As a cost-saving measure, the FSR prompted significant cuts
to personnel numbers, up to 10,500 over ten years: 1,000 from the RAN; 5,200
from Army; 4,200 from the RAAF and more than 3,800 Defence civilians.[166]
The subsequent 1994 Defence White Paper recognised that savings had been
achieved through the reduction of the workforce by more than 16 per cent of
Defence civilian personnel and 15 per cent of military personnel.[167]
The FSR considered what capabilities the ADF was likely to
require in the 21st century, particularly as platforms and equipment became
obsolete.[168]
For instance, the FSR suggested that the RAN’s fleet of surface combatants
should increase from ten to sixteen ships by 2010 and the existing 15 Fremantle
Class Patrol Boats (FCPBs) be retained until 2004, to be replaced by 12 new
patrol boats.[169]
As it turned out, 12 surface combatant vessels were in service with the RAN by
2010 and three Air Warfare Destroyers were under construction.[170] The fleet
of FCPBs began to be replaced by the Armidale Class Patrol Boats from mid-2005.[171]
ASP 90 asserted that Australia’s security approach to
changing global events (such as the end of the Cold War) required little
adjustment from the direction set out in the 1987 Defence White Paper.
Furthermore, Australia’s regional defence policy focus meant that ‘events in
Europe and elsewhere do not have a direct impact on our strategic planning.
Dramatic as the collapse of the Soviet Union or events such as the Gulf War
were, they did not change Australia’s immediate security environment’.[174]
Nonetheless, another strategic review was conducted and released by the Government
in the following year.
In the lead-up to the release of the 1994 Defence White
Paper, the Australian Democrats unsuccessfully called for the Keating
Government to conduct a public consultation process to canvass public opinion
on Australia’s defence priorities. The Democrats viewed current defence policy
(and thinking) as outdated and prompted the Government to take a fresh look at
Australia’s military requirements by involving the Australian public through
public hearings and written submissions.[179] The content of previous
defence white papers was not informed by input from the public. However, a
public consultation process was adopted in the lead-up to the 2000 Defence
White Paper and this has been repeated for subsequent defence white papers
(discussed below).[180]
While Defence Minister Robert Ray acknowledged that the 1994
Defence White Paper was ‘not sexy enough’ and did not contain ‘any massive new
equipment purchases’ or ‘any shocking revelations’, he argued that this was
satisfying because it showed the Government had been doing a good job on
defence matters over the last seven years.[181]
The 1994 Defence White Paper reflected a similar concept to
that which was outlined in the Strategic Review 1993—that Australia’s
strategic outlook should focus on Asia and the Pacific.[182] While
previous defence white papers discussed Australia’s engagement within the
region, they delineated between South East Asia and the Pacific, whereas the
1994 Defence White Paper focused on the broader Asia-Pacific region as a whole.[183]
Subsequent defence white papers continued this trend.
The 1994 Defence White Paper was the first of its kind
produced after the end of the Cold War. The terminology used in it acknowledged
the post-Cold War environment and the changed strategic dynamics within the
region—recognising that Australia’s ‘future security’ was dependent on
stability in broader Asia and in the Pacific.[184] Despite the enhanced focus
on ensuring security in the Asia-Pacific, the overarching premise of
self-reliance continued to dominate. Primarily, Australia must rely on its own forces
because its ‘security environment and national interests are unique’.[185]
The strategic posture laid out in the 1994 Defence White Paper was relatively
defensive, stating:
The White Paper warned of ‘new uncertainties’ as the
security environment in Asia became less predictable following the end of the
Cold War. Power struggles and political change in the region had the potential
to destabilise the region and ‘perhaps quite seriously in the future’ possibly
lead to armed force being used against Australia.[187] As such,
Australia would need to be prepared to respond, and ‘be capable, without combat
assistance from other countries, of defeating any attack which could credibly
be mounted against Australia’.[188]
Consequently, this objective would determine the capabilities required of the
ADF.[189]
Another first for an Australian defence white paper was the
inclusion of a specific objective to use the ADF in disaster relief activities,
domestically and internationally. The 1994 Defence White Paper emphasised,
however, that these activities would not determine the force structure of the
ADF or deter the military from their primary role in defending Australia.[190]
The use of ADF personnel and equipment in disaster relief operations went on to
feature more prominently in subsequent defence white papers.
