WARNING:
This Digest was prepared for debate. It reflects the legislation as
introduced and does not canvass subsequent amendments. This Digest
does not have any official legal status. Other sources should be
consulted to determine the subsequent official status of the
Bill.
CONTENTS
Passage History Purpose Background
Main Provisions Endnotes Contact Officer and
Copyright Details
Company Law Review Bill 1997
Date Introduced: 3 December 1997
House: House of Representatives
Portfolio: Treasury
Commencement: The substantive amendments
(except those relating to the abolition of par values for shares)
must commence within 6 months of Royal Assent. The amendments in
respect of the abolition of par values for shares commence
immediately after the Taxation Laws Amendment (Company Law
Review) Act 1998 commences.
To rewrite and simplify the provisions of the Corporations
Law which deal with the creation of companies, the conduct of
meetings, share capital, financial reports and audits, the
deregistration of companies, and company names.
Scheme
History
In July 1989 the Commonwealth attempted to
establish a national scheme of companies and securities regulation
based upon the Commonwealth legislative power to replace the
existing cooperative scheme which was based on State legislative
power. Under the Commonwealth Constitution, the Commonwealth's
power in respect of corporations is:
To make laws for the peace, order and
good government of the Commonwealth with respect to ... foreign
corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within
the limits of the Commonwealth...
The High Court decided in New South Wales v.
Commonwealth of Australia(1) that it was constitutionally
invalid for the Commonwealth to legislate in respect of the
incorporation of companies. This significantly weakened the
foundations of the scheme sought to be introduced.
Following the High Court decision, the
Commonwealth began negotiations with the States and Northern
Territory to salvage the scheme. In June 1990, an agreement was
reached under which the Commonwealth's legislation was to be
amended to apply as a law of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT)
and the states would enact application legislation adopting the law
of the ACT as amended from time to time as a law of that State.
The Corporations Law commenced as the
national scheme for the regulation of companies and securities law
on 1 January 1991.
Recent
Reviews
In October 1993, the Commonwealth
Attorney-General established a Corporations Law Simplification
Program, the aim of which was to rewrite the Corporations
Law to make it easier to understand, and to remove unnecessary
business regulation. The first stage of the program was completed
in December 1995 with the commencement of the First Corporate
Law Simplification Act 1995.
An exposure draft of the Second Corporate Law
Simplification Bill was released for public comment by the former
government in June 1995. In response to comments and submissions
received in respect of that exposure draft, a second exposure draft
was released by the Corporations Law Simplification Task Force
(Task Force) in July 1996.
That second exposure draft (draft Bill) was
referred to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and
Securities (PJC) by the then Parliamentary Secretary to the
Treasurer, Senator the Hon Brian Gibson AM, on 26 June 1996.
That Committee tabled its report in the Senate
on 18 November 1996 and made 11 specific recommendations. The
government responded to that report in November 1997.
In the meantime, in March 1997, the government
instituted the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) to, in
effect, continue the work of the Task Force and, according to the
government, to comprehensively improve Australia's corporate law as
part of its drive to promote business and economic development.(2)
That program has released discussion papers on six issues:
- Accounting standards
- Fundraising
- Directors' duties and corporate governance
- Takeovers
- Electronic commerce
- Futures and securities markets.
Legislation dealing with elements of CLERP is to
be introduced later in 1998.
The issues which this Bill raises were
identified by the PJC. Readers are referred to the Executive
Summary of the PJC report for a synopsis of those issues.
Electronic
Communications
The PJC heard evidence that the draft Bill did
not fully embrace modern electronic forms of communication.
The option of giving notice via an electronic
address (for example, by email) was not included in the draft Bill.
The PJC suggested that there was a recognition by the Task Force
that a notice of meeting, delivered electronically, might also
specify an electronic return address to which proxies could be
sent.(3) The PJC commented that:
While the Bill should impose no
obligation to use these forms of communications, it should
nevertheless facilitate their use.(4)
The draft Bill was amended so that the Bill now
provides that notices of meetings may be sent electronically to an
address nominated by the member and that a proxy will be taken to
be validly received if sent to an electronic address specified for
that purpose in the notice of meeting.(5)
The PJC did not accept the submission that the
draft Bill should have gone even further to provide for electronic
voting prior to an Annual General Meeting (AGM). It was thought
that such voting procedures could ultimately change the character
of the AGM and the PJC was not convinced that the character of the
AGM should change.(6)
The
Directors' Report
The draft Bill prescribed certain matters with
which the annual directors' report was required to deal. The
provision stated:
The directors' report must discuss and analyse
the matters members need to be informed about if they are to
understand the overall financial position of the company...
