Bills Digest No. 172 2003-04
Trade Practices
Amendment (Australian Energy Market) Bill 2004
WARNING:
This Digest was prepared for debate. It reflects the legislation as
introduced and does not canvass subsequent amendments. This Digest
does not have any official legal status. Other sources should be
consulted to determine the subsequent official status of the
Bill.
CONTENTS
Passage History
Purpose
Background
Main Provisions
Concluding Comments
Endnotes
Contact Officer & Copyright Details
Passage History
Trade Practices Amendment
(Australian Energy Market) Bill 2004
Date
Introduced: 17 June
2004
House: House of Representatives
Portfolio: Treasury
Commencement:
The main provisions
commence on Proclamation, or if this does not occur within 12
months of Royal Assent, on the first day after the end of that
period
To amend the Trade Practices
Act 1974 to create the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) as a
Commonwealth body.
For background to this Bill, see Bills
Digest No. 171 of 2003-04, Australian Energy Market Bill
2004.(1)
Schedule 1 Item 9 inserts a new Part
IIIAA into the Trade Practices Act to create the AER as a
Commonwealth body.
Proposed section 44AE establishes the AER as a
separate legal entity able to sue and be sued in its own name.
Proposed section 44AG states that the AER is to
consist of a Commonwealth member and 2 State/Territory members. The
Commonwealth member must be a member of the Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission (ACCC) (proposed section
44AM). The Commonwealth and State/Territory members must
be appointed in accordance with the Australian Energy Market
Agreement(2) (proposed sections 44AM and 44
AP).
Proposed section 44AAC provides that the
Chairperson of the ACCC must make staff and consultants available
to allow the AER to perform its functions.
Proposed Division 3 of new Part IIIAA provides
Commonwealth authority for the conferral of functions and powers on
the AER. Under the Australian Energy Market Agreement, the AER is
to have regulatory and enforcement powers over the Australian
electricity and gas industries. Electricity related functions and
powers are conferred through the common application by the
Commonwealth, States and Territories of the National Electricity
Law, Regulations and Rules as contained in model South Australian
legislation. The Australian Energy Market Bill 2004 confers
national electricity functions and powers on the AER in areas under
Commonwealth jurisdiction. Matching State and Territory legislation
will confer equivalent functions and powers for other Australian
jurisdictions.
Proposed section 44AH provides that the AER is
to have any functions conferred by a Commonwealth law, or
prescribed by regulations made under the Trade Practices Act. The
note to the section states that the AER can have functions under
the Australian Energy Market Bill and the Gas Pipelines Access
(Commonwealth) Act 1998.
Proposed sections 44AI and 44AJ are designed to
avoid constitutional problems in conferring State powers on the AER
following the decision of the High Court in R v
Hughes (2000).(3) The explanatory memorandum
notes that 'significant AER functions and powers will be provided
for by State and Territory laws'.(4) It is accepted that
a Commonwealth body can be given functions and powers under State
legislation.(5) In the Hughes case, however,
the High Court said any attempt in Commonwealth legislation to
impose a duty on a Commonwealth body to exercise State power which
could adversely affect the rights of individuals must be firmly
supported by a head of Commonwealth constitutional
power.(6)
The AER will have legal enforcement powers under the National
Electricity Law, such as:
-
the power to obtain information
-
the power to obtain and exercise search warrants, and
-
the power to seek and obtain pecuniary penalties and related
orders, from the Federal Court and State and Territory Supreme
Courts.(7)
The exercise of such powers by the AER could plainly affect the
rights of individuals. For activities within the jurisdiction of
the States, the AER will be exercising State powers. The extent to
which the AER's use of State powers will be covered by specific
heads of power in the Commonwealth Constitution is unclear.
However, where the AER needs to exercise powers conferred by State
legislation, it may be doing so because there is no valid head of
power under the Commonwealth Constitution. The approach in the Bill
assumes that imposing a duty on the AER to exercise such
powers may make enforcement action by the new body invalid.
Proposed section 44AI provides the
Commonwealth's consent to the conferral of functions and powers on
the AER by State and Territory legislation. As the High Court noted
in Hughes, 'a State by its laws cannot unilaterally invest
functions under that law in officers of the
Commonwealth'.(8) Subsection 44AI(2)
provides that there is no consent to such conferral where this
would 'contravene any constitutional doctrines restricting the
duties imposed on the AER'. In addition, subsection
44AI(3) provides that the AER cannot exercise a duty,
function or power under State/Territory energy law unless this is
in accordance with the Australian Energy Market Agreement.
