Bills Digest No. 21 2002-03
Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1)
2002
WARNING:
This Digest was prepared for debate. It reflects the legislation as
introduced and does not canvass subsequent amendments. This Digest
does not have any official legal status. Other sources should be
consulted to determine the subsequent official status of the
Bill.
CONTENTS
Passage History
Purpose
Background
Main Provisions
Concluding Comments
Endnotes
Contact Officer & Copyright Details
Passage History
Migration Legislation Amendment Bill
(No. 1) 2002
Date Introduced: 13 March 2002
House: House of Representatives
Portfolio: Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs
Commencement: On Royal Assent. Schedules 1,
2 and 3 and items 1 and 2 of Schedule 6 commence on Proclamation or
6 months after Royal Assent. Item 6 of Schedule 6 commences
immediately before the Border Protection (Validation and
Enforcement Powers) Act 2001.
Purpose
The Migration
Legislation Amendment Bill (No.1) 2002 ('the Bill') is an omnibus
bill that amends the Migration Act 1958 ('the Act'). The
Bill purports to:
-
- change aspects of the Australian legal regime in relation to
visas;
-
- create a Deputy Principal Member position for the Migration
Review Tribunal;
-
- harmonise the Criminal Code and relevant offences
under the Act; and
-
- make a minor technical amendment.
Relevant background to the amendments is
included in the Main Provisions below.
Item 1 of Schedule 1 deals with
'birth entry' and immigration clearance status.
Australian migration legislation draws a
distinction between entry and immigration clearance, and between
lawful non-citizens and immigration cleared non-citizens. A person
'enters Australia' if they 'enter the migration zone' (section 5).
A person is 'immigration cleared' if they 'enter Australia' at a
port or prescribed place, provide evidence of their identity and
visa, and leave with permission of a clearance officer (except to
be in immigration detention) (paragraphs 172(1)(a) and (b)). A
person is also immigration cleared if they are initially refused or
bypass immigration clearance, but are subsequently granted
a 'substantive visa'(1) (paragraph 172(1)(c)).
Similarly, a lawful non-citizen is a non-citizen in the migration
zone who holds a valid visa (section 13). And an
immigration cleared non-citizen is a non-citizen in the migration
zone who has been immigration cleared (subsection
172(1)).
A non-citizen child who is born in the
'migration zone' is taken to have 'entered Australia' when s/he was
born (section 10). These children are taken to hold a visa on a
similar basis as their parents (section 78). However, there is
currently no provision clarifying the immigration clearance status
of non-citizen children who were born in Australia.
Immigration clearance is one of the various
circumstances which affect a non-citizen's access to visas under
the Migration Regulations 1994 (see section 40 of the
Act). In his Second Reading Speech, the Minister of Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs noted that immigration
clearance status of non-citizens 'has significant implications for
a person's entitlements under the Act'.(2) For example,
he said, it affects access to bridging visas.
Immigration clearance also affects immigration
detention. An unlawful non-citizen, that is a non-citizen in the
'migration zone' without a visa, must be detained (section 189). A
lawful non-citizen may be detained if they hold a visa that may be
cancelled (subsection 192(1)). An immigration cleared non-citizen
may only be detained if they are likely to attempt to evade or
otherwise not cooperate with immigration officers (subsection
192(2)).
Immigration clearance also affects access to
visas in relation to safe third country rules. If a non-citizen is
covered by an agreement between Australia and a 'safe third
country', including the CPA,(3) their access to visas
will be substantially diminished (Part 2, Division 3, Subdivision
AI). If they have been immigration cleared, they are prevented from
applying for protection visas. If they have not been cleared they
may not apply for any visa at all (section 91E). Similar
restrictions on access to visas apply if a non-citizen is a
national of two or more countries or has a right of entry into a
declared safe third country (section 91P).
Immigration clearance also affects cancellation
of visas. The general power to cancel visas - for example, because
of non-compliance with visa conditions - does not apply to
permanent visas if the visa holder is in the migration zone and has
been immigration cleared (subsection 117(2)).
Significantly, immigration clearance also
affects review rights. Generally, the Migration Review Tribunal
(MRT) may not review a decision to refuse to grant or to cancel an
onshore visa if that decision was made before the person was
immigration cleared (subsections 338(2) and (3)).
Item 1 inserts proposed
paragraph 172(1)(ba), which provides that a non-citizen
child who is born in Australia is immigration cleared if, at the
time of his or her birth, at least one of the child s parents was
immigration cleared on their last entry into Australia.