including:
- results of operations (both overall and in key industry and
geographical segments); and
- key strategic initiatives adopted; and
- major commitments entered into and sources of funding for those
commitments; and
- unusual or infrequent events or transactions; and
- likely future developments in the business; and
- trends or events (both internal and external) that have had a
significant effect, or are likely to have a significant effect, on
the business. (7)
This requirement received support from some
groups and criticism from others.(8) The PJC took the view that the
requirements were in line with international trends but that they
should be reviewed three years after implementation.
The government response to the report
stated:
The Government believes that accurate
and informative reporting to company members about a company's
activities and performance is essential to maintaining investor
confidence...
The Committee has endorsed changes
proposed to be made to the Law in the Bill in the area of
directors' reports to members by the introduction of a requirement
to include a management discussion and analysis of the matters
members need to be informed about if they are to understand the
overall financial position and performance of the company.(9)
(emphasis added)
It is interesting that whilst the concept of
understanding the overall financial position of the company was
contained in the draft Bill and reaffirmed in the government
response to the PJC report, it no longer appears in the Bill.
Further, the matters with which the directors'
report was required to deal under the draft Bill (listed above)
have been substantially amended. The most obvious omission from the
Bill is the requirement for the report to discuss and analyse key
strategic initiatives adopted by the company.
The PJC also recommended that certain additional
matters should be disclosed, namely:
- the policies of the Board for determining the remuneration of
the Board and senior executives;
- the quantum and components of the remuneration of each director
of the company and each of its 5 highest paid executives;
- the age and all other listed company directorship of each
director;
- whether, during the reporting period, any proceedings were
instituted against the company for any material breach by the
company of the Corporations Law or trade practices law and
(if so) a summary of the alleged breach and the company's position
in relation to it;
- whether, during the reporting period, any such proceedings were
concluded or settled and (if so) the terms on which they had
been.(10)
The government's response to this recommendation
was that certain of these matters, for namely (c) and (d), are
already information which is available to members. However, the
issue of the disclosure of director and senior executive
remuneration has caused concern. Whilst details of options over
unissued shares will be required to be disclosed, details of other
aspects of a director's remuneration package will remain secret. It
has been reported that a major US fund manager has written to the
Australian Treasury officials, concerned that, among other things,
there should be fuller disclosure of executive salaries and
remuneration.(11)
Company
Meetings
Notice of Meetings
The Corporations Law currently provides
for a general period of 14 days' notice for all members' meetings
(with 21 days notice where the meeting is to consider a special
resolution).
The draft Bill proposed, as a general rule, and
in the absence of contrary provision in the company's constitution,
that at least 21 days notice should now be given for all members'
meetings. Institutional and overseas investors regarded the 14 days
notice period to be insufficient. In their submissions to the PJC,
institutional and overseas investors considered that the proposed
21 days period was itself still insufficient to enable a fully
informed vote to be cast. The Australian Investment Managers
Association argued for a minimum period of 28 days for meetings of
companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange.(12)
The PJC took the view that a 28 day notice
period would involve little additional inconvenience for the
management of listed companies while providing investors with a
more realistic period of time to arrange for the casting of their
votes and recommended that the minimum notice period for a member's
meeting should be 28 days.
The Government has taken the view that a
significantly longer notice period would make it more difficult for
listed companies to capitalise on windows of opportunity to enter
into a range of significant transactions requiring shareholder
approval. The Government believes that the 21 days notice period
strikes an appropriate balance.(13)
This is another issue which has attracted
overseas comment. A US financial adviser has reportedly written to
the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer, Senator the Hon Ian
Campbell, stating that:
If passed in its present form, the
measure would set Australia on a course that would place it behind
the emerging international best practice of 28 to 30 days.
...
Look, for example, at the top five
markets. The average notice in the US is 30 days, and by law it is
32 days in Germany, and 30 days in France. (14)
Calling Meetings
At present, the directors of a company must
convene a general meeting on receiving a requisition by:
- where the company has share capital, at least 100 members
holding shares in the company on which there has been paid up an
average of $200 per member;
- where the company does not have share capital, at least 200
members; or
- in either case, members who are entitled to at least 5% of the
total voting rights.
