The Defence of Australia (1987 Defence White Paper)


Synopsis:
Introduction
Government response
1987 Defence White Paper
Strategic objectives
Identified capability choices
Alignment of cost, capability and strategic objectives

 

The Defence of Australia (1987 Defence White Paper)

Guided Missile Frigate HMAS Sydney (IV)

Guided Missile Frigate HMAS Sydney (IV) (Source: Australian Defence Image Library)

Synopsis:

  • Recommendations from the 1986 Dibb Review of Australia’s defence capabilities prompted serious debate about Defence’s force structure and influenced the 1987 Defence White Paper’s strategic objectives.
  • The 1986 Cooksey Review into Australia’s defence exports and industry capacity identified that Australia was not internationally competitive. The Government’s response backing the Review’s recommendations in support of Australian industry was reflected in the 1987 Defence White Paper.
  • The 1987 Defence White Paper reaffirmed the strategy of self-reliance.
  • While the white paper featured around $18 billion (1987 prices) worth of major capital equipment projects, most were not new announcements.
  • At the time of the white paper’s release, tenders (for submarine design and combat systems) were being evaluated for the Oberon Class submarine’s replacement.
  • A decision was pending on the RAN’s new light patrol frigates, which sought to select an overseas design to be built in Australia at around $3.5 billion (1987 prices).
  • The white paper emphasised modernising the ADF with new technology.
  • Force element changes included:
    • the expansion of HMAS Stirling to accommodate more RAN platforms, especially submarines
    • permanently locating a squadron of fighter aircraft at RAAF Base Tindal (Northern Territory) and
    • relocating an Army regiment to Darwin with the prospect of moving an entire Brigade to northern Australia.
  • The Dibb Review recommended that an appropriate level of defence expenditure should be around 3 per cent of GDP. The white paper set a range of 2.6 to 3 per cent of GDP, but within 2 years it had marginally dropped to 2.3 per cent of GDP.

Introduction

On 19 March 1987, the Hawke Government tabled The Defence of Australia 1987 (1987 Defence White Paper) in Parliament as a ‘Policy Information Paper’ with a ten to fifteen-year outlook.[90] The Opposition supported the paper in part while raising a number of concerns about the Government’s strategic priorities in the region, military acquisition programs and the financial resources needed to support these programs, and the retention of trained personnel.[91]

Prior to the release of the 1987 Defence White Paper, reviews were conducted into Australia’s defence capabilities and industry’s capacity to support defence—the Dibb Review and the Cooksey Review. The outcomes from these reviews are discussed below as they made important contributions to the final content of the 1987 Defence White Paper.

Review of Australia’s defence capabilities

The Hawke Government commissioned a review of Australia’s defence capabilities in February 1985. Review Chair Paul Dibb presented the report to the Government in March 1986 (the Dibb Review). It was tabled by the Government in Parliament on 3 June 1986.[92] The Dibb Review stated that difficulties had been encountered in trying to estimate the:

... size of force elements we need to meet our particular strategic circumstances. For much of our force structure this issue has not been comprehensively addressed. The Review could obtain no material centrally endorsed by the higher Defence structure which explained, for example, the strategic rationale for a 12-destroyer Navy, three fighter squadrons, six Regular Army battalions and an Army Reserve target of 30 000. Few of the documents made available to the Review examine, in any rigorous, analytical way, the size of forces we should have for credible contingencies and as a contribution to the expansion base. Most focus on justifying the present force structure rather than estimating what our strategic circumstances require. The key difficulty here is that the Department and the ADF do not agree on the appropriate level of conflict against which we should structure the Defence Force.[93]

As such, one of the Dibb Review’s key recommendations was to employ a ‘strategy of denial’. The intention of the strategy was to deter potential adversaries from bridging Australia’s air and sea approaches by developing capabilities that would create sufficient problems for any invading force, ensuring it would not be a worthwhile venture.[94] As a defensive policy, the strategy involved four layers:

1. Enhanced intelligence and surveillance capabilities

2. Air and naval force posture, with strike capacity, focused predominantly in northern Australia

3. Stronger continental defence capabilities

4. Highly capable and mobile land forces to repel an attack.[95]

The Dibb Review also recommended establishing an area of primary strategic interest that encompassed South-East Asia and the South Pacific, and identifying direct military interests and structuring the ADF accordingly.[96]

The Dibb Review noted that while ‘Australia is a defensible continent’, there needed to be some ‘reordering of priorities’ if Australia was to be better positioned to provide its own defence.[97] The Dibb Review elaborated:

