Bills Digest No. 14 2003-04
Legislation Amendment (Identification and Authentication) Bill
This Digest was prepared for debate. It reflects the legislation as
introduced and does not canvass subsequent amendments. This Digest
does not have any official legal status. Other sources should be
consulted to determine the subsequent official status of the
Contact Officer & Copyright Details
Migration Legislation Amendment
(Identification and Authentication) Bill
26 June 2003
Portfolio: Immigration and Multicultural and
The substantive provisions
of the Bill commence on the earlier of a date fixed by
proclamation, or 6 months from royal assent to the Bill.
The Minister states the purpose of the Bill is
to strengthen and clarify existing statutory powers to identify
Biometric information helps authenticate
identity as it relates to a relatively invariant aspect of who a
person is. There are six generic types of biometric in use today:
face, iris, fingerprint, hand, signature and voice. In contrast,
other authentication systems rely on possession of particular
identifying documentation (such as a passport) or knowledge (a
By way of background, it should be noted that
biometric information does not of itself identify an individual.
The usefulness of a biometric record is when it can be identified
as belonging to an individual by some additional information or
when it can be compared against similar record or records. In an
immigration context, the collection of non-citizen biometric
information would be useful if the non-citizen subsequently
committed or attempted to commit identity fraud, or their data
could be checked against equivalent data overseas.
This Bill provides the framework for the
collection of biometric data by immigration officials. Current
Australian and overseas immigration regimes routinely require
photographs and signatures. The Bill expands the powers available
to collect other biometric information, including finger prints,
iris scans, facial scans and body measurements, from non-citizens
in particular circumstances and sets out a regulatory framework for
the database or databases that would be established.
The bill is part of a whole of government
approach to tackle the growing incidence of identity fraud
worldwide. Identity fraud arises when a person pretends to be
someone else in order to obtain a particular immigration outcome,
or goods and services through the use of a fictitious name or the
adoption of another person s name.
Identity fraud not only impacts on the
integrity of the immigration program, at an organised level it may
be linked to terrorism and organised crime, including
money-laundering and credit card skimming. At an individual level,
identity fraud would include taxation and social security
To the extent that identity fraud may be
committed by a non-citizen, there may be a link between immigration
fraud and identity fraud in a criminal context.
Elements in the Government s approach to
combat identity fraud include proposals beyond the immigration
context, for example:
- a feasibility study into a nationwide electronic gateway that
would allow instant verification and cross matching of documents
such as birth and death certificates, driver s licences, passports
and immigration records(1)
- the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is considering the
addition of a biometric identifier in the next Australian passport
- trialling of photo-matching technology at Sydney-International
- a discussion paper released on 6 March 2003 regarding the
establishment of a national set of powers for cross-border
investigations into serious and organised crime, including use of
Key issues in considering this Bill are
whether the biometric database or databases, in relation to
non-citizens in a non-criminal context, are proportionate to the
size of the currently undetected identity fraud by non-citizens,
and how the information collected will achieve these purposes.
Precise measurement of the extent of identity
fraud is difficult. Detected fraud can be measured, but
extrapolating that into any total figure involves a degree of
guesswork. In Australia, it is even more difficult as there has
been no public study of identity fraud per se, although the
Australian Government estimates the total cost of identity fraud to
be $4 billion per year.(5) Moreover, it is unclear what
part of this is perpetrated by the hundreds of thousands of
non-citizens(6) who enter Australia annually.
In relation to immigration fraud, a UK Cabinet
Office report entitled Identity Fraud: A Study released in
July 2002 states that 50 cases of fraudulent travel documentation
were detected every month at Heathrow Airport Terminal 3. It
estimates that at least 10 times that number that were not
detected.(7) The report also states that the number of
entry documents at UK ports of arrival in 2000 detected as being
counterfeit were 0.006% of the total.(8)
In Australia, there were 143 cases of
fraudulent travel documentation (including non-existent travel
documentation) in 2000-01.(9)
The provisions of the Migration Act
1958 require both non-citizens and
citizens to provide evidence of the person's identity in certain
circumstances. For example:
- photographs and signatures are required in order to make a
valid visa application for some classes of visa(10)
- at immigration clearance evidence of
identity must be provided - regulations specify that this
requirement is met by documentation such as a visa, passport
or travel document and completed passenger card(11)
- departing persons are required to give similar evidence of
their identity, and(12)
- passengers on international flights travelling within
Australian ports must show prescribed evidence of their identity -
regulations prescribe that this requirement is met by provision of
documents that are in force, and include a photo and full name of
the person concerned (usually a passport, but a drivers licence, an
aviation security identity card, or a document issued by a
government or government authority that identifies the person is
The only provision in the Migration Act
1958 that expressly authorises the taking of biometric
information for the purposes of identification is section 258. That
provision applies to people in immigration detention.
