Synopsis:
Introduction
2013 Defence White Paper
Strategic objectives
Identified capability choices
Defence policy for industry
Alignment of cost, capability and
strategic objectives
Conclusion
MH60R Romeo Seahawk helicopter and Landing Helicopter Dock
(Source: Australian
Defence Image Library)
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The 2013 Defence White Paper was released in the wake of the
Asian Century White Paper and the National Security Strategy, both of which
heavily influenced the strategic objectives of the 2013 Defence White Paper.
-
The 2011–12 Force Posture Review informed the 2013 Defence White
Paper, both of which recognised the need for Australia to be self-reliant. The
ADFs primary role is to defend Australia and Australia’s interests close to
home, and these need to be reflected in the ADF’s capability requirements.
-
The 2013 Defence White Paper was widely regarded as a
continuation of the 2009 Defence White Paper. However, the former placed
greater emphasis on the need to balance capabilities with economic realities.
-
The language of this white paper was softer towards China but
still raised concerns about its military development and territorial claims in
the region. It also placed greater emphasis on the relationship between the
United States and China in the region.
-
The gravity of the cyber threat was elevated and the white paper
reinforced an earlier agreement between Australia and the United States that
the ANZUS Treaty could be invoked in response to a significant cyber attack.
-
Defence’s role within the newly established Australian Cyber
Security Centre, announced in the National Security Strategy, was articulated
in the 2013 Defence White Paper.
-
While the 2013 Defence White Paper acknowledged the fiscal
constraints imposed in response to the economic downturn, large capability
items that were announced in the previous white paper, such as 12 conventional
submarines and three squadrons of Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, were still a
capability feature of this paper.
-
The Government’s 2010 Defence Industry Policy was reinforced in
this white paper and similar Priority Industry Capabilities to those previously
identified, remained.
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No new Defence Capability Plan accompanied the 2013 Defence White
paper.
-
The release of this white paper was brought forward one year due
to the effects of the global financial crisis on the economy. The 2013 Defence
White Paper aimed to change the 2009 defence funding model but the forecast
spending for Defence was still unlikely to afford the specified
capabilities—especially the Government’s intention to increase defence spending
to two per cent of GDP.
In the lead-up to the 2012–13 budget release, Prime Minister
Julia Gillard announced that a defence white paper would be delivered ‘in the
first half of 2013’, rather than in 2014 as had been projected in the 2009
Defence White Paper.[540]
The Gillard Government stated that the need for another white paper at this
time was based on the drawdown of ADF operational commitments overseas;
recommendations from the Force Posture Review; Australia’s economic realities
following the global financial crisis; ‘strategic change’ in the region; and
major reforms within Defence.[541]
On 3 May 2013, the Defence White Paper 2013 (2013
Defence White Paper) was released with no defined timeframe. Like the 2009
Defence White Paper, it was not tabled in Parliament and it lacked bipartisan
support.[542]
As with its predecessors, associated reviews contributed to
the 2013 Defence White Paper, with the ADF Posture Review being key to the
process. However, a community consultation process was not undertaken.
Australian Defence Force Posture Review
On 22 June 2011, Defence Minister Stephen Smith commissioned
a review of the ADF’s posture to assess whether the ADF was ‘correctly
geographically positioned to meet Australia’s modern and future strategic and
security challenges’.[543]
The Force Posture Review was headed by two former Defence secretaries, Allan
Hawke and Ric Smith, who delivered the final report to Government in March 2012
(an interim report had been presented in January).[544] This Review was the ‘first
strategic review of force posture since the Cooksey Review of Australia’s
Defence Facilities in 1988, which followed the 1986 Dibb Review’.[545]
The executive summary and recommendations contained in the
final report of the Force Posture Review were released by the Government in May
2012. There were 39 recommendations.[546]
At that time, the Government stated that no decisions had been made in terms of
those recommendations, but that its formal response would be contained in the
2013 Defence White Paper.[547]
In essence, the Force Posture Review posited that while the
location of ADF bases does not require significant change, the ‘ADF posture
needs to be adjusted to meet current and future needs’.[548] The Review noted that the ADF’s
needs continue to be based on ‘the principle of self-reliance in the direct
defence of Australia, and in relation to our unique strategic interests in our
neighbourhood’.[549]
This meant a greater focus on northern Australia, but the more controversial
recommendation was for Defence to ‘upgrade the Cocos (Keeling) Islands airfield
facilities to support unrestricted P-8 [maritime patrol aircraft] and UAV
operations and KC-30 operations with some restrictions’.[550] The Review team argued
that for these reasons, the islands have ‘significant military strategic value’.[551]
The Government’s response and implementation of the Force
Posture Review’s recommendations are discussed below in the section on ‘strategic
objectives’.