There are two limitations to this change. As the
Minister noted in his Second Reading Speech, the proposed change
only applies to non-citizen children on their birth entry to
Australia, and does not provide immigration clearance for any
subsequent entry to Australia'.(4)
Second, the exemption only applies to children
who are born to parents who have been immigration cleared.
In its submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional
Legislation Committee, the International Commission of Jurists
(Australian Section) raised the issue of children who are born to
parents who become immigration cleared at a later date:
We suggest that there needs to be an amendment
following 172(c). This would provide immigration clearance for
children who were born to parents who bypassed clearance who were
subsequently granted a substantive visa. Under the current
legislation, a child born to a person who arrived as a stowaway, or
on a false document, and was later granted a substantive visa, is
not immigration cleared. The child is not covered by the visa if
he/she was born prior to the date of the visa.(5)
Item 2 of Schedule 1 states
that the amendment made by item 1, discussed
above, applies only to a non-citizen child who was born in
Australia on or after 1 September 1994. The Explanatory Memorandum
states that this date 'corresponds with the introduction of the
concept of "immigration clearance" into the Act by the
Migration Reform Act 1992.'(6)
Item 4 of Schedule 1 introduces
proposed subsection 173(2) into the Act.
This item addresses an anomaly between the
notion of birth entry and the requirement to enter via a port.
As noted above, a non-citizen child who is born
in Australia is taken to hold a visa on a similar basis as his or
her parents (section 78). However, strictly speaking, a visa holder
must usually enter Australia at a port or on a pre-cleared flight
(section 43). Entry which fails to comply with these requirements
invalidates the visa (section 174). In other words, 'birth entry'
of a non-citizen child technically seems to be an entry that
offends section 43 of the Act.
Proposed subsection 173(2)
states that these non-citizen children are not to be taken, by
virtue of that birth, to have entered Australia in a way that
contravenes section 43.
Item 5 of Schedule 1 states
that the amendment made by Item 4, discussed
above, applies only to a non-citizen child who was born in
Australia on or after 1 September 1994, and who is taken to have
been granted a visa or visas under section 78 of the Act. The
Explanatory Memorandum states that this date 'corresponds with the
introduction of the concept of "immigration clearance" into the Act
by the Migration Reform Act 1992.'(7)
Item 3 of Schedule 1 introduces
proposed paragraph 172(1)(d) into the Act. It
creates a new category of circumstances in which a non-citizen is
deemed to be immigration cleared namely, if that person is in a
'prescribed class of persons.'
It is not clear why this provision has been
included in Schedule 1, which otherwise seems
broadly designed to clarify apparent anomalies in the immigration
clearance status of non-citizen children born in Australia. The
Bill's Second Reading Speech does not refer to this item. The
Explanatory Memorandum does, and says the following:
The purpose of new paragraph 172 (1)(d) is to
provide flexibility to prescribe in the Migration Regulation
1994 ("the Regulations"), where necessary in the future,
further classes of persons who are immigration cleared for the
purposes of section 172.(8)
No further clarification has been offered of the
kind of situations in which it is envisaged this new power may be
exercised.
Generally, an authorized officer may take
securities to ensure a person's compliance with any condition
imposed in pursuance of the Act or Regulations (subsection 269(1)).
If a person fails to comply with a condition of a security, the
full amount may be recovered in a court against any and all of the
parties or subscribers to the security (subsection 269(4)).
While it is implied in section 269, the
provision is not specific as to the taking of securities for visa
applications. In particular, the provision is not specific as to
the taking of securities before visa applications are
determined. The issue arose in Tutugri v. Minister for
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1785,
specifically, over the power of the MRT to take securities in
respect of a decision under review.
Lee J took the view that the power to take
securities was specific, flowing from a power to impose conditions
in the granting of a visa. The MRT's power to impose conditions was
not prospective: '[t]he Tribunal was not empowered to require the
applicant to provide a deposit of cash in advance of the grant of a
visa and, therefore, before any condition had been imposed on the
visa granted'. Neither was it retrospective: '[i]f the Tribunal
made a decision to grant a visa its power would then be spent [ie,
it would be functus officio]'.(9)
Lee J's reasoning on the first question was that
'[p]ersons providing security must know the terms of the condition
that is being secured and, therefore, what act, or conduct, will
amount to a failure to comply with the condition and make the
security liable to forfeiture'.