The distant projection of military power would have a low priority. Rather such a strategy would seek to deny any putative enemy successful military operations in the sea and air gap around Australia, and to prevent any successful landing of significant forces on Australian soil.[98]

The Dibb Review asserted that restricting the ADF’s area of operation would allow the military to exert adequate, affordable and independent power.[99] One of the outcomes from the Dibb Review was to prompt debate on Australia’s future force posture and influence the strategic objectives contained in the upcoming 1987 Defence White Paper.[100]

This strategy of ‘denial’ was strongly opposed by the Opposition and a variety of critics who contended it was too defensive and even isolationist.[101] In addition, concerns were expressed that the Dibb Review was, in effect, recommending a withdrawal from the whole-hearted level of participation in the ANZUS alliance that Australia commonly pursued.[102]

‘Denial’ continued to be criticised for some years after the publication of both the Dibb Review and the subsequent 1987 Defence White Paper. Commentators such as Graeme Cheeseman and St John Kettle argued that these ‘two documents marked a stage in the evolution of defence policy from a regionally oriented “forward defence” posture wholly tied to the United States, to a concept of “self-reliance” which was more concerned with the defence of the Australian mainland and its maritime surrounds’.[103] Cheeseman and Kettle warned that Australia’s ‘new militarism’ mismatched with other Australian policies in the region and continued to lock ‘Australia into the most offensive defence strategy’ under the ANZUS Treaty.[104] As a consequence, they argued that this strategy would adversely impact relations with New Zealand, which had been suspended from ANZUS, and other regional states.[105]

Review of Australia’s Industry for Defence

One month after the Dibb Review was announced, the Government commissioned Robert Cooksey to conduct a Review of Australia’s Defence Exports and Defence Industry (Cooksey Review).[106] The Cooksey Review’s terms of reference included an examination of Australia’s industry for defence with a view to improving Australia’s defence export prospects. The final report of the Cooksey Review was presented to the Government in October 1986, and included a number of recommendations to improve Australian industry.[107]

The Cooksey Review described Australia’s defence industry as ‘a microcosm of the manufacturing and services sector of the economy’.[108] In referring to ‘defence industry’, it identifies key sectors of Australian industry that align with strategic importance, such as munitions, shipbuilding and aerospace.[109]

The Cooksey Review identified two key factors that were impeding defence industry and defence exports:

... Firstly, there is a distinct lack of policy coordination in relation to overall strategic defence policy, which determines both force structure and policy for defence industry: the latter in turn, determining the supporting infrastructure. Secondly, Australia’s poor performance in export of defence equipment and materiel on any scale is directly linked to industry development policy, highlighting the fact that we are uncompetitive.[110]

The Cooksey Review was critical of the Department of Defence’s approach to working with industry, stating that the department did not have a good understanding of ‘what all the measures of competitiveness are, let alone a strategic plan aimed at maximising defence industry’s true potential’.[111] He went on to argue:

It has been all too easy for DOD [Department of Defence] to hide behind the ‘rubbery’ nature of strategic guidance in the development of competitive industry capabilities, leaving the running on the tougher economic, social and other issues to the relevant authorities. It seems to me that most defence decisions relating to industry are based on qualitative analysis and value judgment, rather than rigorous empirical research and quantitative analysis.[112]

The Cooksey Review recommended that the Department of Defence publish information about ‘capabilities, processes, procedures, products, mechanisms and points of contact within DOD’ to allow industry to compete more effectively in the marketplace.[113]

One of the 30 recommendations in the Cooksey Review was that procurement ‘should be used more extensively to develop selectively those industries of major defence importance’.[114] It also recommended that defence industry be provided with ‘sanitised’ information about expected future defence procurement plans to assist industry with future planning; ideally, the Five Year Defence Program.[115] Most urgently, however, was the recommendation to task the Department of Defence ‘to produce a detailed and authoritative paper which translates long-term strategic defence planning into precise industry objectives and/or measures to encourage maximum participation by Australian industry’.[116]

Government response

In October 1986, the Government released a number of measures targeting defence industry in response to preliminary recommendations from the Cooksey Review. The measures included:

  • the publication of a booklet for Australian industry doing business with the Department of Defence
  • establishing mechanisms that would allow Australian industry to collaborate with international partners on the design, development and production (DD&P) of defence products
  • prioritisation of Defence Offsets for international collaborative projects on DD&P[117]
  • better ownership and control of Australian defence innovations
  • improved information sharing and collaboration between the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) and industry on research and development
  • facilitating information on defence forward plans and capability requirements for industry and
  • better guidelines and support for the export of defence and defence related products.[118]

