Bills Digest No. 9 2003-04
Trade Practices
Legislation Amendment Bill 2003
WARNING:
This Digest was prepared for debate. It reflects the legislation as
introduced and does not canvass subsequent amendments. This Digest
does not have any official legal status. Other sources should be
consulted to determine the subsequent official status of the
Bill.
CONTENTS
Passage History
Purpose
Background
Main Provisions
Concluding Comments
Endnotes
Contact Officer & Copyright Details
Passage History
Trade Practices Legislation
Amendment Bill 2003
Date Introduced:
27 March 2003
House: House of Representatives
Portfolio: Treasury
Commencement:
The substantive provisions
commence on a day to be fixed by Proclamation
The purpose of the Bill is to:
- repeal the Prices Surveillance Act 1983 and replace it
with a new part in the Trade Practices Act 1974 which
preserves the existing prices surveillance powers, and
- amend the Trade Practices Act 1974 to clarify the
ability of State and Territory access regimes to confer duties upon
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and the
Australian Competition Tribunal.
Background
Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act (TPA)
establishes a regime for third party access to essential
infrastructure facilities. It was introduced into the TPA in 1995
in response to the Hilmer Report and the subsequent Competition
Principles Agreement.(1)
The objectives of Part IIIA were explained in
Re Australian Union of Students as
follows:
Part IIIA is based on the notion that competition,
efficiency and public interest are increased by overriding the
exclusive rights of the owners of monopoly facilities to determine
the terms and conditions on which they will focus their services.
In Part IIIA the focus is upon facilities of national significance
that it would be uneconomic to duplicate or replicate and that
supply a service, access to which would promote competition in
another market.(2)
There is a two-part process for access to
essential facilities. The first part deals with determination of
whether or not the facility is essential and the second part
provides for arbitrated access when the parties are unable to agree
on access arrangements or pricing. Both parts of the process are
complex and beyond the scope of this Digest.
However in the context of this Bill it is
relevant to note that Clause 6 of the Competition Principles
Agreement also envisaged that States and Territories may introduce
access regimes of their own. It provides that the Commonwealth
regime is not intended to apply to essential facilities in a State
or Territory where the State or Territory has in place a conforming
access regime, unless either the National Competition Council
determines that the regime is ineffective having regard to the
influence of the facility beyond the jurisdiction of the State or
Territory, or difficulties arise from the facility being in more
than one jurisdiction. Part IIIA of the TPA therefore contains
provisions that deal with both Commonwealth and State access
regimes and the interaction between them.
The subject of such Commonwealth-State
cooperative legislative schemes as found in Part IIIA were until
recently, thought to be relatively secure in a constitutional
sense. However, co-operative legislative schemes are not without
constitutional limits. Recent High Court decisions, like that in
R v. Hughes,(3) raised a number of questions,
some as yet unanswered, about cooperative schemes. The decision in
Hughes tells us that where a State law confers functions
on a Commonwealth entity, the Commonwealth can use the incidental
power found in the Constitution to pass a law permitting those
functions to be exercised by the Commonwealth entity. The situation
becomes more complex where the Commonwealth law expressly or
impliedly imposes a duty on the Commonwealth entity to
exercise the power or function so conferred. In such a case, or
where the function is a coercive one, it may be necessary for a
Commonwealth head of power to be found which supports the law.
Another question left unresolved by the High Court in
Hughes is whether a duty imposed on a Commonwealth entity
under a cooperative legislative scheme can only be imposed by a
Commonwealth law and cannot be imposed by a State law.
Since the decision in Hughes the
Government has introduced a number of Bills designed to secure the
constitutional validity of various Commonwealth-State cooperative
schemes. Among these is the Agricultural and Veterinary
Chemicals Legislation Amendment Act 2001 which aims to shore
up the cooperative national scheme for the evaluation, regulation
and control of agricultural and veterinary chemicals. This Act
allows for the possibility that State laws can impose duties on
Commonwealth entities but provides a fall-back position in case it
transpires that only a Commonwealth law can impose such a duty.
The amendments in Schedule 1 of the Bill are a
similar attempt to remedy the Hughes problem in relation
to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the
Competition Tribunal powers in relation to State/Territory access
regimes.
The Prices Surveillance Act 1983 (the
PSA) provides for the surveillance of, and the holding of inquiries
into prices for the supply of certain goods and services in
Australia. It was introduced in 1983 as part of the Commonwealth
Government s prices and incomes policy. The original intention was
to promote restraint in pricing to accompany wage restraint as part
of the Government s strategy to control inflation and promote
economic growth. Overtime a change in economic conditions and the
competitive environment have meant that prices oversight is now
viewed as part of competition policy restraining monopolistic
prices.