In the Government's view this raises an issue in
relation to the primary decision maker:
In Tutugri v. MIMIA [1999] FCA 1785,
the Federal Court raised significant doubts about the power of an
authorised officer to request and take security for compliance with
conditions to be imposed on a visa before the visa is granted. This
is because a condition on a visa does not bind the applicant until
the visa is granted and a condition cannot be said to have been
"imposed" prior to grant.(10)
Proposed subsection 269(1A)
clarifies this matter. It provides that an authorised officer may
require and take securities before a visa is granted if it is for
compliance with conditions 'that will be imposed on the visa' and
s/he 'has indicated those conditions to the applicant'.
It is worth noting that the
prospective/retrospective argument was not the only concern raised
by Lee J Tutugri v. MIMIA. He also noted the MRT's limited
role, drawing on a basic distinction between the status of a
primary decision maker and a merits review body:
The function of the Tribunal is to determine
whether the decision under review was the correct or preferable
decision. In carrying out that function the Tribunal may exercise
the powers and discretions conferred on the person who made the
decision, limited, however, to the purpose of the review.
That is not an authority to make a new and separate decision [Its
task] was to "address the same question that was before the
decision-maker" and not a distinct and separate question and [it]
was not able to make any decision an officer may have been
authorised to make under the Act.(11)
Taken together, these arguments suggest that it
is not appropriate for a tribunal vis-à-vis an officer to
impose conditions or sanctions to ensure compliance with the visa
regime. Views may differ as to whether a tribunal can
impose sanctions that were not originally imposed by the original
decision maker. But, there is a policy question as to whether a
tribunal should be able to do so. The amendments do not
seem to answer the question.
Special purpose visas (SPVs) are a discrete
category of visa which enable prescribed persons or classes of
persons to enter Australia. They are distinguished from the
ordinary set of visas as they do not require individual visa
applications or determinations. In a sense, they are not so much
visas as an open permission for a specified category of persons to
enter Australia for a given purpose. The classes of prescribed
persons to date have included, for example, members of the royal
party, military personnel, commercial or government ship crew
members and airline crew members.(12)
SPVs were introduced in 1994 to 'clarify the
status of persons currently exempt from the requirement to hold an
entry permit to enter and remain in Australia'. They were intended
to 'provide lawful status for non-citizens who are presently exempt
non-citizens' to be 'held when, and for as long as, a non-citizen
continues to be present in Australia for a specified
purpose'.(13)
The 'openness' of these visas may have the
potential to create compliance problems. For example, given that an
SPV is available to any person that falls within a particular
prescribed class, it may be difficult to control access to the
privileges conferred by the visa on individuals that fall within
that class.
The legal solution has been a post-entry power
to exclude certain persons or classes of person from access to
SPVs. Subsection 33(9) of the Act allows the Minister to make a
determination that it is 'undesirable' that a person or persons
within a class enter or remain in Australia.(14)
Item 1 of Schedule 3 introduces
proposed subsection 33(5), to
provide that the ministerial determination in subsection 33(9) has
immediate effect. Currently, a special purpose visa expires at the
end of the day that the ministerial determination is
made.(15) Under this change, a special purpose visa will
expire when the ministerial determination takes effect. This will
be a time specified in the determination or, if not specified, the
end of the day when the determination is made.
Item 2 of Schedule 3 introduces
proposed subsection 33(11), which
provides that the rules of natural justice do not apply to the
decision to make a ministerial determination in subsection 33(9).
That is, while a person affected may have the ability to challenge
the determination in a judicial review court, the decision cannot
be overturned on the basis that s/he was not given an adequate
hearing, for example, because s/he was not given an opportunity to
hear or respond to adverse information that formed the basis of the
assessment that it was undesirable that the person or relevant
class of persons enter or remain in Australia. Moreover, s/he may
be prevented from alleging other breaches of the natural justice
ground of judicial review, such as apprehended bias.
Although the exclusion of natural justice is not
without precedent in the Act, such exclusion has not been
uncontroversial in the migration context.(16)
In its June 2002 report on this Bill, the Senate
Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee ( the SLCL Committee
), chaired by Liberal Party Senator Marise Payne,
stated:(17)
2.9 .The NSW Council for Civil Liberties
suggested that, rather than abrogate the rules of natural justice,
the Minister should not make a declaration until he or she had made
reasonable efforts in the circumstances to contact the person who
would be affected by the declaration. The Victorian Bar
particularly objected to the Minister s use of adverse intelligence
reports without first giving the person who would be affected an
opportunity to answer them. It pointed out that adverse
intelligence reports (mentioned in the Explanatory Memorandum)
could come from countries that regularly commit human rights
violations and could hardly be regarded as reliable.
