Bills Digest No. 168 2001-02
Financial Sector Legislation Amendment Bill (No.1)
2002
WARNING:
This Digest was prepared for debate. It reflects the legislation as
introduced and does not canvass subsequent amendments. This Digest
does not have any official legal status. Other sources should be
consulted to determine the subsequent official status of the
Bill.
CONTENTS
Passage History
Purpose
Background
Main Provisions
Endnotes
Contact Officer & Copyright Details
Passage History
Financial Sector Legislation Amendment
Bill (No.1) 2002
Date Introduced: 21 March 2002
House: House of Representatives
Portfolio: Treasury
Commencement: Most provisions commence on
the day after Royal Assent. Items 1-17 of schedule 4 which amend
the Insurance Act 1973 commence on 1 July 2002. Item 18 of
schedule 4 is taken to have commenced on the same day as the
General Insurance Reform Act received Royal Assent, that is, 19
September 2001.
Purpose
To amend nine
pieces of legislation relating to the financial sector.
As this Bill has no central theme the background
to the various measures is included in the discussion of the main
provisions.
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
(APRA) was established on 1 July 1998 as the prudential regulator
of banks and other authorised deposit-taking institutions, life
insurance companies (including friendly societies), general
insurance companies, superannuation funds and retirement savings
accounts.
APRA collects levies from financial institutions
that it prudentially supervises on behalf of the Commonwealth.
Under section 50 of the Australian Prudential Regulation
Authority Act 1998 (the APRA Act), APRA is funded by
appropriations based on levies from the institutions it
regulates.
APRA is not entitled to the entire amount raised
by the levies. From the funds received,
the Treasurer determines an amount that covers the costs to the
Commonwealth for the provision of market integrity and consumer
protection functions for prudentially regulated institutions. This
amount is deducted from the levies collected and the remaining
money is appropriated to APRA.
In 2001, the Australian National Audit Office
(ANAO) issued a qualified audit opinion in relation to APRA s
financial statements.(1) The ANAO stated that under the
heading Revenues from Government in its statement of financial
performance, APRA reported an amount equal to the amount of levies
invoiced less the Commonwealth s costs of
providing market integrity and consumer protection functions. The
ANAO commented that section 50 of the APRA Act only entitles APRA
to a Special Appropriation equal to the amount of levy money
received by the Commonwealth net of the
costs of market integrity and consumer protection. It also
commented that:
The policy adopted also represents a departure
from Australian Accounting Standard AAS15 Revenue, which requires
that revenues be recognised when, and only when, the entity has
gained control of the revenue or the right to receive the
revenue.
In the view of the ANAO, the effect of APRA s
reporting approach was that net operating deficit was understated
by $799 000.
Item 1 of Schedule
1 inserts a new section 50 into the APRA
Act. Each financial year the Treasurer is required to make a
determination of the retainable amount . This is the amount of
money that is to be available cover the costs to the Commonwealth
of the provision of market integrity and consumer protection
functions for prudentially regulated institutions.
Retainable amounts may be specified in relation
to the total amount of levy money or in respect of each class of
levy. New subsections 50(2) and
(3) state that levy money in excess of the
retainable amount is payable by the Commonwealth to APRA.
New subsection 50(5) effects the appropriation of
these moneys from the consolidated revenue fund to APRA. As a
result of these amendments APRA will be able to report amounts
payable from Government regardless of whether the levy money has
been received.
The purpose of the Financial Institutions
Supervisory Levies Collection Act 1998 (the Collection Act) is
to allow for the collection of levies on those industries that are
prudentially regulated by APRA.(2)
Section 9 of the Collection Act specifies when
the levy is due for payment. Item 1 of
Schedule 2 amends section 9 to ensure that
entities have at least 28 days notice before a levy becomes
payable.
Section 10 of the Collection Act provides for
late payment penalties. The penalty rate is set at 20 per cent per
annum on the amount unpaid. At present, the penalty is calculated
daily and the Explanatory Memorandum states that APRA has had
difficulty correctly invoicing institutions.(3)
New section 10 inserted by item 3
provides for a penalty calculation day which deems late payments to
have been made on a specified date. This approach is intended to
make it easier for APRA to calculate the liability of an
institution.