The 2013 Defence White Paper was regarded by many as a
continuation of the 2009 version, as the strategic objectives and capability
priorities espoused in both documents remain largely extant. However, three key
themes in the 2013 Defence White Paper particularly stand out as points of
difference: the elevated circumstances of strategic uncertainty, increased
emphasis on international engagement through defence diplomacy, and the crucial
need to balance capabilities with economic realities.[552] While all three elements
were present in the 2009 version, their increased emphasis in 2013 was
significant.
As previously stated, the 2013 Defence White Paper failed to
receive bipartisan support within the Parliament, with the key issue of defence
funding being particularly contentious. For example, Shadow Defence Minister
David Johnston was highly critical of the white paper’s lack of firm financial
details and scheduling commitments.[553]
However, Defence Minister Stephen Smith defended it by claiming there was
limited budgetary scope contained in previous defence white papers and asserted
that defence white papers are not inherently budget documents.[554]
Prior to the release of the 2013
Defence White Paper, two key documents were released: the Asian Century White
Paper (October 2012) and the National Security Strategy (January 2013). Both
documents revealed much of the regional strategic analysis upon which the 2013
Defence White Paper was built. Both documents discussed potential strategic
concerns, while optimistically emphasising the importance of the United
States-China relationship on regional security.[555] In fact the National
Security Strategy and the 2013 Defence White Paper share identical language on
this point, in expecting ‘that both the United States and China will work hard
to maximise cooperative aspects and minimise the competitive elements in the
relationship’.[556]
Although the language of the 2013 Defence White Paper is
non-adversarial towards China, it raised the issue of tensions arising from
China’s military modernisation and territorial claims in the region.[557] The National
Security Strategy was more direct in acknowledging that China’s territorial
disputes were exacerbating regional concerns and sought to encourage further
openness and transparency from China.[558]
The Asian Century White Paper was similarly direct, calling for China to
explain ‘the pace and scope of their military modernisation, to build
confidence and trust’.[559]
While these sentiments were somewhat mirrored in the 2009 Defence White Paper,
it is noteworthy that the 2013 Defence White Paper was not as cautious about
China’s military intentions.[560]
However, departing from the strategic assessment of the 2009
Defence White Paper, the Asian Century White Paper acknowledged the serious
challenges faced in the region but adopted a ‘largely optimistic view of the
region’s geo-political future’.[561]
The Asian Century White Paper foresaw regional security and stability involving
the continuous presence of the United States, ‘engagement with a rising China,
the benefits of trade and investment, and evolving regional multilateral
institutions’ while cooperating with major powers in the region and
multilateral organisations.[562]
This optimism could be viewed as ‘appropriate for a policy blueprint that is
attempting to motivate government, business, education and community sectors to
embrace further domestic reforms and strengthen their understanding of and
links with Asia’.[563]
On the other hand, the Asian Century White Paper downplayed the reality of
security tensions in the region. A more detailed assessment was expected to be
addressed in the 2013 Defence White Paper.[564]
The 2013 Defence White Paper’s position on China generated a
large amount of public commentary, in comparison to the language delivered in
the 2009 Defence White Paper, due mainly to the 2013 version’s statement that ‘the
Government does not approach China as an adversary’.[565] The Defence Minister
asserted that the Government’s consistent approach to Australia’s relationship
with China, as stated in both the 2009 and 2013 Defence White Papers, highlights
the crucial nature of the United States-China relationship for security in the
Asia-Pacific region.[566]
However, it cannot be ignored that the tone regarding China shifted from
diplomatic suspicion to a more nuanced perspective, where Australia sees ‘an
enduring bilateral US-China relationship at every level—economic, political,
strategic and military-to-military’.[567]
The importance of the United States–China relationship rests
largely on the premise that many other regional variables are impacted by
either the United States or Chinese politics. This includes the potential
flashpoints of the Korean peninsula and East and South China Seas, as well as
the growing importance of cyber defence.[568]
However, the 2013 Defence White Paper also noted the potential for other