Under the Bill, the power of members to
requisition directors to convene a meeting will be simplified and
slightly expanded. Directors will be obliged to convene a meeting
on requisition by:
- members with at least 5% of the number of votes that may be
cast at the meeting; or
- at least 100 members who are entitled to vote at the
meeting.
The power to requisition directors to call a
meeting is to be distinguished from the power of members (at least
5%) to convene a general meeting themselves. The costs of such a
requisitioned meeting must be borne by the members who convene the
meeting. Under the Bill, the power of members to convene a meeting
themselves cannot be excluded by a contrary provision in the
company's articles of association, as it can at present. Concern
was expressed to the PJC that this could 'create havoc' for a large
number of companies. (15)It was thought that this power has the
potential for abuse by members for improper purposes.
The PJC agreed that the right of members to
convene a meeting themselves should be retained but recommended
that the legislation should make it clear that the power to
requisition or convene a meeting should not be exercised
frivolously and should only be exercised for a valid purpose. The
Government responded to this recommendation by stating that this
concern would be addressed by including a provision in the Bill
which would restate the common law position that general meetings
must be called for a proper purpose. The Bill contains such a
provision (proposed new section 249Q).
Questions and Comments at an AGM
The Bill would require the person chairing an
AGM to allow a reasonable opportunity for the members as a whole at
the meeting to ask questions about or make comments on the
management of the company.(16)
It also proposes that, if the company's auditor
is present, the person chairing the meeting must allow a reasonable
opportunity for the members as a whole to ask the auditor questions
relevant to the conduct of the audit and preparation and content of
the auditor's report.(17)
There is no obligation on the directors or
auditor to answer questions, nor is there an obligation on the
auditor to attend the meeting.
Whilst some difficulties have been envisaged in
respect of members asking questions of directors and making
comments at AGMs, it has been suggested that in practice most
companies already provide members with an opportunity to ask
questions at the AGM.(18) The PJC made no recommendations in
respect of this proposal.
The issue of questioning of auditors received a
mixed response from within the accounting profession. KPMG took the
view that it would be 'unworkable in practice'. However, Ernst
& Young said that their partners already answer questions at
AGMs.
Section 1289 of the Corporations Law
provides auditors with qualified privilege in respect of statements
made in the course of their duties as an auditor. It is not
completely clear whether this protection extends to answers to
questions asked during an AGM.
The PJC recommended that auditors be required to
attend the AGMs of listed companies to be available to take
questions. It also recommended that the Bill or Explanatory
Memorandum specifically refer to the applicability of qualified
privilege to answers to questions put to auditors by members at an
AGM.
The Government responded by deferring the issue
of compelling auditors to attend AGMs until it considers the report
of the Ministerial Council for Corporations Working Party on the
requirements for registration of auditors, which will deal with the
issue.(19) In respect of the applicability of qualified privilege,
the Government is of the view that privilege applies in the context
of answering questions at an AGM and has stated this in the
Explanatory Memorandum in accordance with the PJC's
recommendation.(20)
As to what constitutes giving members a
'reasonable opportunity' to speak or ask questions, the Explanatory
Memorandum states:
These provisions will not affect the
chairperson's power under the common law to run an orderly meeting.
In particular, the chairman will not necessarily be required to
allow each member who wishes to do so an opportunity to ask
questions. (21)
Voting at Meetings
At present, it is essentially up to individual
companies to determine whether resolutions put to a meeting will be
decided on a show of hands or a poll. However, a company's articles
are void to the extent that they attempt to exclude the right to
demand a poll or require a demand for a poll to be made by more
than 5 members or the members with at least 10% of the total voting
rights.(22)
The Bill proposes that a resolution must be
decided by a show of hands unless a poll is demanded. However, this
is subject to the company's articles providing otherwise.
The Bill also provides that a poll may be
demanded on any resolution (except the election of the chairman and
the adjournment of the meeting if the articles so provide). The
poll may be demanded by at least 5 members entitled to vote,
members with at least 5% of the votes that may be cast or the
chairman. The company's constitution may provide that fewer members
or members with a lesser percentage of votes may demand a poll.
The Australian Investment Managers Association
submitted that voting at shareholder meetings should be by poll
only and that the process of voting by a show of hands should no
longer be used. On the other hand, the Australian Shareholders'
Association declared itself against poll only voting. The PJC was
not convinced that the arrangements in the draft Bill would work
any conspicuous injustice.(23)
The Bill is comprised of 5 Schedules. The
substantive amendments are contained in Schedule 1 and this Digest
will deal only with the contents of Schedule 1. Because the Bill is
largely a rewrite and simplification of the current law, only the
provisions which involve substantive changes in law or policy will
be considered.