Section 13 establishes levies and late payments
as debts due to the Commonwealth. Item 5 amends
section 13 to authorise APRA to bring proceedings on behalf of the
Commonwealth to recover these debts. In the event the Commonwealth
is ordered to pay costs, new subsection 13(3)
makes clear that APRA is to bear these costs.
The Financial Sector Reform (Transfers of
Business) Act 1999 (the Transfer Act) provides APRA with a
prudential tool to facilitate a transfer of business between
institutions where one institution may be in financial distress.
The Act provides for voluntary and compulsory transfers of
business.
In deciding whether to approve an application
for a voluntary transfer of business, section 12 of the Transfer
Act requires that APRA consult with the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (ACCC) and the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission (ASIC). New paragraph
12(2)(c) inserted by item 1 of
schedule 3 will require APRA to also consult with
the Commissioner of Taxation. The Explanatory Memorandum does not
detail what revenue concerns have given rise to this amendment it
merely observes that it has been the practice to ensure that
applicants consult with the Commissioner of
Taxation.(4)
The Commissioner of Taxation may notify APRA
that he or she does not wish to be consulted about a particular
transfer or a class of transfers (new subsection
12(5)).
APRA is the prudential regulator of the general
insurance industry. An insurer may carry on general insurance
business in Australia only if authorised by APRA to do so under the
Insurance Act 1973 (the Insurance Act). This legislation
was substantially amended recently by the General Insurance
Reform Act 2001 (the Reform Act) which will commence on July 1
2002. Schedule 4 amends some provisions inserted
by the Reform Act which have not yet commenced.
The Reform Act inserted a new section 25 which
defined classes of people who are disqualified from being a
director or senior manager of a general insurer, an authorised
non-operating holding company (NOHC) or a senior manager or agent
of a foreign general insurer. Paragraph 25(1)(a) provides that a
person is disqualified if they commit an offence against the
Insurance Act or the Financial Sector (Collection of Data) Act
2001. Item 1 amends section 25 to the effect
that people who are convicted of an offence against Australian or
international corporations legislation are also disqualified
persons.
Item 3 inserts new
section 25A which empowers APRA to disqualify a person
from being a director or senior manager of a general insurer if it
is satisfied that the person is not a fit and proper person to hold
such an office. The meaning of the expression fit and proper is not
defined in the legislation. According to the Explanatory Memorandum
APRA will issue a prudential standard to give some guidance as to
how it will interpret the section.(5) A decision by APRA
to disqualify a person or a refusal to revoke a disqualification is
subject to review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT)
(new subsection 25A(6)).
The Reform Act inserted section 26 which enables
APRA to determine that a person is not a disqualified person
despite the fact that they fall within the definition of the term
under section 25. APRA may only make such a determination if it is
satisfied that the person is highly unlikely to be a prudential
risk to any general insurer or authorised NOHC. Item
4 amends section 26 to enable APRA to impose conditions on
any determinations that it makes. The provision is intended to
allow APRA greater flexibility.
Section 63 of the Insurance Act deals with
review processes under the Act. Currently subsection 63(12)
provides that employees of insurance companies cannot sit on the
AAT if it is reviewing decisions made by the Treasurer or APRA
under the Act. Item 14 amends the subsection to
ensure that the prohibition also covers employees of companies
related to insurance companies.
Schedule 2 of the Reform Act provides for a
transitional period of 2 years from July 1 2002 for insurers to
comply with the new regime. Item 18 will correct a
drafting error so as to allow APRA to determine that all or
specified provisions of the Insurance Act as amended by the Reform
Act, do not apply to a person or class of persons for a specified
period during the transition period.
The Insurance Acquisitions and Takeovers Act
1991 (Takeovers Act) establishes a regime requiring the
compulsory notification of proposals relating to:
-
- the acquisition or leasing of assets of Australian-registered
insurance companies and
-
- the entering into agreements relating to directors of
Australian-registered insurance companies (proposals subject to the
Act).
The legislation empowers the Minister, currently
the Treasurer, to stop a proposal by means of a temporary or
permanent restraining order.
Schedule 5 contains amendments
which abolish the concept of temporary restraining orders for the
purposes of the Act.