The effects of monopoly pricing can also be
encountered in markets left with two or three oligopolists where
one competitor may have a sufficient degree of market power to
charge supra-competitive prices.(4)
Ministerial responsibility for the PSA lies
with the Treasurer and the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (ACCC) administers the Act.(5)
The PSA provides for three forms of prices
oversight:
monitoring and reporting (sections 27A and
27B)
price notification (section 22), and
public inquiries (section 18).
Monitoring and reporting
Price monitoring is where the Minister directs
the ACCC to monitor the prices, costs and profits of companies and
government authorities in relation to specified goods and services
and to report the results of the monitoring to the Minister. This
'formal monitoring' role(6) is used infrequently and is
currently restricted to stevedoring, and airport services. The ACCC
was also recently involved in monitoring the dairy industry as part
of the Government s deregulation and compensation package for that
industry.(7)
Prices notification
Price notification is where the Minister
declares that specified companies are to notify the ACCC of a
proposed price increase for specified goods and services. The ACCC
is required to make a determination about the notified price
increase within 21 days unless the company agrees to an extension.
The determination is not enforceable, but there is a penalty for
increasing prices during the prescribed 21-day period without the
approval of the ACCC. According to the Productivity Commission
report (see below), there has only been one case of non-compliance
with ACCC (or Prices Surveillance Authority) determinations on
price notification.(8)
Services that have been declared for price
notification are harbour towage services, letter services reserved
to Australia Post(9), air services and aeronautical
services.
The ACCC has stated that these pricing
decisions are increasingly complicated and certainly difficult to
achieve within the 21 day period specified by the PSA. The ACCC
also argues that the economic environment in which the Act is
administered has radically altered from the time of its inception.
Therefore the criteria which the Commission are to consider when
assessing a notification need to be interpreted in a different
economic context.(10) In order to cope with the
difficulties posed by complex notifications the ACCC has developed
and implemented a new procedure which allows for pre-submission of
prices notifications, which avoids triggering the 21-day period
until the parties are ready to do so. Since February 1998, the ACCC
has requested that declared companies pre-submit price
notifications.(11)
Public inquiries
The Minister can direct the ACCC to hold an
inquiry into specified matters and report its findings to the
Minister who then makes decisions on the recommendations. Companies
are liable to a maximum penalty of 100 penalty units (ie $11,000)
if they increase prices during the inquiry without approval from
the ACCC.
According to the Productivity Commission
report, public inquiries initiated under the PSA have been used for
a number of purposes, including:
to determine whether pricing outcomes reflect
competitive market forces
to advise the Minister on what types of prices
oversight, if any, should be applied to the company or companies
under inquiry, and
to play an educative role by bringing
information into the public domain, thereby facilitating public
understanding of the pricing matters at issue.
One of the last public inquiries initiated
under the PSA was a 1995 inquiry into bank fees by the ACCC s
predecessor, the Prices Surveillance Authority. There have been no
public inquiries under the PSA since 1996. By way of comparison
between 1984 and 1996 there were 60 inquiries ranging from three
months up to 11 months with an average duration of 5 months.
As the Productivity Commission has noted, the
PSA deliberately provides little guidance to the Minister on
whether a product or service may be declared for price notification
or subjected to monitoring, or whether to hold a public inquiry.
Rather the ACCC applies the instruments of prices oversight in
accordance with the declaration and/or directions issued by the
Minister.
Price notification and public inquiries are a
mixture of direct and indirect forms of price control. There is
direct control while an inquiry is in progress or before a
determination is made under price notification. Beyond this, price
control is indirect in the sense that firms are encouraged to set
prices considered appropriate by the regulator. The PSA relies on
firms deciding that it is prudent to abide by the ACCC s
determination.(12)
In 2000 the Commonwealth Government asked the
Productivity Commission to review the PSA and to report on
appropriate arrangements for prices surveillance in Australia. In
particular the Commission was asked to focus on those parts of the
legislation that restrict competition, or which impose costs or
confer benefits on business. The inquiry stemmed from the 1995
Agreements between the Commonwealth, States and Territory
Government to implement the National Competition
Policy.(13) One of the agreements the Competition
Principles Agreement committed Australian Governments to review all
legislation that restricts competition by the year 2000. This
deadline was subsequently extended to June 2002.(14)
On 20 August 2001 the Productivity Commission
s inquiry report Review of the Prices Surveillance Act 1983 was
released and the Government s response was announced in August
2002.