-
- The Explanatory Memorandum states that the purpose of the new
provision is to ensure that, as originally intended, quick action
can be taken to prevent the use of a special purpose visa by a
person whose entry or stay in Australia is not in Australia s
interest. The Explanatory Memorandum also states that the exclusion
of the rules of natural justice also avoids the operational
difficulties associated with an obligation to afford natural
justice in particular circumstances, e.g. the difficulty
or impossibility of contacting a seafarer who has deserted his
vessel. Adverse intelligence reports or time constraints might also
prevent the declaration being put to the person.
- DIMIA points out that as a matter of policy, the Minister may
revoke a declaration made under s 33(9) in order to allow a person
to be the holder of a special purpose visa again and that this
could occur where it was found that the adverse information
provided by a country was incorrect.
- The Committee considers that the argument about the need for
quick action is confirmed by Item 1 which changes the time for
operation of the Minister s declaration from the end of the day to
immediate. Even the current time for operation of the Minister s
declaration, namely, the end of the day, is inconsistent with the
operation of the rules of natural justice. The Committee is not
convinced that there should be room for the application of the
rules of natural justice to a declaration by the Minister under s
33(9). However, it is not sure that DIMIA has adequately answered
the objection by the Law Institute of Victoria and suggests that
the matter be examined more closely.
In a previous Bills Digest it was suggested that
these special purpose visa amendments might have some relevance to
the processing of offshore entry persons on Nauru or Manos Island
in Papua New Guinea, pursuant to the so-called Pacific Solution.
(18) In summary, it was suggested that a ministerial
determination might allow these persons to be brought to Australia
for the limited purpose of receiving medical care, for example, in
combination with another amendment preventing access to the visa
regime. The other amendment related to creation of a class of
'transitory persons', being offshore entry persons who would not
have access to substantive visas under Australia s migration
legislation.
Schedule 4 basically expands
the administrative layers of the Migration Review Tribunal. It
creates the office of 'Deputy Principal Member' interposed between
the Principal Member and the Senior Members of the Tribunal. The
Explanatory Memorandum states that the effect is to 'align the
executive structure of the MRT with the existing structure of the
Refugee Review Tribunal'.(19) Conceivably, this might be
an administrative step towards the merger of the MRT and RRT into
the Immigration and Refugee Division of the ART (Administrative
Review Tribunal) proposed in the Administrative Tribunal Bill
2000.(20)
The Second Reading Speech states that
Schedule 5 ensures that certain offence provisions
in the Act operate as they did prior to the commencement of the
Commonwealth Criminal Code. (21)
The Act contains various offences relating to
the unlawful entry of non-citizens into Australia. Whilst it is
not an offence for a non-citizen to arrive in Australia
without a visa, it is an offence for a person to be
involved in bringing such non-citizens to Australia.
There is currently some lack of clarity in
relation to the evidential burden in relation to exemptions to some
of these offences.
Subsection 229(1) of the Act
makes it an offence for the carriers of such people defined as the
master, owner, agent, charterer and operator of a vessel - to bring
a non-citizen into Australia, unless any one of the
circumstances in paragraphs 229(1)(a)-(e) applies. In sum, these
circumstances are: the non-citizen holds a valid visa, is eligible
for a special purpose or special category visa, or is covered by an
exemption (set out in subsections 42(2), (2A) and (3)) from the
requirement to hold a visa. The offence is one of absolute
liability,(22) subject to defences established in
subsection 229(5), which describe circumstances that overlap
considerably with the circumstances set out in paragraphs
229(1)(a)-(e). The onus of proof is on the defendant in respect of
establishing these defences (subsection 229(6)).
The stated issue in relation to this offence is
whether the matters in paragraphs 229(1)(a) to (e) constitute
matters of exception or elements of the offence in subsection
229(1). (23) As noted, guilt is imposed
'unless' various circumstances exist. This can be
interpreted as imposing guilt on a defendant 'unless' s/he
puts in evidence regarding those circumstances. This evidential
burden overlaps with the defences in section 229. The Explanatory
Memorandum states that this overlap, and the very wide potential
operation of the offence, are unintended consequences.
Items 1 and 2 of Schedule 5
clarify that the matters in paragraphs 229(1)(a)-(e) are matters of
the offence. Thus guilt is imposed 'if' the various
circumstances in paragraphs 229(1)(a)-(e) do not exist. This
removes the unintended consequences described above.
