse criminal record,(3) although the
Secretary(4) may grant a special permission to allow an
ASIC to be issued
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is considered by the Secretary to constitute an threat to
aviation security if he or she held an ASIC, or
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is an unlawful non-citizen.(5)
ASICs can also be cancelled for the same
reasons. It is understood that as of 31 August 2004, all ASIC
holders will have been subjected to background checks covering all
three of the above matters.(6)
Under the Air Navigation Regulations, a
decision to refuse to issue an ASIC or cancel one is reviewable by
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). A determination by the
Secretary that a person constitutes a threat to aviation security
is also reviewable, as is the Secretary s decision not to grant a
special permission in cases where a person has an adverse criminal
record.
In relation to the new ATS Act, sections 35-38
provide that, amongst other things, regulations may set out
requirements for the security checking of persons who have access
to certain secure areas or zones at airports. In giving the second
reading speech for the (then) Bill, the Minister stated:
Changes to the aviation security identification
card regime will impose stricter controls upon those with access to
security sensitive areas at an airport. The addition of politically
motivated violence background checks goes a long way towards
preventing potential terrorists from accessing these critical
facilities. (7)
Draft regulations supporting the ATS Act were
examined by the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport
Committee who reported in December 2003. The
report did not make any specific recommendations, nor did it
make any comments on the proposed revised ASIC
system.(8) As at August 2004, the draft regulations are
being revised in parallel with a series of stakeholder
consultations.
In December 2003, the Government
announced a range of additional aviation security measures. In
relation to security checks, the Minister said:
Aviation Security Identification Cards (ASICs)
currently held by airport employees working in security sensitive
areas in Australian airports will now be required for all staff
working at airports servicing passenger and freight aircraft.
The background checking process currently
conducted for ASIC holders will be extended to cover all pilots and
trainee pilots prior to the issuing of new photographic licences by
1 July 2004. (9)
The checking process referred to in the second
paragraph of the Minister s statement appears to have been partly
implemented through the Air Navigation (Aviation Security Status
Checking) Regulations 2004, which came into force on 9 July 2004.
These regulations allow background checking to be conducted on
applicants for flight crew licences, and allow the Secretary of the
Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS) to declare
someone as having adverse security status, therefore making them
ineligible to apply for a flight crew licence. However, the
Regulations do not cover persons who already hold such a
licence. These Regulations will presumably be repealed
when and if the ATS Act, including amendments proposed by the Bill,
and associated regulations come into force.
Item 1 adds the term security
designated authorisation into the existing definitions section
(section 9) of the ATS Act. However, the meaning of the term is
only to be given by regulations. Under the Bill, holders of, or
applicants for, such authorisations will be the subject of security
status checking.
Item 3 adds new
Division 9 (sections 74F-74I) to the ATS Act. New
sections 74G and 74H are the key
provisions.
New section 74G inserts the
concept of an adverse aviation security status into the ATS Act.
Under new subsection 74G(1), it is the DOTARS
Secretary(10) who makes a determination of a person s
status, although this function may be assumed by the Civil Aviation
Safety Authority (CASA), (11)or delegated to either the
CASA senior management group(12) or a DOTARS SES
employee.(13) If such a determination is made, a written
copy must be provided both to CASA(14) and the applicant
or holder of the security designated authorisation: new
subsection 74G(2). If the person holds a security
designated authorisation, CASA must then suspend or cancel it:
new paragraph 74G(3)(a). If the person is applying
for an authorisation, it must be refused: new paragraph
74G(3)(b).
In considering the question of a person s
aviation security status, the decision-maker will have access to
advice from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
(ASIO). New subsection 74G(4) provides that a
decision is prescribed administrative action for the purposes of
Part IV of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
Act 1979 ( the ASIO Act ). This gives the applicant/holder the
right to seek a review of the ASIO advice by the Security Appeals
Division of the AAT.(15)
The actual procedure for security status
checks, including the matters which the Secretary must consider in
determining whether a person has an adverse aviation security
status, are to be provided for in regulations: new section
74H. Whilst it is understandable matters should be able to
be added by regulations, there seems no reason why at least a core
list of matters cannot be included in the Bill.
New paragraph 74H(1)(b)
provides that regulations may specify circumstances in which the
Secretary must determine that a person has an adverse
aviation security status. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill
comments:
These are likely to include where a person is an
unlawful non-citizen, or where the person has been convicted of
certain prescribed criminal offences. These are likely to include
convictions for serious offences such as those contained in Part 2
of the Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991 and Part 5.3 of the
Criminal Code.(16)
By comparison, new paragraph
74H(1)(c) provides that regulations may specify
circumstances in which the Secretary may determine that a
person has an adverse aviation security status. Again the
Explanatory Memorandum comments:
It is envisaged that where a person receives an
adverse or qualified security assessment from ASIO, or has a
particular criminal history, that the Secretary will have a
discretion as to whether to declare the person to have an adverse
aviation security status.(17)
New paragraph 74H(1)(g)
provides that regulations may specify procedures and other matters
relating to the issue, suspension or cancellation by CASA of
security designated authorisations or the refusal by CASA to issue
such authorisations. The Explanatory Memorandum comments:
this would enable regulations to be made which
prevented CASA from issuing a security designated authorisation to
a person unless the applicant has been subject to checks by ASIO,
DIMIA and the AFP. It would also allow regulations which provided
that CASA must cancel a security designated authorisation where it
isn t possible to subject the holder to background
checking.(18)
No detail is given as to the situations where
it might not be possible to subject the authorisation holder to
background checking.