Schedules 2, 3 and 4 contain consequential
amendments and amendments to relocate provisions and make
structural changes to the Corporations Law. The provisions
of Schedule 5, which relate to the abolition of par values, will be
discussed where they arise in the context of Schedule 1.
Replacement
Part 1.5 - Small Business Guide
The small business guide is a summary of the
main provisions of the Corporations Law that are likely to
be significant to small business. This Bill repeals the existing
guide and replaces it with a new guide which will reflect the new
substantive provisions.
New Chapter
2A - Registering a company
Proposed new section 117
provides the new one step procedure for registering a company. Upon
lodgement of the application the ASC is empowered to register the
company and issue a certificate of incorporation (proposed
section 118).
Companies will no longer be required to have
common seals (proposed section 123).
New Chapter
2B - Basic features of a company
Acting outside power or contrary to objects
At present, it is a contravention of the
Corporations Law for an officer of a company to be
involved in the exercise by a company of a power:
- contrary to an express restriction in the company's
constitution; or
- which is for a purpose outside the stated objects of the
company.(24)
Under the Bill, it will no longer constitute a
contravention for an officer to be involved in the exercise by the
company of a power in this way (proposed new part
2B.1). However, acts contrary to these restrictions will
still be able to be asserted in other actions under the
Corporations Law, such as dishonesty under section 232 or
oppression under section 260.
The general rule is that where a director
breaches his or her duty to the company, the proper plaintiff in an
action in respect of that wrongdoing is the company.(25) One of the
recognised exceptions to this rule is where the directors have
caused the company to act outside its powers. In that circumstance,
individual members have an action against the relevant directors
under section 162(7)(g) of the Corporations Law and those
directors will be liable to the company for any loss resulting from
the breach.
Section 162(7)(g) will be repealed and acts by
directors which are contrary to restrictions on a company's
exercise of its powers will be treated in the same way as any other
breach of the company's constitution.
Assumptions when dealing with companies
People who deal with companies are entitled to
make certain assumptions about the company, for example, that the
company's constitution has been complied with and that a person who
is held out as an officer of the company has been duly
appointed.(26) Clearly this is to prevent a company, for example,
entering a transaction and later denying the transaction on the
basis that the company did not have the power to enter it or that
the person held out as representing the company was not duly
appointed or did not have the authority to agree to the
transaction.
However, under the law at present a person is
not entitled to make an assumption where the person had actual
knowledge that the assumption was not correct or if the person's
connection or relationship was such that he or she ought to have
known that the assumption was not correct.(27) This has been
interpreted as asking the question whether in the full
circumstances of the person's connection with the company the
person acting reasonably should have known the position about the
matter assumed.(28)
The Bill proposes a stricter test than the one
which has arisen out of the current provision. A person will be
able to rely on an assumption unless at the time of the dealings
they knew or suspected that the assumption was incorrect
(proposed new section 128).
Replaceable rules
At present a company must have a constitution,
i.e. rules governing the operation of the company. These take the
form of memorandum and articles of association. Companies which are
limited by shares can choose to adopt the regulations for
management of a company set out in Table A of Schedule 1 to the
Corporations Law (commonly referred to as the 'Table A
articles of association') as their articles of association.
Under the Bill, a company will no longer be
required to have a constitution. The Corporations Law will
contain numerous 'replaceable rules' which will govern the internal
management of the company (proposed new section
134). A company will be able to either utilise those
replaceable rules for internal management, or replace some or all
of the rules with those which it determines. However, certain
replaceable rules are mandatory for public companies.
A table of replaceable rules is set out in
proposed new section 141.
New Chapter
2F - Members' rights and remedies
The power to vary or abrogate any of the rights
attached to a class of shares may be conferred by the issuing
company's constitution, by the terms of the issue of the shares or
by the Corporations Law. The Table A Articles provide that
if the company's share capital is divided into classes, the rights
attached to any class may be varied with the written consent of the
holders of three-quarters of the issued shares of that class or
with the sanction of a special resolution (i.e. 75% in favour)
passed at a separate meeting of the holders of the shares of that
class.