Section 39 of the Takeovers Act effectively
gives the Treasurer 30 days to impose a temporary restraining order
to prevent a transaction involving the acquisition or lease of the
assets of an Australian-registered insurance company. Section 53
likewise gives the Treasurer 30 days to impose a temporary
restraining order on a proposal relating to the directors of an
Australian insurance company.
If the Treasurer takes no action within this
timeframe he or she cannot take any action under the Act to stop
the transaction from proceeding. According to the Explanatory
Memorandum this time frame has proved to be too restrictive in that
it usually takes longer than 30 days to obtain all the information
necessary to make a decision.(6) The Bill repeals
sections 39 and 53.
Under the new regime introduced by
schedule 5 proposals subject to the Act must not
be carried out unless the Minister has given a go-head decision
(new sections 40 and 54). One draw back of these
changes may be that decisions on proposals may be delayed
indefinitely. With the passage of these amendments there will be no
legislative impetus to deal with matters expeditiously.
Section 236 of the Life Insurance Act
1995 sets out the decisions under the Act which may be subject
to merits review by the AAT. Subsection 236(1A) lists a number of
prudential decisions (7) which, if made within 5 years
after 30 June 1997 are immune from review by the AAT. This period
is about to expire. Item 1 of schedule
6 will ensure that these decisions remain beyond the scope
of AAT review. The Government has taken the view that appeal action
could delay APRA in taking action to protect policy holders.
Currently the lack of merits review is balanced
by a requirement that the decision in question be made with the
consent of the Treasurer. Item 2 will remove this
institutional safeguard.
The central theme of schedule 7
is the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the
Governor-General to the Treasurer. Examples of roles to be
exercised by the Treasurer under the amendments to the Reserve
Bank Act 1959 (the RBA Act) include the:
-
- appointment of 6 members of the RBA Board under subsection
14(1)(d) (item 2)
-
- termination of such Board members under section 18
(item7)
-
- appointment of the Governor and Deputy Governor and the
determination of the length of their terms under section 24
(items 9 and 10)
-
- termination of the Governor or Deputy Governor under section 25
(item 15)
-
- appointment of up to 5 members of the Payments System Board
under subsection 25B(3) (item 16) and
-
- termination of such members under subsections 25L(3) and (4)
(item 18).
Although these roles are currently assigned to
the Governor-General, in practice decisions are made on the basis
of advice from the Treasurer. The Government has argued that the
amendments streamline the appointment and termination
process.(8) As with all significant Government
appointments, Cabinet approval will still be
required.(9)
Some may argue however that the claimed
efficiency gains in the process of appointment and termination come
at the expense of an important safeguard against capricious action
by a future Treasurer. Defenders of the Office of the
Governor-General have rejected the view that vice regal approval is
a mere rubber stamp . Sir David Smith, a former secretary to
Governors-General has stated:
It would be very easy to conclude that a
Governor-General who is required to act on the advice of his
Ministers has no power at all, or that Ministers whose advice has
to be taken have no constraints placed on the use of their
executive power, but to do that would be to misunderstand the basic
principle which underlies our system of responsible
government.(10)
As Governor-General Sir Paul Hasluck remarked
that while the Governor-General may not reject advice outright he
is under no obligation to accept advice unquestioningly:
He can himself question a conclusion, seek to
know the reason for it, draw attention to relevant considerations
to ensure that they are taken in account, and satisfy himself that
the proposal does express the single mind of his
advisers.(11)
The amendments proposed by the Bill will prevent
the Governor-General from exercising this cautionary role in
relation to Reserve Bank appointments and terminations. The
approach may be contrasted with the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission and the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission where members are appointed and terminated by the
Governor-General. The amendments will however bring the RBA into
line with the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority where the
Treasurer may appoint and terminate ordinary board members.
By virtue of section 14 of the RBA Act the
Secretary to the Treasury is an ex officio member of the RBA Board.
Section 22 provides that if the Secretary is unable to attend a
Board meeting a Deputy Secretary of the Department may replace him.
Following a restructure at Treasury the position of Deputy
Secretary has been abolished. Item 8 inserts a
new section 22 which will allow the Secretary to
Treasury to nominate an SES employee in the Department to attend an
RBA Board meeting at which the Secretary is not present.