The 1994 Defence White Paper noted the ongoing post-Cold War
presence of the United States in the region but recognised that it would not ‘seek
nor accept primary responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the
region’.[191]
Despite this realisation, coupled with the Australian Government’s emphasis on
self-reliance, the United States alliance remained a ‘key element’ in Australia’s
defence policy.[192]
In addition, the white paper predicted that over the next 15
years, China’s economy would grow to become the largest in Asia. Consequently,
China’s military capabilities, particularly its maritime forces, would expand
and influence the strategic and political framework within the Asia-Pacific.[193]
Notwithstanding this, the discussion about China in the white paper was relatively
minimal.
Just after the 1994 Defence White Paper was released, the
Defence Minister stated that while self-reliance was still the principal theme
of Australia’s defence policy, this:
Given the recession of the early 1990s, it was not
surprising that the 1994 Defence White Paper contained some austerity measures
and little in the way of new capability announcements. Consequently, the ADF’s
preparedness levels were prioritised to concentrate on areas that contribute to
sea and air intelligence, surveillance and responses, some strike capability
elements and ‘land force surveillance, reconnaissance, ready reaction and
Special Forces elements’.[195]
Outside of these areas, a lower priority was placed on maintaining high levels
of readiness. Specifically, the 1994 Defence White Paper stated that the ADF
would ‘continue to emphasise strengthening the long-term capacity of our
Defence Force through investment, rather than on sustaining higher levels of
preparedness than our present strategic circumstances and levels of activity
require’.[196]
This objective mirrored recommendations made by Alan Wrigley
(former Deputy Secretary of the Department of Defence and former
Director-General of the Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation), following
his review of Defence in the 1990s. Wrigley proposed—and later reinforced in an
article written in January 1994—that:
The 1994 Defence White Paper did, however, maintain that the
ADF needed to be prepared for short-warning conflicts, recognising that while
Australia’s ‘survival as a nation would not be at stake in such a conflict,
great damage could be done to our national interests if we were unable to deal
with the adversary and to settle the conflict on terms favourable to Australia’.[198]
The white paper also stipulated that Australia’s military preparedness needed
to be adequate as the ADF ‘would not have time to develop additional
capabilities within the relatively short notice we might receive of the
development of motive or intention to attack Australia’.[199] In 1999,
the ADF’s ability to respond at short notice was put to the test as part of the
operation to restore peace and security in Timor Leste. While Australia’s
military contribution in support of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET)
was well executed, the ADF was found to have capability deficiencies in
training and equipment, which made it difficult for military units to train
additional personnel and marshal equipment at short notice.[200]
Considering that the strategic doctrine of self-reliance
continued over from the 1987 Defence White Paper, it is hardly surprising that
the key capabilities nominated remained broadly similar. Some of the capability
intentions outlined in the 1994 Defence White Paper were: [201]
Prior to the release of the 1994 Defence White Paper, a
number of reviews had been conducted and recommendations concerning defence
industry policy were in the process of being implemented. The Defence Annual
Report 1993–94 highlighted the Department of Defence’s program for
developing greater industry involvement in defence procurement and sustainment.[210]
The report listed a suite of measures the Department of Defence was undertaking
in this area, including:
The 1994 Defence White Paper contained 11 pages dedicated to
defence policy for industry (slightly less than the 15 pages dedicated in the
1987 Defence White Paper, but certainly more than the four pages in the 1976
Defence White Paper).[212]
The 1994 Defence White Paper adopted a number of Priority Industry
Capabilities that needed government support, which had been identified in the Strategic
Review 1993. These included:
-
combat systems software and support
-
data management and signal processing, including for intelligence
and surveillance
-
command, control and communications systems
-
systems integration and
-
repair and maintenance of major weapons and surveillance
platforms.[213]
The 1994 Defence White Paper asserted that in these areas,
the ‘defence-related skills which Australian companies develop will enable them
to take advantage of wider commercial opportunities in Australia’ and overseas.[214]
The 1994 Defence White Paper commended the success of the Government’s
earlier defence policy for industry, stating that it had encouraged:
... efficient production and work practices and export-oriented
Australian manufacturing and services. Major projects, such as the Collins
Class submarines and ANZAC frigates, have transferred new technologies to
Australia and enhanced important skills, including managing complex engineering
development projects, systems integration and software engineering. Other projects,
such as the Jindalee Operational Radar Network, have developed new technologies
indigenous to Australia. Industry’s capabilities have also been strengthened as
the Defence Organisation has set demanding standards for quality assurance,
project cost and schedule control. At the same time, the Commercial Support
Program has opened significant areas of activity to Australian industry.