Proposed section 44AJ applies where a
State/Territory law purports to 'impose a duty' on the AER. It
provides that a duty will be imposed by a State law where this is
within the legislative power of a State and does not contravene any
constitutional doctrine. Otherwise the duty will be deemed to be
imposed under Commonwealth law by new Part IIIAA
using all available heads of power in the Constitution but again
only to the extent that this does not contravene any constitutional
doctrine.
Proposed section 44AAF provides that the AER
must take all reasonable measures to protect information given to
it in confidence or obtained 'by compulsion in the exercise of its
powers'. However the section specifically authorises disclosure of
such information to the ACCC, the Australian Energy Market
Commission (AEMC), the National Electricity Market Management
Company Limited, any staff or consultant assisting these bodies,
and to any other person or body prescribed by regulations.
Proposed section 44AAG allows the AER to apply
to the Federal Court for a declaration or injunction in relation to
actual or anticipated breaches of the National Electricity Law,
Regulations and Rules, including the National Electricity Code. The
AER will be able to seek a financial penalty, an order that a
particular activity be ceased or that a compliance program or other
remedial action be undertaken. The explanatory memorandum notes
that the financial penalty regime will be set out in the National
Electricity Law, Regulations and Rules.(9)
The proposed section confers jurisdiction on the Federal Court
in relation to breaches both of Commonwealth and State/Territory
energy law. This raises the issue in Re Wakim
(1999)(10) where the High Court held that Commonwealth
legislation could not vest State judicial power in federal courts.
However in Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2001)(11)
the High Court agreed that where a body representing the
Commonwealth sought a declaration or injunction in relation to a
breach of State law, the Federal Court would have the necessary
jurisdiction.(12) Proposed section
44AAG is consistent with Edensor, specifying that
the AER acts 'on behalf of the Commonwealth' in seeking a
declaration or an injunction under a State energy law from the
Federal Court.
Item 13 inserts proposed section
44ZZAB in the Trade Practices Act allowing the ACCC to
rely on consultations undertaken by an industry body instead of
conducting its own consultations before approving, varying or
withdrawing an access code.
Item 15 inserts proposed section
90B in the Trade Practices Act. The new provision will
allow the ACCC instead of carrying out its own consultations in
accordance with Part VII Division 1 of the Act to rely on
consultations undertaken by the AEMC in considering applications in
relation to the National Electricity Code to authorise particular
activities. This will apply, for example, where a market
participant makes an application under section 88 to enter a
'proposed contract, arrangement or understanding [that] might be an
exclusionary provision or .might have the effect of substantially
lessening competition'. If the AEMC has conducted the consultation
process specified in the new provision, the ACCC is permitted to
'disregard any submissions made by the Commonwealth, or by a State,
or by any other person (other than the AEMC)'.
As noted above, a significant part of the AER's enforcement
powers will be conferred by State legislation. The drafters of the
Bill appear to have interpreted the High Court's judgment in
Hughes to mean that a constitutional issue will only arise
if the Bill imposes a duty on the AER to exercise such
powers. However this is not necessarily so. An alternative reading
of Hughes is that any provision in a Commonwealth law that
authorises the use of State law by a Commonwealth body for
enforcement purposes may need to be supported by a specific head of
power in the Constitution.
In Hughes the High Court pointed to section 15A of the
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 which states that every
Commonwealth Act 'shall be read and construed subject to the
Constitution, and so as not to exceed the legislative power of the
Commonwealth'. As the Court noted:
s 15A of the Interpretation Act may be construed
so as to read down a provision expressed in general terms,
including a power to prosecute so as to apply only where the
particular prosecution is supported by a head of
power.(13) (emphasis added).