contributors to Australia’s strategic uncertainty, such as regional instability
closer to our shores, terrorism and increased military modernisation across the
globe.[569]
In broad terms, apart from China, Australia’s stated
strategic interests are almost identical in both the 2009 and 2013 Defence
White Papers. As the core elements of this, the need for ‘a secure Australia’, ‘a
secure South Pacific and Timor-Leste’, ‘a stable Indo-Pacific’ and ‘a stable,
rules-based global order’ have remained an intrinsic imperative throughout this
period.[570]
There was also strong analytical continuity across the two documents, as the
2013 Defence White Paper acknowledged that ‘some defining characteristics of
the order foreshadowed in the 2009 Defence White Paper are now becoming clearer’.[571] This is
especially the case regarding Defence’s understanding of the rising
significance of many Asian nations.[572]
While the concept of self-reliance remained in the 2013 Defence
White Paper, it cautioned:
... commitment to self-reliance does not reflect any lack of
confidence in our Alliance [with the United States] or partners. We would seek
and expect help from our friends if Australia came under direct attack. But we
should not rely on the combat forces of others to defend Australia.[573]
The 2013 Defence White Paper went on to acknowledge that
there are limits to self-reliance and as such, Australia would need to rely on
the ‘United States and other partners’ for specific capabilities like
intelligence, communications and logistics.[574]
Cyber security featured prominently in the 2013 Defence
White Paper.[575]
The seriousness of the threat to national security was emphasised in the
reinforcement of an agreement with the United States that the ANZUS Treaty
would apply to cyber attacks.[576]
This meant Australia needed to enhance its cyber capabilities and as part of
the National Security Strategy the establishment of the new Australian Cyber
Security Centre (ACSC) was announced.[577]
The ACSC would build on the existing CSOC structure with ASD continuing to play
a primary role in its operation. The new ACSC would comprise cyber security
capabilities from ASD, ASIO, the Attorney-General’s Department, the Australian
Federal Police and the Australian Crime Commission.[578]
There were comparatively few additional capability decisions
outlined in the 2013 Defence White Paper, especially when compared with its
2009 predecessor. This was largely due to a lack of available funding and
compounded by the economic downturn in the wake of the global financial crisis.
In acknowledging these circumstances, the 2013 Defence White Paper asserted
that ‘the Government remains committed to fiscal discipline and improving the
sustainability of the budget’, despite the ‘challenging’ fiscal environment.[579] However, while
there was minimal new spending in the 2013 Defence White Paper, many previously
announced acquisitions, such as the 12 Future Submarines and three operational
squadrons of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, remained.[580]
Maritime forces
Given the 2009 Defence White Paper’s ambitions for expanding
and modernising RAN capabilities, the 2013 Defence White Paper confirmed the Government’s
continued commitment to previous capability announcements. This included the decision
to focus resources on either a new or ‘evolved Collins’ design for the Future
Submarine program, instead of existing ‘military-off-the-shelf’ designs.[581] Additionally,
the 2013 Defence White Paper indicated that the RAN will seek to acquire a
proven replacement for the Armidale Class patrol boats and bring forward the
replacement of its replenishment ships HMA Ships Success and Sirius.[582]
Land forces
The 2013 Defence White Paper confirmed the Government’s
commitment to support the Army with protected and armoured vehicles, including
wholesale replacement of ageing medium and heavy trucks. Additionally, Special
Forces would continue to be provided with appropriate resources ‘to maintain an
edge over emerging threats’.[583]
Air power
The 2013 Defence White Paper reiterated the previous
decision to acquire an additional 12 EA-18G Growler electronic attack (EA)
aircraft for the RAAF.[584]
This would allow the retention of its current operational squadron of 24 F/A
18F Super Hornets instead of reconfiguring some of these to generate an EA
capability.[585]
The 2013 Defence White Paper also indicated the Government’s intention to
transition its maritime surveillance capabilities from the current fleet of
AP-3C Orions to P-8A Poseidons, with the potential to incorporate UAVs into
this fleet sometime in the future.[586]
The 2013 Defence White Paper dedicated ten pages to defence
policy for industry and reinforced the Government’s 2010 Defence Industry
Policy document.[587]
The policy would mainly focus on:
-
global defence and broader industry trends
-
relations between Defence and industry
-
PICs
-
innovation policy priorities