Section 258 of the Act states:
Where a person is in
immigration detention by virtue of this Act, an authorized officer
may do all such things as are reasonably necessary for
photographing or measuring that person or otherwise recording
matters in order to facilitate the person's present or future
While the provision
would support the taking of a variety of types of personal
identifiers, it would appear that, in addition to the usual
photographs and signatures, fingerprinting is the main means of
facilitating identification at present.(14)
The practice of
fingerprinting detainees is governed by Departmental instructions.
Migration Series Instruction (MSI) 125 on Fingerprinting of
Detainees explains that:
- the power should be exercised cautiously since the power will
be interpreted strictly by a court(15) (for example, it
should only be used where there is an intention to match the
fingerprints with fingerprint data collected by other
- minors should not be fingerprinted,(17) and
- fingerprint records should be destroyed after the detainee is
removed or granted a visa.(18)
MSI 125 also
provides certain safeguards to the current process where the use of
reasonable force is contemplated:
- a senior officer must authorise the use of reasonable
- a person of the same sex should take the fingerprints
- an independent witness should be present, and
- alternatively, the fingerprinting could be recorded on
In contrast to the
current regime, the Migration Legislation Amendment (Identification
and Authentication) Bill
sets out a definition of a personal
identifier, a number of circumstances in which it may be required,
how it is to be provided, stored, used and the circumstances in
which it must be destroyed. It lifts the Departmental instructions
into primary legislation.
Bill also broadens the basis for collection of identifying
material, from immigration detainees assessed on a case by case
basis, to an opt-out regime in relation to people who fall within
Identity fraud and
its consequences for security, crime and delivery of entitlements
is the subject of increasing attention worldwide. Policies, and
preferred technologies, vary. Some examples of proposed schemes
In May 2003, the G8
countries (USA, Canada,
Russia and Japan) recognised
the need for more work on biometrics in the context of border
control, identity fraud and organised crime. It set up a working
group on biometrics chaired by the USA and
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has adopted a global blueprint
for the integration of biometrics into machine readable travel
documents to enhance processing, security and crime
prevention.(21) Its research into biometric technology
indicates some technologies are more reliable than others: face
technology provides the best results, followed by fingerprint and
iris technology, then signature, hand and voice
The UK Home
Secretary has proposed a passport which incorporates biometric
information to enhance airport processing and
security,(23) and a card with biometric information to
access government entitlements.(24) Belgium and
Italy are including biometric information on ID cards.
Canadian lawmakers are studying the possibility of creating
a national identity card with biometric information
26 October 2004, for a foreign country to participate in its visa
waiver program, the US Government must have certified that the
country s government issues its nationals with machine readable,
tamper-resistent passports that include biometric
The French Minister
of the Interior has recently introduced a Bill which would
require French consulates to fingerprint applicants for tourist
visas in order to combat crime and illegal
Schemes which are
currently operational include Eurodac which operates in EU member
states as a way of reducing forum shopping by asylum
seekers.(28) This is discussed in more detail below. In
the USA(29) and Canada(30) asylum-seekers are fingerprinted.
The countries of the
European Union have recently established Eurodac, an automated
fingerprint identification system. As of 15 January 2003, all
asylum seekers in European Union countries should have their
fingerprints taken when they apply for asylum. The fingerprints are
then sent to a central unit with the aim of checking whether the
person has sought asylum previously. If so, then the asylum seeker
may be sent to that country to decide his or her status. If not,
then the country which has taken the fingerprints should decide the
status of the asylum seeker. Fingerprints are also taken of certain
illegal immigrants for the purpose of ascertaining whether they had
previously applied for asylum.