Justice Kirby's judgment in Hughes indicates more
specifically that imposition of a duty may not be needed
before a specific head of Commonwealth constitutional power is
required to support a prosecution under State law. As he said:
to the extent that federal law purports to
authorise an officer or authority of the Commonwealth to
perform functions which seriously affect the liberty and property
rights of individuals, it may be expected that, when challenged,
those who propound the constitutional validity of such
authorisation will be able to demonstrate that validity
exists.(14) (emphasis added)
Justice Kirby also indicated that the constitutional validity of
a prosecution by a Commonwealth body using State law would depend
on the circumstances of the particular case, especially the penalty
sought. In this context it might be noted that the penalty regime
enforceable by the Federal Court under this Bill is yet to be
finalised.(15) As Justice Kirby said:
The more drastic the consequences for those
affected, the more vigilant will be the scrutiny of the impugned
law, measured against the constitutional warrant. The proposition
that serious and burdensome consequences of criminal proceedings
may be sustained by reference to nothing more than the creation of
the office of the Commonwealth DPP and incidents thereto in the
context of the joint co-operative scheme is highly doubtful. For
such outcomes a firm foundation of constitutional authority would
appear to be necessary. Under our Constitution, criminal liability
and punishment, when provided in a federal law, must be supported
by demonstrable constitutional authority. Convenience and
desirability are not enough if the constitutional foundation is
missing.(16)
As discussed in Bills
Digest No. 171 of 2003-04, these remarks indicate that the
achievement of the Commonwealth, States and Territories in agreeing
to a national energy regulation scheme may not be given any special
consideration by the High Court in determining the scheme's
constitutional validity, including the validity of prosecutions by
the AER using State law.
Moreover, the above statement by Justice Kirby indicates that it
is the more serious breaches of national energy laws, regulations
and codes which might justify criminal proceedings where
prosecutions by the AER under State law would be most doubtful from
a constitutional perspective.
An article written in 2002 by the then Counsel assisting the
Solicitor-General for the Commonwealth, Graeme Hill reinforces
questions about the constitutional validity of provisions in the
Bill. Indicating that these were his personal views (so not
necessarily those of the Government), he stated:
One reading of Hughes is that a Commonwealth body
cannot be given exclusive power to perform a function conferred by
State law unless it is a function that the Commonwealth could have
conferred itself.(17)
The Government has pointed out that the point of creating the
AER is to give it exclusive regulatory and enforcement power in
relation to the national energy market, to replace the 13 existing
State, Territory and Commonwealth regulators.(18)
Hill notes, however, that the judgment in Hughes may
also indicate that the Commonwealth could rely on its executive
power (based on section 61 of the Constitution) 'to authorise
Commonwealth bodies to perform exclusively what might be termed
"non-coercive" functions (that is, functions that do not adversely
affect the rights of individuals)'.(19) Based on this
view, a question mark clearly remains about the validity of the
AER's exercise of State power for its coercive enforcement
functions.
In this context, Parliament may wish to consider requesting
detailed submissions on the constitutional validity of the
enforcement regime envisaged by this Bill, including the
consequences of any invalidity.
Finally, it would have been useful for Parliament when
considering this Bill to have had available to it the full package
of State and Territory legislation making up the National
Electricity Law, Regulations and Rules, as well as the final
Australian Energy Market Agreement.
Endnotes
-
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2003-04/04bd171.pdf.
-
As of 17 June 2004, this agreement was being finalised under the
auspices of the Council of Australian Governments: see 'Explanatory
memorandum: Australian Energy Market Bill 2004', p.1.
-
(2000) 202 CLR 535.
-
'Explanatory memorandum: Trade Practices Amendment (Australian
Energy Market) Bill 2004', p. 12.
-
R v Duncan; ex parte Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd
(1983) 158 CLR 535.
-
R v Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535 at 558.
-
Ministerial Council on Energy Standing Committee of Officials,
Intergovernmental Agreement and Legislative Framework,
Information Paper May 2004, at
http://www.industry.gov.au/assets/documents/itrinternet/IGALegislativeframeworkfinal20040525161258.pdf?CFID=1658449&CFTOKEN=87460888.
-
202 CLR 535 at 553.
-
Explanatory memorandum, p. 21.
-
(1999) 193 CLR 511.
-
204 CLR 559
-
By virtue of section 39B(1A)(a) of the Judiciary Act 1903
(Cth) supported by section 75(iii) of the Constitution. See
the discussion in George Williams, 'Cooperative Federalism and the
Revival of the Corporations Law: Wakim and Beyond', 20
Companies and Securities Law Journal 160, May 2002 at
163-4, fn 30.
-
202 CLR 535 at 557.
-
ibid, at 583.
-
Explanatory memorandum p. 21.
-
ibid.
-
Graeme Hill, 'Revisiting Wakim and Hughes: The Distinct Demands
of Federalism', 13 Public Law Review, 205 at 214.
-
'Explanatory memorandum: Australian Energy Market Bill 2004, pp
2-3.
-
Hill, op.cit., p. 214.
Peter Prince
25 June 2004
Bills Digest Service
Information and Research Services
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ISSN 1328-8091
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