-
enhancing innovation in this sector and providing support
programs
-
promoting and developing competitiveness
-
facilitating international defence trade cooperation
-
developing a skilled workforce, particularly in new fields
-
focusing on the skills market in the maritime sector and
-
facilitating greater linkages between industry and the education
sector.[588]
The 2013 Defence White Paper also claimed that the Government’s
Plan for Australian Jobs helped to establish a defence hub in the
Manufacturing Precinct in Adelaide.[589]
The existing PICs model still emphasised self-reliance in support of ADF
operational capability.[590]
2012
Defence Capability Plan
The 2009 DCP promised updates ‘every six months to reflect
government decisions’, and this was almost achieved up until 2012 when the
format changed to include an additional document—the Defence Capability Guide
(DCG).[591]
Like its predecessors since 2009, the 2012 DCP still kept its four-year outlook
but now the DCG would cover the subsequent six years to provide industry with “general
guidance” on defence projects.[592]
This approach was confirmed in the 2013 Defence White Paper, but unlike the
2009 version, there was no specific promise or timeframe for providing updates.[593]
A key pillar of the 2009 Defence White Paper
was its unequivocal funding commitment ‘for the life of the White Paper’ (out
to 2030), where the Department of Defence would receive real annual funding
growth of at least 2.2 per cent, in addition to any internal savings generated
by the Strategic Reform Program.[594]
This commitment proved inherently unsustainable and as such, the 2013 Defence
White Paper was drafted in a very different budgetary climate.
The 2013 Defence White Paper acknowledged that
defence funding was susceptible to broader pressures, claiming that the ‘continuing
adverse effects of the [global financial crisis] have necessitated the bringing
forward of this White Paper’.[595]
Accordingly, the 2013 Defence White Paper was highly
cautious in articulating a defence spending framework, stating:
... the Government has decided that the Defence
funding model will be based on the four-year forward estimates cycle,
determined on an annual basis taking into account contemporary strategic
economic and fiscal circumstances.[596]
It went on to say that the Department of
Defence would receive six-year funding guidance from Government, arguing that
such an approach would allow for greater flexibility and create a lower burden
of expectation.[597]
The 2013 Defence White Paper also indicated that ‘as Australia’s financial and economic
circumstances allow, the Government will want to grow the defence budget to
around two per cent of GDP.[598]
The broad intention to increase the defence budget to this level was shared by
both sides of federal politics.[599]
Despite these funding targets, ASPI analyst
Mark Thomson argued that the Government’s forecast spending would still be unlikely
to be sufficient to afford the 2013 Defence White Paper’s
list of proposed capability acquisitions.[600]
Thomson further asserted that aspirations to fund Defence at levels of two per
cent of GDP would be difficult to achieve and instead stated that a decade of defence
funding below 1.7 per cent is more realistic, given the substantial funding
shortfall Defence experienced from 2009–13.[601]
The Secretary of the Defence Department, Dennis Richardson, also indicated
during Senate Estimates in June 2013 that the Strategic Reform Program was
unlikely to deliver its anticipated $20 billion in efficiency savings and that
since 2009 only $3.3 billion in savings had been generated through the program.[602]
At the release of the 2013 Budget, the Government
also stated that it had provided the Department of Defence with ‘funding
guidance’ of around $220.0 billion between 2017–18 and 2022–23. However, in the
post-global financial crisis world, it is difficult to know what ‘funding
guidance’ will mean in reality as long-term plans are likely to ‘remain subject
to change as strategic circumstances evolve’.[603]
As previously stated, the only major new
addition to the capital equipment program in the 2013–14 Budget was the decision
to purchase 12 EA‑18G fighter planes (the Growler variant of the Super
Hornet) from the United States. The cost was estimated to be $2.9 billion, with
$2.0 billion allocated to Defence in 2014–15 for this purpose.[604]
The 2013 Defence White Paper flagged that the
Government would seek to replace the current Armidale Class patrol boats and
the supply vessels HMA Ships Sirius and Success ‘at the first
possible opportunity’.[605]
The Defence budget noted that the replacement of Sirius and Success
was set for first pass approval consideration in 2013–14, but there was no
mention of specific funding for this or the patrol boats.[606] However, it
was possible that the Government’s intentions were covered by the $220.0
billion of ‘funding guidance’.