In 1994–95, some 80 per cent of Defence’s expenditure on
facilities, equipment, goods and services will be spent in Australia. This
percentage, which represents a major increase over the last decade, results
from the high levels of Australian industry involvement in major equipment
projects. These projects increased the share of capital equipment expenditure
in Australia from 25 per cent in 1984–85 to 64 per cent in 1994–95.[215]
However, the white paper warned that demand for defence
specific goods and services would remain uneven and would inevitably be
insufficient to sustain the whole range of companies. As such, Australian industry
would need to continue diversifying into other markets to remain sustainable in
the long term.[216]
The risk with Australian companies branching out into other markets was that
defence-related work could potentially be sidelined and as a result, defence
contracts could be lost to other countries, which was the case when Australian
firm ASTA lost the F/A-18 fighter aircraft maintenance contract to New Zealand.[217]
The Government promised to provide specific information for
each major procurement project, regarding the level of industry capacity
required to provide through-life support to the ADF. Additionally, to promote
better industry involvement in the capability development process, the
Department of Defence would ‘consider modifying the timing of its defence
projects where this improves the continuity of work-flow, encourages the
sustainability of high priority skills, and does not jeopardise the capability’
of the ADF.[218]
To allow Australian industry to provide input to procurement and sustainment
solutions, the Department of Defence also promised to release forward
procurement plans. Similarly, it would seek Australian industry’s contribution
to technically complex capability solutions.[219]
The Government’s contracting policy in 1994 resolved to ‘buy
Australian’, and as such, all Defence acquisitions worth more than $5 million
formally required the involvement of local industry considerations.[220]
The 1994 Defence White Paper promised that the Department of
Defence would prioritise and support industry capabilities by improving ‘its
Industry Development Program to ensure it promotes those industrial processes
which are critical to developing adaptable and versatile defence capabilities’.[221]
It also noted that there was limited industry involvement in defence-related
research and development (R&D). In response, the Defence Science and
Technology Organisation (DSTO) expanded its interaction with industry under its
new Industry Support Office to seek greater local R&D contributions to
major projects.[222]
The defence export market plays a crucial role in
maintaining Australia’s own industry capabilities, but at the time of the 1994
Defence White Paper, efforts in this area remained quite modest. The sale of
defence and defence-related goods in 1993–94 totalled just $70.6 million and
the white paper acknowledged that Australia was unlikely to become a major
exporter in this market. However, it also noted that if Australia’s defence
industry continued to focus on ‘niche markets’, further export opportunities
would likely develop, particularly under the defence investment program.[223]
Despite the long-term benefits to the Department of Defence for supporting
defence industry exports, the Government expected ‘Australian firms to take the
lead in marketing and exporting defence products’.[224] Nevertheless,
the Government also undertook to consult with industry in developing an export
and materiel cooperation strategy, especially given the strict controls the
Department of Defence placed on defence exports.[225]
While the 1987 Defence White Paper emphasised the benefits
of the Defence Offsets Program (via the Australian Industry Involvement
program) as a way to promote and support local defence industry, the 1994
Defence White Paper did not feature Offsets as a defence industry policy measure.