In its report the Productivity Commission
concluded that generally price control should be applied only to
markets that display substantial market power and are of
significance to the national economy. In the Commission s view,
Part IV (restrictive trade practices) and Part IIIA (national
access regime) of the TPA provide sufficient means to promote
competition and regulate prices in situations where monopoly prices
are likely to warrant attention.(15) The Commission
therefore recommended that the PSA in its current form should be
repealed. It argued:
[The PSA] was written and enacted in quite
different circumstances, for purposes very different from its
current use. Further, it has many deficiencies from the perspective
of good regulation:
- it does not have clearly defined objectives;
- it does not require that there be an assessment of the
existence or significance of monopolistic pricing, prior to a
decision to apply notification or monitoring;
- it does not require that there be explicit consideration of
options for addressing monopolistic pricing; and
- the regulator is the primary adviser on the need for prices
oversight.
These deficiencies give rise to uncertainty
about how the Act may be applied in the future and therefore the
Commission considered that new legislation is needed. The
Commission stated:
[ as] prices oversight is now part of competition
policy, it would be sensible to create a new part in the TPA,
appropriately written to avoid the deficiencies in the current PSA
and to complement the rest of the TPA.
The new part in the TPA would:
have a clearly defined objects clause stating
that the objective of pricing inquiries and prices monitoring is to
enhance economic efficiency
provide guidance to the relevant Minister as
to the circumstances in which an inquiry could be initiated
specify that inquiries must be undertaken by
an entity that is independent of the ACCC
provide guidance as to how any inquiry should
be undertaken
specify that the reasons for inquiry
recommendations be made publicly available, and
provide for prices monitoring to be
undertaken, but impose limitations on the way it is undertaken to
ensure that it does not become a de facto form of price
control.
The Commission also recommended that there
would be no provision in the new legislation for the ACCC to be
directed administratively by the Minister to approve price
increases or control prices. If price control were recommended by
an inquiry, industry-specific legislation would be required if the
Government wished to implement the recommendation.
In relation to price notification the
Commission s view was that price notification is an indirect form
of price control and is no longer appropriate. It argued:
A general discretionary mechanism such as this is
no longer needed now that the majority of areas where price control
may be warranted are covered by Part IIIA of the TPA.
The Government in its response to the
Productivity Commission report agreed that the PSA should be
repealed and a new part be incorporated into the TPA. It also
agreed that an objects clause be inserted into the new part that
provides that prices surveillance will only be applied in those
markets where competitive pressures are not sufficient to achieve
efficient prices and protect consumers.
However the Government disagreed with a number
of the recommendations of the Productivity Commission and argued
that removal of the existing price restriction provisions as
recommended by the Commission would weaken the Government s ability
to respond promptly to concerns about price related matters. This
could be contrary to the public interest and consumer protection.
Furthermore, while appreciating the potential for inappropriate
price restrictions to create inefficiencies, the Government argued
that it intends that prices surveillance will only be applied in
those markets where competitive pressures are not sufficient to
achieve efficient prices and protect consumers, and where the
Minister considers that the pricing issue is sufficiently important
and a public interest exists.
Amongst other things the Government saw merit
in:
preserving in the new part of the TPA the
price restriction provisions currently in the PSA
allowing the Minister the discretion to
appoint either the ACCC or another inquiry body to conduct
inquiries
providing for public inquiries, and
continuing price monitoring by the ACCC and
not restricting it to situations where it was recommended by a
public inquiry.
Schedule 2 of the Bill implements the
Government s response to the Productivity Commission report.
Item 1 inserts a definition
of a State or Territory access regime law into section 44B of the
TPA.
Item 2 inserts new
sections 44ZZM, 44ZZMA and 44ZZMB. These sections will
replace the current sections 44ZZM and 44ZOA which deal with ACCC
and the Tribunal functions and powers under State and Territory
access regimes. The proposed provisions differ from the current
sections in the following ways.
New subsection 44ZZM(1)
explicitly refers to the conferral of duties on the ACCC and the
Tribunal (whereas the current sections refers only to powers and
functions).
New subsection 44ZZM(2)
confirms that the conferral of a duty on the Commission or the
Tribunal can be authorised by a State or Territory access regime
law subject to constitutional and legislative powers.