It is worth noting that the position of a
representative of the Treasury on the RBA Board has been a matter
of public controversy. The RBA is the only central bank in the OECD
that has a treasury official on its governing board.(12)
Critics have claimed that this undermines perceptions of the Bank s
independence from government. There is a considerable body of
economic literature which suggests that central bank independence
enhances the effectiveness and credibility of monetary
policy.(13) In 2000 the ALP members of the House of
Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public
Administration called for the examination of a proposal to enhance
the independence of the Bank by removing the Secretary to the
Treasury from the RBA Board.(14) Supporters of the
current arrangements argue that they assist in the co-ordination of
monetary and fiscal policy.(15)
Section 70 of the RBA Act requires the Bank to
operate a superannuation fund for its staff. It also requires that
the rules for the fund be subject to approval by the Minister for
Finance. Item 19 repeals the section. According to
the Explanatory Memorandum the Bank s existing superannuation fund
will continue to operate(16) but will be easier to
administer because the need to consult the Minister of Finance on
rule changes will be abolished.(17)
If this is the objective of the amendment then
it may be asked why the requirement for Ministerial approval of
rule changes was not simply deleted. The deletion of the section
entirely may give rise to speculation that the Bank s
superannuation fund is to be closed to new members.
Subsection 74(2) of the RBA Act states that the
head office of the Bank shall not be in the same building as the
head office of any authorised deposit-taking
institution.(18) This section has been in the RBA Act in
similar terms since 1959. While the original intention of the
provision is unclear, it is possible that the section reflected a
concern to ensure the security of market sensitive information and
a desire to prevent the RBA from being a tenant of an institution
that it prudentially supervised.
Item 20 repeals the subsection.
The Explanatory Memorandum states that it unnecessarily restricts
the ability of the Reserve Bank, in the event of an unexpected
occurrence, to find alternative short-term accommodation
.(19)
It may be suggested that an additional benefit
of the proposal is that it will maximise the number of potential
tenants for the Bank s vacant office space at its head office in
Martin Place, Sydney.
As a result of technological change, outsourcing
and the transfer of responsibility for bank supervision to the
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, the number of staff at
the RBA s head office has fallen to around 715 from a peak of 1500
in the mid 1980s.
In November 2000, the Joint Committee on Public
Works(20) approved a proposal to consolidate the Bank s
head office accommodation and lease 7000 square metres (5 floors)
of surplus office space. The cost of the proposal was estimated at
$21.5 million to be funded from the Bank s own resources. The Bank
estimated that the lease of surplus office space could raise $3.5
million per annum.
Amendments to the Superannuation Industry
(Supervision) Act
Subsection 121A(1) of the Superannuation
Industry Supervision Act 1993 (the SIS Act) states that a
person must not be, or act as, a trustee of a superannuation entity
that is a superannuation fund with fewer than 5 members (other than
a self managed superannuation fund) unless the person is an
approved trustee.
The Government is concerned that an unintended
consequence of this section is that a fund that does need to have
an approved trustee that is being wound up may drop to fewer than 5
members. At present failure to appoint a trustee is a strict
liability offence carrying a maximum penalty of 6 months
imprisonment.
Item 4 of schedule
8 inserts new subsection 121A(1A) stating
that the requirement to be an approved trustee does not apply if at
the relevant time
-
- the fund is being wound up
-
- immediately before the commencement of the wind up the fund had
at least 5 members, and
-
- the fund has not had less than 5 members for more than 1 year
(unless APRA permits a longer period.).
Section 252C deals with the secrecy obligations
imposed by the SIS Act particularly on taxation officers.
Unauthorised disclosure can lead to a penalty of 2 years
imprisonment. Item 6 amends section 252C to make
clear that it is not an offence for the Commissioner, or a tax
officer to disclose information which is a description of court
proceedings in relation to a breach or suspected breach of the Act
or activity engaged in by the Commission in relation to such
matter.
Presumably this amendment is intended to allow
the ATO to give publicity to its enforcement activities. It is
possible that some might suggest that the ATO should take care to
ensure that such publicity does not lead to a trial by media .