The number of DCP projects being prepared for
approval had risen modestly since the 2012–13 Budget. There were now 12
projects on the First Pass list (there were six in the 2011–12 budget) and 17
projects on the Second Pass list (there were 19 the previous year). The list of
projects set for consideration for Second Pass approval included major
acquisitions such as the JSF and the P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft.[607]
Graph 1: Defence
spending since 1975–76
Source: GDP: ABS, Australian National Accounts: National Income,
Expenditure and Product, Cat. No. 5206.0. 12 months ended June (calculated on
the quarterly original series using current prices), CPI – ABS, Consumer
price index, June 2015, Cat. no. 6401.0
Department of Defence Annual Reports, ASPI Cost of Defence.
With the change in government in late 2013 came the promise
to release the next defence white paper within 18 months of taking office.[608] The Abbott
Government has stated that the 2015 Defence White Paper will be ‘costed and
affordable’.[609]
The Government aimed to achieve this by ensuring there were no further cuts to
the defence budget and that they would work towards raising defence spending to
two per cent of GDP.[610]
Both the 2014–15 and 2015–16 budgets significantly increased spending on
defence.[611]
Whether this trend will, or can, continue for subsequent budgets remains to be
seen given the ongoing concerns about the current economic climate and the many
pressures that are exerted on Australian Government expenditure.
As part of the 2015 Defence White Paper process, the Government
has been conducting a community consultation process. An Issues Paper was
released for discussion in July 2014 and the final report on the outcomes of
this process was issued on 1 July 2015.[612]
This is the third occasion in which the community has been consulted in the
lead-up to a defence white paper: previous occurrences were the 2000 and 2009 Defence
White Papers (noted earlier). As with previous defence white papers, it will
most likely be difficult to determine the extent to which the public
consultation process has influenced the content of the 2015 Defence White Paper.
There is much anticipation surrounding the upcoming defence white
paper, not least because the Government has been holding off making some key capability
announcements until its release. The capability decisions include important
decisions about Australia’s future submarine and future frigate fleets. Accompanying
the next defence white paper will be a new ten-year Defence Investment Plan
(which will contain the DCP), a Defence Industry Policy Statement and the
recently released naval shipbuilding plan.[613]
Whether the strategic objectives, identified capability choices, cost of
capability, and alignment of these elements can be achieved as part of the
overall 2015 Defence White Paper package will be the subject of much debate.
Australia’s significantly changing strategic environment has
been reflected in each of the defence white papers produced since 1976—from the
end of the Vietnam War and the Cold War to the escalation of international
terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, the rise of China, cyber attacks,
conflict in the Middle East and fluctuating tensions in the Asia-Pacific.
Additionally, each white paper asserted Australia’s need to be self-reliant
while correspondingly emphasising the importance of the United States alliance.
However, the degree to which these factors translated into changes in ADF
capability has been marginal. Key capability decisions were often made outside
the white paper process and were generally confirmed retrospectively in
subsequent white papers due to the longevity of the projects, regardless of
which major party was in government at the time.
In recent years, the role of Parliament in scrutinising and
debating major policy announcements contained in defence white papers has
diminished. The convention of tabling defence white papers in Parliament was
not followed in 2009 and 2013; rather, these key policy announcements were made
outside of Parliament. In a recent ASPI publication, Anthony Bergin and former
Parliamentarian Russell Trood suggested that the responsibilities of the Joint
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade might include
‘investigating the contents of Defence or Foreign Affairs white papers’.[614]
There has been a gradual increase in the recognition of the
ADF’s assistance to the civil community and aid to the civil authority, as well
as its broader support in regional humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
operations. However, only within the last decade has the strategic
logic—demonstration of the ADF’s ability to provide a swift response to
emergencies—of this capability been fully recognised, resulting in a minimal
influence on capability decision-making, such as the importance of maintaining
the RAN’s amphibious fleet.[615]
Regardless, defence planners must consider capability choices on the basis of
the ADF’s core role which is the defence of Australia and its national
interests, and it follows that the procurement of military equipment must be
primarily for military purposes.