The Eurodac system
has a number of safeguards. Fingerprints may only be taken of
minors over the age of 14. No personal details are held in the data
base. The system relies on biometric comparison only. Fingerprints
are not stored indefinitely, they are erased if a former asylum
seeker becomes a national of a participating state or after 10
years. Finally, the operation of the system is monitored by a
Item 11, new section 5A
defines personal identifiers to mean, in relation to a particular
- their fingerprints or hand prints
- photographs or other images of the face and shoulders
- measurements of height and weight
- audio or video recordings
- iris scans, and
- other identifiers as prescribed in the regulations.
Item 11, new section 5A(2)
states that before prescribing new tests, the Minister must be
- obtaining the identifier would not involve the carrying out of
an intimate forensic procedure within the meaning of section 23WA
of the Crimes Act 1914(32)
- the identifier is an image of, or a measurement or recording of
an external part of the body, and
- obtaining the identifier will promote the purposes for the new
testing regime set out in the Bill.
The purposes are set out in the following sub
section.(33) Some purposes are quite specific, for
example, to detect forum shopping by applicants for visas . Others,
however, are considerably more general. For example:
- to assist in the identification, in the present or
future, of any non-citizen required to provide identifying
- to improve the procedures for determining visa
- to enhance the Department s ability to identify non-citizens
who have a criminal history, who are of character
concern(36) or who are of national security
The implications of a broad set of purposes
are discussed in the comments below.
In addition, it should be noted that the
definition does not expressly distinguish between the biometric
data and the information which links it to a particular person.
The Bill sets out the general circumstances in
which non-citizens may be required to supply personal
- when applying for visas (item 13, new sub section 40(3)
and item 16, new sub section 46(2A))
- when entering
Australia at immigration clearance (item
17, new paragraph 166(1)(aa))
- when travelling or appear intending to travel on an overseas
vessel from a port to another port (item 20, new sub
- when departing Australia (item 22, new sub section
- when an immigration officer knows or
reasonably suspects a person to be an unlawful non-citizen
(item 24, new sub section
- when a non-citizen is detained
pursuant to section 192 pending investigation into the cancellation
of their visa (item 28, new sub
Importantly however, the precise circumstances
in which a personal identifier must be supplied is left to
regulations. The Bill contemplates that the Minister will prescribe
at a later date circumstances in which biometric data is
Item 11, new sub section
5A(1) states that the regulations may not prescribe
intimate forensic procedures, as defined under the Commonwealth
Crimes Act 1914,(38) such as taking a sample of
blood or saliva or pubic hair or taking a buccal/oral swab or
external examination of a genital or anal area.
Item 20, new sub section 170(4) and
item 24 new sub section 188(6) provide that personal
identifiers must be taken by an authorised officer,(39)
except where prescribed otherwise.
Item 31, new section 258E
guarantees certain minimum procedural safeguards when taking
personal identifiers. Identification tests:
- must be carried out in circumstances affording reasonable
- must not be carried out in the presence or view of a person
whose presence is not necessary
- must not involve the removal of more clothing than is
- must not involve more visual inspection than is necessary.
Moreover, item 31, new section 258F and
item 32, new section 261AF provide that identification
tests must not be carried out in a manner that is cruel, inhuman or
degrading, or that fails to respect human
Additional safeguards apply in certain cases.
Item 32, new section 261AH provides that
immigration detainees must be informed in a language they
understand of their right to have the tests taken by an officer of
the same sex. In addition, to avoid the systematic use of testing
as a management tool in detention centers, item 32, new
section 261AK restricts retesting of immigration
Item 30, new section 192A and item 31,
new section 258B provide that non-citizens who are
suspected of being unlawful non-citizens pursuant to section 188,
or who are detained for the purposes of questioning pursuant to
section 192, must be informed, in a language they understand, that
they have the right to request an authorisation for the test from a
senior authorising officer.(41)
There is also provision for the Minister to
limit the types of identification tests that an officer or class of
officers can carry out.