New subsection 44ZZM(3)
replaces the current subsection 44ZZM(2). It specifies that the
ACCC or the Competition Tribunal can only perform functions or
duties, and exercise powers in accordance with an agreement between
the Commonwealth and the State concerned. In short the new
subsection adds a reference to duties.
New section 44ZZMA specifies
the boundaries between the Commonwealth and States power where a
State or Territory access regime law purports to impose a duty on
the Commission or Tribunal. In particular new subsection
44ZZMA(2) provides that a duty is taken not to be imposed
by any law of the Commonwealth to the extent to which the duty is
not supported by State or Territory legislative power. New
subsections 44ZZMA(3)-(6) provide that if State or
Territory legislative power is not sufficient to support any duty,
that duty will be imposed by the TPA.
New section 44ZZMB sets out
the circumstances in which a State or Territory access regime law
imposes a duty on the ACCC or the Tribunal.
As stated above, Schedule 2
repeals the Prices Surveillance Act 1983 (see item
31) and replaces it with a new Part VIIA in the Trade
Practices Act 1974. At the outset it is worth noting that
there are four essential differences between the provisions in
Schedule 2 of the Bill and the PSA. The new Part VIIA:
contains an objects clause (new
section 95E)
allows for AAT review of decisions by the ACCC
rejecting claims of confidentiality (new subsection
95ZC(6))
introduces a 2 years imprisonment penalty for
a breach of the secrecy provisions (new sections 95ZP and
95ZQ), and
allows for the holding of public inquiries by
bodies other than the ACCC (new subsection
95H(3)).
Apart from these differences together with a more
modern drafting style, the new Part VIIA essentially replicates the
PSA.
Items 1-30 make consequential
amendments to a number of Acts to replace references to the
Prices Surveillance Act 1983, with references to the
corresponding new sections in the TPA. The amended Acts are the
Airports Act 1996, Air Services Act 1995, Australian Crime
Commission Act 2002, Australian Maritime Safety Authority Act
1990, and the Australian Postal Corporation Act
1989.
Section 6 of the TPA is primarily a machinery
provision designed to expand the operation of the Act.
Items 33-35 exclude the new Part VIIA from section
6 of the TPA. Accordingly, the application of prices surveillance
under Part VIIA will be the same as it has been under the PSA.
Section 25 of the TPA allows the Commission to
delegate any of its powers under the Act. Item 36
prevents the Commission from delegating, under section 25, certain
powers conferred in relation to prices surveillance. Note however
that item 37 inserts a note indicating that new
section 95ZD rather than section 25 allows the Commission to
delegate certain powers relating to prices surveillance.
Item 38 is a similar
provision. It prevents the Minister giving directions relating to
Part VIIA under paragraph 29(1A)(a). Instead, Ministerial
directions relating to Part VIIA would be given under new section
95ZH.
Items 39 and 41-43 make
consequential amendments to replace references to the PSA with a
corresponding reference to the new part to be inserted into the
TPA.
Item 31 repeals the Prices
Surveillance Act.
Item 40
inserts the new Part VIIA Prices surveillance, into the TPA.
New section 95A contains
definitions relevant to the prices surveillance provisions in new
Part VIIA. These include definitions of price, services, supply,
notified goods or services, which are identical to definitions
listed in the PSA.
New section 95C defines
the application of the new prices surveillance provisions which,
broadly, extend to the supply of any goods or services by the
corporate sector or by Commonwealth authorities but not by State,
Northern Territory or Norfolk Island authorities.
New section 95E is an objects
clause. It states that prices surveillance is to be applied only in
those markets where the Minister believes competitive pressures are
not sufficient to achieve efficient prices and protect consumers.
An objects clause is the modern variant of a preamble. It has been
explained as something the courts can resort to it where there is
uncertainty or ambiguity. It is there to assist in interpretation
and is not legally definitive.(16) It is of note that
that the Productivity Commission recommended the inclusion of an
objects clause in its review of the PSA.
New section 95G sets out the
Commission s functions under the new Part VIIA. These functions
relate to the holding of price inquiries, price notification and
price monitoring. In performing its functions the ACCC has to take
into account three statutory criteria:
the need to maintain investment and
employment, including the influence of profitability on investment
and employment
the need to discourage a firm, which is in a
position substantially to influence a market for goods or services,
from taking advantage of that power in setting prices, and
the need to discourage cost increases arising
from increases in wages and changes in conditions of employment
inconsistent with principles established by relevant industrial
tribunals (new subsection 95G(7)).
These are the identical criteria found in
subsection 17(3) of the PSA.