Item 3 of Schedule
5 preserves the reversal of the onus of proof relating to
the exemptions in subsections 42(2)-(3). Thus the defendant retains
the evidential burden in respect of the exemption from the
requirement to hold a visa. As the Explanatory Memorandum explains,
'[t]his means that the defendant must adduce or point to evidence
that suggests a reasonable possibility that the matters in
subsections 42(2), (2A) or (3) exist'. If this is done, then the
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that these matters
do not exist.
Item 4 applies to a similar
absolute liability offence established by section 232. This offence
applies to the master, owner, agent and charterer of a vessel,
where a non-citizen has entered Australia on the vessel without
permission to do so conferred by a valid visa, unless s/he is
covered by an exemption (set out in subsections 42(2), (2A) and
(3)) from the requirement to hold a visa. The offence also applies
where a non-citizen has left the vessel in Australia (otherwise
than in immigration detention) where s/he has been placed on the
vessel for removal or deportation from Australia. Proposed
subsection 232(1B) makes it clear that the evidential
burden is on the defendant in relation to establishing that one of
the exemptions contained in subsections 42(2) to (3) applies. The
Explanatory Memorandum states that this is consistent with
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code, which provides
that a defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to any
matters of exception to an offence. (24)
Item 5 applies to an offence
established by section 232A, which makes it an offence to organise
or facilitate bringing a group of five or more non-citizens into
Australia if they have no lawful right to come to Australia. This
is not an absolute liability offence; the defendant must be
reckless as to whether the non-citizens had a lawful right to
enter, in order for the offence to be established. Again, the
offence does not apply if the non-citizen is covered by an
exemption - set out in subsections 42(2), (2A) and (3) - to the
requirement to hold a visa. Proposed subsection
232A(2) makes it clear that the evidential burden is on
the defendant in relation to establishing that one of the
exemptions contained in subsections 42(2) to (3) applies. Again,
the Explanatory Memorandum states that this is consistent with
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code, which provides
that a defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to any
matters of exception to an offence. (25)
Paragraph 233(1)(a) of the Act establishes
another people smuggling offence, making it offence to take any
part in the bringing or coming to Australia of a non-citizen under
circumstances from which it might reasonably have been inferred
that the non-citizen intended to enter Australia in contravention
of this Act. The penalty for contravening this provision is
imprisonment for 10 years or 1000 penalty units, or both.
Item 6 of Schedule 5 inserts
proposed subsection 233(1), to make it clear that
strict liability(26) applies to this offence.
The Explanatory Memorandum states that this amendment is necessary
to restore the application of strict liability to this
offence, in the light of the unintended application of the fault
element of recklessness in this context, by virtue of the
application of the Criminal Code.(27) This is
further explained in the SLCL Committee s report on this Bill:
-
- The Law Institute of Victoria argued that it was inappropriate
for strict liability to apply to any element of an offence which
carried a penalty of 10 years in prison and/or a fine of 1000
penalty units ($110 000).
- DIMIA responded that the effect of s 233(1)(a) currently was to
make it an offence for someone to participate in the bringing or
coming of a non-citizen into Australia being reckless as to whether
the non-citizen has a lawful right to come to Australia. It said
that the Director of Public Prosecutions wrote to it in September
2001 saying that, because of the application of the Criminal Code,
the offence in section 233 had been altered. The courts had
interpreted the offence in s 233 as being a strict liability
offence, and this had not been picked up in the harmonisation
exercise that was undertaken the previous year. The amendment would
ensure that the provision operated in the way it always had. It was
being made a strict liability offence again.
Commenting on the more general policy question
of whether strict liability is appropriate where an offence carries
a heavy penalty of this kind,(28) the SLCL Committee s
report continued:
- DIMIA also referred to a number of provisions in Commonwealth
Acts which provided for elements of offences punishable with
imprisonment for 10 years or more to be subject to strict (or
absolute) liability. However, most of these related to elements
which might be seen as subsidiary. For example, it is an offence
against Item 71.2 of the Criminal Code to intentionally or
recklessly cause the death of a UN or associated person engaged in
a UN operation and strict liability applies to the elements that
the person is a UN or associated person engaged in a UN operation.
Similarly strict liability applies to the element of offences under
the Crimes (Aviation) Act that the aircraft against which the
offences are committed is a Division 3 aircraft.
- On the other hand, there are some offences where (as is the
case with s 233(1)(a)) the element to which strict or absolute
liability applies appears to be fundamental to the criminality. For
example, strict liability applies to the offence of being owner or
master of a vessel which enters or remains in safety zone contrary
to s 119 of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967.
Again, in relation to the offence of engaging in sexual intercourse
outside Australia with a person under 16, absolute liability
applies to the elements of where the offence occurs and the age of
the other person.