In relation to the use of force to collect
personal identifiers, the Bill treats non-citizens in immigration
detention (other than for the purposes of questioning under section
192) differently from non-citizens generally.
Item 32, new section 261AE
states that, in relation to a non-citizen in immigration detention,
reasonable force may be used in carrying out the identification
- where a non-citizen in immigration detention refuses to agree
to the identification test,
- all reasonable measures to carry out the test without the use
of force have been exhausted, and
- the use of force is authorised by a senior authorising
A senior authorising officer is defined in
new sub section 261AE(8) to mean
an officer whom the Secretary has authorised to perform those
Depending on the circumstances, failure to
comply with an identification requirement may:
- make a visa application invalid (item 16, new sub
- be grounds for refusal of a visa (item 13, new sub
section 40(3)), or
- give rise to suspicion on reasonable grounds that the person is
an unlawful non-citizen, with consequential detention
(item 26, new sub section 190(2)
and existing section 189 Migration Act 1958).
The Bill defines minors as less than 18 years
old and provides that any biometric tests of minors must be carried
out with the informed consent of, and in the presence of, a parent
or guardian, or an independent person (item 32, sub
sections 261AL(2), (4) and (5)). The parent or guardian,
or independent person, must be informed of their right to request
authorisation of the test from a senior authorising officer.
Similar safeguards apply in the case of an incapable person
(item 32, new section 261AM).
In relation to minors who are less than 15
years old, the Bill restricts the number of personal identifiers
that can be collected from this group to two: measurement of the
child s height and weight and photograph of the child s face and
shoulders (item 32, new sub section 261AL(1)).
Item 33, new Part 4A
regulates access to, disclosure of, and modification or impairment
of identifying information. It includes disclosure of identifying
information to foreign countries and agencies, with the Secretary s
authorisation (item 33, new section
Item 33, new sub section
336K(4) provides for the destruction of identifying
information. Importantly, destruction is defined narrowly to mean
the destruction of the means of identifying the information with
the person from whom it was taken or to whom it relates. It would
not require the underlying data sample to be destroyed.
Item 33, new sub section
336K(1) states as a general principle, destruction is
required as soon as practicable after the information is no longer
required to be kept under the Commonwealth Archives Act
1983. However, new sub section 336K(2)
exempts measurements of height or weight, photographs of face and
shoulders, and signatures, or the attached identifying information,
from the requirement. In addition, new section
336L allows even the identifying information to be
indefinitely retained in certain other cases. Those cases are where
the person has:
- been in immigration detention
- had an application for a visa cancelled or refused
- has overstayed a temporary visa
- has been convicted of an offence under the Migration Act or
- has been subject to deportation proceedings, or
- has been the subject of a conclusive certificate by the
Minister that the person is a threat to national security or that
it is otherwise in the public interest to issue the
The Bill contemplates collection of biometric
information on a large scale and as such takes Australia into
previously uncharted territory. Notwithstanding the fact that the
application of the Bill is limited to non-citizens and that there
are significant safeguards built into the proposed regime, it
contains a number of aspects that require close examination.
As a party to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Australia is obliged to ensure that no
one be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy
.(42) The Human Rights Committee, established to oversee
implementation of the treaty by States parties, recognises that as
all persons live in society, the protection of privacy is
necessarily relative .(43) Thus, interferences with
privacy do not themselves breach the Covenant, they will only do so
where the curtailment of the right is unreasonable or not
objectively justifiable on a case-by-case basis.(44) The
more significant the problem, the more justifiable is a curtailment
of the right to privacy.
It follows that the extent of identity fraud
by non-citizens, or in the Australian immigration context, is
highly relevant to a consideration of whether the interference with
privacy permitted by this Bill is justifiable, and therefore
complies with the right to privacy enshrined in the Covenant.
Arguably, it would be precipitous to proceed with new policy that
has significant ramifications for personal privacy in the absence
of analysis based on verifiable information.(45)
Moreover, to determine the value of the data
to Australia s immigration program, it would be important to know
whether the data collected under the Bill is compatible with that
available in other countries, and whether arrangements could be
made to facilitate sharing of information.