Division 3, new
sections 95H-95W, deal with price inquiries. Under
new section 95H the Minister can require the ACCC
or another body to hold an inquiry into matters relating to the
prices for the supply of goods and services. By way of comparison,
under the PSA only the ACCC can hold inquiries into prices.
New sections 95J-95N set out
the process of initiating an inquiry. The Minister may, in an
inquiry notice, give directions as to the holding of the inquiry
and the matters to be taken into consideration in the inquiry
(new section 95J). The inquiry notice must also
specify the time frame within which the inquiry is to be completed.
Companies that are subject to the inquiry are liable to a maximum
penalty of 100 penalty units (ie $11,000) if they increase prices
during the inquiry without approval from the ACCC (new
section 95N).
New section 95P deals with
the reporting requirements. The inquiry body is required to send
its report to the company subject to the inquiry on the same day on
which it gives the Minister the report. The inquiry body must,
unless directed otherwise by the Minister, make the report
available to the public within 28 days. New section
95Q requires that company to notify the Commission within
14 days of receiving the inquiry report the prices at which they
are supplying the goods and services covered by the inquiry. A
penalty of 10 penalty units applies to a breach of this provision.
The Commission then has 14 days in which to make public those
prices.
New sections 95R-95W deal
with the procedure at inquiries. Amongst other things:
inquiries must be in public (unless directed
otherwise by the Minister)
procedure at inquires is normally to be at the
discretion of the chair, and
the inquiry body is not bound by the rules of
evidence.
The inquiry body has the power to summon
people to attend as witnesses to an inquiry and produce documents
(new section 95S). Failure to attend an inquiry or
failure to answer questions or produce documents without reasonable
excuse incurs a maximum fine of 10 penalty units (new
section 95U).
Division 4, new sections
95X-95ZC, deal with price notification. Price notification
is where the Minister or the Commission with the approval of the
Minister, declares that specific companies are to notify the ACCC
of a proposed price increase for specified good or services. The
price notification provisions in the PSA are essentially replicated
in Division 4 of new Part VIIA.
New section 95X provides that
the Minister, or the Commission with the approval of the Minister,
may make declarations in relation to goods or services or to a
company. A declaration must be published in the gazette and must
specify the time it is to remain in effect. Under new
section 95Z a declared organisation cannot raise the price
of a declared product beyond its peak price of the previous 12
months. If it wishes to raise prices of the declared product, the
Commission must be notified. The Commission is
required to make a determination about the notified price increase
and whether it is acceptable within 21 days unless the companies
agree to an extension (new section 95ZB). The
determination is not enforceable, but there is a maximum penalty of
100 penalty units for increasing prices during the prescribed
21-day period without the approval of the ACCC (new section
95Z).
New section
95ZC requires the Commission to keep a public
register showing price notifications, together with the Commission
s deliberations, the outcome and reasons for the outcome on price
notifications. The Commission may exclude material from the public
register where satisfied that a claim of confidentiality is
reasonable and that disclosure is not necessary in the public
interest. Decisions by the ACCC against exclusion from the register
are reviewable by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Review by
the AAT is not available in the PSA..
New section 95ZD enables the
Commission to delegate to a single member the task of dealing with
price notifications.
Division 5, new
sections 95ZE-95ZG, deal with price monitoring. The
Minister may give the Commission written directions to monitor
prices, costs and profits relating to the supply of goods or
services by persons in a specified industry or business for a
specified period. The Commission s monitoring report must be
prepared with regard to commercial confidentiality.
New section 95ZH deals with
Ministerial directions. The ACCC, when performing its functions
relating to notification, monitoring and inquiries must give
special consideration to and comply with ministerial directions.
Section 20 is the equivalent section in the PSA.
New Section 95ZI provides
that the regulations are to specify the manner in which an inquiry
body conducts its inquiry which is either an unincorporated body or
a group of 2 or more individuals.
New sections 95ZK-ZO deal
with the information gathering powers of the ACCC and other inquiry
bodies. New section 95ZK enables the ACCC to
request that organisations or individuals provide information or
documentation relevant to a price notification, an inquiry or
monitoring. Refusal to comply with such a request incurs a maximum
penalty of 20 penalty units. An inquiry body has similar powers in
relation to inquiries (new subsection 95ZK(2)).
New section 95ZN provides for the protection of
confidential information given at inquiries or furnished in
accordance with the monitoring or notification process.
Confidentiality is on the basis that the particular information
given would affect the competitive position of the particular body.
There are equivalent information gathering powers found in section
32 of the PSA.