Additionally, the Government promised to improve ‘information and access to defence industry, and the wider export support and increased role of Austrade in selling defence-related products’.[119] Despite the report being handed down in 1986, the recommendations of the Cooksey Review were not fully accepted by the Government until 1988. Various reasons have been cited for this delay, in particular resistance from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade over its veto power on proposed defence exports.[120]

At the time the outcome of the Cooksey Review was released, representatives of the manufacturing industry believed Australia needed to become more ‘isolationist’ in its approach to defence industry policy. To achieve this, Government assistance would be needed through the Defence Offsets program and technical exchanges.[121] In support of this argument, industry representatives pointed out that Australia’s skilled labour force drastically lagged behind other nations such as Japan, where 30 per cent of the manufacturing labour force involved professional engineers. In the United States, statistics suggested a much lower figure of 5 per cent. In Australia at that time, the number of professional engineers working in the manufacturing industry was assessed at only 0.05 per cent.[122]

Criticism of the Government’s Defence Offset program emerged around the time of the 1987 Defence White Paper’s release. Commentators argued that the program was a ‘band-aid’ measure with limited long-term benefits.[123] The original intention of the program was well-regarded in that it aimed to support Australian industry through the transfer of ‘high technology and advanced manufacturing techniques’. However, it was noted:

... in very few cases there has been a transfer of technology which has given Australian industry a new capability in particular areas, but more often the result has been a limited production run of specialised components that ends when the offset contract expires, leaving no residual benefit to industry.[124]

Industry representatives and commentators argued that Australia needed to develop its own ‘design and project management expertise in major projects. Without such expertise Australian industry would be limited to producing components or providing services for overseas designed systems’.[125]

1987 Defence White Paper

Strategic objectives

The 1987 Defence White Paper affirmed that Australia faced ‘no presently identifiable military threat, except for the remote possibility of global war’.[126] It asserted that no regional country had the ‘capacity, nor the motivation, to sustain high level military operations against Australia’. However, the 1987 Defence White Paper noted that Australia might be vulnerable to a low level campaign of harassment across its large coastline and sea approaches.[127]

Self-reliance was reaffirmed in the 1987 Defence White Paper and the strategy of ‘defence in depth’ adopted.[128] The paper defined self-reliance in terms of giving ‘Australia the military capability to prevent an aggressor from attacking us successfully in our sea and air approaches, gaining a foothold on any part of our territory or extracting concessions from Australia through the use or threat of military force’.[129]

The strategy of ‘defence in depth’ meant that Australia should aim to meet ‘any credible level of threat in Australia’s area of direct military interest’ in such a manner that a potential adversary would be aware that they would pay a significant cost for an act of aggression.[130] While this concept was widely perceived to be a departure from the Dibb Review’s controversial ‘strategy of denial’ recommendation, a closer look might suggest there are similarities in the two concepts. Journalist Peter Cole-Adams’s assessment was:

The actual program for military procurement, force structure and ‘layered defence-in-depth’, which the White Paper endorses, is almost exactly as advocated by analyst Paul Dibb. What is different, more in flavour and emphasis than in substance, is the rhetorical dressing. The White Paper is Dibb with a touch of curry to please the military palate.[131]    

In the paper’s introduction, Defence Minister Kim Beazley is at pains to point out that the strategy is not isolationist. He wrote:

For Australia, defence self -reliance must be firmly set within the framework of our alliances and regional associations. The support they give us makes self-reliance achievable....It must be emphasised that self-reliance does not mean self-sufficiency.[132]

The 1987 Defence White Paper firmly restated the importance of Australia’s alliance with the United States and noted that any extension of the Soviet Union’s influence in ‘our region’ would be a matter of fundamental importance to Australia.[133]

Like the Dibb Review, the 1987 Defence White Paper assigned priorities in military planning according to two main areas:

  • direct military interest, which is defined as ‘Australia, its territories and proximate ocean areas, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and other nearby countries of the South West Pacific’ and
  • broader strategic interests, which include South East Asia, Indochina, the eastern Indian Ocean and the South West Pacific. Further, the 1987 Defence White Paper speculated that Australia might face three levels of conflict: low level, escalated low level and more substantial conflict. [134]

Australia’s area of direct military interest, as defined by the Dibb Review and adopted in the 1987 Defence White Paper, is an area stretching more than ‘7,000 kilometres from the Cocos Islands to New Zealand and the islands of the South-West Pacific, and over 5,000 kilometres from the archipelago and island chain in the north to the Southern Ocean’.[135]

The 1987 Defence White Paper endeavoured to set out an intellectually cogent underpinning for Australia’s defence and the enduring emphasis on self-reliance made it clear that, as the Minister for Defence put it some weeks after the release of the white paper, Australia’s ‘contribution to global conflict would be small and not a force structure determinant’.[136] Although the Government emphasised the need for Australia to be self-reliant, this was not reflected by any real change to force structure.