The international obligations mentioned above
are implemented in domestic law through the Privacy Act
1988. The protection of personal information is set out in the
Privacy Principles (IPPs).(46) Section 16 of the
Privacy Act states that an agency, defined to include Commonwealth
Departments, shall not collect, use and disclose personal
information inconsistently with the IPPs.(47)
IPP 1 states that personal information should
only be collected if it is necessary for a lawful purpose directly
related to a function or activity of the collector. As noted above,
the purposes for collection of identifying material are very
generic. For example, the purposes in the Bill for the collection
of identifying material is stated to be mere identification both in
the present and future.(48) Without further elaboration
of the circumstances in which identification is required,
this would allow information to be collected in cases where there
was rarely if ever immigration fraud. It gives rise to the question
whether the creation of a just-in-case database is a proportionate
response to the scale of identity fraud by non-citizens.
Moreover, the low level of generality of the
purposes for the Bill facilitating sharing of information with
agencies outside the immigration context, for example, domestic or
foreign enforcement agencies. While the Bill prohibits disclosures
of certain types of identifiers for the purposes of investigating
an offence against an Australian law,(49) the
prohibition is not absolute and no such limitation is imposed on
sharing of information in relation to foreign offences. Indeed, the
Bill itself contemplates the provision of data to foreign law
enforcement agencies.(50) Yet there is no guarantee that
the use of the identifying information by the law enforcement
agency will have any connection with the purpose for which the data
was collected in the first instance by the Department of
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs.
In addition, it is unclear whether information
sharing arrangements with foreign countries would be subject to a
consideration of the consequences of that disclosure, for example,
whether they would lead to prosecutions under laws that do not have
any equivalent in Australian law.
The circumstances in which personal
information may be disclosed under the Bill deserves further
examination in the light of the IPPs. IPP 11 states that personal
information cannot be disclosed to another agency except in certain
circumstances. The most relevant of the exceptions for current
purposes allows disclosure when it is authorised by or under law .
Accordingly, authorisations should be in primary legislation.
Arguably, it is not sufficient to note that information can be
disclosed if it takes place under an arrangement with
another Commonwealth agency .(51) If this were the case,
then the purpose of the authorised by law disclosures would be
As mentioned above, the definition of
destroyed in the Bill(52) is weak. It only goes to the
destruction of identifying information and not the sample
itself. It would allow the identifying labels to be removed, but
the finger prints, scans etc, to remain. These anonymous samples
could still form the basis of a useful database. Indeed, anonymous
samples alone form the Eurodac database established in Europe for
minimising forum shopping by asylum seekers.
In addition, the need for a database for all
the categories of indefinite retention in section 336L could also
be tested against some grounds of proportionality. One precedent is
the approach in the Eurodac system whereby fingerprints must be
destroyed after 10 years or upon grant of nationality. One perhaps
unintended consequence of maintaining the indefinite retention of
biometric data in cases where citizenship has been granted would be
to create distinctions between citizens dependent on the amount of
data stored in individual cases.
Without the benefit of regulations that set
out the circumstances in which personal identifiers are required
and exemptions to those requirements, the application of the
biometric regime established by the Bill is potentially very broad.
Its provisions may apply to any non-citizen in Australia, whether
permanently resident or temporarily visiting. Such a lack of detail
in its drafting would affect a range of stakeholders, including the
tourism industry, and the business community, recent settlers with
family overseas. The potential for travellers to Australia to be
subjected to the biometric testing regime is limited only by
As noted above, the Minister must prescribe
the circumstances in which personal identifiers are to be used and
may prescribe exemptions to that regime. Furthermore, the Minister
may prescribe further types of biometric measurements that are to
be used. It must be asked whether these issues which go to the
coverage and intrusiveness of the new regime are properly dealt
with by delegated legislation.