- It appears that there are very few Commonwealth offences where
strict liability applies to a fundamental element. However, as
DIMIA pointed out, there is an objective element to the offence,
namely, the presence of circumstances from which it might
reasonably have been inferred that the non-citizen intended to
enter Australia in contravention of the Migration Act. There is no
such objective element in the strict/absolute liability offences
mentioned in paragraphs 2.17-2.18 above. The presence of this
objective element in an offence against s 233(1)(a) means that
substituting strict liability for recklessness will not greatly
reduce the burden on the prosecution .
- The Committee notes concerns in respect of strict liability
raised in other reports of this Committee and of the Scrutiny of
Bills Committee. However, in this instance, the change from
recklessness to strict liability is justified in the current
context. Having regard to the above considerations and to the fact
that the maximum penalty had already been set at its current level
by the Migration Legislation Amendment Act No 1) 1999 on
22 July 1999 (i.e. before the Application of Criminal Code Act took
effect in 2001), the Committee is satisfied that the maximum
penalty for the offence is not unacceptably harsh.
A different view on this matter was expressed by
(then) Australian Labor Party Senator Barney Cooney, in his
comments appended to the SLCL Committee s report:
The legislation attaches strict liability to
elements of offences set out in sections 233 and 241 of the
Migration Act 1958. These crimes carry a maximum penalty of 10
years. It is exceptional for strict liability to be assigned to
elements of offences as serious as these. However there is now a
trend for this to happen with Commonwealth legislation. This is
unacceptable and should be rejected. Most serious crime is dealt
with by State and Territory Parliaments and Governments and they
appear to be able to cope with it without resorting to strict
liability. The Federal Bodies seem to lack the same ability.
In recent times Australia has experienced, at
the Federal level, the shrinking of the rule of law. The asylum
seekers Act guillotined through the Senate at the end of September
2001, the anti-terrorist Legislation, and the Bill dealing with the
proceeds of crime, now before Parliament contain provisions which
reduce the safeguards traditionally available to those facing the
accusations of others. The Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No
1) 2002 continues the current process whereby the Commonwealth is
stripping from people more and more of the rights they have
traditionally enjoyed. Recent legislation dealing with asylum
seekers and terrorists are other examples of the same penchant.
There is an unhappy development in Commonwealth
activity which prejudices the quality of civil rights in Australia.
It is time this trend was reversed.
In his own appended comments, Australian
Democrats Senator Andrew Bartlett expressed his support for the
conclusions and recommendations contained in the main report of the
SLCL Committee, but additionally stated that he retained some
concerns regarding the implications and potential application of
the amendments that introduce strict liability My concern is that
the penalty for such offences may in some circumstances far
outweigh what may be just and reasonable in the circumstances.
Subsection 241(1) makes it an offence for a
person to make arrangements that make it look as if two people are
de facto spouses for the purposes of the regulations, where that
person knows or believes on reasonable grounds that they are not de
facto spouses. The penalty for contravening this provision is
imprisonment for 10 years or $100 000, or both.
Item 7 of Schedule 5 inserts
proposed subsection 233(1), to make it clear that
strict liability applies to this offence. The Explanatory
Memorandum states that the current structure of this offence means
that the prosecution must prove that the defendant knew the two
people were not de facto spouses for the purposes of the
regulations, and that this may prove an extremely difficult
task for the prosecution given the complexity of the definition of
de facto spouse in the regulations.(29) The Explanatory
Memorandum also states that the purpose of this amendment is to
make it clear that the prosecution is required only to prove that
the de facto relationship was not genuine, and that the defendant
knew, or reasonably believed, that this was the case.
(30)
In its report, the SLCL Committee rejected
claims by the Law Institute of Victoria and the Law Council of
Australia that the penalty is excessive for an offence involving
strict liability.(31) The separate comments of Senators
Andrew Bartlett and Barney Cooney, referred to above, indicate they
were not satisfied that application of strict liability to an
offence carrying such a penalty is appropriate.
The SLCL Committee did, however, identify
another problem with the proposed amendment namely, that in its
current form it only adds to the complexity of the existing
provision , in respect of the matters that must be proven by the
prosecution to establish the offence.(32) The SLCL
Committee recommended that:
Instead of the proposed new subsection being
inserted, s 241(1) be amended to provide in effect that it is an
offence to make arrangements that would falsely make, or help to
make, it appear that two other persons are de facto spouses for the
purposes of the regulations with the intention of assisting one of
them to get a stay visa by appearing to satisfy a criterion for the
visa.