Identified capability choices

While the 1987 Defence White Paper did not announce a long list of completely new capability projects—although previous decisions were reiterated—it valued the major capital equipment projects at around $18 billion (in 1987 prices).[137] There was also a great deal of reassurance in the 1987 Defence White Paper that Australia had the capabilities it needed to defend itself.[138] However, these capabilities tended to be geared towards the ADF’s ability to adequately respond to low-level conflicts, which would be tested much later in the case of Timor Leste in 1999.[139]

Given the emphasis on air and sea denial, the 1987 Defence White Paper emphasised the acquisition of modern technology to accomplish this aim. It committed the Government to establishing a large satellite communications station in Western Australia (the Australian Defence Satellite Communications Station near Geraldton) and further development of the Jindalee Over-the-Horizon Radar Project.[140] In order to make better use of the information acquired through these and other sources, the 1987 Defence White Paper set out the Government’s commitment to the development of a national air defence and aerospace control system. The Government also acknowledged the requirement for the Department of Defence to seek and evaluate proposals for new airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft.[141]

The 1987 Defence White Paper highlighted the ongoing project to acquire six new submarines to replace the Oberon Class boats (which would become the Collins Class submarines). At the time of its release, the Government was evaluating tenders for both submarine design and submarine combat systems and stated that a public announcement about the decision would be made sometime in 1987.[142]

A further major development for the RAN was the decision to build eight ‘light patrol frigates’ in Australia at around $3.5 billion (1987 prices). These frigates—which would become the Anzac Class frigates—were intended to extend the RAN’s ability to fulfil the requirements set out in the Dibb Review and 1987 Defence White Paper for patrol and interception activities in Australia’s area of military interest, as well as contributing to contingency operations.[143]

The concept of ‘defence in depth’ demanded some rethinking of the location of certain military assets. To this end, the 1987 Defence White Paper announced the expansion of HMAS Stirling near Perth to allow the homeporting of a greater number of RAN platforms, specifically submarines and a soon-to-be-established submarine training facility.[144] In addition, a squadron of F/A-18A/B Hornet multi-role fighter aircraft would be located at RAAF Base Tindal in the Northern Territory.[145] An Army Regiment would be moved to Darwin and a study had commenced into the possible deployment of an entire brigade to the north.[146]

Alignment of cost, capability and strategic objectives

The 1987 Defence White Paper provided no detailed expenditure proposal to explain how the approved capabilities would be paid for. Instead, it asserted that defence funding would need to be maintained at ‘a share of GDP [gross domestic product] similar to that devoted to defence in recent years’.[147] The white paper set a range of 2.6 to 3 per cent of GDP.[148] The Minister for Defence stressed that the goals set in the 1987 Defence White Paper could be achieved without excessive spending, declaring that the ‘fact is that with the sustained growth of recent years, defence spending has now reached a level at which further growth is not required to sustain a credible defence policy’.[149] The Minister went on to state that the ‘extraordinarily difficult budgetary circumstances of the next few years’ would make promises of real growth impossible to fulfil.[150]

The budget is one place where the 1987 Defence White Paper diverges somewhat from the Dibb Review. The latter had gone into greater detail about the financial implications of its recommendations and concluded that ‘total defence outlays of around three per cent of GDP seem broadly appropriate for Australia ... With some modest adjustments, the Review’s recommendations can be accommodated within the Department’s 3.1 percent real growth program for FYDP 1986–91, and there is no indication of difficulties beyond this period’.[151]

Nonetheless, not for the first (or last) time, the availability of funds to pay for defence capability development did not live up to the expectations raised in the white paper. Defence budget outlays were falling throughout the period in which the Dibb Review and the 1987 Defence White Paper were published. In fact total spending on defence had fallen slightly below the benchmark of 2.6 per cent of GDP, as set out in the 1987 Defence White Paper, to 2.5 per cent in 1987–88 and 2.3 per cent in 1988–89.[152] Likewise, the proportion of the defence budget spent on capital equipment fell from 27.1 per cent in 1986–87 to 21.8 per cent in 1988–89.[153]