The guidelines of the Senate Regulations and
Ordinances Committee for delegated legislation suggest that
- must not lessen the operation of provisions protecting human
- must show sensitivity to personal matters, and
- must protect privacy.(53)
Furthermore, the Administrative Review Council
in its report Rulemaking by Commonwealth Agencies,
recommends that measures which affect individual rights and
liberties, including powers of search, should be enacted in primary
As mentioned above, the Bill limits the tests
available in the case of a non-citizen below the age of 15 years,
but not the tests available in the case of minors aged between 15
Of particular concern is the fact that the
Bill would permit a more extensive testing regime in the case of a
child than is currently available under the Commonwealth Crimes
Act 1914. For example, in the criminal law,
authorisation for a forensic test of a suspect or an offender
between the age of 10 and 18 years must be given by a magistrate.
Moreover, children under the age of 10 are not subject to the
forensic procedures provisions of the Crimes Act.
In contrast, the provisions of the Bill
contemplate testing with only the consent of a parent or guardian,
or in the absence of a parent or guardian, an independent person,
and if requested, a senior authorising officer.(55)
ensuing regulations will remove a level of doubt about the taking
of identifiers from detainees. The Bill provides the
Minister with the power to prescribe a wide range of tests, and to
prescribe the circumstances in which they can be carried out. It
also provides statutory procedural
protections under Migration Act 1958 (such as the
implication that fingerprinting is a measure of last resort, the
prohibition on fingerprinting of minors, and the obligation to
destroy data on grant of a visa or deportation) would be
In contrast to the Eurodac system, the Bill
does not provide for oversight of the data collection, storage, use
and destruction. Were supervisory functions to be given to an
independent authority, they would enhance the protections against
arbitrary or unlawful interferences with personal information. A
lesser degree of oversight would also be possible, for example, by
giving the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and
Indigenous Affairs reporting functions.
The literature on the usefulness of biometric
identifiers indicates that the technology is not 100 per cent
reliable at this stage. ICAO s study found that the technology with
the highest compatibility rating still had a relatively high rate
of error.(57) Error may be induced for a number of
reasons including dummy identifiers (for example, fake
fingerprints) or quirks of human physiology (for example, around
one in 70,000 people do not have an iris). For this reason, some
commentators have recommended multiple types of identifiers, with
the concomitant cost implications of such
The Bill gives significant new powers to the
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
to establish a database or databases of personal identifiers in
relation to non-citizens by regulation. There is value in codifying
in primary legislation current practice and safeguards in relation
to fingerprinting of asylum-seekers, and indeed there may be value
in maintaining equivalent border control mechanisms as other
countries in the interests of avoiding being a soft target for
terrorists and other people of concern. In the absence of a debate
regarding what incursions on privacy are considered acceptable in
the context of undetected identity fraud in Australia, the Bill
requires decision makers to weigh complex issues: the convenience
of delegated legislation, the value of the data collected, and the
policy shift towards collecting identifiers from all non-citizens
who meet the prescribed conditions.
- See press release by Justice Minister Chris
Ellison dated 6 July 2003 at
- See press release on Attorney-General s
- Press release by Justice Minister Chris
Ellison dated 6 July 2003 at n1 above. It has been reported that
the Federal agency Austrac has commissioned a report that will
calculate for the first time the costs and types of identity fraud
in Australia Article by Brendan Nicholson and Gary Hughes in the
Age, 6 July 2003 at:
- The Immigration Update for 2001-02 produced
by the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs in September 2002 indicates that total arrivals in
Australia for the financial year 2001-02 wrer around 8,500,000.
However this figure is not broken down into citizenship categories.
- Identity Fraud, A Study by the UK Cabinet
Office dated July 2002. See at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs/id_fraud-report.pdf,
box 2.1 and annex A, pr 21.
- Ibid., pr 2.17.
- Department of Immigration and Multicultural
and Indigenous Affairs Fact Sheet 74 at: http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/74unauthorised.htm.
This figure includes persons arriving without visa or passport as
well as with improper documents.
- Section 40 and the second reading speech of
the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs on 26 June 2003.
- Section 166, regulations 3.01 and 3.03 and
Migration Series Instruction 218 (MSI
218) on Summary Removal Procedures in Immigration Clearance at
Proclaimed Ports one of a series of DIMIA instructions.
- Section 175 and MSI 373 on Immigration
Clearance at Airports and Seaports, pr. 13.
- Section 170, regulation 3.09 and MSI 373, pr.
8 and attachment 1.