The reason for its omission can be traced to the Price Review in 1992, which
recommended that Australian industry involvement in defence purchasing should
be achieved by more focused provisions in contracts and that ‘Defence offsets
are to be maintained as a measure of last resort’.[226]
At the time the 1994 Defence White Paper was released, the
Keating Government committed to spending two per cent of Australia’s GDP on defence
and was committed to making ‘a five-year defence budget commitment from
1996–97’. The two per cent expenditure figure stated in the 1994 Defence budget
was less than that committed by the Hawke Government on the release of the 1987
Defence White Paper. At that time, the Government promised to maintain defence
spending at between 2.6 and 3 per cent of GDP.[227]
Defence Minister Robert Ray argued that while the Department
of Defence budget had decreased by 1.25 per cent in 1994, this was minimal
compared to other countries. For instance, in that same year, it was reported
that Canada’s defence budget decreased by 11.3 per cent, New Zealand’s by 23.6
per cent, Britain’s by 13.3 per cent and the United States’ by 21.9 per cent.[228]
The Defence Minister predicted that the Australian defence budget would need to
increase in 1997–98 to allow the white paper targets to be met.[229] Minister Ray
warned, however, that capability gaps in Australia’s combat aircraft, surface
combatant fleet and Army tanks could develop around the year 2010 if governments
in the years 2000 and 2002 neglected to make decisions about replacement
capabilities.[230]
Efficiency savings that had previously been put in place
were still being implemented through the reduction of the Department of Defence’s
civilian workforce—the number of civilian employees declined from 25,006 in
1991 to 20,966 by 1994.[231]
The number of civilian employees was further reduced to 17,664 by 1997–98.[232]
The Defence Minister also highlighted key changes to funding
arrangements which would allow the Department of Defence to ‘carry over up to
$100 million of planned expenditure on major capital equipment and facilities
projects into the following financial years’.[233]
Previously, the Department of Defence had to spend its entire budgetary
allocation or risk any underspend being deducted from future funding.[234]
The capital investment expenditure allocated to the Department of Defence for the
year 1994–95 amounted to $2.9 billion. This was expected to cover approved
planned procurement projects, such as the ANZAC Frigates, Collins Class
submarines, JORN and the Australian light armoured vehicle.[235]
Following the Government’s budget announcement, the
Opposition raised concerns about the risk of lowering the ADF’s preparedness
levels. Shadow Defence spokesperson Peter Reith argued that the Government
should prioritise bringing ‘the capital equipment, personnel and operating cost
equations back into a more sensible balance’ to ensure levels of preparedness
were maintained.[236]
The reduction in the 1994–95 Defence budget had been
forecast in the previous year’s Budget. The Chief of the Defence Force at the
time, Admiral Alan Beaumont, warned that ‘defence spending had already been cut
to the bare bones and that a further fall in spending would directly harm
combat capability’.[237]
The Defence Minister was quoted as agreeing with Admiral Beaumont, saying that
he did not ‘think the defence budget [could] be reduced much further without
cutting capabilities’.[238]
Nonetheless, Minister Ray was adamant the current defence allocation would ‘enable
Defence to continue with its planned capital investment programs and its
ongoing schedule of exercises, deployments and training activities’.[239]
The Government’s 1994–95 Defence budget measures drew
widespread criticism, particularly from the Australian Defence Association
(ADA) which argued that the budget measures had effectively dismantled
Australia’s national defence. ADA spokesperson Michael O’Connor stressed that
the ADF was ‘being reduced to a care and maintenance organisation as it had
been in the 1930s’ and was ‘simply unable to support the government’s foreign
policy in Asia, much less’ defend Australia; ‘the ADF is just one more major
national asset being sold off by the government’.[240]
[160]. Australian
Government, Defending
Australia: defence white paper 1994 (1994
Defence White Paper), White paper, November 1994, accessed 13 January
2015; R Ray, ‘Ministerial
statements: Defence white paper‘, Senate, Debates, 30 November 1994,
accessed 13 January 2015.
[161]. Ibid.,
pp. iii–iv.
[162]. J
Newman, ‘Ministerial
statements: Defence white paper‘, Senate, Debates, 30 November 1994,
accessed 13 January 2015.
[163]. Australian
Government, Force
structure review: report to the Minister for Defence, Department of
Defence, Canberra, May 1991, accessed 13 January 2015.
[164]. Ibid.,
p. v.
[165]. Ibid.,
p. 1.
[166]. R Ray,
‘Ministerial
statements: Defence policy‘, Senate, Debates, 30 May 1991, accessed
13 January 2015.
[167]. Department
of Defence, Defending Australia: defence white paper 1994, op. cit., p.
59.
[168]. R Ray,
‘Ministerial statements: Defence policy’, op. cit.
[169]. Australian
Government, Force structure review: report to the Minister for Defence,
op. cit., p. 4.
[170]. RAN, ‘Ship
histories‘, ‘Guided
missile frigate‘, ‘Frigate helicopter‘
and ‘Future ships‘,
RAN website, accessed 13 January 2015.
[171]. RAN, ‘Patrol boat‘, RAN
website, accessed 13 January 2015.
[172]. Australian
Government, Australia’s
strategic planning in the 1990s, op. cit., p. iii, accessed 13 January
2015.
[173]. S
Frühling, A history of Australian strategic policy since 1945, op. cit.,
pp. 35–36.
[174]. Ibid.,
p. iii.
[175]. Australian
Government, Strategic
review 1993, Departmental Publications, 8009/93, Canberra, 1993, p.
iii, accessed 13 January 2015.