It has been rare for capability decisions identified in
defence white papers to align with the actual funding needed to achieve them.
Since 1976 this has occurred only once: the 2000 Defence White Paper, which was
followed by years of strong economic growth, managed to fulfil its funding
promise (although, even here, it later appeared that many capability costs had
been underestimated and were less affordable than initially thought). The 2009
Defence White Paper did not have the luxury of the sustained economic growth of
the Howard years and it quickly came to seem that capability choices were
overly ambitious, given the prevailing fiscal climate.[616]
Recognition that Australia’s industry for defence has an
important role to play in capability development also gradually gained greater
acceptance and was fully acknowledged in the 2001 DCP, in line with the assertions
made in the 2000 Defence White Paper.[617]
Subsequent white papers, DCPs and Defence industry policies continued this
trend. The current debate about the role Australian industry plays in the
defence domain has gained significant traction, particularly as a decision
about future submarines is pending. State governments are vying for defence-related
work, but ultimately defence capability decisions rest with the Federal
Government.[618]
On 4 August 2015, some clarity was provided on the role of Australian industry
when the Abbott Government announced its naval shipbuilding plan.[619]
The plan outlines a continuous build program for Australia’s future frigates
and offshore patrol vessels. The forthcoming 2015 Defence White Paper is
expected to prioritise RAN capability investment and the number of new maritime
assets required.
While the strategic objectives identified in each defence
white paper seek to justify the level of force structure required by the ADF,
the size of the military in terms of personnel has been subject to varying
degrees of austerity measures. The ADF’s preparedness levels have also suffered
at times due to broader economic factors. Ultimately, the strength or
volatility of Australia’s economy is more influential in deciding how much
money is spent on defence, regardless of commitments in any defence white
paper.
[540].
Australian Government, Defence
white paper 2013 (2013 Defence White Paper), White paper,
Canberra, 2013, accessed 13 January 2015; J Gillard (Prime Minister) and S
Smith (Minister for Defence), New defence white paper 2013, op. cit.
[541].
Ibid.
[542].
J Gillard (Prime Minister) and S Smith (Minister for Defence), Release
of the 2013 defence white paper, media release, 3 May 2013, accessed 13
January 2015; D Johnston (Shadow Minister for Defence), 2013
defence white paper: no plan, no schedule, no money, media release,
3 May 2013, accessed 13 January 2015.
[543].
S Smith (Minister for Defence), Australian
Defence Force posture review, media release, 22 June 2011, accessed 13
January 2015.
[544].
Ibid.
[545].
A Hawke and R Smith, Australian
Defence Force posture review, Department of Defence, 30 March 2012, p.
1, accessed 13 January 2015.
[546].
J Gillard (Prime Minister), Release
of final Defence Force posture review report, media release, 3 May
2012, accessed 13 January 2015.
[547].
Ibid.
[548].
A Hawke and R Smith, Australian Defence Force posture review, op.
cit., p. i.
[549].
Ibid., p. 6.
[550].
Ibid., p. 26.
[551].
Ibid.
[552].
2013 Defence White Paper, op. cit., pp. 1–4.
[553].
D Johnston (Shadow Minister for Defence), 2013
defence white paper—no plan, no schedule, no money, op. cit., accessed
13 January 2015.
[554].
S Smith (Minister for Defence), ‘Interview
Peter van Onselen: 2013 defence white paper; federal elections‘, Sky
News, Australian Agenda, transcript, 5 May 2013, accessed 13 January 2015.
[555].
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), Strong
and secure: a strategy for Australia’s national security (National
Security Strategy), PM&C, Canberra, 2013, p. 27, accessed 22 July 2013;
Australian Government, Australia
in the Asian century: white paper, White paper, October 2012, p. 73,
accessed 13 January 2015.
[556].
National Security Strategy, ibid., p. 27; 2013 Defence White Paper, op.
cit.
[557].
2013 Defence White Paper, ibid., p. 11.
[558].
2009 Defence White Paper, op. cit.; National
Security Strategy, op. cit., p. 29.
[559].
Australia in the Asian century white paper, op. cit., p. 228.
[560].
2013 Defence White Paper, op. cit., pp. 10–11.
[561].