- MSI 125 on
Fingerprinting of Detainees. MSI 234 on General Detention
Procedures only refers to identification through fingerprint
- Prs 7, 8, 13.
- Pr 14. According to the MSI, other countries
which fingerprint asylum seekers are Canada, USA, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.
- Pr 19.
- Pr 16.
- Prs 10 and 11.
- eGovernment news, 6 May 2003.
- Blueprint adopted on 28 May 2003, see release
- ICAO Technical Report Executive Summary, pr
4.2. See at:
- The Guardian, 8 May 2003, p.
- Consultation paper dated July 2002 at:
- In November 2002, the Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration suggested that it was time for Canadians to engage
in a debate about a national identity card. Minister Denis Coderre
suggested that the House of Commons Standing Committee on
Citizenship and Immigration would be an appropriate forum for such
a discussion, and the Committee agreed to study this question. In
June 2003 the Committee visited Europe to study initiatives
See also ID authentication: do the eyes have it? By Mark
Sneddon, Sen Bluemmel and Ron Holzer, Canberra Time 6 May
- Introduced 30 April 2003. See introduction
- Council Regulation no. 2725/2000.
- Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act 1996.
- Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
- Eurodac. The Fingerprint database to help
asylum seekers. European Commission
Directorate-General Justice and Home Affairs.
- An intimate forensic procedure is defined
an external examination of the genital or
anal area, the buttocks or, in the case of a female or a
transgender person who identifies as a female, the breasts;
(b) the taking of a sample of blood;
(c) the taking of a sample of saliva, or a sample by buccal
(d) the taking of a sample of pubic hair;
(e) the taking of a sample by swab or washing from the external
genital or anal area, the buttocks or, in the case of a female or a
transgender person who identifies as a female, the breasts;
(f) the taking of a sample by vacuum suction, by scraping or by
lifting by tape from the external genital or anal area, the
buttocks or, in the case of a female or a transgender person who
identifies as a female, the breasts;
(g) the taking of a dental impression;
(h) the taking of a photograph or video recording of, or an
impression or cast of a wound from, the genital or anal area, the
buttocks or, in the case of a female or a transgender person who
identifies as a female, the breasts.
- Item 11, new sub section 5A(3).
- New paragraphs 5A(3)(a) and (b).
- New paragraph 5A(3)(e).
- A non-citizen of character concern is defined
in item 11 (new section 5C) and includes a non-citizen association
with a person or group who is reasonably suspected of having been
or being involved in criminal conduct, or a non-citizen who poses a
significant risk of engaging in criminal conduct or inciting
discord or becoming involved in activities that are disruptive to
- New paragraph 5A(3)(g).
- Section 23WA. See n28 above.
- Item 11, new section 5D states that the
Minister may, in an instrument authorising an officer as an
authorising officer, specify the types of tests that the officer
may carry out.
- The same proposed sections specify that the
carrying out of an identification test is not of itself to be taken
as cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or as a failure to respect
- Note however that no consequence attaches to
a failure to evidence the authorisation.
- Article 17.
- General Comment 16, pr 7.
- See General Comment 16 pr 8. See also Novak,
UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR Commentary,
Engel, 1993 Kehl am Rhein, p. 295.
- See n5 above.
- The Act applies to citizens and non-citizens
alike. There is nothing that requires that the personal information
be that of Australian citizens, but merely that it is an act or
practice of a Commonwealth agency.
- Item 11, new paragraph 5A(3)(a) and (b).
- Item 33, new sub section 336E(3).
- Item 33, new section 336F.
- Item 33, new paragraph 336E(2)(e).
- Item 33, paragraph 336K(4).
- See Guidelines in the Committee s application
of its Principles http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committe/regord_ctte/guidelines.htm.
See also Pearce and Argument, Delegated Legislation,
Butterworths, Sydney 1999, p. 27.
- ARC Report no. 35, pr 2.19.
- Item 32, new section 261AL and item 30, new
- See item 32, new sections 261AD, 261AH,
- See n 22. Facial technology achieved the
highest compatibility rating greater than 85 per cent.
- Identity crisis by Andrew Lee, The Engineer,
13 26 June 2003, pp. 26 31.
8 August 2003
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