[176]. R Ray
(Minister for Defence), Strategic
review 1993, Defence Publication, Canberra, 1993, p. iii, accessed 13
January 2015.
[177]. Ibid.,
pp. 1–2.
[178]. Ibid.
[179]. J
Woodley (Senator for Queensland), Democrats call for expert public inquiry
to precede defence white paper, media release, 30 June 1994.
[180]. J
Moore (Minister for Defence), Community
consultation team report released, media release, 9 November
2000, accessed 13 January 2015.
[181]. Editorial,
‘Australian Defence Studies Centre Conference: Ray ‘opens up’ on defending
Australia’, Defence Industry & Aerospace Report, 4, 16 December
1994, p. 1; G Cheeseman, ‘Defending Australia from Defence: Labor’s 1994 White
Paper’, Current Affairs Bulletin, June/July 1995, p. 37.
[182]. The Strategic
Review 1993 used the term ‘Asia-Pacific’ to broadly incorporate the
following: Australia’s ‘region’ refers to the ‘Subcontinent, South-East Asia,
North-East Asia and the South West Pacific. Australia’s ‘nearer region’ refers
to South-East Asia, the South-West Pacific and the nearer reaches of the Indian
Ocean. South-East Asia comprises the six members of the Association of
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, The
Philippines, Thailand and Brunei) as well as Burma and the three countries of
Indochina. The South-West Pacific includes Papua New Guinea, the other South
Pacific Forum states, French, New Zealand and United States territories’. Cited
in Australian Government, Strategic Review 1993, op. cit., p. 1. The
1994 Defence White Paper used the term ‘Asia and the Pacific’ and included the
states described in the Strategic Review 1993 with varying levels of
importance—1994 Defence White Paper, op. cit., pp. 85–93.
[183]. Ibid.,
1994 Defence White Paper, pp. iii–iv.
[184]. Ibid.,
p. 3.
[185]. Ibid.,
p. 3.
[186]. Ibid.,
pp. 3–4.
[187]. Ibid.,
p. 4.
[188]. Ibid.,
p. 14.
[189]. Ibid.,
p. 14.
[190]. Ibid.,
p. 5.
[191]. Ibid.,
p. 8.
[192]. Ibid.,
pp. 13 and 16.
[193]. Ibid.,
p. 9.
[194]. Editorial,
‘Australian Defence Studies Centre conference: Ray ‘opens up’ on defending
Australia’, Defence Industry & Aerospace Report, op. cit., p.
2.
[195]. 1994
Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 31.
[196]. Ibid.,
p. 32.
[197]. A
Wrigley, ‘Defence forces must live in real world—and on a real budget’, The
Sydney Morning Herald, 27 January 1994.
[198]. 1994
Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 24.
[199]. Ibid.,
pp. 24–25.
[200]. ANAO, Management
of Australian Defence Force deployment to East Timor, op. cit., p. 10.
[201]. 1994
Defence White Paper, op. cit., pp. 14 and 43–51.
[202]. The
1994 Defence White Paper noted that Australia was scoping a collaborative
arrangement with Malaysia for an offshore patrol combatant/joint patrol vessel.
This program was not pursued by the Government at the time and the life-of-type
of the Fremantle Class Patrol Boat was extended until a suitable replacement
could be sourced. The patrol boat replacement program commenced in 1999 under
Project SEA 1444 with the contract awarded to Defence Maritime Services in
December 2003, with Austal Ships as the builder. Cited in Sea Power Centre
Australia, ‘Welcome
to the Armidale Class‘, Semaphore, 4, 4 February 2006, accessed 13
January 2015.
[203]. This
became known as the ill-fated Super Seasprite project. Defence signed a
contract with Kaman Aerospace International Corporation in June 1997 but by
1999 the project was already in trouble. After more than 12 years and $1.4
billion later, the Rudd Government cancelled the project in March 2008. Cited
in ANAO, The
Super Seasprite: Department of Defence, Audit report, 41, 2008–09, ANAO,
Barton, ACT, 2009, p. 13–14, accessed 13 January 2015.
[204]. Ibid.,
pp. 13–14.