C Hill, ‘Australia
in the Asian century: regional security and foreign policy dimensions‘,
FlagPost, Parliamentary Library blog, 12 November 2012, accessed 13 January
2015.
[562].
Ibid.
[563].
Ibid.
[564].
Ibid.
[565].
A O’Neil, ‘Defence
white paper pulls its punches on China’, Lowy Institute for International
Policy, blog, 6 May 2013, accessed 13 January 2015; B Schreer, ‘Introducing
nuance: the white paper and great power competition’, Australian Strategic
Policy Institute, blog, 3 May 2013, accessed 13 January 2015; R Medcalf, ‘Sweet
and sour in defence take on China’, Australian Financial Review, 6
May 2013, p. 47, accessed 13 January 2015; 2013 Defence White Paper, op.
cit., p. 11.
[566].
S Smith (Minister for Defence), ‘Interview Peter van Onselen’, op. cit.;
2009 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 34; 2013 Defence White Paper, op. cit.,
p. 9.
[567].
2009 Defence White Paper, ibid., p. 34; 2013 Defence White Paper, ibid.,
p. 10.
[568].
2009 Defence White Paper, ibid., p. 95; T Feakin, ‘Squaring
up for round one—cyber intrusion knock out‘, Australian Strategic Policy
Institute, blog, 6 June 2013, accessed 13 January 2015.
[569].
2013 Defence White Paper, op. cit., pp. 14–16 and 18.
[570].
Ibid., pp. 24–27.
[571].
Ibid., p. 7.
[572].
2009 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 95.
[573].
2013 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 28.
[574].
Ibid., p. 29.
[575].
Ibid., pp. 20–21 and 78–79.
[576].
At the September 2011 AUSMIN talks in the United States, both parties
‘endorsed a Joint Statement on cyber declaring that cyber attacks could be
invoked under the ANZUS Treaty...’ Cited in S Smith (Minister for Defence), Australia-United
States ministerial consultations (AUSMIN), media release, 16 September
2011, accessed 13 January 2015. This position was reinforced in the 2013
Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 20.
[577].
National Security Strategy, op. cit.
[578].
Ibid.
[579].
Ibid., p. 71.
[580].
2009 Defence White Paper, op. cit., pp. 70 and 78.
[581].
2013 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 83.
[582].
Ibid., pp. 84–5.
[583].
Ibid., pp. 86–7.
[584].
Ibid., p. 88.
[585].
Ibid., p. 88.
[586].
Ibid., p. 88.
[587].
Ibid., p. 115.
[588].
Ibid., pp. 115–124.
[589].
Ibid., p. 115.
[590].
Ibid., p. 118.
[591].
The first update was dated December 2009 but released publicly in February
2010. The second update was released in December 2010. In June 2011, the
government issued two supplements that were in table format, which was closely
followed by the release of a full update in August 2011. In July 2012, the
Government changed the format of the DCP to include a Defence Capability Guide
(DCG). The DCP retained its four year outlook and the DCG covered the
subsequent six years providing ‘general guidance’ to industry on potential
projects. Cited in Library Catalogue, ‘Project
update summary‘; S Smith (Minister for Defence) and J Clare (Minister for
Defence Materiel), Public
defence capability plan—update 2, media release, 17 December 2010, accessed
13 January 2015; S Smith (Minister for Defence) and J Clare (Minister for
Defence Materiel), Release
of the 2011 on line public defence capability plan, media release, 18
August 2011, accessed 13 January 2015; S Smith (Minister for Defence) and
J Clare (Minister for Defence Materiel), Defence
capability plan, media release, 10 July 2012, accessed 13 January
2015.
[592].
S Smith (Minister for Defence) and J Clare (Minister for Defence
Materiel), plan, media release, Ibid.
[593].
2013 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 89.
[594].
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primarily to provide the RAN with a humanitarian and disaster relief
capability. HMAS Choules (landing ship dock) was also purchased from the
UK Government. The RAN’s new Landing Helicopter Docks also have the potential
to provide a humanitarian assistance role but the platform’s main purpose is to
provide the ADF with an amphibious assault capability. The RAAF’s strategic air
lift capabilities, such as the C-17 Globemaster and C-130 Hercules aircraft,
already play a significant role in supporting government intent when responding
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