The Government declared that Defence would contribute towards the cost of capability development by making savings from within its existing budget. Defence Minister Beazley told the House of Representatives in March 1988 that the Government’s:

... defence policy encompasses the largest capital investment program in Australia’s peacetime history; but we can fund that program without continuous growth in defence spending provided we manage the defence budget carefully. We have proved that over the past year. Financial circumstances have been tough. After years of strong growth under the Hawke Government defence spending has been cut this year, but through innovative management we have kept the White Paper on track.[154]

Indeed, Minister Beazley asserted that the realisation of such savings was typically a part of the white paper process. The same speech also indicated that the Government was engaged with one of the major problems of the 1987 Defence White Paper strategy: how to defend Australia from low-level attacks across large areas of northern Australia and its air and sea approaches. To this end, the Minister announced the formation of Northern Command (NORCOM) to be based in Darwin and also, the conduct of exercise Kangaroo 89, which he claimed would test the ADF’s ability to respond to threats across such large areas.[155]

The 1987 Defence White Paper defined Australia’s area of primary strategic interest as being South East Asia, the South West Pacific and the eastern Indian Ocean. Some commentators pointed out the difficulty Australia, with its limited resources, would have operating across such a broad area. In particular, Ross Babbage, a former Head of Strategic Analysis in the Office of National Assessments, commented on limitations in the ability of the ADF to counter widespread but low-level incursions into Australian territory, including the:

  • inability of the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) to track small vessels which would be used to assist with such low-level incursions
  • difficulties faced by Australia’s P3-C Orion fleet in identifying such vessels
  • JORN’s inability to detect the height of incoming aircraft would restrict its ability to direct RAAF fighters to intercept incoming aircraft
  • lack of adequate ocean hydrography in some areas of Australia’s northern coastline and
  • legal constraints on Australia’s ability to act outside of its territorial waters.[156]

Babbage also noted the concerns of ‘many, and perhaps most, senior servicemen’ that denial as a strategy was too reactive. They would have preferred to select a ‘range of offensive options’. Babbage also pointed out the difficulty this would present in translating this approach into clear force structure options.[157]

The air and sea denial concept set out by both the Dibb Review and 1987 Defence White Paper highlighted low-level conflict capabilities to deal with ‘credible contingencies’. However, global events would soon test the white paper’s capability focus. The 1987 coup in Fiji resulted in the deployment of ADF personnel to assist in the possible evacuation of Australians from that country, under Operation Morris Dance. According to some, Operation Morris Dance revealed shortcomings in the ADF’s capacity to land troops from the sea, as well as securing and evacuating Australian citizens.[158] In addition, the deployment to the Gulf War in 1990–91 highlighted the difficulties the ADF faced when preparedness levels declined.[159] These two deployments provided specific examples of the varying roles of the ADF, and highlighted that capability choices needed to be aligned with the full range of potential ADF activities.

 


[90].        Australian Government, The defence of Australia 1987 (1987 Defence White Paper), White paper, March 1987, accessed 13 January 2015; K Beazley, ‘Defence policy: paper and ministerial statement‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 19 March 1987, accessed 13 January 2015.

[91].        I Sinclair, ‘Defence policy: paper and ministerial statement: procedural text‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 20 March 1987, accessed 13 January 2015.

[92].        K Beazley, ‘Review of Australia’s Defence capabilities‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 3 June 1986, accessed 13 January 2015.

[93].        P Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence capabilities: report to the Minister for Defence by Mr Paul Dibb, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, March 1986, pp. v–vi, accessed 13 January 2015.

[94].        Ibid., p. 5.

[95].        Ibid., pp. 49–51.

[96].        Ibid., p. 5.

[97].        Ibid., pp. 1–16.

[98].        Ibid., p. 50.

[99].        Ibid., pp. 5–6.

[100].      K Beazley, ‘Review of Australia’s defence capabilities’, op. cit.; G Evans, ‘Review of Australia’s defence capabilities‘, Senate, Debates, 3 June 1986, accessed 13 January 2015.  

[101].      I Sinclair, ‘Review of Australia’s defence capabilities‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 3 June 1986, accessed 13 January 2015.

[102].      Ibid.

[103].      G Cheeseman and ST J Kettle (eds), The new Australian militarism: undermining our future security, Pluto Press, Marrickville, 1990, p. 22.

[104].      Ibid., p. 193.

[105].      Ibid., p. 194.