[205]. Despite
these ships being launched in the United States in the early 1970s, the
Australian modernisation program was expected to enable the ships to remain in
service until around 2015–16. Both ships were decommissioned in 2011 following
significant maintenance issues. Cited in S Smith (Minister for Defence)
and J Clare (Minister for Defence Materiel), Team
of experts to plan way forward on amphibious ships fleet, media
release, 15 February 2011; RAN, ‘HMAS Manoora II‘, RAN
website, accessed 13 January 2015; RAN, ‘HMAS Kanimbla II‘,
RAN website, accessed 13 January 2015.
[206]. The
A27 BAE Hawk 127 lead-in fighter entered into service with the Royal Australian
Air Force (RAAF) in October 2000 and remains in service today. Cited in RAAF
Museum, ‘A27
BAE Hawk 127‘, RAAF Museum website; RAAF, ‘Hawk
127‘, RAAF website, accessed 13 January 2015.
[207]. ANAO, 2013–14
major projects report: Defence Materiel Organisation, Audit report, 14,
2014–15, ANAO, Barton, ACT, 2014, p. 280, accessed 3 August2015.
[208]. S
Smith (Minister for Defence) and J Clare (Minister for Materiel), New
battlefield aircraft for the Air Force, media release, 10 May 2012,
accessed 13 January 2015.
[209]. 1994
Defence White Paper, op. cit., pp. 37–55; R Hill (Minister for Defence), M1
Abrams chosen as Australian Army’s replacement tank, media release, 10
March 2004, accessed 13 January 2015.
[210]. Commonwealth
of Australia, Defence annual report 1993–1994, Department of Defence,
Canberra, 1994, pp. 191–196.
[211]. Ibid.,
pp. 193–195.
[212]. 1994
Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 13 and 113.
[213]. Ibid.,
pp. 115–116.
[214]. Ibid.,
p. 116.
[215]. Ibid.,
pp. 113–114.
[216]. Ibid.,
p. 114.
[217]. S
Dolan, ‘Dispute over $2.5 m aerospace deal’, Herald Sun, 6 February
1995.
[218]. Ibid.,
p. 117.
[219]. Ibid.,
p. 117.
[220]. Commonwealth
of Australia, Defence annual report 1995–1996, Department of Defence,
Canberra, 1996, p. 144.
[221]. 1994
Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 121.
[222]. Ibid.,
p. 121.
[223]. Ibid.,
p. 122.
[224]. Ibid.,
p. 123.
[225]. Ibid.,
pp. 122–123.
[226]. R
Price, Defence policy and industry: report to the Minister for Defence,
Department of Defence, Canberra, January 1992, p. vii.
[227]. 1987
Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 112.
[228]. Editorial,
‘Australian Defence Studies Centre conference: Ray ‘opens up’ on defending
Australia’, Defence Industry & Aerospace Report, op. cit., p.
4.
[229]. Ibid.
[230]. Ibid.,
p. 5.
[231]. P
Keating, ‘Ministerial
statements: Defence Australia: defence white paper 1994‘, House of
Representatives, Debates, 8 December 1994; ibid., p. 60, accessed 13
January 2015.
[232]. Department
of Defence, Defence annual report 1997–1998, Canberra, 1998, p. 24.
[233]. R Ray
(Minister for Defence), New
defence budget arrangements to maximise value for money, media release,
10 May 1994, accessed 3 August 2015.
[234]. Editorial,
‘Defence cuts continue’, Royal Australian Air Force News, June 1994;
Editorial, ‘Ray ‘trumps’ Beazley on Budget overflow: Defence budget report’, Defence
Industry & Aerospace Report, 13 May 1994, p. 3.
[235]. Ibid.;
M Hawkins ‘Defence update’, Australian Aviation, July 1994, p. 41.
[236]. P
Reith (Shadow Minister for Defence), Defence cuts exacerbate Labor’s record
of mismanagement, media release, 10 May 1994; Editorial, ‘Defence spending
down $42.5b: Reith’, The Canberra Times, 26 June 1994, p. 3.
[237]. G
Ferguson, ‘Australian Defense [sic] chief warns against more budget cuts’, Defence
News, 18–24 October 1993, p. 40; C Stewart, ‘Defence capability in doubt as
allocation sliced again’, The Australian, 11 May 1994, p. 21.
[238]. Cited
in Editorial, ‘Funding can’t be cut, says minister’, The Australian, 11
October 1993, p. 7.
[239]. Cited
in C Stewart, ‘Defence capability in doubt as allocation sliced again’, op.
cit.
[240]. M
O’Connor, Government is dismantling national defence, media release,
Australian Defence Association, 11 May 1994.
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