(Recommendation 1)
Items 8 11 of Schedule 5 make
amendments to subsections 268BJ(1) and 268CN(1) and to section
268CM of the Act; more detail is given in the Explanatory
Memorandum. These proposed changes do not seem to be
contentious.
Item 1 of Schedule 6 deals with
the relationship between bridging visas and re-entry into
Australia. Subsection 48(1) provides that a non-citizen who does
not hold a substantive visa and who after last entering Australia
was refused a visa may only apply for a prescribed class of visa.
The Explanatory Memorandum states that currently a non-citizen who
leaves and re-enters Australia on a bridging visa is able to
circumvent this bar on subsequent visa applications, because, on
re-entering Australia, s/he has not had a visa refused after
last entering Australia. The Explanatory Memorandum also
states that it was never intended that these bridging visa holders
would not be subject to the section 48 bar. (33) Item 1
introduces proposed subsection 48(3) to address
this perceived problem, ensuring that the section 28 bar on further
visa applications applies to a non-citizen who leaves and re-enters
Australia as the holder of a bridging visa that allows such
travel.
In its report on this Bill, the SLCL Committee
noted that there had been considerable confusion about the impact
of this amendment, based on a misapprehension that the new
provision applied to offshore as well as onshore visa applications.
The SLCL Committee discussed this in some detail in its
report,(34) and made the following recommendation:
Although the Committee is satisfied that the
criticisms of proposed s 48(3) are unfounded, it notes the great
amount of confusion caused by its terms. It therefore recommends
that it be amended by inclusion of a description of the operation
of the section along the following lines:
For the purposes of this section (which
deals only with onshore applications for visas)
(Recommendation 2)
Items 2 -7 make minor
amendments that are explained in detail in the Explanatory
Memorandum. These changes do not seem to be contentious.
Concluding
Comments
As noted by the SLCL Committee, some of the
amendments proposed in this Bill raise technical and complex legal
issues. The SLCL Committee recommended that the Bill be passed, but
with the two recommended changes noted above.
Before reaching this conclusion, however, the
SLCL made reference to two issues that did not arise from the terms
of the Bill, but which were raised by the Refugee and Immigration
Legal Centre (RILC) in its submissions to the Committee on the
basis that it would have expected the Bill to deal with them. Both
issues arose out of the fact that the Migration Amendment
(Excision from Migration Zone)(Consequential Provisions) Act
2001 inserted a new visa subclass and amended the criteria for
other visa subclasses in the regulations:
-
- The first matter related to the new s 447 Secondary Movement
Offshore Entry (Temporary) visa subclass which can not be issued to
people who have come directly from, say, Sri Lanka, to the places
which have been excised from the migration zone, but only to people
who have come by way of a third country. The RILC submitted that
the unavailability of this visa subclass to the people who had come
direct from their home country was a serious oversight.
- The second matter related to the insertion of safe third
country clauses in the offshore humanitarian visa categories so
that people in a third country are not eligible for these visas if
they could have sought and obtained effective protection from the
country they are in or from the United Nations officers in that
country. The RILC submitted: these amendments require either
further amendment, or better, repeal, given that the bars which
they seek to impose on the grant of the visa subclass operate to
effectively exclude the very situations in which applicants avail
themselves of these visas. In other words, the grant of these visa
subclasses is usually the result of an applicant who has been in a
third country for some time being identified (or mandated) and
referred to Australia by the offices of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees in the said country.
The SLCL Committee was not satisfied that DIMIA
s response to these questions in its evidence to the Committee
addressed these issues. It suggested that, given the importance of
these matters , DIMIA confer directly with the RILC as a matter of
priority. (35)
Arguably the determination of these issues is
not directly relevant to the question of passing this Bill, either
in its current form or with the suggested amendments. The nature of
the SLCL Committee s response to these issues, however, indicates
some recognition of the importance of considering the incremental
changes proposed in this Bill against the wider backdrop of
Australian migration law and policy.
The SLCL s concluding comment on this Bill
should also be noted:
2.40 At the conclusion of this inquiry, the
Committee finds itself in agreement with the salutary warning in
the Australian Council of Social Service submission:
In the current political climate surrounding
migration and refugee issues, it is imperative that any proposed
legislative amendments are transparent and well understood.
The Committee does not consider that all aspects
of the Bill satisfy these criteria. As has been indicated in the
report, some of the provisions in the Bill are quite obscure.
-
- A 'substantive visa' is a visa other than a bridging, criminal
justice or enforcement visa (section 5).
- Philip Ruddock, MP 'Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No.