[106].      RJ Cooksey, Review of Australia’s defence exports and defence industry: report to the Minister for Defence, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 17 October 1986.

[107].      Ibid., p. 45.

[108].      Ibid., p. 45.

[109].      Ibid., p. 48.

[110].      Ibid., p. 53.

[111].      Ibid., p. 53.

[112].      Ibid., p. 57.

[113].      Ibid., p. 57.

[114].      Ibid., p. 6.

[115].      Ibid., p. 8.

[116].      Ibid., p. 8.

[117].      Some countries include offset agreements in large defence contracts, which can be either direct or indirect. Direct offsets ‘are linked to the original defence contract. Companies often agree to transfer relevant technological knowhow or use local suppliers to build the equipment they are selling to the government’. Indirect offsets, while ‘prompted by the defence sale, have nothing to do with what the country is purchasing. These can include the company making or drumming up investments in local industries, or helping export a country’s goods’. Cited in C Hoyos et al., ‘Q&A: what are offsets?‘, Financial Times, 9 October 2013, accessed 13 January 2015.

[118].      K Beazley (Minister for Defence), Defence supports ‘buy Australian’ and export drives, media release, 14 October 1986.

[119].      K Beazley (Minister for Defence), Major report on Australia’s exports and defence industry, media release, 15 December 1986.

[120].      G Brown, ‘The dilemmas facing Australia’s Defence policy’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 15(3), December 1993, fn. 19, p. 339.

[121].      T Mannix, ‘Manufacturers aim at defence orders’, Canberra Times, 30 July 1986.

[122].      Ibid.

[123].      J Jesser, ‘The offsets debacle’, Australian Business, 18 March 1987, p. 69.

[124].      Ibid.

[125].      Ibid.

[126].      1987 Defence White Paper, op. cit., p. 30.

[127].      Ibid., p. 25

[128].      Ibid., p. vi.

[129].      Ibid., pp. vii–x

[130].      Ibid., pp. vii–x.

[131].      P Cole-Adams, ‘A dob of rhetorical dressing makes Dibb recipe palatable’, The Age, 21 March 1987.

[132].      1987 Defence White Paper, op. cit., pp. vii–x.

[133].      Ibid., p. 3.

[134].      Ibid., p. 2.

[135].      Ibid., p. 2.

[136].      K Beazley (Minister for Defence), After the white paper: the challenge of management; address to the National Press Club, speech, 25 March 1987.

[137].      Department of Defence, Defence report 1987–88, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1988, p. 21.

[138].      1987 Defence White Paper, op. cit., pp. 34–64.

[139].    Australian Government, Australia’s strategic planning in the 1990s, Department of Defence, Canberra, September 1992, p. 22, accessed 13 January 2015; Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), Management of Australian Defence Force deployment to East Timor: Department of Defence, Audit report, 38, 2001–02, ANAO, Barton, ACT, 2002, p. 10, accessed 13 January 2015.

[140].      Ibid., pp. 34–35 and 71–72.

[141].      Ibid., p. 36.

[142].      Ibid., pp. 41–42.

[143].      Ibid., pp. 44, 62 and 87.

[144].      Ibid., pp. 44 and 48.

[145].      Ibid., p. 49.

[146].      Ibid., p. 63.

[147].      Ibid., p. 99.

[148].      Ibid., p. 112.

[149].      K Beazley, After the white paper, op. cit. 

[150].      Ibid.

[151].      P Dibb, Review of Australia’s defence capabilities: report to the Minister for Defence by Mr Paul Dibb, op. cit., pp. 172–73.

[152].      Department of Defence, Defence report 1987–88, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1988, p. 90; Department of Defence, Defence report 1988–89, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1989, p. 114.

[153].      G Cheeseman, ‘Australia’s defence: white paper in the red’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 44(2), August 1990, p. 103;  Department of Defence, Defence report 1988–89, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1989, p. 117.

[154].      K Beazley, ‘Ministerial statement: Defence policy progress report‘, House of Representatives, Debates, 22 March 1988, accessed 13 January 2015.

[155].      Ibid.

[156].      R Babbage, A coast too long: defending Australia beyond the 1990s, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1990, pp. 61–96.

[157].      R Babbage, ‘Australia’s defence after the Dibb Report’, Current Affairs Bulletin, 63(7), December 1986, pp. 16–23.

[158].      A Hinge, Australia’s search for self-reliance: a critique of Australian defence policy implementation and outcome 1985–2005, op. cit.,
pp. 45–46.

[159].      Ibid., p. 50.

 

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