If a company has a procedure in its constitution
for varying rights attaching to classes of shares, that procedure
must be adhered to when varying or abrogating any relevant
rights.29)
If a company's constitution makes no provision
for variation or abrogation of class rights but does not declare
those rights to be unalterable, the Corporations Law
provides that the rights may be varied or abrogated upon the
consent in writing of three-quarters of the relevant shareholders
or members, or with the sanction of a special resolution passed at
a meeting of the shareholders or members.(30)
The Bill substantially reenacts these rules.
At present, where rights are varied or
abrogated, the variation or abrogation may only be challenged by
the holders of the aggregate of at least 10% of the issued shares
in that class. Any such application to challenge must be made
within 28 days of the variation. If such an application is made the
variation or abrogation has no effect until it is confirmed by the
Court.
The Bill changes this slightly, in that any
variation or abrogation which does not obtain unanimous approval
has no effect until the expiration of 1 month from the variation
without an application being lodged to set the variation aside
(proposed new section 246D).
A further addition is the requirement to give
members of the class written notice of the variation within 7 days
of the variation being made, to allow them to take advantage of
their right to challenge the variation [proposed new
section 246B(3)].
New Chapter
2G - Meetings
Meetings of Directors
The issue of the use of technology in the
conduct of directors' meetings has been considered by the courts in
the context of telephone meetings. It appears that the prudent
approach is for there to be an express provision in the company's
articles authorising meetings by telephone or video
link-up.(31)
Proposed new section 248D
clarifies that issue and allows directors' meetings to be called or
held using any technology consented to by all the directors. A
director may only withdraw their consent within a reasonable period
before the meeting.
Meetings of Members
Section 255 of the Corporations Law
allows proprietary companies to pass resolutions as if in general
meeting by circulating a document to all members for their
signature.(32) The limitation is that only ordinary resolutions can
be passed in this way. Proposed new section 249A
will extend the ability of proprietary companies to pass
resolutions in this way to all resolutions (including special
resolutions) except a resolution to remove an auditor.
The ability of members to requisition to
directors to convene a meeting and to convene a meeting themselves
is discussed in the Background above under the subheading 'Calling
Meetings'. Proposed new section 249E continues the
right of members with more than 50% of the votes who requisitioned
the directors to convene a meeting, to convene a meeting themselves
if the directors do not do so within 21 days after the request. The
liability of the company to pay the reasonable expenses of the
members incurred because of the failure by directors to call and
hold the meeting is continued, as is the ability of the company to
recover that amount from the directors in default.
Members of a company currently have a right to
put a resolution at the annual general meeting and to have a
statement in respect of the resolution, of no more than 1000 words
circulated to all members.(33) Unless the company otherwise
resolves, the cost of circulating the resolution and statement must
be borne by the requisitioning members. Under the Bill, this right
will be extended to all general meetings not just the annual
general meeting and the company will be responsible for the cost of
giving members notice of the resolution and a copy of the statement
provided those documents are given to the company in time to send
them out with notice of the meeting (proposed new sections
249N, 249O and 249P).
Proposed new section 249S will
allow companies to hold members meetings at two or more venues
using any technology that gives the members as a whole a reasonable
opportunity to participate. In accordance with the recommendation
of the PJC, the draft Bill was amended to require the notice of the
meeting to make known to participants the technology which is to be
used to facilitate the meeting if the meeting is to be held in two
or more places (proposed new section 249L).
The Bill simplifies the provisions of the
Corporations Law relating to proxies. Two noteworthy
policy changes are:
- at present a company's constitution must specifically provide
that a proxy can vote on a show of hands before the proxy can do
so. The Bill reverses this and gives proxies the right to vote on a
show of hands unless the company's constitution provides otherwise
[proposed new section 249Y(2)].
- currently, a failure by a proxy to follow voting directions is
a contractual issue between the proxy and his or her principal. The
Bill provides that where the company has held a person out as being
prepared to act as a proxy and that person fails to vote as
directed, the person is guilty of an offence.
Proposed new section 250K
restates the right that a poll may be demanded on any resolution,
but that a company's constitution may provide that a poll may not
be demanded in respect of the election of the chairman or the
adjournment of the meeting.
Meetings of members of registered managed investment
schemes
The provisions of proposed new Part
2G.4 will place the investors in managed investment
schemes in a similar position to members of public companies, in
terms of calling meetings, proxies and voting at meetings. However,
a number of distinctions should be noted:
- managed investment schemes will not be required to hold annual
general meetings. The Explanatory Memorandum states that this is
consistent with 'the usual character of collective investment
schemes as passive investment vehicles'.