1) 2002', Second Reading Speech, House of Representatives, Debates,
13/03/02,
p. 1107.
- Comprehensive Plan of Action approved by the International
Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees, held at Geneva, Switzerland,
from 13 to 14 June 1989.
- Philip Ruddock, MP 'Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No.
1) 2002', Second Reading Speech, House of Representatives, Debates,
13/03/02,
p. 1107.
- International Commission of Jurists (Australian Section),
Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation
Committee, Inquiry into the provisions of the Migration Legislation
Amendment Bill (No 1) 2002, 4 April 2002, p. 3.
- Explanatory Memorandum, p. 5.
- Explanatory Memorandum, p .6.
- Explanatory Memorandum, p. 6.
- Tutugri v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural
Affairs [1999] FCA
1785 per Lee J at [48]-[49].
- ibid., at [29].
- ibid., at [46].
- Migration Regulations 1994, reg. 2.40.
- See generally Ian Ireland and Sarah O'Brien, Migration
Legislation Amendment Bill 1994,
Bills Digest No. 36 of 1994.
- Subsection 33(9).
- Subparagraphs 33(5)(a)(iii) and 35(b)(v).
- See further Kirsty Magarey, Migration Legislation Amendment
(Procedural Fairness) Bill 2002, Bills
Digest No. 169 of 2001 02.
- Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee,
Consideration of Legislation Referred to the Committee Provisions
of the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2002, June
2002.
- See Natasha Cica, Migration Legislation Amendment (Transitional
Movement) Bill 2002, Bills
Digest No. 113 of 2001 02.
- Explanatory Memorandum, p. 11.
- See generally Katrine Del Villar, Administrative Tribunal Bill
2000, Bills
Digest No. 40 of 2000 01.
- Philip Ruddock, MP 'Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No.
1) 2002', Second Reading Speech, House of Representatives, Debates,
13/03/02,
p. 1107.
- An offence where liability does not depend on the prosecution
having to prove that the defendant put his or her mind to the
prohibited conduct; see further section 6.2 of the Criminal
Code.
- Explanatory Memorandum, p. 12.
- Explanatory Memorandum, p. 13.
- Explanatory Memorandum, p. 14.
- An offence where liability does not depend on the prosecution
having to prove that the defendant put his or her mind to the
prohibited conduct, but where the defence of mistake of fact is
available; see further sections 6.1 (strict liability) and 9.2
(mistake of fact) of the Criminal Code.
- Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 14 15.
- Strict liability is most often used in minor or regulatory
offences attracting small penalties where requiring the prosecution
to prove a fault element would render the legislation unenforceable
because it would inhibit prosecution and make the hearing of cases
more complex and lengthy : Jennifer Norberry, Transport and
Regional Services Legislation Amendment (Application of Criminal
Code) Bill 2002, Bills
Digest No 88 of 2001 02, p. 3.
- Explanatory Memorandum, pp 15-16.
- Explanatory Memorandum, p 16.
- Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee,
Consideration of Legislation Referred to the Committee Provisions
of the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2002, June
2002, para 2.22.
- See further Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation
Committee,
Consideration of Legislation Referred to the Committee Provisions
of the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2002, June
2002, paras 2.21 2.27.
- Explanatory Memorandum, p. 19.
- Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee,
Consideration of Legislation Referred to the Committee Provisions
of the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2002, June
2002, paras 2.28-2.32.
- Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee,
Consideration of Legislation Referred to the Committee Provisions
of the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2002, June
2002, para 2.39.
Natasha Cica and Nathan Hancock
21 August 2002
Bills Digest Service
Information and Research Services
This paper has been prepared for general distribution to
Senators and Members of the Australian Parliament. While great care
is taken to ensure that the paper is accurate and balanced, the
paper is written using information publicly available at the time
of production. The views expressed are those of the author and
should not be attributed to the Information and Research Services
(IRS). Advice on legislation or legal policy issues contained in
this paper is provided for use in parliamentary debate and for
related parliamentary purposes. This paper is not professional
legal opinion. Readers are reminded that the paper is not an
official parliamentary or Australian government document.
IRS staff are available to discuss the paper's
contents with Senators and Members and their staff but not with
members of the public.
ISSN 1328-8091
© Commonwealth of Australia 2002
Except to the extent of the uses permitted under the
Copyright Act 1968, no part of this publication may be
reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, including
information storage and retrieval systems, without the prior
written consent of the Parliamentary Library, other than by Members
of the Australian Parliament in the course of their official
duties.
Published by the Department of the Parliamentary Library,
2002.
Back to top