New sections 95ZP and
95ZQ impose secrecy obligations on members and
staff of the ACCC and other inquiry bodies in relation to the
information or documents obtained in relation to their work with
prices surveillance. A maximum penalty of imprisonment for 2 years
applies to a breach of these provisions. It is of note that the
equivalent provision in the PSA imposes a maximum penalty of 10
penalty units.(17)
Items 44-58 are transitional
provisions. In particular items 46-55 continue the
effects of price inquiries, price notifications, price monitoring,
information gathering, inspection of documents, witness allowances,
secrecy, and related matters made under the PSA as if they were
made under the new part to be inserted into the TPA.
At the time of the release of the
Productivity Commission report, the Opposition expressed concern at
the Commission s proposed light handed prices oversight regime in
the TPA and called on the Howard Government to rule out watering
down the existing protection for
Australia.(18) The
Bill in fact leaves intact the current prices
surveillance powers so presumably will receive bipartisan support
within the Parliament.
It is of note that since 1996 when the
Government announced changes to the use of prices surveillance(19) there
has been a dramatic drop in the number of public inquiries,
notifications and monitoring carried out under the PSA. Should
Parliament pass the Bill it would seem
that the Government will continue to use the new Part VIIA
provisions as it has used the PSA since 1996. On the other hand
should a government have the political will the proposed provisions
which have left intact the powers of prices surveillance could
allow price monitoring, notification or a public inquiry into
industries such as banking and insurance. Arguably such an inquiry
could be justified on the grounds of what the Government has
referred to as public interest and consumer
needs.(20)
- Clause 6 requires the Commonwealth Government
to establish legislation granting third party access to essential
infrastructure facilities and sets out principles for State and
Territory access regimes.
- Re Australian Union of
Students (1997) ATPR 41-573.
- (2000) 171 ALR 155.
- Boral Besser Masonry Ltd v ACCC
(2003) ALJR 623 per McHugh J at p. 668.
- The ACCC has administered the PSA since the
merging of the Trade Practices Commission and the Prices
Surveillance Authority in 1995.
- Separate from these formal monitoring powers
found in the PSA, the ACCC from time to time monitors markets
informally. According to the ACCC s website, the
Prices Oversight Section is undertaking informal monitoring of a
number of industry sectors including public liability, professional
indemnity and medical indemnity insurance. This informal monitoring
relies on publicly available sources of information and the
cooperation of the monitored organisations. While petrol and diesel
prices were deregulated on 1 August 1998, the ACCC also still
retains an informal monitoring role and monitors petrol prices in
metropolitan areas and country towns.
- Milk prices were monitored from April 2000 to
January 2001. The ACCC released a monitoring report in April
2001.
- In 1998 Waratah Towage Pty Ltd increased
charges for tug services in Port Jackson by 15 per cent, despite
the ACCC's objection to the price increase.
- Under the Australian Postal Corporation
Act 1989 Australia Post has the exclusive right to carry
letters within Australia and the exclusive right to issue postage
stamps. The ACCC has responsibility for reviewing price
notifications relating to proposed increases in charges for these
reserved services .
- ACCC Journal, December 1999.
- Productivity Commission, Review of the Prices
Surveillance Act 1983 , Inquiry Report, no. 14, 14 August
2001, p. 66.
- Productivity Commission, Op. cit., p.
xv.
- The National Competition Policy was the
outcome of the 1993 inquiry by the Independent Committee of Inquiry
into National Competition Policy known as the Hilmer Report. The
policy was to consist of laws principles and processes aimed at
improving Australia s international competitiveness and living
standards (Hilmer Report 1993).
- Productivity Commission, Op. cit., p. 1.
- ibid., p. 45.
- Barwick CJ in the TPA case Re credit
Tribunal; Ex parte General Motors Acceptance Corp,
Australia (1977) 14 ALR 257 at 260.
- Section 43.
- Shadow Assistant Treasurer, Kelvin Thompson,
Press Release, 13 June 2001.
- Treasurer, Press Release, 19
September 1996. The Treasurer stated that the Government would
retain the Prices Surveillance
Act, but in future, prices surveillance
would only be applied in those markets where competitive pressures
are not sufficient to achieve efficient prices and protect
consumers.
- The Government in its response to the
Productivity Commission report argued that prices surveillance
should be maintained to allow it to respond promptly to concerns
about price related matters on the grounds of public interest and
consumer needs . See above at p. 6.
Mary Anne Neilsen
4 August 2003
Bills Digest Service
Information and Research Services
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