- In contrast to members of companies, members of registered
managed investment schemes are only entitled to put special and
extraordinary resolutions to meetings (proposed new section
252L).
- On a vote by show of hands, each member has one vote. On a
poll, each member has 1 vote for each dollar of the value of the
total interests they have in the scheme (proposed new
section 253C).
- Votes which are taken on special and extraordinary resolutions
must be decided on a poll (proposed new section
253J).
New Chapter
2H - Shares
The major change in respect of shares is the
abolition of par values (Schedule 5, item
10, section 254C).
The Table A articles currently provide that a
company's existing members be offered unissued shares before they
are issued to non-members. This gives existing shareholders the
right to take up shares before they are offered to others.
Proposed new section 254D establishes a
replaceable rule to this effect for proprietary companies.
In circumstances where a company is limited by
shares, the total amount of the company's share capital is referred
to as its 'authorised share capital'. The Corporations Law
presently includes a mechanism for increasing or decreasing
authorised share capital (by a resolution at a general meeting
where provided for by the company's articles).(34) The concept of
authorised share capital will be removed from the Corporations
Law because it no longer serves any particular purpose.
The rules in respect of redeemable preference
shares, which are presently contained in the Table A articles, will
be moved into the body of the Corporations Law. The
primary rule is that a company may only redeem redeemable
preference shares on the terms on which there are issued
(proposed new section 254J). Redeemable preference
shares issued after the commencement of the Bill will only be able
to be redeemed using profits or the proceeds of a share issue made
for the purpose of redemption (proposed new section
254K). Because shares will no longer have a par value and
consequently there will be no share premium account, companies will
no longer be able to fund a redemption using the share premium
account.(35)
At present, directors may be subject to civil
penalties and criminal consequences if they allow the company to
incur a debt whilst there are reasonable grounds to suspect that
the company is insolvent.(36) Item 222 of Schedule
2 expands the meaning of incurring a debt to include the
redemption of redeemable preference shares, i.e. where a company
proposes to redeem shares which are redeemable at its option, the
directors must ensure that the company will be solvent after the
redemption before proceeding with it.
New Chapter
2J - Transactions affecting share capital
Share capital reductions and share
buy-backs
Reductions in share capital is currently dealt
with in section 195 of the Corporations Law. Essentially
that provides that a company may reduce its share capital provided
it is authorised to do so by its articles, the members resolve to
do so by a special resolution and the reduction is approved by the
Court. Proposed new sections 256A
to 256F largely rewrite section 195. However, upon
the commencement of the Taxation Laws Amendment (Company Law
Review) Act 1998, Schedule 5 of this Bill will commence
operation and repeal these rewritten provisions.
The new provisions will remove the requirement
for court confirmation of the reduction. The basis of a capital
reduction will be the satisfaction of 3 conditions:
- it must be fair and reasonable to the company's shareholders as
a whole;
- it must not materially prejudice the company's ability to pay
its creditors; and
- it must be approved by shareholders by the appropriate
resolution. An ordinary resolution is required where the reduction
relates only to ordinary shares, the reduction applies in
proportion to the number of shares held and the terms of the
reduction are the same for each holder of shares. In any other
circumstance a special resolution or unanimous shareholder
agreement is required.
The rules in respect of share buy-backs were
inserted into the Corporations Law by the First
Corporate Law Simplification Act 1995. This Bill will reenact
those provisions with only a couple of changes of any
significance:
- redeemable preference shares can be cancelled under a share
buy-back or reduction of capital (proposed new section
254J).
- it will be a requirement that a buy-back not materially
prejudice the company's ability to pay its creditors
(proposed new section 257A).
Financial Assistance
The giving of financial assistance by a company
for the purpose of acquisition of its own shares is prohibited by
section 205(1)(a) of the Corporations Law. The aim of the
financial assistance prohibition is to ensure that those who
acquire shares in a company do so from their own resources and at
their own risk and not with the help of the company itself.(37) The
prohibition also helps to prevent:
- creditors or minority members of a company being prejudiced by
financial transactions which may be entirely unrelated to the
company's normal business activities; and
- a company's officer using the company's funds to manipulate the
market in the company's shares for profit or control-related
reasons.
The present law allows for the provision of
financial assistance upon compliance with a relatively complex
process of notification and shareholder approval. This process can
impede ordinary commercial transactions.