Recently the ACCC has been subject to criticism over its aggressive
use of the media in publicising its enforcement of the Trade
Practices Act 1974.(21)
The Superannuation Supervisory Levy
Imposition Act 1998 (SSLI Act) imposes the superannuation
supervisory levy on superannuation entities. Superannuation
entity is defined under section 10 of the SIS Act as a regulated
superannuation fund(22), or an approved deposit fund, or
a pooled superannuation trust.
Under section 7 of the SSLI Act, the amount of
levy payable by an entity is determined by multiplying the levy
percentage by the entity s asset value on 30 June of the previous
financial year. The levy percentage is currently set at 0.025%. The
maximum amount that an entity can be required to pay is capped at
$53 000. Any entity, regardless of the size of its assets must pay
a levy of at least $400.(23)
Items 1 and 2
of schedule 9 seek to clarify the levy that is
payable by an entity, for example a self managed superannuation
fund, that becomes a regulated superannuation entity in a financial
year. At present it is ambiguous as to whether entities that become
regulated entities in a given financial year are subject to the
levy in the first year that they have this status. Item
2 inserts new paragraph 7(1)(a) which
makes clear that entities that were unregulated on 30 June of the
previous financial year are nevertheless subject to the levy based
on their asset value on that date. The Explanatory Memorandum does
not state whether any revenue has been lost to the Commonwealth as
a result the existing ambiguity.
Endnotes
-
- Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Annual Report 2001,
p. 87. See: http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Annual-Report-2001.cfm
- The levies themselves are imposed by a number of industry
specific Acts eg Authorised Deposit-taking Institutions
Supervisory Levy Imposition Act 1998, Superannuation Supervisory
Levy Imposition Act 1998 etc.
- p. 7.
- p. 9.
- p. 10. APRA s power to make prudential standards is set out in
section 32. Either house of Parliament may disallow these
standards.
- p. 5.
- Such as APRA directions that a company should increase its
capital or remedy a contravention of the Act.
- p. 15.
- See Chapter 6, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet,
Cabinet
Handbook, 5th Ed 2000.
- Sir David Smith, The Role of the Governor-General: Our
Australian Head of State, Australians for Constitutional
Monarchy, 1997, p. 11.
- Sir Paul Hasluck, The Office of Governor General
(originally given as the William Quale Memorial Lecture Adelaide
1972), Melbourne University Press, 1979, p. 20.
- House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics,
Finance and Public Administration, Review of the Reserve Bank
of Australia Annual Report 1999-00: Interim Report: the Wagga Wagga
Hearing, February 2001, p. 19. See
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/efpa/Rba9900/fullreport.pdf
- See for example A. Alesina and L. Summers, Central Bank
Independence and macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative
Evidence , Journal of Money, Credit and Banking , Vol 25,
No.2 (1993) pp. 151 162.
- House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics,
Finance and Public Administration, Review of the Reserve Bank
of Australia Annual Report 1998-99: Final Report, June 2000.
See:
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/efpa/Rba9899/finalreport.pdf
- R. Maddox, The Government s stake in Monetary Policy , BCA
papers, September 2000 pp.81 84.
- The repeal of section 70 removes the requirement for the RBA to
operate a superannuation fund for its staff, it does not prevent
the RBA from running a fund if it decides to do so.
- p. 16.
- Such as a bank, building society or credit union.
- ibid.
- Joint Standing Committee on Public Works, Reserve Bank of
Australia Proposed Head Office Building Works, November 2000.
See: http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/pwc/Reserve/fullreport.pdf
- See for example R. Webb, The big showdown: ACCC v big business
, Sunday Age, 12 May 2002 and A. Fels, Its not a trial by
media , Australian Financial Review, 20 May 2002.
- The term regulated superannuation fund is defined in section 19
of the SIS Act. To fall within this category, a fund must have a
trustee; the trustee must be a corporation within the meaning of
paragraph 51(xx) of the Constitution or the fund s governing rules
must state that its sole or primary function is the provision of
old- aged pensions; and the trustee must have elected that the Act
apply to the fund.
- These amounts are sets by Ministerial Determination. The levy
amount will increase to 0.03% and the maximum amount payable to $66
000 under a new determination recently made by the Assistant
Treasurer. See:
http://assistant.treasurer.gov.au/atr/content/pressreleases/2002/065.asp
Mark Tapley
17 June 2002
Bills Digest Service
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