New paragraph 74H(1)(h)
provides that regulations may provide that applicants for, or
holders of, security designated authorisations may request security
status checking be undertaken. New paragraph
74H(1)(i) provides that regulations may also specify the
consequences of a failure by a holder or applicant to request that
such checking be undertaken. There is no elaboration on the
rationale for these two provisions, particularly the rather cryptic
new paragraph 74H(1)(i).
New paragraph 74H(1)(k)
provides that regulations may also give CASA the function of
determining that a person has an adverse security status. Where
regulations have been made under new paragraph
74H(1)(k), and are in force, any references to the
Secretary in new sections 74G and
74H are to taken to include references to CASA:
new paragraph 74H(2)(a).
New section 74I provides that
Division 9 of Part 4 (ie new sections 74F-I) is
still to have effect notwithstanding any inconsistency between it
and anything in the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (the CA Act)
or its associated regulations. The Explanatory Memorandum suggests
that an example of such an inconsistency is existing section 18 of
the CA Act, which essentially restricts CASA to making decisions on
authorisations only on safety grounds. (19)
Item 4 inserts new
paragraph 126(f). This allows a person to seek an AAT
review of a decision by the Secretary or CASA to give them an
adverse aviation security status. However, item 4
also specifies that this provision does not permit the AAT to
review an adverse or qualified ASIO security assessment other than
as provided for in the ASIO Act and the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal Act 1975.
Item 5 inserts new
subsection 127(2A) to allow the Secretary to delegate any
of his or her powers under Division 9 above to a member of the
Senior Management Group of CASA. This Group has no statutory basis.
Any person so delegated is subject to the directions of the
Secretary.
Items 6-9 make consequential
amendments to the CA Act.
Item 6 amends CASA s
functions to include functions conferred on it under the ATS
Act.(20) Item 7 repeals existing
subsection 9(5), which currently states that CASA s functions do
not include aviation security. Item 8 allows for
the making of regulations under the CA Act in order to formulate a
scheme in relation to security status checking . Item
9 allows for CASA to prescribe fees for its doing of
anything under the ATS Act.
Item 2 inserts new
paragraphs 1(2)(ba) and (bb) into
Schedule 3 of the Aviation Transport Security (Consequential
Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Act 2004. This will
allow for the making of regulations that will enable airport
security, ASIC and international cargo security programs made under
the existing Air Navigation Act to continue to be in force as
transport security or other programs under the ATS Act.
Item 3 states that the
exercise or purported exercise of power under Regulation 5 of the
Air Navigation (Aviation Security Status Checking) Regulations 2004
to determine that a person has an adverse aviation security status
is taken for all purposes to be, and is taken for all purposes
always to have been, prescribed administrative action for the
purposes of Part IV of the ASIO Act. As for new subsection
74G(4) discussed above, this gives the applicant or holder
the right to seek a review of the ASIO assessment by the Security
Appeals Division of the AAT.
The Bill will extend security-related checking
to persons who are not required to hold ASICs. Such persons will
include pilots and trainee pilots who do not have access to
officially designated security restricted areas at
airports.(21) This seems sensible given that the
September 11 2001 attacks in the United States demonstrated that
aircraft can be a potent terrorist weapon. As part of this policy
change, CASA will for the first time have a role to play in
aviation security, rather than just aviation safety.
Much of the actual content of the background
checking process proposed by this Bill is actually to be determined
by regulations. For example, the matters which the Secretary must
consider in determining whether a person has an adverse aviation
security status. Parliament may wish to consider whether it is
necessary to leave quite this much to regulations rather than
including it in primary legislation.
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Unless amended by subsequent legislation, the operative parts
Aviation Transport Security Act will come into effect no
later than March 2005.
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http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2003-04/04bd023.pdf
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The meaning of this is detailed in subclause 90(4).
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Currently, the Secretary of the Department of Transport and
Regional Services.
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This term has the same meaning as that in section 14 of the
Migration Act 1958.
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Personnel communication, DOTARS.
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The Hon John Anderson MP, House of Representatives
Debates, 37 March 2003, p. 13749.
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See:
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/rrat_ctte/aviation03_draftreg.report/report.pdf
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The Hon John Anderson MP Enhanced aviation security package
announced , Media Release, 4 December 2004. See:
http://www.ministers.dotars.gov.au/ja/releases/2003/december/a155_2003.htm.
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That is, the Secretary of the Department that administers the
ATS Act.
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See: commentary on new paragraph 74H(2)(a)
below.
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See: item 5.
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Existing section 127 of the Act.
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Obviously CASA only receives a copy if the determination is made
by the DOTARS Secretary or SES officer.
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See: http://www.aat.gov.au/ApplyingToTheAAT/SecurityAppeals.htm
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At p. 3.
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ibid.
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At p. 4.
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There are some exceptions.
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That is, the ATS Act as amended by the Bill.
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Presumably this is more likely at smaller rural or regional
airports or other aviation facilities.
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Published by the Parliamentary Library, 2004.