The Bill will continue the prohibition but in
addition to allowing the provision of financial assistance
following shareholder approval, financial assistance will be able
to be provided where the giving of assistance does not materially
prejudice the interests of the company, its shareholders or
creditors (proposed new section 260A).
New Chapter
2M - Financial reports and audit
Financial Records
Proposed new section 286
restates the requirement that a company must keep written financial
records (currently referred to as 'accounting records') that:
- correctly record and explain its transactions and financial
position and performance; and
- enable true and fair financial statements to be prepared and
audited.
Financial Reporting
All disclosing entities ('disclosing entity' is
a complex term but significantly includes companies listed on a
stock exchange), public companies, large proprietary companies and
registered collective investment schemes must prepare a financial
report and a directors report each financial year (proposed
new section 292).(38)
Shareholders with at least 5% of the votes in a
small proprietary company or the ASC may give the company a
direction to prepare a financial report and a directors' report for
a financial year (proposed new sections 293 and
294).
Proposed new section 295
specifies the contents of the annual financial report. The
financial report for a financial year comprises the financial
statements, the notes to those statements and the directors'
declaration about the statements and the notes. The major change in
respect of the financial statements is the requirement of the
inclusion of a statement of cash flows.
The requirement that the financial reports of a
company comply with accounting standards (section 298) is restated
in proposed new section 296.
The content of the annual directors' report is
split into 'general' and 'specific' information under
proposed new section 299 and 300.
The content of the directors' report has been discussed in the
Background above.
Existing section 332(10) provides that if an
auditor is satisfied that there has been a contravention of the
Corporations Law, the auditor must report the
contravention to the ASC. The Report of the House of
Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional
Affairs, entitled Corporate Practices and the Rights of
Shareholders states:
The accountancy bodies convinced the Committee
that the use of the term 'satisfied' presents problems because it
requires an unduly high degree of proof before the auditor can make
a report.(39)
The Committee recommended that the provision be
amended so that there need only be 'reasonable grounds to suspect'
that malpractice has occurred. Proposed new section
311 adopts that form of words.
Existing section 315 of the Corporations
Law obliges all public companies to provide a copy of their
annual report to members at least 14 days before the annual general
meeting. Proposed new section 314 will give
companies which are required to report to members the option of
sending a concise financial report instead of the full annual
financial report. Members who wish to obtain a copy of the full
report will be able to request one and the company must provide one
at no charge to the member.
New Chapter
2N - Annual returns and lodgments with the ASC
Companies must lodge a return, referred to as an
'annual return', in the prescribed form with the ASC each year.
Under the Bill, the number of items which must be contained in the
return has been significantly reduced. The annual return for a
company will now need to contain only 10 items:
- ACN
- name
- address of registered office
- address of principal place of business
- details of each director and company secretary
- details of issued shares
- details of options granted
- the top 20 members in each class of shares
- a statement as to the company's solvency
- the ultimate holding company.
New Chapter
5A - Deregistration of Companies
Upon deregistration, a company ceases to exist.
The chapter introduces a greatly simplified procedure for the
deregistration of a company. The Corporations Law
currently contains a procedure by which the members of the company
may wind up the company.(40) That procedure involves a number of
steps including the appointment of a liquidator, a special
resolution to wind up, the directors declaring that the company is
solvent and the preparation of a statement of affairs.
The new procedure for deregistration is in
addition to the voluntary winding up procedure. It allows an
application for deregistration to be made by the company, a
director, a member or liquidator of the company. The application
may only be made where:
- all members of the company agree to the deregistration;
- the company is not carrying on business;
- the company's assets are worth less than $1,000;
- the company has paid all fees and penalties payable under the
Corporations Law;
- the company has no outstanding liabilities; and
- the company is not a party to any legal proceedings.
Upon making the application and satisfaction of
these preconditions, the ASC must give notice of the proposed
deregistration on the ASC database and in the Gazette. When 2
months have passed since the Gazette notice, the ASC may deregister
the company (proposed new section 601AA).
The Bill restates the ability of the ASC to
initiate deregistration of a company in certain circumstances
(proposed new sections 601AB and
601AC).
On deregistration the company's property vests
in the ASC (proposed new section 601AD).
In its most
recent Economic Survey on Australia, the OECD concluded its
assessment of corporate governance in Australia by stating:
By and large, the balance in Australian
corporate regulation appears to have shifted too far towards a
prescriptive and intrusive approach. The core goals of ensuring
honesty and efficiency in business could be achieved while
streamlining some important aspects of the current regulations.
Continued progress in the reform and simplification of corporate
law should therefore remain a priority for the government.(41)
To the extent that the aim of this Bill is to simplify a
relatively substantial and commonly referred to part of the
Corporations Law, it may be viewed as successful. The one
step procedure for company registration, the paring back in the
detail required in annual returns and the simplification of the
deregistration process will make it easier for small businesses to
use and comply with the Corporations Law.
From the perspective of shareholders and prospective investors,
the watering down of the components of the directors' report and
the failure of Bill to require full disclosure of directors' and
senior executives' remuneration are disappointing.
- (1990)1 ACSR 137
- Australia, House of Representatives, Treasurer, Second Reading
speech in respect of the Company Law Review Bill 1997,
Debates, 3 December 1997, p. 11930.
- Australia, Parliament, Parliamentary Joint Committee on
Corporations and Securities, Report on the Draft Second
Corporate Law Simplification Bill 1996, (Senator G. Chapman,
Chairman), Canberra, 1996, p. 11.
- ibid.
- Company Law Review Bill, proposed new s. 249J.
- Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities,
op. cit., p. 12.
- Second Corporate Law Simplification Bill: exposure draft,
proposed new s. 298.
- Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities,
op. cit., pp. 32-34.
- Australia, Parliament, Government Response to the report of
the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities on
the Draft Second Corporate Law Simplification Bill, November
1997, p. 13.
- Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities,
op. cit., p. 36.
- Main, A., 'Some black letters over company law', Australian
Financial Review, 8 January 1998.
- Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities,
op. cit., p. 19.
- Government Response to the report of the Parliamentary
Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities on the Draft Second
Corporate Law Simplification Bill, op. cit., p. 8.
- Main, A., op. cit., p. 10.
- Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities,
op. cit., p. 16.
- Company Law Review Bill, proposed new s. 250S.
- Company Law Review Bill, proposed new s. 250T.
- Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities,
op. cit., p. 21; Australia, Parliament, Company Law Review Bill
Explanatory Memorandum, 1997, p. 6.
- Government Response to the report of the Parliamentary
Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities on the Draft Second
Corporate Law Simplification Bill, op. cit., p. 17.
- Company Law Review Bill Explanatory Memorandum, op. cit., p.
46.
- ibid.
- Corporations Law, s. 248.
- Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities,
op. cit., p. 27.
- Corporations Law, s. 162(3).
- Foss v. Harbottle (1843)2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189.
- Corporations Law, s. 164.
- Corporations Law, s. 164(4).
- Bank of New Zealand v. Fiberi Pty Ltd (1994)14 ACSR
736.
- Corporations Law, ss. 197(3), 198(3), 199(3).
- Corporations Law, ss. 197(2), 198(2), 199(2).
- Intercapital Holdings Ltd v. MEH Ltd (1988)13 ACLR
595; Residues Treatment & Trading Co Ltd v. Southern
Resources Ltd (1989)15 ACLR 770.
- A proprietary company is a company which is:
a. either limited by shares or an unlimited company that has a
share capital; and
b. has no more than 50 members
A proprietary company is limited in the manner
in which it can raise funds and it cannot do anything which would
result in the Corporations Law requiring the issue of
prospectus.
- Corporations Law, s. 252.
- Corporations Law, s. 193.
- At present, when a company issues a share of a certain par
value at a price higher than that value, the difference is referred
to as the premium. Upon the issue of shares at a premium, a share
premium account is created in the financial accounts and any amount
standing to the credit of the share premium account can later be
used for the purpose of redeeming shares.
- Corporations Law, s. 588G.
- See for example Darval v. North Sydney Brick and Tile Co
Ltd (No.2)(1989)16 NSWLR 260.
- A large proprietary company is one which satisfies 2 of the
following:
- Operating revenue is greater than $10 million
- Value of consolidated gross assets is $5 million or more
- 50 or more employees at the end of the financial year.
- Australia, House of Representatives, Standing Committee on
Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Corporate Practices and the
Rights of Shareholders, 1991, p. 135.
- Corporations Law, s. 491.
- OECD, Economic Surveys - Australia 1997-98, Paris,
1997.
Lee Jones
23 February 1998
Bills Digest Service
Information and Research Services
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ISSN 1328-8091
© Commonwealth of Australia 1997
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